§ 4.5 p.m.
§ THE LORD PRIVY SEAL (THE EARL OF LONGFORD)My Lords, with permission I should like to repeat a Statement which my right honourable friend the Prime Minister is making in another place. I will use his own words.
"Honourable Members will have seen the White Paper (Cmnd. 2346) laid before the House to-day. This gives the sequence of events and the record of decisions taken by the Government and sets out the main questions on which action, both national and international, should be taken, issues to which the Government are giving urgent attention.
"Honourable Members who have had time to study the White Paper will have seen that from the day of the disaster the Government's prime objective was to keep to a minimum the amount of oil fouling the beaches in the West Country and indeed along the South Coast and Bristol Channel.
"At the same time, oil having started to pour out from the moment of the shipwreck, the spraying of detergent on the discharged oil began that day and was intensified from the Monday onwards.
"The Navy were on the job from the Saturday onwards and took operational control, so far as the Government were concerned, of all questions affecting the ship itself. From the Sunday my honourable friend the Under-Secretary of State for the Navy co-ordinated the conduct of the operation with the Commander-in-Chief Plymouth, and I cannot pay sufficient tribute to the work of the Navy—and of my honourable friend—in a situation unprecedented at any time in any part of the world.
"Determined to do everything possible to limit the discharge of oil from the ship, the Government, with all the expert technical advice available to them, decided that it was right 875 to give the salvage company, highly skilled and expert in these matters, an opportunity to get the ship off the rocks during the period of the very high spring tides due from the Thursday following the shipwreck. While there were inevitably doubts about whether the salvage company could succeed in this task, I am sure we were right in this decision and in the massive help given by the Admiralty to the salvage authority.
"Every alternative method was most carefully and urgently analysed in the light of all the information available from such previous occurrences as had any bearing on the situation.
"Clearly, the best course, if it had been feasible, would have been to pump off the oil into shallow draught coastal tankers close in to the reef. Quite apart from the extreme difficulty and hazard in the weather conditions of that week, it was physically impossible to pump off the oil because the ship's pumps were out of operation and a Naval survey showed that no tanker of sufficient size could get near enough for the operation to be reasonably safe. With the very high explosive content of the oil gases on the ship no operation of an engineering character involving friction and the possibility of sparks could have been attempted. It would have been quite impossible to place generating equipment on the ship and to secure it in position, and to do all other necessary repairs and adjustments required to get the ship's own pumps into operation. The tragic explosion which led to the death of the captain of the salvage team confirms the hazards which rightly influenced the minds of the Naval authorities.
"Equally, operations to examine the damage under the ship by Naval divers could not be carried out because the oil would have blocked the breathing apparatus and caused suffocation.
"Another possibility considered from the outset was that of setting fire to the oil on the ship. As the White Paper makes clear, a previous case where a tanker had caught fire in the Persian Gulf provided a serious warning here, in that after more than two months little more than half the oil had caught fire and the rest of the 876 cargo was in fact sold as crude oil when the fire died out. For the rest, a tarry residue of the kind most feared on holiday beaches was the main outcome of the fire.
"Moreover, the fire itself might well have blown out the sides of the ship and released a lot of unburned oil long before there was any chance of it being burned.
"The course which was ultimately taken, once the hope of salvage had disappeared, was that of opening up the ship by bombing and attempting to set the oil on fire. The oil was in sixteen separate tanks and the steel deck of the vessel itself was nearly 1½inches thick. The risk we faced from the outset was that we would have opened up the ship and released up to 90,000 more tons of oil without any guarantee that it would be set alight and destroyed.
"On Sunday, March 26, while the international salvage experts were still hopeful of floating off the ship on the high tides of the Monday or Tuesday, gales broke the tanker into two and then, on the following day, into three sections.
"In these circumstances the Government took the decision to bomb the ship, not, of course, with the idea of destroying it but of setting the oil on fire. Even so this was a great gamble. Though scientific experiments on an inland lake with a thousand gallons of Kuwait crude had been successful in burning the oil without any noxious residue, experiments made on the sea with the same fire-raising methods, on an eight square-mile patch of floating oil near Wolf Rock, failed to set the oil on fire. This appeared to rule out the hope we had had that when the ship was opened up and the oil poured out it could be immediately fired on the sea. Despite the very great risk involved, the decision to bomb the ship went on, and just before 4 o'clock on the Tuesday afternoon the ship was bombed by aircraft of the Fleet Air Arm, and the fire maintained by R.A.F. aircraft dropping tanks of aviation fuel. As the House knows—and those of us who witnessed it were filled with a high sense of relief—the oil was in fact set on fire. Though here again, despite 877 every effort to keep the fire going with incendiary weapons, the fire died away and further bombing attacks were necessary in the next two days to destroy the last remaining tanks which had oil in them.
"Meanwhile, almost from the time the ship struck the reef, operations with detergent, in which local fishing vessels played an important part, were put into force. These were supplemented by many other forms of attack on the problem as the oil reached the beaches.
"The White Paper sets out in detail what has been done, and I am glad to see that honourable Members for the area concerned have joined with local authorities in the tributes paid to the leadership shown by the Ministry of Housing and Local Government and other Departments concerned and the tremendous work done by all the Service Departments, and by the units of the Army and Royal Marines who engaged in the task. This was a successful improvised partnership between the Government authorities and the local authorities, with very successful calls on local authority services and on local civilian volunteers. It is right that I should pay tribute to the great resilience and vigour of the individual local authorities in the area.
"In addition, great efforts have been made by the erection of booms to keep the oil away from estuaries and harbours and to protect, so far as this was possible, marine life.
"Finally, Mr. Speaker, I turn to the lessons that must be drawn from this disaster.
"With tankers increasing in size, the possibilities of shipwreck or collision pouring perhaps hundreds of thousands of tons of oil on to our beaches—and to those of other countries—is one which requires urgent international action. Many honourable Members would have been surprised to find that the Seven Stones Reef was not within British territorial waters. That did not and has not deterred us in any action we considered right. Equally we made clear our refusal to allow the ship, if it was towed off the rock, to be brought into British territorial waters.
"We are now urgently considering the proposals which are to be put before the meeting of the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative 878 Organisation to ensure that new international regulations and any necessary changes in international law and practice can be pressed on with the urgency which is required. Without waiting for international agreement we are also considering any action which lies within our own control, including control of the routes taken by these giant tankers and other ships carrying potentially dangerous cargoes into British ports. The old concept of territorial waters is not enough.
"In addition, all possible scientific aspects of the problem are being further examined in the light of our own experience and the lessons we have learned during these past seventeen days.
"Equally the question of legal liability and insurance must be considered both on a national and an international basis. And while, during the fight to keep the oil off the beaches, we did not wait to settle matters of finance, compensation or legal liability, the Government now are urgently considering the question of the claims which must be pressed on behalf of the high cost falling on the taxpayer, and the claims of local authorities. The House would wish to know that the Government have already instructed the Treasury Solicitor to inform the owners' solicitors of our intention to institute proceedings against them for damages."
That concludes the Prime Minister's Statement.
§ 4.16 p.m.
§ LORD CARRINGTONMy Lords, I should like first to associate myself with the tribute which the noble Earl the Leader of the House has paid to the Services for their hard work in trying to clear up the mess which has come about as a result of the grounding of the tanker. Many of them lost their Easter leave, and I think we should all be very grateful to them for what they have done. I am also grateful to the noble Earl for having repeated this Statement in this House. I think all your Lordships would like an opportunity of studying the Statement, and indeed the White Paper, rather more carefully than has been possible so far.
I do not know whether the noble Earl could tell us why the Press had the White 879 Paper at midday yet it reached your Lordships' House only at 2.35 p.m. this afternoon. It could be, of course, that that had something to do with the defacing of the White Paper which I have in my hand. Something seems to have been crossed out which, though it appears the Press were allowed to read it, we were not. I have a friend who used a little detergent on this pollution, and he tells me that what has been crossed out are the words "and clearly cheaper". I wonder whether the noble Earl could confirm that. If that is the right reading of these words, I can quite understand why he wanted them crossed out.
At first blush I think the White Paper leaves a great many questions unanswered, and we may have to return to it later; perhaps it may be possible to return to some of the questions in the debate on Thursday on oil pollution, or it may be that we shall have to press for some kind of inquiry, not so much as to why the tanker ran aground but as to what lessons may be learned from this disaster.
To-day, I would confine myself to asking the noble Earl two specific questions. First, has he any idea of what the overall cost of this effort is likely to be? I notice that in the White Paper the Government say they cannot draw up a balance sheet, but I think the House would be very interested to know what order of cost will be involved in clearing up the mess.
Secondly, I notice that in the last sentence of the Statement the Government say that they have instructed the Treasury Solicitor to inform the owners' solicitors of their intention to institute proceedings against them for damages. What exactly does this statement mean? Does it mean that those who have suffered damage—for example, the fishermen off the South-West Coast; possibly the local authorities, and those who are going to suffer, possibly the tourist industry—have a claim for damages against the owners of the oil or the underwriters? Or does it mean that those people who have suffered damage may claim damages from the Government, who will recover them from the owners of the oil? Or does it mean that there is going to be an interminable legal argument as to whether anybody is responsible and whether any money is payable to these people? I think it would 880 be helpful if the noble Earl could answer some of these questions, because they are important to the people who live in this area.
§ LORD OGMOREMy Lords, I am very grateful to the noble Earl the Leader of the House for repeating this long Statement, and I should like to associate myself with the noble Lord the Leader of the Opposition in the tribute he has rightly paid to the Services, and also to the local authorities, who were faced in this disaster with a most unprecedented task. I agree with him, too, that we shall need to study the White Paper, and also, possibly, to consider the results of the inquiry now being held in Italy, before making any detailed comments on this matter and putting any detailed questions to the noble Earl the Leader of the House.
There is only one question that I should like to ask. This meeting of the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organisation will, of course, be a momentous meeting, and this body will have to take into consideration urgent and important questions. Matters of international law and practice will have to be dealt with which have never been dealt with before. Will the House have an opportunity of learning from the Government the proposals which the Government are to make to this body at its forthcoming meeting?
§ 4.20 p.m.
§ THE EARL OF LONGFORDMy Lords, if the noble Lord, Lord Boothby, will forgive me, I will comment on the remarks of the Party Leaders and then reply to anything he wishes to say. I am grateful to both the Opposition Leaders for the restraint they have shown; there was certainly no disposition to try to take any advantage of this situation. I would only assure the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, that we on the Government side have no reason whatever to be apologetic over these happenings, although there are many causes for regret when a great disaster of this kind takes place. There will be a debate on Thursday on matters within this area, and if at any future time noble Lords wish to discuss it, we shall be the first to oblige them.
The noble Lord asked me why the White Paper was not received here by 12 o'clock. I must look into that. I cannot give him the answer offhand, but 881 I can assure him that the detergent which his friend used on the White Paper was not the most effective. I imagine that all the best detergents were in use elsewhere. At any rate, the words which his friend thought he read beneath the ink were not the actual words. I gather that the real words in paragraph 13 were simply redundant; they were tautology. Therefore, they were excised, rightly, in the interests of good English. So there is nothing at all sinister, nothing whatever to hide. But I am sorry that the White Paper did not reach the House by midday. I do not know why that was. I will look into it. I have given the noble Lord the facts. The noble Lord's friend was wrong. His detergent, while no doubt excellent for other purposes, did not work in this case.
The noble Lord, Lord Carrington, asked two specific questions. He asked whether I could give him even an approximate assessment of the damage. He will not be surprised to hear that I am afraid I cannot give him any sort of figure. But certainly the approach of the Government, which I am sure he shares, is a desire to eliminate the damage, or reduce it to the minimum. But we are keeping the whole issue under consideration, as is natural, and further statements will be made in due course.
But I would answer the noble Lord's second point a little more clearly. It will be understood that Her Majesty's Government are not legally responsible for the payment of compensation in respect of damage sustained by individuals. Any claimant who wishes to bring an individual claim against the owners of the tanker will be well advised to consult his solicitor about the legal complexities before embarking on such a course. I think that is clearly right, although obvious, advice. I do not think there is anything more I need say now about the noble Lord's general comments, except that we all regret this disaster and we share in the tributes which he paid, and which the noble Lord, Lord Ogmore, paid, following the example of the Government, to the Services, to our friends and allies from abroad and to many other authorities, national and individual.
§ LORD BOOTHBYMy Lords, I had intended to say a few words upon the subject of bronchitis with which I am 882 closely acquainted. But now that we have moved on to another subject, I feel it right, even in the light of Lord Carrington's characteristically generous comments on this tanker business, and those of the noble Lord, Lord Ogmore, that somebody should say that on the whole Press comment on this whole business has been grossly unfair. I feel strongly that the Government, on the whole, have handled this situation just about as well as it could be handled. They had to hold on to this ship for as long as there was any hope of salvage and, when there was no hope of salvage and it broke up, they had to bomb it; and they did. I think a great deal of the Press comment, particularly in leading articles, has been grossly unfair. As I say, on the whole the Government have handled this extremely well. I even took the trouble to write a letter to the Prime Minister to say how well it had been done, and I think somebody should get up and say that. That is all I want to say.
§ LORD BALFOUR OF INCHRYEMy Lords, may I ask the noble Earl the Leader of the House one question, which arises from certain Press reports of words of the Prime Minister? Can the noble Earl assure use that the Government carry in their minds no general condemnation for those who sail under flags of convenience, as many of those maintain the highest standards of maritime safety, and do so only to avoid unfair discrimination and penal taxation which would kill maritime trade?
§ THE EARL OF LONGFORDMy Lords, I do not think the noble Lord, Lord Balfour of Inchrye, would expect me to say anything on the general issue involved. Certainly there is not a blanket condemnation of those who sail under these flags. But, as regards the other issue he raised, I think I should refer him to paragraph 46 of the White Paper, which he will no doubt study when he has time.
§ LORD CARRINGTONMy Lords, on the question of claims, may I just press the noble Earl a little more? I understood him to say that anybody who thought he had a claim would be well advised to consult his solicitors. That, of course, is sensible advice. But surely the Government have some responsibility 883 to help these people who have suffered damage. Are they not even going to try to help these people themselves by pressing claims on their behalf against those who are responsible for the damage? It seems to me that the Government should not just wash their hands of this matter, and say that it is up to those concerned to consult their own solicitors. I think the Government should be prepared at any rate to try to help those who have suffered this damage.
§ THE EARL OF LONGFORDMy Lords, I fully appreciate what the noble Lord has in mind, but at this stage it would be wrong of me to give the impression that those who have suffered damage can look to the Government for redress. I think I should be misleading the people concerned if I gave that impression. All I can say is that the Government are looking into the issues which the noble Lord has raised. May I take this opportunity of thanking the noble Lord, Lord Boothby? It could have been argued that a strong Leader of the House would have suggested that he was out of order; but in the circumstances, I thought it would have been carrying virtue to an absurd point if I had tried to interrupt him when he was paying this generous tribute.
§ LORD BOOTHBYMy Lords, I am always out of order.