Lords Sitting of 9 March 1966

Preamble
The House met at half past two of the clock, The EARL OF LISTOWEL On the Woolsack.
Prayers—Read by the Lord Bishop of Norwich

COST OF "THE PLAN AND YOU"
2.35 p.m.
LORD INGLEWOOD: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
[The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government what is the cost of producing and publishing The Plan and You issued by the Department of Economic Affairs, and how many copies it is intended to issue.]
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, the estimated cost of producing the first issue, based on a print order of 50,000 copies, is £736. In addition, the cost of postage and distribution is estimated at £711.
LORD INGLEWOOD: My Lords, bearing in mind the fact that this broadsheet is little more than Election propaganda, and is in fact even set out like an oversized Election address with a photograph of the candidate in the corner, will the Minister give an assurance that this cost will be debited against the Election expenses of Labour candidates in whose constituencies this broadsheet is to be distributed, or tell us whether it is all going to be debited against those of Mr. George Brown?
SEVERAL NOBLE LORDS: Hear Hear!
LORD SHEPHERD: Noble Lords are rather brittle this afternoon. The noble Lord, Lord Inglewood, does not seem to see the difference between Election propaganda and material required to ensure an understanding by all workers and management of the necessity to improve productivity, imports, and exports. In regard to the noble Lord's allegation that this is Election material, I would tell him that this was designed before
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Christmas and was issued on February 24, prior to the date of the announcement of the General Election.
LORD INGLEWOOD: My Lords, if this leaflet contained nothing but information such as the noble Lord described, it would not have met with criticism from any quarter. As it is, any noble Lord who has read it will see that it is utterly unworthy of any British Government.
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, the noble Lord must get his facts right. My understanding is that we have received 3,584 replies in response to the distribution of 30,000 copies, and of those replies 14 were criticisms. Most of them, however, were to the effect that they did not apply to the writer's industry.
LORD ST. HELENS: My Lords, since there is no mention in the Manifesto of the Socialist Party of the Prices and Incomes Bill in the forthcoming Parliament, can we take it that the Government will withdraw this document and have it correctly reproduced?
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, the noble Lord again is wrong. The Government do intend to bring legislation forward; my right honourable friend has made that perfectly clear. There is no need to alter our Manifesto in any respect. I would say to the noble Lord, taking into account what this document intends to obtain, that we shall produce it immediately after the Election.

THE NATIONAL YOUTH ORCHESTRA
2.38 p.m.
LORD AUCKLAND: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
[The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government whether they have any statement to make regarding assistance to the National Youth Orchestra.]
THE PARLIAMENTARY SECRETARY, MINISTRY OF TECHNOLOGY (LORD SNOW): My Lords, as my honourable friend Miss Jennie Lee said in another place on March 3, we are now examining the legal difficulties

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which affect the powers of the Department of Education and Science to assist the orchestra financially. We are, however, determined to save it.
LORD AUCKLAND: My Lords, I thank the noble Lord for that Answer. May I ask him to ask his right honourable friend whether at least some of the additional £3 million which has been granted to the Arts Council can be given to an orchestra which has done a great deal for the country in foreign travel and has produced, and will continue to produce, some of our best orchestral musicians?
LORD SNOW: My Lords, we are as determined to support this orchestra as noble Lords would wish us to be. The difficulties are purely technical, and several solutions have been looked at. At the moment, the Department of Education and Science has not the power to produce the finance needed. My right honourable friend the Secretary of State for Education and Science is about to take new powers to make him able to do so.

BUILDING CONTROL
2.41 p.m.
VISCOUNT DILHORNE: My Lords, I beg to ask leave to ask the Question of which I have given Private Notice; namely, to ask Her Majesty's Government why this House was not informed yesterday of the Statement made in another place by the Minister of Public Building and Works about building control, and whether Her Majesty's Government will now inform this House of the contents of that Statement.
THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES (THE EARL OF LONGFORD): My Lords, my right honourable friend the Minister of Public Building and Works yesterday made a Statement on building control which resulted from the fact that the Building Control Bill, at present passing through its stages in the House of Commons, would be unable to pass into law because of the impending Dissolution of Parliament. On the information available, I felt that it would not be right for this Statement to be made in this House, as the Statement referred to a Bill which was before
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another place and of which this House therefore has no cognisance. It is, of course, a well-established principle of our Constitution that neither House may concern itself with legislation which is before the other. It may be that an element of misunderstanding entered into my decision, and, if so, I express regret for it.
VISCOUNT DILHORNE: My Lords, I do not wish to pursue this matter unduly, but I must say that when one looks at the Statement that was made one sees that it deals entirely with the exercise of building control at the present time. The noble Earl has not answered the second part of my Question and I would, if I may, put this further point to him. If there is to be a further Statement to-day about this matter, will that be communicated to this House?
THE EARL OF LONGFORD: My Lords, I am grateful to the noble and learned Viscount for giving me the opportunity of answering that point. There will be a further Statement to-day in another place and, if the House approves, that Statement will be made here as soon as possible after half-past three.

GOVERNMENT STATEMENTS
THE MINISTER WITHOUT PORTFOLIO (LORD CHAMPION): My Lords, at a suitable moment after 3.30 p.m., my noble friend Lord Shackleton will be making a statement on the cancellation of the Super VC 10s, and my noble friend Lord Mitchison will be making a Statement on the Statement on the Bill to control building.

PRIVATE BUSINESS
2.44 p.m.
THE CHAIRMAN OF COMMITTEES (THE EARL OF LISTOWEL): My Lords, the Motion standing in my name on the Order Paper is to provide for Private Bills introduced this Session and now before the House to continue their progress in the next Parliament without putting the promoters of these Bills, and such petitioners as there are against them, to the trouble and expense of depositing their Bills and petitions again after the Dissolution. Paragraph 10 of the Motion

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makes a similar provision for any petition which may be placed against a Hybrid Special Order, and also extends the time for depositing petitions against such Orders.
This Motion is in accordance with precedent, and a similar Motion is, I understand, being moved in another place to-day. I beg to move.
Moved—

(1) That the promoters of every Private Bill which shall have been introduced into or presented to this House in the present Session of Parliament, shall have leave to introduce or present the same in the next Session of Parliament, provided that notice of their intention to do so be lodged in the Private Bill Office not later than Noon on the last sitting day of the present Session; and provided that all fees due by them thereon, up to that period, be paid;

(2) That a list of all such Bills, with a statement of the stages at which they shall have arrived, shall be prepared in the Private Bill Office, and printed;

(3) That every such Bill shall be deposited in the Private Bill Office not later than Three o'clock on or before the third day on which the House shall sit after the next meeting of Parliament for business other than judicial business, with a declaration annexed thereto, signed by the agent, stating that the Bill is the same in every respect as the Bill at the last stage of the proceedings thereon in this House in the present Session;

(4) That the proceedings on any such Bill shall, in the next Session of Parliament, be pro forma only in regard to every stage through which the same shall have passed in the present Session, and that no new fees be charged in regard to such stages;

(5) That the Standing Orders by which the proceedings on Bills are regulated shall not apply to any Private Bill which shall have originated in this House in the present Session, in regard to any of the stages through which the same shall have passed;

(6) That every certificate from the Examiners in respect of a Petition for Additional Provision in any Private Bill originating in the House of Commons, upon which the proceedings shall have been suspended in that House in the present Session, shall be deemed to have been given in respect of such petition in the next Session of Parliament;

(7) That no petitioners shall be heard before the Committee on any Bill in the next Session unless their petition shall have been presented within the time limited in the present Session;

(8) That any report of the Examiner in respect of a Petition for Additional Provision in a Bill presented in the present Session, shall stand referred to the Standing Orders Committee in the next Session;

(9) That all Standing Orders complied with in respect of any Public Bill presented in the
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House of Commons during the present Session shall be held to have been complied with in respect of any Bill presented in that House in the next Session provided that the Bill presented in the next Session is the same in every respect as that which was presented in the present Session; and where the Examiner has already reported that the Standing Orders have been complied with in respect of any such Bill, he shall report only whether any further Standing Orders are applicable;

(10) That any petition presented in respect of any Special Order which stands referred to the Special Orders Committee in the present Session shall stand referred to that Committee in the next Session; further that paragraph (4) of Standing Order 216 in so far as it prescribes the time within which petitions must be deposited shall be dispensed with and that so much of the petitioning time as is unexpired on the day of prorogation shall run from the first sitting day after such prorogation.—(The Earl of Listowel.)

On Question, Motion agreed to: Ordered that a Message be sent to the Commons to acquaint them therewith.

THE DEFENCE ESTIMATES
2.45 p.m.
Debate resumed (according to Order) on the Motion moved yesterday by Lord Shackleton on the Defence Estimates, 1966, and on the Amendments moved by Lord Carrington and Lord Gladwyn.
LORD SHACKLETON'SLORD SHACKLETON'S Motion was, That this House approves the Statement on the Defence Estimates 1966 [Cmnd. 2901 and 2902].
LORD CARRINGTON LORD CARRINGTON had moved, as an Amendment, to leave out all the words after "House" and to insert instead: "regrets that the Statement on the Defence Estimates 1966 shows that there has been no real attempt to match military resources to political commitments, and fears that the policy announced will lead to a growing gap between our commitments and our ability to meet them ".
LORD GLADWYN LORD GLADWYN (on behalf of Lord Rea) had moved, as an Amendment to the Amendment, to leave out "military resources to political commitments "and insert" political commitments to military resources".
THE EARL OF SELKIRK: My Lords, we are examining in this debate a very grave issue, and I think that it is proper to recall some words which the noble Lord, Lord King-Hall, put forward late yesterday evening. He reminded the House of the big changes which have

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taken place over the last twenty years. It is only 21 years since Hiroshima, and since that time there have grown up all over the world a multitude of new nations which are finding it not very easy to get on to their feet. As things are going to-day, if we look into the future of the next twenty years we only see even bigger changes. Technology to-day is advancing faster than it has done in the past, and I think it is dangerous to be too dogmatic as to the direction in which we are likely to go.
The Government have told us that the Anglo-French V.G. aircraft is the core of their programme. I sincerely hope that their hopes will be justified, but I can remember a great many aircraft of which I had high hopes and which did not live up to them. I can remember looking forward to an aircraft called the Battle as being the great aircraft of the future, and to-day I think of it with horror. Nothing which has been said about the V.G. aircraft has not already been heard about the TSR 2. That was a wonderful aircraft technically, but it fell down on the last hurdle of expense. At the beginning of the war we had to build three four-engined bombers before we found one that was first class. I sincerely hope that the V.G. aircraft may have a longer run, but it will have a great many hurdles to get over, and I am afraid that the Government have based their programme much too tightly on this aircraft.
The Government have made an extensive review, as former Ministers of Defence have and as no doubt other Ministers of Defence will do again in two or three years' time. I wish the Government had given us a little more of their wisdom, which I think is very inadequately set out in Part I of a not very good document. But there are two points for which I am grateful. The Government are standing firm on the Anglo-American alliance. This, I am sure, is important. However, some of us have felt that interdependence is turning a little too much into dependence, and I hope that the Government will watch this, because we do not want to become a satellite. The second aspect which I welcome is that the Government have made a firm commitment to stand by Malaysia. It is stated that this will last until confrontation ends. But "con-
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frontation" is a pretty vague term. We do not know exactly what Mr. Healey said in Singapore, but we know from Mr. Lee Kuan Yew the impression he left in Singapore. Mr. Lee said that he
"got the impression that Britain was thinking in terms of staying in Singapore up to 1979 or 1980."
There is nothing there about confrontation, and I think that it is important that our friends there should have reliance on what we are doing.
The question worrying me is this: just what is the reasoning in Part I of the White Paper? The Secretary of State, when he went to Washington a week before the White Paper was published, said that he did not think it would cause any resignations. He may or may not have known at the time what the position was. I do not mind his side-stepping the Press if he wants to do so. But I am quite certain that no Board of Admiralty could have agreed to paragraphs 3 to 6 of Chapter III of the First Part of the White Paper. It says:
"Land-based aircraft should take over air defence functions of the carrier."
I find it difficult to believe that either the Air Staff or the Navy Staff could ever have agreed with those words. I am therefore in doubt as to what professional advice the Government are taking. It is worth remembering that in much more exacting circumstances Sir Winston Churchill never overruled his professional advisers. This Secretary of State has done so in the first eighteen months of holding this office. I wonder what we are letting ourselves in for.
We are said to be making cuts of £400 million in an imaginary budget five years ahead. A cut of £400 million on a £2,000 million expenditure looks to me more like a 20 per cent, than a 16 per cent. reduction. We have been told by the Secretary of State that this will arise almost entirely from changes in equipment programme, and not from cuts in manpower. That means that the 16 per cent. or 20 per cent, will fall on half the Defence budget, which looks like a cut in equipment of between 30 and 40 per cent. This is very severe indeed. Since we abolished conscription our policy has been high mobility and modern equipment for smaller numbers. I wonder how far we are going to be able to carry that on.

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I was disturbed when the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, said several times, yesterday and earlier, that the late Government had not built any carriers. I think we should get this position clear. They did not lay down the keel of a carrier; but they had hulls which were left over from the last war, and very properly and economically they built them up into first-class carriers. Between 1955 and 1964 there were five modern carriers, which were comparable in quality with those of the Americans, though not so big. And I think it is true to say that, in aircraft control and some electronic equipment, they were even superior. It is natural that this should be the case, because the Government have said that the carrier is the most important element in the Fleet. I find it hard to know on what professional advice the Government have reached the conclusion that carriers are not required. But I must in fairness say that the Secretary of State has modified what he said recently in the other place and has emphasised the importance of the rôle that carriers play in exercising sea power.
I am glad that the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, said yesterday that there is no conflict between the Canberra replacement and the carriers. But I wonder whether 50 F 111s can really fulfil the rôle described for the Canberra in paragraph 58 of Part I of the Statement. We have been told that the Air Staff wanted 158 TSR 2s, and we have to suppose that 50 F 111s are able to take their place. The Canberra's rôle is described as follows. Their primary rôle in NATO is nuclear strike; they are also declared for CENTO and SEATO. I did not know that any equipment was declared for SEATO. Possibly we can be told if any other equipment has been so declared. I do not think that we ever used to declare for SEATO.
However, that is by the way. How can these 50 aircraft, perhaps three squadrons, cover NATO, CENTO and Singapore? I know there are said to be the V-Bombers, such as will remain at and after 1970, and they will play a tactical strike rôle. I greatly admire these aircraft, but I doubt whether this is a rôle which they are well equipped to fulfil. It seems to me, therefore, that we are going to have a gap, because they have
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suddenly been thrown, beside the Canberra rôle, a considerable rôle in sea protection. I should like to ask the Government whether they do not think they will have to ask for another 50 F 111s. I should be surprised if they do not.
Before answering this question, may I look for a moment at what we are trying to do outside Europe. I would not differ from what is said in the Labour Manifesto, that "Britain has a key rôle to play in promoting peaceful change", as a world Power. We are agreed on that. What does it mean? I think it means that we are trying to help the evolution of the young States in Asia and Africa to enable them to develop themselves, without using methods of force, but to make their evolution by reason, by understanding and by agreement. After all, all our efforts in aid and economic development will fall to the ground unless stability is maintained. And there will for a long time be people in this world who, when they have the opportunity of using this power, will use it. This does not by any means apply only to Communist countries: any country which has the opportunity will continue to do so.
So long as we believe in the expression of free opinion, these countries are, in my view, entitled—at least, it is in our interests—to see that they evolve without being overawed by China, or by any other country, until they have got properly on their feet. They have had little experience in defence, and little experience in foreign policy, and in many cases we can help them, provided always that we have the means to do so. It is not enough to say that they want us, or that they do not want us. In most countries there is a division of opinion, as there is here in politics; and because, in many countries, the division is so wide, they have gone over to the one-policy system. We may regret this, but that is what has happened. It is in just this kind of situation, in helping the evolution of young countries, that I think the carrier can play a very special rôle.
Noble Lords have talked a great deal about cost-effectiveness. I think there is another side to that, and it is peace-effectiveness. I should like to mention some of the rôles which, in my view, cannot be weighed and cannot be carried out by any other arm of defence. The first is secrecy. There is no unit which can be used with such force and secrecy

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as the carrier. The second is that it can be poised, awaiting development, often unknown to the enemy, and without necessarily being used at all. Thirdly, the carrier constitutes a much smaller infringement of sovereignty—much less than that of any land-based unit, whether it be of the Army or the R.A.F.; and it is easier for a Government wanting assistance without arousing opposition inside the country to ask for something which does not need to go on land.
Fourthly, the carrier is the most sophisticated instrument of defence that has yet been developed—that may be a criticism, but it is true—combining a wider range of scientific research and a fuller measure of built-in discipline which other countries will find it difficult, if not impossible, to copy. It is for that reason that we should have an advantage over any other country which has not got carriers. And not only that; there is also in the carrier the element of the unknown which cannot easily be understood except by those who have experience. It is indeed the key to sea power. It is not without interest that it was to sea power that President Kennedy turned when the supreme test came in Cuba. We have learned something about this recently from the fascinating books which have been written on the subject. He decided then that it was an exercise for sea power, which was the most delicate, decisive and effective way in which he could make his will known.
Finally, on this subject, may I say this? The carrier, to my mind, is essentially the complement to land-based aircraft. We are on the verge of V.T.O.L., and it may well be that the pilots of the R.A.F. or the Fleet Air Arm will be able to land with equal facility on ships or on land, and it would be a great pity to bring this to an end.
I think it is rather cynical to run down the air power of the Navy. The Board of Admiralty have often been criticised for not being sufficiently conscious of the power of the air. I have done it myself, and I was fairly familiar with the views of the late Lord Trenchard on this subject. The Admiralty Board, who are conscious of this, are now having their teeth, their eyes and their shield taken away by their political masters. Is it really possible
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that they did not make alternative suggestions of how this could be achieved? They are a pretty resourceful body, and I should be surprised if something was not suggested to the Government as to how the object which the Government had in view could be achieved, while still retaining the essential element of sea power.
I should like to ask one question, of a perhaps rather more minor nature, on Part II. Are we making enough use of the universities in research and development? I believe that the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, is specially charged with this, and I am glad to see that all three Services are asking for recruits from the universities. The Navy, I know, is the slowest in this, but I am glad to see that it is doing so now. I notice that the universities are helping in instruction and in the medical field. But can we not use a wider source of charging universities with certain fields of research and development? It might well produce economies—I am sure that it would produce ideas. I am always a little worried that the great research organisations of this country may become too inward-looking, and may not have the fertilisation or cross-fertilisation from outer ideas. The noble Lord, Lord Plowden, refers to this point in his Report on the aircraft industry. It would, I am sure, be good for the universities, and it might provide a valuable flow of ideas.
I do not know whether this is a fair comparison, but I notice that an interesting new anti-submarine weapon, called IKARA has been produced. It is, I presume, a weapon faster and of longer range than the torpedo and a weapon for which scientists have been looking for a long time. It comes from Australia. I do not know why it does. I have no doubt that our organisation has helped there, but I would suggest that it may be that in a different environment broader ideas can come out. Recently, in a discussion on the universities, the noble Lord, Lord Hughes, stressed the importance of using the universities research facilities, both by the Government and industry. This is a point which cannot be emphasised too much, and I hope noble Lords will consider trying to use them rather more.
I do not underestimate the problems which face the Minister of Defence. My

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impression is that the Armed Forces are going to be more over-stretched and less versatile than they were. What are the Government doing? I take it, first of all, that they are not modifying, or renouncing, any of our Treaties, withdrawing troops from British Guinea, Swaziland, Malta or Cyprus, and are not reducing our commitments. All they are doing is to change the position of our troops. So far as Aden is concerned, I imagine the best that the Adenis can say is that this is a tricky Government. What, may I ask, will the Government say if the Adenis now ask for a Treaty of protection? Do we refuse it, or what do we do? What do we do if anyone invades Adeni territory? I do not think the Government can claim to have saved overseas exchange. The figures given in answer by the Secretary of State were that there has been committed on the F 111, £240 million in dollars; on the Phantom, £310 million in dollars, and on the Hercules, £110 million in dollars. That is a total of £660 million in dollars. I suppose one would deduct from that, say, £200 million for Phantoms which had been ordered by the previous Government. That leaves a commitment during the year of £460 million in dollars.
The Minister of Aviation said that this will not be covered by orders from the United States placed in this country. What we can do, apparently, is to bid for something like £100 million of contracts, out of £460 million which was the sum incurred last year. The rest is to be obtained from third countries. In third countries, how do you reckon this? How do you know we should not have got the contracts in any case? What happens, may I ask, if we do not get the dollars? Do we cut off the aircraft? Last year we borrowed £900 million, and the Secretary of State appears to have committed half of it in aircraft already. The Government theme is domestic cost. We are therefore pruning an imaginary Budget in 1970 with, apparently, a ceiling of £2,000 million or 6 per cent. of the gross national product. Could we be told which it is? Is it one, or is it the other? Is it the higher or is it the lower according to which suits the Government?
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, my mind was wandering. Could the noble Earl repeat that?
THE EARL OF SELKIRK: I was saying this. We are told that we are pruning an imaginary Budget in 1970. We do not know what the Budget is, but an interesting exercise is going on to prune something we cannot see. I hope the Government are enjoying it. Is the ceiling £2,000 million, or is it 6 per cent. of the gross national product? Or is it the higher or the lower of those figures as convenience suits?
One of the Government supporters last night gave vent to a thought which I dare say is not wholly absent from some other supporters of the Government. It was the noble Lord, Lord Soper. He said this:
"When, for instance, it is said as an accusation against the Government that their intention is all butter and very few guns, what in the name of God is wrong with that? That would seem to me to be a thoroughly admirable intention for any Government which invites the people of any country to support it."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, Vol. 273 (No. 48), col. 1048; 8/3/66.]
Some of us are, I think, rather anxious that this is really behind the minds, at least in a shadowy form, of some supporters of the Government.
To sum up, if I may, the Government have denied the Navy the use of air power. In views expressed both on this side and the other side of the Atlantic, the aircraft industry has been brought to its knees. They sought to abolish the Territorial Army. I was never a Territorial, but I was in the Auxiliary Air Force, and I think it is important for those who live in the ivory towers of Whitehall to remember that ours is a citizen army, and that in many ways the Territorial organisation provides the important link between the Services and the civilians. I am, therefore, very glad that the Government are reconsidering this point, and I sincerely hope that they will go on reconsidering it in the light of the speeches made last night, particularly that of the noble Lord, Lord Thurlow. I was also glad that the noble Lord, Lord Leatherland, had his doubts about the abolition of the Territorial Army. It may be that they will find consolation in what Mr. Ernest Bevin said:
"So long as I have any power at all, I will never be a party to treating the Army in the

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future as it has been treated in the past. They broke up in peace-time the very foundations of the Army structure, and expected to build it up during war time with the enemy at the gates."
The Territorial Army is a deep foundation of great value.
If I may say so, I think we have been for many years rather a lucky nation. We may perhaps agree with what Sir William Watson has said:
"Time and the ocean and some favouring star In high cabal have made us what we are."
I do not think that this is the time to take chances with our good fortune, but I am very much afraid that that is what the Government: are doing now. I believe that all they are doing it for is 0·5 per cent. of the gross national product. Is it worth it?
3.10 p.m.
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, the noble Earl has started the second day's debate in good form. Some parts of his speech were penetrating, others were sweeping, and there were a number of errors. I thought the first one that he made was when he called upon Sir Winston Churchill by name as being one of the great Ministers who always accepted the advice of his Staff. I am quite sure the noble Lord, Lord Boothby, will remember that it was Admiral, Lord Fisher who resigned in 1915.
THE EARL OF SELKIRK: And so did Sir Winston Churchill.
LORD SHEPHERD: But not at the same time.
THE EARL OF SELKIRK: Oh yes, he did.
LORD BOOTHBY: Yes, it was at the same time.
LORD SHEPHERD: The noble Earl also complained about the inadequacy of the Defence White Paper. I should have thought it was generally recognised—it certainly was yesterday—that the White Paper which the Government have issued is a revolutionary form of Defence White Paper in the amount of information that is made available.
THE EARL OF SELKIRK: May I make this quite clear?
LORD SHEPHERD: What I will undertake with the noble Earl is that next year, before we produce our White Paper, we will have a discussion to see how we can improve it for him.
THE EARL OF SELKIRK: If the noble Lord will just allow me to say one thing, I was referring to Part I and not to Part II. In regard to Part II I would agree with the noble Lord.
LORD SHEPHERD: But the noble Earl has to take the two Parts together.
A NOBLE LORD: Why?
THE EARL OF SELKIRK: Like the curate's egg!
LORD SHEPHERD: The noble Lord asks why: surely if you want to take an intelligent interest in the defence problems of the country you have to take the précis, which is in the first part, and the details, which are in the second part. If any noble Lords really want to be stupid in this matter—but I must contain myself, I have a long way to go.
My Lords, the Government originally did not want to provoke your Lordships into a Division. The noble Lords opposite have done reasonably well during the period of this Government. The Conservatives, however, have decided to put down an Amendment. I think most of us on this side of the House understand the reasons for that. No doubt the noble Lord and his colleagues on the Front Bench wish to send the troops into battle for the next three weeks. We are, in fact, going to take part in a great national debate in which defence will play a prominent part—and so it should. We on this side of the House will help it. When one sees the strength of the Conservative Party, and the scale and the size that will go through the Lobby this evening, perhaps someone outside will say that that vote will have as much validity as a vote at Crockford's on gambling. Because, my Lords, most of you have come to vote against the Government. Be that as it may, it is my job, and that of my noble friend Lord Longford, to put the case for the Government and this White Paper.
During this Parliament we have had a number of important debates upon the economic position. Yesterday the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, said that he and

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his Party would be quite content if the Defence Budget was contained within 7 per cent. of the gross national product. At least, that was my understanding of what he said. The Manifesto relates it to our economic resources. I want to relate that for a moment against our economic resources, not only in terms of monetary matters but also in terms of physical resources. We made some progress during 1965 in the balance-of-payments difficulties, but I do not believe there is any noble Lord opposite who has any connection with the City of London or with industry who will disagree with me when I say that we have a stern battle ahead, not only to get into surplus but to remain in surplus; and in order to do that we shall have to face the harshest possible competition from European trading competitors.
The Conservative Government had a Defence Budget running in the region of 7 per cent. of the gross national product. The proposals of the Government are that by 1969–70 it should be around 6 per cent. of the gross national product. I would ask noble Lords to consider what other countries provide by way of defence in terms of their own gross national product. In Germany the figure is 5 per cent., and I understand that next year it will be reduced to 4·5 per cent. For Holland, the figure is 4·4 per cent.; in France, 5·1 per cent.; in Sweden, 5·2 per cent.; in Canada. 3·7 per cent.; and in Italy, 3·3 per cent. Only the United States of America contributes a higher percentage to defence, in terms of its gross national product; but America has two and a half times the income per head. We must also take into account the effect of this high spending on defence. If we consider the E.E.C. countries, they provide 26 per cent. of their gross national product to fixed capital expenditure, whereas in the past we have contributed only 19 per cent. This is one of the reasons why, in Europe in particular, they have been able to move faster ahead in economic growth. I think we should not forget this.
Turning now to manpower, we have discussed the fact that we are going to face a grave shortage of skilled manpower in this country. We have a work force of 23 million. One and a quarter million workpeople are to-day involved
1116
in defence. One-fifth of our scientists and technologists are involved in defence. Think of that in relation to our effort to meet the competition in world trade. Then, my Lords, 40 per cent. of the money we in this country invest on research and development is also for defence. These are significant figures, and they should never be forgotten when we view the task that lies ahead.
We have from time to time discussed overseas investment and overseas expenditure. The House may like to know of the steady growth in recent years of Government defence expenditure overseas, excluding the cost of exports and imports of arms. In 1956 it was 96 million; in 1959, 136 million; in 1962. 227 million; and in 1964, 272 million. Thus, taking our balance-of-payments problems into account, surely the Government were right to say that we must find a means to bring this down, and the Government's proposal is that by the redeployment of our forces and our equipment this class of expenditure overseas will be reduced between now and 1969–70 by 25 per cent.
We have heard a great deal, and quite rightly so, about the extent of public expenditure. This Government, I think rightly, have laid a discipline on all the spending Departments, of 4¼ per cent. The Government, when they took office, found that public expenditure would absorb all the revenue for the next few years, and we had to take into account particular payments that are necessary for our industrial development. The previous Administration (I would refer to the White Paper on Public Expenditure of 1963) estimated that by 1969–70 our Defence Budget would reach £2,400 million in 1964 terms. The Government took the view that this was far too high a rate of growth for our economy to sustain. We therefore laid a discipline on the Ministry of Defence, in the same way as we had laid disciplines upon all the other spending Departments, to the effect that we would contain defence expenditure at £2,000 million, in 1964 terms, or (and I hope the noble Earl, Lord Selkirk will remember this) what should be 6 per cent. of the gross national product at the time. So we have really an argument whether it should be 6 per cent. or 7 per cent., as was the case with the Conservative Government.

1117
Let us consider what we have in mind for public expenditure. I have heard many debates on the great need for money for roads and many other services. We expect, and it is within our National Plan, that by 1969–70 we shall be increasing the amount spent on roads to £575 million, an increase of 35 per cent.; on public housing investment to £691 million, an increase of 21 per cent.; on housing subsidy to £257 million, an increase of 57 per cent. I could go on dealing with health and benefits and education. There may be some noble Lords who will say that those figures are not high enough; but those figures can be attained only if we contain defence expenditure to the figure I have just given. If the noble Lords opposite say that we should spend more on defence—and this I believe is what they are saying in their Election manifesto—the country is entitled, and so are the noble Lords behind the Front Bench, to know which of these essential services are going to be cut; and I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Harlech, when he replies this evening on behalf of the Opposition Front Bench, will give us that information. The country is entitled to know.
I cannot stress too highly the need in the years that lie ahead to put our economic situation in order, because that is how we are going to be judged in world affairs. The Conservative Amendment at least recognises that there was a gap between our commitments and our ability to meet them, and I should like to deal with some of the steps that we have taken to bridge that gap. We state in the White Paper that we found our forces over-stretched and under-equipped, in spite of the fact that we had been spending such vast sums of money. For the Army—and I think it was the noble Lord, Lord Sinclair of Cleeve, who mentioned it yesterday—we have a ceiling of 181,130 men. On January 1 the strength stood at 177,860. During 1965 we recruited 20,000 men out of 36,000 applicants, a net increase of 1,550. 1965 was a difficult year for all the Forces for recruiting. This is clearly understandable when we look at the great shortage of labour, particularly skilled labour, in this country, and I think we must be honest and admit that this state of affairs is going to be with us. We shall have to make a sustained effort to get the num-
1118
bers of troops that we require. But we hope that the new pay scales will close the gap during 1966. Whether or not we get the target figure, we must face the fact that the Army will still be out of balance. We shall still be short of skilled tradesmen, particularly in Signals and R.E.M.E.
We must also not forget the problems of servicemen's families. We have sent men abroad at very short notice, leaving their wives and their families behind. Perhaps the noble and gallant Field Marshal, Lord Montgomery of Alamein would be interested in the progress of one of the regiments from "the tribal areas", the First Battalion the King's Own Scottish Borderers. In February, 1962, it moved from the Scottish Command to Aden, and only a very small proportion of the families were able to join the battalion. In January, 1964, it moved from Aden to the United Kingdom. In April, 1964, three months later, it went back to Aden, this time unaccompanied. In July, 1964, it returned to the United Kingdom. In April, 1965, it was sent to Hong Kong, and it is now serving in Borneo. We must bear this problem very much in mind when considering the conditions in which many of our soldiers and other Servicemen are serving to-day. We must see, not only in their interest but also in the interest of recruiting, that they have greater opportunities to remain at a station abroad where there is family accommodation, or in this country.
The House will know that the Government have proposed to redeploy many of our military forces in the next two to three years. We shall be reducing by about 30 per cent. the strength of our Army overseas. We are doing this for two reasons. First, the Government do not believe that it is right for the Army to be widely spread in small pockets. We believe it is of vital urgency and necessity that we re-create the strategic reserve. The noble Lord, Lord Caning-ton, knows that last year and the year before there were times when we had little or no strategic reserve available in this country. We must build up this strategic reserve so that, if we are called upon to meet emergencies, we can meet them more effectively.
I think I should now come to the question of our Reserves. I could not help thinking, yesterday afternoon, that

1119
many noble Lords were thinking in rather out-of-date terms. The Government do not believe that the Army will be faced with sustained or traditional warfare in Europe; we believe that the peace of Europe depends on the nuclear umbrella of NATO and the Western Alliance. But we must face the fact that we shall be needing Reserves to assist the Regular forces outside Europe. For economic reasons, it is not possible to have a properly balanced Regular force, we must have a major part of that Regular force as "teeth" units. Therefore we must see that the Reserves are in fact the logistic forces to bring the Army up to strength in times of difficulty. The Regular Reserve now stands at 27,000 and in 1970 we believe it will be in the region of 45,000. These, as I say, will be mainly "teeth" forces who are all well trained. It is to the Territorial Army that we look for a major contribution for this Reserve Force.
I congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Barnard, on his maiden speech yesterday afternoon. I was glad to hear him speak, with his experience as a commanding officer, of the high morale of the soldier in the Territorial Army. I had the privilege last September of visiting the Territorial Army, and I was amazed—no, that is not the right word; I was gratified—to see that the old standards of humour and of loyalty that one knew in the Territorial Army days before the war still remained. The Government will look to the Territorial Army for a major contribution to the Reserve; but I will deal with that in a few moments.
The Army Emergency Reserve is mainly concerned with logistics and consists of highly skilled tradesmen. In category A, which is the category which can be called up without a Proclamation, we have a strength of 9,000 against the ceiling of 11,000. I should like to draw the attention of the House to a number of advantages which will result from the new Army Volunteer Reserve. It will be tailored to meet the requirements of Regular reinforcements within a limited Defence budget. We shall be able to give it far better training and equipment than in the past. Apart from some major items, it will be provided with current vehicles and equipment to the standard of those in Regular units. Initially, it
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will take over the equipment now held by the Territorial Army. Because the number of "teeth" Army units in the Army Reserve will be fewer than in the Territorial Army, they will immediately receive more modern equipment than counterparts in the present Territorial Army. The money available will enable nearly twice as much per man to be spent on equipment. I think this will give satisfaction to the Territorial soldier who, as the noble Lord, Lord Thurlow, knows, has complained consistently over the years, not only in regard to equipment, but also in regard to uniforms, particularly the battle uniform.
Turning to the Home Defence Force, I readily accept the criticism—or should I say the gratification?—of noble Lords opposite because the Government have taken note of what they have put to us and have advised us; and, as the House knows, we have now agreed to the creation of a Home Defence Force. The details are still under investigation, but the House will be glad to know that already most, if not all, of the existing major units of the Royal Armoured Corps, the Royal Artillery and the infantry, which could not be fitted into the Army Volunteer Reserve will in some way or the other be represented in the new force. But I must stress the necessity to keep this force within the figure set of 22,000. We believe that this well-trained force will provide a useful supplement to the police and the Civil Defence authorities in the event of a nuclear attack. Equipment will be mainly rifles, some wireless sets, radio instruments and a few vehicles; and the training will consist basically of infantry training, with wireless sets.
Some noble Lords asked whether these two forces could not be integrated. Their rôles are quite different, and we do not believe they could be brought within one command. But we fully accept the advice that has been given to us, both yesterday and on other occasions, that there should be as close a link as is possible between these two organisations. As the noble Lord, Lord Thurlow, knows, discussions are now taking place between the Council of the Territorial and Auxiliary Forces Associations and the Government. I hope the noble Lord

1121
will understand that I cannot go any further than that.
There was some concern expressed yesterday as to whether the volunteer soldier would respond to this new force. Having seen the soldier in the ranks, I must say I have no doubt at all; but I think it is now up to the officers, the Council and the Government to carry out a publicity campaign, not only in public but also among the soldiers, to interest them in this new force. I have no doubt that we shall get the men we need, men of the highest possible quality. The noble Lord, Lord Thurlow, asked about the WRACS. He will be pleased to know that we hope to be able to find a place for the WRACS within the Army Volunteer Reserve, perhaps in the Signals. In regard to the Home Defence Force, this is a new force and I think it is too early to say whether we shall be able to find a position for them, but there is a definite desire to see whether we can do so.
One last question I should deal with before I move from the Territorial Army. I see in the Conservative Party Manifesto that, if they were returned to power, the Conservative Party would retain the Territorial Army. I should like to know from the noble Lord, when he winds up for noble Lords opposite, what he has in mind or what his Party has in mind in regard to the Territorial Army. Does this mean that we should go back to the "pre-force" of last year, or do they now accept the need for these new Reserves of the Army which the Territorial Army obviously can provide?
I now come to the question of the carrier. I think this was the main plank of the complaint of the noble Lord, Lord Carrington. He was reminded that in 1962 the Government took into account the problems of the requirements for this class of ship ten or fifteen years' ahead. They then went on to make a condition, that there would have to be one range of aircraft common to the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force. As your Lordships know, this was not obtained during the period of office of the noble Earl, Lord Jellicoe, as First Lord of the Admiralty, in that the last Government decided to buy Phantoms from the United States at a cost in dollars of £200 million. As I understand it, the need for the carrier is that it is a defence against
1122
shipping and it is vitally necessary for opposed landing where you are facing sophisticated forces. I think the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, claimed that since 1945 there have been a number of occasions upon which carriers were required. I think in regard to this argument that I should make it clear that there has not been any occasion since 1945 when carriers were used when Royal Air Force cover was not available. It is true that carriers have been used, because they were available. But it is wrong to assume that carriers have been used because Royal Air Force cover was not available to meet the demand.
The noble Lord, Lord Carrington, raised the question of prediction. I think this point was also made by the noble Earl, Lord Selkirk. It is difficult to make a firm prediction of what we shall need by 1969 or 1970. When dealing with a military force you have to make certain assumptions. You may have to lay down guide lines as to how you would operate, because this country is quite unable to provide all the equipment needed for the foreseeable assumptions and predictions that military strategists may think up. We have to cut our cloth according to our coat.
NOBLE LORDS: It is the other way round.
LORD SHEPHERD: I have spoken to a number of noble Lords opposite who are interested in Navy matters. They have taken the view that two carriers in concert are a viable force. One carrier by itself becomes vulnerable, particularly if it is to undertake the operation which has been envisaged for an aircraft carrier. As my noble friend Lord Shackleton explained yesterday, we are likely to have only three aircraft carriers available from 1970. It means that we shall have one aircraft carrier in the Far East, one refitting, and one able to be on station in operation within fifteen days. My noble friend referred to H.M.S. "Hermes". If there were to be one aircraft carrier in the Far East, it would have 12 fighters and 7 strike aircraft. If it were one of the larger aircraft carriers, such as the "Ark Royal" or the "Eagle", it would have 12 strike aircraft and 24 fighters. The cost of such a force would be in the region of £1,450

1123
million in the next ten years. It is interesting to realise, when making a comparison of strike capacity that two F 111As are equal to seven Buccaneers. Therefore, in terms of strike power, the F 111A, if it is able to operate, is infinitely greater than the aircraft which can be flown off an aircraft carrier.
Noble Lords who ask for a new aircraft carrier must recognise that, if we were to decide to order one, it could come into operation only by 1973 at the earliest, by which time our two available aircraft carriers will not have so many years of active service afloat in front of them; and if we were committed to the one aircraft carrier, we should be committed thereafter to CVA 02 and 03.
LORD CARRINGTON: My Lords, would the noble Lord not agree that, if they had ordered the new aircraft carrier, they would have had a force of four aircraft carriers until 1980?
LORD SHEPHERD: No, my Lords. The information I have is that if we had ordered this aircraft carrier it would have come into operation in 1973, and we should then have available only H.M.S. "Eagle", and H.M.S. "Ark Royal"—
LORD CARRINGTON: And "Hermes".
LORD SHEPHERD: And
"Hermes".
LORD CARRINGTON: That is four.
LORD SHEPHERD: That is true, but we should have to buy the new aircraft carrier at £70 million-odd, and should be faced with a major refit of "Ark Royal" at £30 million.
LORD CARRINGTON: But you are doing that anyway.
LORD SHEPHERD: Yes, but we are not buying a new aircraft carrier. The noble Lord wants it all ways. This is the Party which is fighting the next General Election by promising to cut income tax. The noble Lord shakes his head. The noble Lord, Lord Carrington, asked me why we should not now scrap the aircraft carriers we now have. We believe—and I feel that this is generally recognised—that they have an important part to play. They have
1124
valuable existing equipment; we must keep them until the new equipment of the Royal Air Force—the F 111A, the Maritime Comet, and the Phantoms—come into service. If I may correct the noble Earl, Lord Selkirk, he referred to the number of aircraft carriers which were laid down during the time of the Conservative Administration. I understand that all the present aircraft carriers were laid down prior to the Conservative Administration of 1951. All, except H.M.S. "Hermes", were launched before the 1951 Government, and three were completed and operational during the period of the Conservative Government. So the case made by my noble friend still stands.
LORD CARRINGTON: No.
THE EARL OF SELKIRK: My Lords, I must interrupt the noble Lord for one moment. Lord Shackleton said that the previous Government had not built any aircraft carriers. I said that they had not laid down the keel of any aircraft carrier, but that they had either built, completely reconstructed, or modernised five aircraft carriers which could take the most modern aircraft.
LORD SHEPHERD: I apologise to the noble Earl. I thought he was claiming that the Conservative Administration had ordered and laid down an aircraft carrier. Therefore, I readily admit that I am wrong.
The noble Lord, Lord Carrington, also spoke about the need for an expanding Navy, instead of what he thought of as a smaller and disappearing force. But, on the contrary, during the period of this Labour Government—and since the noble Lord takes claim for aircraft carriers I ought to say this—we have seen being laid the keels of two guided-missile destroyers, two Polaris submarines, a conventional submarine, and a frigate. We have ourselves placed orders for four new frigates, one hunter-killer submarine, and we are now asking for tenders for the first destroyer of the Type 82. Therefore, I hope that noble Lords who say that this Government are opposed to the Navy will withdraw, perhaps by correspondence. The noble Lord, Lord Carrington, also asked about servicing.
LORD TEYNHAM: My Lords, before the noble Lord leaves the question of carriers, perhaps I might be allowed to correct my speech of yesterday. The noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, queried the telegram which I mentioned was sent to the Prime Minister by the Chairman of the Air League. I find that I was misinformed about this telegram which referred only to the performance and cost of Spey-Mirage projects. On the other hand, I can confirm that the other telegram I mentioned was sent by Mr. Maurice Edelman, a distinguished member of the Party opposite and also a member of the Council of the Air League, to Mr. Mulley, the Minister of State for Air. I will read the text of the telegram:
"Senior colleagues of the Air League and myself urge most strongly reconsideration of Spey-Mirage project in view of new factors publicly stated affecting F 111 performance and consequently increased cost and ancillary logistic equipment. Further urge formation of Spey-Mirage plan plus aircraft carriers as most desirable in British interest."
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, all I can say to the noble Lord is "Thank you", for having given me a breathing space. We will look at what he has just said. I believe—and the words of my noble friend Lord Blyton yesterday should be read on this matter—that there is a very great future for the Navy, and any Member of this House who in any way strives to give a different impression is not doing that Service any good. There is a great future for the Navy. One has only to look at the White Paper to see the number of vessels on the strength and the number of vessels coming forward.
I now want to turn to Lord Carrington's Amendment—I know he is getting rather worried about the length of my speech. I now want to deal with the gap that we inherited in terms of military aircraft. We heard a great deal from the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, yesterday about honour, as though honour were a property peculiar to the noble Lord. We on this side would regard it as a reflection on our honour if we were to send our airmen into operations with weapons which obviously did not match up to the standards of their possible opponents. That was the position which we found when we took office in October, 1964.
I will deal, first of all, with the Hastings and the Beverley. The Hastings came
1126
into service in 1948; the Beverley came into service in 1953, and it should go out of service in 1968. The Conservative Government decided to go ahead with the HS 681. It is perfectly true that it is a revolutionary aircraft, and I want your Lordships to remember this. It should have been coming into service in 1968, but the development contract was not placed till October, 1963. As it did not appear that that particular aircraft could come into service before 1971–72—and even that delivery date was slipping—the Government reluctantly had to buy an American aircraft, the C 130. I think we were right to do that, particularly in view of the speeches that have been made over many years about the great necessity for having mobility for our Army. We had to bridge the gap left by the previous Administration.
Let us consider the Hunter. This came into service in 1952 and it should go out of service in 1968. The Conservative Government placed initial holding contracts in April, 1964, for a revolutionary aircraft to come into service in 1968. The R.A.F. were acutely short of that type of aircraft, and that is the reason why the Government had to buy the Phantom. We are buying 200 and delivery will start in 1968, to meet the date when the Hunter should go out of service.
Take the Canberra. This is a very fine aircraft which was originated in 1945–46. It came into service in 1953 and, originally, it should have gone out of service in 1965, but it was reassessed to last until 1968–69. We had to find another aircraft to replace that. Because of the massive expense of the TSR 2—my noble friend Lord Shackleton gave the figures yesterday—the Government were forced to buy the F 111A. We did not wish to buy American equipment, and perhaps we could have had British equipment if the orders had been placed earlier and if the aircraft industry had been given the sort of assistance for which noble Lords continually ask.
I want to deal with a point that was made by the noble Earl, Lord Selkirk. Under the Conservative Government the cost of the Phantom, Polaris and other items was £410 million over ten years. The Labour Government's plan will cost in excess another £165 million, but we shall get many more Phantoms than were originally ordered. We shall also get the

1127
C 130 and the F 111A. The noble Earl wanted to know how we were going to pay for them. In the case of the F 111A, these hardheaded Labour Ministers were able to get a better deal than the so-called hard-headed Conservative Ministers ever got. We were able to get the United States to remove the 50 per cent. rule regarding the purchase of military equipment by American forces. It is perfectly true that there is no guarantee that America will spend the £100 million or so necessary to pay for the F 111A, but at least we now have the opportunity to go and get the orders if we can. The bar that was there during the time of the Conservative Administration has been removed, and it is now up to industry itself.
THE EARL OF SELKIRK: My Lords, may I ask the noble Lord whether he would look again at his figures about the cost in dollars, in the light of the reply which Mr. Healey gave on this subject? The figure which he gave was a total of 660 million dollars. What I do not know is how much of that was incurred before the Socialist Government came into power. So far as I can see, only 200 million dollars, at the most, was incurred on Phantom aircraft, leaving 460 million dollars incurred last year by the present Government.
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, I will not dodge the issue. This is an involved matter. I will ask my noble friend Lord Longford to give your Lordships the details. I am advised by my noble friend Lord Shackleton that £410 million was committed by the Conservative Government.
I have tried to show—and I think any fair-minded Peer not committed to his Whip would agree—that there was a gap between our defences and our commitments, and that this Government have set about filling that gap. I think that is right. On a number of occasions in this debate I have heard complaints that we are relying too much upon the Americans for equipment. I wish we could use more British material, but I do not see why we should now sneer at the Americans. We have lived with the Americans in the NATO alliance, and I have never heard any sneers in that regard. I can see no particular interest in the Far East
1128
where the Americans would not be involved in their rôle in SEATO. Some day or other there will be a conference to deal with the problems of peace, at which all the nations will have to sit down. I do not see why, in order to get the collective security which my Party has always supported, we should not have these alliances and on occasions, according to circumstances, perhaps rely on a stronger and larger nation. But we do not intend to give up our own individual points of view, and we shall continue to put them clearly to our allies.
I think I should say this, because a number of noble Lords kept on talking yesterday in terms of unilateral action; of an occasion when this country might be involved alone against aggressive and sophisticated forces. We on this side do not contemplate a Suez. We do not contemplate such a form of action, but we will play our part within the alliance. I come back to what I said at the beginning. Our main task in the years that lie ahead is to build up our economic strength. The defence forces should in no way dissipate that effort, because only by economic strength can we be a true partner of our allies in the furtherance of peace.

CANCELLATION OF SUPER-VC l0s
4.10 p.m.
THE MINISTER OF DEFENCE FOR THE ROYAL AIR FORCE (LORD SHACKLETON): My Lords, I apologise to your Lordships for intervening just as the noble and gallant Viscount, Lord Montgomery of Alamein, is about to speak, but I fear I shall give offence to the noble and learned Viscount, Lord Dilhorne, if I do not repeat here a Statement which has already been made in another place by my right honourable friend the Minister of Aviation on the cancellation of Super VC 10s. The Statement is as follows:
"As Members will know, work on ten of the Super VC l0s originally ordered by B.O.A.C. from Vickers Limited has been in suspense since April, 1963, by agreement between the parties. If B.O.A.C.'s judgment of their future requirements later changed,

1129
this would still have allowed the aircraft to be delivered following the seventeen "—
Super VC 10s—
"which B.O.A.C. have in service or in the course of construction.
"The Board of B.O.A.C. has again reviewed its future needs for passenger aircraft and foresees no requirement for more Super VC 10 aircraft after the seventeen have been delivered. In these circumstances the Board has negotiated terms with Vickers for the cancellation of the last ten aircraft. These involve a payment by B.O.A.C. to Vickers of £7½ million in respect of cancellation charges. The amount of compensation is, of course, entirely a matter for negotiation between the two parties to the contract. Vickers have also left B.O.A.C. in no doubt of their wish for an early conclusion of this matter.
"Before giving effect to this decision B.O.A.C. naturally informed me of their intention, and I have had discussions with the Chairmen of B.O.A.C. and Vickers. I asked Sir Giles Guthrie to defer action for the time being so that both B.O.A.C. and the Government could assess the full implications of this decision. Despite this opportunity for review, B.O.A.C. have informed me that they still have no requirement for any Super VC l0s after the seventeen; B.O.A.C. moreover recognise that in no foreseeable circumstances will the Government approve the purchase by B.O.A.C. of any further passenger aircraft of a comparable size from a foreign source to augment their fleet.
"I have again yesterday asked B.O.A.C. whether the recent tragic accident to one of B.O.A.C.'s aircraft in Japan modifies their view, but they have confirmed to me that this loss could not effectively be rectified by the purchase of an additional Super VC 10 for delivery at a much later date.
" In these circumstances I have regretfully come to the conclusion that I cannot ask the parties to the contract to defer further the agreement they have reached for the cancellation of these ten aircraft. I take this occasion however to say that this cancellation implies no reflection on the
1130
Super VC 10 itself, which is giving every satisfaction in service and is second to none in its current attraction to the travelling public."
VISCOUNT DILHORNE: My Lords, whilst I should like to thank the noble Lord for repeating this Statement here, in accordance with the usual custom, I would assure him that there is no question of offence to me but merely of complying with the custom of this House, and I am glad he has done that. I would say that this Statement is, of course, sad news for the aircraft industry. I myself had something to do with the negotiations in 1963, and all I would wish to ask, in relation to this Statement, is this. Is it not the case that the VC 10, broadly speaking, has proved so satisfactory and so remarkable an 'aircraft that B.O.A.C. find they can now meet their requirements with fewer aircraft than they originally anticipated would be the case?
LORD SHACKLETON: My Lords, I cannot precisely answer the last point, but in general terms I am in full agreement with the noble and learned Viscount. It is a matter of calculation of the amount of traffic; and certainly the VC l0s are proving very attractive and very successful, and are taking considerably improved passenger loads.
LORD REA: My Lords, may I also thank the Minister for his Statement and say that, of course, we sympathise with him in this state of affairs, which I think the House recognises with some anxiety. Apart from the fact that this decision will hit the aircraft industry, as the noble Viscount has said, there are just two points that I should like to put to the noble Lord. The first is: who is going to pay the £7½ million to Vickers? I gather it is going to be B.O.A.C. Will that come out of the taxpayer's pocket, or in what other way will it be raised? The other point is: I wonder if the Minister knows whether there is any truth in the rumour that Boeings might be grounded; and, if they were, would that not very seriously affect the position?
LORD SHACKLETON: My Lords, if I may take the last point first, I should certainly deprecate any suggestion that Boeings are about to be grounded. I

1131
have no knowledge of this, and I think it would be most unfortunate if that rumour were to be given circulation. This is no reflection on the noble Lord, of course. As to the question of payment of the cancellation charges, this is a matter for B.O.A.C. They have not asked for any special assistance from the Government in financing the cancellation charges, and they will charge them against their 1965–66 profits. But, of course, under the legislation which has now passed through your Lordships' House, there is provision to write them off against the reserves for which the Air Corporations Bill—or Act, as it probably will be to-morrow—provides.
My Lords, this is a sad decision. It is a hangover from the past. I shall not reflect on the circumstances of this, but if anyone wishes to study them he can refresh his memory by reading the Report of the Select Committee on Nationalised Industries, which describes how this decision has now become necessary.
LORD BYERS: My Lords, in view of the fact that these machines are quite exceptionally magnificent flying machines, may I ask the Minister whether any effort has been made to sell them overseas?
LORD SHACKLETON: My Lords, I am quite sure that every effort has been made by the British Aircraft Corporation, with the support of the Government. I entirely agree with the noble Lord in his view of these machines; unfortunately, we have not succeeded in selling enough of this group of aircraft.
VISCOUNT DILHORNE: My Lords, am I correct in thinking that the noble Lord's statement does not mean that it may be possible for Vickers to supply some of these cancelled aircraft to other possible purchasers?
LORD SHACKLETON: Not so far as I know, my Lords.
LORD MERRIVALE: Could the noble Lord say what is the total cost of the ten Super VC l0s which are cancelled?
LORD SHACKLETON: I am very sorry, I cannot; but I did give the cancellation charges.

BUILDING CONTROL
4.8 p.m.
THE JOINT PARLIAMENTARY SECRETARY, MINISTRY OF LAND AND NATURAL RESOURCES (LORD MITCHISON): My Lords, perhaps I may intervene, at the request of noble Lords earlier to-day, to repeat a Statement made in another place by my right honourable friend the Lord President of the Council. This is the Statement:
"The House will recollect that following the Statement made by my honourable friend yesterday about the Building Control Bill, I was asked to make a Statement about the Government's proposals and the constitutional propriety of what my right honourable friend announced.
"There is, of course, no question of the provisions of any Bill having the force of law until the Bill has received the Royal Assent. This was made clear yesterday by my right honourable friend. It is, however, the Government's intention, in the event of its being re-elected and the Bill being approved by Parliament, to give effect to the controls provided for in the Bill.
"The House will be aware that under the provisions which it was proposed to incorporate in the Bill, work carried out in the construction or alteration of a building or civil engineering project costing more than £100,000 would be unlawful unless it were exempt or licensed by the Minister. The Minister has since November 1, 1965, been indicating cases in which building would be permitted and the arrangements he has made have been broadly accepted by the construction industry.
"The purpose of my right honourable friend's Statement, which was made at the request of the Opposition, was to give further guidance to the industry. In the view of the Government, it would be regrettable that possibly urgent and essential projects might be held up because those proposing to carry them out were uncertain whether they would be granted a licence. Accordingly, my right honourable friend felt it helpful and prudent to indicate that existing arrangements will continue for the time being.

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"The Government considers that to do less than my right honourable friend proposed would create confusion and uncertainty in the industry".
VISOUNT DILHORNE: My Lords, while thanking the noble Lord for communicating to this House the contents of that Statement, I should like to put a question or two about the constitutional propriety of the course that has been pursued; because the Statement he has just read did not seem to deal with that. Is there any precedent for a Minister on the eve of Dissolution of Parliament saying that he proposes to exercise powers which Parliament has not given him for licensing the building industry? And is the noble Lord aware that the Minister said yesterday that there was nothing illegal about starting a project costing over £100,000, but anyone doing so without authorisation does so at his peril? The announcement, I gather, was made by the Chancellor of the Exchequer on July 27 last. Am I to take it that in the event—the unlikely event—of the Party opposite being returned to power they will introduce a Bill which will make a provision of this kind retrospective until July 27 last; and is there any precedent for a Minister seeking to exercise controls of this sort just following upon an announcement made by the Chancellor of the Exchequer?
LORD MITCHISON: My Lords, this Bill is still one of which another place is seized; and I think noble Lords would agree that in those circumstances it is in accordance with well-established precedent that it should not he discussed here. If the noble and learned Viscount cares to look at page 452 of Erskine May, I think he will find the matter discussed there. If I am right in this, as I believe myself to be, it is obviously impossible to discuss questions relating to this subject which the noble and learned Viscount wished to discuss. However, I have made a Statement to-day at the request of the Opposition, and if it is proper to discuss it then I suggest that it should be discussed at much greater length than is possible in the course of a debate about other matters.
VISCOUNT DILHORNE: My Lords, is the noble Lord aware that I am not discussing the Bill at all? I am discussing a Statement made by the Minister of Public
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Building and Works yesterday about the authorisation he is going to give for building. I am not discussing a Bill at all. The Minister made perfectly clear yesterday that he is seeking to exercise powers which Parliament has not given him and for which he has no statutory authority at all. That is what I am asking the noble Lord about, and I am asking him whether there is any precedent for any such unconstitutional action. The Statement he read purported to deal with constitutional propriety. It gave no justification for this most unconstitutional action.
LORD M1TCHISON: My Lords, things do not get any better or worse by the loudness with which they are said. What the noble and learned Viscount asked about was a matter so closely connected with a Bill now before the House of Commons that I suggested to him and to your Lordships' House that it could not be properly discussed without involving a discussion on a Bill of which the House of Commons is at present seized. I see that the noble and learned Viscount shakes his head. I do not believe for one moment that I shall convince him; but he must listen to me since I listened to him.
If I may go a little further, he will remember that towards the end of his speech he was talking about proposals in the Bill. This Bill has not yet reached its final form; it has had no Third Reading in another place; we do not officially even know what it is. But assuming we looked at it, we should have to remember that it is still possible that these proposals may be changed. They are at present in the Bill—perhaps I am allowed to say this—and are retrospective. But, be that as it may, it does not meet the difficulty we shall be under if we start discussing matters so closely connected with a particular Bill and the proposals in it. We cannot discuss them without, as I see it, breaking the sound tradition that one House does not discuss matters which are at the moment before another House in the form of legislation. Therefore I must maintain, with respect to the noble and learned Viscount and with respect to his long service in another place, that we really cannot discuss this matter properly. We shall discuss only a part of it, and that is not fair to anybody concerned.
VISCOUNT DILHORNE: My Lords, may I put this to the noble Lord? I am not asking about a Bill and the noble Lord is really not meeting the point I am putting to him. The Minister of Public Building and Works said yesterday on what policy principles he was going to apply licensing to the building industry from now on. That is what I am asking him about. I am not asking him about any Bill or anything like that. I am not concerned with that. I am asking about the announcement by the Minister of Public Building and Works of the policy he is going to pursue now. And I am asking whether there is any precedent for such an announcement when there is no lawful power to exercise it.
LORD MITCHISON: My Lords, I am well aware of what the noble and learned Viscount has just said. It is what he said before. I gave my answer to it and I believe that the argument—for it is an argument—that he is putting forward is fundamentally fallacious for the reason that I gave. I hesitate to say these things to the noble and learned Viscount; but, after all, we both served in another place and we know the distinction between the two Houses and the importance of seeing that we do not get House of Commons legislation discussed in this House. You cannot do it by raising questions about the constitutional propriety of a Statement made about the very Bill that is now under discussion in another place.
LORD WADE: My Lords, we are grateful to the noble Lord for making a Statement, as a very genuine concern is felt about this matter. Does he agree that an important constitutional principle is involved here, as Mr. Grimond pointed out in another place yesterday? Secondly, does he agree that retrospectvie legislation is nearly always objectionable, as we on these Benches pointed this out at the time of the Burma Oil Bill? I am rather sorry to say that the Opposition Front Bench sold the pass on that occasion. Thirdly, does he agree that retrospective government by Ministerial threat is even more objectionable, and that Parliament must be on guard against it?
LORD MITCHISON: My Lords, in my opinion there are at least two constitutional principles involved here. No doubt
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the noble Lord had one in mind; the one I have in mind is the one that must restrict the interference by either House with the legislative procedure of another House. I do not see how you can discuss a Statement made with reference to a particular Bill before the House of Commons without interfering with that constitutional principle. As the noble Lord asked me whether I agreed with a whole host of things, I hope he will accept, since we have another debate, that I agree with about half of what he said.
LORD BYERS: Surely the noble Lord does not expect to get away with it like that. He has been asked a direct question. May we have an answer to the direct question: is there a precedent or not?
LORD MITCHISON: My Lords, the answer is in the negative.
LORD CONESFORD: My Lords, may I assure the noble Lord, first, that I am not discussing any legislation in another place. I wish to ask him two questions about the legislation that he has announced will be introduced in the next Parliament. The first question is this: Does he agree that the legislation to which he referred in his statement proposes to make retrospective provisions dealing with the criminal law? Secondly, does he recollect that the present Lord Chancellor, his noble and learned friend Lord Gardiner, said in this House that such legislation was always objectionable?
LORD MITCHISON: My Lords, in answer to the first question, I have nothing to add to the Statement that I read out. In answer to the second question, I should like to know the context in which the statement was made and then I should like to have an opportunity of reading it and of considering a reply on an occasion more appropriate than the present one.
LORD CARRINGTON: My Lords, may I respectfully and humbly congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Mitchison, on as skilful a piece of evasion as I have heard in twenty years in this House? But I would just say this: he has not fooled anybody.

THE DEFENCE ESTIMATES
4.20 p.m.
Debate resumed.
VISOUNT MONTGOMERY OF ALAMEIN: My Lords, it is time that we got back to the Defence Review. I have spoken in many Defence debates in your Lordships' House, and I have always pleaded that the role of the Armed Forces is to support British foreign policy, the two being taken out of the realm of Party politics. This appears to be impossible, as we have seen in this debate. I have been a Member of your Lordships' House for twenty years, and I have never known a Defence White Paper which was not immediately criticised by the political Party in Opposition. This Review is no exception. It is not to be expected that everybody, wherever he or she may sit in the House, will agree with everything in the Review. I should now like to instil some common sense into this debate.
Let me say at once that in broad outline I consider the Review to be an eminently sensible Paper—in so far as it goes, that is the point. The real trouble is that we cannot solve British defence problems in isolation, and to put things right the Western Alliance needs, as I said in 1958, a complete overhaul. It is quite obvious once we face the following facts. First, there is no danger in Europe. Secondly, the areas of trouble are now outside Europe, and particularly in the Far East. Thirdly, the burden of handling troubles outside Europe is borne by two NATO members, the United States and the United Kingdom. Fourthly, we keep a large British Army in Continental Europe doing nothing, and it will continue to do nothing for years. Finally, NATO must cease to look inwards at itself and look outwards, reshaping itself on a global basis. The Defence Review points the finger at those facts, but we cannot act in isolation, and I hope that after the General Election Her Majesty's Government will urge a complete reorganisation of the Western Alliance.
My Lords, let me take the Review in itself. There appear to be three points which have come in for the greatest criticisms and I should like to give my personal view on those three points, because time will not allow of roaming over the whole Review. I understand the
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three points to be the following. First, deciding first on a financial ceiling and then working out the best defence we can get for that sum. The second point, sea power and the organisation of the Royal Navy to get the best results; together with the rôle of air power. Thirdly, British defence policy East of Suez. Those are the three points with which I should like to deal, and if there is time, and your Lordships by then are not completely bored, I should like to conclude with a few minutes on the Reserve Army.
Regarding the first point, the financial ceiling, most people would agree that in normal times we should first consider our commitments and then decide what Armed Forces are needed to meet them, matching military expenditure to the commitments. But, my Lords, the present times are very far from normal. The Western Alliance is in no defence danger, but as a nation we are faced with serious economic problems—balance of payments, gold and dollar reserves, safeguarding sterling, rising costs, and so on. Our military strength must be backed by economic strength, the two being properly balanced; and in the particular circumstances, I consider that it is prudent ("prudent" is not a word I often use, but I would use it at this time) to fix a ceiling for the Defence Budget, and I agree with the Government in the way in which they are tackling that problem.
Now, about sea power. During my long and very enjoyable military life I have always been a great advocate of sea power, and I have been a serious student of its influence on warfare. Indeed, when I was serving for ten years in the Western Defence Organisation several navies said that I was the best Admiral they had. In 1958 the United States Navy presented me with a silver boatswain's call, and the British Navy gave me an Admiral's cap. Whether they would do so again after this debate is concluded, is another matter.
My Lords, from the days of the Greek-Persian wars in the fifth century B.C., up to the mid-twentieth century the side which possessed superior sea power has, in the end, always prevailed. During Hitler's war, the Second World War, the progress of science and the mighty

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weapon of air power exercised a profound influence on the conduct of war and, as I know very well indeed, regarding land warfare. Your Lordships will recall that in the Coral Sea in May, 1942, the United States Fleet defeated the Japanese Fleet and removed the threat to Australia. That was the first naval battle in which the opposing warships never once sighted each other, and not one direct shot was exchanged. The battle of the Coral Sea proved that air power, when developed to its full potential, has an amazing effect on war at sea, and on war on land.
The greatest value of air power is its flexibility, which is a battle-winning factor of the first importance. It follows that control of all available air power, land-based and sea-based, must be centralised, and command must be exercised through one channel. This great principle will bring into discussion whether it is sound policy, as regards strategic flexibility and financial and economic saving, to have a separate Fleet Air Arm, rather than an undivided Air Force capable of operating on land, sea and in air defence.
The most important military development of Hitler's war, due to the onward march of science, was the upsurge of naval and air power as a major factor in warfare. It revolutionised strategic and tactical conceptions. But in my view sea power in future, because of the impact of science, will be operated in a different way. The Navy has got to go increasingly under the sea—a very good place for the Silent Service! There, under the sea, its armament will be the nuclear-powered submarine—the Polaris and the Hunter-Killer. I have always admired the submariner: he will now come into his own. That part of the Navy on the sea will increasingly become fast, small ships, capable of launching missiles. In fact, striking aircraft will in due course give way to missiles.
Now we come to air cover; and this is a very important point. Until such time as air cover of surface ships can be provided from land bases at considerable distances away, we shall have to continue to rely on carrier-borne aircraft; but looking to the mid-70s, and beyond, it is difficult to say what the scientists may produce for us by then. During the past fifteen years, the contribution of the scientists in the realm of research and
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development has been absolutely fantastic, and the answer is that as Defence Budgets are reduced, the money allotted to the scientists must be proportionately increased. If this is done, and if our scientists are given the money and the manpower they need, it is not impossible that in some ten years' time the large aircraft carrier will go out of business. The problem will arise over reconnaissance for ships at sea, on the surface and under the sea. V.T.O.L. aircraft capable of being operated from small surface vessels appear to be the answer, but at present their radius of action is too small for reconnaissance needs, and this is where I hope the scientists will lend a hand.
To sum up sea power, in any military organisation there is no surer way to disaster than to take what has been done for many years and go on doing it, the problem having changed. We British need a strong Navy. We have a vast merchant fleet, which brings us food and essential raw materials from all parts of the world. It must be protected. Therefore, we cannot weaken our historic sea power. But we must realise that the progress of science makes it necessary to exercise our sea power in the future in a different way. The Royal Navy is a magnificent Service. If I had not decided to be a soldier, I would have been a sailor—if the Royal Navy had accepted me. As it is, my grandson is going to join the Navy.
Take Britain's defence policy East of Suez. Your Lordships will know very well that during the past twenty-five years there has been a decline in the prestige of the white man in Oriental and Asiatic countries. This decline began in the winter of 1941–42, when Japan entered the Second World War and her armed forces overran South-East Asia. When Japanese overlordship ended in 1945, as suddenly as it had begun, the peoples in that part of the world did not want to take their old masters back, and movements in favour of independence began. And, as your Lordships are aware, the dark masses of Africa began to stir. It is very clear that to-day the white man, with his armed forces, is not too popular in countries East of Suez.
It is difficult to prophesy what the future may hold for the West in that area. One has only to compare the relations

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between Germany, the British Commonwealth, China, Russia and the United States in 1941, in 1945 and to-day to realise that the most unlikely and kaleidoscopic change is possible in the years that lie ahead. One point is vital: we cannot desert our friends in that part of the world. It may not be too easy to decide who are our friends To borrow a principle from strategy, the Western Alliance to which we belong must plan to be so well and flexibly deployed that it can deal quickly and effectively with all situations, including the unexpected and the unlikely—in fact, an elastic deployment based on a maritime strategy.
I am very doubtful whether the West is best served by a multitude of fixed bases, whether for sea, land or air forces. In a crisis such bases may suddenly be found to be facing in the wrong direction. They tend to cramp possible mobility. They are hostages to fortune, and often they are in territory where the local inhabitants are not too friendly, or may not be friendly for long. In that last connection, such bases make very good propaganda for enemies of the West.
The only safe place for a British base East of Suez is in a white Commonwealth country, and for many years in your Lordships' House I have advocated a base in Australia. Our future presence in bases East of Suez would seem to be uncertain. But in paragraph 24 of the Defence Review I note a reference to the possible base in Australia. There are some who say that we should begin at once a withdrawal from East of Suez. That would be highly dangerous. A quick withdrawal on our part would lead to a tremendous upheaval in social conditions in the area, with appalling consequences: for we have been there too long. Do not let us forget what happened in the Congo. It is essential that we have absolute naval superiority in the Afro-Indian Ocean. Let us get that right first and keep it, before we think of pulling out elsewhere in the East. In that respect, the Simonstown Agreement is vital and must never be abrogated.
What I have been saying is merely the outline of a really gigantic problem. The whole matter needs a much tighter control of the three Fighting Services by an all-powerful Minister of Defence than exists at the present time. I had hoped
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that we might get inter-Service unity when the centralised Minister of Defence came into being, but it is clear that there is still a good deal to be done in that respect.
If your Lordships will allow me a few more minutes, I should like to say something about the Reserve Forces. I hope that it will be possible to take the Territorial Army out of Party politics. The policy of the Government, as I understand it, is to reshape the Territorial Army to meet the needs of the mid-20th century; and it certainly needed doing. It should have been done fifteen years ago. The process of reshaping it has aroused terrific controversy. I gave my views about it in two speeches that I made in your Lordships' House, on June 30 and November 23 last year, and I do not want to go all over the matter again. I would say that the Government have shown courage in grasping this very prickly nettle, which previous Governments declined to do.
In tackling this particular problem, tradition and sentiment must not be allowed to be a bar to progress. I am all for tradition. But let us decide first what sort of Reserve Army is needed, and then decide how we can get it without extinguishing the tremendous voluntary national spirit of the British people. This is highly important, because the recruitment for the Reserve Army will depend on voluntary effort. I should like to suggest to your Lordships a few principles which must form the framework of future planning. First, it is most important that both the Army Volunteer Reserve and the Home Defence Force should succeed, and since they will be composed of volunteers, it will be essential to have the good will of their representatives. This means that the Ministry of Defence must listen to, and give proper consideration to, their views.
If the Home Defence Force is to succeed, it must be seen to make military sense; and since its cost is to be borne by the Home Office, the men must not be regarded as policemen in khaki. The order of battle must allow the Force to make military sense. Therefore it must be provided with the normal military elements needed to carry out its ôle, such as a simple command structure, communications, reconnaissance ability and means of self-maintenance in the field.

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All these points need careful examination in order to find the cheapest answer—and when I say "the cheapest answer", I do not mean cheap and nasty. These points must not be ruled out of court. If they are, the Force will not make military sense.
If both Forces are to succeed, we must draw as much as we can on the traditions and the spirit of the old Territorial Army. The closest association possible between the two Forces must be the aim, based on the continuation of Territorial Army units and their links with county and city associations. It is most important that the Home Defence Force should be spread right across the country. The money available, £3 million a year, is not very much, and it will be difficult to do everything at once. But we have at least the structure, which, if necessary, can always be improved or expanded. If we can get the close tie-up between all the voluntary reserves, based on the old Territorial Army, all may yet be well. What we want is a military organisation, suitably composed and commanded, and one that makes military sense. And it looks as if that has now been agreed.
Now let me conclude. I am under the definite impression that my noble Leader proposes to divide the House on this defence issue. I hope that he will not do so—though I do not think my hope will make any difference. But we have had a good debate, and many interesting points have arisen. Why divide the House on the last day but one of a dying Parliament?
LORD CARRINGTON: Why not?
VISCOUNT MONTGOMERY OF ALAMEIN: I hope that my noble Leader will withdraw his Amendment and not divide the House. But if he does decide to divide, then I shall find it impossible, for the reasons I have given, to follow him into the Division Lobby.
4.47 p.m.
LORD BOURNE: My Lords, it is somewhat difficult to follow the noble and gallant Viscount, except in one respect, and that is that he clears our minds on the subject under discussion, and therefore I am grateful and happy to follow him because I do not have
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to explain the fundamentals of the subject. Like the noble and gallant Viscount, I would prefer that this was just a discussion, not to be followed by a Division. We were waiting for this Defence Review. Now that it has come it is full of information, and it is, I believe, a brave attempt to match commitment to the money available. But I am sorry to say that I think it has failed. The only thing it has done is to save the money. It has not reduced the commitment; and it has certainly not reduced very much the over-stretch which is so well described in Part I. It has failed strategically, but not financially.
I should like to give my reasons for supporting the Amendment if there is a Division at the end of the debate. I want to say, also, that my confidence in the Government's defence decisions has been very much shaken in recent months by the fact that they can make a very serious mistake—I refer to the one on Home Defence. Admittedly, it was rather gracious to withdraw that error at the end of July. Nevertheless, it was a terrible thing to say that there was no Home Defence problem, not even a Civil Defence problem, which the Army should help in; and I think the Army Board, or whoever was advising the Secretary of State for Defence in that decision, are very much to blame. The Government have now had the courage and good sense to reverse that decision, and I will not trouble your Lordships by saying any more about the Territorial Army or the Home Defence problem.
There are two or three mechanical points in the White Paper that I should like to mention, and then I want to get on with what I think are the fundamentals of our defence problem, which were dealt with, in my opinion, rather piece-meal in the Defence Review. The first organisational question is the changeover in the use of our nuclear strike deterrent force from Bomber Command to the naval Polaris submarines. Not so long ago people got very excited and hot under the collar at any such suggestion, but here it is. It has gone through extraordinarily quietly, and it is a fundamental change.
Another point which you can dig out of the White Paper, which is not dealt with in a few words but which I am glad

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to report, is that the Army is now properly equipped, or very shortly to be. By the end of this year it will be a modernly equipped Army, with the best weapons. We have the best tank in the world, the best field gun in the world, and now the infantry, I am thankful to say, have the best infantry weapons. Incidentally, only one weapon out of about five or six was invented in this country, and those I have mentioned were ordered by the previous Government.
The last mechanical point is about the aircraft carriers. I will not go through the arguments again, of course, but there is one point which has not been mentioned. That is, that the Army, if it goes ashore, whether it has sophisticated opposition or a doubtful opposition (as is so much more often the case), wants an intimate air support, hour to hour, minute to minute, and the nearness of a carrier is something which the Royal Air Force really cannot supplant, especially if they are operating from an island base 1,000 or 2,000 miles away. They simply cannot do it. Whether we can afford the aircraft carrier is another subject entirely. It may be that the Government are right in saying that they can replace the necessary air support by other means. We have not yet, by the way, learned to use our helicopters offensively, which the Americans are doing every day. I heard recently from a parachute battalion which I was visiting that they wanted to use a helicopter or two offensively in the mountains of Aden. They were not allowed to do so, because they would risk losing an aircraft, which would mean that the logistic purpose for which it was built would be lost. So we have to examine, as my noble and gallant friend said, ways and means of replacing the modern strike fleet carrier, if we can afford it. One suggestion which has been made is that perhaps we could build or buy very much smaller carriers—25,000 tonners, instead of the 75,000 tonners, which I believe are contemplated. I am not sure about that; I am not an expert on the subject.
Now I should like to turn to the fundamentals of the subject, and to do so I will deal with the three co-ordinates mentioned, I think, by the Foreign Secretary in another place yesterday: first of all, our place in the world, secondly, our
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commitments, and, thirdly, what we can afford. First, our place in the world. No one in this House has argued, I believe, that we can match for power the two super Powers. We are no longer a world Power so far as defence is concerned. We may have a wide-world rôle, but we are not a world Power. I have much sympathy with what the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, said yesterday, that we could not contemplate being a world Power any longer on borrowed money. So we are a medium Power. On the word "power", I should like to remind your Lordships that this business of pacifism does not enter my horizon. Somebody who would shake hands with the Russians if they walked up Kingsway is, in my opinion, wasting the time of the House in this debate. On the other hand, the suggestion of the noble Lord, Lord King-Hall, for United Nations aid service brigades—doctors, engineers and so on—may be a fine suggestion, again if you can project it ten, twenty or thirty years ahead. If you could come back and make the same speech in thirty years' time I think it might be more to the point. Lastly, we simply cannot carry on in all the rôles which I will describe in a moment. We simply cannot afford it any longer.
Now our commitments. I will not bore your Lordships by going through a list of the commitments—you know them well by now. But I will say that this argument about reaching a balance of Asiatic forces, or the countervailing forces, which have been mentioned and discussed so frequently in recent months, is probably a valid argument, but again it is not valid to-day. It may be valid in ten years' time, although so far as the Far East is concerned we must remember that we have to wait for Japan and India to have any countervailing forces available; and the countervailing forces in the Middle East are by no means clear to me at the present time. So I would argue that we should not leave the stability of these countries in Asia to their own independent forces yet awhile.
I entirely agree with the noble and gallant Viscount that we must stick to our friends, and, incidentally, we must defend our interests. We have friends and interests, and usually they coincide in that part of the world. For example, your Lordships have heard me talk many times

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in your Lordships' House about the situation in Asia; the position is similar in the Middle East. I was in the Arabian Gulf in December. If you talk about creating power vacuums there, and the possible British withdrawal one day from Aden—I did not know it was to be planned quite so soon—the Sheikh or Sultan to whom you are talking is not interested in the military vacuum or who is going to fill it. All he would say straight away was, "I shall have Nasser on my frontier, or so-and-so on my frontier". To him it is a much more intimate problem. We talk about it in a much more ethereal. theoretical, way, but to them it is a very real problem.
I have not been to Libya lately, but if you go and talk to the King he will tell you that the Treaty of Defence with this country is very important indeed, and he inquires how far away are the British tanks and whether we are going to defend him if an aggressor comes over his frontier? At a time when we are withdrawing forces from Libya, it is a difficult thing to tell him that we are going to fulfil our Treaty. So I am not with the argument which we heard from the Liberals yesterday for abrogating Treaties or weakening our links with our friends in any way at all. I think we should stay with our friends. and I entirely agree with the Secretary of State for Defence when he said yesterday that we will stay East of Suez for many years.
This very brief survey brings me to a choice. Our forces in this country are divided roughly into three First of all. there is the nuclear strike force, which I am glad to see is getting cheaper. It used to be 10 per cent., it is 5 per cent. in this Defence Review, and it is going to be 2 per cent. when the Polaris submarines get hold of it. Secondly, there are very large forces in Europe and, thirdly, there are large forces overseas, chiefly East of Suez. To talk about the nuclear force first, a Member of this House yesterday suggested that we could get rid of our nuclear forces now. The last chance for doing that, and for having any influence on the non-proliferation system, was about 1957, before the French started making their bomb. Now we have not only the French to consider but the Chinese, and a good many people
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waiting on the threshold to make bombs, and who may do so. The days of nonproliferation seem to me rather far off. Proliferation is the order of the day at the moment, and we are quite right to give it top priority in our White Paper and in our policy, but we have not reached it yet. So we cannot throw away our nuclear force.
Next, we have the large forces in Europe. I would remind your Lordships that the defence of Europe rests chiefly on two things: first of all, the strength of the U.S. strategic air command, which is still the big threat which keeps the peace, and, secondly, the West German army of twelve divisions. If that were taken away, there would be no conventional defence of Europe worth the name. Lastly, we have the East, where we are very stretched indeed. If we are faced with this choice and we have to economise, which we must do, it seems to me we can choose to save only on the middle one: that is, the large Army and Air Force in Germany. I will come to that in a moment.
So my plan for saving money would be rather different from the one in the Defence Review. First of all, instead of having large bases overseas which, by their very presence, are apt to aggravate the local situation which we have heard so much about, I would reduce the size of the bases and go for small garrisons overseas and not for large ones. Incidentally, the three conditions for operating in war which are so clearly stated in the Defence Review are not new: they have been operating now for about fifteen years, to the best of my knowledge. We certainly do not go to help anyone unless we are asked, and we certainly do not stay if we have lost the sympathy of the local population. Therefore, as I say, I would reduce the size of the bases, and I would go for small garrisons overseas. A small garrison creates much less friction with the local inhabitants; it is also much easier to discuss if there is a sudden debate in the United Nations, and your actions are criticised the moment you want to take them. For instance, in Aden we used to want to bomb this or that target; we had only to drop about two bombs for the matter to be raised in the United Nations, whereas if you have small forces—a company of infantry and a few scout

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cars and helicopters—very often they can prevent trouble from starting. So I am in favour of small garrisons dotted about, without big bases behind them. I think that if we adopted that policy we could also save a good deal on the size of the headquarters.
In recent years we have not been content with Navy, Army and Air Force headquarters, we have put a Supreme Headquarters over them in Singapore and Aden, and it is extremely expensive; and although it might be necessary from the world wide point of view, it would not be nearly so necessary if we had the small garrisons that I am recommending. Such a change would save thousands of men. I remember writing in from Cyprus, where there was a big Army headquarters, and suggesting that we should reduce the size of my headquarters by 1,200 men. That was ten years ago, and I am fairly sure we would save not hundreds but thousands of men on the headquarters staff.
Returning to the subject of Germany, I agree that it is a very difficult matter to argue. Germany costs us £199 million a year, of which £89 million, according to Part II of the Defence White Paper, is foreign exchange. One can save a little by getting out of Aden, although we must not forget that, if we are not careful, we start talking about defending the base in Aden, which is fundamentally wrong. After all, what we are really defending is the frontier, and if we withdrew from Aden it would not be just a question of losing the base: it would result in an invasion over the frontier by hostile troops, Yemeni troops backed by Egyptians. So I reckon that if we want to save foreign exchange, which is the chief object on the financial side, it would be better to do it in Germany rather than East of Suez.
The arguments for keeping three weak divisions in Germany no longer apply. The noble and gallant Field Marshal, Lord Montgomery of Alamein, says that they are doing nothing; I say that they have not fired a shot for twenty years, except in training. The Army have been shooting, supported by the other two Services, but do not forget that for the past twenty years, in nearly every situation, there has not been an idle day for the Army. So, from the point of view of shooting, we have the Army in the
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wrong place. I say that it is high time we reduced the numbers in Germany. The Defence Review says that we can withdraw troops temporarily from the B.A.O.R. I would say that we should alert our NATO allies and tell them that we are moving our troops away, and for longer than just temporarily, leaving their stocks behind—their ammunition, and their weapons perhaps and getting over the quartering difficulty. If we were to withdraw nearly half of the B.A.O.R. it would not endanger the security of Europe, but would save £50 million of foreign exchange. So my plan would be rather different from that in the Defence Review. I think we should get the Navy, Army and Air Force in the right places for dealing with the emergencies which we actually face. Then we should finish up with a plan which would actually work. We should encourage stability by small forces which we could afford.
5.7 p.m.
LORD WINTERBOTTOM: My Lords, it is something of an ordeal to follow in a defence debate two such eminent soldiers. For this reason I hope that I shall not be accused of evasion if I talk in rather simpler terms about the ways in which we can finance the Armed Forces and defence policies that we all want to see. I am certain that my noble friend Lord Shepherd, who opened this debate for the Government this afternoon, will not be displeased with me if I underline a number of points that he made in his speech.
One important element in the clash of ideas that this defence reappraisal has provoked—and I think it is one of its virtues that it has forced all of us to reassess our attitudes towards the defence policy—is the assertion that vital responsibilities which we now have will not be able to be discharged because an arbitrary ceiling of £2,000 million at 1964 prices has been imposed on our expenditure on the Armed Forces. This argument is also expressed in terms of percentage of the gross national product applied to defence, but I would maintain that to argue the case in straight monetary terms is to conceal the real nature of the problem.
What we are trying to do is to look five or ten years ahead and to measure the cost of the various alternatives open to us. During the first five years of that period our gross national product will

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rise, according to the National Plan, which I suppose is as good a guess as we can get, from £32,000 million to £40,000 million. In the same Plan, in which the Defence Review was integrated, we are shown that defence costs will rise during this five-year period by an estimated sum of £115 million at 1964 prices. But at the same time the estimate shows that the expenditure on personal spending will rise by £4,400 million —approximately twice the whole of our expenditure on our defence programme.
So I think it is true to say that, if we argue in monetary terms alone, we should be able to find the money for a carrier force if we really needed it. And, indeed, we should find the money if some great national crisis had to be faced. But as the noble and gallant Viscount, Lord Montgomery of Alamein, has said, we are not at the moment facing such a crisis. We are living through a period of uneasy stalemate, while the young emerging nations bicker among themselves. What we must do is to tailor our defence expenditure to that situation, and—what is equally important—we must survive economically in a competitive world.
The problem is not a monetary one so much as a problem of the use of scarce, skilled human beings. My noble friend I think was quite right in drawing your Lordships' attention to a statement in the National Plan:
"As a nation we spend as much on defence as we do on investment in industrial plant and machinery … the defence programme now uses some 35 to 40 per cent. of total national research and development expenditure and about one-fifth of the qualified scientists and technologists engaged on it."
The diversion of one-fifth of our scientists and two-fifths of our research expenditure is the true burden on the economy. It is not a monetary one; it is these scarce human beings that the defence programme sucks in. It is for this reason that I believe that in many sections of our bread and butter industry we are less competitive than other nations who are devoting a lower proportion of their high-grade people to military research. I am thinking in particular of Japan and Germany, both of whom have based their defence systems on American aid, American equipment and so on, and have used their technologists to
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develop the various engineering projects that they are so successfully selling in world markets. We talk about the brain drain abroad. We must not forget that we have suffered a very severe internal brain drain, into a whole series of ill-conceived design and research projects which we have had to cancel in the course of the last few years.
As my noble friend has pointed out, and as did the noble and gallant Viscount, Lord Montgomery of Alamein, our capacity to compete in world markets is absolutely basic to the success of our defence policy. If we are to give the White Paper any reality we must become competitive once again. The Prime Minister was quite right when at the head of the Labour Party's Election Manifesto he stated that his first responsibility was the stability of the pound. We cannot have a presence abroad if we cannot afford the foreign exchange costs involved. I am in full agreement with the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, who yesterday pointed out that it was the foreign banking community that was financing our overseas commitments at present. This, of course, cannot continue but must soon be replaced by finance from our own resources.
I believe that the husbanding of our foreign exchange is an essential part of our defence policy, and for this reason I think we should all congratulate the Minister of Defence on the whole series of parallel measures he has been taking either to reduce our commitments abroad or to increase our earnings abroad. The agreement we have reached with the Americans on the ending of the 50 per cent. rule is, I think, of prime importance. Of course nothing falls into our lap; we must go and take the opportunities that have been offered to us. But these negotiations, brought to a successful conclusion, I think, are of the first importance. I also think that the impetus the present Government have given to the competitive selling of arms abroad is of importance and the Minister is to be congratulated upon it. But, as the noble Lord, Lord Bourne, has said, the main drain on our foreign exchange resources has been our commitment on the Continent of Europe. I agree with him fully when I say that unless the European

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Powers, in particular Germany, are willing to make a greater contribution to our support costs in that country, then we must be prepared to withdraw some, at least, of our forces from that theatre of operations.
We as a nation have, I believe, played our full part in bringing stability to Western Europe. Stability now reigns because of the things that our allies the Americans and ourselves have done in meeting the Russian pressure on Germany. But now I think it is right that our German partners should pay their fair share of the cost of a policy we are continuing to support at their request. I think the debate to-day has shown quite clearly that we are not afraid of the situation in Western Europe. The Germans still are, and it is for this reason, in order to support them as allies, that we are staying in Western Germany. But since this policy is for their benefit they must be prepared to pay. I have not done any research on this matter, but I am reasonably certain that in the 18th century when we employed Hanoverian mercenaries we paid for their skills in gold, and in advance. I suggest that the Germans should pay for our mercenaries on the same terms to-day.
The Defence Review has faced up to the various problems that we have to analyse rationally. This is the important word, I think: they have been faced rationally. The Minister has not let himself be influenced by national sentiment which is no longer relevant to our position to-day. He has accepted the reality of our economic situation and for this reason has accepted the fact that if our defence forces are to continue to function at all we must buy certain advanced weapon systems from the United States of America. The former Government and the present Government have committed us to Polaris missiles, the Phantom, the F 111 and the Lockheed Hercules aircraft. These weapons will be the key weapons during the next decade, and they are all American. We shall therefore to a great extent be dependent on the United States of America. Our foreign policies will have to be in harmony with theirs in the future, as at present, but we shall not, as Mr. Enoch Powell stated in another place, with what I suggest is a note of hysteria, be their prisoners.
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It is not the Americans' fault that we have had to buy substantial quantities of American equipment. It is not really our fault either. Social evolution throughout the world has changed our power position in the world. Within the framework of that changed power position we have done our duty, and must continue to do our duty. But, as the noble Lord, Lord Bourne, said, we are no longer a world Power but a Power of second magnitude, and for this reason we have to adapt our policies so that the policies of a Power of second magnitude are effective and consistent. At the moment we are dependent on the United States of America, but the hard fact is that we shall always be dependent on someone.
If we are peering into the future for our defence requirements, it seems that Anglo-French co-operation will play a large part in this shift of the balance of dependence, but a successful air policy for this nation seems to depend on interdependence between ourselves and France. We should all of us, I know, like to control every aspect of weapons-supply to our armed forces and to control it from the centre of political power. This is not possible with America. But if we were in Europe, and if the political community were created in Europe, then we might be able to have influence at the centre of political power over the whole field of procurement of weapons. And I would suggest that one of the important political factors we should bear in mind as we consider defence is the need for entering Europe as a necessary part of increasing our economic strength and increasing our ability to influence the centre of political power in strategy. That is all I have to say. I do not believe we have shirked our responsibilities. I believe we must take and accept those responsibilities we bear at the moment. But this is no reason for not considering rationally the way of best disposing our resources so that our policies, such as they are, can be effective.
5.20 p.m.
LORD BOOTHBY: My Lords, I shall be brief. I propose to support the Government in the Division Lobby to-night, simply because I think that, broadly, the conclusions of their Defence Review are right, and those of the two Amendments which have been moved are wrong. Undoubtedly we are overstretched, and this

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overstretch can only be met, as both Lord Carrington and Lord Gladwyn said yesterday, by some reduction of our commitments. I think the Government are particularly right when they point out that once nuclear weapons were employed in Europe, on however limited a scale, it is almost certain that the conflict would escalate rapidly to a general nuclear exchange, in which case organised land warfare would become impossible; and that what we need there is more air support for conventional operations. I think that that should be accompanied by some withdrawal of our troops from Germany. I agree entirely with what the noble Lord, Lord Bourne, and the noble and gallant Field Marshal said on that subject—they are wasting their time, and they should be brought back to form part of the strategic reserve in this country, where they would be well trained and could be sent anywhere. I think the Government are right to reduce our forces in Cyprus and Malta.
I should have thought it would be all right to withdraw from Aden when South Arabia becomes independent; but the noble Lord, Lord Bourne, knows much more about this question than I do, and I would hesitate to contradict his view on this point. I am sure the Government are right to contemplate some increase of our forces in the Persian Gulf, where the oil interests are vital to this country. Why Lord Gladwyn imagines that the security of Kuwait has been greatly increased because she has become a member of the United Nations, is beyond my comprehension.
I think the Government are right not to build, at colossal expense, and at this time, a single carrier, which could not come into service for seven years, and then in circumstances which cannot possibly be foreseen, but which will certainly be quite different from those prevailing to-day. That is all I feel about this question. I feel that the expense would not be justified, and that if it did happen we might find ourselves with a tremendous "white elephant" on our hands. I think they are also right to buy the F 11lAs from the United States, although I agree with the noble Earl, Lord
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Selkirk, that their number may have to be increased at a later stage.
I certainly do not share the view that the Royal Navy is being run down. Apart from the conversion of the Tiger-class cruisers, and the building of the Type 82 destroyers, they will remain in charge of by far the most formidable and deadly weapon in our possession.
Finally, I am not much worried about the financial ceiling, which has clearly been imposed by the Treasury, and has been referred to quite frequently in the debate. I have been in public life for forty years, and I cannot count the number of financial ceilings I have seen. They proliferate, and they can go up and down; and I must tell your Lordships that usually they go up. The only thing that puzzles me a little about the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Shepherd, was how he expects that the wireless sets with which the Home Defence Force is to be provided are going to protect us from nuclear attack. He said that they would be a great safeguard against nuclear attack. That is most hopeful, if he takes that view.
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, I do not think I am quite as crazy as that. What I was saying is that these forces are going to be equipped with rifles, vehicles and radio sets to supplement the police and Civil Defence in the event of a nuclear attack. I do not think we can use radio sets against a nuclear attack.
LORD BOOTHBY: My Lords, I am delighted to hear that, because I was getting a little worried. The Defence White Paper says
"It is in the Far East and Southern Asia that the greatest danger to peace may lie in the next decade".
The danger already exists. I am in a rather difficult situation, because I know that this topic is a delicate one, but I do not see how you can have a two-day debate on defence without any reference at all to the only war that is going on in the world. We cannot ignore Vietnam altogether, and at least somebody ought to say something about it. This is the place where a horrible war is flaring, and children are being burned to death, day and night, in their village homes. After the Second World War—I saw quite a bit of this—great pressure was put on by

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the Americans to get us out of India, the Dutch out of Indonesia and the French out of Indo-China. In every case they succeeded. I thought at the time—this was in 1946–47—that they were wrong. Now I am not so sure. The cost has been great—not to us, or to the Dutch, or to the French, but to the inhabitants of those areas. But the tide of history was already flowing quite strongly against colonial empires, and continues to do so.
In these circumstances, it seems to me to be almost incredible that they should have embarked alone on what might well be described as a colonial war in Vietnam. a war which is not only cruel but, to my mind, senseless. Ten years ago Walter Lippmann remarked to me
"If we ever make the fatal mistake of landing ground troops on the Continent of Asia we shall find it almost impossible to extricate them."
I put down that remark in my diary. He has now written the best series of articles of his long journalistic career—which is saying a lot. To the great credit of the American people, these articles have been published and syndicated throughout the United States, which indicates that they are a real democracy. There is, of course —and we know it—a great controversy going on in the United States about the Vietnam business.
I can understand the desire of Her Majesty's Government not to get involved in it. But I should like, just for the record, to give a brief quotation—it is only a few sentences—from one of Walter's articles. It is very good. He says:
"I regard both the bombing pause and the resumption of the bombing as irrelevant to the real problem, which is how to make a truce which is consistent with the military realities. Some will say that by more and bigger bombing and by a big build-up of troops we shall be able to change the military realities in our favour. Experience and the history of this wretched war are against that hope. For the forces against us can be increased indefinitely, and the notion of a decisive military superiority over the land powers of Asia is a dangerous fantasy."
Well, the French discovered it at Dien Bien Phu, and my fear is that the Americans may discover that, too, and when it is too late.
I thought a week or two ago that President Johnson intended to make an end of it. Now it appears that he does
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not. This means that there is no discernible end, except the increasing possibility of war between the United States and China, which would be the ultimate catastrophe. I realise, as I have said, the difficult position of Her Majesty's Government; but I regret that they should appear to give some tacit approval to what is happening in Vietnam, and that they do not appear to have made more strenuous efforts to get a truce and to keep peace in that area. I see no reason why we should quarrel with the United States over this. We know quite well that they are rent among themselves, torn with dissension, and in great disagreement. Senator Fulbright, for example, takes a strong view; but I should like to see the Government make it perfectly plain that they are really flat out for a truce in Vietnam, and certainly do not approve of any continuation of this ghastly war if it can possibly be avoided.
In this matter I consider that President de Gaulle has taken the wiser course and played a better hand—an example which Her Majesty's Government would do well to follow. There is no need to quarrel at all with the United States; but we should make our attitude on this question much clearer than we have done.
5.30 p.m.
LORD MORRIS OF KENWOOD: My Lords, as the last, but I hope not by implication the least, of a long list of Back Benchers who have put down their names to speak in this debate, I feel a little like Salome. As speaker has succeeded speaker, my veils have been stripped from me and I now find myself with little to say.
We have ranged during the debate over the whole field of defence from the Charge of the Light Brigade, through the two world wars to the terrible prospect of world annihilation by atom bombs? However, it is not my intention to discourse upon such momentous happenings. Instead, as one who has served comparatively recently as a pilot in the R.A.F., I will confine my remarks in the main to the part of the Review dealing with that service. Indeed, it would be unnecessarily repetitious of me if I were to attempt a lengthy discourse on the decision not to go ahead with

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the new carrier. Given the hard fact that this country cannot afford to jeopardise its economic life by apportioning too great a part of its gross national product to defence, the decision had to be made as to how the money was to be allocated. Those who had to make this choice were, I believe, influenced not only by the cost-effectiveness of this form of insurance, but also by the whole concept of defensive thinking. Apart from the enormous cost of the new carrier and the time taken to bring it into service, is it right that we should, as it were, put too many of our eggs in one basket, particularly when that form of basket becomes increasingly vulnerable to attack by nuclear submarine?
The last time I addressed your Lordships' House on the subject of the Air Force, I made a plea for urgent action to be taken on the replacement of the obsolescent aircraft with which a large proportion of the R.A.F. was equipped. To a great extent I believe that the Government's proposals will satisfy this need. During the last year I had the opportunity to visit several of our bases at home and overseas. One such visit to Cyprus produced the ironic comment from a Canberra pilot that they were able to achieve success in their low-level operations by flying through the sound barrier backwards. While this was intended to be a somewhat frivolous remark, it is indicative of the disturbing position which relates at this time to the discrepancy in performance between the Canberra and its possible adversaries.
The future acquisition of the F 111A has been greeted by the R.A.F. with great enthusiasm. This excellent aircraft will fill the much-needed role as a Canberra replacement and will put the R.A.F. on an equal or superior footing "equipment-wise" with other air forces. The choice of this aeroplane in preference to the Spey-Mirage or Buccaneer 2 double star has been fully covered by my noble friend Lord Shackleton in his opening speech and does not need repeating. Suffice it to say that its main attractions lie in its versatility, its short take-off ability and, most important of all, its availability.
Another of the visits I made was to the Kestrel Evaluation Squadron at West Rainham just before it was dispersed. In
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spite of almost freezing to death, I was greatly impressed with this aircraft—a sentiment which apparently was shared by the pilots of the three countries involved in the evaluation. Apart from its striking vertical take-off ability, and even more useful and practical short take-off and landing capability, its greatest asset, from the pilots' viewpoint, is its extreme simplicity of operation. Other than the normal controls found in all single-seater attack aircraft, there is only one other control, that which operates the gas flow deflectors. As an ex-Hunter pilot I can assure your Lordships that this simplicity is of the greatest importance to the pilot. Together with its ability to operate from forward dirt strips, it has a good load capacity and, with the Phantom, should provide a first-class replacement for the Hunter.
One possible application of the P 1127 which has been mentioned by the noble and gallant Viscount is its potential as a ship-borne aircraft. Whilst I appreciate the operating difficulties which such a concept may engender, I should have thought that this idea, supplementing the helicopters to be carried, would considerably enhance the defensive capacity of the naval escort vessels. Perhaps the noble Earl the Leader of the House, in his winding-up speech, would let us know if such a suggestion has received serious consideration.
The basis on which the future Air Force has been planned and the reason for the small number of F 111s ordered is the intention to go ahead with the Anglo-French variable geometry aircraft. Far from being just a gleam in somebody's eye, as was suggested in another place on Monday, design work is going on, and if the aeroplane comes up to expectations it will enormously enhance the strike and reconnaissance capability of the R.A.F. From an economic standpoint also, together with the proposed light strike and trainer aircraft, the Jaguar, this decision will demonstrate the oft-commended need for joint action with the French in the production of military aircraft. It will also provide much-needed work for the design and production teams of our aircraft industry.
Finally, my Lords, these decisions, together with the acquisition of the other aircraft referred to in the Statement, should give a great boost to the morale

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of the R.A.F. and will increase the attraction to young men to join; and I hope that the very expensive advertising campaign which started in last Sunday's newspapers will have the desired effect on recruiting.
5.38 p.m.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: My Lords, I had not intended to speak in this debate, for I realised that there were many others who wished to do so, and I felt that I had no special contribution to make which would have justified my taking up your Lordships' time. Even now I shall intervene for only a few moments. But there was one aspect of the Government's Defence White Paper which emerged more clearly, I thought, than before from yesterday's debate, and which, in the light of such experience I have had while in office, seemed to me especially disturbing. I refer to the Government's decision to give up the British base at Aden.
I am worried about this, first because I believe that it will be regarded as definitely a breach of faith by all our friends in South Arabia. In that connection the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, recalled yesterday how the Prime Minister had emphasised as recently as 1964, less than two years ago, how vital Aden was to our peace-keeping operations and our communications. No doubt that statement was regarded by all our friends—and we have good friends in that part of the world—as a solemn assurance on the part of Great Britain that we intended, whatever might be the evolution in the hinterland in that area, to keep our base at Aden, a base which was their chief protection against the machinations of President Nasser and others in the Arabian Peninsula. Now, less than two years later, we are told in this White Paper that we intend to clear out and leave them, our friends, to their fate. In such circumstances, can they regard us as anything but a broken reed for the future?
Nor is it only in Southern Arabia that the bad effects are likely to be felt. In foreign affairs—and this is really more a decision of foreign policy than of defence policy—one cannot divide the world into separate compartments and assume that what you do in one area will have no effect in other areas as well. Anything
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one does, for good or ill, has an effect everywhere. This is no new idea of mine trotted out for use in this particular debate. I believe it to be fundamental to our whole approach to foreign and Imperial policy.
It was, indeed, the reason why I myself resigned from the Leadership of this House and the membership of the Government almost ten years ago. I took that action, which virtually ended my active political life, because I was convinced that to let Archbishop Makarios return to Cyprus, in spite of his repudiation of our demand that he should call off his terrorist campaign as a condition of his release from detention in the Seychelles, would give the impression that we were on the run and could always be bullied into acquiescence by a campaign of violence and terrorism, if it was pursued with enough resolution; and that it would have repercussions far beyond Cyprus itself. Nor, I believe, did subsequent events prove this view to be wrong; for the campaign of violence in Kenya, which is a long way off, began to be intensified very soon after, and that succeeded, too. And we have been on the run ever since, and we are on the run still, as the Government's announcement of the abandonment of the Aden base clearly shows. Nothing, I believe, that Government speakers said yesterday will convince our remaining friends there—and they are getting, I am sorry to say, very few—that that is not the case. And what is more, the evil consequences of our abandonment of the base will not be merely economic, as I thought was suggested by the noble Lord, Lord Beswick, last night. They are likely to be even more political—an aspect of which he, in his speech, said nothing.
It is quite true that the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, spoke some very brave words yesterday afternoon about the Persian Gulf. He said:
"… we shall fulfil our obligations in the Persian Gulf area by increasing our forces there."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, Vol. 273 (No. 48), col. 954, March 8, 1966.]
That sounds very good. But what are the friendly rulers, our friends in the Persian Gulf, going to think as they ponder over that statement? They are going to think "That is just what the Prime Minister of Britain said about Aden only two years ago." In any case,

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the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, was careful to follow his bold pronouncement with a carefully worded proviso. He said:
"Some time in the future. no doubt"—
and "some time" is rather an elastic phrase—
"our forces may cease to be required in the Persian Gulf but until that time comes we must honour our existing obligations." [col. 954.]
After that, apparently, when those obligations cease to be useful to us, we shall regard ourselves as quite free to rat on them, and leave our friends there, in that equally important area, to their fate.
Nor was that all. There was the same note, I thought, if I may say so—and I regretted to hear it—in the remarks of the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, on Malaysia and Singapore. He said:
"We plan to retain forces in Malaysia and Singapore, but we recognise that this may not be acceptable for all time. This will be a matter of hard fact, rather than of choice." [col. 953.]
Can anyone consider that this kind of early warning system, telling the people, first in one area and then in another, that we may be obliged to walk out at a not too distant date, is a sensible way to run our foreign policy or consolidate our friends? Can we really hope to maintain our position as a great Power on that kind of basis?
The noble Lord, Lord Bourne, in the admirable speech to which we have just listened, said that we are no longer a world Power in the military sense; and this may well be so, though it is sad to many of us to think it. But, as he equally said, we still have both interests and friends and we have an obligation to defend both; and I entirely agree that we must do that, to the best of our ability. But such things as the decision to abandon Aden and to abandon the aircraft carrier make it almost impossible to do it.
And if I am told that it is all very well for me to talk like this, but where would I look for the money to enable us to pursue a less discreditable policy, my answer would be, quite frankly, something of this kind. I should say this to the noble Lord, Lord Shepherd, who spoke on these particular lines this afternoon: first, I should look at our policy
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of overseas aid to emergent countries. I believe that hundreds of millions are at present being handed out in this way, and it is extremely doubtful how much of it is being well spent. Surely it would be worth while at any rate to go into this and limit what we lend to what we believe to be entirely justifiable. And secondly, we ought to look, I think—though perhaps we should not save quite so much that way—at the kind of economies of which the noble Lord, Lord Bourne, spoke in the speech to which I have just referred. And thirdly and lastly —and most important, I think—we should look again at our home expenditure; look at our spending here in this country. The noble Lord, Lord Shepherd, obviously thought that there was no real possibility of any further economy in that quarter. He reminded us of what we were spending on roads, of what we were spending on this, of what we were spending on that, and indicated that we could not cut any of it down. That, perhaps, is a natural attitude, if I may say so—and I do not say it in any spirit of offence—in any Party spokesman who has to make an oration on the very eve of a General Election.
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, I hope that the noble Marquess will forgive me for interrupting. I suggest that he looks at the Manifesto of the Conservative Party, the Party to which he belongs. He will see the very large claims that they make with regard to public expenditure.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: I would apply the same remarks equally to my own Party. But, as noble Lords on the opposite side of the House constantly remind us, they are the Party in power at this moment and they intend to stay there.
Yet if we go on piling on expenditure in the home sector, while leaving our defences inadequate and our foreign policy without the military support that it needs to make it effective, we shall be like the house in the Bible which was built on the sands. If we do not mind our ways while there is still time, we shall, just like that house, if and when a storm comes, as it well may, find ourselves without defences and without friends, and crumble away in ruin and disaster. Your Lordships may think that those are too strong words: but I have been through

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the approaches to two world wars. I know how inadequately prepared we were for both. I do not want to see it happen again. Let us therefore, in this House, at any rate, which is a wise House, consider these things frankly and courageously before it is too late.
5.50 p.m.
LORD REA: My Lords, at this stage of the debate I have a very shrewd suspicion of what your Lordships would like, and I am going to comply. I think we all want to see what it is all about. I am rising to refer to the Liberal Amendment, which comes last on the Paper and which I ask your Lordships not to regard as a verbal quibble. We believe very much in the Amendment put forward by the Conservative Party to-day, except that they have put the cart before the horse—and that is the whole point of our Amendment. We maintain that commitments can be so large that military support of them cannot be afforded, and that that is the position which this country has got into, not necessarily owing to one Government or another Government, but because of the progress and the development of Defence in the last twenty years.
We do not claim that this is a poor country, an unimportant country, one that is despised; because I am convinced that it is a country full of potential. But I would say that there are means of arranging commitments and promises by mutual consent whereby you can get out of things when you are over-promised. We consider that this country is over-promised in its commitments and must get out of them, not by dishonouring them, not by walking out of them, but by the historical, Parliamentary tradition of negotiation and diplomacy. If I may paraphrase a remark of the noble Lord, Lord Shepherd, I would say that we must cut our cloth according to our cloth. The emperor who had no clothes was very chilly; and there is not much satisfaction in going on cutting a coat when there is no cloth to cut, or when you can only cut off one arm to put it on the other side.
We have very simple criticisms—and I am not going to repeat anything, because everything has been repeated a great deal. The noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, who asked me to express his regret for not being here, made a very good case from our point of view of why we should try
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to be an important European Power and not a third or fourth rate world Power, which we shall be if we go on as we are. That, really, is the criticism we have of the Labour Party's point of view.
With the Conservative Party, we have great sympathy, because they have with them the element —that small element that there always will be in this country —of the "gunboat mind". It is a little element, but I can assure your Lordships that, on March 31, they will to a man vote for the Conservative Party and not for any other Party. My Lords, this is not 1866; it is 1966, and things have changed a great deal. We should all like to be in 1866 for some reasons. We have heard that the Americans have fifteen carriers. Now the thing for us to have, of course, would be 21 carriers, and another 50 divisions in every country in Europe and the Far East. That is the idea of the "gunboat mind", and we in Parliament must remember that we have got to deprecate that quite a lot, and not act upon it.
We must phase ourselves out of over-commitments by proper negotiation. We must not inflate defence, but must deflate commitment properly and by diplomacy. The noble Lord, Lord Beswick, told us about and explained the position in Aden, and that seems to be a pattern on which we can act in other parts of the world. But we cannot approve of this Statement on Defence, which seems to us an unsatisfactory Statement, an unworkable compromise, really, between outdated military glory and economic irresponsibility. if I may use a classical analogy, I would say that this Government are going right ahead piling Pelion slap into Charybdis, and the result is not very satisfactory.
My Lords, this, I hope, is not a Party matter. It is very difficult at this stage, the very last day of Parliament, to take it out of Party affairs; but nobody wants to deal a body blow to-night—at least, I hope they do not, and it would be very unsatisfactory if anyone did. I ask your Lordships to look objectively at our little Amendment, which says merely that political commitments must be reduced, that military resources will therefore go down and that, on those lines, we shall be a prosperous country. I have had tremendous support from the noble and gallant Field Marshal, who took up our point and, I take it, will come into the

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Lobby with us to-night. I hope that others of your Lordships will please look on this objectively, and not as a political matter, and will consider whether our little Amendment is not, in the end, really making sense and putting the horse before the cart.
5.55 p.m.
LORD HARLECH: My Lords, I shall have a few words to say about the Liberal Amendment in the course of my speech, but first, as this is the first debate on Defence that I have attended in your Lordships' House, I should like to say that I have found it an extremely valuable one; and, though very strong feelings are held in many parts of the House on these matters, it has been an extremely good-tempered debate. It is, I think, my first pleasant duty to congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Barnard, on an admirable maiden speech. He spoke with authority on the Territorial Army, and made some very pertinent points. We are most grateful to him for the part he played in the debate.
Our fundamental criticism from these Benches is that the Government's policy, of first setting an arbitrary ceiling to defence spending and then trying to make the resources cover our world-wide commitments, is the negation of sensible defence planning, and nothing we have heard in the two days of debate has shaken us in the slightest degree from that conclusion. The approach to the defence policy adopted by the Labour Government seems to me rather reminiscent of Alice through the Looking Glass. I was going to say Alice in Wonderland, but it is obviously more like Alice through the Looking Glass—it is done in the reverse way. Indeed, when the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, and the noble Lord, Lord Shepherd, kept on jumping up to explain to us how admirable their Defence Statement was—they were saying about their own Defence Statement that is was long and full of merit—I was reminded of the White Knight who, before starting on his poem, said that it was long but very, very beautiful.
We have had, I think, an excellent debate on the merits and demerits of aircraft carriers. We have had speeches from these Benches from the noble Lords, Lord Teynham and Lord Ashbourne, and the noble Earl, Lord Selkirk; and, from
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the Government Benches, from the noble Lords, Lord Shackleton and Lord Blyton. At one stage I thought their arguments were so similar that they seemed to have been hewing their material from somewhat the same quarry. We have had a good discussion, also, on the Reserve Forces and the future of the Territorial Army. The noble Lord, Lord Shepherd, asked me one particular question on this matter. He asked: what does the Conservative Party Manifesto mean by our retaining the Territorial Army? What we mean is that, whatever is agreed between the Government of the day and the Council of the Territorial Army Association regarding the remaining volunteer forces which we are to have in this country, it will be known as the Territorial Army.
LORD SHEPHERD: Oh!
LORD HARLECH: I thought that Lord Shepherd's other remarks about noble Lords on these Benches sneering at the Americans were uncalled for and totally unjustified. I have listened to most of the speeches in this debate, and I have read all those to which I have not listened, and I heard no sneering at the Americans from these Benches. I did, however, read a speech made from the opposite Benches by the noble Lord, Lord Soper, in which he suggested that, in the Cuban crisis, President Kennedy was within half an hour of starting a nuclear war. "It so happened that Mr. Khrushchev was not". I thought that that was an unworthy remark, and I think Lord Shepherd might have addressed his comments to his own side of the House.
My noble friend Lord Carrington yesterday indicated the astonishing way in which the Labour Party's policy while it has been in office had been almost the exact reverse of what it said it would be when it was in Opposition. I want to take up some of these points again later on in my speech. but first I wish to deal with this question of the correct approach to defence policy.
The alternatives seem to be these. Either you can review your commitments, reduce them to the minimum consonant with the country's security and then set aside the resources needed to meet them—that is our approach—or you can do as the Liberal Party suggests. and decide that it is absolutely necessary to reduce the resources expended on

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defence; and set about reducing your commitments substantially in order to bring your commitments into balance with your ability to meet them. I think that is a fair statement of the Liberal Party position. This is a perfectly rational approach; although I and my noble friends on these Benches think it an unwise and somewhat irresponsible one. Or you can do what the Government have done: place an arbitrary, rigid; and lower limit on the proportion of the national wealth to be expended on defence and then maintain virtually all your commitments. For it is clear that in abandoning the Aden base the Government are not giving up any commitments, but are simply giving up part of our ability to meet them. The third alternative is, self-evidently, the worst possible solution and is likely to lead us into severe trouble.
The only argument that Government spokesmen have advanced in support of this topsy-turvy method of dealing with defence is that this country cannot afford to spend more than 6 per cent. of the gross national product for this purpose in 1969 –70. It is all a question of priorities; but this assertion by Government spokesmen is supported by no convincing evidence. There is a whole series of figures, dating back to the previous Labour Government, to show that it is possible to spend over 7 per cent. of the gross national product on defence and still have a surplus on our balance of payments. Indeed, in the last thirteen years, with defence spending never falling below the figure of 6·6 per cent.—and sometimes going higher —we had a surplus on current account in eight out of those thirteen years, a virtual balance in one, and we were in deficit in four years.
I do not think that comparisons with the level of expenditure in other European countries is valid for us. It might be valid if the Government said that they no longer wished to carry out a world rôle. But if they insist on carrying out a world rôle—and, indeed, we have commitments around the world which force them to do so—then a comparison with these figures from Europe is not valid. And if they took the view that the best scheme would be to get down to somewhere near the same figure as was quoted for Germany and France, I think they would soon find them-
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selves in the same Lobby as the Liberal Party.
The country as a whole is substantially better off than it was in the early 1950s, and it should be better off still by 1970. But Government spokesmen insist that the British people are not prepared to spend a penny over 6 per cent. of the gross national product for their defence in that year. The country will be richer, but the proportion that we shall be spending on our security will be the lowest for twenty years. The Government rejoinder to all this is that we, the Conservatives, are committing ourselves to spending more on defence. We do not seek to deny it because we are convinced that it is a burden that we can bear, provided that we find a buoyant and expanding economy.
Here we come to one of the troubles: there seems to be little prospect, in our view, of the Socialist economic policy producing this kind of expansion. Productivity in 1965 was stagnant and the gross national product increased by nearer 2 per cent. than the 4 per cent. which was planned. This has meant that the resources available to us as a country will be about £600 million short of what they should have been; and it looks as though the same story will be repeating itself this year. If the Labour Party is convinced that it cannot do better than this, then the Government's determination to make unjustified defence cuts becomes more understandable. But the National Plan promises a very substantial increase in both production and living standards by 1970, and it is in the light of these that we believe it to be quite wrong to insist upon a lower and rigid ceiling for defence expenditure.
It is also a matter of grave concern that the Labour Party show no enthusiasms or determination to take Britain into the Common Market—and I recognise that the noble Lord, Lord Winter-bottom, is an exception to this—for as the years go by we are bound to find it increasingly tough going economically if we are left out in the cold. Indeed, I believe that I have under-stated the case, in that the Prime Minister and a number of senior Cabinet Ministers are known to be strongly opposed to Britain's entering into Europe. Personally, I do not believe that it will be possible for Britain,

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in the long run, to sustain the world rôle envisaged in this year's White Paper unless our economy is joined to that of Europe.
THE EARL OF LONGFORD: My Lords, may I interrupt? The noble Lord has made an important statement derived, I have no doubt, from what he imagines to be the facts about the Prime Minister's attitude to Europe. I can assure him that to the best of my belief his statement is quite false.
LORD HARLECH: My Lords, we listened to the Prime Minister speaking at a Press conference the other day at which he was laying down conditions for getting into Europe—conditions which everybody in this House knows perfectly well will make it impossible for us to do so.
I turn now to one aspect of the Statement on the Defence Estimates with which I found myself in broad agreement: the necessity to reinvigorate the United Nations so that it can discharge the burden laid upon it more than twenty years ago of being the main instrument for keeping the peace. In the aftermath of the most destructive war in human history, those who survived set out to create an organisation which, through collective machinery, could deter aggression and settle disputes between nations peacefully. We and the U.S.A. played the leading rôle in establishing the United Nations and in drawing up its Charter. Some who played prominent parts are, happily, still with us. I have in mind the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, who is with us here to-day, and also the noble Earl, Lord Avon. They, and men like them, who shared in the task, were not visionaries with no conception of the realities of international political life. No! They were those who had had the fullest experience of it and they were convinced that in the nuclear age we had to find a way of maintaining peace or the whole of human life was in jeopardy.
That is why I am not one of those who decry the United Nations. Rather I grieve at its recent weakness and I am angered by those who scoff at it and seek to diminish its rôle. Of course, it may need some improvement. All human institutions do. It may need reform. But the major improvement needed is in the
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performance of the individual Governments that make up its membership. So long as they show scant regard for the purposes and provisions of the Charter, so long will the Organisation fail to command the confidence and respect of the people it was designed to serve.
Similarly, I find myself in agreement with the words of the Statement on disarmament—apart from some mumbo-jumbo about the aim to "internationalise" our nuclear strategic forces, which I will come to later. It is a thousand pities that the momentum towards arms control and disarmament generated by the partial nuclear test ban has so far led to nothing. But we all know that the political climate has been unfavourable, and it is difficult to see how any important progress can be made while the Vietnam war continues at its present intensity.
Nor shall we reach any finality with regard to a non-proliferation agreement, until we in the Western Alliance decide on what arrangements we intend to put into practice over nuclear sharing. Frankly, from the point of view of reaching agreement with the Soviet Union, I do not think it makes much difference which of the alternative solutions we go for. Whichever one we adopt they will inevitably threaten dire consequences, since it is clearly in their interests to try to stop any move designed to strengthen the Western Alliance and to tie the United States more closely to the defence of Europe. But when the deed is done, they will live with the facts of the situation as they did over German rearmament in 1954.
My Lords, there is one other comment I would make while on the subject of disarmament. I was an enthusiastic supporter of the idea that the United States had of setting up a separate Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. A strong disarmament section in our own Foreign Office is also important, but I am sure that we must guard against the danger of allowing disarmament to become a special subject somewhat remote from the main thrust of our foreign and defence policy. This would be quite wrong. The Prime Minister, the Foreign Secretary and the Secretary of Defence should all feel a personal responsibility in the disarmament field, because it is only by a combination of both political

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and specific disarmament initiatives that any progress is likely to be made.
Reference is also made to the need to check the conventional arms race among the smaller Powers, and I found some difficulty in squaring this statement with the appointment of a super-salesman for armaments and with the deal under which a Labour Government is selling £100 million worth of arms to Saudi Arabia. I imagine that this sale will result in the renewal of understandable demands from Israel to us to make purchases of further arms here; and no doubt also from Egypt to the Russians to supply them with arms. It looks as though for the time being the arms salesmen are winning over the disarmers in the Government. However, I am sure that this is no more than a temporary aberration and that Her Majesty's Government, together with representatives of all Parties in this House sincerely desire to strengthen the role of the United Nations and to make progress in the disarmament field.
But, my Lords, we have to face the fact that for the time being no progress is discernible and that, in the words of the Defence Statement:
"the United Nations has not yet assumed effective responsibility for keeping the peace."
We are therefore obliged to discharge the responsibility of defending ourselves and our own interests, and of helping to defend our friends, and this requires us to provide forces under three broad headings: first, the nuclear strategic forces; secondly, forces contributing to the defence of Europe, and thirdly, forces to meet our commitments in the rest of the world, particularly East of Suez. I propose to discuss them shortly in the reverse order.
So far as our rôle East of Suez is concerned, the Statement says that it is in the Far East and South-East Asia that the greatest danger to peace may lie in the next decade (the passage from the Statement has already been quoted to us by the noble Lord, Lord Boothby), and it adds that some of our partners in the Commonwealth may be directly threatened. It is in this context, and with the present evidence of continued Indonesian hostility to Malaysia, that the Government have decided to phase out carriers from the Royal Navy. We know that the Navy Board, with the full support of Mr. Mayhew, gave it as their firm
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opinion that this commitment could not be carried out effectively without aircraft carriers; and it is really straining our credulity beyond breaking point to expect us to believe that their task can be performed by surface-to-surface missiles which we do not at present possess, and by a small element from the force of 50 F 111s which we are to buy from America.
I have no doubt that the F 111 will prove to be a very remarkable plane, certainly the best of its type in the world. But it will have to be a great deal more than this if 50 of them are going to replace and do the job of the Canberras and other aircraft in Europe and the Middle East, while at the same time providing around the world the long-distance strike capacity now provided by five aircraft carriers. The truth of the matter is that the phasing out of the carrier force is a pure gamble, with the odds, on the Government's own assessment, stacked heavily against its being a successful gamble.
LORD SHACKLETON: My Lords, may I interrupt the noble Lord, purely on a point of fact? The F 11ls are not intended primarily to re-provide the carrier capacity. I do not want to go into too much technical detail on this, but the re-provision, of course, is coming mainly with Phantoms in the fighter protection rôle—the Maritime Comet. I ought to say that it is certainly true that the Admiralty Board took that view, but, as the Secretary of State made clear, in fairness, other Staffs in the Ministry of Defence did not.
LORD HARLECH: My Lords, I quite accept that. As regards the F 111, I thought I had understood correctly that it was to provide the long-range cover; indeed, it will be the only plane which has the same radius of action. The Phantom will not have the same radius of action as the F 111, and therefore in very distant places, a long way away from a land base, it will be the F 111 on which the Government will have to rely. To this extent I was correct in saying that a small contingent out of this 50 will be doing, perhaps not all the work of five aircraft carriers, but at least some of it.
We have, rightly in my view, encouraged the Malaysians to offer a vigorous resistance to Indonesian confrontation; and, as Mr. Healey explained

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last year, we persuaded Australia and New Zealand to support our policy and to help in the defence of Malaysia by convincing them of our long-term intention to play a rôle in that area. This is a vitally important point because there was, on the face of it, much to be said from the Australian point of view for not adopting an openly hostile attitude towards Indonesia. Indonesia is Australia's closest neighbour and has a population ten times that of Australia. I know it was of real concern to the Australian Government that Britain, having entangled her in this imbroglio, perhaps rightly, might grow weary of the burden, and either pull out of our commitments or seriously reduce our military capability in the area. There seems to me to be a real danger that Australia's and New Zealand's suspicions will be heightened, and Indonesia's hopes of wearing us down will be encouraged, now it is known that we wish to abolish that element of our naval forces in the Far East which Mr. Mayhew described last year as the vital element, and which we know the British Government's naval advisers still regard as vital.
We find much the same sorry tale in the Middle East. We are to retain all our commitments in the area, together, apparently, with one to intervene in a peace-keeping rôle in Africa; but we are to diminish substantially our ability to meet them by winding up the Aden base in 1968. In spite of the very full statement made yesterday by the noble Lord, Lord Beswick, I do not quite know where our commitments to the defence of an independent Southern Arabia now stand. I gather that the existence of some commitment is no longer denied, but we now intend to discharge it by building up the Federation's own forces and by helping the authorities there to cushion the economic effects of our withdrawal. What the financial saving to this country will be after these new burdens have been taken on, and after our forces from Aden have had new accommodation provided in Bahrein and elsewhere, is debatable, but it is unlikely to be very large. I quote a statement made by Mr. Healey on March 3:
"Incidentally, it is no good simply closing foreign bases unless the men who serve in them are demobilised, because otherwise the
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overall defence expenditure will have to be increased in order to provide new accommodation and facilities for them somewhere else."
LORD BESWICK: My Lords, I think we want to get this clear, since the noble Lord is talking about new heavy economic burdens. We are already spending a considerable sum in Aden every year, and my understanding is that the financial commitment will be continued for some time after independence.
LORD HARLECH: My Lords, I accept that, but the noble Lord also told us yesterday that the economic effects upon Aden of our withdrawal will be quite substantial, and I understand that his Department is entering into discussions now as to how they could be cushioned. My general experience has been that, when we come to cushion these effects, it usually entails the spending of a good deal of money, but I may be wrong; I hope I am.
One thing which has not been denied is that, by closing the base, we are certain to be reducing our capability to discharge the commitments which the Government are retaining in the area. I cannot feel that a small transfer of forces to Bahrein is a satisfactory substitute. The total forces remaining available will be minimal. They will have been removed from a territory now wholly under our jurisdiction, and a territory which was later on to be a co-partner with us in a new defence agreement, into a territory which is entirely independent and where nationalist elements are strongly resentful of our presence. I should have thought it inevitable that an increase in our local presence, together with a weakening in our military capability in the area as a whole, could only lead to a rise in Arab nationalist hostility to us.
We have all read and listened to cogent arguments in favour of eliminating bases and reducing our commitments in the Middle East. There was a particularly thoughtful and intelligent article on the subject by Miss Elizabeth Monroe in the January number of International Affairs. If, gradually, it were possible for Britain to disengage from the area, without endangering our interests or the interests of our friends, there would be much to be said for such a course. But surely the whole essence of such a policy is good

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timing, and whatever else may be said about the Government's decision to abandon the Aden base, its timing has been disastrous.
It had seemed that Egypt was at last weary of her intervention in the Yemen, and an Egyptian withdrawal from the Yemen was bound to be followed by a decrease in Egyptian subversion in South Arabia and in Aden. One would have thought that a principal objective of British policy in the area was to ensure that such an Egyptian withdrawal took place. But, of course, the Government's announcement about giving up the base in Aden has practically guaranteed that Egypt will stay in the area and that subversion will increase and continue. Indeed, as my noble friend Lord Carrington said yesterday, President Nasser has already intimated as much. There has been a great deal of lip-service paid during the course of this debate to the idea that defence policy should be the handmaiden of foreign policy. Here the rôles have been exactly reversed.
What seems to me so profoundly worrying about all this is that, whether we look at the Middle East or at the Far East, we seem to be encouraging our friends to adopt policies which depend upon an assurance from us that, if they get into difficulties, we shall he standing by with sufficient force to guarantee their security. This places upon us a tremendous responsibility, for if the situation in one of these areas should deteriorate and it then becomes apparent that we could not match our word with deeds, then we should have committed perhaps the worst crime in the sphere of foreign policy.
I shall never forget how greatly I was struck by reading Lord Salisbury's violent condemnation of Palmerston's conduct of the Schleswig-Holstein crisis. I need hardly say that I am not referring to the noble Marquess who has just addressed the House, but to his illustrious grandfather. Your Lordships will recall that Palmerston was continually urging the Danes to stand up to Germany and gave them every encouragement to believe that, if this led them into conflict, we should stand by them. The Germans called the bluff, seized territories in Schleswig-Holstein, and we did nothing. The episode brought shame upon this country and ruin on Denmark. It was a lesson which was never to be forgotten
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by Lord Salisbury in the conduct of his foreign policy, and I trust that it will never be forgotten by this Government. [Interruption.] It has happened to different Governments at different times but, as I say, I hope that this is a lesson the Government will learn, because some of the policies they are attempting to pursue in this White Paper run this particular danger.
I turn now to our rôle in the defence of Europe and I am glad to see that Her Majesty's Government have no intention of reducing our conventional forces in that theatre. I am sure that it would be unsound to do so, both on political and on military grounds. On the other hand, they no longer demand that these forces should be increased at the expense of our nuclear forces, which was the theme of so many of their speeches while in Opposition.
However, there is just one point I should like to make. To some extent this is in answer to the objections expressed by the noble and gallant Viscount, Lord Montgomery of Alamein, and also by the noble Lords, Lord Bourne and Lord Boothby. I think there is at the moment an exaggerated confidence in a prolonged state of calm along the Iron Curtain. The Berlin situation remains full of inflammable material, while the balance of forces on both sides has hardly changed since those days in 1961 when we had a very serious crisis on our hands. With the United States Government ever more heavily committed in South Vietnam and with NATO in some disarray, the Soviet Union might well decide once more to test our will and our determination over West Berlin. If they do so, we should find ourselves in a dangerously inflexible position if we had meanwhile run down our conventional forces, so bringing appreciably nearer the threshold at which we should need to threaten the use of nuclear weapons. We must not allow ourselves to be lulled into complacency and so drift into such a position. I quite accept that some of these forces may have to come out on a temporary basis, but I think that the Government are quite right in attempting to maintain 55,000 men on the mainland of Europe.
The third aspect of our defence forces I want to deal with is the nuclear one, and here I find the Government's policy almost totally incomprehensible. They

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do not accept the Conservative view that, in present circumstances, a nuclear capability is a sensible and not unduly costly insurance for this country. Indeed, when in Opposition, the Labour Party used the strongest language to condemn the continuation of nuclear forces and, in particular, they inveighed against the Nassau Agreement, which enabled us to buy Polaris missiles for fitting in British submarines.
I have two typical quotations from the Prime Minister. On January 16, 1964, he said:
"Then, of course, on Polaris we have made it clear a hundred times that we intend if returned to power to renegotiate the Nassau Agreement on the basis of our declared policy that our proper contribution to our Alliance and that our most effective military strength in this country is secured without the illusion which is created by nuclear, missile-carrying submarines."
Later, in March, 1964, he said:
"We have made absolutely clear that the idea of Britain trying to add anything to the Western striking force by buying or hiring Polaris submarines from the Americans is absolute nonsense. In terms of strength it is like a dry pea on top of a mountain."
I think that everyone must have assumed from this and similar statements that a Labour Government would be determined to rid themselves of these unwanted weapons. But nothing of the sort has happened, and the Polaris fleet has been described by the Government since they took Office as
"a massive British contribution to the Alliance"
and
"a force of tremendous power and significance."
I have seen it suggested in the Press that the Government were urged by the United States not to abandon the Polaris programme. This is, of course, totally untrue. The United States very properly took up a completely neutral attitude and would have been as ready to arrange for the cancellation of the programme as for its retention; and I know that the noble Earl who is to reply would wish to confirm this.
The Government now say that the Polaris forces are being built for the purpose of internationalising them, since they deny that they could ever be of value in a national rôle. But is there
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any evidence that there are other nations clamouring for us to take on this work of supererogation? Not the Americans; not our European partners, so far as I know. Her Majesty's Government profess that they do not want British Polaris submarines either. In the Government's view, who on earth are they being built for? Perhaps we can also be told of the progress that is being made towards the setting up of an Atlantic Nuclear Force, because it would appear that the Government's whole nuclear policy hinges upon this initiative. That being the case, there seems to have been a curious lack of information about how it is faring in recent months.
To sum up, we find much of the Government's defence policy muddleheaded and inconsistent. Shortly after taking office, Mr. Healey said, on November 23, 1964:
" We are still trying to sustain three major military rôles—to maintain an independent strategic nuclear striking power, to make a major contribution towards the Allied defence of Western Europe and to deploy a significant military capacity overseas."
He then added that
" Britain must decide which of these three rôles should have priority."
After sixteen months of careful deliberation, the Government have decided that they should all have priority. Having carefully set out and arranged three stools around the room, they have sat with the greatest precision between them.
Last autumn, while in New York, I was saddened to read in Mr. Walter Lippmann's column his judgment that:
" Britain is unable for the time being to play a leading rôle in the world."
And Mr. Robert McKenzie had much the same thing to say in last Sunday's Observer, when he commented, having travelled recently in most parts of the world:
"There is no more laughable claim than the Prime Minister's assertion that under Labour Britain speaks with a new voice in the world."
These statements make depressing reading, and I fear that if the present misguided policies of the Government are allowed to continue, Britain will become increasingly a light-weight in international affairs. I believe that the people of Britain, and indeed the world, expect us to play a nobler and more important rôle. I therefore urge your Lordships

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to support the Amendment which was moved so ably yesterday by my noble friend Lord Carrington.
6.34 p.m.
THE EARL OF LONGFORD: My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Harlech, comes to this House with high credentials, some of them relative to his family and some to himself. When I first came into this House the noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury, used to take a certain pleasure in congratulating his noble uncle, the late Lord Cecil of Chelwood. I am sure that he will find it equally satisfactory to be able afterwards to congratulate his noble nephew. The noble Lord, Lord Harlech, has rendered a splendid service to this country in more fields than one: in disarmament, and also as our highly regarded Ambassador in the United States. Therefore, the country has reason to be grateful to him. I realise that he won golden opinions in the United States. I came across a passage in Mr. Schlesinger's book about the late President Kennedy in which this passage occurred:
" Bundy possessed dazzling clarity and speed of mind—Kennedy told friends that next to David Ormsby Gore Bundy was the brightest man he had ever known—as well as great distinction of manner and unlimited self-confidence."
I read that also in that way. There is something to live up to certainly, and I am sure the noble Lord will wish to be judged against this background to-day.
As regard the noble Lord's speech, I would only say at times that he was the lofty and elavated statesman, and at other times the equally lofty partisan, although not always quite so elevated. I could not speak more politely than that. I will come back later to some of his main contentions, but before doing so, perhaps I can deal with one or two of the issues that have arisen.
There have been so many speeches, all of them expert, quite a few moving, that I am aware that I shall fail to answer most of them in any adequate sense. Before attempting to do so, I should perhaps say this—and I hope the House will not think it impertinent. It has been a great privilege to me to lead the House during the whole of this Parliament, and although we know, as the noble and gal-land Viscount, Lord Montgomery of Alamein—who was in magnificent form to-day—was yesterday reported to have
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said, that "war is a very uncertain business", the same is true of politics, and this may be the last time that I occupy this position. But as the late Julian Grenfell said:
"If this is to be the last song you shall sing, Sing well, for you may not sing another. Brother, sing!".
I do not intend to sing for ever.
Among the most attractive speeches we have had was the one from the noble Marquess, Lord Aberdeen and Temair, who referred to the Battle of Waterloo and the part played by his heroic ancestor. He finished on this note: "It must be borne in mind that, whatever defence arrangements are made, the end must be victory as usual." On the face of it, that might conflict somewhat with the voice of the noble Lord, Lord Soper, who argued strongly yesterday that those who take the sword will perish by the sword. I can only remind the noble Marquess of what the Duke of Wellington said on the morning after the Battle of Waterloo, when he was told by the doctor that the noble Lord's distinguished ancestor had died. The Duke of Wellington, with tears coursing down his cheeks, said:
" Well, thank God I do not know what it is to lose a battle, but certainly nothing could be more painful than to gain one with the loss of so many of one's friends."
So that, like many other great soldiers —and some of them have taken part in this debate: the noble and gallant Viscount, Lord Montgomery of Alamein, and the noble Lord, Lord Bourne—the Duke of Wellington certainly detested war. Maybe in the conclusion the future will lie rather with the noble Lord, Lord King-Hall, who held out a prospect which, if we could realise it, would appeal to everyone in different ways—that is, the prospect of World Government.
Many other speeches have been made to which I cannot refer. There was that of the noble Lord, Lord Balerno, yesterday and those of my noble friends Lord Haire of Whiteabbey and Lord Blyton; and to-day of my noble friends Lord Winterbottom and Lord Morris of Ken-wood. I am afraid that I cannot cover all the speeches that I should wish to. The maiden speech of the noble Lord, Lord Barnard, was one which attracted

1183
the whole House and made us all want to hear him often again in the future.
But if one asks what are the issues that have emerged, there have been some concrete issues which I do not intend to pursue very far. My noble colleagues are much better equipped to deal with these matters, which require not only physical courage but technical knowledge, and they have already spoken very convincingly. I am referring now to the questions of the carrier, the aircraft programme, and the Territorial Army, among others. On all those matters, the noble Lords, Lord Shackleton and Lord Shepherd, have set out our position much better than I could. As the House knows, I certainly would never dream of coming down to speak with any personal authority on the matter of defence, but since carriers have been mentioned I will indicate my only claim to fame. I am told that I am the first First Lord ever to have landed on a carrier, so I do not suffer from any prejudice against carriers. I am sure that the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, landed on them very often afterwards, but that gives me some slight bias in favour of that weapon, or instrument of war.
I am not going to deal with those matters. However, if the House is not convinced already, I do not think there is much more which can be added on those topics. I would rather come to some of the wider issues that have been raised during the debate concerning commitments. I should have liked, if I had time, to deal with the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Bourne (though I am afraid that I was compelled to miss some of it), and the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Boothby. I will say only one word about Germany, and I will simply refer the House, if I may, to a rather carefully drafted passage in the Defence Review. The passage runs as follows:
"As things now stand, we think it right to maintain our ground forces in Germany at about their existing level until satisfactory arms control arrangements have been agreed in Europe provided, however, that some means is found for meeting the foreign exchange cost of these forces."
I hope the noble Lords in question, and other noble Lords, will realise that those words have not just crept in, inadvertently, but that great importance is attached to them.
LORD BOOTHBY: My Lords, could the noble Earl say one or two words about what Her Majesty's Government are doing, and propose to do, about the war in Vietnam, because I did put that question?
THE EARL OF LONGFORD: I do not feel that I am called upon to-day to deal with that topic—
SEVERAL NOBLE LORDS: Hear, hear!
THE EARL OF LONGFORD: —except to repudiate any idea that we have been dragging our feet in pursuit of a truce. I do not think noble Lords opposite accuse us of that. I do not think anybody accuses us of that. I hope that they would know, and that Lord Boothby would know, the efforts which have been made by the Prime Minister and by Mr. Stewart, and I do not seriously suppose there is any difference between the main Parties in this House with regard to peace in Vietnam.
I would now come on to the points raised by the noble Lord, Lord Harlech. The same point (I am referring to the question of nuclear policy) was raised by several noble Lords, including the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, at the beginning of the debate. When we came into power, we inherited a nuclear programme for the Forces that included the V-Bombers with their various weapons, the Polaris firing submarines which were planned to succeed them, and a range of aircraft and missiles for the tactical delivery of nuclear weapons. I cannot believe that noble Lords opposite are criticising us for this. They may or may not argue that we have learnt from them, which I would not accept; but they may claim we have learnt from them—they had nine Ministers of Defence in their period and I should be surprised if we learned nothing from them, although I am afraid that it does not amount to an awful lot. Wherever we acquired this wisdom, we decided that the maximum use should be made of these elements of the Forces to forward our long-term objectives for the international control of nuclear weapons, and, indeed, of all armaments.
Proposals were made for an Atlantic Nuclear Force, a subject which has frequently been discussed in this House—and if I may say so, with the greatest

1185
respect, to the noble Lord, Lord Harlech, his absence from previous debates has been a slight handicap, because in his excellent speech he covered much ground which had been traversed before, and a number of points that have been dealt with before now by the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton. So I will not reply to points which he could, so to speak, look up in earlier Hansards.
Proposals were made for an Atlantic Nuclear Force to which we would assign our V-bombers, and subsequently Polaris submarines, organised in such a way as to further the aims of non-proliferation and non-dissemination of nuclear weapons. There is no one in this House who is more entitled to talk about disarmament than the noble Lord, Lord Harlech, but if he had been present in previous debates, or would do us the courtesy of reading them, he would see that in all these debates since we came into office we have stressed non-proliferation or non-dissemination more than any other aspects of our policy. So I hope he will take it from me that there has been no departure from our principles, or objectives, which are just those—non-proliferation and non-dissemination. The sooner, therefore, we can internationalise these nuclear forces, the more satisfied we shall be that we are coming at any rate somewhere near to the objectives we set ourselves.
LORD HARLECH: My Lords, I quite appreciate what the noble Earl is saying, but could he indicate what progress has been made recently towards an Atlantic Nuclear Force? I do not think we have yet heard what progress has been made by the Government.
THE EARL OF LONGFORD: I have not a progress report to make to-day, and with a good many points to answer I am not quite sure that I am called upon to deal with that matter in any detail. But as soon as we have another debate, I am sure the noble Lord will receive full information. I was only trying to stress the point that, in our view, the only object of possessing these weapons is that they assist us in the search for control of armaments and the policy of non-dissemination.
I would also stress the point—and I think I may accuse the noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury, perhaps unfairly, of being
1186
a little out of date. I am not sure that he realises that times have changed since his very distinguished grandfather, who was referred to with so well-justified eulogy by the noble Lord, Lord Harlech. In 1901, the noble Marquess's grandfather, of course, espoused a policy of isolation for Britain. That was his policy. He rejected the idea (I will not go into the passage in detail) that we need become entangled in alliances. Times have changed, and now the essence of our policy—which I think was shared by the noble Lord, Lord Harlech, and the noble Lord, Lord Carrington; or, at least, I should hope so—is that we must achieve our purposes through interdependence, and not in isolation. That is fundamental for our policy. This interdependence, acting with others, is something which is not to be regarded with contumely. It is not a rôle of which we must be ashamed: it is a forward move to internationalisation, which is the only foreign policy that will save the world.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: My Lords, the change has been that we are moving out, and people who stand for the things we stand for are moving in. The situation is steadily deteriorating, and has done so during the whole period of this Government.
THE EARL OF LONGFORD: At the risk of being impertinent to a Member of the House I respect dearly, I think the noble Marquess feels that it has been deteriorating ever since the time of his grandfather.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: I should be delighted to accept that from the noble Earl.
THE EARL OF LONGFORD: I am delighted to have it accepted. But I can only say, to wind up that little passage, that it was not from a Labour Government that the noble Marquess resigned twice. All honour to him—at any rate to his high principles, if not, on the latter occasion, possibly to his prudence.
Leaving out these personal factors, let us come back to what is undoubtedly a much more important question, this idea of interdependence. This brings me to the whole topic of commitments. I should think there is no word which is now causing more confusion than this word "commitment". We really need

1187
the noble Lord, Lord Conesford, first to redefine it, and then to abolish it, because it is undoubtedly full of the gravest ambiguity. I would say, myself, that it is simpler to think in terms, in the first place, of our vital interests as a country, and then of our duty which may carry us, and in my opinion does carry us, a long way beyond our vital interests in any narrow sense.
The matter is put quite simply, but perhaps a little less grandiloquently, in a passage in The Defence Review, at paragraph 16, on page 6 of Part I:
"At first sight, a direct threat to our survival seems less likely outside Europe. Although we have important economic interests in the Middle East, Asia and elsewhere, military force is not the most suitable means of protecting them, and they would not alone justify heavy British defence expenditure. We have, however, a number of obligations, which we cannot relinquish unilaterally or at short notice; some of these obligations will still exist in the 1970s."
It then refers to particular obligations where we have undertaken some kind of formal pledge, and no doubt they would also refer to dependent territories for which we would recognise a responsibility—for one of our remaining Colonies. But in addition it says:
"It is this interest above all which justifies our military presence outside Europe."
So may I briefly submit to the House that, in addition to what is necessary for our survival, we have these pledges which we made to other countries, and beyond that we have this responsibility for playing our part in maintaining the peace of the world and in establishing the United Nations on a much firmer basis. That is surely the soundest approach, and if one adopts that approach one has to look at one's responsibilities.
I will not weary the House with an account of my own responsibilities as Secretary of State for the Colonies, but we do recognise responsibilities for Colonies. The point was raised by the noble Lord, Lord King-Hall, yesterday of our colonies which have gained independence—and I am now referring to the policy of recent Governments of various Parties. Our policy is that we should not retain any continuing responsibility for their defence unless we have specifically entered into a defence agreement, as for example in Malta. That is, if you like,
1188
the bipartisan policy of accepting responsibility for our colonies but not for a country which becomes independent, unless we enter upon a defence agreement which is recognised to be of mutual advantage. I do not think there is any controversy between the Parties over that, but it is as well to set out the position.
However, the more idealistic noble Lords may say that our responsibilities do not stop there. When anyone approaches these things from a Christian or other high ethical point of view we put the question, "Who is my neighbour?" and answer that the whole world is our neighbour. In that sense, of course, I would say that the only limit to our moral responsibility is set by our economic capacity. I do not think anybody would deny that at the present time America is, rightly, in view of her wonderful economic resources and achievements, assuming larger responsibilities than we can ever afford to do, once we pass beyond the survival of this island and the promise we have given of what we can in fact afford to contribute to peace-making and establishing the United Nations. I am bound to say I am surprised there is so much argument about what in the end is surely a fairly simple matter.
On the question of commitments, I think I should answer one question which was asked by the noble Lord, Lord Thurlow. I am glad that the noble Lord, with his happy memories of the gallant island of Malta, has raised the question of the deployment of British forces there. We fully abide by our obligations to consult with the Government of Malta when major changes on the island are contemplated. Until these have taken place it is not possible for me to add to the information given in the Defence White Paper. We shall of course continue to discharge our responsibilities under the defence agreement. I realise that our friends in Malta are keenly interested in what is said to-day, and I am sorry that I cannot go further, but I hope the noble Lord will agree that, so far as it goes, it is satisfactory.
My Lords, I must not keep the House very much longer, but before I close I would try to explain quite clearly how I see these Amendments. I am glad the

1189
noble and gallant Viscount, Lord Montgomery of Alamein, has called on the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, to withdraw his Amendment. if I thought that the noble Lord was a free agent, and if I did not feel that he had a great commitment here (to use a phrase of the moment), I would add my appeal to that of the noble and gallant Viscount, but I realise that the noble Lord's followers have come for one purpose. Admittedly the noble Lord is as brave as a lion, but he would hardly dare, even so, to send them away hungry, so I am afraid my appeal would be wasted. If there were any way in which I could add to the force of the appeal made by the noble and gallant Viscount, I would certainly do it, but I am afraid it would be useless.
The noble Lord, Lord Rea, to-day, and the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, yesterday, were very interesting in their remarks, though I am afraid they are not sufficiently aware (which is a little strange, as they come from the Party of such idealistic traditions) of our duty to sustain a number of countries owing to promises given. I followed the noble Lords' arguments, but I think they are not quite sufficiently aware of our duties in this respect and I do not think they realise how important it is, if we are to build up the United Nations, that Britain, in the words of the noble and gallant Viscount, Lord Montgomery of Alamein, should be one of the two Powers which really count in the world East of Suez. Therefore, I think that they would in fact keep our rôle—I will avoid the word "commitment" again if I can—below that which our duty imposes on us; and I would say to the Conservatives that they would in fact impose a rôle—I am not going to accuse the noble Lord, Lord Harlech, of pursuing the ghost of empire —which it is beyond our power to sustain. I am sure the noble Lord would agree that there must be a limit to what we can accomplish. He said 7 per cent. We say it is more than we can afford, but it is a very narrow distinction.
I can only say that this is the most thorough review of the defences of this country which has ever been conducted at any time in our history. I do not think anybody will challenge that. I will repeat that statement because I am not sure that noble Lords took it in: this is the most thorough review of the defences of this country which has ever
1190
been conducted. I am sure each of those nine Conservative Ministers would in turn have conducted an equally thorough review if he had been spared, but there was not time. No one can claim that this review has been conducted in an atmosphere of Party politics. The best official advice in the world has been mobilised and this tremendous review has taken place.
I have sat through it; I have had a front seat in the stalls—I would not claim a higher position than that—and I would make one point of a personal character in concluding. I will not go into the question of Aden because in my opinion the noble Lord, Lord Beswick, dealt with that so thoroughly and clearly that it is beyond controversy. I will only say this. I became Colonial Secretary before the decision was finally taken, but when it seemed likely to be taken, that we would act in the way we have done. I was perfectly clear that it was quite monstrous to remain in Aden if all the best defence advice was opposed to the idea that there was any value in staying there.
But I would add the further point and say, particularly to the noble Lord, Lord Carrington—the noble Lord, Lord Beswick, said it and the noble Lord, Lord Harlech, raised the issue and I must answer them—that I think it would have been wicked to conceal from the Ministers in Arabia the fact that we intended to leave the base. That was an issue which came very close to me. I saw these Ministers in London when I knew we were likely to leave the base, and it would have been a betrayal almost without parallel in British history, a real act of the greatest deceit and hypocrisy, if we had gone on talking to them about the future of their Constitution and keeping this a secret in the cupboard. So I am afraid I entirely refute the suggestion that if we were going we could have chosen a later date to inform them and inform the world. If I misjudged the noble Lord I withdraw my remark, but I must make the point very clearly.
I would, in conclusion, say this. I suppose that when I first sat in on these discussions a year ago I was very doubtful whether the world-wide rôle, with all this expenditure, was compatible with the kind of international aspirations which I

1191
had shared so long with so many in my own Party and outside my own Party. But I have come to the conclusion personally (and I speak for myself, but noble Lords will see that I have some right to offer my opinion here) that if in this phase we are going to make our maximum contribution towards the establishment of a permanent peace-making machinery—in other words, towards the World Government which alone offers any prospect of peace for long—then it was necessary to embark on the worldwide rôle. So I cannot accept, I am afraid, the view of the noble Lord, Lord Rea. But, having accepted that proposition, I am perfectly happy to believe, according to all the expert opinion I have listened to, that we shall be able to honour the obligations we are assuming.
Finally, I would say that this House, which is going into the Division Lobby now, will be going through ritual motions, but I cannot myself believe that after hearing the noble and gallant Viscount, Lord Montgomery of Alamein, any dispassionate person will come here and say that noble Lords opposite have any justification. We have not been told their policy. Would they really keep the carriers going? Would they really build one at an extra cost of £500 million to
1975, and at a cost of very much larger sums from 1975 to 1985. Would they really keep the Territorial Army at its former size, and would they really incur all these foreign exchange costs in Aden to the tune of £150 million from 1968 to 1975? We have listened to them and have enjoyed their speeches, but we are still completely in the dark.
They have been told they must vote against the Government, and so they will do that. The noble Lord, Lord Rea, has not told us how he would de-negotiate these agreements and escape from these commitments without dishonour. As we move to the Division and bring this memorable Parliament to an end in the House of Lords, I can only say we are satisfied that in years to come this will be seen as a turning point, not simply because for the first time it is a defence policy which makes military sense but because it is a defence policy which clearly leads on to the better world which all of us, in all Parties, equally desire in our hearts.
7.8 p.m.
On Question, Whether the Amendment to the Amendment shall be agreed to?
Their Lordships divided: Contents, 15; Not-Contents, 109.

CONTENTS

Airedale, L.

Carnock, L.

Ogmore, L.

Amherst, E.

Henley, L.

Rea, L.

Amulree, L.[Teller.]

Iddesleigh, E.

Stamp, L.

Barrington, V.

Mottistone, L.

Terrington, L.

Byers, L.

Moynihan, L.

Wade, L.[Teller.]

NOT-CONTENTS

Aberdeen and Temair, M.

Colville of Culross, V.

Ferrier, L.

Ailsa, M.

Conesford, L.

Foley, L.

Ailwyn, L.

Courtown, E.

Forster of Harraby, L.

Albemarle, E.

Coutanche, L.

Fortescue, E.

Aldington, L.

Crathorne, L.

Furness, V.

Allerton, L.

Cromartie, E.

Goschen, V. [Teller.]

Ampthill, L.

Cullen of Ashbourne, L.

Greenway, L.

Atholl, D.

Daventry, V.

Grenfell, L.

Auckland, L.

Denham, L.

Hailes, L.

Audley, Bs.

Derwent, L.

Harlech, L.

Balerno, L.

Dilhorne, V.

Hawke, L.

Barnard, L.

Drumalbyn, L.

Howe, E.

Bessborough, E.

Dudley, L.

Hylton, L.

Birdwood, L.

Eccles, V.

Ilford, L.

Blackford, L.

Effingham, E.

Inglewood, L.

Boothby, L.

Egremont, L.

King-Hall, L.

Boston, L.

Elliot of Harwood, Bs.

Kinnoull, E.

Bourne, L.

Emmet of Amberley, Bs.

Limerick, E.

Boyd of Merton, V.

Erroll of Hale, L.

Lindsey and Abingdon, E.

Brecon, L.

Exeter, M.

Long, V.

Carrington, L.

Falkland, V.

Lothian, M.

Cholmondeley, M.

Ferrers, E.

MacAndrew, L.

McCorquodale of Newton, L.

Polwarth, L.

Sinclair of Cleeve, L.

Malmesbury, E.

Rathcavan, L.

Somers, L.

Mancroft, L.

Remnant, L.

Strange, L.

Margadale, L.

Rockley, L.

Strange of Knokin, Bs.

Massereene and Ferrard, V.

Rothes, E.

Strathcarron, L.

Merrivale, L.

Russell of Liverpool, L.

Strathclyde, L.

Mersey, V.

Sackville, L.

Swansea, L.

Milverton, L.

St. Aldwyn, E. [Teller.]

Teynham, L.

Monk Bretton, L.

St. Helens, L.

Thurlow, L.

Monsell, V.

St. Just, L.

Wakefield of Kendal, L.

Montgomery of Alamein, V.

Salisbury, M.

Windlesham, L.

Mowbray and Stourton, L.

Savile, L.

Wolverton, L.

Newall, L.

Selkirk, E.

Woolton, E.

Newton, L.

Sherfield, L.

Ypres, E.

Oakshott, L.

Resolved in the negative, and Amendment to the Amendment disagreed to accordingly.
7.18 p.m.
On Question, Whether the Amendment shall be agreed to?
Their Lordships divided: Contents 107; Not-Contents 55.

CONTENTS

Aberdeen and Temair, M.

Effingham, E.

Mersey, V.

Ailsa, M.

Egremont, L

Milverton, L.

Ailwyn, L.

Elliot of Harwood, Bs.

Monk Bretton, L.

Albemarle, E.

Emmet of Amberley, Bs.

Monsell, V.

Aldington, L.

Erroll of Hale, L.

Mowbray and Stourton, L.

Allerton, L.

Exeter, M.

Newall, L.

Ampthill, L.

Falkland, V.

Newton, L.

Atholl, D.

Ferrers, E.

Oakshott, L.

Auckland, L.

Ferrier, L.

Polwarth, L.

Audley, Bs.

Foley, L.

Rathcavan, L.

Balerno, L.

Forster of Harraby, L.

Remnant, L.

Barnard, L.

Fortescue. E.

Rockley, L.

Bessborough, E.

Furness, V.

Rothes, E.

Birdwood, L.

Goschen, V. [Teller.]

Russell of Liverpool, L.

Blackford, L.

Greenway, L.

Sackville, L.

Boston, L.

Grenfell, L.

St. Aldwyn, E. [Teller.]

Bourne, L.

Hailes, L.

St. Helens, L.

Boyd of Merton, V.

Harlech, L.

St. Just, L.

Brecon, L.

Hawke, L.

Salisbury, M.

Carrington, L.

Howe, E.

Savile, L.

Clwyd, L.

Hylton, L.

Selkirk, E.

Colville of Culross, V.

Ilford, L.

Sherfield, L.

Conesford, L.

Inglewood, L.

Sinclair of Cleeve, L.

Cottesloe, L.

Kinnoull, E.

Somers, L.

Courtown, E.

Limerick, E.

Strange, L.

Coutanche, L.

Lindsey and Abingdon, E.

Strange of Knokin, Bs.

Crathorne, L.

Long, V.

Strathcarron, L.

Cromartie, E.

Lothian, M.

Strathclyde, L.

Cullen of Ashbourne, L.

MacAndrew, L.

Swansea, L.

Daventry, V.

McCorquodale of Newton, L.

Teynham, L.

Denham, L.

Malmesbury, E.

Thurlow, L.

Derwent, L.

Mancroft, L.

Wakefield of Kendal, L.

Dilhorne, V.

Margadale, L.

Windlesham, L.

Drurnalbyn, L.

Massereene and Ferrard, V.

Wolverton, L.

Dudley, L.

Melchett, L.

Woolton, E.

Eccles, V.

Merrivale, L.

NOT-CONTENTS

Archibald, L.

Citrine, L.

Iddesleigh, E.

Arwyn, L.

Cohen of Brighton, L.

Kilbracken, L.

Attlee, E.

Collison, L

King-Hall, L.

Beswick, L.

Gaitskell, Bs.

Latham, L.

Blyton, L.

Gifford, L.

Leatherland, L.

Boothby, L.

Granville-West, L.

Lindgren, L.

Bowles, L. [Teller.]

Haire of Whiteabbey, L.

Listowel, E.

Burden, L.

Hall, V.

Lloyd of Hampstead, L.

Burton of Coventry, Bs.

Henderson, L.

Longford, E.

Champion, L.

Hilton of Upton, L.

Mitchison, L.

Chorley, L.

Hughes, L.

Morris of Kenwood, L.

Morrison, L.

Shackleton, L.

Strabolgi, L.

Peddie, L.

Shepherd, L.

Taylor, L.

Phillips, Bs. [Teller.]

Silkin, L.

Walston, L.

Piercy, L.

Snow, L.

Wells-Pestell, L.

Plummer, Bs.

Sorensen, L.

Williamson, L.

Royle, L.

Southwark, L.Bp.

Winterbottom, L.

Sainsbury, L.

Stonham, L.

Ypres, E.

St. Davids, V.

On Question, Motion, as amended, agreed to.

Resolved in the affirmative, and Amendment agreed to accordingly.
On Question, Whether the Motion, as amended, shall be agreed to?
LORD SHACKLETON: My Lords, in exercising my right of reply, I shall not detain the House beyond thanking noble Lords who have taken part in this debate, and expressing my regret that noble Lords on that side of the House did not take the advice of the noble and gallant Viscount. It is not to the credit of the House of Lords that, on the eve of an Election, a matter of such seriousness should be treated in this way.
SEVERAL NOBLE LORDS: Order, Order!
LORD SHACKLETON: If noble Lords think that this will do them any good on March 31, they are much mistaken.

GIBRALTAR
7.31 p.m.
LORD MERRIVALE LORD MERRIVALE rose to ask Her Majesty's Government whether they will bear in mind the strong tics that have existed between Gibraltar and this country since 1704; whether they will seek to obtain the lifting of the restrictions on the frontier before the beginning of the negotiations with the Spanish Government; and finally what support and assistance is proposed for the future economic development of Gibraltar. The noble Lord said: My Lords, we now turn from the consideration of the Defence White Paper to the defence of Gibraltar from an economic blockade. I am conscious of the fact that next month there are to be negotiations with Spain on the question of Gibraltar, but abnormal restrictions over the last sixteen months have existed on the frontier of Gibraltar. That is why I think it is right that I should bring certain facts to the attention of your Lordships.
It would seem that the Spanish Government, anxious for reasons of national prestige to take any opportunity of recovering Gibraltar, saw and took the opportunity of invoking the 1713 Treaty of Utrecht within the Committee of 24, when this special committee was set up under the United Nations General Assembly Resolution passed in December, 1960, and November, 1961, which affirmed that:
"All peoples have a right to self-determination".
At this point, I think it right to put a few words of Mr. Alisa, the representative of Iraq, when speaking before the Committee of 24 on October 6, 1964. He said:
"They …"—
the Gibraltarians—
" … exist as surely as the populations of many other places in the world, to whom there has been no suggestion that self-determination should be denied simply because they have been migrant people over the centuries in an area which they now call home. Through the very fact of their existence these people have rights as people."
Discussions were started on Gibraltar, which was considered as a colonial case, on September 11, 1963. On April 10, 1964, following a Constitutional Conference in Gibraltar, it was announced there that a Council of Ministers would be set up and that changes were to be made in the Executive and Legislative Councils. Therefore I think it is interesting to note the remarks which Senor de Pinies, the representative of Spain, made before the Committee of 24 on September 24 of that same year. If I may, I will quote his words. He said:
" As the sine qua non condition for any possible contact between our country and the new political entity in Gibraltar, there would have to be a complete withdrawal of the British presence on the Rock, since the self-determination of Gibraltar would presuppose for my country a cancellation or abrogation of all the obligations of Spain towards Great Britain. If this withdrawal of British presence on the Rock were not to occur, then I take it that this new Gibraltarian entity would be no more than a trick to maintain and perpetuate a Colonial situation there. The means of communication between Spain and Gibraltar would,

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of course, be broken for the 17,985 agents of this manœuvre we have denounced, and they would be considered persona non grata in Spanish territory."
In view of such a statement, I sincerely hope that there are no grounds whatsoever for the first few remarks contained in the leader article of last Sunday's Sunday Express.
If I may now refer to these 17,985 agents mentioned by Senor de Pinies, elsewhere referred to as "these 17,985 psuedo-Gibraltarians", I would add that after Gibraltar was captured in 1704 by an Anglo-Dutch force, under the command of Admiral Sir George Rooke, only about 100 persons remained in Gibraltar. By 1826 there were 15,480 civilians, predominantly of Genoese extraction; the next two largest elements, apart from British, being Portuguese, and Spanish from Minorca on account of its former connections with Britain. In 1940, 16,700 men over 45, women and children were evacuated to this country from Gibraltar, and by 1951 repatriation was complete for all those Gibraltarians who had homes to go back to. Since then the Gibraltarian population has remained around 24,000 or 25,000, and not 17,985.
What struck me so forcibly, when I was in Gibraltar last January, with such a fusion of peoples where Spanish is perhaps more readily spoken than English, was the universal desire for a close association with Britain, with its traditions and its institutions. One is very struck, too, by the strong links and ties between Gibraltar and this country which have existed for over 260 years, and still persist—as shown, for example, by relics that can be found in the museum. I would mention, for instance, the relics of the great siege of 1779–1783, under the Governorship of Sir George Elliott (later to become Lord Heathfield), which is one of the finest pages of British military history; the inscriptions on the gravestones in the Trafalgar cemetery; the R.A.O.C. plaque to the effect that "Ordnance" had served there continuously from 1704 to 1963; and, also, the Gibraltarians' admiration for the principles of British law and justice, and their appreciation of the British way of life and purpose. In a lighter vein, Gibraltar now even has its "Bull and Bush" pub.
My Lords, it is interesting to note that it was approximately 150 years ago that the concept came into being of a Gibraltarian population, as distinct from immigrants living in Gibraltar. In 1830, Gibraltar became a Crown Colony, with a new Charter of Justice and the grant of civil liberties, and it was in 1950, still as a Crown Colony, that Gibraltar was granted its first Constitution, with legislative powers from then on vested in the Legislative Council, the Executive Council (which is now known as the Gibraltar Council) having been first set up in 1922. So I think it is very true to say that the Gibraltarian has a deep-rooted loyalty to the British Crown, and he also has a strong desire to remain British. As the leaders of the two political Parties (now united in a Coalition Government) said in a joint communiqué issued in July, 1964—and I quote:
"Their common objectives were to strengthen Gibraltar's links with Britain and to preserve the fundamental freedoms and standard of living".
Again, my Lords, only a few days ago they stated—and I quote:
" We are sure that, in the crucial period which may lie ahead, we shall, as on past occasions, speak with one voice in our fervent desire to maintain our way of life and to strengthen our links with Britain ".
I would add, though, that the Gibraltarians naturally have a keen desire to have good neighbourly relations with the Spanish people.
On December 20 last, in a speech delivered before the Plenary Assembly of the Cortes, Senor Castiella, the Spanish Foreign Minister, went on to say that the Treaty of Utrecht had outlived its day. On November 15 last, Mr. de Pinies, the Spanish representative, stated before the 4th Commission of the 20th General Assembly of the United Nations that Gibraltar's situation
"still remains that of a British colony in Spain";
whilst on September 22, 1964, the Mayor of San Roque, Mr. Pedro Hidalgo, referred before the Committee of 24 to the "loyal city of Gibraltar." Loyal, yes, my Lords—but to this country, and not to Spain.
An article in The Times on March 2, in a report from Madrid under the heading "Gibraltar talks welcomed", stated that the Spanish newspaper, in brief comments, noted that Britain had neither

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insisted on the suspension of Spain's frontier blockade nor referred to Gibraltar's sovereignty as conditions for the talks. Might I add, my Lords, that since the imposition of the blockade British subjects have, at short notice, had to move out of the Campo area in Spain into poor emergency hutments—they are temporary accommodation, I agree—in order to continue to work in Gibraltar. The Spanish authorities have also denied the validity of certain British passports on the flimsy grounds that they bore a certain endorsement or the title of a particular office; and it looks as if we may be going into these talks without even requesting the lifting of the frontier restrictions.
Also on March 2 of this year, the Daily Telegraph, in an article under the heading, "Two flags plan for Gibraltar", reports from Madrid as follows—and I quote:
" Spain may propose at the forthcoming Gibraltar negotiations that while her sovereignty over the Rock should be conceded. the base, with its air, naval and military establishments should be "leased" for an indefinite period to Britain, it was learnt to-day."
Further on, the article goes on to say:
" The status of the base would be similar to the American bases in Spain which are legally under joint Spanish and American sovereignty."
May I mention here that it was as recently as July 27, 1964, by an Order in Council, that the present Constitution for Gibraltar came into being: and, as a result of the "Consensus" of October 16, 1964, of the Committee of 24, a series of restrictive measures against Gibraltar have been initiated since then by the Spanish authorities. These restrictions and delays at the frontier have seriously affected traffic movement and trading activities. The import figures for 1965 show a decrease of 40 per cent. over 1964. The cost of living rose 12 points during the last quarter of 1965. There has been an 80 per cent. decrease in trade for the local tobacco industry, which produced tobacco and cigarettes primarily for the Spanish workers. They are now prohibited by the Spanish authorities from taking into Spain any purchases whatsoever. In the past, these purchases amounted to approximately £10,000 per week.
Hotels received numerous cancellations last summer. Restaurants have suffered
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a 50 per cent. decrease in receipts. The sale of petrol and oils has decreased by 40 per cent. Servicing and repairs by garages have decreased by 90 per cent. Self-drive car-hire firms have virtually ceased operation. Traffic to Gibraltar from Morocco by car-ferry has strongly declined. A large number of British residents in Southern Spain used regularly to drive into Gibraltar to buy substantial amounts of food, tobacco and spirits: this is now prohibited. The number of cars crossing the frontier decreased from 105,118 in 1964 to 7,182 in 1965. In 1964, my Lords, there were 1,526 coaches: in 1965, no coaches crossed the frontier. Due to the decrease in air passengers in transit, four weekly flights between London and Gibraltar have been withdrawn.
Since last January there has been a complete embargo on all exports from Gibraltar to Spain by tourists. Previously, tourists could take into Spain articles purchased in Gibraltar, with the option of paying high rates of duty. Also since last January, Spanish workers have been prohibited by the Spanish authorities from crossing the frontier on their motor-bicycles or bicycles. The reason given locally was the avoidance of traffic congestion. The reason given over the Spanish radio, and by the Spanish information services, was that the Gibraltar authorities had in mind the imposition of taxes on these vehicles. My Lords, nothing could have been further from the truth.
I understand that Spanish trade unions have been endėavouring—with some success, I am advised—to convince Spanish workers in Gibraltar to "go slow"; and, according to figures I have seen, productivity by these Spanish workers has decreased by 10 per cent. No new permits have been issued to these workers by the Spanish authorities since 1954, and these permits are withdrawn at the slightest provocation. I would add, finally, that the Spanish authorities have a "black list" of Gibraltarians who are prohibited from entering into Spain—and I do not mean criminals.
My Lords, I trust that I have painted a fair and true picture of the difficult situation in which the residents of Gibraltar now find themselves. I think one should realise that the strain of this

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blockade, and of being permanently restricted to an area of only two and a quarter square miles, is indeed severe. Therefore we must take their plight to our hearts and see what can be done; in other words, we must not let them down.
What assistance or support are Her Majesty's Government prepared to give? First of all, I would humbly urge them to request that the Spanish authorities lift the restriction on the frontier before the negotiations are entered into, with a view to creating a propitious climate for the holding of these talks, having regard to the consensus of the Committee of 24 which specifically stated that the interests of the people of the territory should be borne in mind during the negotiations; and in view, too, of Her Majesty's Government's recognition in the White Paper that constitutional developments in Gibraltar could be a matter for discussion.
In his speech on December 20 last, the Spanish Foreign Minister, Senor Castiella, went on to say:
" Apart from my country's interests and the unswerving defence of them, there will always remain inside me a friend of England who is bound to think of the future rather than of the past."
Later, in the same speech, he said:
" Firmness and friendship; that is the spirit in which we must face tomorrow."
May Her Majesty's Government also be firm and friendly! If these negotiations are to commence in a mutually friendly spirit, with the hope of ending in a satisfactory negotiated solution, is it too much to ask that the frontier restrictions be lifted now?
Secondly, from an economic point of view, I think it is generally recognised that the development of tourism can make a large contribution towards improvement in the economy of Gibraltar. It has a good climate, good hotels, attractive gardens, good shops, an up-to-date casino, a cable-car, a marina which is developing as a full-scale yacht port, pleasant beaches, and easy access to North Africa. And the English language is spoken, and British currency is used. Finally, a low return air fare from London is available. I think that a further development, and a desirable one, would be more flats and houses attractive to retired persons who might wish to settle there and end their days in Gibraltar. I understand that that
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is the desire and wish of His Excellency the Governor, among other persons.
Can the noble Lord, Lord Walston, say whether the Ministry of Defence are shortly to relinquish some of the land that could be made available for such projects as the building of attractive houses and more flats for these retired people? But such schemes cost money, and I imagine that they will be the subject of discussion between Her Majesty's Government and Sir Joshua Hassan and Mr. Peter Isola who are coming to this country shortly.
Assistance is certainly needed from Her Majesty's Government with regard to the promotion of tourism in Gibraltar. The amount that the Government of Gibraltar have been able to allocate for that purpose in this country is around £6,000. This is a very small amount. I was wondering whether Her Majesty's Government could give assistance in that direction. In this context, I was glad to see last Sunday a full-page advertisement in the Sunday Times by B.E.A. for a Silver Wing holiday in Gibraltar. The Rock can also be a good stepping-stone to Morocco; for, according to Command Paper No. 2866, Gibraltar Airways is now authorised to operate not only to Tangiers but also on to Casablanca. And, in view of the increasing trade between Gibraltar and Portugal since this economic blockade has been set up by Spain, would it not be desirable for Her Majesty's Government and B.E.A. to give further consideration to the request made last year by the board of directors of the Gibraltar Chamber of Commerce for B.E.A. to introduce a London-Lisbon-Gibraltar air service?
With regard to shipping and the use of the port, it is indeed encouraging to learn that last year there was an increase in the number of cruise liners calling at Gibraltar. However, I feel it might be possible for Her Majesty's Government, and in particular the Admiralty, to give consideration to the question of high Admiralty charges for the use of certain facilities at the port by merchant shipping. I have in mind rental for storage tanks, the supply of oil, tug services, wharfage dues, dry dock facilities, and so on.
I would conclude by hoping sincerely that the noble Lord, Lord Walston, may be able to give sympathetic consideration to the points I have raised this evening,

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and that he will be able to allay some of the fears in the minds of every Gibraltarian this day—for on Monday, February 28 last, each one of them was, morally, dealt a severe blow.
7.58 p.m.
THE PARLIAMENTARY UNDERSECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (LORD WALSTON): My Lords, I hope I shall be able to do what the noble Lord, Lord Merrivale, has asked me to do: that is, to allay the fears and uncertainties of the people of Gibraltar. I can assure him that I have the greatest sympathy for them in their present predicament. He, himself, drew a very graphic picture of the decline in their economy over the last eighteen months, or a little less; and he also pointed out—and I am glad that he did so—that it is not only the people of Gibraltar who are suffering; it is also the people of Spain who live nearby who derive a large part of their sustenance from the work they can do in Gibraltar.
It was very largely for those reasons that Her Majesty's Government, when this matter was raised in the Fourth Committee of the United Nations last autumn and again in the General Assembly on December 16 last year, supported the Resolution which invited the Governments of Spain and the United Kingdom to begin without delay the talks envisaged under the terms of the consensus adopted on October 16, 1964. The noble Lord will remember that in that consensus it was specifically stated that talks should take place between the United Kingdom and Spain, bearing in mind the interests of the population of the territory. We therefore thought that, in spite of the continuance of the various restrictions to which the noble Lord has referred, it was undoubtedly in the interests of those people (whose interests the noble Lord and I both have at heart), the people of Gibraltar, that these talks should be entered into.
I am quite sure that the noble Lord will not expect me, in view of the fact that these talks are to take place some time during the next month, in any way to anticipate what may be said there, or what may be decided there or to say anything which could in any way jeopardise the success of those talks. What I can say to
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the noble Lord, very clearly, is that, as regards the question of sovereignty, we have no doubt of our right to sovereignty over Gibraltar. But we have never sought to make acceptance of our view a precondition to the holding of talks in compliance with the United Nations Resolution. I hope that will to some extent allay some of the anxieties which have been expressed.
I wish to go on to deal with what, perhaps, is the more urgent matter: the economic plight of Gibraltar, whether the talks (as I sincerely hope they will) succeed or whether (which is always possible though I hope it is a remote possibility) they fail. We have already taken considerable steps to help the Gibraltarians in their present situation. In 1965 there was a special grant of £100,000 approved as a form of budgetary aid, as a contribution towards the general increase in expenditure in 1965 resulting from the Spanish frontier measures. But further, and more important than that, is the question of development aid, because it is no good just putting in a small amount of money here and there. What we want is to have a far more comprehensive economic development plan.
In order to bring that about, my right honourable friend, the then Minister for Overseas Development, announced an allocation of £1 million from Colonial Development and Welfare Funds to cover the period from April, 1965, to March, 1968, a three-year period; and this rate of assistance is 2½ times as great as in the previous three years. In addition, £200,000 of Exchequer loans would be available during the same period, if required. So there is a very substantial amount of money, taking into account the relatively small population of Gibraltar, which has been made available for the economic development of the Colony. But I think we all agree that money is not enough: you must have wise plans as to how that money should be spent.
In order to bring this about, the Gibraltar Government commissioned a study group of experts, most of the cost of which was met by the Ministry of Overseas Development under the technical assistance arrangements, to examine development needs and prospects. The

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Gibraltar Government, who are the responsible body for this, have already received a summary of this study group's proposals. They have been studying them and will doubtless themselves make their own decisions about how many of these proposals they will adopt; and then they will, naturally, come and discuss with the British Government the financing of them out of the sums of money which I have already mentioned.
The Ministry of Overseas Development also paid the expenses of a team from the Commonwealth Development Corporation which went out last year to report to the Gibraltar Government on the possibility of setting up a Gibraltar Development Corporation. This report also is being studied by the Gibraltar Government. So I hope that the noble Lord will accept from me (and I am sure that the people of Gibraltar will accept; indeed they know it already) that we are helping them not simply with words but with the actual cash needed for development and with actual experience and manpower to prepare the plans for their development.
My Lords, with regard to the specific questions which have been raised by the noble Lord, so far as British European Airways' services are concerned, this is not a matter for Her Majesty's Government. British European Airways is an independent Corporation, and it is for the Corporation to fly where it considers its duties and its financial profit is likely to take it. But I am quite sure that the Corporation will pay attention to the views of the noble Lord on this matter, and I hope that they will be considered very sympathetically.
Regarding tourism, the Government of Gibraltar are very well aware of these possibilities, and my information is that the total amount allocated to tourist promotion by the Gibraltar Government this year amounted to £45,000, of which £22,000 is allocated to advertising and publicity.
LORD MERRIVALE: My Lords, is that in Great Britain or in Gibraltar?
LORD WALSTON: My Lords, we are speaking of the Gibraltar Government. Where they spend it, of course, is up
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to them. I am sure that they spend a good deal of it in Great Britain, but they may feel it wise to spend a certain amount in other countries, in order to bring not only British people, but others, to Gibraltar. That is for them to decide, and it is not for us to tell them what to do. But certainly they are very much aware of the matter, and are doing their best to encourage tourism. I have no doubt that the experts who have been studying the development possibilities of Gibraltar will put forward very well-thought-out proposals about how to develop this great asset of the Colony. I also have no doubt that some of the money which we are making available will be used in this way.
The noble Lord asked about making land available for houses for retired people. I hope he did not get the impression that I was in any way scornful of this idea. I am sure that to retire to Gibraltar would be, for many people, a most delightful way to spend their declining years, particularly if attractive and pleasant houses could be made available for them at reasonable cost. The Ministry of Defence is co-operating in this to the best of its ability. It has in fact been relinquishing land in the Colony and in the town itself, but, of course, it will not be in a position to give up all its property in the town for several years to come.
There has, I believe, been a suggestion that land on the Upper Rock, most of which is Ministry of Defence property, may be used for building houses, particularly with the object, which the noble Lord has in mind, of providing accommodation for retired people. The Ministry of Deterice has informed the Gibraltar Government that they can have this land whenever it is required. It is therefore available for them. At present the Gibraltar Government are not in a position to take it over, but I understand that they intend to do so before long. Of course, the whole implementation of this plan depends in a very large measure on the general development plan, and the same will go for the maritime suggestions which the noble Lord put forward.
I think I need say no more than to assure the noble Lord once more of our

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intention to assist Gibraltar in every way we can, and to indicate that we can do it in many important ways, whatever the outcome of these talks may be. I would also assure him that our objectives in holding these talks are motivated, on the one hand, by our desire for friendship—and continuing friendship—with Spain, with whom we have had many long years of close association. Spain is one of the great and old countries of Europe, with a long tradition of civilisation, which makes me confident that these talks will have a successful outcome. On the other hand, we desire and intend to honour our own obligations to Gibraltar and to ensure the economic welfare, and the welfare in the widest sense, of the Gibraltarians themselves. I hope that when these talks are held both sides will have those objectives in view, and that the outcome will be one which does honour and credit to the traditions and civilisation behind all of us involved in them.

KENT QUARTER SESSIONS BILL [H.L.]
Reported, with Amendments.
MERSEY DOCKS AND HARBOUR BOARD BILL [H.L.]
The Queen's Consent signified, and Bill reported, with Amendments.
COVENT GARDEN MARKET BILL
Returned from the Commons with the Amendments agreed to.