CRIMINAL JUSTICE BILL

HL Deb 17 July 1967 vol 285 cc75-134

6.7 p.m.

Order of the Day for the Third Reading read.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR (LORD GARDINER)

My Lords, I have it in command from Her Majesty the Queen to acquaint the House that Her Majesty, having been informed of the purport of the Criminal Justice Bill, has consented to place Her interest, so far as it is concerned on behalf of the Crown and the Duchy of Lancaster at the disposal of Parliament for the purposes of the Bill.

THE JOINT PARLIAMENTARY UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE, HOME OFFICE (LORD STONHAM)

My Lords, I beg to move that this Bill be read a third time.

Moved, That the Bill be now read 3^a.—(Lord Stonham.)

On Question, Bill read 3^a, with the Amendments.

Clause 14 [Disqualification of ex-prisoners from serving on juries in criminal proceedings]:

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

My Lords, this is a drafting Amendment to make it clear beyond doubt: first, that persons sentenced to borstal training fall within the ambit of the temporary disqualification from jury service provided by paragraph (a) of subsection (1) of the clause, and, secondly, that permanent disqualification from service, for which paragraph (b) of subsection (1) provides, extends to young persons sentenced to be detained during Her Majesty's pleasure. I beg to move.

Amendment moved—

Page 11, line 33, at end insert— ("( ) For the purposes of the foregoing subsection a person sentenced to borstal training shall be treated as if he had been sentenced for a term of more than three months, and a person sentenced to be detained for an offence during Her Majesty's pleasure or during the pleasure of the Governor of Northern Ireland shall be treated as if he had been sentenced to detention for life.")—(The Lord Chancellor.)

LORD BROOKE OF CUMNOR

My Lords, there is an exceptionally large number of drafting Amendments put down on Third Reading by the Government. I have examined them all and have nothing to raise on any of the drafting Amendments. May I say that, so far as I am concerned, and I think my noble friend also, if they are moved quite briefly we shall not demur, and will intervene only if there is any point to raise.

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

My Lords, the effect of this Amendment will be to require summoning officers to despatch the warning notice setting out the provisions relating to disqualification of jurors together with each individual summons that is sent out to prospective jurors. As your Lordships will remember, the noble and learned Viscount, Lord Dilhorne, raised a point on this, and I said in reply, on Report stage of the Bill, that it had always been the intention that the warning notice should be sent in the same envelope as the summons, but that as this was not made explicit in subsection (4) to Clause 14 I would undertake to consider the matter further and, if necessary, make the appropriate Amendment on Third Reading.

I am sorry that it has not proved possible to adopt the suggestion made by the noble Lord, Lord Rowley, that the warning notice should be printed on the summons. One of the difficulties about this is that there are 166 summoning officers, and they all at present have their own form of summons. Apart from the waste of money and effort, it is doubtful whether a reprinting on this scale could be completed sufficiently expeditiously to enable this clause to be brought in without undue delay. I hope, therefore, that the noble Lords who raised the point will feel that we have met them, so far as we could, by ensuring that at least the summons and warning notice are enclosed in the same envelope. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 11, line 43, leave out ("to every person so summoned") and insert ("with every summons for that purpose").—(The Lord Chancellor.)

VISCOUNT DILHORNE

My Lords, may I thank the noble and learned Lord for meeting so completely the point I made.

LORD ROWLEY

My Lords, perhaps, as I made the suggestion, I might say that, although my noble and learned friend the Lord Chancellor has not, apparently, for very good reason, seen fit to adopt the suggestion, I share the thanks expressed by the noble and learned Viscount, Lord Dilhorne. I would only ask my noble friend whether the warning notice would be attached in any way, because, presumably, some junior clerk might deal with the letters and there might be a number of them requiring the notice, to which importance is attached. Would my noble friend consider this a reasonable apprehension, or does he think there is not very much to it?

LORD AIREDALE

My Lords, would it not be possible, at any rate when the summons forms are reprinted in due course, for the warning to be printed either at the foot or on the back of the summons? Because we want to take the very greatest care that nobody is in jeopardy of committing a criminal offence arising out of his being summoned to perform a public duty.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

My Lords, I should have thought that, if the statutory duty is placed on the summoning officers, we can rely on them to see that it is carried out. But I will undertake to see whether, when the forms are reprinted, it will be possible to reprint the summons and the warning on the same document.

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Clause 18 [Restrictions on refusal of bail]:

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

My Lords, this is a drafting Amendment, designed to bring the wording of subsection (4) into line with that of subsection (5). I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 13, line 30, leave out ("be construed as requiring") and insert ("require").—(The Lord Chancellor.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Clause 22 [Extension of power of High Court to grant, or vary conditions of, bail]:

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

My Lords, this is another drafting Amendment, necessary in order to make it clear that the High Court has power to vary the conditions of bail in cases where the inferior court has already released a person on bail but he is dissatisfied with the conditions of his bail. Without the additional words, the subsection could be read as confining the powers of the High Court to cases where the inferior court either had refused to admit to bail or had offered bail on terms which the person had refused to accept, with the result that he remained in custody.

Amendment moved— Page 15, line 21, after first ("so") insert ("or does so").—(The Lord Chancellor.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Clause 31 [Extension of Costs in Criminal Cases Act 1952]:

6.14 p.m.

LORD STONHAM moved, in subsection (1), to leave out all words after the first word, "proceedings" down to and including "discharge" and to insert instead: for dealing with an offender under section 6, 8 or 9 of the Criminal Justice Act 1948 (probation orders and orders for conditional discharge)".

The noble Lord said: My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 3, standing in the name of my noble and learned friend the Lord Chancellor. In doing so, I would eagerly accept the invitation of the noble Lord, Lord Brooke of Cumnor, and invite your Lordships to agree that I should take this Amendment with 18 other Amendments: Nos. 4 to 8, 12, 14, 17 to 21, 23 to 25, and 27 to 29.

Although this is a drafting Amendment, I think I should briefly explain the point. The main purpose is to delete from the Bill the words "subject to a suspended sentence", which are thought to be somewhat ambiguous, because on a literal interpretation they could be taken to mean that a person ceases to be subject to a suspended sentence at the end of the period of from one to three years ordered by the courts. The words are used in this sense in, for example, Clause 40(2). But a person retains a liability under the suspended sentence after the period for which the sentence was suspended if during that period he commits another offence for which he was not brought to trial before the period had expired. In this sense, therefore, an offender is still "subject to a suspended sentence" after the period of suspension, and the expression is used to include such a person in, for example, Clause 39(2).

For the former sense, where the period ordered by the court is being described, the expression "operational period" has been introduced in the Amendment, and a definition of "operational period" is being inserted, subject to your Lordships' agreement, in Clause 38(1). As a consequence, it becomes unnecessary to use the expression "subsequent offence" in a technical sense, and the definition of this expression is therefore deleted from Clause 38 by Amendment No. 12. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 19, line 19, leave out from beginning to ("and") in line 21 and insert the said new words.—(Lord Stonham.)

LORD BROOKE OF CUMNOR

My Lords, I am not sure that the phrase "operational period" is an entirely happy one, but I think the Government are right in seeking to make the general change they are making by this series of Amendments, and I am glad the noble Lord took my hint. So far as I am concerned, I see no objection to these consequential Amendments being put in batches.

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, if it is the wish of the House, I will move Amendments Nos. 4 to 8 inclusive together. I beg to move.

Amendments moved—

Page 19, line 22, leave out ("subject to") and insert ("in respect of")

Page 20, line 8, leave out ("subject to") and insert ("in respect of")

Page 20, line 11, leave out ("while he was so subject") and insert ("during the operational period of the sentence")

Page 20, line 24, leave out ("and")

Page 20, line 26, at end insert ("and 'operational period' has the same meaning as in Part II of this Act.")—(The Lord Chancellor.)

On Question, Amendments agreed to.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR moved, after Clause 34, to insert the following new clause:

Examining justices

" . It is hereby declared for the avoidance of doubt that a magistrates' court before which a person is charged with an indictable offence begins to act as examining justices as soon as he appears or is brought before the court, except where before that time the court has determined under section 18 of the Magistrates' Courts Act 1952 to try him summarily."

The noble and learned Lord said: My Lords, this is a drafting Amendment, to make it clear that where a man is arrested for an indictable offence and is brought before a magistrates' court which remands him without hearing evidence about the offence the proceedings are proceedings before examining justices. The Bill was prepared on the basis that this is so, and, indeed, this view of the law is widely held. The difficulty is that the application of Clause 3 to such remand hearings depends on the proceedings being before examining justices. Newspapers frequently report the early court appearances of defendants in notorious cases, and it would be wrong to leave the restriction of such reports to rest on the argument that the justices are acting as examining justices, if there is any doubt about the validity of that argument. In Committee in another place at least one Member thought that remand hearings were not conducted by examining justices. Careful research has failed to discover anything which would establish the point conclusively, and it would be wiser to deal with the problem now by this declaratory Amendment, rather than to leave it to be decided later by the courts.

Amendment moved— After Clause 34, insert the said new clause.—(The Lord Chancellor.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

6.19 p.m.

VISCOUNT DILHORNE moved, after Clause 34, to insert the following new clause:

Proof of conviction of an offence to be conclusive evidence of guilt of that offence in certain subsequent proceedings.

" . Where a person has been convicted of an offence by a court of competent jurisdiction, that person shall not, save in proceedings by way of appeal from the conviction or on a reference by the Home Secretary to the Court of Appeal, be allowed to deny in any subsequent proceedings the rightness of the conviction and proof of the conviction shall, unless the conviction be quashed, be proof that that person was guilty of the offence of which he was convicted."

The noble and learned Viscount said: My Lords, this, I think, is an important proposal. I apologise to the Government and to the House for not raising it before, but, quite frankly, it had not occurred to me before; but a recent case has highlighted the point and I hope it will commend itself to your Lordships. In recent years we have had experience of persons who have been convicted of serious crimes and whose convictions have been upheld on appeal later instituting actions in which the propriety of the conviction is challenged. One thing that cannot be done after a lapse of many years is to try the case again as it was tried initially. Witnesses have forgotten certain events. Perhaps they have forgotten entirely all the evidence that has gone before, with the result that although under our system the conviction was proper, and so held by the Court of Criminal Appeal (as it was) and perhaps by this House sitting judicially, none the less the propriety of that conviction has been questioned in other civil proceedings many years afterwards; and if those civil proceedings are successful it has been promptly claimed that there has been a miscarriage of justice and that the person concerned was wrongly convicted. That may be widely reported and may lead some people to believe it to be so. I do not think that is at all satisfactory. I think the position should be that if a man has been convicted and his appeal against conviction has been dismissed, then that conviction must be treated as standing, and it should not be open to him (it may be many years afterwards) to contend in other litigation that he was not guilty of the crime of which he had been found guilty.

That is one category among the cases which this new clause seeks to deal with; but there is the other type. I do not know whether your Lordships read in The Times a report of a case tried very recently indeed where Barclays Bank were seeking to obtain judgment for a large sum of money of which they had been robbed at one of their branches and some of which had been paid into an account at another branch of their bank. To succeed in that claim Barclays had to prove that the customer at that branch who had the account was a party to the commission of the criminal act of robbing the bank. He had in fact been convicted of that offence, and that conviction stood, but it was not possible for Barclays to say: "Here is the conviction; this is the guilty man. He has had the money and it is our money". After all those years they had to establish by evidence, based largely, as it was, on identity, that this was the man who in fact had done it. Is it not right to say that they ought to have been able to produce the conviction, to prove that he was the man named in that conviction, and say: "You were found guilty of this offence and that conviction has not been quashed"?

I cannot help but believe that the change in the law recommended by this clause should be made without delay. I hope the Government will say that they will accept this new clause. It may be I shall be told that the matter is under consideration by a Committee which will report to the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor. Of course I shall be glad to hear that, but I do not think that is enough now, in the light of these recent cases. We all know that a long interval may elapse between the report to the Lord Chancellor, the acceptance of that report and the changing of the law by a Bill. It may be years.

I think it would be better to make this change now, and then, if need be—and I personally cannot see that there will be any need—make some modifications later in the light of the report. It brings our administration of the law into contempt if somebody who is properly convicted can, years later, appear to get a reversal of that finding because the Crown or the other party to the case is not then in a position to produce all the witnesses who gave evidence at the trial, and the witnesses who can be produced cannot really remember what took place so many years ago and of which they testified when the convicted man was charged with that criminal offence. I have moved this Amendment as shortly as I can, and with apologies for not having raised it before, but I regard it as of considerable importance and I hope the Government will accept it. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— After Clause 34, insert the said new clause.—(Viscount Dilhorne.)

6.26 p.m.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

My Lords, I would, of course, agree that there is an anomaly in our law, as the noble and learned Viscount has pointed out. There are quite clearly civil cases in which the fact that there has been a criminal conviction should be admissible as evidence. But it is not altogether a simple question. The Amendment would provide that in all cases it must be conclusive evidence. No doubt it would raise a prima facie case, but whether it should in all cases be conclusive is very much in question.

I may be proceeded against for some minor case of careless driving, and I may feel that instructing a solicitor and a barrister and all the expense involved is not really worth while; therefore I may plead guilty to save trouble. Or, for that matter, a man with previous convictions, asked whether he wants 15 other cases to be taken into account, although there are really 14 may say, "All right" to the 15, in order to get rid of the matter. If, in the accident case, I was subsequently sued for a large sum of money by a pedestrian or a motorist involved in the same affair, it may be open to question whether the fact that to save trouble I pleaded guilty when I thought no civil proceedings were going to be taken against me, should necessarily be conclusive.

The second question one has to consider is that the new clause treats foreign convictions as being exactly the same as English convictions. It would not be tactful to mention any particular countries, but I do not know whether our people here would necessarily agree that convictions in some countries one could think of should be final and conclusive against people in this country. Therefore there are a number of points which I think would need consideration. As the noble and learned Viscount has indicated, he himself, when Lord Chancellor, referred the question of civil law evidence to the Law Reform Committee, and when the cases to which he referred took place last year I asked that Committee to consider what was the right solution to this problem.

While I think of it, I might mention that there is a third point also which the Amendment does not cover. The Amendment covers only the man who is convicted, and his conduct being in question in proceedings to which he is a party, and his not being able to deny it. It is open to question whether it ought not to extend in some cases to the conviction being at least prima facie evidence in proceedings to which an accused is not a party. For example, if my house is burgled and proceedings are taken by the police against the burglar and the burglary is established, and the burglar is convicted and sentenced, if there is then a dispute between me and the insurance company it seems rather extraordinary that the fact of the burglary having taken place and having been proved in a criminal court does not constitute prima facie evidence that there was a burglary, and that I should have to start all over again to prove the whole thing against the insurance company, if they are disputing it. So there are a number of points to be considered.

The Law Reform Committee are at the moment settling the final draft of their Report. This does relate, after all, to the civil law of evidence. This is a Criminal Justice Bill. I do not know whether the Long Title would include it or not, but I would suggest to the noble and learned Viscount, with his experience, that if one is going to call on the time of busy judges, barristers and solicitors to sort out a matter like this and advise us what is the right thing to do, it really would be extremely discourteous, just as they are in process of drafting their final report, having spent a lot of time on it and taken a lot of trouble, if the Government were to say: "We are not going to wait for you; we are going to go straight ahead". That Committee have already given me, and there has been published, a very valuable Report on the reform of the law of hearsay evidence, and I am hoping in the not too far distant future—I only say that because we are approaching the time of year when everybody wants to know what is in the Queen's Speech, so I cannot be more precise—to introduce a Bill to give effect to their Report on hearsay evidence. And I should certainly wish to give effect at the same time, if their recommendations are accepted by the Government, to what is contained in their Report. I hope on all those grounds the noble and learned Viscount will be satisfied with that assurance and will withdraw his Amendment.

VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS

My Lords, I do not know what my noble and learned friend will do, but I think on one point, with respect, the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor must be wrong. He said that this Amendment would cover cases which are taken into consideration when somebody was being convicted for another offence. But cases that are taken into consideration, so far as I know, are not convictions at all. They are certainly not based upon any sort of statutory provision, and so far as I know they never officially enter into the category of being convictions. So I do not think those cases are covered by what my noble and learned friend has said.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

My Lords, I think the noble and learned Viscount may be technically right. It was one of a number of cases that occurred to me where to the man who pleads guilty it may appear a small thing. The noble Viscount may be quite right in saying that technically they would not be covered.

LORD CONESFORD

My Lords, it seems to me that the proposal put forward by my noble and learned friend is of the greatest importance, and anybody who read even the shortened versions that appeared in the Press of the judgment of Mr. Justice Paull, I think as recently as last week, will have no doubt about that. Some of the things that can take place under the law as it stands are absurd; in fact, the learned judge used very emphatic language about it. I think, therefore, that my noble and learned friend has performed a very useful service in putting this proposal forward.

On the other hand, let me admit at once that the noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack put forward very important considerations, and I have no doubt that my noble and learned friend would not wish to press his Amendment on this occasion, but would very much wish to be satisfied, as I think from what the noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack said he can be satisfied, that, when the Report is forthcoming, the matter will be treated with some urgency. If that is the case, while thanking my noble and learned friend for his proposal, I am sure he will adopt the suggestion made by the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor.

VISCOUNT DILHORNE

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor for what he has said. So far as the convicted person is concerned, I think proof of the conviction should be conclusive. I hope that the noble and learned Lord will give careful consideration to that, because if it is only prima facie then you will get into all the difficulty of calling evidence years after the conviction to rebut that presumption. With regard to evidence of conviction in proceedings to which the convicted person is not a party, I should have thought myself that the same would apply.

The noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor criticised the drafting of this Amendment. I am always very unlucky in my drafting attempts. So far as pleading guilty to careless driving and things of that sort are concerned, rather than fight the case in the magistrates' court, I think there is force in that, although it is very limited. I think that if I had drafted this clause as "a court of record of competent jurisdiction" that would have met that point. Unfortunately, this being Third Reading, I cannot move a manuscript Amendment to that effect. It certainly was not my intention that this should apply to convictions abroad. I think this should apply only to convictions by courts of record of competent jurisdiction in this country. My noble and learned friend Lord Colville of Culross referred to cases taken into consideration. If I may say so, I do not think there is any risk there, because of the care taken to get the document signed by the accused person agreeing to the list of cases to be taken into consideration, and if he does not agree he just strikes out one.

I am very glad to hear that we shall soon see the final Report of the Committee. They have had, I know, a very formidable task to undertake. I am glad that I have raised this to-day, because I hope that by pressing the Government on this I may assist the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor in his efforts to get into the programme for next year a Bill to implement some of these proposals to deal with this problem. And in the hope of assisting him further in that direction, may I say that I shall without doubt press him further on this matter, in the hope that I can give some strength to his elbow to do that. But for to-day I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 38 [Suspended sentences of imprisonment]:

LORD STONHAM

My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 11, and with it I would ask your Lordships to deal with Amendment No. 13. These are both drafting improvements. At present subsection (2) as it stands says in effect that a court shall not pass a suspended sentence for one offence if it makes a probation order for another offence. The Amendment turns the subsection round to say that a court which passes a suspended sentence for one offence shall not make a probation order for another. Another point is that subsection (2) as it stands places a restriction on the power of courts to pass a suspended sentence, and this makes necessary the words "subject to the next following subsection" in subsection (1). Subsection (2) as amended will not in form place any restriction on the power of courts to pass a suspended sentence, and those words therefore become unnecessary. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 25, line 6, leave out ("subject to the next following subsection).—(Lord Stonham.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

LORD STONHAM

My Lords, I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 25, leave out lines 14 and 15 and insert ("'operational period', in relation to a suspended sentence, means the period so specified").—(Lord Stonham.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

LORD STONHAM

My Lords, I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 25, line 16, leave out from ("court") to ("a") in line 18 and insert ("which passes a suspended sentence on any person for an offence shall not make").—(Lord Stonham.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

LORD STONHAM

My Lords, I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 25, line 24, leave out ("he commits a subsequent offence") and insert ("during the operational period he commits an offence punishable with imprisonment").—(Lord Stonham.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

6.40 p.m.

LORD STONHAM moved, in subsection (4), to leave out "on being convicted of an offence". The noble Lord said: My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 15, and with it would like to deal also with Amendment No. 16. The reason for Amendment No. 15 is that a person could be sentenced to borstal training otherwise than "on being convicted of an offence". For example, suppose a person is convicted of an offence and is conditionally discharged, and he then commits a further offence and is given a suspended sentence. The court which conditionally discharged him then hears about the second conviction and has him up and sentences him to borstal training for the original offence. In a case like that the offender would not have been sentenced to borstal training "on being convicted of an offence". Accordingly, the Amendment deletes those words from Clause 38(4).

The second Amendment is consequential. If a person subject to a probation order or an order for conditional discharge commits a further offence or a breach of the probation order, and is then sentenced for the original offence, that sentence results from a finding that the offender has breached the probation order or has committed a further offence. The Amendment therefore inserts a reference to a finding along with sentence and conviction. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 25, line 27, leave out ("on being convicted of an offence").—(Lord Stonham.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

LORD STONHAM

My Lords, I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 25, line 29, leave out ("conviction or sentence") and insert ("sentence or any conviction or finding on which it was passed").—(Lord Stonham.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Clause 39 [Power of court on conviction of further offence to deal with suspended sentence]:

LORD STONHAM: My Lords, I beg to move this Amendment, and I should be glad if we could accept the invitation of the noble Lord, Lord Brooke of Cumnor, to take with it Amendments Nos. 18, 19, 20 and 21.

Amendments moved—

Page 26, line 4, leave out from ("of") to ("a") in line 5 and insert ("an offence punishable with imprisonment committed during the operational period of")

Page 26, line 16, after ("under") insert ("subsection (1) of")

Page 26, line 28, leave out from ("sentence") to ("shall") in line 29.

Page 26, line 33, leave out ("him") and insert ("the offender").

Page 27, line 7, leave out ("his detention") and insert ("the detention of the offender").—(Lord Stonham.)

On Question, Amendments agreed to.

LORD STONHAM moved, after subsection (5), to insert as a new subsection: ( ) In proceedings for dealing with an offender in respect of a suspended sentence which take place before a court of assize or quarter sessions any question whether the offender has been convicted of an offence punishable with imprisonment committed during the operational period of the suspended sentence shall be determined by the court and not by the verdict of a jury.

The noble Lord said: My Lords, this is a technical Amendment. Under the Bill as it stands, if there was a dispute at a court of assize or quarter sessions about whether an offender had been convicted of an offence punishable with imprisonment committed during the operational period of a suspended sentence, the issue might have to be determined by a jury. The position in the Bill as it stands is not entirely clear, and it is desirable to avoid any possibility of doubt. The Amendment accordingly provides that the issue shall be determined by a court and not by the verdict of a jury. There is a corresponding provision in relation to probation and conditional discharge in Section 11(4) of the Criminal Justice Act 1948. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 27, line 9, at end insert the said subsection.—(Lord Stonham.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

LORD STONHAM: My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 23.

Amendment moved— Page 27, line 18, leave out from ("cases") to end of line 21, and insert ("any such order made by a court shall be treated as a sentence passed on the offender by that court for the offence for which the suspended sentence was passed").—(Lord Stonham.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Clause 40 [Court by which suspended sentence is to be dealt with]:

LORD STONHAM: My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 24. Perhaps with it we might deal also with Amendment No. 25. I beg to move.

Amendments moved—

Page 27, line 29, leave out from first ("offence") to first ("a") in line 30, and insert ("was committed during the operational period of")

Page 28, line 1, leave out ("relation to") and insert ("respect of").—(Lord Stonham.)

On Question, Amendments agreed to.

LORD STONHAM moved to leave out subsection (4), and insert: (4) For the purposes of this and the next following sections a suspended sentence passed on an offender on appeal shall be treated as having been passed by the court by which he was originally sentenced.

The noble Lord said: My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 26 and should be grateful if with it we could consider Amendment No. 30 also. Subsection (4) of Clause 40 and subsection (6) of Clause 41 provide that, for the purposes of those clauses, a suspended sentence passed by the Criminal Division of the Court of Appeal or by the House of Lords on appeal from that Division shall be treated as having been passed by the court of assize or quarter sessions from which the appeal was brought. The object of these subsections is to provide that, if the offender commits a further offence, the suspended sentence shall be dealt with by the court from which the appeal was brought to the Court of Appeal. It would be inappropriate for the Court of Appeal or the House of Lords to have to have the offender up and deal with the suspended sentence. I beg to move Amendment No. 26.

Amendment moved— Page 28, line 8, leave out subsection (4) and insert the said new subsection.—(Lord Stonham.)

VISCOUNT DILHORNE

My Lords, I want to raise two points with the noble Lord, Lord Stonham. I see his explanation for this Amendment, but if you are going to treat a suspended sentence passed on an offender by the Court of Appeal as passed by the court of quarter sessions or assize, does that not mean that the person who has this suspended sentence will have the right of appeal from that court again to the Court of Appeal?

LORD STONHAM

My Lords, the point and the purpose of the two Amendments was to ensure that the appeal would not be brought to the Court of Appeal or the House of Lords. We are dealing not only with this level, because the same considerations would apply where a suspended sentence has been passed by quarter sessions on appeal from a magistrates' court. In such cases, it is better that the magistrates' court should have the responsibility for dealing with suspended sentence if the offender commits a further offence. That is why the Amendment to Clause 40(4) extends the application of the subsection to all suspended sentences passed on appeal. I hope that that makes it perfectly clear to the noble and learned Viscount.

VISCOUNT DILHORNE

My Lords, I must say, before the noble Lord sits down, that it is not perfectly clear to me. I should have thought you would have wanted some provision to show that there should be no right of appeal from the sentence which is treated as the sentence passed by the inferior court. But I will leave it at that; I have raised the point.

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Clause 41 [Discovery of further offences]:

LORD STONHAM: My Lords, I beg to move this Amendment, and with it I hope that the House will consider Amendments Nos. 28 and 29.

Amendments moved—

Page 28, line 17, leave out from ("committed") to ("in") in line 19 and insert ("during the operational period of a suspended sentence and that he has not been dealt with").

Page 28, line 40, leave out ("while he was subject to") and insert ("during the operational period of").

Page 29, line 18, leave out ("relation to") and insert ("respect of").—(Lord Stonham.)

On Questions, Amendments agreed to.

LORD STONHAM: My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 30.

Amendment moved— Page 29, line 24, leave out subsection (6).—(Lord Stonham.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Clause 49 [Supplementary provisions as to payment of fines, etc.]:

LORD STONHAM: My Lords, I beg to move Amendment 30A, which is a drafting Amendment. It is designed to make it clear that under the new higher court fines procedure, higher courts will be able to order young defaulters to be detained in detention centres rather than in prison. Higher courts, like magistrates' courts, have this power under the present law. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 36, line 32, at end add ("and in section 5(5) of the Criminal Justice Act 1961 (construction of references to terms of imprisonment) the reference to section 14 of the Criminal Justice Act 1948 shall be construed as including a reference to section 46 of this Act").—(Lord Stonham.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Clause 56 [Social inquiry report before sentence]:

LORD STONHAM moved, after subsection (2), to insert: ( ) No sentence shall be invalidated by the failure of a court to consider a social inquiry report in accordance with rules under subsection (1) of this section, but any other court on appeal from that court shall consider such a report in determining whether a different sentence should be passed on the appellant from the sentence passed on him by the court below.

The noble Lord said: My Lords, subsection (1) of Clause 56 empowers the Secretary of State to require courts in certain cases to consider a social inquiry report before passing a custodial sentence. If in such a case a court failed to consider a report, and passed a custodial sentence, there would be some doubt about the validity of the sentence and consequently some doubt about the propriety of continuing to detain the offender. But to let the offender go scot free would give him an undeserved benefit, and in some cases the sentence might be for a long term in order to protect the public. The appropriate course would seem to be that an appellate court should repair the omission of the sentencing court. The Amendment accordingly provides that failure to obtain a statutory social inquiry report shall not invalidate the sentence but that on appeal the appellate court shall consider such a report in determining whether to substitute a different sentence. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 43, line 10, at end insert the said subsection.—(Lord Stonham.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Clause 61 [Revocation of licences and conviction of prisoners on licence]:

LORD STONHAM: My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 31A, which is a drafting Amendment.

Amendment moved— Page 48, line 13, leave out from beginning to ("commit").—(Lord Stonham.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Clause 63 [Supplemental]:

6.50 p.m.

LORD STONHAM moved to add to the clause: (2) The following powers, that is to say—

1. (a) the power conferred on the Secretary of State by section 59 of this Act to insert or include conditions in the licence of any person released under that section after being transferred to either part of Great Britain from another part of the United Kingdom, the Channel Islands or the Isle of Man;
2. (b) the power conferred on the Secretary of State by section 61 of this Act to revoke the licence of any such person and recall him to prison;
3. (c) the power conferred on a court by the said section 61 to revoke any such licence;

shall be exercisable notwithstanding anything in section 26(6)(a) of the Criminal Justice Act 1961 (exclusion of supervision of persons so transferred)".

The noble Lord said: My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 32. The purpose of this rather lengthy Amendment is to ensure that the release on licence provisions of the Bill may be applied to a prisoner in England and Wales, or Scotland, whose sentence was imposed in Northern Ireland, the Channel Islands or the Isle of Man. It was always envisaged that such a prisoner would be treated for release purposes, as for other purposes, in the same way as a prisoner sentenced here, but Section 26(6)(a) of the Criminal Justice Act 1961 might unintentionally have been an obstacle. The Amendment puts the matter beyond doubt. I would add that the authorities of Northern Ireland and the Islands concerned have agreed to the Amendment.

Amendment moved— Page 49, line 31, at end insert the said subsection.—(Lord Stonham.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Clause 71 [Power of magistrates to issue warrants for arrest of escaped prisoners and mental patients]:

LORD STONHAM: My Lords, with Amendment No. 33, I should like to take Nos. 34 and 35. All three are drafting Amendments. Nos. 33 and 34 are designed to make subsection (1) clear; and the third, Amendment No. 35, remedies the omission of a reference to detention in the specification of the powers conveyed by the Mental Health Acts. I beg to move.

Amendment moved—

Page 52, line 17, leave out ("that— (a) any person is") and insert ("alleging that any person is— (a) an offender").—(Lord Stonham.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

LORD STONHAM

My Lords, I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 52, line 22, leave out ("any convicted mental patient is") and insert ("a convicted mental patient").—(Lord Stonham.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

LORD STONHAM

My Lords, I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 53, line 4, leave out ("or kept") and insert ("kept or detained").—(Lord Stonham.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Clause 73 [Supplementary provisions as to legal aid orders]:

THE LORD CHANCELLOR moved, in subsection (10), to leave out all words after "for an offence and", down to and including the words "before that magistrates' court", and insert: under a duty to appear or a liability to be brought before a magistrates' court in respect of that offence". The noble and learned Lord said: My Lords, with Amendment No. 36 I should like also to mention Amendments Nos. 37 and 44. These are drafting Amendments.

Clause 73(10) extends the power of magistrates' courts to grant legal aid under clause 72(2) to cases where a person has been arrested or summoned for an offence but has not yet come before a magistrates' court. As soon as such a person comes before a magistrates' court his case falls within Clause 72(2). It is unnecessary, therefore, to cover in Clause 73(10) the case of a man "appearing or brought" before a magistrates' court and these words are omitted from Clause 73(10) by Amendment No. 36. Where a person has been summoned the summons will specify the magistrates' court before which he is to appear. That court is clearly the right court to grant legal aid, and it is unnecessary to provide for regulations to specify which court is to grant legal aid. Accordingly, Amendment No. 37 limits the provisions in Clause 73(10) about regulations to the cases of persons who have been arrested but have not yet come before the court. It is necessary to mention both "appeared" and "brought" to cover cases where the defendant has been granted bail at the police station as well as cases where he is remanded in custody. Finally, Amendment No. 44 omits the reference to regulations specifying which magistrates' court may grant legal aid. The power to make regulations is perfectly general and there is no need to duplicate the reference in Clause 73(10) to regulations on this subject. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 56, line 21, leave out from ("and") to ("and") in line 23 and insert the said new words.—(The Lord Chancellor.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

My Lords, I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 56, line 24, leave out from ("shall") to ("be") in line 25 and insert ("in the case of a person arrested for an offence who has not appeared or been brought before a magistrates' court").—(The Lord Chancellor.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Clause 74 [Circumstances in which legal aid may be given]:

THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, Amendments Nos. 38, 39 and 40 are drafting Amendments. The Amendments to Clause 74 are consequential upon the Amendment to Clause 75(2), which enables references to a contribution towards costs to be construed throughout Part IV as including repayment of the whole amount of legally-aided costs. As at present drafted this interpretation applies only to references subsequent to Clause 75(2) because, as your Lordships can see from Clause 75(2), it begins In the following provisions of this Part of this Act …

My Lords, I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 57, line 19, leave out ("or repayment") and insert ("towards costs").—(The Lord Chancellor.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

My Lords, I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 57, line 24, leave out ("or repayment").—(The Lord Chancellor.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Clause 75 [Liability for contributions]:

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

My Lords, I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 57, line 40, leave out ("the following provisions of").—(The Lord Chancellor.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Clause 76 [Means inquiry by the Supplementary Benefits Commission]:

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

My Lords, this is a drafting Amendment, which is intended simply to make the clause easier to read and understand. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 58, line 33, leave out from ("into") to ("to") in line 35 and insert ("his means and the Commission shall comply with the request and report on his means").—(The Lord Chancellor.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

My Lords, the effect of this Amendment is to require a court which receives a report from the Supplementary Benefits Commission after it has made a contribution order to reconsider the terms of the order in the light of the report. The altered wording is more consistent with the terms of Clause 76(2) which requires a court which receives a report from the Supplementary Benefits Commission before making an order to have regard to the report. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 58, line 42, leave out ("may vary the order") and insert ("shall reconsider the order and may vary its terms").—(The Lord Chancellor.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Clause 78 [Supplementary provisions as to payment of contributions]:

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

My Lords, this is a drafting Amendment which makes it clear which of the seven subsections of Clause 80 is referred to in Clause 78. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 59, line 24, after ("80") insert ("(1)").—(The Lord Chancellor.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Clause 82 [Regulations]:

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

My Lords, as I mentioned when dealing with Amendment No. 36, Amendment No. 44 is consequential on that. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 63, line 31, leave out from first ("of") to end of line 33.—(The Lord Chancellor.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Clause 84 [Prohibition on possessing or acquiring a shot gun without a certificate]:

7.0 p.m.

LORD STONHAM moved, in subsection (2), to leave out all words after "granted" down to "any person," and to insert instead: by the chief officer of police unless he has reason to believe that the applicant—

1. (a) is prohibited by the Firearms Act 1937 from possessing a shot gun; or
2. (b) cannot be permitted to possess a shotgun without danger to the public safety or to the peace;

and a shot-gun certificate may be revoked by the chief officer of police for the area in which the holder resides if the officer is satisfied that the holder is so prohibited or cannot be permitted to possess a shot gun as aforesaid. (2A) A shot-gun certificate shall—

1. (a) be in the prescribed form;
2. (b) be granted or renewed subject to any prescribed conditions and no others; and
3. (c) specify the conditions, if any, subject to which it is granted or renewed.

(2B)".

The noble Lord said: My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 45, and would ask your Lordships' agreement that with it we deal with Amendments Nos. 46, 47 and 49. The purpose of these four Amendments is to meet two points raised by the noble and learned Viscount, Lord Dilhorne, on Report stage. The first point was that the criterion of "unfitness to have a shot gun" was too wide and ought to be limited to factors having a relationship to the prevention of crime and criminal activities. The noble and learned Viscount also objected to the words "intemperate habits" as being concerned with safety and not with criminal activities. The second point gave rise to a considerable debate. It arose from the way in which subsection (3) of Section 2 of the 1937 Act is applied to shot-gun certificates by subsection (5) of the clause which we are now considering. The noble and learned Viscount and other noble Lords feared that the effect might be to permit shot-gun certificates to be used to control the sale and possession of shot-gun ammunition.

The four Amendments together meet the point about unfitness and intemperance by substituting the criterion of "danger to the public safety or to the peace." This, we believe, sets an acceptable criterion which the public will expect an authority to have in their mind when issuing certificates for the possession of lethal weapons. It also brings in the concept of criminality, and as regards criminality it looks to the present rather than to the past. We have cleared up the ammunition point by not applying subsection (3) of Section 2 at all, but instead have rewritten it altogether in relation to shot-gun certificates. We believe that this makes it clear beyond any misinterpretation that a shot-gun certificate can apply to shot-guns only, and cannot therefore apply to ammunition.

The words "danger to the public safety" and "danger to the peace" already appear in Section 2 of the 1937 Act and the meaning here will be the same. I do not think that chief officers of police will have any difficulty in interpreting "danger to the peace", and without being too dogmatic about the meaning of an existing Statute I think that "danger to the public safety" would include such things as subversion, unlawful drilling, gun-running for political reasons and activities of that kind, where the danger to the peace, although lurking, is perhaps less immediate. I hope that the noble and learned Viscount, Lord Dilhorne, will agree that in meeting his ammunition point on subsection (3) of Section 2 of the 1937 Act we have really dealt with the corner stone of the ammunition argument. Having met the point there, and particularly having regard to the marked contrast now between subsection (2A) of the Amendment and subsection (3) of the Act, we think that it must now be beyond argument that this clause and the shot-gun certificates granted under it have nothing to do with ammunition, and leave it clear that the present position of shot-gun ammunition is completely untouched by this Bill. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 65, line 21, leave out from ("granted") to first ("any") in line 24 and insert the said new words.—(Lord Stonham.)

VISCOUNT DILHORNE

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Stonham, and to the Government for taking such trouble in considering the points which I raised in Committee and on Report, and in meeting me in this way. I think the position is made much clearer, by re-writing subsection (3) of Section 2 of the Firearms Act, and I think that the circumstances in which a certificate can be withheld are now made as clear as possible. I thought that the noble Lord was very wise in not seeking to define more closely the wording which has been taken in this new subsection from the Firearms Act 1937, because it is not easy to define what is meant by "danger to the public safety" as contrasted with "danger to the peace". Speaking as one who has had the misfortune of once being shot by a neighbouring gun, luckily without sustaining any injury, I shall not put to the noble Lord the question whether my being shot in those circumstances would constitute a danger to the public safety. But if it did, and if on that account a certificate could be withheld from anyone who was a dangerous shot, then I do not think that that would be at all a bad thing.

Having said that, I should like to ask the noble Lord just one question. The new subsection (2A) says: A shot gun certificate shall—

1. (a) be in the prescribed form;
2. (b) be granted or renewed subject to any prescribed conditions and no others; and
3. (c) specify the conditions, if any, subject to which it is granted or renewed."

When one looks at the Bill, one sees in lines 22 and 23 that the conditions have to be, prescribed by rules made by the Secretary of State under the Firearms Act 1937", Those words have been left out of this Amendment and I could not find (I may have missed it) where that condition is laid down in the Bill. I do not know whether the noble Lord has seen that, but I wanted to raise that point. Maybe the answer is there and I have not detected it.

The only other point I want to make—though I do not want to raise this question about ammunition again—is that ammunition is referred to in a number of other sections mentioned in Clause 84(5), and I think that in each of those sections it is expressed to be "ammunition to which this Part of this Act applies". It is perhaps rather unfortunate to incorporate those sections containing the word "ammunition", when ammunition is meant to have no application to shot-gun certificates. However, I do not think that has any practical effect, and I again repeat my gratitude to the noble Lord for meeting me so completely on these matters.

LORD STONHAM

My Lords, I am most grateful to the noble and learned Viscount for all that he has said. The answer to the first question which he asked is that the provision is in Clause 88 of the Bill. May I now answer him on the other point, which has really given me a very great deal of concern, in particular, Section 11 of the 1937 Act which mentions ammunition. The reason why we accepted the noble and learned Viscount's strong advice on Report stage to take out subsection (3) of Clause 2, was because this had a particular application, or so it appeared to us, with regard to ammunition and this does not apply to the others.

Perhaps I may discuss, quite briefly, the Section 11 point, which I think is the main one that will concern the noble and learned Viscount. As we see it, subsections (1) and (3) of Section 11 of the 1937 Act prevent anyone, notably a registered firearms dealer from selling, repairing or testing any Part I firearm or any Part I ammunition, except on production by a customer of a Part I certificate. Part I firearms and Part I ammunition have no necessary relationship with each other. Ammunition for a Part I firearm is not necessarily Part I ammunition, and Part I ammunition includes certain rare kinds of shot-gun ammunition. But the effect of subsection (5) of Clause 84 of the Bill is to apply Section 11 to shot-guns and shot-gun certificates as it already applies to Part I firearms and to Part I certificates. There is no mention, either in the Bill or in Section 11, to ammunition other than Part I ammunition. Accordingly, registered firearms dealers and other persons will be as free to deal in and test ammunition, other than Part I ammuni- tion, as they are at present. On the other hand, a person wishing to purchase Part I ammunition will still have to produce a Part I certificate authorising him to purchase ammunition of that kind, because a shot-gun certificate will not and cannot authorise the possession of anything but a shot-gun.

My Lords, we have considered this matter very carefully and, so far as I am concerned, very painfully. We are satisfied that this is the effect of the Bill, and the effect of the legislation which the Government intend. I hope that what I have now said will not only satisfy the noble and learned Viscount but will put the position beyond question in case there should be any doubt on the point which the noble Lord, Lord Hawke, raised on Report stage.

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

LORD STONHAM

My Lords, I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 65, line 37, leave out ("to (4) and (7)") and insert (", (4) and (8)").—(Lord Stonham.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

LORD STONHAM

My Lords, I beg to move.

Amendment moved—

Page 66, leave out lines 3 to 11 and insert— ("( ) the reference in section 2(4) of that Act to the foregoing provisions of that section shall be construed as including a reference to subsection (2) of this section.")— (Lord Stonham.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

7.12 p.m.

VISCOUNT DILHORNE moved, in subsection (5), after paragraph (b), to insert: ( ) In section 6(2) of that Act for the words 'the constable may seize and detain the firearm or ammunition and may require that person to declare to him immediately his name and address', there shall be substituted 'the constable may require that person to declare to him immediately his name and address and to undertake to produce the certificate within seven days at a named police station, and, if that person refuses to give his name and address or fails to satisfy the constable that the name and address he gives is genuine, the constable may seize and detain the gun'.

The noble and learned Viscount said: My Lords, this Amendment brings us back to a point which I raised at a previous stage and on which I moved an Amendment. I have now put down a slightly altered form of Amendment which I hope the Government will be able to accept. Under Section 6(2) of the Firearms Act, if you have not got your certificate upon you a constable can seize and detain the firearm and require you to give your name and address immediately. He has the power to do that. I think that that is really too draconian a power to give in relation to shot-guns, so I have attempted to put down an alternative form; that is to say, that a constable may require a person who does not produce his certificate on demand to give him his name and address and to undertake to produce a certificate within seven days at a named police station, and that only in the event of a refusal to give the name and address or of a failure to satisfy the constable that the name and address is genuine can the constable seize and detain the gun. I think that that is a reasonable proposal, and I hope the Government will say that they can accept it.

It is argued that this power to seize a gun when a man has not got a certificate might be useful if one found people armed with shot-guns going over one's land. I do not think that this certificate procedure ought to be used as a pretext, in those circumstances, for seizing a gun. It may be that, if it does not exist already, there ought to be the power to seize guns when people are found committing armed trespass; but, as I see it, you really cannot justify a seizure forthwith, when they are committing armed trespass, by the fact that they do not produce a certificate.

It would lead to this anomalous situation. If people living in some part of London get shot-gun certificates and are then found going on the estate of my noble friend Lord St. Aldwyn with shotguns in their possession, engaged in criminal activities of one kind or another, you cannot rely, or ought not to rely, on this certificate procedure for removing their guns from them; because in all probability when the local police constable comes up to them he will find that they are all armed with certificates issued in London. So it seems to me to be nonsense to give a constable the power of seizure in all cases. But he certainly should have the power of seizure if he is not satisfied that the name and address given to him is genuine.

I have worded this Amendment rather carefully for this reason. Sometimes one finds a provision that police constables have certain powers if there are reasonable grounds for their exercise. I have not put on the police constable that burden of showing that there are reasonable grounds for the exercise of this power. I would leave it to the discretion of the police constable to say that he was not satisfied that the name and address were genuine, when he would be able to keep the gun. But I would not give the police power in all cases, including a case where a man finds that he has left his firearms certificate at home, to seize the gun forthwith because of that reason. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 66, line 11, at end insert the said subsection.—(Lord Dilhorne.)

LORD STONHAM

My Lords, the effect of this Amendment would be to prevent a constable from seizing a shotgun when he found someone with it without a shot-gun certificate and when that someone was unable to demonstrate that he was within an exemption. The noble and learned Viscount feels that it would be enough if the person gave his name and address and undertook to produce the certificate at a named police station within seven days unless the constable had grounds for believing that the name and address were false.

VISCOUNT DILHORNE

My Lords, with great respect, that is not so. The noble Lord has got it wrong. It is not, "unless the police constable has grounds for not believing him". The onus is the other way. It will be for the person who has the gun to satisfy the police constable that he has given a genuine name and address. That is a very different thing.

LORD STONHAM

I am sorry I misrepresented the noble and learned Viscount; it was quite unintentional. But I am very glad he has emphasised that point so clearly, because in our view that is one of the main objections to the Amendment. It is an Amendment with which one is in sympathy. We do not want to be draconian about these things, but at the same time we do want to protect the countryside, and particularly the estate of the noble Earl, Lord St. Aldwyn, from the depredations of hooligans and other people. The machinery proposed by the noble and learned Viscount is somewhat similar to that in the road traffic law. But as to the point about the name and address, there will be plenty of occasions when a constable coming up to a hooligan who is in possession of a shot-gun will know his name and address only too well because he is a frequent nuisance in the village. Of course he knows his name and address, and of course the constable ought to be in a position to seize the shot-gun if he feels that the man has been doing wrong. If we accepted the noble and learned Viscount's Amendment the constable would find himself unable to do anything but say, "Hallo, Billy Brown", because he would know what his name and address was. Therefore, this is a weakness.

Then, again, perhaps it is not that particular case but the case of someone who the constable has reason to believe, perhaps by his conduct, his appearance or in some other way, is not respectable and ought not to be there shooting. So the constable says, "Give me your name and address", and he is given a name an address. If it sounds reasonable and he concludes he has got to accept it, and if, eventually, it is found that the address is false, the court cannot act because the person is not there; therefore they cannot seize the gun because it cannot be brought before the court.

There is also a technical objection to this Amendment. The noble and learned Viscount mentioned just now that he was unlucky in his drafting. I never make much of technical objections, but they do militate against the acceptance of Amendments. The technical objection is that the undertaking contemplated by the Amendment would be quite unenforceable; because it is not an offence to fail to produce a certificate, whether in pursuance of an undertaking or otherwise. In the Government's view—and I think I said this on Report stage—this matter of when the power of seizure should or should not be exercised is best left to the good sense and training of the police. Any attempt to limit the power can result only in a complexity—and a complexity, moreover, as between one class of firearms and another—which no policeman, however well trained, can be expected to carry in his head. The interaction of this Amendment with subsections (6) and (7) of Section 5 of the Firearms Act 1965, which relates to powers of constables in relation to the seizure of firearms, would tax the understanding of anybody—as, in the earlier stages of this Bill, this particular clause more than taxed our understanding.

I think the crux of the matter is whether or not you trust a police officer to carry out his duties in this matter sensibly. I think any of us who have had the good fortune to live for any number of years in the country will say: "Yes, you can trust a policeman in this matter." We also want the countryside to be protected from depredation by hooligans, who have been able at times to move about with impunity and have been quite a menace to farmers. We believe, therefore, that in this particular clause of the Bill we have given powers to the police which, reasonably used—and they will use them reasonably—can be useful. I hope, with that and with what I have said about the Amendment, the noble and learned Viscount will feel able to withdraw it.

VISCOUNT DILHORNE

My Lords, the argument about hooligans walking about the countryside does not seem to me to be a very strong one for this reason: hooligans may or may not have certificates in their possession; and if they have certificates you cannot take the gun from them. The real answer to that particular provision is to give a power (if there is not that power already) to take away guns found in the possession of people who are guilty of armed trespass. That is a different matter. You cannot, or ought not to, use the certificate procedure for that particular purpose; although that purpose is desirable. When you try to use it you will find that a lot of people on land with guns have had certificates issued a long way away. It may be true that the police constable knows the name and address of the hooligan; and he finds him without a certificate in his possession. It may be that you will want a further Amendment to deal with that. But I do not think that is any answer to the Amendment I put before the House.

The strongest argument against the Amendment is the one the noble Lord advanced last, that because of the Firearms Act 1937 a police constable would have different powers depending on whether it is a rifle or a shot-gun. I think there is force in that argument. I think the provision in the Firearms Act 1937 is really unsatisfactory; but while it remains there in relation to rifles it would also be unsatisfactory perhaps to have a different procedure with regard to shot-guns.

While I am going to ask leave to withdraw the Amendment, I impress on the noble Lord, Lord Stonham, that the right way to deal with the people he talks about, the armed hooligans, is to amend the general law so that their weapons can be taken from them if they are found guilty of armed trespass, and not to try to reply on this certification procedure; and also to bear in mind that it might not be possible for the local chief of police to refuse these people called hooligans a certificate because he might not be able to say that possession by them of a shot-gun would be a danger to public safety or to the peace. It is a difficult thing to tell in advance. Having said that, I ask leave to withdraw the Amendment.

Amendment by leave withdrawn.

LORD STONHAM

My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 49.

Amendment moved— Page 66, line 13, leave out ("the Firearms Act 1937") and insert ("that Act").—(Lord Stonham.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

7.25 p.m.

LORD INGLEWOOD moved, in subsection (8), to leave out from the first "of", to the end of the subsection, and to insert: land or a person entitled to exercise sporting rights over land and use the shot gun on such land.

The noble Lord said: My Lords, on Report stage the noble Lord, Lord Stonham, moved an Amendment permitting someone not in possession of a shot-gun certificate to borrow and use a gun in certain specified circumstances. I understand it was his intention to meet a point raised at an earlier stage, and to do it in a helpful way. While all of us would deplore the indiscriminate borrowing or lending of a gun—finding that quite unacceptable—I do not think he had any wish to make it impossible for a responsible person to be forbidden to borrow a gun in all circumstances. There was a short debate on this point, and doubt was cast on the choice of the word "occupier" in this context; because if the occupier was the occupier of agricultural land he would often only have limited rights under the Ground Game Acts; and if he were an occupier of land which did not rank as agricultural land, he might have no right to shoot at all.

I submit that the use of the word "occupier" is too limited, and that what we had in mind, and no more, is covered by the addition of the words now proposed. The noble Lord, Lord Stonham, knows that I have no objection to the addition of the words "in the presence of" which were in his Amendment, although I should think it would be better without them, because they appear only to elaborate what is really a simple thing. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 66, line 28, leave out from ("of") to end of line 30 and insert ("land or a person entitled to exercise sporting rights over land and use the shot gun on such land.").—(Lord Inglewood.)

VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS

My Lords, I do not suppose this Amendment can be altered now because it is Third Reading, so either we must deal with it as it is or not at all. I wonder whether the noble Lord, Lord Stonham, could tell me one thing about this. There is this difficulty about the occupier, mentioned by my noble friend Lord Inglewood. But is it quite certain for these purposes that "private premises" is the same to all intents and purposes as "land"? Is the distinction intended to be made between all private land and any place to which the public has access—there is the difficulty of footpaths and the like which may have to be taken into account. The Government produced this Amendment at the last stage of the Bill. I do not disagree with it; I want just to see the extent to which it goes. I wonder why it is "private premises" as opposed to "land" or some other slightly more familiar phrase in this general context. If the noble Lord could tell me that I think it would be helpful.

So far as the rest of the Amendment is concerned, I suppose it could be a little difficult on occasion for any policeman who came up to question the person who was shooting without a certificate to make certain that the excuse that he was shooting there with the permission of the person entitled to exercise sporting rights was a valid one. I think this might be rather a large loophole on some occasions, because by the time the policeman has gone to check the information, the person who is shooting may have disappeared. It may be that that is a flaw in this particular Amendment which cannot be put right. If, at any rate, the noble Lord can help about "private premises" and "land" I should be much obliged.

LORD STONHAM

My Lords, to deal first with the noble and learned Viscount's point, he will remember that on Report stage I moved an Amendment that "premises" included "land", and I think that answers his point. It is occupiers of private land we are dealing with, so far as this Part of the Bill is concerned. The noble Viscount was also correct in thinking that this Amendment could not now be amended; and in this form it is not acceptable. But I always prefer to discuss the sense of a particular Amendment rather than to stand pat on technicalities.

Lord Inglewood's Amendment appears, on first sight, attractive, desirable and not unreasonable, but its effect, as I shall try to explain, would go far wider than I think the noble Lord has in mind, and far wider than he would desire. Its effect, as he said, would be to permit a person to shoot over someone else's land without a shot-gun certificate, so long as he had borrowed the shot-gun he used from the person occupying the land or having sporting rights over it. One difficulty is that under the noble Lord's Amendment there is no requirement that the borrower should be accompanied by the occupier—which we think extremely important—or by anybody else; and the occupier or the owner of the sporting rights might not even be in the country. I would point out to the noble Lord that the loan does not have to be made in person. One can lend by an agent, which broadens the field considerably.

I have tried to make clear at the various stages of this Bill that the policy behind Part V is that all shot-gun owners and regular shot-gun users should have a shot-gun certificate. The Amendment would provide wide freedom to shoot regularly for persons who do not have a certificate and who, indeed, might have been refused a certificate by the police for reasons provided in the Bill. The exemptions from the shot-gun certificate system which have been made in Part V are specific and admittedly narrow. Overseas visitors, for example, are not exempt for more than 30 days in any period of 12 months. Special approval is required from the police for people without a certificate to shoot at artificial targets at any particular times and places.

Subsection (7), with which we are dealing, refers to another limited case, that of the non-shooting visitor staying in the country who goes out with his host on the spur of the moment. In that situation the lawfulness of what is occurring can be established and the control, therefore, is not seriously weakened. I put it to the noble Lord that if all that is required is that a landowner or the person holding shooting rights should have lent the gun, control is capable of evasion on a widespread and organised scale. And that would go a long way to create the impression that, provided the gun is borrowed, no firearms certificate is ever required. After all, if the occupier does not have to be present, why should not this exemption apply to any borrowed gun? If this were so, the whole impact of Part V of the Bill would be undermined.

So far as the police are concerned in administering this, it would mean that any person, or groups of persons, however suspicious they might seem, could claim that they had borrowed their weapons from the occupier. Groups of hooligans, who already cause considerable damage by irresponsible shooting in the country, could in that way escape scot-free. They could say that just one of them had a certificate, and the whole gang could borrow guns from him. For the exemption to be practicable, enforcement has to be kept in mind which requires the occupier of the land to be present when the person without the certificate, his guest, has the shot-gun, since he is the only person from whom the police officer on the spot can reasonably expect to get statisfactory information. He, as the host, as owner of the gun, is the only person who could be reasonably expected to exercise any control.

My Lords, another major difficulty about the Amendment is that it is not possible to define in legal terms what are sporting rights. I have no doubt that almost every noble Lord could tell us what he means by sporting rights, but it is a very difficult thing to put it in a Statute. You could, for example, pay the owner of the land so much per week, per month or per year. Or you could knock on any farmer's door and ask permission to shoot a few pigeons. If he said, "Yes", you would have sporting rights, and under this Amendment you would be able to shoot with impunity, without a certificate. We have already tried to meet noble Lords in this matter and have made a number of exceptions. I appreciate the thought that the noble Lord, Lord Inglewood, had in mind, and we have pushed the door ajar. In view of what I have said, I hope that he will agree that if we accepted his Amendment, we should be at risk of opening it so wide that we should destroy the safeguard altogether. In the light of that, I hope the noble Lord will feel able to withdraw his Amendment.

LORD INGLEWOOD

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Stonham, for replying to my Amendment at such length and showing me the weaknesses of it—and there certainly are weaknesses. And if I admit that, I hope that the noble Lord will admit that I have shown the weaknesses of his wording. Whereas my Amendment may be too wide, his wording is so tight that it will hardly ever be used. It will simply be a subsection in a Bill filling up so much space. But as my Amendment could do harm, I think it better that we should prefer the noble Lord's which would do neither good nor harm. Accordingly, I ask leave to withdraw the Amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 85 [Restrictions on gifts of shot guns]:

LORD STONHAM

My Lords, this is a drafting Amendment. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 67, line 11, leave out from ("committed") to ("as") in line 12.—(Lord Stonham.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Clause 86 [Power of court to order forfeiture of firearm, etc.]:

7.36 p.m.

LORD STONHAM

My Lords, I beg to move to leave out Clause 86.

The effect of this Amendment would be to delete from the Bill an additional provision relating to forfeiture inserted by an Opposition Amendment on Report stage. I do not think I shall be held to be exaggerating if I say that at that moment during the Report stage, for a variety of reasons which there is no need to explore, the House temporarily lost the fine edge of its alertness and the Amendment was accepted and duly incorporated in the Bill. We have now had time for cooler reflection as, no doubt, has the noble Viscount, Lord Colville of Culross.

There are already forfeiture provisions for Part I firearms and ammunition in Section 25 of the 1937 Act, and for air weapons and ammunition in Section 3 of the Air Guns and Shot Guns, Etc., Act 1962. Clause 85(2) and Clause 88(2) of this Bill provide similar forfeiture provisions for shot-guns and shot-gun ammunition. The salient feature of the provisions in this Bill, which I have mentioned, and in the other two Acts, is that the power of the court to order the forfeiture of a weapon is conditional upon a conviction for a relevant offence. This is the great point of difference from Clause 86 which I now seek to remove from the Bill, because in that clause the power of forfeiture is exercisable in the absence of any conviction at all. It is not necessary to have a conviction for a court to order forfeiture of a weapon. I am sure your Lordships will agree that this would indeed be a novel provision in the criminal law. There is no indication as to the principles on which the court should exercise this rather startling and novel power.

A very strong case would have to be made out for allowing the forfeiture and destruction of property—which might, in the case of a shot-gun be very valuable—without proof that any offence had been committed by anybody. In the opinion of the Government, Clause 85(2) of this Bill and the 1937 Act provide together sufficient powers in relation to forfeiture. Accordingly, we recommend the deletion of the clause as being excessive. If I may I will put to the noble Viscount, as an additional reason for trying to secure his agreement that we should delete this clause, that as the text stands the drafting is not satisfactory. It leaves a number of procedural problems wholly unresolved. I think we all know how this happened to creep in, and I think we should all agree that it should now creep out. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Leave out Clause 86.—(Lord Stonham.)

VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS

My Lords, while accepting that at the time (and I regret that I was not here) chaos reigned supreme in this House, and this particular clause was put in without much consideration, I think slightly scant respect has been paid by the noble Lord to the reasoning behind it. May I say at once that I shall shed no tears if it is taken out, but I am surprised that the Government have not understood the point of it. Perhaps I can tell them what it is, and make sure that the noble Lord appreciates it.

I do not think that the circumstances in which this clause was to operate are in the least obscure. It was really my second barrel, if I may put it like that in this context. I was proposing, and the House accepted in Clause 85, that a child under 14 should no longer be a criminal if he was given a present of a shot-gun and he accepted the gift. Hitherto in the Bill that had been a criminal offence. The situation now is that the person who gives the gun or the ammunition is still a criminal, or liable to be a criminal if he is convicted, but the child who accepts it is not.

The question then arose in my mind as to what was to happen to the gun. If the child was not guilty of an offence, then, as the noble Lord, Lord Stonham, has quite rightly said, the powers of forfeiture and disposal which are available in the Firearms Act, and also in the Air Guns, Shot Guns, etc. Act 1962 would not be able to be used. I therefore did my best to concoct a power for the courts so that where the child had been given the gift and was under 15 they could, if they thought fit, order forfeiture of the gun or, I suppose, in extreme cases, destroy it. The principle seems to me, on reading the clause—and it relates specifically to the offence of children receiving gifts—to be perfectly clear.

I hope that the noble Lord will not be in any further doubts about the reason why I put my Amendment down. If the drafting is faulty, I of course accept that in Amendments of my own concoction. Is the noble Lord satisfied that, in cases where a child has a gun, under the relevant age, which is different for various weapons, and is prosecuted for an offence for having the gun, the firearm or ammunition in his posession, the court has sufficient power under the existing Acts or under the other parts of the Bill? If so, then I am certain that this ought to be left out. This was the only contingency that I was attempting to deal with, and if the noble Lord is satisfied about that, my moment of glory is over and my clause must come out of the Bill. Perhaps I have now explained the point to the noble Lord.

LORD STONHAM

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Viscount for explaining this so carefully. I share his regret that he was not present on Report to explain it then, and even more am I sorry that I was not here to hear the explanation he did not give. But to answer his question immediately, we are completely satisfied that subsection (2) of Clause 85 contains that power, where it says: and the court by which he is convicted may make such order as to the forfeiture or disposal of the shot gun or ammunition in respect of which the offence was committed … We are quite confident that this gives the necessary power of forfeiture which the noble Viscount wants.

I know we are talking about a case where the child has the gun, and it is not possible for the child to have committed an offence by reason of the Amendment which was accepted by the House on Report. I read this clause carefully, and so carefully that I underlined a section of it in ink. I am talking about Clause 86(1), where appear the words: if the Court is of opinion that, in addition to or instead of dealing with the person so charged, an order should be made as to the forfeiture or disposal of the firearm, air weapon, shot gun or ammunition in respect of which the charge has been brought the Court may make such order in that respect against the person to whom the gift of the firearm, air weapon, shot gun or ammunition was made … I interpreted that—and I think it was a correct interpretation—that the forfeiture could be made without a conviction, and that it is expressly provided there. This was, in my belief, a novel and unacceptable piece of jurisdiction and one that, on reflection, we should not want to have in the Bill. It was for that reason that I moved the deletion of the clause, to which I hope noble Lords will agree.

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Clause 87 [Power of court to order forfeiture of firearm etc.]:

VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS moved, in subsection (5), to leave out paragraphs (a) to (c) and insert: ("(a) for subsection (2) there shall be substituted the following subsection:— '(2) No person shall make a gift of or lend any firearm or ammunition to which Part I of this Act applies to any person under the age of fourteen.' (b)—(i) for the words in subsection (1) from 'to any other person' to the end; and (ii) for the words in subsection (3) 'to any other person whom he knows or has reasonable ground for believing to be under the age of fourteen years',")

The noble Viscount said: My Lords, since the noble Lord has now said that he is satisfied for the purposes of Clause 85 that the child who receives the gift, though not guilty himself of an offence, may in suitable cases have the shot-gun or the ammunition taken away from him as a result of having been convicted for some other offence, as I understand it there seems to be no reason now why we should not assimilate, as I had intended to do on Report stage if I had been here, the new wording of Clause 85(1) with the equivalent provisions that relate to firearms and ammunition for them, and to air weapons and ammunition for them.

The House accepted that children should not be guilty of a criminal offence in accepting shot-guns or ammunition, and precisely the same arguments apply to the acceptance by children of these other weapons. If it is a ridiculous concept to suppose that a child under 14 should be able to quote the provision of the criminal Statute against the would-be donor in the case of a shot-gun, then it is just as ridiculous in the case of other weapons. That is why I have reverted to my Amendment No. 54, which is intended to have this effect so far as Part I firearms are concerned, and I hope that in the circumstances the Government may see fit to bring this provision into line with what is already in the Bill in relation to shotguns. The Amendment looks complicated, but the provisions in paragraph (b)(i) and (ii) are only the provisions that already appear in the Bill, re-arranged so as to take account of my re-writing of the relevant portion of the 1937 Act. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 68, line 21, leave out paragraphs (a) to (c) and insert the said paragraphs.—(Viscount Colville of Culross.)

LORD STONHAM

My Lords, I gather that the noble Viscount is also asking the House to consider Amendments Nos. 55 and 56 at the same time.

VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS

If the House pleases.

LORD STONHAM

Then we can consider them together, my Lords. It will be in the recollection of the House that we had an interesting discussion on this point when the Amendment was pressed to a Division and carried. As the noble Viscount has pointed out, we are now in a position of inconsistency where, so far as shot-guns are concerned, it is not an offence, and so far as the Firearms Air Guns and Shot Guns etc. Act is concerned, it is an offence. In those circumstances, the Government had a choice. We could have opposed the present Amendments for the sake of consistency and left it to another place to disagree with us on the Amendment which was carried on Report, or we could, as the noble Viscount has suggested, accept the Amendment that he now proposes and achieve consistency in that way. The three measures would then be in line with regard at least to the principle of the offences committed by children. Clearly, we cannot have a different rule in this respect between shot-guns, on the one hand, and air-guns and Part I firearms, on the other.

In considering this position, I think we must take into consideration what I regard as the feeling of the House on that occasion, quite apart from the way the vote went. But certainly I had the feeling that a number of my noble friends who were then sitting behind me voted, as it were (to put it rather crudely), with their posteriors by remaining sitting. Therefore, in these circumstances I think we should achieve consistency, levelling up, by recommending to your Lordships that the noble Viscount's Amendments should be accepted.

VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS

My Lords, I am very much obliged to the noble Lord. I do not think I ought to take the credit for this, except in that perhaps, for once, I have the drafting right. The originator of this point was, I think, my noble friend the Duke of Atholl, and to him should be accorded the glory of having put this matter correctly into the Bill. But I am glad that the noble Lord has seen fit to recommend to the House in this way. Of course, I am very grateful to those noble Lords, particularly on that side of the House, who agreed with the arguments put forward. I think that the noble Lord himself must agree now that to make it an offence for a small child in these circumstances to accept a gift really is taking it a bit far, particularly when there are the other offences with which he can, if necessary, be charged on suitable occasions. I am therefore, as I say, very grateful to the noble Lord, and to the Government, for accepting these Amendments.

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS: My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 55.

Amendment moved—

Page 69, line 15, at end insert— ( ) For subsection 1(1) of the Air Guns and Shot Guns, etc., Act 1962 (Restrictions upon the use and possession of air weapons) there shall be substituted the following subsection:— '(1) No person shall make a gift of any air weapon or ammunition for an air weapon to any person under the age of fourteen'.")—(Viscount Colville of Culross.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS

My Lords, this Amendment is consequential. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 69, line 16, leave out ("Air Guns and Shot Guns, etc., Act") and insert ("said Act of").—(Viscount Colville of Culross.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Clause 97 [New provision as to appeal against sentence passed at assizes or quarter sessions]:

7.54 p.m.

LORD STONHAM

My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 57. This is an Amendment of substance, which adds a new subsection to Clause 97 to extend the powers of the Court of Appeal under subsection (7) of that clause. It is rather complicated. I should be pleased to explain it to your Lordships if you feel it necessary otherwise, I will move it formally.

Amendment moved—

Page 76, line 37, at end insert— ("( ) The power of the Court of Appeal under the last foregoing subsection to pass a sentence which the court below had power to pass for an offence shall, notwithstanding that the court below made no order under section 39(1) of this Act in respect of a suspended sentence previously passed on the appellant for another offence, include power to deal with him in respect of that suspended sentence, where the court below—

1. (a) could have so dealt with him if it had not passed on him a sentence of borstal training quashed by the Court of Appeal under paragaph (a) of the last foregoing subsection; or
2. (b) did so deal with him in accordance with paragraph (d) of the said subsection (1) by making no order in respect of the suspended sentence.")—(Lord Stonham.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

LORD STONHAM

My Lords, this Amendment, No. 58, remedies an omission in Clause 97(8). It replaces a reference to Section 5(1) of the Criminal Appeal Act 1907 in that subsection by a reference to Section 5 of the Act. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 76, line 39, leave out from ("under") to end of line 41 and insert ("section 5 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1907) (special powers of Court on appeal against conviction)").—(Lord Stonham.)

LORD BROOKE OF CUMNOR

My Lords, the explanation of the noble Lord, Lord Stonham, seems to be perfectly clear, but the Amendment appears to me to be ambiguous. As I read line 39 of page 76, the word "under" occurs twice. I think we ought, if we are sending this Amendment to another place, to make it clear beyond question what we mean. I am perfectly ready to move a Manuscript Amendment, so to speak, to leave out the words from the second "under", if that indeed is correct. I think that that will accord with the noble Lord's explanation. But I would urge that, unless there is something which has escaped my notice, we should specify, in passing this Amendment, which "under" we mean—that is to say, in line 39 the second "under".

LORD STONHAM

My Lords, I am most grateful to the noble Lord. It is quite obvious that nothing whatever escapes him. I should be grateful to your Lordships if you would accept the suggestion of the noble Lord, Lord Brooke of Cumnor, that the Amendment should read "… leave out from second 'under' …".

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

My Lords, may I take it that there has been a manuscript Amendment, so that the Amendment now reads to "leave out from second 'under'…"?

On Question, Amendment, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 98 [Amendment of enactments relating to criminal appeals]:

LORD STONHAM moved to add to the clause: (7) In the Criminal Appeal (Northern Ireland) Act 1930, sections 13A(5) and 17 of the Courts-Martial (Appeals) Act 1951, the Administration of Justice Act 1960 and Schedule 1 to the Criminal Appeal Act 1964 any reference to an enactment of the Parliament of Northern Ireland shall include a reference to an enactment corresponding thereto and for the time being in force in Northern Ireland.

The noble Lord said: My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 59, and I shall be grateful if we consider with it Amendments Nos. 63, 66, 68, 71, 77 and 77A, which are all consequential. This Amendment adds a new subsection to Clause 98. Its object is to facilitate consolidation of the enactments relating to criminal appeals in Northern Ireland and to courts-martial appeals. These Statutes refer to enactments of the Parliament of Northern Ireland, notably the Mental Health Act (Northern Ireland) 1961. Some of these references do, and others do not, include a reference to any corresponding future enactment of that Parliament or of the United Kingdom Parliament legislating for Northern Ireland. Other references (for example, those in Acts passed before 1961) refer to earlier Acts of that Parliament or in general terms of enactments corresponding to particular enactments applicable to England and Wales. This Amendment and also Amendment No. 66, in Schedule 4, provide a uniform definition applicable to all Northern Ireland enactments and bring up to date references to such enactments which are not now in force, having been replaced by a subsequent Act. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 78, line 14, at end insert the said subsection.—(Lord Stonham.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Clause 100 [Regulations, rules and orders]:

LORD STONHAM

My Lords, this is a drafting Amendment. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 78, line 22, after ("orders") insert ("other than orders under section 69(1) of this Act").—(Lord Stonham.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

LORD STONHAM

My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 61A, which is of a technical nature, and adds to the Bill a provision that has become common form. It enables orders under the Bill to be varied or revoked. I beg to move.

Amendment moved—

Page 78, line 26, at end insert— ("( ) Any order made under any provision of this Act by statutory instrument may be varied or revoked by a subsequent order made under that provision").—(Lord Stonham.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Clause 106 [Short title, extent and commencement]:

LORD STONHAM

My Lords, this Amendment extends to Scotland such transitional provisions as are needed for clauses of the Bill which may apply to Scotland. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 80, line 32, at end insert ("and paragraphs 7, 10 to 12 and 14 of Schedule 5").—(Lord Stonham.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

LORD STONHAM: My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 63.

Amendment moved— Page 81, line 9, after ("98(6)") insert ("and (7)").—(Lord Stonham.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

LORD STONHAM

My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 64, and with it I should like to move Amendment No. 65. These are drafting Amendments consequential to Amendment No. 72 in Schedule 4. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 81, line 12, leave out ("and").—(Lord Stonham.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

LORD STONHAM

My Lords, I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 81, line 13, at end insert ("and section 16 of the Criminal Justice Act (Northern Ireland) 1966").—(Lord Stonham.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Schedule 4 [Miscellaneous amendments of enactments relating to criminal appeal]:

8.0 p.m.

LORD STONHAM

My Lords, I beg to move.

Amendment moved—

Page 123, line 32, at end insert— (". In section 17 (removal of prisoners for purposes of appeal from courts-martial) the following shall be substituted for paragraph (f):— '(f) section 13 of the Prison Act (Northern Ireland) 1953'.")—(Lord Stonham.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

LORD STONHAM

My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 67 and with it I would discuss Amendment No. 76, in Schedule 7. These are drafting Amendments. I beg to move.

Amendment moved—

Page 124, line 7, at end insert— ("( ) For section 3(3) there shall be substituted the following subsection— '(3) Where an appellant who is not in custody appears before the criminal division of the Court of Appeal, either on the hearing of his appeal or in any proceedings preli- minary or incidental thereto, the Court may direct that there be paid to him out of local funds the expenses of his appearance; and any amount ordered to be paid to him under this subsection shall be ascertained as soon as practicable by the registrar of criminal appeals.'").— (Lord Stonham.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

LORD STONHAM

My Lords, I beg to move No. 68.

Amendment moved— Page 125, line 21. leave out from ("1961") to end of line 23.—(Lord Stonham.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

LORD STONHAM

My Lords, this is another drafting Amendment. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 126, line 28, leave out ("be ascertained") and insert ("except where it is a specific amount ordered to be paid towards the costs as a whole, be ascertained as soon as practicable").—(Lord Stonham.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

LORD STONHAM

My Lords, this Amendment provides that paragraph 29 of Schedule 4 shall apply to England and Wales only. It deletes a reference in Section 9(3) of the Administration of Justice Act 1960 to rules of court authorising a defendant to be present on the hearing of an appeal to the House of Lords or of any preliminary or incidental proceedings. The change effected by paragraph 29 is not required for Northern Ireland. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 126, line 32, after ("appeal)") insert ("as it applies to England and Wales").—(Lord Stonham.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

LORD STONHAM

My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 71.

Amendment moved— Page 127, line 46, leave out from ("1961") to end of line 48.—(Lord Stonham.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

LORD STONHAM

My Lords, this Amendment, which applies to Northern Ireland only, includes a further provision in Schedule 4. The effect is to add a new subsection to Section 16 of the Criminal Justice Act (Northern Ireland) 1966. This is a technical Amendment which corresponds to that effected in Section 3 of the Criminal Procedure (Insanity) Act 1964 by lines 24 to 28 on page 128 of the Bill. The change ensures that where an appeal is allowed against a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity there is an automatic amendment of the record of the trial court. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 129, line 15, at end insert—

("THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACT (NORTHERN IRELAND) 1966 (c. 20)

At the end of section 16 (provisions relating to disposal of appeal against verdict of not guilty on the ground of insanity) there shall be added the following subsection— '(5) An order of the Court of Criminal Appeal allowing an appeal in accordance with subsection (4) shall operate as a direction to the clerk of the Crown and peace acting for the court before which the appellant was tried to amend the record to conform with the order'").—(Lord Stonham.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Schedule 5 [Transitional provisions and savings]:

LORD STONHAM

My Lords, this is a drafting Amendment. I beg to move.

Amendment moved—

Page 131, line 39, leave out paragraph 14 and insert— ("14. Section 93 of this Act shall not apply to a term of imprisonment to be served by a defaulter which has been fixed or imposed before the commencement of that section.")—(Lord Stonham.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Schedule 6 [Minor and Consequential Amendments]:

LORD STONHAM

My Lords, this is a drafting Amendment to Section 98 of the Magistrates' Courts Act 1952. I beg to move.

Amendment moved—

Page 134, line 36, at end insert:— ("18. In section 98(2) and (3) (constitution and place of sitting of magistrates' court) for the words section 70 of this Act' there shall be substituted the words 'section 43 of the Criminal Justice Act 1967'").—(Lord Stonham.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Schedule 7 [Enactments Repealed]:

LORD STONHAM

My Lords, this is a drafting Amendment to eliminate an unnecessary repeal in Section 21 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1907. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 138, leave out lines 13 to 16.—(Lord Stonham.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

LORD STONHAM

My Lords, I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 139, line 14, column 3, leave out ("Section 3(3)").—(Lord Stonham.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

LORD STONHAM

My Lords, the words in Section 67(3) of the Mental Health Act 1959 which it is proposed to repeal enable legal aid to be granted to a person committed to quarter sessions with a view to the making of an order restricting his discharge from hospital. Clause 72(4) of the Bill will enable legal aid to be granted in these and other circumstances in which a person is committed to quarter sessions to be dealt with, and the provision in Section 67(3) of the Mental Health Act will therefore no longer be necessary. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 140, line 45, column 3, at beginning insert ("In section 67(3), the words from 'and the Poor' onwards").—(Lord Stonham.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

LORD STONHAM

My Lords, I beg to move.

Amendment moved—

Page 141, line 9, column 3, at end insert—
	("In paragraph 6 of Schedule 1, the words 'or any enactment of the Parliament of Northern Ireland amending or replacing the said Part III'").
	—(Lord Stonham.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

LORD STONHAM

My Lords, I think there must be a misprint on the Marshalled List and this should be Amendment No. 77A. It is the last Amendment on the Marshalled List. I beg to move.

Amendment moved—

Page 142, line 25, at end insert—
("1964 c. 43. The Criminal Appeal Act 1964.	In paragraph 6 of Schedule 1, the words 'or any enactment of the Parliament of Northern Ireland amending or replacing the said Part III'").
	—(Lord Stonham.)

LORD LEATHERLAND

My Lords, may I support this Amendment?

SEVERAL NOBLE LORDS: Order!

THE DEPUTY CHAIRMAN OF COMMITTEES (LORD CHAMPION)

My Lords, I think I had better put the Amendment first. The question is, That Amendment No. 77A be agreed to. I was rather expecting the noble Lord, Lord Leatherland, to make a speech upon this Amendment.

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

8.8 p.m.

LORD STONHAM

My Lords, I beg to move that this Bill do now pass. On May 10, on Second Reading, I referred to the many improvements which had been made to the Bill in another place, where it had been considered in an atmosphere virtually free from Party, and I ventured to prophesy that your Lordships would consider it in the same atmosphere and that it was not unreasonable to assume that further improvements would be suggested. That assumption has not proved unreasonable. We have added 18 new clauses and one new Schedule, and have actually made a total of 301 Amendments, prior to consolidation, to the Bill we received from another place. This is just a little short of the post-war record of 309 Amendments which your Lordships made to the Town and Country Planning Bill in 1946–47. That was a monumental Bill, immortally associated with the name of my noble friend, Lord Silkin, not only because he was the responsible Minister but because he was reliably alleged to have understood it. We have exceeded also the number of alterations made to the London Government Bill, in which my noble friend, Lord Shepherd, gave a foretaste of the talents he has developed so fully in his present post.

But, most important, I think we have done a good job. The number of Amendments is significant only as evidence of three things; namely, the careful consideration we have given to the Bill, the willingness of the Government to consider constructive proposals, and the value to the country of the work of your Lordships' House. I believe that this Bill, whilst safeguarding the rights of accused persons, will simplify and strengthen the processes of justice and I am confident that the arrangements for parole and changes in sentencing policy will turn many criminals away from recidivism and will turn many minor deviants back to the paths of decent citizenship. If these hopes are realised we shall have made a major contribution to the wellbeing of society.

When so many noble Lords have helped, it would be invidious to particularise. I would therefore only say to those who have played speaking parts, thank you for your constant readiness to seek ways of reaching agreement and for the helpful spirit of our discussions, and to my noble friends who have turned up and stayed for long silent hours, often at considerable personal inconvenience, thank you for your indispensable presence which has played its part in work with which we have reason to be well satisfied. I beg to move that the Bill do now pass.

Moved, That the Bill do now pass.—(Lord Stonham.)

8.12 p.m.

LORD BROOKE OF CUMNOR

My Lords, if the hour were earlier my speech would be longer, but I know that your Lordships have further business to complete this evening. I have no doubt, as the noble Lord, Lord Stonham, has said, we have done a good job. The criticism that I made on Second Reading still remains: that this Bill is a patchwork, and I hope that it will not be too many years before we see another Criminal Justice Bill with the foundations dug deep and a real philosophy of justice and punishment embodied in it. But there is no doubt, first, that this Bill as it reached us embodied a great many improvements on the present law, and secondly, that in the Amendments which we have passed here we have afforded yet further proof of the essential value of this House as a revising body. We have worked together on this, both sides of the House, and out of those 301 Amendments I do not suppose there is more than a handful that were settled on a Division; in almost every case the Amendment was agreed to without need for a Division.

I, for one, feel that the most important thing now is to get this mass of Amendments back to another place, where I hope they will all be accepted, and the Bill come quickly into operation. When it does, may I express the strong hope that the Home Office will put in hand all the necessary research at once, so that future legislators will have a stronger body of research material on which they can judge the effect of what their predecessors have done? I know that when I became Home Secretary one of my regrets was that much of the research on crime and punishment had been started only recently and therefore the results of it were necessarily not yet available. A number of the changes here need to be tested in the light of experience and only well-planned research will produce the necessary results.

Secondly, and no less important, I trust that we shall succeed in building up the Probation and After-care Service sufficiently. So much that we can do in this Bill by legislative action will depend for its practical effectiveness on the quantity and the quality of that Service. It is a Service which carries with it, I believe, the goodwill of all who care about these subjects of crime and punishment, people who care about human nature. If we have made a fault in our discussions of the Bill it is that we have not constantly enough referred to the necessity of building up that Service so that it can perform the tasks that we have placed upon it.

Finally, while the noble Lord said it would be invidious to particularise, I think the whole House would wish me to particularise in one respect. The noble Lord, Lord Stonham, has had single-handed to carry large parts of this Bill through the House. No one could have done it more courteously and more conscientiously, and I think, if I may respectfully say so, both the Government and the House have been superbly served by him in these proceedings.

8.17 p.m.

LORD AIREDALE

My Lords, I should very much like to associate myself with those last observations of the noble Lord, Lord Brooke of Cumnor. I would add that I think we ought not to pass this Bill without one final, brief word being said on the subject of majority verdicts by juries in criminal cases. Your Lordships will remember that in Committee the noble and learned Lord the Master of the Rolls, Lord Denning, pleaded with the Committee not to sweep away, without at least some preliminary inquiry, the 600-year-old practice of requiring juries in criminal cases to be unanimous. That Amendment, moved by the Master of the Rolls, was defeated by 74 votes to 8.

One of the charms about your Lordships' House is its unpredictability. I should have thought that the result of that Division was one of the most unpredictable things that had happened in your Lordships' House in recent times. I have sought the reason for the extraordinary result of that Division, and I wonder whether it possibly is because the noble Lord, Lord Stonham, in his speech on that debate, quoted some very headline-catching observations that had been made by Mr. Justice Lawton, who was then in the process of trying, with a jury, the celebrated torture trial case—observations with regard to certain attempts having been made to influence certain members of that jury.

There is a sequel to this story, and I wish to place it briefly on the record before this Bill is passed. The result of that torture trial was known two days after we debated in Committee in this House the Amendment with regard to majority verdicts, and on the morning after the result of that trial was known The Times devoted a leading article to it, in the course of which the leader writer wrote this: The witnesses and jury, for their part, showed great steadiness of nerve throughout what must have been a considerable ordeal. The argument that where a criminal ringleader is brought to trial some member of the jury will be bribed or bullied to return a false verdict has been seriously weakened. There could hardly have been a case in which the jury were reminded more terrifyingly of what intimidation means or in which it was more likely that attempts would be made to corrupt them. Yet they stood firm, and in doing so undermined the whole case for majority verdicts. What is especially ironic is that this dramatic vindication of the traditional virtues of the jury system came in the same week that the House of Lords rejected by a large majority an Amendment to the Criminal Justice Bill that would have retained the principle of unanimity for juries. All the advantages of that principle are to be jettisoned for the sake of a contentious argument that has just been shown to be alarmist in what could be regarded as a perfect test case. I do not blame the noble Lord, Lord Stonham, for having quoted Mr. Justice Lawton's observations in support of his argument against Lord Denning's argument when we were in Committee, but I think it right that these words from The Times leading article the morning after the result of that trial was known should be added to the Record as a postscript to that matter.

8.21 p.m.

VISCOUNT DILHORNE

My Lords, despite the lateness of the hour I should like, on the Motion, That the Bill do now pass, to say just a few words about this Bill. I should be the last one to discourage anyone from the Liberal Party from fighting causes that have been wholly and properly lost. But when the noble Lord, Lord Airedale, refers to what has been said in The Times, and expects us to accept what was said in The Times with regard to that particular matter as accurate, I can only say that it is a pity he did not carry his researches a little further and read a little more extensively in The Times. Because if he had done so he would have seen that there are people standing their trial now for attempting to influence jurors in relation to that case. I am quite certain that the change we have made with regard to majority verdicts is an improvement in the law, but it is not, to my mind, the main improvement that this Bill has made.

Looking at it as a whole, I welcome particularly the power to increase the rate of release of people on licence and the institution of the Parole Board and local review committees. I think that is going to prove to be perhaps the most important change made in this Bill. I only hope that it works well. We shall watch it with interest. Secondly, I regard as next in importance the accelerated procedure for committing cases. This provision will save a lot of time and trouble, and will improve the administra- tion of justice. Perhaps in dealing with a Bill like this one is apt to think mostly of crime and punishment, and not so much of the preservation of law and order and that side of the coin. In welcoming this Bill, I would urge that the Government be most reluctant further to restrict the powers of those who have to preside over courts, and especially their discretion as to what they should do.

I welcome this Bill, and I should like to join in what my noble friend, Lord Brooke of Cumnor, has said in regard to the way that Lord Stonham has carried the heavy burden—and it is a heavy burden—of a Bill like this, and for the way he has responded to some of the tiresome arguments that have been advanced by those who have not always seen eye to eye with him. I should also like to thank the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor for the consideration that he has given to this Bill. I was glad that when the noble Lord, Lord Stonham, moved, That the Bill do now pass, he not only referred to the number of Amendments that had been made in this House, but also to the fact that this House had in this Bill once again demonstrated its value to the country. I think it is most important that that should be recognised. Now that we have made this close and detailed Study of this Bill, it makes one rather shudder to think what the consequences would have been if it had been enacted as it had left another place. They have a great burden of work to do, of course, and I am not criticising them. But we, too, have our part to play, and I think that we have all played a part in improving this Bill. I believe that it will leave this House much better than it came in, and I only hope that it works as well as all of us, in all parts of the House, would desire.

8.25 p.m.

LORD HAWKE

My Lords, I should like to associate myself with everything said about the conduct by Lord Stonham of this Bill through the House; I think it has been wholly admirable. I only hope that it has not taxed his health too much, because it has been a heavy burden. I would remind the noble Lord, Lord Airedale, that I think I am right in saying that thousands of detective hours were spent in guarding that jury lest one man should be "nobbled". I do not know how much crime must have gone undetected in London as a result of having to put on that perpetual night and day guard on 12 people.

LORD AIREDALE

Are not police man hours going to be spent to see that three jurymen are not "nobbled"?

LORD HAWKE

My Lords, I would suggest that it is not so difficult to prevent three being "nobbled" as it is one. I will say only a few words now because my noble friend Lord Mansfield, who was particularly anxious to be present but has been unable to be here, wanted to make known the views of his Wild-fowlers Association on Part V of the Bill, he being the president. As the views of his Association and my views so closely coincide, I am pleased to put a few joint thoughts on the Record.

First of all, we believe that in enacting Part V the Government are prompted by a wholly erroneous chain of reasoning. Admittedly, crime involving firearms has been on the increase; but so has all forms of crimes of violence. To any ordinary person it would seem fairly obvious that the reason for that increase is the fact that criminals do not get caught nowadays. Once upon a time criminals did not go around armed; they were too frightened of making a mistake, of committing a murder, of being caught and being hanged. To-day, the chances of their being caught are much smaller, and if they do make a mistake and commit a murder and are later caught, they are no longer hanged. Therefore, they go around armed, because it is much easier to commit robbery and get away if you are armed.

That is a much more plausible explanation for the increase in crime with firearms than the one advanced in favour of the Bill; namely, that the shot-gun holders are not really properly registered. I do not believe that crime with shot-guns will be affected one way or the other by this Bill. After all, the underworld has never lacked pistols, or indeed passports, in spite of all the regulations there have been making it difficult to get them. But as a result of this highly theoretical approach to the subject, ordinary people are going to be put to a great deal of trouble.

My noble and learned friend, Lord Dilhorne, at various stages of the Bill, mentioned the case of the man with a pair of guns and a gun-maker. Surely, the man will often have a secretary to do the donkey work, and he will merely sign a form. But it is the small men who are going to suffer and be inconvenienced by this Bill. Forms and fees are all rather frightening things to these people. The particular association for which the noble Earl, Lord Mansfield, speaks comprises smallish people. But there are many smaller still—farmers, farm labourers and gardeners, nearly all of whom have guns. What with rabbits and pigeons, there is precious little they can grow unless they have guns. To these people, authority is always a little frightening, particularly when it concerns the police. There is not a soul among us who does not break the law from time to time. These people will not like having to go to the police for a certificate, even though Lord Stonham's Amendment No. 45 will make it a little better for them because the police will have to have a reason for the refusal of a certificate. But, so far as I can see, there is no duty on the police to disclose that reason, and in any appeal to quarter sessions it will be difficult for a person to appeal if he does not know the grounds upon which his application has been turned down.

The British people do not like putting power into the hands of the police to grant permits when it is not in their hands at the moment. I do not know what the police think about it, but it will certainly increase the burden of paper work under which they are already bowed down. The Bill is practically law now, and I am quite sure that Part V will make no difference to crime. It will be a very great nuisance to a lot of people, and one can only hope that it will be administered in the most tolerant sort of way, so that people who have had a gun for years will not find themselves deprived of that right without any explanation.

8.30 p.m.

LORD LEATHERLAND

My Lords, it seems that a few minutes ago I was rather too keen to pull the trigger before the bird had come into view. I welcome this Bill, and I do not on this occasion want to enter into discussion of its virtues and defects. As one who occupies one of the lowest ranks of the judiciary in this country, as a mere chairman of a bench of magistrates, I heartily welcome the rationalisation and liberalisation of our criminal law which this Bill will put on the Statute Book. On one or two occasions in your Lordships' House I have found it necessary to criticise the abstruse and complicated phraseology of some of the measures which come before us. I want to compliment my noble friends Lord Stonham and the Lord Chancellor, as well as the draftsmen in the "back room" at the Home Office, for a Bill which is very clearly written and simple to understand.

The only qualification I would make in the fulsome praise is in regard to the early clauses of Part V, which contain a good deal of legislation by reference. I only wish that the words could have been spelt out in their modern application rather than that the man when he goes out shooting should have to carry in his pocket a copy of Stone's Justices Manual or Archbold's Criminal Pleadings or some book of that kind. On the whole, I feel that the Bill is a great credit to the country. It is a great credit to your Lordships' House for all the time and attention which has been given to it—not merely in regard to details, but as to some of the fundamental provisions of the Bill. I think that it leaves your Lordships' House in a much better form than the one in which it arrived here. That is justification for the continued existence of your Lordships' House, and I feel that we have done a very good job on a very good Bill.

8.32 p.m.

LORD STONHAM

My Lords, I am sure your Lordships will be in agreement if I say that the greatest disservice I could do to your Lordships at this hour would be to make a long speech. I should like to express my grateful thanks for the very kind words which were addressed to me by the noble Lord, Lord Brooke of Cumnor. I can only say that from the very first week—and I have had experience of the other place—it has always been a great pleasure and privilege to serve in this House. Never have the pleasure and privilege been greater than to serve on this Bill, a Bill which has a great many years of my life wrapped up in many of its clauses. I would remind the noble Lord, Lord Brooke of Cumnor, that as this Bill comes into operation—and he will appreciate that it will come into operation by stages—research will be built in from the very beginning and the results can be studied and compared so that we can profit from them. I would also agree with him in regard to the Probation Service. We will do everything we possibly can in that regard.

In regard to the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Airedale, curiously enough I was astonished by the extent of the majority on majority verdicts, and I am delighted to hear that, according to the noble Lord, Lord Airedale, it was a speech of mine which counted. He was quite right to put his views on record, as well as to express what happened two or three days afterwards. I know that he will forgive me for not going into that subject. I will take careful note of what was said by the noble and learned Viscount, Lord Dilhorne, about not further restricting the discretion of the courts. We have had some good discussion about that.

With regard to the noble Lord, Lord Hawke, and the remarks he made on behalf of his noble friend, I would say that we have had consultations with interested bodies. We shall have further consultations with the interested bodies before my right honourable friend makes any rules, and I can only hope that the noble Lord's fears will not be realised but rather that the Government's hopes for this Part of the Bill will be realised.

I am particularly grateful to my noble friend Lord Leatherland for thanking the "back-room boys" for the clarity of the language in this Bill. They have indeed done a monumental job, from the time the Bill was first produced, through all its stages in another place and in your Lordships' House. It was an immense job which was done with patience, great skill and interest in the subject, and with great helpfulness in trying to meet the points and criticisms which were made. It is indeed fitting that my noble friend should have paid tribute to the "back-room boys" in that way. On their behalf, I thank him. This has been a very great experience and I will not detain the passing of the Bill one second longer.

On Question, Bill passed, and returned to Commons.