VIETNAM: BRITISH PEACE EFFORTS (Hansard, 18 January 1967)

§ THE MINISTER OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (LORD CHALFONT)
My Lords, with your Lordships' permission, I should like to repeat a Statement which is being made in another place by my right honourable friend the Foreign Secretary, on recent developments in Vietnam and the efforts the Government have continued to make to stop the war there. Questions have been tabled on this subject, and I should like, therefore, to take this opportunity to give your Lordships the Statement in full. It is as follows:
"Our policy continues to be directed towards stopping the fighting and promoting a comprehensive and lasting 134 settlement on the lines of the plan I put forward at Brighton on the 6th October last year and to the United Nations General Assembly on the 11th October.
"Because of the loss of life and other suffering in both South and North Vietnam, and because it is more likely to provide the climate for discussion of the political and other issues raised by the conflict, we believe that all immediate efforts should be concentrated on stopping the war. If this could be done there would be so much more chance of working out a political settlement.
"The Government deplores the loss of life in Vietnam, however it is caused and in whatever part of the country. In our view, this makes the need for action the more urgent. We are sorry that the Soviet Government is unready to join with us in reconvening the Geneva Conference, or indeed to join in any other positive step to halt the conflict. This must not be regarded as debarring us from action.
"On the 30th December, therefore, I sent messages to Mr. Rusk and to the South and North Vietnamese Foreign Ministers, suggesting a meeting of representatives of the three Governments principally concerned to arrange a cessation of hostilities. I offered facilities in any suitable British territory and said that I would arrange for the secret transmission of messages between the parties if it was considered that this would help.
"In making this proposal, I took into account the fact that it has already been made clear that the representation of the Liberation Front at any discussions was not a real problem I believed, therefore that the appeal should be directed in the first instance to the Governments who hold major responsibility in this conflict.
"As the House knows, the United States and South Vietnam accepted our proposal. We are the more disappointed at Hanoi's refusal.
"Nevertheless, we are continuing to seek ways of bringing the parties to this conflict together and are in close consultation with the United States and other Governments. The United States Government have repeatedly made clear 135 their earnest desire to end the fighting and their readiness to negotiate with the other side. We support the efforts which the United Nations Secretary-General is now making and have made known our readiness to collaborate with any nation or individual, within or outside the Commonwealth, in any action offering the prospect of progress towards negotiations.
"In conclusion I wish to say something very personal to the House. While I cannot quote chapter and verse for this, I have the feeling, and I repeat the feeling, that there is at last the possibility of change in this problem. This feeling results from all that reaches me from many different sources. Honourable Members will wish Her Majesty's Government to do everything they can to encourage and promote this possibility."

§ LORD CARRINGTON
My Lords, I am obliged to the noble Lord, Lord Chalfont, for giving us this Statement. As your Lordships will know, those of us who sit on this side of the House give general support to the Government in their policy on Vietnam. We certainly supported the initiative which the Foreign Secretary made a few weks ago, although I must say that some of us had doubts about its timing, or rather about the fact that the timing could have been misinterpreted. Nevertheless, we support this initiative and are quite sure that we should do all we can in this matter.
I must say that I am a little surprised that this Statement has been made at all. It does not seem to me to say anything new that we have not heard before. In fact, I think the only new thing is contained in the last phrase which the noble Lord, Lord Chalfont, used about the Foreign Secretary's having "a feeling"—at least I suppose it was the Foreign Secretary who had the feeling and not the noble Lord, Lord Chalfont, because it would be very much out of character if the phrase were applied to the noble Lord, Lord Chalfont. I wonder if I might ask the noble Lord whether the Foreign Secretary has been good enough to tell him on what he bases this feeling. There must be some concrete facts which he can tell us about and which give rise to this optimism on the part of the Foreign Secretary. Those 136 of us who are not lucky enough to be equipped with such sensitive personal radar would be glad of some basic facts.

§ LORD CHALFONT
My Lords, the noble Lord is right in assuming that this feeling was one expressed by my right honourable friend the Foreign Secretary. He said in his Statement that the feeling arose from all the information which has been reaching him on this subject. I think it would be unwise—and it might even be irresponsible, or as the current jargon has it "counter productive"—to go too deeply into the exact nature of that information at this moment.
As to the reason why this Statement was made and whether the Government's action has been misinterpreted, as the noble Lord suggested, I think that those two things are connected. The Government were anxious to make clear the context and the circumstances in which the recent initiative was made. On the question of misinterpretation, I would say that almost any action that is taken to bring to an end this terrible and cruel war is bound to be misunderstood or misinterpreted or resisted by somebody, but Her Majesty's Government feel that, whatever the degree of misunderstanding and misinterpretation, we must and will go on trying.

§ LORD OGMORE
My Lords, we on these Benches naturally welcome any initiative which the Government can take to bring the parties together, and we are glad they are seeking ways continually, as they say, of bringing the parties together and are in close consultation with the United States and other Governments. But I rather agreed with the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, that it was a mistake to bring personal feelings into the matter. If Mr. Brown's feelings are found to be without any basis in fact, disappointment will have been aroused in many breasts and we shall be back once more in the position that the world will think that the British initiative has failed—that Mr. Brown thought it was coming off and for some reason it has not come off. It would be better to stick to facts rather than to go into the realm of fancy.
So far as I myself am concerned, I have over the last forty years had some experience of the Far East and South East Asia. I have always thought that 137 China is really the key to much of the problem in the Far East. I would hesitate to say that there is going to be a great change in this theatre until the problems which at present face China are resolved and a new Government has been established there with power to make its wishes felt, not only in China but in the countries which border China where Chinese influence is very pronounced. Perhaps the noble Lord, Lord Chalfont, would comment on that, if he feels so inclined. That, at any rate, is my own view. In these circumstances I feel that it might be a little unwise to raise false hopes at this moment.

§ LORD CHALFONT
Of course I agree with the noble Lord that one of the keys to this whole problem is China and what China's intentions and policies are and what they are likely to be. This is central to the whole problem, and (I have said this before, and it is the firm conviction of Her Majesty's Government) we shall probably not solve this problem or any of the other major problems that face the world until China is brought into the community of nations and into the debates which take place on these matters.
In regard to the noble Lord's comments on the feeling expressed by my right honourable friend, I can only say that my right honourable friend, like many of us on this side of the House and I am sure many on the other side, feels deeply about this subject. It is not a subject that can be dealt with by the emotions alone, but it is not a subject which can be divorced from emotion. I find it in no way surprising that my right honourable friend should see fit to give his feelings about this matter. When he expresses a feeling that things could improve, I assure your Lordships' House that he bases his feeling upon facts. As I have said, it would be silly and irresponsible of me to go into those facts in great detail, but I think it is wrong and ungracious to comment adversely because my right honourable friend has pointed out that he has a feeling that things are getting better. I wonder whether the same comments would have been made if he had said that he had a feeling they are getting worse.

§ LORD BROCKWAY
My Lords, I had two Questions on this subject and readily 138 reserved pressing them until the Statement which has now been made. I must confess, however, that the Statement does not contain much that is new. We appreciate the very deep sincerity of the Government in desiring peace. I regret the remarks which have been made, both by the Leader of the Opposition and by the representative of the Liberal Party in this House, regarding the feeling of the Foreign Secretary. The Foreign Secretary has information from unofficial sources, as have others, which he is not able to state, and his judgment of those statements leads him to a feeling about the situation. I do not think anybody who is in touch with events in Vietnam now doubts that there is a change of atmosphere. The dispatches which have been published in the New York Times and the reports which have come for the first time from visitors to Hanoi all build up ground for saying that there is a reason to think that there is a better situation.

§ THE EARL OF LONGFORD
My Lords, perhaps the House is looking to me to ask the noble Lord whether he is going to put a question. If he is, perhaps he will put it.

§ LORD BROCKWAY
My Lords, I am in the hands of the Leader of the House.

§ LORD BROCKWAY
Then I am in the hands of the House, and in the hands of the Leader of the House as expressing the view of the House. Perhaps I may add this.

§ LORD BROCKWAY
Perhaps I may put it as a question.

§ LORD BROCKWAY
And I do not desire to be taught by Members on the opposite Benches. Perhaps I may put it in the form of a question. If Leaders of other Parties are allowed to make statements which do not make questions, except in the last sentence, are Back-Benchers in this House to have less rights, and by what Standing Order, than those who are Leaders of Parties? As a Back-Bencher I want to press that point.

§ THE EARL OF LONGFORD
My Lords, that question seems to be addressed to me, and I can only say that there is a certain convention in this House that when a Statement has been made the Leaders of the Parties speak first and offer their comments. It is very difficult to say exactly how the convention relates to subsequent speakers; but, broadly speaking, after that it is expected that anything said will be in the form of questions. That is putting the matter quite broadly, but I think that is the general tradition of the House.

§ LORD BROCKWAY
My Lords, having made my statement, I will put my question. Can my noble friend say whether note has been taken of the reports which have come from Hanoi, that they are no longer pressing that their four points shall be regarded as conditions for negotiations but, instead, shall be regarded as subjects for consideration at negotiations? Does that not alter very fundamentally the situation in relation to the Government of North Vietnam?

§ LORD CHALFONT
My Lords, of course all the reports, both official and unofficial, that are coming from Vietnam at the moment are being examined extremely closely, both by Her Majesty's Government and by the United States Government, who are more closely involved. The United States Government have assured us that they have very carefully examined all these reports, especially those reports brought back by Mr. Harrison Salisbury, the distinguished journalist, who brought back a number of interesting reports and some interesting information from Hanoi. But the United States Government assure us that they have concluded that they contain no specific indication of what the North Vietnamese would do—in other words, what their conditions are and what they would do—for example, in response to the cessation of bombing or any other comparable move from the American side. So I am afraid that it would not be true to say that any of the reports we have at the moment indicate any substantive change in the North Vietnamese position in this matter.

LORD ST. OSWALD
My Lords, while understanding that the Government may see reason for not divulging, not de- 140 claring the bases of hope which the Foreign Secretary feels, might I ask whether the Government will later—whether or not these hopes have borne fruit—give us the reasons for the Foreign Secretary's hopes at present which he has to-day declared? I wonder whether the noble Lord understands me. I appreciate that he feels he cannot give them now, but we should like to know, with hindsight, when the Government feel that they can make a statement, precisely what were the Foreign Secretary's reasons for the hopes which he expressed to-day.

§ LORD CHALFONT
My Lords, I am sure the noble Lord will understand that I cannot possibly commit the Government to any course of action in a hypothetical situation of the sort he has outlined. If these negotiations are successful, I am sure that all the steps which lead up to success will be divulged. Personally, I shall never regard these negotiations as being unsuccessful, because we shall go on until they do succeed.

§ LORD COLERAINE
My Lords, while both sides of the House would, I think, agree with the noble Lord, Lord Chalfont, in his feeling that everything would be very much better if China were in the full comity of nations, is it not a fact that in the eyes of the Administration of the United States China is an illegal regime? So ought not Her Majesty's Government to accord the United States Government the same right that they give themselves; namely, the right of burying their heads in the sand?

§ LORD CHALFONT
My Lords, I think it would be wrong that I should follow the noble Lord along this path. This is strictly outside the realm of the Statement and, I think, of any reasonable question which arises out of the Statement. I have agreed that China is a crucial matter in the whole of this terrible crisis, but of course I should not dream of commenting in your Lordships' House about the attitude of the United States Government to China, or the legal position which China holds in the eyes of the United States Government. I think this would be a matter for an entirely different discussion and an entirely different debate.

§ LORD MILFORD
My Lords, I welcome the Government's statement saying 141 that they support U Thant's efforts to get peace in Vietnam. Does this mean that Her Majesty's Government also support his plea that bombing should stop before negotiations can take place?

§ LORD CHALFONT
My Lords, we naturally support U Thant's initiative and, indeed, his three points as a group of measures which, if they were put into effect collectively, would enhance the prospect of peace. But I think the noble Lord extracts from those three points one particular one—the readiness of the United States to stop bombing. I would make the point that the United States is, and has said that it is, ready to stop the bombing once there is an assurance of a reciprocal response towards peace from North Vietnam. I might further point out that in the letter which he wrote to the Secretary-General of the United Nations on December 31 my right honourable friend the Foreign Secretary acknowledged the great efforts which U Thant is making for peace, and stressed that all his efforts, and those of Her Majesty's Government, were in support of those of the United Nations and its Secretary-General.

§ LORD BROCKWAY
My Lords, whilst welcome what my noble friend has just said, is it not, nevertheless, the case that, in replying for the United States Government to U Thant, Mr. Goldberg did not accept the terms which U Thant laid down as a necessary condition for peace? And is my noble friend aware how much we welcome the statement which he has now made, that the British Government do support those three proposals, taken collectively, as a condition for peace?

§ LORD MILFORD
My Lords, while thanking the noble Lord for his answer to my question, it seems to me that perhaps it is putting the cart before the horse—

§ THE EARL OF LONGFORD
My Lords, may I intervene, very reluctantly? I think perhaps I should just read out the passage from the Companion to the Standing Orders of the House which bears on the state which we have now reached: Questions for clarification may be asked upon such statements, but they should not 142 be made the occasion for immediate debate unless the House so order. I should have thought we had almost reached the point covered there. However, I should not like to stand between the noble Lord (who does not speak very often) and the House, and perhaps he would feel that he should put one more question and that we might then get on.

§ LORD MILFORD
My Lords, on this question of bombing, it seems to me to be putting the cart before the horse—

§ THE EARL OF LONGFORD
My Lords, may I intervene? I think the noble Lord must ask a question if he is going to address the House.

§ LORD MILFORD
My Lords, I am asking a question. Would Her Majesty's Government, if London were under potential bombardment and Britain were perhaps threatened by invasion, ever agree to negotiate under duress?

§ LORD CHALFONT
My Lords, this really is carrying hypothesis to an almost intolerable point. I do not feel that I can comment on that statement, or answer that so-called question in this particular context. I think that, as the noble Earl the Leader of the House has said, I have answered a number of questions in clarification of the original Statement, and shall, of course, be prepared to answer any other questions in clarification of that Statement.