HL Deb 04 December 1967 vol 287 cc392-5

4.2 p.m.

THE MINISTER WITHOUT PORTFOLIO (LORD SHACKLETON)

My Lords, with permission I should like to repeat a Statement which my right honourable friend the Minister of State For Foreign Affairs is making in another place on the subject of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

As the House will know, a key issue in the negotiations at present taking place in Geneva to secure a non-proliferation treaty has been the safeguards to be applied in order to ensure that there is no diversion by the non-nuclear weapon signatories of the treaty of materials from their civil nuclear programmes to nuclear weapon purposes.

In order to assist these negotiations Her Majesty's Government have decided that, at such time as international safeguards are put into effect in the non-nuclear weapon States in implementation of the provisions of a treaty, they will be prepared to offer an opportunity for the application of similar safeguards in the United Kingdom subject to exclusions for national security reasons only. Her Majesty's Government welcome the similar decision announced by President Johnson on behalf of the United States.

LORD ST. OSWALD

My Lords, while thanking the noble Lord for repeating the Statement of his right honourable friend, I should like to congratulate him on his mastery of Sanskrit in which language his Statement apparently is couched. His right honourable friend in another place might as well have been speaking in his native Welsh. What I did understand enables me to be happy for once at the guarded phraseology of the terms of the undertaking at this stage. Her Majesty's Government, we understand, will be prepared to offer an opportunity for the application of similar safeguards in the United Kingdom subject to exclusions for national security reasons only. Most of the implied italics are mine, although I noticed one that I shared with the noble Lord. But none of them will be repeated in Hansard. But since "the key issue", as the noble Lord called it, has been the safeguards, I would ask: what sort of safeguards have the Government in mind? I think that is the only question I should like to put to him at this point.

LORD SHACKLETON

My Lords, I am sorry, but if the noble Lord would like it in Arabic I will supply it to him next time. I should have thought that because of the noble Lord's interest in national security the position would be clear. The safeguards relate to the diversion of particular materials to the making of weapons, and this statement relates particularly to fissile materials. These are the international safeguards. But clearly since we ourselves are a nuclear Power involved in making nuclear weapons, it is also necessary for us to reserve our position with regard to that nuclear weapon-making. The safeguards are to ensure that products which might be turned into nuclear weapons in States which sign these treaties do not go into that direction. Clearly, this imposes on them somewhat onerous obligations of inspection, and the United States and the United Kingdom have agreed that we are prepared to make our own facilities available for inspections of this sort.

LORD OGMORE

My Lords, while thanking the noble Lord for making this Statement, may I ask him how rigorous it is intended the inspection will be under the treaty, and who are the type of people who are to do the inspecting? Will they be, for instance, in this country, nationals of this country, or may we expect Russians to come here? Or who are likely to be the inspectors? Secondly, if this reservation is in the agreement on the part both of the United States and of the United Kingdom, how will the inspector be able to inspect if at any time one of these Powers tells him that a particular inspection is excluded because it is against the national interest of the party whose plants are to be inspected?

LORD SHACKLETON

My Lords, the noble Lord is raising one of the fundamental difficulties that arise in relation to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the difficulty of the position of those who are nuclear Powers, and have nuclear weapons, and those who are non-nuclear Powers and accept the limitations of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. It is hoped, none the less, that it will be regarded as in the international interest, and indeed in the interests of the countries concerned themselves, to accept that general proliferation would be a dangerous thing for the world and that they will accept that limitation.

As for the safeguards, it is a little early for me to attempt to describe them. Obviously, they involve a most technical and detailed form of monitoring. It is likely that this will be carried out under the auspices of the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna. On the other hand, if we join Euratom, Euratom also has a system of safeguards, and that might be appropriate. But, of course, the Treaty is a little way off at the moment, I am afraid. This Statement is merely an indication of willingness on our part o accept the obligations, and indeed the disadvantages, because such inspection can be an expensive business.

LORD CARRINGTON

My Lords, I wonder whether I might ask the noble Lord a question. Perhaps I should have understood this, but it is a complicated subject. Does the exclusion for national security reasons apply only to the United States and to this country, or does it apply also to other countries who are participants in the Treaty?

LORD SHACKLETON

My Lords, this particular undertaking that I gave referred to the United Kingdom; and it relates, of course, to the production of nuclear weapons. The undertaking given so far by nuclear Powers has been given only by the United States and the United Kingdom. As I understand it, it is not relevant to other Powers, since they themselves, I presume, under the Non-Proliferation Treaty, will not be making nuclear weapons at all. But I think the noble Lord is on an interesting point. I hope that I have construed correctly for him the answer I have. But I should be happy to pursue that further.

LORD CARRINGTON

My Lords, I wonder whether I may pursue the matter to just this point? I quite understand what the Gvernment are trying to do, which is to put the nuclear Powers on the same footing as the non-nuclear Powers. But surely if you exclude from the operation of the safeguards the only reason whereby anybody would want to be excluded, while you may be trying to do some good, in practice you are not doing very much.

LORD SHACKLETON

My Lords, I take the noble Lord's point. We are back on the fundamental difficulties of all forms of disarmament negotiations. But, as I understand it, the particular exclusions to which I was referring were the exclusions which related to our own nuclear weapon system and, therefore, would not be relevant in the case of other countries which will be fully exposed so far as their nuclear activities are concerned. Their production and use of fissile material, for example, will be under continuous international check. But, clearly, so far as the United Kingdom is concerned, so far as we may be involved in producing fissile material for weapons, there is clearly a cut-off point where this inspection may no longer have effect.

LORD ROWLEY

My Lords, may I ask whether there is any reason to expect that the Soviet Government will give a similar undertaking, or is this matter tied up with the discussions which are taking place on Article 3 of the Treaty in regard to general inspection? Is it not a fact that this undertaking is relevant to the Russian position?

LORD SHACKLETON

Yes, it is, my Lords. I am afraid that I cannot make any statement on the Russian position. They may decide that it is not necessary for them. I should say—I do not want to mislead the House—that this is no protection against the making of nuclear weapons by a nuclear Power like the United States, ourselves, or Russia. I should have thought (again I would speak subject to ultimate correction) that the burden of the matter is the fact that commercial information may be derived. Where a non-nuclear Power is concerned, the problem is not related quite so much to national security. I should also add that every country has the right to refuse an inspector nominated by the Agency, and we should not be obliged to accept, say, an inspector from the Soviet Union.

LORD SOMERS

My Lords, I do not think that the noble Lord has yet told the House who will do the actual inspecting.

LORD SHACKLETON

My Lords, I thought that I did tell the House.

LORD SOMERS

I am sorry.