SOUTHERN RHODESIA ACT 1965 (CONTINUATION) ORDER 1966 (Hansard, 10 November 1966)

§ THEMARQUESS OF SALISBURY
My Lords, I rise only to say that I and a number of other noble Lords for whom I have the honour to speak have decided not to intervene to-day in the debate on this Order which has been moved by the noble Lord, Lord Beswick. Like the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, we feel that a more appropriate occasion will be on the general debate on Rhodesia, which I understand is likely to take place in the near future. But we wish to make it quite clear that the experience of the last year has in no way weakened our total opposition to the whole policy of sanctions, the results of which, in our view, have been as disastrous as we expected them to be, and possibly more so. We shall develop these views at greater length and, I hope, with suitable force when the day of the debate arises.

§ LORD MORTON OF HENRYTON
My Lords, many of your Lordships know that I have never taken any part in politics, and I will not take part in them to-day. But I feel bound to say this. I think it is lamentable that the noble Lord, Lord Wade, should have made those one-sided statements, and it is peculiarly unfortunate at this stage of history.

§ LORD ALPORT
My Lords, when I heard that my noble friend the Leader of the Opposition had decided to postpone the Motion which was down for to-day, I thought that that decision was a right and wise one in the circumstances. But the more I have thought about the problem which faces your Lordships' House at the moment, the more I think that this is in fact the right psychological moment when a debate on Rhodesia should take place. Therefore I intervene in this debate shortly to put a point of view which I hope may commend itself to some Members of the House.
1007 When he intervened earlier, my noble friend said that his reason for not raising Rhodesia as a subject for debate at the present moment was that we do not know what proposals Her Majesty's Government have made to the Smith régime, and whether an agreement is near or not. It is precisely for those reasons that I think we should press Her Majesty's Government at the present time to make clear, not so much to us here—although it is important that we should know what proposals are in train—but, what is much more important, to the generality of the European population of Rhodesia, who do not, so far as I am aware, know at the present time, what the Government have offered to the Smith régime as a solution to this problem.
There is only one chance, and it is a very slender one, of a solution to the Rhodesian problem being achieved which would be satisfactory to this country and to Rhodesia—this is, a modification of the attitude that has been taken up over a period of more years than one by the present régime in Rhodesia to the political progress and future Constitution of that country. The only way in which a modification of the views of the present régime in Rhodesia can be achieved is by the pressure of European opinion in Rhodesia; and the only way in which Europeans in Rhodesia who may not be committed to the Rhodesian Front policy can bring that pressure to bear on the present régime is by knowing what the alternative before Rhodesia is.
This is a point which I made a year ago. I prophesied at that time, when there was considerable optimism on the Government Benches, that we should still be wrestling with the Rhodesian problem at Christmas of this year. This will turn out to be true, and it may go on for very much longer than that. For reasons which I need not go into in this House at the present time, it was clear to me as long ago as January of this year that there was no chance at that time of an emergence in Rhodesia of any régime that was a modification of the Smith régime. It has been clear to me that there can be no agreement which the present Government, or any Government in this country, could reach with the Smith régime and still maintain its self-respect, its sense of confidence and its integrity.
1008 The long period of negotiation that has gone on was perhaps inevitable, and I would not criticise it. But, of course, it has made a settlement more difficult, because the longer Rhodesian European opinion thinks that there may be a settlement as a result of negotiation with the United Kingdom Government, the less pressure internally there is likely to be on the Smith régime to modify its policies in order to come some way to meeting the policies of a British Government. I say "a British Government" specifically, because it has always been my view that the policies to be followed, or the settlement which could be achieved, by a Socialist or a Conservative Government would follow very much the same lines and have the same principles at the base. So I think that, because we have been carrying through a negotiation which I say is inevitable, it has in fact made the task facing the Government of the day even more difficult.
We cannot now reach an agreement, and in my view we should be mistaken to suppose that we can ever do so with the Rhodesian Front régime. If we are to reach any settlement, then the people of Rhodesia—that is, the European electorate of Rhodesia—must know what the British Government propose. Over a long period of time both Conservative and Socialist Governments have been carrying out negotiations with the Government of the day in Rhodesia which have been kept a close secret. I know because, at any rate for a short period, I was party to that process. The result is (and this is particularly true of Rhodesia at the present moment) that public opinion—reasonable, fairminded, moderate public opinion, which undoubtedly exists in Rhodesia at the present time—has no idea what the British Government are offering and the chances there may be of survivial for them and all they stand for in a future Rhodesia if they reach a settlement with the British Government. They are only listening, and have been for more than a year, to the loaded propaganda of a régime which in this respect has been following the principles of an authoritarian State.
In my view it is not fair to European public opinion in Rhodesia—I am not referring perhaps to many; I am not referring perhaps to a majority, although I 1009 hope it is a majority—that we should follow the policy of maintaining secrecy with regard to the propositions which we have put to the régime in Rhodesia, without letting them know what they are, and then suddenly facing them with what is a very dangerous and perhaps tragic prospect of having the whole of their problem handed over to the United Nations. And this without allowing a period of time to elapse during which they would have a chance of understanding what Her Majesty's Government are proposing and then, if they wish and regard it as being in their interests as the people of Rhodesia, to bring pressure on the Smith regime to adjust its policies towards reaching a settlement with Her Majesty's Government here.
I do not know whether the Prime Minister is making a detailed Statement in another pace with regard to the proposals which have been put to the Smith regime. I do not know whether during the next few months, few weeks or few days the Government plan to try to get their proposals over to the people of Rhodesia. It is no good my noble friend Lord Fraser of Lonsdale talking about the B.B.C. I am very doubtful whether the B.B.C. is able to penetrate into Rhodesia, and whether it has any effect at all. What I am quite certain is that, before Her Majesty's Government take the next step, which apparently they intend to take, are committed to take and which they will take in my view as sure as fate—that is, to hand the problem over to the United Nations—they should give a chance to the moderate elements in European Rhodesia to think again, knowing (which they do not know at the moment, and have not done during the whole of the last twelve months or more) what Her Majesty's Government propose for the future constitution and political settlement of the Rhodesian problem.
Therefore I would strongly urge Her Majesty's Government to make any effort they possibly can to ensure immediate publicity of the details of their proposals —the full details—and, secondly, to make certain that they do everything they can to ensure that the people of Rhodesia know what those details are and what they will mean in the long run. I hope noble Lords will not think I am like my friends on the Liberal Benches and have 1010 become a dove in hawk's plumage, if I suggest that there should be air activity over Rhodesia. What I am suggesting is that if it came to dropping leaflets by unarmed aircraft over Salisbury or Bulawayo, which contain 50 per cent. of the European population of Rhodesia, at any rate it would be an effort on our part, and an effort with a certain amount of integrity and purpose behind it, to ensure that our message and our point of view is understood by reasonable people there.
I have always held that we face the prospect, and indeed almost the certainty, of a tragedy in Rhodesia unless by some fortunate chance we can reach a settlement. I think we are now at the very last moment and the situation will shortly pass beyond the control of the British Government. All I am saying is that, realising the significance of that moment as far as the people of Rhodesia are concerned, it is the responsibility of Her Majesty's Government to ensure that the people of Rhodesia do not become the victims of their propaganda machine, the victims of the lack of integrity of their own Government, but that they have a fair chance of knowing the issues and understanding them, which the vast majority of Europeans in Rhodesia at the present moment unfortunately do not.

§ LORD FRASER OF LONSDALE
My Lords, may I ask the noble Earl the Leader of the House a question? What is the earliest moment when this Order must be passed to be valid? If, as he says, there will "shortly" be a debate, and it appears that the usual channels have been talking about "shortly", cannot this Motion be withdrawn, and then we can have the debate and then vote?

§ THE EARL OF LONGFORD
My Lords, I understand that this is the last Parliamentary day which will enable us to do it.

§ VISCOUNT DILHORNE
My Lords, I listened to the speech of my noble friend Lord Alport with the deepest regret. I am sorry he did not follow the advice of the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, and the example of the noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury. I, like him, have thought it would be a matter of extreme difficulty to reach a settlement with Rhodesia. I 1011 must say that what he has said this afternoon has not diminished those difficulties. Therefore I much regret that he should have taken the course he has done to-day, when the speech he made could just as well be made next week if no settlement is arrived at, and need not have been made at all if in fact a settlement is achieved. I hope a settlement will be arrived at, and I should be the last person to wish to express any view which might impede its being effected. Therefore I hope we can pass this Order, the need for which has been clearly established, without any further debate or discussion which might imperil the very delicate negotiations which are now proceeding.

§ THE LORD CHANCELLOR (LORD GARDINER)
My Lords, the only Question before the House is whether or not the House approves of an Order, the sole effect of which is to continue the legal status quo in relation to Rhodesia for a further period. For my part, if I may say so, I echo the statesmanlike words of the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, and the noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury, that it is unlikely to be helpful if any general observations on the Rhodesian situation are made this afternoon.
May I reply briefly to those observations which have been made? The noble Lord, Lord Wade, asked how sanctions were working. This is something which it is quite impossible to answer in a sentence, and no doubt it would repay an afternoon's discussion at some suitable time. Then he asked whether the Orders made under the Act which we are continuing will themselves require renewal. The answer is that if the Order now before the House is approved they will simply continue and will not need renewing. Thirdly, the noble Lord asked whether the Government still adhere to their six principles. The answer to that is, Yes, they do. He then asked whether the Government accepted responsibility for some alleged tortures in Rhodesia. There again, if I may respectfully say so, I concur with the observations made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Morton of Henry ton. I cannot imagine any question more likely to give rise to feelings of anger and both in Rhodesia and outside, than if we were to discuss at this point of time whether or not 1012 African Rhodesians are being tortured by white Rhodesians and, if so, who is responsible for it.
In reply to the noble Lord, Lord Alport, I appreciate what he says, but, if I may say so, he appears to have forgotten that after the Prime Ministers' Conference my right honourable friends the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations and my right honourable and learned friend the Attorney General went to Rhodesia and saw there a large number of representative citizens. It must also be said that the discussions which are taking place are on the footing that while they last they are treated as confidential, and no such discussions would have been possible on any other terms. Not one of your Lordships who has spoken has suggested that this Motion should not be passed approving the Order, which, as I have said, does no more than continue the Act in force for a further year.

§ THE EARL OF LONGFORD
My Lords, may I intervene for one moment to correct a misstatement which I made on the spur of the moment in reply to a question put by the noble Lord, Lord Fraser of Lonsdale? I said I thought to-day was the last day: actually it could be taken on Monday or Tuesday, but we are taking it to-day in order to run concurrently with the other place.