HL Deb 19 June 1967 vol 283 cc1194-209

4.8 p.m.

LORD SHACKLETON

My Lords, the Foreign Secretary is speaking in another place this afternoon on the Government's policy towards South Arabia. As noble Lords know, I have recently spent two months in South Arabia and in London on South Arabian matters, and with the leave of the House I should like to take this opportunity to make a Statement this afternoon and give the gist of the Government's proposals. I must apologise for the length of the Statement, but in view of the importance of the subject I believe the House would welcome a reasonably detailed report. I must also apologise to the noble Earl, Lord Jellicoe, for interrupting the proceedings on his Civic Amenities Bill. I will deal only briefly with the situation as I found it in the course of my mission to South Arabia, but will concentrate on setting out the main decisions being announced to-day by Her Majesty's Government. I shall, however, be glad to try to answer any questions.

The main factors—and I shall try to put this as uncontroversially as possible—are, first, that the Federation of South Arabia was created only in 1958 from a number of separate States in large areas of which primitive tribal conditions still prevail. Furthermore, there have been particular difficulties in integrating Aden into the Federation. In 1964 Ministers of the day declared there should be Independence by 1968, and finally in 1966 the present Government, in the context of last year's Defence Review, decided to withdraw our base from Aden. In the light of that decision Her Majesty's Government concluded that it would be wrong to have a defence treaty with the successor Government of South Arabia, since without a military position in that country we should not be able to honour its provisions. Moreover, to maintain a military presence would have been to attract the continuing denunciation by Arab nationalists everywhere, both of ourselves and of the Government we were trying to defend, as "Imperialist stooges".

In the meanwhile, the campaign of intimidation and violence, supported and increasingly organised by the Egyptians from the Yemen, was continuing to grow and showed itself in violence not only against our own troops but also against Arabs, who are the principal sufferers from such violence. We therefore recognised the need to build up South Arabia's armed forces and committed ourselves to a large-scale expansion of the Federal forces in the period from 1966 up to 1971 in addition to the amount we were already spending, and this additional cost amounted to some £36 million.

At the same time, we encouraged political evolution in order to establish a Government with a broader base than the one composed mainly of State rulers or their representatives, which came into being as a result of the act of federation. The Federal Government, let me stress, itself wishes to broaden its base, but, as noble Lords know, so far all our efforts, including a number of attempts which I personally made to make contact with terrorist leaders, have been unsuccessful. We had also hoped that the United Nations could help in bringing about some form of coalition of the various political forces in South Arabia, but the United Nations Mission also was frustrated by the unwillingness of the extremist Parties to co-operate. Nevertheless, we still hope that the United Nations can play a part in bringing about a broad-based Government.

When I arrived in South Arabia in April of this year I found that the situation was continuing to deteriorate. In particular, the Egyptian campaign of subversion had intensified in South Arabia and as Independence approached ever nearer the South Arabians were themselves, being the victims of this, becoming increasingly anxious about their future in the face of an enemy who was prepared in the Yemen to use any means, including poison gas, to wipe out opposition. It was clear that the first need was to strengthen South Arabia's self-confidence and its ability to stand up to the Egyptian threat, whether in the shape of overt aggression or large-scale subversion inside South Arabia. At the same time, it was also clear that we should continue our efforts to associate all political groups, including the extremists, in South Arabia with the Government on as broad a base as possible.

Accordingly, my right honourable friend, the Foreign Secretary, has decided on a number of measures designed to meet these objectives. They are based on the recommendations of the new High Commissioner, Sir Humphrey Trevelyan, and myself, and I may add that they have been accepted in their entirety by Her Majesty's Government. Together they form a package of proposals which constitute a major issue of policy, and I should like now to outline these measures.

First of all, there is the date of Independence and the necessary constitutional advance towards that end. The Government have decided that the date of Independence should be January 9, 1968. We have also decided that we should accept, in respect of Aden, a draft Constitution designed for an independent State which the South Arabian Government are circulating to the member States of the Federation for approval. The new Constitution, which is based on the recommendations of Sir Gawain Bell and Sir Ralph Hone, two distinguished constitutional advisers, will be modern in form, will provide for an effective Government, for human rights, for eventual elections on the basis of a universal adult franchise and for the integration of Aden and the present Federal capital of Al Ittihad in a capital territory for the whole State. There will also be provision within the Constitution, if this be possible, for the immediate formation of a central caretaker Government. Though South Arabia is not yet independent, we are prepared for such a Constitution to come into force before Independence provided that certain essential transitional provisions are made to cover the remaining period of our sovereignty in Aden State and our responsibility for its welfare. We regard a new Constitution as essential now in the interests of an advance towards democracy, economic rationalisation and progress, and above all towards obtaining a broader-based and more liberal Arabian Government.

Secondly, my right honourable friend has decided to take action under four heads to strengthen the security of the emergent country. To meet the threat of armed subversion fomented from abroad, and external aggression, Her Majesty's Government have decided that South Arabia needs some more help in the form of additional money, assistance and equipment for the army, the air force and the forces in the Eastern Aden Protectorate. We have also decided on a major reassurance to the new State which I shall describe in a moment.

Where the Army is concerned we have informed the Federal Government that we are prepared to pay for the South Arabian Army to re-equip with more modern small arms—the self-loading rifle instead of the Lee Enfield. To any soldier his personal weapon is of the greatest importance, and in a situation in which the enemy is armed with Czech, Chinese or Russian automatic weapons, we decided that the South Arabian Army should be similarly armed. In all the talks that I had with Federal army officers, in which various facts were stressed, this was the one they stressed most often. We are also prepared to supply additional armoured cars and field artillery, and to give further help with such things as transport communications and base maintenance, and with some medical staff for the Federal forces hospital.

As regards the air force, we have agreed to finance the provision and operation of a squadron of eight Hunter aircraft which would be additional to the Jet Provost ground attack aircraft which the air force is already in process of receiving. In addition we have agreed to provide a strong military aid mission to help the South Arabian forces with advice and training. All of this represents a very important strengthening of the armed forces of South Arabia and should greatly increase not only their combat capability but also their confidence and morale.

Her Majesty's Government have also considered the problem of the unfederated States of the Eastern Aden Protectorate. Our policy is to encourage these States to join the Federation. But it now seems unlikely that they will commit themselves before Independence. This leaves a practical problem of considerable importance. Peace there is maintained not by British arms, but, first by the State forces of the Eastern States, Kathiri, Quaiti and Mahra, all of which I visited, and, secondly, by the Hadhrami Bedouin Legion. It was clear to me that this was a crucial force in maintaining order, and indeed government. The latter is virtually an entirely Arab force but it is British-paid and, at the moment, British-controlled. It operates throughout the Eastern Protectorate and is not confined to any single State there. If it were disbanded, and with current external pressures operating against South Arabia, there would be serious risk of widespread disorder, with a corresponding threat to the Eastern flank of the newly independent State of South Arabia, and also to Dhofar and Muscat.

We are therefore informing the Federal Government and the Governments of the three Eastern States that we are prepared to pay for the Hadhrami Bedouin Legion for two years after Independence if arrangements can be agreed between them to take over control from us. For example, this could be done by setting up a Military Committee with representatives of the Federal Government and of each of the three Eastern States to control the Hadhrami Bedouin Legion's operations. This should also help to ensure co-ordination in the fields of foreign affairs and defence and not only should help to protect the Eastern flank of the Federation but will, we hope, lead to close association between it and the Eastern States. We are also informing the Federal Government that if it becomes possible to negotiate merger terms in earnest for the Eastern Aden Protectorate States we are prepared to help with the economic problems the merger may create, especially over customs revenue, as well as with the support of the Hadhrami Bedouin Legion.

These measures taken together should enable the South Arabian Government to deal with subversion and armed incursions into its territory and to maintain order. South Arabia has no other wish than to live peacefully with its neighbours, and in such circumstances this scale of armed forces would have been more than adequate. There is, however, the possibility of military aggression from outside, and we have accepted the South Arabian Government's view that they need protection from this threat. The Government have therefore decided to station a strong naval force in South Arabian waters for the critical first six months after Independence. It will include an attack aircraft carrier, the aircraft from which would be used in the repulse of any aggression.

As an additional assurance and measure of deterrence we have also informed the Federal Government that we are prepared to keep a force of V-bombers, with their extensive radius of action and their capacity to carry heavy loads of conventional weapons, within easy range of South Arabia—on the island of Masirah—for the critical months after Independence. They will be available for the six month period of the naval force and for as long thereafter as Her Majesty's Government may determine according to circumstances at the time. The V-bomber force and the naval force taken together constitute a very powerful deterrent which any potential aggressor will have to take very much into account. They are designed to ensure the safety of the independent State and I am confident will add greatly to achieving that object.

The third ingredient in our package of decisions relates to internal security in Aden. Two considerations have guided the Government. One is the need to deal more effectively and severely with those who are obdurate in maintaining violence. The second is to ensure that this is not counter-productive and that scope is provided for more constructive activity by the extremist organisations. The most important handicap for the authorities has been the intimidation of witnesses and jurors which has effectively prevented the trial of known terrorists. The absence of criminal convictions and the scrupulous observance of the principle that people detained without trial are not convicts has left detainees to enjoy a comfortable régime—indeed having visited it I might say it is more like a boys' holiday camp—which constitutes hardly any sanction against terrorists. This must stop. Jury trial, which is in any case unusual in a Colony, is therefore to be suspended in respect of terrorist offences, subject to suitable safeguards for the defence. Severer sentences of imprisonment will be possible and secure custody will be ensured.

At the same time we are also determined to take every opportunity to open ways towards reconciliation. Experience has shown that in South Arabian conditions the proscription of political Parties, and even terrorist organisations, is pointless and does not seriously inhibit terrorist activity. Experience has also, as I found, shown that it is a bar to useful negotiation. It is an accident of history that the National Liberation Front, which is much more nationalist, indeed anti-Egyptian as well as anti-colonialist, is banned and FLOSY is not. The Government have decided therefore that the ban on the N.L.F. should be lifted. We are also considering the question of releasing some detainees, but it is too early to make a firm announcement on this at the moment.

I have already told the House that Her Majesty's Government have decided on Independence and the withdrawal of the base early in January, 1968. Until then we and the South Arabian Government will make every effort to restore law and order and will also continue our efforts to persuade the extremist groups that it is in their interest to join in with the Government. We should welcome the help of the United Nations in achieving this. Both the Federal Government and, we believe, their help could be vital for the establishment of the central care-taker Government called for in the U.N. resolutions which both we and the Federal Government have accepted. But in the meanwhile we must press ahead with the plans that I have outlined.

In conclusion I should like to quote from my right honourable friend's final words, in his speech in another place today. He said: Our policy in South Arabia has two objectives and can be summarised in a sentence. We intend to withdraw our military forces in an orderly way and to establish an independent South Arabia in January, 1968. To achieve these objectives we have approached the problem in its many and related aspects. The Federal Government are providing in the new constitution for the creation of a broader-based Government and evolution towards a democratic society. This will proceed, and we hope that the U.N. will be able to help in the process. In our efforts to establish a strong and representative Government we shall continue to make every reasonable effort to talk with all those, inside and outside South Arabia, who wish to co-operate in providing for the future of their country. An essential step to this is a further effort to restore the rule of law, and I have outlined some of the measures, both by way of conciliation and firmness, which we would propose to take. This will, not least, hearten the British civil and business community, who have done so much in the most difficult circumstances for the administration and economy of South Arabia, and of whom many expect to stay on after Independence. At the same time we have decided greatly to increase the very considerable support we have already promised to the South Arabian Government to enable them to defend their Independence by additions to the strength of the South Arabian Armed Forces and by the provision of a powerful deterrent against external aggression for as long as we judge necessary for South Arabia to establish itself as a free and independent nation. Whatever detailed criticisms the House may have, I hope"— this is my right honourable friend, and I agree with him— they will agree that the package of measures I have announced to-day demonstrates the determination of Her Majesty's Government to make every effort to bring our objectives about. In the last resort the success and stability of an independent South Arabia will depend on the people of Arabia themselves, and we are determined to help them in that task.

4.26 p.m.

LORD CARRINGTON

My Lords, it seems to me, if I may say so, quite right that the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, who is in effect the author of the proposals which he has just outlined to your Lordships' House, should have the opportunity of telling us at first hand what they are, and indeed an opportunity of answering any questions your Lordships might like to put. I for one would like to thank him for the very careful Statement he has made to the House this afternoon.

I have never disguised from noble Lords opposite that I have very strongly criticised and disapproved of their policy towards the South Arabian Federation, and I say regretfully that by the decisions which they took two years ago they themselves contributed a great deal to the troubles which have taken place there. But having said that (this is a long Statement that needs to be studied, and I do not want to make a speech about it) I must add that it seems to me that the Statement is a considerable advance on what the Government have said they were prepared to do in the last two years, and particularly an advance in the defence field. In other fields I think that the Statement is a little bit vaguer, and I understand why. For instance, I am not at all sure exactly what the proposed Constitution is going to be. I do not know whether the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, can give us any indication of that, or whether he was intentionally vague because it was still a matter of consultation within the Federation. But the Statement does not get us very far on that line.

There are certain aspects of it on which I feel inclined to be critical, but I am not going to be so this afternoon, since we shall have an opportunity later to debate this when we discuss the Bill on Aden. It is very difficult to know how the events of the last month in the Middle East are going to affect the situation in Aden. It could well be that the situation will be much easier, since Egyptian troops have been pulling out of the Yemen, and certainly from that point of view there may be less overt pressure on Aden. It could be, however, that as a result of the events of the last month or so subversion may be stepped up in Aden because of the untruths which have been told about Imperialists and Anglo-American aggression and so on. It is too early to know what will emerge there. Certainly I think what the noble Lord has told us about defence matters and what the Government are prepared to do after the beginning of 1968 will greatly help in that matter.

There is just one thing I should like to add, and I know the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, thinks this is one of my hobbyhorses. I said, with quite remark-able foresight, when we had a Statement on the Middle East the other day, that the Government were always relying on aircraft carriers. I said that I should not be a bit surprised if they did not rely on aircraft carriers when they decided to leave Aden. And so it has proved. I greatly wish that the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, and the Government will once and for all realise that if they intend to keep a presence around the world, air power deployed from the sea is going to be essential; and I hope that the noble Lord will say something to encourage us to believe that the Government have at long last learned that lesson. As I say, particularly in the defence field, I think this Statement is a step forward, and I think that the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, has in the last two months done a typically courageous and forthright job. As for the rest of the Statement, I think we should reserve judgment until we have read it more carefully and perhaps have an opportunity of debating it when the Bill comes before us.

4.31 p.m.

LORD GLADWYN

My Lords, speaking on behalf of my colleagues on these Benches, may I say that in general we, too, welcome the new policy of the Government, as I think it might be called, with regard to Aden as giving evidence certainly of new thinking and of a much more flexible approach. I think it is only natural that it should be so, if I may respectfully say so, given the fact that men of the calibre of the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, and Sir Humphrey Trevelyan are now grappling with this terrible problem.

We agree with the conception that independence should be granted at a specific date in the fairly near future; and that, for a period following that, defence against external aggression should be provided by the means suggested. We en tirely agree also, in principle, with the idea of an independent State for Aden, which I think is rather a new idea. We think, too, that the measures contemplated in regard to the Eastern States, and the Hadhrami Bedouin Legion are most constructive and wise steps in the present circumstances. Nevertheless, we have grave doubts whether the Federation, as such, will be able to exist for long, even given these measures. We have doubts in view of the obvious acute differences both in the nature and in the development of Aden and of the sheikhly States which compose the majority of the Federation.

But, having said that, may I just ask three questions of the noble Lord? In the first place, what do the Government think are the chances of the new régime for Aden being accepted by the member States of the Federation; and what happens if, by any chance, they are not accepted? In the second place, is it the intention—I suppose it is—to afford our military assistance for six months only by a sort of unilateral declaration on our part; or are the Federal Government to be a party to this action by ourselves, to agree in it, and to be in a position to say whether they want it to be extended or not to have it at all? That seems to me to be an important question to be resolved. Lastly, after independence would it be theoretically possible for either the Federation or the independent State of Aden to apply for membership of the United Nations?

4.34 p.m.

LORD SHACKLETON

My Lords, it may be helpful if I deal first with the points just raised. First of all, on the subject of the Constitution, the process is that this is submitted to all the member States for approval within a certain period, and Her Majesty's Government's responsibility is in relation to Aden, of which the High Commission is at the moment the Government. This will subsequently, assuming that it is agreed—and I think there is a good chance that it will be—be the subject of an Affirmative Order in Parliament. At that moment the Constitution will be freely available. The reason I did not go into the detail of the document, although I have read it three times, and in its amended form, is that it is fairly lengthy. It is satisfactory, but there are of course certain aspects which in this situation cannot be wholly satisfactory. None the less, it represents a great advance and will, I hope, help to remove the charge, all too often made, and sometimes unfairly made, that the Federal Government, which I prefer to call the South Arabian Government, is purely in the possession of Sheikhly stooges. I might add that a Sheikh or a Sultan cannot survive for long without the support of his people. But I will not go into the sociology of South Arabia. None the less, it is a more modern Constitution.

In relation to the future of the Middle East and events there, it is, of course, very difficult to be precise. If it were not for the fact that my Statement would have been made longer, I should have tried to set it in the Middle East background. But I would say to the noble Lord that it is too early to foresee what is happening. One of the extraordinary consequences of the "big lie", and of its successful dissemination, is that at the moment there is, if anything, more pro-Nasser feeling, and even those who are critical of his particular brand of nationalism are finding it difficult to speak out. I should prefer to say no more on that subject, except that events may reveal that later the heat will come off a bit in the Yemen. Present signs are not in this direction, however, and therefore we must be prepared to meet the position. This is not to suggest that I or my right honourable friend are not sympathetic to concepts of Arab nationalism.

The noble Lord, Lord Carrington, was unable to resist referring to the carriers. Let me say, both to him and to the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, that the six-months period is determined not by some date agreed by the Federal Government, but by the difficulties in regard to maintaining even a carrier force of limited size, which can be a heavy strain on the Fleet. But I would not doubt the value of it. However, I will not be drawn by the noble Lord to-day into discussing the carrier force, because I would do nothing to weaken the significance of this as a deterrent. Of course, one of the reasons for stationing the V-bombers there is not only to supplement, but so that they go on for a longer period. They are not limited to six months, and it will be for Her Majesty's Government to decide how much longer they should in fact remain. I hope that I have answered all the noble Lord's questions; if so, I am most grateful for what he has said.

LORD GLADWYN

My Lords, there was the one question on the United Nations.

LORD SHACKLETON

It is certainly the hope that the independent country of South Arabia will be recognised and will become a member of the United Nations. How soon this will happen I do not know; but it is the intention that it should. When it has a more broadly based and democratic Government, we hope that it will be accepted as a fully-fledged member of the United Nations. But I should not like to forecast when this will come about, or what will be happening in the United Nations during the next few days.

LORD ROWLEY

My Lords, in warmly welcoming my noble friend's Statement, may I make just two comments? First of all, he has referred to what he calls the "big lie", and we all know the consequences throughout the Arab world of these grotesque statements. May I make this suggestion for consideration? In addition to the preparations for aircraft carriers, V-bombers and so on on the military side, would it not be useful to invite the United Nations to provide a number of observers to survey the border between the Yemen and the South Arabian State, so that it will make it difficult for the Arab world eventually to accuse either the South Arabian Government or our own forces of starting any hostilities that may perhaps ensue? I should like to suggest that that be considered.

The other point is with reference to my noble friends' statement that the ban on the National Liberation Front has been lifted. Is it intended to organise a constitutional conference to which representatives of the National Liberation Front might be invited, in addition to a representative of U Thant or the United Nations itself, so that such a conference might well be held under the ægis of the United Nations, as was the case with the Geneva conferences in 1952 to 1954 with reference to South East Asia?

LORD SHACKLETON

My Lords, I am very sympathetic to the noble Lord's hopes in the United Nations, and I wish that they would bear fruit, but at the moment I am not very hopeful that the United Nations would be willing to take responsibility on the South Arabian frontier. But obviously an effective United Nations presence could largely solve all our problems. Indeed, I should have thought that the chances of calling a conference of the National Liberation Front, FLOSY, SAL and the others—let us not assume that those who practise violence are the only patriots; there are other patriotic people in South Arabia—would be immeasurably increased if the United Nations were to do this. I should prefer not to speculate too much on the prospects, beyond saying that it certainly is the wish of Her Majesty's Government that we should look to the United Nations; but we cannot afford to look for ever to the United Nations, and there are decisions which must be taken now.

LORD ROWLEY

My Lords, I am sure that my noble friend did not wish to misrepresent what I said. What I said was that we should call the conference, but that we should invite the United Nations to send a representative, and that this might well be under the ægis of the United Nations but not necessarily called by the United Nations.

LORD SHACKLETON

I am sorry. There are a number of variations. My only fear is that we shall not succeed in calling such a conference unless the United Nations actually sponsor it. None the less, this is certainly one of the ideas, and indeed is a main idea, which my right honourable friend the Foreign Secretary has put forward and with which we shall try to press on.

LORD MOLSON

My Lords, are we to understand from something the Minister let drop in the course of his speech that he found clear evidence that poison gas has been used in this campaign and that it was used by the Egyptians? We have read about this in the Press, but I am inclined to think that this is the first official statement that that has in fact been done.

LORD SHACKLETON

Poison gas has been used in the Yemen, and there have been reports of this for a considerable period. Recently, the International Red Cross themselves investigated such an in cident and in fact confirmed the gas. It is uncertain what it may be, whether it is mustard gas or phosgene. Let no one delude themselves about the methods which have been used over a period in the Yemen. This is a particular source of fear because this would be a device which in certain circumstances could be made to terrorise people in the States up-country who otherwise would be prepared to resist aggression. I hope that it will never come about, and I hope also that publicity will be given to this.

BARONESS GAITSKELL

My Lords, I would ask my noble friend whether it is not possible for us to have a powerful radio—a kind of pirate radio—which could dispel some of these lies which are put out in the Middle East about us, and why we cannot have a greater propaganda in that part of the world.

LORD SHACKLETON

My Lords, I do not understand how it is we are not able to combat these lies. Some people seem to be cleverer than us and the Americans. But I sympathise with the noble Lady, for I attach great importance to explaining our position at every opportunity, and I am sure that my right honourable friend the Foreign Secretary feels the same.

LORD ST. OSWALD

I should like to follow my noble Leader in congratulating the noble Lord on the critical and helpful part he has played in the relative conversion of Government policy. I think noble Lords on both sides of the House can congratulate themselves on the natural prescience they showed in affirming their confidence in the noble Lord as being the man for the job, as expressed in our debate on May 2. We are grateful to him and we hope that his efforts will produce results.

I should like to ask him one or two brief questions which I feel are very pertinent at the moment. I would ask when the eight Hunters and other sophisticated equipment which are being given to the Federal forces will be delivered and particularly when the training will be completed, because it is of importance to them to know when these will become useful. I am also encouraged by the noble Baroness, Lady Gaitskell, to ask a question about the B.B.C. broadcasts. As I understood the noble Lady, she asked a question about a pirate radio station. I would not suggest that a pirate radio station would be necessary, but what I should like the noble Lord to do is to do his best to restore the cuts made four months ago in B.B.C. Arabic broadcasts, cuts which seemed very unnecessary.

LORD SHACKLETON

My Lords, I do not wish to discuss the military equipment in too much detail, because the Ministry of Defence have only just had time enough to think about them and to say that they were possible, and they have to be examined in detail. I understand that the Hunters are likely to be Hunters which are already out there and which would otherwise be disbanded. The real difficulty will be in operating and getting contract pilots for them. Having flown twice over South Arabia in a Hunter, I would say that it is a fighter ground attack pilot's paradise for operations, whether he fires his guns or not. As regards the B.B.C., I can only say that I have noted what the noble Lord has said. I also did not quite understand the proposition about a pirate radio.

BARONESS GAITSKELL

Pirate off the peninsula, not one of our pirate radio stations.