Lords Sitting of 29 June 1966

Preamble
The House met at eleven of the clock, The LORD CHANCELLOR on the Woolsack.
Prayers—Read by the Lord Bishop of Chichester

WESTMINSTER ABBEY ANNIVERSARY SERVICE
THE MINISTER WITHOUT PORTFOLIO (LORD CHAMPION): My Lords, I beg to move that the House do now adjourn for the purpose of attending the Service for Parliament in Westminster Abbey.
Moved accordingly, and, on Question, Motion agreed to, nemine dissentiente:
Whereupon the House adjourned, for the Members, Officers and Staff of the House to attend the Service commemorating. the 900th Anniversary Year of Westminster Abbey.
The House resumed at two o'clock.

LORD POPPLEWELL
Ernest Popplewell, Esquire, C.B.E., having been created Baron Popplewell, of Sherburn-in-Elmet in the West Riding of the County of York, for life—Was, in his robes, introduced between the Lord Henderson and the Lord Champion.

LORD MAELOR
Thomas William Jones, Esquire, having been created Baron Maelor, of Rhosllanerchrugog in the County of Denbigh, for life—Was, in his robes, introduced between the Lord Granville-West and the Lord Champion.
The Viscount Caldecote—Took the Oath.

THE CHANNEL TUNNEL
2.20 p.m.
VISCOUNT HALL: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
[The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government whether the Joint Committee of Surveillance of the English Channel Tunnel has recently been consulted; and, if so, what decisions have been taken towards speeding the urgency of this work.]
LORD CHAMPION: My Lords, the Commission of Surveillance is an Anglo-French committee of experts set up by the two Governments to advise on the recent geological survey for the Channel Tunnel. They are at present assessing the first results of the survey, and although final conclusions cannot yet be drawn, it seems that the technical feasibility of the project has been confirmed. British and French officials are also drafting a report to both Governments on the problem of organisation and finance, and this should be available soon. The next step is further discussions with the French Government, which we hope will begin shortly. The Channel Tunnel is a joint project, and I cannot anticipate the results of those discussions.
VISCOUNT HALL: My Lords, while I thank my noble friend for his reply, I remain a little concerned about the second half of my Question. Would my noble friend advise me whether the Government are aware of the increasing urgency of reaching a decision in this matter, and also when we might expect a joint statement on the present state of the project?
LORD CHAMPION: My Lords, the answer to the first part of my noble friend's supplementary is that the Government are aware of the need for planning and investment decisions in the light of a clear decision one way or the other on the Tunnel. On the second part, this depends on the progress of further discussions with the French Government, but we hope that such a joint statement will be possible shortly.
LORD PEDDIE: My Lords, might I ask my noble friend whether the development of hovercraft is likely to have any

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influence on the implementation of the plans for the Tunnel?
LORD CHAMPION: The latest studies confirm the 1963 conclusion that the Tunnel would be a sound investment. Cross-Channel traffic has been growing, and is likely to continue to grow, much faster than was expected in 1963; and a Tunnel, a fixed link, will bring a great potential of a new quality of cheap and regular through services, and we do not think that the recent development of the craft to which my noble friend referred will materially alter our consideration in this matter.

FLAMMABLE CLOTHING
2.24 p.m.
BARONESS BURTON OF COVENTRY: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
[The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government what recommendations have so far been made by the Working Party on Flammable Clothing and what action will now be taken to give them effect.]
THE JOINT PARLIAMENTARY UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE, HOME OFFICE (LORD STONHAM): My Lords, the Working Party has recommended that the present exemption of infants' gowns from the requirements of the Children's Nightdresses Regulations 1964 should be partly removed; that in the case of children's nightdresses made from thermoplastic materials, the use of non-melting embroidery and button-hole thread should be permitted above the waist and elbows; and that all adults' nightdresses exceeding 45 inches in length, which do not satisfy a prescribed flammability test, should bear a label warning the customer that such garments are not safe from fire. Regulations will now be prepared giving effect to these recommendations, except that Her Majesty's Government propose that the labelling requirement should apply to all adults' nightdresses coming within the scope of the new controls, regardless of their length. The present exemption of infants' gowns from the Children's Nightdresses Regulations would in future be
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limited to gowns with a chest measurement not exceeding 21 inches.
BARONESS BURTON OF COVENTRY: My Lords, while thanking my noble friend for his Answer, but reserving comment on the specific details, might I ask him whether the Regulations will be laid before Parliament rises for the Summer Recess, and could he give us any indication as to when he would hope they might become law? Might I ask also whether the Home Office has been able to adopt the suggestion I made, that they should sponsor a film giving publicity to these matters?
LORD STONHAM: My Lords, Draft Regulations must first be circulated for comment to all concerned, and they will be made as soon as possible after that. I cannot give a firm date at present, but I should have thought it unlikely that they could be laid before the Summer Recess. The answer to my noble friend's second question is that we have adopted my noble friend's suggestion. A short "filler" film on this subject, for showing on television in breaks between programmes, is now being produced and is expected to be ready in the early autumn. Another film, also in preparation, will deal with the importance of guarding open fires.
BARONESS BURTON OF COVENTRY: My Lords, is my noble friend able to do anything to hasten what seem the interminable preliminaries to getting these Regulations laid? Am I not correct in saying it is five weeks before the House rises, and surely that is time enough for the discussions to take place?
LORD STONHAM: My Lords, the Working Party's recommendations have only just been received by the Government and the decision I have just announced has only just been arrived at. The Draft Regulations have to be framed, and then, as I have said, submitted to interested parties and organisations. I do not think we can do this within a period of five weeks. As my noble friend is aware, I am as anxious as she is to get these Regulations approved, but I cannot hold out any hope that they can be ready before the Summer Recess.
LORD DERWENT: My Lords, the noble Lord says the Regulations have to be circulated to interested parties. May

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we take it, apart from the actual drafting, that all the interested parties have already been consulted?
LORD STONHAM: My Lords, I could not be certain that all the interested parties have in fact been consulted, although most would have been represented on the Working Party. But if the noble Lord followed the first Answer I gave, he will be aware that the Government have not entirely accepted the recommendations of the Working Party. Therefore, it is proper that they should be apprised and given the opportunity of expressing their views on the decisions we have taken.
LORD AUCKLAND: My Lords, in view of the fact that a large number of accidents, including those of last winter, were due to burns, would the noble Lord do all in his power to ensure that these Regulations are put into force as soon as possible? May I also ask him whether a White Paper will be published on the recommendations when they come out, in view of the great public importance of this matter?
LORD STONHAM: My Lords, as the noble Lord also is very well aware, I am most anxious for these Regulations to be laid and to come into operation as soon as possible afterwards. I have already been into this question thoroughly and satisfied myself they cannot be brought out more quickly. With regard to publication of a White Paper, that is something I will consider, although it may be that other forms of publicity, perhaps through the Consumer Council, will be more suitable. We shall do all we possibly can to bring to public notice this menace and the ways of avoiding these fatalities.

TRADE NEGOTIATIONS WITH NEW ZEALAND
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, at a suitable moment after 3.30 p.m. my noble friend Lord Beswick will be making a Statement on the Anglo-New Zealand Trade Talks.
DERBY CHURCHES (SAINT CHRISTOPHER'S, SAINT PETER'S AND SAINT PAUL'S) BILL
Read 2a, and committed to the Committee on Unopposed Bills.
OLDHAM CORPORATION BILL
Read 2a, and committed to the Committee on Unopposed Bills.
THAMES CONSERVANCY BILL
Read 2a, and committed to the Committee on Unopposed Bills.

EUROPE: THE COMMON MARKET
2.30 p.m.
LORD BOOTHBY LORD BOOTHBY rose to call attention to the relations between the United Kingdom and Europe; and to move for Papers. The noble Lord said: My Lords, I have troubled your Lordships on this subject on several occasions in the past, and therefore this afternoon I propose to be as brief as possible and to try not to repeat myself. I am happy to know that the next speaker is to be my noble friend Lord Gladwyn, because his knowledge of this subject is extensive, and I am sure he will make a most convincing speech.
I do not want to go back on the past more than I can possibly help, but Sir Winston Churchill once remarked that the purpose of recrimination about the past was to ensure better action in the future. I think there is something in that. Our great chance to form a United States of Europe under our own leadership was between 1945 and 1950, when I suppose that we, as a nation, had a higher prestige than we had ever had before. We were the saviour of Europe. We could have done anything we liked. They longed for us to take the lead, and we could have had it on our own terms. I do not want to make any Party political point of this, because there was another ten years when we still could have had it, from 1950 to 1960.
So it is not untrue to say, I think, that we had fifteen years when we could have created a United States of Europe on our own terms, and led it. Yet throughout that period we firmly refused to do so. Let us face it: we have missed, for the time being, the European boat. I do not think there is now much point in swimming, because we shall not catch up with it. What we must find is another

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craft, and rather a fast one, to take us out to it. It seems to me that the only people who can find that craft for us are the French, and I think that they may do it.
It would be untrue to say that I hate quoting my own speeches—in fact, I rather enjoy it, because they are so frightfully good. But I must give a brief quotation from a speech which I made eighteen years ago in another place, on May 5, 1948, in which I said:
"It seems to me that the supreme object of our policy should surely be to build a democratic world order so strong that no State or combination of States will dare to challenge it.…Such a democratic world order can only be built up by the creation of a United States of Western Europe, in some form or other, in close association with the British Commonwealth, and with the United States of America upon whose material strength the entire structure must in the first phase depend.…The process must be one of spiritual growth, as well as material progress; and the end must be a series of organic acts of union. I see no other way. The choice that confronts hon. Members…is fundamental. I do not think it is obscure. It is the choice between international anarchy and the rule of law; between the rebirth or the doom of out Western civilisation."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, Commons, Vol. 450, col. 1382]
I think that holds to-day just as much as it did then, and I further think that we still have time. I still hold the view that the only solution of this problem lies in some merging or pooling of national sovereignty, not so much the surrender as the chance to exercise by common consent certain defined sovereign powers which we sought for many years at Strasbourg, and which was resisted by successive British Governments.
I want now to make a brief quotation from the noble and gallant Field Marshal, Lord Montgomery of Alamein. All these quotations are from a very long time ago, and we have done nothing about any of them. But he said, when he was still in NATO:
"The task before the nations of the West is primarily political. Economic fusion and military strength will not be obtained until the political association between the group of nations concerned has first been defined."
It has never been defined; and I am sure that the noble Viscount, not for the first time in his life, was absolutely right. My speech was nearly twenty years ago, and his was ten years ago.
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More recently, about five years ago, President de Gaulle said:
"The nations which are becoming associated"
in Europe
"must not cease to be themselves, and the path to be followed must be that of organised co-operation between States, while waiting to achieve, perhaps, an imposing confederation."
I see nothing to be frightened about in that. Confederation is defined in the dictionary as:
"A permanent union of sovereign States for common external action."
That is precisely what we want.
Now I want to say something that may not be too popular, but I hope that your Lordships will not mind. I think that President de Gaulle is a great man, one of the great men of our time. I think he was enormously underestimated during the war, both by President Roosevelt and by Sir Winston Churchill. I worked indirectly for him, under General Legentilhomme, for three years; and the more I saw of him the more deeply impressed I became. I remember an occasion when he had an angry argument with the Prime Minister, then at the zenith of his power. Sir Winston said to him, "Am I to understand, General, that you are prepared to make no concessions of any kind?" Without a flicker of hesitation, he replied "Prime Minister, at the moment I am too weak to make any concessions of any kind." I saw a flicker of admiration in Sir Winston's eye, as if he were saying to himself "Well, that was a pretty good one "—and it was. President de Gaulle is a most remarkable man. It seems to me that he is now going in the right direction.
Incidentally, I think at this point I may say that the only major row I ever had with Sir Winston was when I obtained the permission of Mr. Speaker in another place—which is rarely given—to move the Adjournment of the House on a definite matter of urgent public importance, on account of the refusal of His Majesty's Government (as it then was) to allow General de Gaulle to land in France after the successful invasion. Sir Winston came down to the House in a towering rage, and for the first time in my life I was really frightened of him. He was extremely angry, and David I Kirkwood came up to me afterwards and

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said "Bob, that man doesn't like you any more". But that was not true. It was de Gaulle he did not like; and Roosevelt liked him even less. I think that de Gaulle is quite magnanimous, because he knew how much they disliked him. What did they not inflict on him?—Giraud, Darlan, and Heaven knows what else! At one point I believe there was an idea that he should be put under house arrest, but the telegram was put in the wastepaper basket by Mr. Harold Macmillan. Anyhow, de Gaulle has got a good deal to feel aggrieved about what he calls the "Anglo-Saxons"; and I really do think that he is pretty magnanimous.
But much more important than the past is the present. Now, it seems to me, he is going in the right direction. As Churchill once said of Lloyd George: he is in the next field but one. First of all, he wants to end the dangerous partition of Germany, and sees how it can ultimately be done: by military disengagement, by seeing that there are no nuclear weapons in Germany in any circumstances, by recognition of the Oder-Neisse frontier, and by a confederation between West and East Germany. If the present dangerous partition of Germany is ever to be ended, that is the way it can be done—and the only way it can be done; and I think that de Gaulle realises it.
Secondly, he has for some years wanted to revise the command structure of NATO, and I believe that he is absolutely right. The Americans have consistently resisted this, forgetting that we are now living in the year 1966 and no longer in the year 1950. Thirdly, he wants to bring about a genuine détente and an expansion of trade between the countries of Eastern and Western Europe. Again he is right. Finally, he deplores—and again I agree with him—the senseless and useless war in Vietnam. The truth is that the Americans are still living in 1950, and a great part of the General—perhaps not the whole of him—is living in 1970, and there is much difference between the two attitudes.
What I am therefore asking for is a resumed dialogue between the United Kingdom and France: no more but no less. It can well begin next week, when the Prime Minister of France visits this
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country. It may also take quite a long time, and the time factor is now of great importance to us because, to begin with, we are at the moment economically very weak. By comparison, we were very strong in 1945–50, and even after that for some years. But to-day our rate of productivity, compared with that of Germany, France and Northern Italy, is quite deplorable. We are in an economic jam, we are in desperate debt, we are living on tick; and, as my old friend "Cassandra" wrote in the Daily Mirror the other day,
"The people of this country are in deep disarray."
I think they are in disarray mainly on account of the fact that, for some extraordinary reason, a large number of them have decided not to work ever again. I have often reached that decision myself and I think it is an admirable one. But you cannot really do it. You have got to box on. The main concern of a lot of people in this country is to do as little work as possible. We all know industry after industry in which three men in this country are doing the job which one man is doing in the United States and Germany, and there is no use blinking that fact.
To go on with, the Commonwealth has now become something of a myth. It is no longer capable of acting as a political or an economic unit. If your Lordships' think these are very radical comments, I would commend your attention to some recent remarks made by Mr. Enoch Powell, who is not notably on the extreme left of the Tory Party. The problem of agriculture and the problem of butter and mutton from New Zealand can easily be solved. I have for a long time been of the opinion that we cannot continue indefinitely to maintain the system of support prices for agriculture in this country. Prices must be raised, at least a little, for the present system is too expensive. I know that that view is shared by Mr. Christopher Soames, the former Minister of Agriculture.
The problem of sterling is more difficult, because the Europeans may insist on setting up a European central bank and making a European currency the reserve currency of the world in addition to the dollar, so that we cannot maintain sterling alone as a reserve currency.

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Having regard to the difficulties we are having at the moment, this might well be another answer to our problems, and increase international liquidity.
Never mind about the economic details: what really matters now is the political solution. And the first thing we should do is to accept, without equivocation, the provisions of the Treaty of Rome. I think it is more important than anything else. It should be a general declaration of intent and, as such, will be understood by the Continent. I beg Her Majesty's Government to bend all their energies to this great task, because I have not the slightest doubt in my mind that the future of this country lies within Europe, and not outside it. I beg to move for Papers.
2.45 p.m.
LORD GLADWYN LORD GLADWYN had given Notice of a Motion "To draw the attention of Her Majesty's Government to the desirability of making it clear that their objective is to enter the European Economic Community and, once having become a member, to work towards the gradual construction of a democratic Political Community where decisions will increasingly be taken in common by qualified majority vote in a Council of Ministers with the advice of a European Parliament and the assistance of an independent European Political Commission, such a Community to become a partner with United States of America within the framework of a sound and developing Western Alliance; and to move for Papers." The noble Lord said: My Lords, I am delighted to follow my old friend Lord Boothby. We have been hunting in couples for a long time, ever since 1921 when he succeeded me as Secretary of the celebrated Canning Club at Oxford. I am also very pleased to follow him when it comes to the subject of France. Nobody could desire more passionately than this ex-Ambassador a good, happy, close relationship with France—the closer the better. Nobody believes more than I do that unless we get some kind of close association there is not much hope for any of us in Western Europe. That is a fact which we should all appreciate.
As regards the character and attributes of that admittedly great man, General de Gaulle, I am not sure that I approve
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of his policies so much and so entirely as it seems my friend Lord Boothby does. My criticisms have been published and are generally known. But I must say that I am passionately looking forward to the moment—and it may not be too far removed: perhaps even next year—when the General, after his spectacular journeys all over the world, makes the shortest, and I think the most significant and most useful visit he could possibly make, which is to London to address the crowd in Trafalgar Square on the day when this country joins the Common Market. I hope and believe that that day may not be too far removed.
The trouble arises when it comes to the possibility, as some people make out—this was alluded to in the Press last Sunday, and elsewhere—of some separate deal between this country and France. It is apparently thought that, having got agreement in principle with France, all would be quite easy, because everybody else would accept it, and that if we two once came together the whole thing would go through, the economic difficulties would all be smoothed out, and that therefore within a few months we could be in the Common Market. I think that that view is optimistic and a little dangerous. You cannot resolve this great European equation solely on the basis of some deal between our two great countries, Britain and France.
It is true that both Britain and France are in a rather special position because, after all, we have both been nations longer than the other nations on the Continent. If we entered the Common Market, we and the French would not have any special position legally, but we should have a certain influence and a certain authority, because both of us have links with the outside world through the facts of history and the fact that we are old nations and have a certain prestige in the world. Both of us also are in the same boat in that we have no longer any empires left; we are, in a sense, much more on our own, and, therefore, despite the fact that we are old and ancient nations, we must adapt ourselves to the needs of the modern world. As I say, once we are in the Common Market, we may well have some special kind of influence, and I hope that we shall. But one thing is

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certain, and that is that the Common Market cannot be run on the basis of the leadership of one State, however ancient and important; namely, France. For the others just will not take it. One sees what happened when the French went back the other day from Luxembourg to Brussels. The other five, in other words, are not going to stand for what is known as a Europe of States, a complete veto on the part of one State, and therefore necessarily hegemony of one of the partners.
Just as that is not possible and not practical politics—and I think it is becoming more and more evident that that is not practical politics—so it will be evident, I think, that you cannot run a thing like this on the basis of a sort of dual hegemony—a kind of Anglo-French accord—where, once the French and British have reached agreement, everything goes through and the Germans have to salute and say, "That is O.K. We will do what you say." Some people think that is practical politics, but I just do not agree. I think it is very important, therefore, before we more nearly approach this great entity on our doorstep, that we should—as I note that the noble and gallant Viscount, Lord Montgomery of Alamein, very properly said not so long ago—define collectively our political objectives. What do we want as a political end if we are successful, perhaps with French support, in coming into the European Economic Community? It is very important to know this. It is a question of principle which one cannot ignore. If you ignore it, you do so at your peril.
The simple point, as I see it, is that if the European Economic Community is to prosper and eventually be a power in the world, it can be only by the application, in some form or other, of the principle, not of nationalism but of supranationalism. That is a point which was admitted by my noble friend Lord Boothby in his speech. (He nods his agreement.) The very broad lines of such a system are given in the Motion which stands in my name on the Order Paper, and I should like to explain very briefly what I and those of your Lordships (whom I thank very much) and, indeed, over 150 Members of the House of Commons of all Parties who signed the declara-
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tion, the text of which your Lordships may have read in some organs of the Press this morning, believe.
We all believe that the acceptance by all concerned of some such concept as that outlined in my Motion is the only way to make genuine progress towards a united Europe. The real point is that, formed on any other basis, the Community will, as I have tried to explain, inevitably be dominated by one Power or another. The French may think that they still have a chance to dominate it, but I do not think there is any chance of that being possible, nor do I believe that any joint hegemony is possible. Unless we come in there is indeed every chance that it will he dominated by Germany, as the French are beginning to realise, unless, of course, it breaks up altogether, when we are all likely, in the long run, to come under the influence of the Soviet Union. If, therefore, we do go in, it must be on the understanding that nobody dominates. And if nobody dominates, what is the only alternative? It means that decisions must be taken increasingly in common, and that is what is meant by the term "supranationalism".
At this stage of the argument, the point is invariably made, when one talks to people, that supranationalism equals federalism, which equals the suppression of the Queen and the reduction of the status of this great Parliament to that of the State Legislature of Idaho. This is, no doubt, the reason why the Government as a whole (in contradistinction, I suspect, to some of its members) is extremely coy when it comes to discussing the probable political consequences of our joining the European Economic Community, and why there is constant allusion—more especially, perhaps, by the Prime Minister—to the absolute necessity of preserving inviolate our foreign policy and our national right to plan our economy, and so on.
These fears are groundless. The Queen will not be abolished if we enter the European Economic Community. Who knows, she might even one day be the Queen Bee of the new Community. Nor will this great Parliament be suppressed; nor its power materially limited. The point is that a British Government duly representing the majority of Parliament will, under the system I have

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described, as your Lordships have read in the Order Paper, be, as it were, in a continuous process of negotiation with its fellow members of the Community, aided by a new and, as I think, admirable device known as the Commission; and by a set of proved procedures designed to result not in the ultimate triumph of the will of one, but in the discovery of the will of all.
It is perfectly true that for such a system to work no member should possess the absolute right of veto. That is inherent in the thesis. In other words, after all the discussions have taken place; after all the conferences have been held between the Commission and the various delegations; after all the meetings between the national delegations and so on, and after the matter has been threshed out, there must in case of absolute necessity be a decision by what is called a qualified majority vote—namely one which might result in any member, including ourselves, finding itself in a minority of one and therefore being over-ruled.
In such an event, most unlikely though it would be if the system functioned in the way it should, and in the way I have tried to describe, the majority decision would just have to be accepted by the member concerned, whether it was France, Germany, Italy or us. And why not? If it really was considered that such acceptance of a majority decision would have absolutely intolerable consequences on this country, then this Sovereign Parliament could, if it so insisted—there is no doubt about that—take the country out of the Community. But, of course, it would not do anything of the kind. The advantages of membership of the Community would, over a period, be so enormous that there would be no question of any member wanting to secede. These things have happened in the past, but that they should happen in the future is almost inconceivable. This is the lesson of the "nationalistic" challenge made by France to the Community in June, 1965, on the question of the agricultural budget. There was what was called a compromise in Luxembourg, but the challenge was effectively withdrawn when France came back to Brussels six months later, in January of the present year.
It is quite true that since the early days of the European movement—and I am sure that my noble friend Lord Boothby will be the first to recognise this—many Europeans have sought to suggest that the transition from nationalism to supra-nationalism can be accomplished only if all concerned agree to form part of a directly elected European Parliament in Strasbourg, on which some kind of Executive would be made to depend. It is only by so doing, say these Europeans, that we can arrive at a really democratic system and avoid some kind of dictatorship of technicians and super-civil servants running the whole show without any real democratic control over them. Therefore, they want to initiate something which from the start would be very like the Constitution of the United States—namely, a directly elected House of Representatives; the equivalent of a sort of Senate, I suppose, formed by the Ministers; and an Executive of technicians or civil servants, presumably, presided over by a President of Europe who had also been elected by direct suffrage.
Such a system would, indeed, reduce this Parliament to the level of the State Legislature of Idaho, and there would be no obvious role in it for the Queen, who, of course, would presumably give place to some kind of elected Governor of England. But it must be recognised that if we entered the Community—and I hope we shall—such a system as this could, under the Treaty of Rome, be instituted only with our consent, and there would not, I suggest, be the faintest possibility of such consent being forthcoming. Even the conceivable arrival of a Front Populaire in Paris, after the departure of the General, which would no doubt be wedded to this idea of direct elections, could not possibly mean that it would be acceptable in point of fact to the French nation. Nor, in practice, would there be any enthusiasm for it, I believe, on the part of any of the other European Governments, no matter what might be said by pressure groups around them. Even direct elections to the Parliament of Europe, I think, would be highly unlikely to be approved by the various national Parliaments when it came to the point. One can imagine the effects on Parliament here if it were accepted.
Of course, there should be a Parliament, as there is now. It might even

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profitably be given, I think, greater powers than it has at present. Why not? And our own Parliamentarians would have an essential role to play in Strasbourg if we came in. But even if this Parliament were chiefly advisory, as I think it would be, there is no reason why the whole system should be thought of as undemocratic. Why should it be? After all, the Commissioners, who are held in such fear by General de Gaulle, would be chosen by the Governments for a period, and only for a period; they could, if necessary, under the Treaty of Rome, be dismissed by a given procedure; and the Ministers themselves would, of course, be chosen by the people. So the set-up simply cannot be said to be undemocratic.
The essential thing, though, on which I think everything else depends, is for those Governments to agree to be bound by a formal system for taking decisions in common, not only in the economic sphere but also, gradually of course, in the spheres of foreign policy and defence. When this happens, my Lords, a sort of mutation will have taken place. Out of a number of things one thing will have emerged. Admittedly, it may take a long time to develop, but this new thing will at least have been born, and that ancient promoter of wars, the nation State, conceived in Europe after the Reformation, nearly 500 years ago, will then have been tamed, not by conquest, as has so far been thought the only way in the troubled history of Europe, but by the exercise of human reason.
As I see it, this is what any Government in this country worthy of its salt ought to be fighting for. It is here, as I see it, that any Government ought to step in and take the lead. It may not hope to succeed immediately, but at least the object will have been clearly fixed, our general policy will have been made clear, as the noble and gallant Field Marshal, Lord Montgomery of Alamein, apparently wishes, and the famous "rôle"for these islands will at last have been discovered. What is more, nothing could be better calculated to promote enthusiasm for our entry into the Community on the Continent of Europe and, my Lords, even in France, where the European idea has many more adherents than now appears so on the surface—manymore adherents, I assure your Lordships.
All the more so, I think, since it could be no longer pretended in France that Britain was not genuinely seeking membership, was remaining an island (as I think was said three years ago), or was in any event not prepared to abide by the Treaty of Rome. In Britain, too, a genuine and widespread enthusiasm for a European policy could be engendered, I am sure, if the essential political objectives—that is to say, the pursuit of peace by a limitation of the absolute power of the nation States—were clearly explained. This is what I hope the Government will one day explain alongside the economic advantages to be obtained by membership of the Economic Community.
My Lords, I have only a few more minutes, but perhaps I can make one or two more points. It is commonly said that this country is allergic to ideas; that in any case it is now wallowing in affluence and is quite unconscious of the hideous dangers which surround it, to which the noble Lord, Lord Boothby, so rightly drew attention; and that it is becoming increasingly parochial and bored with the great affairs of State. It may be so, but I must say I rather doubt it. Those who did any electioneering last March were usually impressed—and I heart his from all Parties—by the number of questions, at least, they heard about Europe. There is certainly a vague feeling that the Commonwealth is finished as a political conception—I repeat, as a political conception—and that we are now therefore very much on our own. I suggest that it needs only an inspired leader to produce a national conviction that really will change the face of international politics and lead us away from our present ridiculous nationalist bickerings and towards genuine co-operation for the construction of a new society in the West of Europe which, once established, will enable the Americans to go back to America and the Russians to Russia, and thus contribute, as nothing else, to world peace, to the reduction of tension and to the solution of all the major political problems of our time.
In a word, I think it is only if Britain joins the Common Market that this great conception, this new conception of the Community, can avoid a slow decline and eventual failure. People talk

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despondently about the collapse of ELDO and the constant danger to the Concord project owing to the strain on the finances of this country and, no doubt, other countries as well. What can you expect if Britain continues to be isolated, and nationalism remains the only foundation for the European Community? ELDO cannot function in practice unless we come into the Community, because at the moment there is no head to it. The thing goes haywire; a lot of people spend money for which there is no particular authority; they go on spending money, and there is nobody to appeal to. If we came into the Community there would be a definite political authority to take the matter in hand and to do it in the way in which it should be done. I repeat, without our coming into Europe ELDO cannot function properly. None of these things can come about in practice; no end to the cold war and the confrontation of the two super-Powers on the Elbe is conceivable; no fruitful partnership with America can form the basis of some new Western Alliance, unless Britain and some other European States sign the Treaty of Rome and agree to abide by its provisions.
For this to happen there must admittedly be some change of heart and, indeed, I think some change of policy in France; but there must also be a firm commitment to the Community idea in Britain. Once this happens; once it is apparent that this country, by a large majority, accepts, not federation, as I have described it, but the idea of taking all major external decisions in common in the Community way; and once octogenarian mutterings to the contrary in another place have been shown to be of no real political account, then it will be evident to all that the entry of Britain into Europe can no longer be delayed, and then—and, I fear, only then—shall we be able to start off on a new path which will lead us out of our present doubts and towards the golden opportunities of the twentieth century.
3.8 p.m.
THE EARL OF DUNDEE: My Lords, your Lordships may perhaps have noticed in The Times of last Thursday that an amiable Japanese gentleman bought four whole pages in the centre of the newspaper, for which he paid between £5,000 and £6,000, in order that he might des-
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cribe at suitable length a plan for creating a Paradise on earth which had occurred to him while he was fishing. I thought this plan was rather more entertaining than the Government's National Plan and not much less likely to be achieved. It included the abolition of unnecessary family obligations, the ending of the war in Vietnam, the separation of young men and women under 21 so as to protect them against the danger of falling in love with each other too soon, and the conversion of all vacant spaces in every city into car parks. It did not, however, include—
LORD BOOTHBY: My Lords, if the noble Earl will forgive my interrupting, it seemed to me an excellent plan.
THE EARL OF DUNDEE: My Lords, it may be better than the Government's National Plan, but it did not include the entry of the United Kingdom into the European Economic Community. I could not help thinking that if only the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, instead of the Japanese fisherman, had bought those four pages in The Times he would not have omitted the Common Market from his earthly Paradise.
LORD GLADWYN: I cannot get your point.
THE EARL OF DUNDEE: Never mind. I do not think he would have left it out. Also he would have had enough space at his disposal to tell us how the affairs of the world in general ought to be arranged at even greater length than he has done in his Motion on the Order Paper. I always support the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, when he condemns the Prime Minister for the reiteration (as many of us think, the unnecessary reiteration) of the Labour Party's five conditions about the Common Market because that may very likely have the effect of making the existing six members of the Community think that we are trying to undermine the principles of the Treaty of Rome so that no negotiations are ever likely to begin. But I think that perhaps the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, must be careful not to make a similar mistake himself; for it seemed to me that all these supplementary points that he has raised in his Motion, and upon which he has elaborated, although they are very interesting, and some of them, no doubt, very good, are not the kind of questions

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which ought to be decided on in advance or made a pre-condition of our entry. They might conceivably have the effect, if we try to use them in that manner, of putting off rather than encouraging collaboration from those with whom we want to negotiate.
But I am much more anxious to agree than to disagree with the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn. When he said that he and the noble Lord, Lord Boothby, always hunt in couples he reminded your Lordships that Lord Boothby had succeeded him as Secretary of the Canning Club at Oxford. I thought he might have gone on to mention that it was I who succeeded Lord Boothby. Now here we all are, speaking one after the other; but as for hunting in couples, I am the only one of the three who has continued to be a Tory—which was, after all, the purpose of the Canning Club.
The noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, referred to the growing support for the Common Market in this country, to the number of people who had signed a declaration. I think he is right: it is true that support in Britain is growing. I know that some of your Lordships—and, indeed, some of our friends in all Parties—do not share the view that I hold: that our entry into Europe would bring immeasurable benefits to humanity and particularly to human freedom from want and from fear in all parts of the world. I know there are some who do not agree with that in particular; but it is the main and basic reason why I am anxious that we should join the Common Market at the earliest possible moment. There have always been some Conservatives (though I think the number is diminishing) who fear that a united Europe, with us in it, might mean the end of the Commonwealth. That feeling was most eloquently expressed by the late Leader of the Labour Party, Hugh Gaitskell, in October, 1962, although he had taken a less unfavourable view not very long before. I think it possible that if he had lived he might have done so again.
The Commonwealth formed the main subject of those long eighteen months of negotiations when the present Leader of our Party, Ted Heath, conducted the talks at Brussels with so much patience, perseverence and courage. For the African,
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Asian and Caribbean members of the Federation he got the most favourable agreements from the other members who were negotiating with him. Indeed, some of them, like Nigeria, have since the negotiations came to an end been trying to make their own terms to get in on their own accord. The tough problems are, of course, always those of the white Commonwealth. To put it in the shortest possible phrase, I would say that the two main points of difficulty were New Zealand butter and Canadian wheat. He did get an agreement on principle on these things, and it is my firm belief that he would have won a final agreement upon them in the course of the next month or two if the negotiations had not been ruthlessly broken off. Therefore, I do not think it is necessary for anyone to claim that the Commonwealth is likely to be let down or abandoned if we try once more to get in. We all know what problems there are; and we know, as the noble Lord, Lord Boothby, said, that they can be solved.
My Lords, I should say that at the moment the two chief difficulties to be overcome are the attitude of the present Government and the attitude of France; and the two things which need to be done are that our own Government should clarify their mind on the subject and that France should have a sincere and genuine desire that we should join. I want, not to criticise the Government, but to help them to move in the right direction in this matter. We have often quizzed the noble Earl, Lord Long ford (whose own ideas on this subject, I think, are fairly satisfactory), because the emphasis with which he spoke was not always similar to the emphasis of the pronouncements made by some of his colleagues. I want to encourage the likelihood that they can all be reconciled, not scold him about the apparent divisions of opinion.
But the truth is this: it would be so much better and it would make our attitude so much clearer to the world if the Labour Party could now agree to drop those five conditions quietly—or, if not quietly, then noisily; but, anyhow, drop them. So far as these five conditions are good—and, of course, they contain a great deal of goodness and sense—they are platitudes; they are generally agreed. If you mean by those five conditions that we ought to try to mitigate the difficulties

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in changing from one agricultural system to another; that we ought to try to make arrangements which will not hurt the Commonwealth; that we ought to try not to tread on the toes of those nations who are sensitive about their sovereignty and so on, then these are all platitudes. They do not need to be said. It is unnecessary to say them. They are merely the grammar of negotiation.
However, if you mean, and they can sometimes be interpreted to mean, that you want to break the principle of the common external tariff or the agricultural policy as laid down by the Treaty of Rome (and they can be interpreted to mean that) then, even though you may not want them to mean that, they may have the effect of preventing those negotiations which you desire to bring about. Therefore, please let us drop them; or please let us try to say as little as we can about them.
THE LORD PRIVY SEAL (THE EARL OF LONGFORD): My Lords, I am sure that the noble Earl is absolutely sincere in this; he wants to be helpful and not critical. But would he make no conditions at all in advance? Would he say to our friends with whom we have to negotiate that we are ready to come in without any conditions at all? Or, if that is not his position, would he indicate the sort of conditions that he himself has in mind?
THE EARL OF DUNDEE: My Lords, it is not necessary to say anything about conditions at all. We simply say that we want to come in. Everybody knows that you cannot come in without any negotiations, and in those negotiations you make conditions. But do not make a parade of it, as if you were a sort of special case, because then you will only excite suspicion that you want to under-mine the Treaty of Rome, even although in reality you may have no such intention.
I know that it may be purely a question of emphasis. I do not know whether any of your Lordships during the Whitsun Recess saw the B.B.C.2 television programme about this. I could not, because I happened to live in a place which does not receive B.B.C.2 television, but the programme lasted for two hours and all the stars performed. George Brown, Ted Heath, Jo Grimond—the whole lot came in. I have a transcript of it here
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and it is well worth reading, even if you did not see the programme. It rather surprised me that Mr. Grimond, the Leader of the Liberal Party, in the course of this television star performance, started off by saying that he did not think we could get in in five years, that it would take more than five years to do it. I thought that a little pessimistic. However, Mr. George Brown hoped we could get in (and it is a good thing, I think, that he said this) before the end of the present Parliament.
There is just one sentence from Mr. Brown's script that I should like to quote to your Lordships on this difficult question of agriculture which has been so much repeated by the Prime Minister, and I think it is possible to reconcile the two things—Mr. Brown's setting and the Prime Minister's setting. Mr. Brown said that we should find it exceedingly difficult to go wholly over in any short space of time to the sort of system which operates in some fields and to which the French are attached—I do not think that anybody will quarrel with that. "But", he said,
"I believe that over a period we could arrange for an assimilation of our system with the Common Market system, high prices and high levy system, and that it would not be impossible to make arrangements."
I wish that the Prime Minister would say that, too, and that the Government would co-ordinate their manner of expression so as not to make it thought that we want to come in without accepting the agricultural policy which has now been agreed on by the Six.
In our debate a week ago my noble friend Lord Nugent of Guildford, in a very admirable maiden speech, pressed the Government to agree that they should change our agricultural policy to a levy subsidy system, because that would obviously make negotiations easier, and would save a vast amount of time when we came to discuss these matters with the Six. The reply of the noble Lord, Lord Champion (I think it was probably about as far as he would be permitted to go), was
"…I can say to the noble Lord, Lord Nugent of Guildford…that these points deserve, and are receiving, consideration by the Government. They must do. We cannot say that because we like the 1947 Act, because we are still working the 1957 Act, this is right for ever and ever, amen. What we must

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do is to be considering always whether there is a better way of doing this job of securing for the industry a reasonable degree of prosperity, at the same time, perhaps, bringing certain advantages to this country."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, Vol. 275, (No. 24), col. 386; 22/6/66.]
Well, that is pretty vague and non-committal, but perhaps it is better than a slap in the eye with a cold fish. I quite recognise that it is at least as much as the noble Lord, Lord Champion, would have been able to say. My Lords, I hope that the present Government will soon be able to make a more unequivocal, more firm and general declaration about their intentions.
I must say just a word, my Lords, about the French position. I agree with what was said by the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, in general about the desirability of co-operation with France. At the moment we have the disagreement with France about the military arrangements of NATO, and I think the Government have taken the right line and done what is right in this disagreement. But I think I should add that it does not follow, I do not think that it has followed or will follow, that because the French, as we believe, have made this mistake, or taken this course with which we disagree, they are trying to weaken or destroy the strength of the Western Alliance. I do not think that they are, and I do not think that the visit by General de Gaulle to Russia has given the slightest encouragement to any hopes which the Russians might perhaps have been entertaining that they might use this difference of opinion in order to break up NATO.
I believe that General de Gaulle went to Russia for essentially the same reasons as those for which every British Prime Minister for the last ten years or more has sought to go there: because we think it so important to break down the barriers between East and West, to encourage not only more cultural relations and exchange of visits, but the liberalisation of trade and a general economic and political rapprochement and coming together again between East and West Europe. I think that is de Gaulle's objective, which is similar to ours; and I think that one of the best and most significant things which has happened since the ideological and military division of Europe into two
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camps is that the President of the French Republic should publicly attend Mass in the Catholic Church at Leningrad. I think that is a very hopeful sign for peace and perhaps or the future of humanity.
My Lords, next week, I think, or very soon, the French Prime Minister is coming here, and I hope—and I am sure it is the intention of the Government—that every opportunity will he taken to improve our relations with France, although the Government have not always acted in that direction. They have made two of the most monumental errors in the last eighteen months in their behaviour, first over the Concord, and now, more lately, over ELDO; so tremendous, almost incredible, that I still can hardly believe that it happened, or that they made such mistakes. And the French, or the French newspapers, on both occasions seemed not really to believe it either. In a certain way they were right, because in both cases the Government retracted, or did their best to retract, their mistakes, and have tried, so far as they can, to make amends. But I beg them not to make a third "clanger" of this kind, because, even if they do decide to withdraw afterwards, it does not give the best impression about our reliability as a friend and collaborator
This morning there is a report of what happened at the W.E.U. meeting in Brussels yesterday. I tried to see if I could get an official transcript of it, but I could not, so I use the best report I can see, the one in the Guardian, which seems to be fuller than that of any other paper. I shall accept, of course, any correction at once, if this report is not accurate. It says:
"M. Jean de Broglie, the French Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, said that nothing could better crown the success of the E.E.C. than the inclusion of Britain and the other EFTA countries."
He was quoted as saying:
"The stage for stating intentions is over. Negotiations at diplomatic level may now begin."
I think that the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, who represented us at the meeting, made an entirely appropriate reply. The report in the Guardian says:
"Mr. Thomson, the Minister for European Affairs, said that the political will to join E.E.C. now existed in Britain."

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He went on to make what I think was an unexceptionable statement about our position in the matter, hoping that negotiations might ensue.
We all remember that at the last meeting of W.E.U., in March, the French delegate made a statement which caused a certain amount of excitement, but it turned out not to amount to very much. So we must be cautious and patient about this and not leap to conclusions too soon. But I think that we ought to try always to take these statements at their face value and act on them as well as we can. We cannot, of course, renew the formal discussions until there have been a great many diplomatic negotiations in order to make sure that we are not going to have a failure a second time.
We must discuss, first of all, what our difficulties are and get some assurance in advance that the French really want to to have us in. That, I think, is generally agreed. But what we should do now—and perhaps the visit of the French Prime Minister may be an occasion for doing it—is to make, not a number of disconnected ministerial statements, but one coherent statement on behalf of the Government, declaring that we desire at the earliest opportunity to enter the European Economic Community and sign the Treaty of Rome.
We must be patient. We must not expect that any declaration of this kind will immediately be followed by the kind of action we are ultimately hoping for, but I think that now is the time to make this declaration of our intentions. We should make it without stating in advance any conditions, because everybody knows what are the conditions, the kind of things we should have to discuss if serious negotiations begin. Everybody knows these already and by elaborating on them now we shall only cause misunderstanding. So let us make a plain unadorned declaration of our desire to do this and to meet other members of the Community as soon as they are ready to invite us to join and discuss details. Let us make that declaration, neither in the tone of a beggar nor in the tone of a bully, but as a reasonable man talking to his friends, believing that reason will persuade them that it is not only to our interests to join the Community, but also to the interests of France that we should do so, that it is also to the interests of
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Europe that we should do so and, most of all, to the interests—perhaps it might be vital to the survival—of the whole Free World.
3.35 p.m.
LORD CACCIA: My Lords, I too have read the newspapers this morning and wondered, in regard to the report to which the noble Earl, Lord Dundee, has referred, whether the proposers of the Motion in front of us would call off the hunt, whether it be a hunt in couples or in threes. But as they have not decided to do so, perhaps I too may be allowed to say, as they have done, that I support the general objective of our going into the European Economic Community put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, in his Motion—that is, that it would be to our national advantage to do so provided that we can secure the essential "platitudes"—as I think the noble Earl, Lord Dundee, would prefer to call them. Whether we call them conditions or platitudes does not seem to me to matter very much. But let that rest. I do, however, think they are important and I do not believe that we should disregard the Commonwealth and our associates in EFTA in quite the way in which my noble friend Lord Boothby appeared at one moment to suggest we now could do.
Where I differ, and differ regretfully but sharply, from some is in thinking that this sensible objective can be properly furthered by continually seeking to harry Her Majesty's Government, of whatever complexion, into making fresh statements and declarations of intent every few weeks. On the contrary, I hold the view that this is against the national interest and is in danger of becoming a sort of good custom which could corrupt the world. The French this morning, apparently, have said through their representative that the intentions phase has come to an end. Well, can we not accept that?
LORD BOOTHBY: My Lords, will the noble Lord forgive me for interrupting? I can assure him that there is no question of a hunt of any kind this afternoon, either on the part of myself or on the part of my noble friend Lord Gladwyn. We do not propose to divide the House and no hunting is being done at all.
LORD GLADWYN: My Lords, my noble friend Lord Boothby speaks for me.
LORD CACCIA: My Lords, I am glad to hear that. However, the word was suggested by the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn. It is one thing for individuals and associations to expound in this country the case for joining the Common Market. There can surely be nothing against that. There perhaps might be more doubt about the advocacy of a particular form of European political community which does not now exist, which is a matter of controversy amongst the Six themselves, but which the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, and others would like to come about. If you want to get in, perhaps there is more doubt about that, especially with the French Prime Minister in the offing—more doubt, though not necessarily any strong objection. But it is quite another thing to try to force Her Majesty's Government, as things are now, to tie themselves hand and foot, not only to joining the Market without any accompanying platitudes, but to what line they would take if once they got in.
For what is the position since our last discussion here a few weeks ago? Her Majesty's Government have appointed a Minister of State for European Affairs. If he will allow me, as an ex-official in his Department, to say so, Mr. Thomson has all those Scottish qualities of persistence and judgment to know what the Market will take, to know what is politically possible and what is not.
So much for deeds. Now, in words, since the noble Earl the Leader of the House made a statement to us on the position of Her Majesty's Government, both Mr. Thomson and Mr. George Brown have reinforced and reiterated what he said. They may not have gone quite so far as some noble Lords would like them to do, but for a Government who have responsibility, and so have to be careful of public commitments, these statements made the general intention of Her Majesty's Government clear; and, in advance of negotiation, I for one, would not have thought it possible to be more precise.
Now we have the first response from the French; that is, that the phase of intentions is passed. This being the case, what can be achieved by pressing for more and more statements from Her Majesty's Government? I can see no
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advantage; I can see even positive harm: harm to our self-respect in our own eyes, and harm to our standing in the eyes of others. I ask noble Lords to consider this most seriously. No one, I am sure, wants us to cheapen ourselves. Yet what is the spectacle that Her Majesty's Government are asked to provide? Is it of Britain—for constitutionally they must speak for us all—like some disconsolate and ageing spinster, repeatedly professing her passion, and at the same time giving notice in public of the way she is going to behave in private if ever her suit is accepted? This is not consonant with our need, our interest or our dignity.
And if the Government were to fall for this pressure, what would be the probable effect of such a showing on the Six? We should, of course, all rejoice that these ancient and new countries, relatively to Western Europe, have recovered their independence and prosperity. But in considering this aspect we might, not without justice, remind ourselves that not one of the Heads of State or Governments of these countries would be where they are now if it had not been for the exertions of Britain some 20 to 25 years ago. In the light of that history, I should myself surmise that the probable effect of such a spectacle on our friends among the Six would be sorrow that a one-time bulwark of Europe should so abase herself, and so unnecessarily. Among others, who are less truly our friends, there might well be amused contempt, and a contempt that we should have brought upon ourselves.
It is a commonplace in foreign affairs that we are apt to judge others by our own standards. By this same token, does anyone imagine that in similar circumstances General de Gaulle would act as it is now suggested that Her Majesty's Government should do? Would it be conceivable that the General would think this compatible with the dignity of France?
But I must not weary your Lordships. I have no idea what the noble Earl the Leader of the House will say in answer to this debate, except that he will say it with his usual courtesy and I must ask him to forgive me for my apparent discourtesy in that I cannot wait to hear what he has to say, because I have a

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personal pressing appointment which cannot be kept except this afternoon and outside the Palace of Westminster. In substance, I know very well the line that I hope the noble Earl will take. It is to tell us that, pending some negotiation, Her Majesty's Government have nothing more to say in public. The Six know quite enough about Her Majesty's Government's position to make progress possible as soon as they want this. I submit that it is as misleading to suggest that some further public statement will open any door any wider as it is to believe that the Five will kick France out in order to let us in.
If, my Lords, I have put these points too bluntly, I hope that your Lordships will excuse me. But what is at issue here this afternoon is not, I suggest, some kind of educational teach-in about the Common Market, nor yet a competition to prove who is "a better European", whatever that may mean. If it be geography, well, we are part of the European land mass. It it means what the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, says it should mean, then General de Gaulle is not a good European. If we accept General de Gaulle's definition, it is whatever he says it should be. This way lies confusion and, I submit, a desert of the spirit. It can well be left for some television quiz. What we are here dealing with is the proper conduct of the national interest, and, besides that, the standing of Britain in the world. This must be my excuse, if excuse there should be, for the plainness of my speech.
LORD GLADWYN: My Lords, before the noble Lord sits down, I should like to say that my noble friends and I are not harrying or hunting the Government. We are not even asking the Government to make some political announcement. What we are doing is to ask the Government to take into consideration that there is a powerful body of opinion in this country which, though it wants to come into Europe, only wants to come into a certain kind of Europe, and which consequently hopes that the Government will not succumb to blandishments to accept the principles of a "Europe of States", whether this may be thought to be in the interests of France or anybody else.
LORD BOOTHBY: My Lords, before the noble Lord replies to that, may I say
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that this is clearly one of the most important issues confronting this country and the world to-day, and if Parliament cannot discuss it, who the hell can?
LORD CACCIA: May I say at once, in reply to both of those observations, that discussion is one thing, but the Government are being pressed—and I have heard it this afternoon—to make a further statement of their intent. This is what I suggest is not now in the national interest.

AMERICAN BOMBING IN HANOI AREA
3.45 p.m.
THE LORD PRIVY SEAL (THE EARL OF LONGFORD): My Lords, with permission I should like to repeat a Statement which my right honourable friend the Prime Minister has just made in another place. His words were:
"The House will have seen the reports that American planes have today bombed fuel storage areas at the North Vietnamese capital of Hanoi and its main port of Haiphong. At 1.30 p.m. to-day a statement was issued from No. 10 Downing Street about this, and I thought the House would wish to know its terms. It said:
'Her Majesty's Government have noted with regret that United States aircraft have attacked North Vietnamese targets touching on the populated areas of Hanoi and Haiphong.
'It is difficult for the British Government, which is not involved in the fighting in Vietnam, to assess the importance of any particular action which the United States Government regards as militarily necessary in this conflict. Nevertheless we have made it clear on many occasions that we could not support an extension of the bombing to such areas, even though we were confident that the United States forces would take every precaution, as always, to avoid civilian casualties. We believe that the value of each application of force must be judged not merely in terms of the military needs which it is designed to meet but also in terms of the additional suffering and distress which it inflicts upon

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innocent people and the effect it can have on the prospects for an early move to a political solution.
'For these reasons, when President Johnson informed me that the United States Government judged it necessary to attack targets touching on the populated areas of Hanoi and Haiphong, I told him that, while we naturally accepted his assurance that these attacks would be directed specifically against the oil installations and that everything possible would be done to avoid harm to the civilian population, we should nevertheless feel bound to reaffirm that we must dissociate ourselves from an action of this kind.
'We remain convinced, however, that the United States are right to continue to assist the millions of South Vietnamese, who have no wish to live under Communist domination, until such time as the North Vietnamese Government abandon their attempt to gain control of South Vietnam by force and accept the proposals for unconditional negotiations which have repeatedly been put forward by the United States as well as by Britain and the Commonwealth. We are also convinced that the North Vietnamese refusal alone prevents these negotiations; and we deplore Hanoi's constant rejection of the path of peace. The opportunity for bringing all the fighting in Vietnam to an end is open to Hanoi; and the onus for continuing it rests there also.'"
My Lords, that concludes the Prime Minister's Statement.
LORD HARLEM: My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Earl the Leader of the House for repeating the Statement made by the Prime Minister in another place. I think that most Members of your Lordships' House would find themselves certainly in general agreement with the final paragraph of that Statement. But I would ask the noble Earl whether there is yet any evidence of civilian casualties being suffered as a result of this United States action, and whether these casualties are in any way higher than casualties that have been suffered in other raids by the United States Government into North Vietnam which have been approved by Her Majesty's Gov-
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ernment It seems to me that, unless this evidence is available, it is perhaps a little premature for the British Government to dissociate themselves from the actions of the United States Government.
LORD OGMORE: My Lords, I should like, also, to thank the noble Earl the Leader of the House for making this Statement, but I must say that I take somewhat the same point of view as the noble Lord, Lord Harlech. It is obvious that in the past there must have been a good number of civilian casualties. The bombing in North Vietnam has been on a wide scale. I cannot see why there should be any great difference in degree between the casualties suffered in rural areas—because that is what it amounts to—and the casualties suffered in suburban areas. I suppose it means that there is a certain amount of escalation; and I think it also means that we must urge the Government to do everything they possibly can to bring this most unfortunate war to an end.
THE EARL OF LONGFORD: My Lords, I am grateful to both noble Lords for any measure of agreement that they have expressed with the Statement. As regards the question about casualties that have actually been suffered, I have no information up to the moment. I can only conclude that this represents—to use the term of the noble Lord, Lord Ogmore—according to our information, a degree of escalation, and therefore this differentiation was considered necessary.
LORD ROWLEY: My Lords, while I do not seek to dissociate myself from the Statement of my noble friend, and while I realise that the difference between now and 1950, when the then Labour Prime Minister made an urgent visit to Washington, was that we had troops actually engaged in the Korean campaign, in view of the possible danger of escalation are there not grounds upon which this country, as well as others, could be concerned with possible dangers? Therefore, may I ask my noble friend whether the Prime Minister could either advance his forthcoming visit to Washington—where, no doubt, he will discuss this vital problem of the war in South Vietnam—or, alternatively, through diplomatic channels make the suggestion to President Johnson that the United States Government

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should suspend all bombing activities in North Vietnam, at any rate against targets which might well be described as non-military targets, pending the Prime Minister's arrival in Washington next month?
THE EARL OF LONGFORD: My Lords, the noble Lord has worked on these subjects for many years, and anything that he says will be conveyed to the Government. But I certainly could not expect that the visit could be advanced, and I should not like to suggest that the attitude of the Government will go beyond what has been expressed in this Statement.
LORD LINDGREN: My Lords, may I ask my noble friend whether an attack on supply lines is not a normal operation in war, and whether oil is not an essential supply during war?
THE EARL OF LONGFORD: My Lords, I suppose there would be two opinions about this question in general, but there is no doubt that, in the view of the Government, this represents a new development, and the attitude of the Government has been clearly indicated.
LORD SNOW: My Lords, I should like to associate myself with the remarks made by my noble friend Lord Rowley.
LORD HARLECH: My Lords, will the noble Lord confirm that these are quite clearly military targets? We are not talking about non-military targets here. As I understand it, these oil depôts are on the outskirts of Hanoi and Haiphong; they are not in the civilian populated areas.
THE EARL. OF LONGFORD: My Lords, the noble Lord will appreciate that I have not had much notice of this, and I have told him all I know about it up to this moment. The expression used to the House is that these are targets touching on the populated areas, and I cannot at the moment go beyond that.
LORD GRIMSTON OF WESTBURY: My Lords, is it not possible that, being war targets, the bringing of them into the attack might possibly shorten the war?
THE EARL OF LONGFORD: My Lords, of course everything is possible,
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and no doubt the United States believes that. But the attitude of the Government has been made extremely plain here. Clearly there is a difficult balance of decision, and the Government have done the best that occurred to them in face of what could be a very complex problem.
VISCOUNT STUART OF FINDHORN: My Lords, I wonder whether the noble Earl could explain to the House—I think many people will be interested to know—how it is possible for the British Government to support the United States in prosecuting a war of which they disapprove?
THE EARL OF LONGFORD: My Lords, if I may say so, the noble Viscount has misunderstood the position completely. The Government do not disapprove of the general actions of the United States, but in this case they must dissociate themselves from the step which has been described.

EUROPE: THE COMMON MARKET
3.55 p.m.
Debate resumed.
LORD SILKIN: My Lords, we are discussing this afternoon one of the most important questions of any which have faced this country for centuries. I hope that that may not be regarded as a platitude. I believe we are discussing something which involves the future of Europe and the future of the world, and vital questions of war and peace. I believe that if there had been a European Community, say, in 1914, we should have had no First World War and, consequently, no Second World War. Therefore, this is a vital question, and I am glad that it has been synchronised—by pure accident, of course—with the announcement which has been made in the Press as to the new approaches that are being made by this country to the European Community.
If the Press reports are accurate—and I am sure my noble friend will be able to tell us in due course how accurate they are—questions are being discussed at diplomatic level as to possible ways and means of British entry into the Common Market. If this is correct, it is the first time there has been a clear and

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irrevocable statement of decision on the part of Her Majesty's Govrnment to seek entry into the Community.
I believe that public opinion to-day is enormously in favour of this step. In one form or another every speaker so far (I do not know whether this will apply to future speakers) has expressed approval of it. Even though we have recently seen in the Press that there were 70 signatories one way, and 80 in another way, the fact remains that all 150 of those signatories to various proposals accept the fact that we should go into the Common Market. But there are various ways of approach. One method of approach is that we are to lay down conditions beforehand. Of course, that is not negotiation. I do not believe in setting out in advance the conditions under which you are prepared to enter into an institution; that is more a form of dictatorship and, to my mind, does not savour of negotiation at all. I agree with the noble Earl, Lord Dundee, that some of the so-called conditions are really platitudes, things one would normally have in mind when negotiating entry into an organisation such as the European Market.
We must keep in mind two matters. Whether or not we make their settlement a pre-condition is another matter. The first is the position of the Commonwealth, and the second is the position of the European Free Trade Association, our partners in EFTA. As to the Commonwealth, I do not accept the view of the noble Lord, Lord Boothby (I am sorry he is not here at the moment) that the Commonwealth is in process of dissolution, and that it is not important to satisfy ourselves that we are doing everything we can to carry out the commitments we have to the Common Market. I believe that, even though there is no written Constitution for the Commonwealth, it is a very important and valuable world organisation and is capable of doing a great deal of good in the world. Admittedly, at the moment it has fallen on bad times, as may happen with any institution; but just to rule out the Commonwealth as being of no significance in this context is, I think, a fundamental and basic mistake.
With regard to our European Free Trade associates, there again we have entered into commitments with them
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which we must honour and cannot ignore; but in my view both of these commitments—our commitment to the Commonwealth and our commitment toEFTA—are, with good will and with a certain amount of give and take, capable of being resolved, before we enter the Common Market. For my part I can see no other obstacle. There are precedents—
THE EARL OF LONGFORD: My Lords, if I may interrupt my noble friend, merely to enlighten myself, may I ask this question? The noble Lord is an agriculturist, so would he not agree that agriculture raises a different problem? I would not say it is an insuperable problem, but surely it cannot be brushed aside as if it did not exist.
LORD SILKIN: I was not brushing it aside. It is open to us to raise all these points, but at the end of the day we either join the Treaty of Rome in its present form or we do not. We are not in a position to say to the other members of the Treaty of Rome, "We do not like your agricultural policy, so we will come in but not in regard to that". We have to make our case clear, but it is for us to determine our policy on agriculture and to satisfy our Commonwealth colleagues and our EFTA associates before going in. Questions of agriculture, and so on, in so far as they are negotiable (and they are not much negotiable) we have to accept, just as we have to accept all the other conditions of the Treaty of Rome.
I wonder how many people who are supporters of entry into the Common Market really understand all its implications? I think it is only fair that they should; they should study the Treaty itself and all its Articles and see what we are involved in if we join. Let me say at once that I have made a careful study of the Treaty of Rome in the last few days and I am prepared to accept it completely. If we join we must, as a nation, be in that same position; but there are a great many implications of joining the Treaty of Rome which I think even the noble Earl did not face up to. It not only involves an economic union—the free transport of goods right throughout the area, the free passage of workers and other people employed, the institution of businesses in any part of

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the area by any citizen—but almost eliminates citizenship. You may retain your citizenship of your particular country, but the free movement is a factor which, to a great extent, does away with the advantages of citizenship and the differences that exist between countries.
There is also the harmonisation of the social services—of benefits—so far as possible, and, in due course, some kind of harmonisation of wages and salaries, a unification of medical and other professional qualifications. Generally, if the terms of the Treaty of Rome as they are set out in the numerous Articles are carried out, in practice it constitutes a State in itself, whatever we may call it. Of course, each country will be master of its own fate in the sense that it will have its own Government and deal with its own internal affairs, but under the various Articles of the Treaty the Community will actually have jurisdiction over the member States in a number of respects. There is the setting up of a court of justice and there will be a Commission. The court of justice will be empowered to make decisions which will affect not only individuals of the various members of the Community but also the States themselves, and they will have the power to enforce those decisions. That is going a very long way towards some kind of European unity.
I agree with the noble Earl, Lord Dundee, that it would be a mistake to set out in detail exactly what kind of a European Community we are going to have. We believe, and I think rightly, that these things ought to proceed by trial and error and as we go, rather than trying to work to a preconceived Constitution. But let us make no mistake as to the direction in which we are going, and, frankly, as to the direction in which I want to go if we join the European Community.
If we do this we shall be taking a big step towards political unity, as well as economic unity, and we shall be making (and I do not wish to minimise this at all) considerable sacrifices of sovereignty. I am not alarmed about that. We have already made considerable sacrifices of sovereignty if we are true members of the United Nations. It involves taking away from every member nation the right to decide a good many things for itself, and there is no clearer example of that
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than the steps taken by the United Nations at the time of Suez when, having invaded Egypt, we were forced to come out as a result of the decision of the United Nations. In addition to that, of course, every nation to-day is subject to world opinion. No nation can snap its fingers at world opinion and defy it; and to that extent also there is a curb on sovereignty. Therefore I think that in joining the European Community, and in actually realising and loyally carrying out the implications of joining, we are not making any greater sacrifice of our sovereignty than we have already made in connection with the United Nations.
I very much hope that the Government will carry out these discussions and negotiations in the spirit of accepting the Treaty of Rome in its present form. Of course, once we become members of the Community, our influence, which will be considerable, can be instrumental in carrying out variations of the Treaty, and I have no doubt that if these variations are required, and are reasonable, we shall get support. Some of them, of course, may require unanimity, but others can he carried out by majority decisions. I am satisfied myself that we need make no unreasonable requirements or extravagant requirements. I think everything we might conceive of as being necessary to negotiate upon should be acceptable to all parties.
It has been suggested that it might take five years. If it took anything like that time to negotiate, it would be an admission of failure. In my view, this question of entry into the Community should he settled within twelve months. I see no justification for long and protracted negotiations. I say this with all respect to Mr. Heath, who in my view did a very fine job. I think that one of his difficulties was that these negotiations were too long protracted, and possibly we stuck on too many matters that were not vital, so giving to some the impression that we were not really serious in our negotiations. If we mean business, we ought to come to terms within the next twelve months and give the impression that we genuinely want to come in. I very much hope that my noble friend will be able to make a reassuring statement at the end of the debate, and one which will give us confidence that we are moving towards a stage in the world's history when we may

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live free from want and free from fear, and certainly free from any danger of war in the future in Europe.

TRADE NEGOTIATIONS WITH NEW ZEALAND
4.12 p.m.
LORD BESWICK: My Lords, I should like to repeat a Statement on the United Kingdom/New Zealand trade negotiations given by my right honourable friend the President of the Board of Trade in another place. The Statement is as follows:
"I am glad to report to the House the successful conclusion of the trade discussions which I have had with Mr. Marshall, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Overseas Trade of New Zealand, during the past few weeks.
"Our trade relations with New Zealand are at present governed by the United Kingdom/New Zealand Trade Agreement, 1959, and by a separate agreement of 1952 relating to meat. The 1959 Trade Agreement provides for the continuance of duty-free entry for New Zealand products into the United Kingdom, for certain preferences in her favour, for unrestricted access until 1967 of New Zealand dairy products and pork, and for possible anti-dumping action for the benefit of New Zealand exports to the United Kingdom. In return the United Kingdom received guaranteed margins of preference on an extensive list of products.
"The effect of the understandings reached in the talks concluded yesterday is that the 1959 Trade Agreement remains as the basis of trade relations between the two countries; but a number of important matters were agreed which will modify the Agreement:

(1) the admission to the British market without restriction of quantity of imports of dairy products and meat from New Zealand will be extended until September, 1972; imports of apples and pears from New Zealand will be treated in the same way;

(2) New Zealand will guarantee margins of preference for certain
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United Kingdom exports at a higher rate than at present provided for by the Trade Agreement; and will bind duty-free entry for tariff items to be listed; this will cover a further £8 million approximately of our exports;

(3) revised arrangements have been agreed for the operation of the butter quota system;

(4) Trade Agreement of 1959 will be extended for three years from 1st January, 1967.

"I am sure that the results of the trade negotiations will be welcomed both in New Zealand and in the United Kingdom.
"The understandings which we have reached still require in some respects to be worked out in detail. It is intended to embody them in a Protocol to the Trade Agreement which will be laid before the House as soon as it has been signed. I hope that this will be in about 3 weeks."
LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, I should like to thank the noble Lord for having repeated this Statement in the House, and I would ask him to confirm—I gathered from the tone of what he said that it is so—that when he talks of a successful conclusion of these particular discussions he means one that has been concluded in mutual good will and is likely to be regarded as successful on both sides. May I ask the noble Lord one or two questions? I understand that the difference in the timing, the duration of these arrangements for the admission to the British market of the meat and dairy products, and so on, and for the rest of the Treaty, is due to the fact that meat, and only meat, was the subject of a separate agreement. I wonder whether he could tell us why it was necessary to prolong this disparity between the duration of the agreements, and whether it would not have been possible to end them at one time.
Secondly, it is not quite clear for how long New Zealand is guaranteeing the increased margin of preference for United Kingdom exports and the binding of duty-free entry for others of our exports. I take it that is for the duration of the Treaty—that is, for three years from January 1, 1967. I would just

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comment that the proportion of our trade to which this arrangement applies is, I understand, about one-fifteenth of our exports. I do not know whether the noble Lord could tell us what these particular exports are. I think your Lordships are always interested in the butter quota system for which revised arrangements are being made. May I ask what the changes agreed upon are? May I ask whether the duties on non-Commonwealth butter still remain suspended and whether New Zealand's proportion of imports is increased under this arrangement, or are they guaranteed at the same level as before?
We pay higher regard, perhaps, to our trade arrangements with New Zealand than to those with any other country, despite New Zealand's great distance from us, and their per capita purchases of our goods are high, although the balance of trade between us is about three to two in New Zealand's favour. May I ask the noble Lord whether there is any particular significance in the timing of this announcement in the middle of this debate?
LORD BESWICK: My Lords, I will try to answer all those questions. The significance of the timing of the announcement is, of course, that the agreement was reached yesterday. I would say at the outset that the atmosphere of these talks was most friendly, and I think it can be said that the results generally are acceptable to both sides. I was asked about details of the different articles which will be found by the new tariffs. This is the sort of detail which is still to be worked out and which we hope will be completed and published in about three weeks' time. The same applies to the imports of butter. I cannot give the figure. Again it will be published when the Protocol is signed in about three weeks' time. I can say that the preference on butter will be suspended throughout the period for which this agreement is valid.
There was a further point about the special arrangements between this country and New Zealand. I should like to confirm what the noble Lord has said: that we do accept here that there is a special relationship and a special agreement which has worked out to our mutual benefit. I think the fact is, as the noble Lord says, that our exports to this small
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country of about 2½ million people amount to one-fifteenth of our total export business.
LORD OGMORE: My Lords, I am most grateful to the noble Lord for repeating this Statement to us to-day. I regard it as an extremely important Statement, not least because of the context of the debate we are having this afternoon and its possible impact upon that debate, or upon any results that come out of the subject of the debate. I have not had an opportunity of discussing with my noble friends their views on the question as a whole; therefore I should not like to go into any detail on the future of this scheme such as the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, has gone into to-day. Speaking, however, entirely for myself I wonder whether it is wise to take in effect all the exports of New Zealand. New Zealand is fertile. I appreciate to the full the long and happy association that we have had with New Zealand. But, as we discovered yesterday (if we did not know it already), two-thirds of the world is under the hunger line, and New Zealand could probably make a far greater contribution than she does to the millions in South East Asia and other parts of Asia, many of which are Commonwealth countries and whose people would, I am sure, appreciate the opportunity of buying New Zealand meat and other products. I should like to know whether Mr. Marshall and the President of the Board of Trade at any time considered this much wider aspect of New Zealand trade in their recent talks.
LORD BESWICK: My Lords, although I appreciate what my noble friend has said—I always refer to the noble Lord, Lord Ogmore, as "my noble friend"—I do not think this arrangement means that any food supplies which we take from New Zealand are being diverted by virtue of this agreement from countries which we were discussing yesterday. This is not so. It so happens that butter is in ample supply and we know that, both as regards meat and butter the New Zealand Government would be quite pleased if alternative markets were available.
I should like to emphasise, now we are talking about mutual benefits from this trade agreement, that New Zealand buys from us some £130 million of goods a

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year. Apart from our Irish neighbours, they buy more per head than any other country in the world. That is to our mutual benefit. Although the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, said that the ratio of trade was 3 to 2, as Mr. Marshall was quick to point out when this same ratio was put to him during the course of the talks on the agreement, if you take into account invisible exports the balance is not 3 to 2 but 3 to 3.
LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, I wonder whether I might return to the point I made before: why it is that there should be this difference of timing in regard to the two sides of the agreement. The noble Lord said that there was a separate agreement relating to meat dating from 1952;but the arrangement to continue to September, 1972, also covered dairy products, and it also covered apples and pears. It is a long time for which to make an agreement of this kind. I wonder why this could not have been brought into the general agreement, which is formed for three years from the beginning of January next year.
LORD BESWICK: My Lords, I am much obliged to the noble Lord, and I am sorry I did not refer to this question earlier. The fact is that the original trade agreement was at six months' notice, and it provided for a guarantee of dairy products and pork until 1967; so there has always been this difference in the timing. So far as agricultural produce is concerned, there is an advantage in having as long a period of stability as possible, and we were able to give this five years' period of stability without committing ourselves, so far as the rest of the trade agreement was concerned, beyond the three years. This, it was thought, was to our advantage.
LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, does it mean we are committing ourselves to take some New Zealand produce for a longer time than they are entering into any commitment vis-à-vis our exports?
LORD BESWICK: My Lords, what we are doing is guaranteeing for ourselves a stable and fair supply of dairy produce over this period of time.

EUROPE: THE COMMON MARKET
4.27 p.m.
Debate resumed.
LORD GRANTCHESTER: My Lords, I should like to speak this afternoon in support of a practical approach, in the circumstances in which we find ourselves, to the achievement of a wider European Community. The steps taken in the past must be kept in mind. As we remember, the first plan after the war was to build a European Defence Community based upon European multi-national forces. It was too soon for such a plan to be generally acceptable, and it was dropped. After further abortive attempts to work out some common plan on a European scale, we in Britain stood aside while discussions took place between the Six which led to the signing of the Treaty of Rome in March, 1957. Then, perhaps because the Community which the Treaty of Rome brought into being was called the European "Economic" Community (which obscured the rather subtly built-in assumptions that some form of political unity would follow) we affected to believe that its whole concern was in the economic field.
Many noble Lords will recall a speech in this House by Sir Alec Douglas-Home, then Foreign Secretary, in August, 1961. This was, I think, the first ministerial statement which stressed the political implications of the developments which were taking place in Europe. Some of the words he used were these:
"The centre of power and the weight of investment could well shift from this island of Britain to the Continent of Europe; and over 200 million people…can exercise a greater political power and offer greater opportunities…than 50 million people."—[OFFICIAL RFPORT, Vol. 234, col. 121; 2/8/61.]
He went on to suggest that we had a strong interest
"to be inside this new power complex rather than excluded or on the periphery".
He concluded:
"When the United States and Europe are more nearly equal in their achievements…then it will be more practical to join forces and men will be able to achieve a new impetus to freedom."
My Lords. I think those words of the then Foreign Minister are well worth repeating to-day.

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In the same year, 1961, Britain made formal application, in accordance with the Treaty of Rome, for membership of the European Economic Community. Negotiations followed, but only on economic problems. There were no parallel negotiations on political questions. As we all know, these economic negotiations were suspended early in 1963.
I think there are few to-day who would challenge the assertion that the question whether we join the European Community will be decided on political grounds. In the interests of brevity, I will risk the accusation of somewhat simplifying the position as I see it to-day by saying that our entry is dependent upon whether we can agree with France on three fundamental issues. The first is: are we prepared to work out with France a defence policy for Europe which is European-directed and maintained, whatever extra strength is added from non-European allies? The second: are we prepared to make it our aim to join with other European Powers to express a European view and so exert a European influence on world affairs? The third: are we prepared to stand firmly for a monetary system which is not inflationary?
If I were asked why I place emphasis upon a prior agreement on these matters, with France, rather than with any other European Power, I could give several reasons, but let one suffice. I accept the argument used by Sir Winston Churchill at the Yalta meeting, during the war, in discussions with Stalin and Roosevelt. At a time when this was not obvious to less far-sighted men, Sir Winston insisted that the co-operation of France was the first condition for rebuilding Europe and declined the primary role for this country. This view was, I believe, based on considerations of both geography and history.
Discussions with the French Government, when they take place, should, in my view, be free from strings, as other noble Lords have said. I am sure there will have to be political discussions, however much exploration is done in Brussels on economic and agricultural difficulties. So I prefer to leave Constitution-making until such talks start. An agreement, to be worthwhile, has got to work in practice. The only assurance that it will work will be the
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will of the members associated together politically to make it work. I have not much belief in majority decisions where any great Power is involved. Nothing less than real agreement is worth much. The Community has already recognised this basic fact of life and has adjusted itself accordingly. This, I believe, as a good omen for its future.
We have in existence to-day a body which is probably not greatly different in constitution from what is likely to emerge as the political executive organ of a unified Europe in its early days, so it is perhaps worth while to study its work. I refer, of course, to the Council of Ministers of Western European Union where Ministers of the Six and of our Government meet and are in a position, if they so wish, to take decisions. Over the past months I have been trying to get a European answer on a question of policy which I think is the sort of question the political executive of a unified Europe would be called upon to consider when formulating European foreign policy. If your Lordships will bear with me, I should like to read the questions I put to this Council of Ministers because I think the Ministers' replies are of considerable interest. They have been communicated to the Assembly of Western European Union this month, so they are available to the public.
In June, 1965, I asked the following question:
"Ministers of the United Kingdom for some years have been drawing attention to the economic strain upon the resources of Great Britain, to their responsibilities in Europe and other parts of the world. As this strain is now threatening the structure of the international monetary system, will the Council of Ministers of W.E.U. consider the financial implications of British policies, suggest any modifications thought necessary and make recommendations to bring this programme within the purview of existing arrangements for monetary co-operation?"
The Council replied a month later, on July 9, 1965, as follows:
"Matters affecting the international monetary system can be more appropriately handled in international bodies other than Western European Union. The Council would, therefore, prefer not to comment on the substance of Written Question 95."
I followed this up by a further question in August, as follows:
"Question 95 drew the attention of the Council to the economic strain upon the

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resources of the United Kingdom caused by their responsibilities and obligations in various parts of the world. Does the Council of Ministers,"—
and this is the important thing—
"meeting as a body which is concerned to co-ordinate the policies of Member States, consider that the discharge of these responsibilities by the United Kingdom, in particular those covered broadly by the description ' East of Suez' serves the interests of Europe?"
To which the Council replied in September:
"The Council are satisfied that by continuing to play her special part in maintaining stability in the areas referred to in Written Question 96, the United Kingdom is acting in the interests of the Western Alliance as a whole."
I then tried a third time, with this question:
"Appreciating the Council's reply to Question 96, in which it states that the United Kingdom 'by continuing to play her special part in maintaining stability in the areas referred to in Written Question 96'—those covered broadly by the description East of Suez'—'is acting in the interests of the Western Alliance as a whole', may the Assembly assume that the Council of Ministers, reviewing these responsibilities, considered the acceptance of them to be of importance to Britain's European partners in Western European Union as a whole and is not passing on an opinion expressed in some other body?
"If so can the Council of Ministers say whether the sense of its relevance as of European concern was considered sufficiently strong that the duty ought to he shared by the seven members of Western European Union rather than carried by one member? If this consequence from the decision reached was not discussed, would the Council of Ministers give further consideration to the implications of their reply?"
This was in February this year. I received a reply, via the Secretary General of Western European Union, which informed me that the Council
"…is not in a position to reply to your question, as the necessary unanimous agreement could not he reached."
As I have said, these questions and the replies of the Council of Ministers were communicated to members of the Assembly held in Paris earlier this month.
This exchange with the Council of Ministers might be regarded as a story of failure. I do not so regard it. The important thing is that this question was considered at all. Common action on foreign policy will not come easily.
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Ministers will need a lot of practice in working together. People who ask questions are apt to be regarded as somewhat of a nuisance, but both Ministers and their deputies treated me with the utmost courtesy, and I think they were sorry to conclude on a negative note. Because of this negative note I think we must probe a little behind the reply.
I cannot imagine that the French Government would wish to re-involve itself in any military sense in the Far East. I cannot imagine that the Netherlands Government would wish to re-involve itself militarily in the Far East. In fact, I cannot imagine that any of the Governments of the Six would wish to be so involved. It may be deduced from their reply that the Ministers were not willing, collectively, to contribute to the cost of the policy which the British Government are pursuing, or even to endorse it. If the Ministers of the Six had been so disposed, I am sure the British representative would not have objected and there would have been unanimity.
As this could not be agreed, there was an alternative open to the Ministers. They could have tried to formulate a positive European policy, based, perhaps, on phased military disengagement in the area roughly north of the continent of Australia, such as has already been carried out by France and the Netherlands. A reply in this sense might well have had the support of all the Ministers of the Six, but from recent disclosures would have been unacceptable to the present British Government. I wonder whether all noble Lords who advocate majority decisions would have welcomed such a majority declaration, had it been made.
But what an opportunity those Ministers missed to offer in this area their combined influence to secure the settlement of existing disputes; to offer the fruits of the cultural heritage of Europe in exchange for the fruits of the cultural heritage of the East; to offer the scientific achievements of Europe in order that they may be disciplined by the philosophy of the East! So there could be built together a concept of human values more important even than human rights. My Lords, this is the sort of message which we want to see go out from the Europe which we are striving to build.
4.43 p.m.
THE EARL OF SELKIRK: My Lords, I was abroad when the negotiations were proceeding in 1962, and when I came back I was surprised at the degree of unanimity, or, shall I say, the degree of support, which the Common Market negotiations had attained in this country. I think that the last time I spoke to Mr. Gaitskell, which was about that time, I was very surprised at the keenness which he showed, and the, to him, obvious economic necessity for going in with Europe. If I did come in the end to very much the same view as the noble Lord, Lord Boothby, it was not for the reasons he gave. He said that he would go into Europe because our future lay in. Europe. I would associate with Europe, because I believe that, if we do, our future can be more powerful and interesting outside it.
It is important to remember that a hundred years ago Europe was much more important, compared with the rest of the world, than it is to-day, and I rather guess that in a hundred years' time it will be considerably less important, compared with the rest of the world, than it is today. For that reason, I think we are right to go into it, and not because we are going to create in any way a circumscribed Community. It would be quite wrong, however, to suppose that there are not many people in this country who are concerned at what will be the effect on our Commonwealth relations, on the one hand, and on the question of sovereignty, on the other. This has been referred to by a number of speakers. I should like to say one or two words on these points, which, as I say, I believe are of great concern to many people.
First of all, I do not agree with the noble Lord. Lord Boothby, that the Commonwealth is a myth. It is anything but a myth, I would agree with the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, however, that it is an entirely different organisation from the one we are discussing to-day. We have no chance, and we have not had for fifty years, of consolidating the Commonwealth. At the end of the First World War the Canadians made that quite clear, and the consolidation of the Commonwealth has never really been "on" since that time. Perhaps I may add, too, that I do not think the Commonwealth Secretariat will make the slightest difference to that.
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But I would also add that we are probably very lucky that it has never been consolidated, because as an economic bloc it is hopelessly unbalanced. And this fact is fundamental to our approach to this point. The Commonwealth can never be a viable economic bloc. One reason is that there is an unbalance between developed and underdeveloped, or developing, countries. About 90 per cent. of the Commonwealth consists of what we to-day call "developing countries", and the burden for the remaining 10 per cent. of developed countries is far too great. We could not possibly accept that burden, and we should be deluding ourselves if we did.
Secondly, many of the products of Commonwealth countries are far greater in quantity than we in the developed areas of the Commonwealth could handle. There is too much of them, and inevitably those countries will have to trade extensively with the rest of the world. Indeed, it is interesting to note that at the present time Canada and Australia, between them, are more or less feeding the Communist world; and we are very glad that they are doing so. This is part of the necessary trade pattern to which they have come. Of course, there is another point, too: that many of our products will be sold in developed countries, which are developing more quickly than the underdeveloped countries. We may regret that, but it is a fact. For these reasons, we can be confident that our economic association—and I will come in a minute to the political side—can go forward without serious damage to the Commonwealth, though inevitably there are a number of points which need particular attention.
I happened to be in New Zealand when they were complaining bitterly about their balance-of-payments crisis, and I explained to them what a tremendous benefit it was to the British householder to be able to buy cheap New Zealand butter. Of course, this was the obverse side of the coin. There were masses of butter for sale in this country and the New Zealanders were not getting a sufficient price for it. I am quite certain that this is a problem which will need attention during a transitional phase. I am also sure that it would be quite wrong to encourage New Zealand and Australia indefinitely to link themselves economically with this country, instead of

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with their nearer neighbours. They are to-day taking a much more active interest in their neighbours in South-East Asia, and I am sure this is a wholly desirable and much more economically sound basis than tying themselves exclusively to this country. For that reason, it would be quite wrong for anyone to think that a Commonwealth connection would be a justifiable ground for our not going into Europe, if we got the chance. Indeed, it would be very unfair for the Commonwealth, which cannot supply an alternative market, to say that we should keep out of Europe because of our Commonwealth connections.
I should like now to say one word on this extremely difficult question of national sovereignty. The noble Lord, Lord Silkin, has given, very properly, some examples of what is involved in this matter, but I am going to deal with it from a very broad angle. I think the principle of national sovereignty has evolved out of all proportion to what could reasonably be accepted between nations to-day. There arc about 130 sovereign nation States at this time. I just do not believe that this situation can continue: that we in this world can have 130 States each with complete independence and claiming freedom from any external coercion. I do not think that this can go on. I know that some of them are modified by treaties; I know that many of them are members of the United Nations, and that some of them accept the International Court at The Hague. This is a useful step forward, but I do not really think it is enough. I believe we have to go forward and find other ways of modifying this conception of complete independence. Because, if we do not do so, it will be modified by force.
I have no doubt that, in the end, sovereignty cannot continue in its unlimited form. If I may say so, this is an idea which has evolved in Europe, just like the nation State, and to-day it is being copied all over the world. I think it is right and proper that we in Europe should try to take a lead in showing how sovereignty can be modified on a wider basis; and, if we are successful in doing it, other countries—other regions, shall I say?—may succeed. I do not know whether the qualified majority vote, which the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, refers to, is the best
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way, but what I am saying is that I am sure some way or other must be found to get round it. If I may use a phrase which I think applies to individuals as much as to nations, unless a nation has sufficient internal discipline it will have to have external discipline applied to it. As I say, that applies to individuals just as much as it does to nations—and this is the problem which I believe we have to face. Again, I do not think we should hold ourselves back from Europe because of fear of loss of sovereignty. To begin with, the principle is so deeply engrained that it is not going to be modified very quickly. We can see that in Europe at the present time. They are not giving way very easily on the question of their national sovereignty; and, frankly. I believe it will be many years before there will be a deep inroad into the concept of sovereignty.
My Lords, I will add only this, if I may. This is, of course, on the principle that Europe will not be an in-looking organisation but an out-looking organisation; that it will not simply regard itself only, but will essentially regard itself as part and parcel of the world. It is in these terms, as outward-looking organisations, that I personally think that we should give the Government all encouragement to go forward with their negotiations.
4.53 p.m.
LORD STOW HILL: My Lords, I suppose I should not be the first newly-admitted Member of your Lordships' House who had hoped to intervene in a debate and who, as he listened to the speakers who came before him, felt that they were so completely masters of their subject that almost everything he had prepared to say had been said much better and that therefore it had better remain unsaid by him. Nevertheless, there is a very narrow approach, possibly, that I think might not be wholly unuseful in this debate, and it is this. Many people—certainly I would include myself among them—feel strongly that we should sign the Treaty. They recognise that there are difficulties which have to be overcome, but their great hope is, as it is mine, that we shall soon be able to join the Common Market. But I think a number of people have a kind of anxiety that it is something like plunging into the unknown.

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We in this country have a number of deeply-cherished concepts. We believe in our administration of justice. We have deeply engrained in our souls the maxim that nobody should be convicted in criminal process unless the case against him has been proved beyond reasonable doubt. We also feel strongly on the question of sovereignty, about which the noble Earl who last spoke was so extremely interesting, if he will allow me to say so. I think that a number of ordinary people, of whom I count myself one, ask: If we sign the Treaty, to what extent do we automatically bind ourselves to depart from a number of those things which we think are of inestimable value to the preservation of the liberty of the individual or of the Parliamentary process? How far should we have to alter, in order to conform to a European pattern, the delicate balance of our constitutional arrangements? Would Parliament change—or, indeed, cease to exist? What does signing the Treaty involve?
I thought I might perhaps offer to your Lordships some very tentative conclusions which I had formed. I do not claim for a moment that they are necessarily accurate, and certainly they are not exhaustive. I am emboldened to do so by the most interesting speech, if he will allow me to say so, of my noble friend Lord Silkin. He asked: What does signing the Treaty involve? In a sense, to try to draw a distinction between signing the Treaty and what will come after the Treaty is wholly unreal. All of us, I think, would be bitterly disappointed—I know the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, would be—if we signed the Treaty and then stood on a rigid interpretation of its terms, and nothing came after it.
Clearly, if the Treaty is signed, it is the gateway to a growing co-operation, a growing political and social integration of the nations of Europe into something which is completely different; something which, in a sense, may be not wholly different from the Commonwealth of Nations; something which must, in course of time, involve a considerable secession from what we regard as national sovereignty at the moment. But if one accepts that that dichotomy is unreal and that it would be very disappointing if we stopped at simply signing the Treaty, it is perhaps not wholly unuseful, never-
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theless, to see what changes the Treaty would make it inevitable we should accept in our own domestic arrangements and in our own internal law.
Perhaps it is a truism to say that the Treaty is simply a contract. If we sign it, we enter into a contractual arrangement with the six other signatory nations. It is a contract of very high sanctity, and of course we would observe it, as it is our tradition to observe international obligations which we assume. But signing the Treaty does not alter our own internal law in the least bit. We can—and there are many precedents for this—by our own Parliamentary process, embody as part of our own internal, domestic law either the whole Treaty or specific parts of it. It may be it will be necessary to do that. Perhaps the Government have given some preliminary thought to this, although at this early stage I certainly would not expect my noble friend the Leader of the House to state any conclusions that have been formed. But, my Lords, it may be. There are many precedents. The Carriage by Air Act 1932 embodied a considerable part of the Warsaw Pact of 1929.
What of the procedure of our courts? Should we have to amend our criminal and civil processes in order to conform to European standards which may be very estimable in themselves but may not wholly coincide with what we regard as indispensable in our own procedure? I hope it is not simply a lawyer's sterile exercise to consider this. My answer would be that, subject possibly to one qualification which I shall indicate in a moment, signing the Treaty would leave our own courts absolutely untouched. Our procedure would be precisely the same. Our procedure before criminal courts would not alter in the least, and it would equally be the case in our civil courts. The slight qualification to which I should like to refer hinges upon the existence of the European Court, to which my noble friend Lord Silkin referred. That has—and I shall come back to it in a moment—a very limited jurisdiction, jurisdiction in a sense limited, at any rate; but we should have to accept the fact that British companies and, I suppose, British individuals might from time to time have to appear before that European Court by way of appeal, generally speaking, against decisions

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made by the Council or by the Commission affecting those individuals.
The jurisdiction of the European Court is an economic jurisdiction. It is limited to economic topics. A nation—for example, one of the six or seven, or whatever the number would be—could be hauled before the European Courtby the Commission if the Commission complains against that nation that it had failed to comply with a regulation duly made by the Council of Ministers. Equally, one nation could cite another nation before the Court. An appeal lies to the Court at the instance of individuals against decisions affecting them. But subject to that, the Court would not have the effect of altering in the least our own internal juridical arrangements in this country.
That is, perhaps, subject to one qualification. Regulations, as your Lordships know, can be made by the Council of Ministers on the proposal of the Commission. They are in general only to be made by a qualified majority of 12 out of the 17 votes of the existing voting pattern. I suppose if a regulation were made, as regulations have to be obeyed by all member-nations our courts would have to accept in the administration of our own law the interpretation put upon a regulation by the European Court. Subject to that, it seems to me that our own existing procedures, the complete independence of our judges, the present system of administration of justice, would remain completely and absolutely untouched.
Apart from the possibility that we might have to incorporate in our law parts of the Treaty, is there any other change in our domestic law that we might have to make if we signed the Treaty of Rome? Changes could arise only in this way. The Commission makes proposals to the Council of Ministers and the Council of Ministers, on the proposal of the Commission, can make recommendations, which have no compulsive effect, issue directives and decisions and—and this is the relevant power—make regulations. Those regulations can cover broad economic matters only. If they go beyond that and with what we should regard as personal relationships in the field of criminal law, and so on, they can he declared invalid by the European Court. But if we signed the Treaty of Rome we should be
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undertaking, by that Treaty, to give effect in this country to any such regulations. As I have said, it would be for the European Court to interpret them and they would have to be enforced in our courts. But, beyond that, we might also have to make changes in our internal law; and no doubt the Government will have to consider in due course what changes are necessary.
I have tried to envisage what they would be, what broad fields of our own domestic law might have to be changed in order to enable us to comply with regulations made by the Council of Ministers. Our law relating to monopolies, I think, undoubtedly would have to be changed, as would the Restrictive Practices Act and the Resale Prices Act. We should have to alter our aliens legislation in order to permit of the freedom of movement of persons. Possibly we should have to make orders under our Exchange Control Act in order to provide for the free movement of capital. But if one looks, for example, at our broad field of legislation covering trade unions, should we have to change that in any way? The noble Earl the Leader of the House will know better than I; but, so far as I can tell with the limited research I have been able to make in the matter, that would be a matter entirely for us and there would be no change we should find it necessary to make to comply with the letter of the Treaty or any existing regulations made under the powers conferred by the Treaty.
Our Agriculture Acts from 1947 to 1957 almost certainly would have to change. We should have to change, I suppose, the Acts relating to our social security provisions, in order to provide for the broad harmonising of social security benefits applicable throughout the countries of Europe. I do not know any other sphere in which we should have to make a change, and I do not think it in the least oppressive to expect us to make those changes. Subject to that, we could, by our own Parliamentary processes, amend our laws or take what steps we thought necessary to remodel or adjust our own economy, whether in the private or the public sector. It may be that we should enter into subsequent obligations, Euratom and the Coal and Steel Community which would impose obligations of that sort. But the Treaty itself would not.

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With that review of the changes that we should have to make, I would say, as I said at the outset, that that is based simply on the wording of the Treaty itself. I hope that the Treaty would be simply the first stepping stone to a much larger identity of purpose among the nations of Europe: a growing mutual understanding, a growing interlocking of interests, a growing exchange of persons, ideas and wealth, which would make any new 1914 or 1939 unthinkable and impossible. If it did not have that result, although it has a fundamentally economic base, entry into the Treaty, I should have thought, would largely fail of its purpose.
I look forward to that as the beginning of the creation of another new enormous aggregation of persons (about 200 million), the existence of which in our present world would serve to buttress up the purposes of peace and preserve international authority. The United Nations is one aggregation, the Commonwealth (which, after all, includes 700 million people of all races) is another. By creating large units embracing hundreds of millions of persons and modelling them into an association, close or loose, based upon a Treaty or purely on the voluntary will of the leaders of those nations, seems to me to be the way in which to guarantee peace for the future. Narrow national sovereignty is antipathetic to that. As the Treaty matures into the post-Treaty history, I hope. as the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, said in his fascinating speech, that the Council would increase in authority, that the European Assembly (elected on a basis of universal suffrage, and not as it is now) and the civil service of the organisation, the Commission, would grow in authority and would be recognised as being more and more entitled to speak, act and decide in the name of all of the nations of Europe; not constrained to it by the iron letters of a rigid Treaty but readily assenting to its decisions and recognising that it is in the interests of each of them to join in a common purpose for maintaining and supporting world order and promoting world prosperity and understanding. That is how I envisage the Treaty and its subsequent history. I greatly hope that once the initial difficulties are overcome—and there obviously are initial difficulties—we shall be able to sign it, and that that
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will inaugurate a new page in European history which will be productive of immense good for mankind.
5.9 p.m.
BARONESS EMMET OF AMBERLEY: My Lords, I am glad to be able to follow the noble Lord, Lord Stow Hill in his reassuring speech about the Treaty of Rome. I myself have been a convinced European for some time. I was brought up in Europe, and perhaps I was conditioned in that way. I feel certain that our entry into Europe is a natural historical evolution, and almost inevitable. Had the present Government, when they were in Opposition, supported US at the time of the Heath negotiations, we might have been in by now, because it would not have enabled General de Gaulle to say that our country was not ready because it was divided. I am sure that it is just as necessary for Continental Europe as it is for us that we should join, but I do not believe that we can force the pace by signing declarations about a political future, such as the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, would like us to do, at the present moment. I feel that this would be putting the cart before the horse. To my mind, economic unity must precede political unity. After all, until you have made good foundations and sound walls, you cannot put on a roof.
I think that it cannot be repeated too often (I was glad to hear the noble Lord, Lord Stow Hill, reinforce this) that there is nothing in the Treaty of Rome at the present time which binds a signatory to any particular form of political future. Indeed, if we look at the situation among the Six, we see that they themselves are very confused as to which way they are going. General de Gaulle has pointed in no uncertain way to the liberty of decision which still exists, and obviously the political future of twelve or thirteen countries is going to be very different from that of six. I believe that we must give time for the political possibilities to evolve, and I would use the Latin expression solvitur ambulando. That, after all, is the way both our Commonwealth and our own Constitution have evolved, and I believe that a premature or hasty attempt to put something down on paper binding all parties through all time would be the worst possible way of proceeding.
LORD GLADWYN: My Lords, may I interrupt the noble Lady to say that this declaration has been signed already by a number of Peers, including several of her noble friends; but it does not bind anybody to anything. It is merely an expression of intention on the part of some people who know where they want to go; that is all.
BARONESS EMMET OF AMBERLEY: My Lords, I agree. But those people who have signed that piece of paper have already decided what they want to do.
LORD GLADWYN: Why not?
BARONESS EMMET OF AMBERLEY: My Lords, I do not want to do that at this stage. I should also like to express this view, which I think is very important. Signing a treaty involves for the Continental European a rather different outlook from that with which we, on our part, sign. The Continentals have signed the Treaty of Rome and are working towards the evolvement of the Treaty of Rome. In our country it has been very much more usual not to sign a treaty until we can immediately put the whole treaty into effect. I feel that this divergent attitude towards treaties is a very important factor, and one which, when we negotiate with our Continental friends, we ought to bear very much in mind.
I should like to say something on a completely different line about what one might perhaps describe as "grass-roots politics". If we are going into Europe, I think it very important that the political Parties in Continental Europe and in this country should understand each other better. I travel a good deal in Europe, and your Lordships may or may not believe me when I say that in some parts of Europe the image of the Conservative Party is grossly distorted. I have been told, quite definitely, that there are, of course, no Catholic Conservatives, and that the Party I belong to is composed mostly of Dukes and heretics. There is also in some quarters in Europe an impression that members of the Labour Party are all uneducated and died-in-the-wood nationalisers—a form of politics which the pragmatical Socialists in Continental Europe gave up a long time ago.
We also, I think, come across misunderstandings about Party politics be-
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cause of the insistence of some European Parties to label themselve as "Christian"—Christian this or Christian that. This makes for misunderstanding, because it seems to label people who do not call themselves "Christian" as not being Christian; and that is a great mistake. The practice is understandable, because after the war there was a great upsurge of Parties in Continental Europe determined to defeat the Communist wave which was threatening Europe. That is how this label came to be attached to them, and we must praise those Parties, for they succeeded in holding back the Communist wave. But there are problems which have evolved from this aspect. It is interesting to note that last week in the municipal elections in Italy the Right-Wing Parties—splinter Parties, Liberals, Republicans, Monarchists and Misini—all lost heavily. The Christian Democrats, in combination with the Socialists, did well, but the Communists pretty well held their own and are now the official Opposition in Italy. One wonders what effect that may have at some time on the European Parliament.
My Lords, there are still strong religious influences in politics in Continental Europe. They disappear in time of war but they reappear in periods of dtente. It is sad to see how isolated the Iberian Peninsula is at present from the rest of Europe. There, of course, religion still plays a very difficult and complicated part in politics. Again, the Scandinavian Parties seem to be somewhat in isolation from the Six. I believe that if Europe is to come together, as I have said, we must try to get like thinking people of like Parties to try to work together and to travel along the same road. Institutions like Koenig winter and Wilton Park have done an enormous amount in this direction, and should be encouraged in every way.
In conclusion, my Lords, may I say that in my view this is the time for strong leadership. Sometimes, as a good British woman, I resent a little the fact that General de Gaulle shines out in Europe as the only strong man. Where is our country at this moment? There is much stirring in Europe. The Russian satellites are breaking out of their cocoons. East and West German relations and interchanges are taking place for the first

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time openly. Russia, with the growing Chinese threat, may prefer to secure one front, at all events, and surely it would not be good for us, or for the world in general, if, as an alternative, we sank to becoming a satellite of the United States of America; though that is where the present Government appear to be leading us. I think this is a time when we need strong leadership. I do not agree with the noble Lord, Lord Caccia, who said that no declaration of intent should be made. I believe that Europe needs the confidence of a declaration from us, and I am sure that if there were such a lead this country now would follow.
5.19 p.m.
LORDWELLS-PESTELL: My Lords, I may be quite wrong, but the wording of the Motion on the Order Paper this afternoon in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, tends to suggest to me that he feels that the Government have failed to make their meaning clear in respect of the European Economic Community. I may be quite wrong about that.
LORD GLADWYN: My Lords, I think that they have come very near to making the declaration of intent which I urged on them a year and a half ago. They have come very near to making a declaration of intent to join the European Economic Community as such. What they have not made very clear—I am not asking them, naturally, to make any sort of political judgment now, but to consider it, anyhow—is where they are going from the political point of view if they do join. That is my point.
LORD WELLS-PESTELL: My Lords, I am much obliged to the noble Lord. I think we ought to bear in mind that the Labour Party has stated its aims clearly and concisely over a period of several years and, I should have thought, as consistently as the Liberal Party has stated its own ends over that period. As far back as September, 1962, Hugh Gaitskell, on behalf of the Labour Party, made it particularly clear that we should be willing to go into the Common Market provided that five broad conditions were met. I am hoping that my noble friend and Leader is not going to say this afternoon that those five conditions are no longer of any consequence. I was surprised that the noble Earl, Lord Dundee, should describe those five conditions as
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"platitudes", or even as ones on which there is general agreement.
If we examine the five conditions, surely they are most reasonable, if we are seeking to enter into the Common Market. The Labour Party said some years ago that there must be strong and binding safeguards for the trade and other interests of our friends and partners in the Commonwealth, that there must be freedom, as at present, to pursue our own foreign policy, that there must be the fulfilment of the Government's pledge to our associates in EFTA, that we must have the right to plan our own economy and, finally, that there must be guarantees to safeguard the position of British agriculture.
It seems to me that if we are going in, we must make our position perfectly clear. We must say what exercises our minds; we must say what disturbs us. And we must set those matters out very clearly. Whether we join or not, the E.E.C. is a question of grave moment. It is one of the biggest political issues this country has had to face for many decades. When we are faced with making the decision, it is going to be one of grave moment, which will have serious and far-reaching consequences for every home and family in Great Britain.
There is a tendency in debates (I do not refer to the debates in your Lordships' House) to see the Common Market as an economic instrument only and to lose sight of the fact that the economic aspect is only a part—an important part, I concede—of the Treaty of Rome. If we join the Common Market, it will mean accepting in toto the Treaty of Rome, including, as somebody put it very well, its disciplines. The Treaty of Rome seeks to do many things—many admirable things in theory—every one of which needs careful consideration. Among the various things it seeks to do are three which are well known, I feel sure, to your Lordships—to abolish import duties and other restrictions respecting trade between member countries, to establish identical import duties on goods coming into member countries from the rest of the world, and to set up institutions which will eventually take over certain powers, duties and functions from member countries and to deal with non-member countries in respect of those matters.

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I do not deny for one moment that it sounds good to have a home market of upwards of 200 million people, within which manufacturers would be able to co-operate without facing import duties. The gradual harmonisation of social, economic and financial policies also sounds attractive. But we must keep in the forefront of our minds the fact that the Common Market is not just concerned with economic matters, as I believe many people outside your Lordships' Chamber think. The Rome Treaty is concerned also with closer political unity.
The principal aim is to build on the foundation of the Common Market a single political community, with a common Parliament and, eventually, a common Government—in other words, the creation of a West European Federal State. Is this what we want? This means that membership of the Common Market would involve commitments which, in their scope and depth, go far beyond our relationships with any group of nations. For the central purpose of the Common Market is not just the removal of trade barriers, but the conscious merging of the separate national economies into a single unit. Membership of the Common Market could—and I believe would—decisively change our political and economic relations with the rest of the world.
I would remind your Lordships—not that there is any need to do so—that Britain is the centre and founder member of a much larger and, I believe, still more important group, the Commonwealth. I do not accept the view that has been expressed in your Lordships' House to-day that the Commonwealth is no longer an important factor.
LORD BOOTHBY: It is a myth.
LORD WELLS-PESTELL: The noble Lord is entitled to his view. I sometimes think that the noble Lord is a myth. As a member of the Commonwealth we have access to the largest single trading area in the world, and we also have political influence within a worldwide multiracial association of over 700 million people. It is a great pity, in my view, that many members of the Conservative Party have allowed themselves to be seduced from their traditional loyalty to the Commonwealth
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and that the Conservative Party has become the pro-European Party of to-day. It is almost unbelievable.
The economic aspect has been given a great deal of importance, but what, if any, are the economic advantages to us? I do not think that there is any real evidence of any. I cannot see that we should be either stronger or weaker economically if we remained out of the Common Market. The Economic Director of the National Economic Development Council, appointed, if I may say so, by a Conservative Government, who is the Chief Economist in the planning set-up, said, after carefully and closely examining the Common Market proposals:
"There is really no compelling economic argument for Britain's joining unless it is thought that without being exposed to the blast of competition from the Continent she will never put her house in order."
This cannot, surely, be sufficiently good reason for going into the Common Market.
Our entry would mean that barriers would go down between ourselves and the Six, but barriers would go up between ourselves and the Commonwealth, the existing association of 700 million people, who are our tried and trusted friends. If I had to make the choice, I should choose the Commonwealth every time. The Commonwealth preference system is good although, like many other things, it needs revising from time to time. We are given, as everyone knows, substantial trade advantages by the Commonwealth.
Agriculture is perhaps our biggest concern. If we go into the Common Market, we shall be obliged to import expensive foods from Europe in the place of cheap foods from the Commonwealth. Our food prices are bound to rise, and Mr. Heath has been honest enough to admit it. I think it was in March last, during the time of the General Election, that the National Farmers' Union bitterly attacked the Leader of the Tory Party for being prepared to go into the Common Market without reservation. The N.F.U. stressed the increased costs to the farmers and the housewives. As your Lordships know, various sums have been mentioned from time to time, ranging from £250 to £800 million a year in levies on food exports. I frankly am not an expert in this field and, therefore, I do not know

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what the figure is likely to be. But it must be borne in mind that the policy of the European Economic Community would prevent our farming industry from being consulted about the price of food and the level of production costs. It seems to me that farm incomes would be bound to suffer.
I think we need to keep in the forefront of our minds the fact that the British price-support mechanism for farmers in the 1947 and 1957 Agriculture Acts has, on the whole, worked well. As a result of guaranteed prices and deficiency payments, the British people benefit from the cheaper prices. Our food prices are among the cheapest in the world. We need to remember that the standard of living in the Common Market countries is not as high as it is here, and I see no reason for bringing ours down to their level, as may well be the result.
LORD BOOTHBY: My Lords, the noble Lord will forgive me for interrupting, but that really is not true. The standard of living in France and in Germany is higher than it is in this country. And now that I am on my feet, I should like to ask the noble Lord whether he would seriously maintain that Tanzania, Zambia and Nigeria are tried and trusted friends of this country.
LORD WELLS-PESTELL: I was referring to the standard of living in the whole of the six Common Market countries: the noble Lord chooses two out of the six. We are about the world's largest food importer, and we are an expanding population. Our food supplies come substantially from Australia, Canada and New Zealand, and have done for about a hundred years. I think it is worth while remembering that their development has been largely due to this vital trade with us.
It is by no means clear what will happen in the industrial field of we go into the Common Market. At present, investment abroad by our industrialists is under and subject to Government control. This would not be so if we go into the Common Market. There will be a free flow of capital and because—I repeat—of the low standard of living in the Common Market countries, and the low rate of wages—
LORD BOOTHBY: It just is not true.
LORD MERIVALE: My Lords, if I may interrupt the noble Lord, I wonder whether he would tell us which country out of the Six he has in mind when he says that there is a lower standard of living.
LORD BOOTHBY: It is not Luxembourg, France, Italy or Germany.
LORD WELLS-PESTELL: The only country I would exclude would be West Germany; and I have had some personal experience of the others. Is there not reason to believe that industrialists will move their plants abroad and invest in Europe, which they are likely to do to the detriment of us at home? It is said that the Common Market industrialists will be encouraged to come here. But is it likely, in view of our high wage rates and—I repeat it once more—our better standard of living, that they will come and open industrial plants in this country?
The European Economic Community is held up as a dynamic force, and it is true that there has been a remarkable industrial expansion there. But this is not due, in my view, to the Treaty of Rome, but is due to the natural development following the war, and to the fact that American aid was poured into these countries, particularly Western Germany and Italy, immediately after the war. It was a case of the vanquished countries getting a fantastic amount of aid. Industrial progress in these countries was faster between 1950 and 1955, before the Common Market came into existence, than in the following five years.
The prosperity of Britain rests far more on our ability to make better use of our own resources than it does on securing tariff-free access to the Six, particularly in view of the price which we should have to pay in the long run. Many of our present economic difficulties could have been avoided if past Governments had faced up years ago to the need for economic planning. Rather late in the day, the Conservative Government did what many of us were pleased to see them do, and that was to set up the National Economic Development Council. Entry into the Common Market will not offer an easy escape from our economic difficulties. The truth is that the growth of our economy and of our trade will depend far more on our

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own exertions; on the sensible planning by us of our economy; on reasonable restraint of incomes based on a fairer division of wealth, and on our ability to put investment and exports before home consumption. In other words, we must have a planned and controlled economy. Hence the Government's National Plan. Going into the Common Market is not going to be a cure for our economic ills, and I do not think there exists a sound or convincing argument on the economic side which will justify our doing so.
The real solution is a planned and controlled economy in Britain, and I think it is desirable that there should be frequent conferences between the Commonwealth and the EFTA countries to consider further measures to promote trade and economic development. I believe that if we could do this it would result in an even better trade association. As I see it, we cannot go into the Common Market and have an economic union without the fullest implications of Political Union, and I question whether some of the Common Market countries have the same understanding and concept of democracy as we have in this country. I am not persuaded that it would be right for us to join the E.E.C. I firmly believe that the world needs, however soft it may sound at times, or however muffled, an independent British voice, and I should like to see it free and unfettered.
5.39 p.m.
VISCOUNT HALL: My Lords, I rise in close physical relationship to my noble friend Lord Wells-Pestell, but I must declare that we are not in that degree of thought relationship. This subject contains such a mass of intangibles, with such far-reaching implications for the future of this country, that I hesitate even to offer a finger of direction within the seriousness of it all. Nevertheless, I should like to submit a constructive step in a small way to the solution of the most major policy problem and series of decisions that face this country to-day, to-morrow, and, indeed, for many weeks to come.
We depend—and those who follow in the future will depend—heavily on the Government of the day to fight very hard indeed for a just and proper place in an arrangement with our immediate
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neighbours, which logically and properly progressed, I, for one, believe will bring supreme benefit to us all. I believe that my noble friend the Leader of the House has clearly given that undertaking, and he has my unqualified support for the effort that he and his right honourable friends are making to ensure our rightful place in the future economic sun.
But, my Lords, clouds, and particularly political and economic clouds, are quick to rise and pour rather dampening afterthought on the unwary and imprudent. We have had some cautionary fingers this afternoon from my noble friend Lord Stow Hill and also from my noble friend Lord Wells-Pestell. Our traditional links with Empire have gone, and those with the Commonwealth, I think in all fairness, can be seen to be slowly withering as the nations we have nurtured reach maturity and make their own arrangements for their marriage and their security, too, in the new kind of world facing all nations to-day.
We have a Britain becoming more and more alone in resisting the challenge upon her affluence and influence from many of those about her by new techniques of politics, economics, finance and aid programmes, all so complex that only those at the very centre of things, as the noble Lord, Lord Caccia, has made forcibly clear, can be fully aware of all the implications of any specific major decision and action. The long span of history, the dictates of geography, too, and daily bread, more and more seem to revolve around the word "Europe". But I, for one, do not quite know what constitutes the definition of "Europe". Does it, in fact, include Turkey, Greece, Morocco and Algeria? And what about Spain? Or is it the land mass bordered by the mountains of tariffs or of traditional safeguards, or by the bank of international settlements? It is quite clear, and I think has been made abundantly clear here this afternoon, that the terms "Europe" and "Common Market" are far from synonymous, and I venture to suggest that synchronisation of the two will eventually provide new frontiers that can only be broadly projected in our debate to-day.
For these reasons of definition, the well-known views of the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, can, I think, be looked upon as a kind of bull's-eye on a distant target.

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I do not know that I subscribe to every item of his broad concept, but I wholeheartedly agree with him that there is a vast amount of work yet to be done on a much more lowly level before that target can be achieved. Such a target will take a long time in which events from local pressures, national elections, commercial variants, and all kinds of shifts in international trading positions, will provide an ever-changing kaleidoscope within which Her Majesty's Government have to take progressive decisions on everyday relations. It is because of this state of flux that I welcome the Motion tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Boothby, with its inference that the terminology of both "Europe" and the "Common Market" should be continuously studied and observed, without the pressure upon the Government to disclose too many of its negotiating cards. I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Boothby, will find it convenient, under those terms, to put down this same Motion again as soon as circumstances warrant it, for only by this continuous review can we work to the bull's-eye of the target of the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn.
But where are we now? The history of the Six is weighted down with economic forces dictating the direction of political actions, and I doubt whether there is any very strong argument against that basic theme. There is no doubt—and your Lordships will forgive me for any over-simplification—that we live in an era of the economic grouping of neighbouring States. Only a few weeks ago we here agreed to contribute to the Asian Development Bank and we agreed very often before then to regional arrangements. In Europe we are already members of O.E.C.D., which embraces every member of EFTA, including Austria, and every member of E.E.C. We are also members of the Economic Commission for Europe. This, again, embraces all the members of both EFTA and E.E.C.
I am quite sure that the Government regard this halfway relationship with Europe as profoundly unsatisfactory. With apologies to those noble Lords with a military or naval background, it seems to leave us belonging to a kind of European "in-and-out" club. We are in some projects where we can be of
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benefit, and we are out of others iron which we could benefit. We are in Concord for our technology; we are out of the Six's car markets by high tariffs. We are in for the pound as a reserve currency, and we are out for agriculture. It appears now that the present Common Market countries are prepared to share with us the burden of sterling as an international trading and reserve currency, and this has bedevilled our economic progress over the past decade. We cannot afford to stay out of Europe. We need consistent allies as urgently in peace as in war—and so do they.
When it comes to negotiating, I recognise that we must be mindful of our existing obligations to both the Commonwealth and EFTA, but we must not exaggerate them. Our attitude towards the White Commonwealth, if I may say so, is rather like that of the anxious parent thinking of his grown-up children. Having travelled in the Commonwealth a great deal, I do not think the children need us quite so much as we think they do. They are quite capable of standing on their own feet, and some indication of that has already been shown by the efforts of Nigeria to get into association with the Six. As an "in" club of a logical grouping, Europe and the United Kingdom can, and must, be able to play a decisive world role which no one nation among them could hope to sustain.
A unit of 340 million people with the highest proportion of skilled workers in the world, a gross reserve of gold and a level of steel production greater than those of the United States of America, a gross product just levelling below that of the United States, would be a voice of major significance in world affairs, political, financial and commercial, and the strength of this unity greatly enhances the strength of the composite parts.
We in this country do not number over 300 million Britons. We have not a gold reserve equal to that of the United States, nor a steel production equal to theirs; nor have we a gross national product in the region of £200 billion. But we in this country, as is well known to us all, possess an inventive, productive and political experience second to none, East or West, and these qualities will make of a united Europe incorporating the United Kingdom a whole far exceeding the sum of its constituent members

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in initiating peace, stability, prosperity and aid to the developing nations.
The short time that I spent directing the investment of monies to aid lagging or emergent economies did little to fire me with over-enthusiasm for the continuation of the present system of aid-grants, aid investment or loans, and I must confess that I remain convinced that some deeper and stronger leverage is potentially available to help those nations help themselves. Indeed many of us have seen some such large programmes backfire with lessening to nil respect and good will to the donors or the investors who took the risk.
I have in mind the early days in the United Nations and the preparations for the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, when I represented the World Bank. It was a most satisfying experience to be present when the United Kingdom proposed that this structure should be set up, and there we had no fewer than fifty varying national views; but after some time the United Nations Conference was agreed to and I think, after the study now being made by the World Bank, will be a great success, but on the initiative of the United Kingdom. The leverage, therefore, that I have in mind is from the beneficial consequences that would flow from a strong, outward-looking Europe with the financial resources, technical know-how and the commercial vision to embark on a logical programme of economic development overseas comparable to Europe's efforts in the century of peace from the Treaty of Vienna right up to 1914. These energies can be released only if Europe is coherent, united and at peace with herself. But how is this to be brought about?
The Common Market has already gone a long way along the road of organisation: it has its investment machinery set; it has its Coal and Steel Community set. It has its system of joint consultation between the Finance Ministers, and it has, most important of all, very decided views on new members and who they shall be. On this there are volumes and volumes of themes and theses, and pamphlet upon pamphlet on what should be done, by whom to whom and on what conditions. I regard, as I am sure do other noble Lords, the visit of Monsieur
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Pompidou to London, hard on the heels of France's policy reversal on central banking support for the pound, as a hopeful sign that the main obstacle to Britain's conjoining into Europe may not be immovable. But, whatever Monsieur Pompidou may propose, there will remain other massive vital interests to be taken into account.
There is therefore at this stage, now, need on the general lines that have been outlined by the noble Earl, Lord Dundee, and also by the noble Lord, Lord Caccia, for a kind of forum in which the nations concerned can harmonise their economic differences away from the spot-light of publicity which bathed every manœuvre in Brussels at all times. Consider, my Lords, that there are possibly fourteen principals at least; a number of Commonwealth and other countries which will wish consultation; and deep division among all of them on the concept of the prime industries of each one of them. Fundamental issues are involved which demand logical, cool appraisal and very discreet negotiation. All these countries, and others too, arc represented by distinguished senior men on the executive boards of those harshly practical and proven inter-governmental organisations for whom most of the world has a great respect. I refer to the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and to its sister organisation, the International Monetary Fund.
I do not for one moment even tentatively suggest that fiscal and monetary unity is the starting point in this problem. It is, if anything, the fruit of unity. But what I do maintain is that the gentlemen on the executive boards of the World Bank or the I.M.F. are people with long experience in the service of a Government, and more often than not in very differing departments of a Government, and that the overall experience of the Bank and the I.M.F. goes beyond direct financing to the area where economics overlap with politics. Consequently, I beg leave to suggest to my noble friend the Leader of the House that he and his right honourable friends may care to ponder upon the possibility of negotiating the setting up of a Working Party under the confidential conditions that surround the World Bank and the I.M.F., composed of those representative gentlemen who are appointed by their respective

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Governments, to sit down together in a continuing and confidential exchange of views as a real Working Party to reconcile the interests of those primarily concerned and those secondarily concerned.
I submit, my Lords, that some such initiative is of vital importance during the present phase of toleration and moderation in East-West relationships, and at a time when some of the rigidities which have governed inter-European relations in the last twenty years are relaxing. We cannot count indefinitely on the support of our present allies within the Common Market and we certainly cannot afford yet another failure.
6.0 p.m.
BARONESS GAITSKELL: My Lords, I hope that the noble Lord, Lord St. Oswald, will forgive me if I intervene for a moment in this debate, in view of the fact that several noble Lords have referred to the Gaitskell five conditions. For the Record, I should like to make it plain (I do not think this is generally understood, even to-day) that Hugh Gaitskell was not in principle against going into Europe: he was against going in without conditions. In 1962 he knew—and he had seen and talked to hundreds of people in the French Government, to Mr. Couve de Murville, a few weeks before he died—that there was not the faintest chance of our getting into Europe on any conditions, good or bad, at that time. Mr. Heath's attempts, admirable though they were, led him into wishful thinking that it was possible.
But, since 1963, things have changed, and I am sure that my husband, had he lived, would have taken this into account, as the noble Earl, Lord Dundee, said. I myself am not against going into Europe, but I am not in favour of rushing into Europe on any terms. I think, too, that we should take the first steps and join the European Economic Community before we begin to talk glibly about Political Union and before we begin to speculate as to whether Her Majesty The Queen will be known as Queen of the Common Market.
6.3 p.m.
LORD CAMPBELL OF ESKAN: My Lords, I wonder whether I also may be forgiven for intervening to make a very
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short point; I feel very hesitant to speak after the noble Baroness, Lady Gaitskell. I want to make a plea that the most earnest consideration should be given to the effects on the Commonwealth countries in the Caribbean of Britain's possible entry into the E.E.C. I must declare an interest. I have business interests in the Caribbean. The problems and plight of the West Indies may seem a very minor point and a side issue to many of your Lordships in the context of the great range of national and international issues involved in the subject of this important debate. But the future of the West Indies and Guyana and British Honduras is not a small point or side issue to West Indians or Guyanese or British Hondurans.
I agree with the noble Viscount, Lord Hall, that we cannot go on patronising and adopting a paternalistic attitude to the new nations of the Commonwealth. But we in Britain largely created these Caribbean societies and countries for our own strategic and trading purposes. We established their industries on slavery, maintained them on indentured labour and exploited their resources largely for our own ends and to our own advantage. We exported our language, our institutions, our values, our expectations to them, not to mention cricket. Now that most of them have become independent they are left with formidable inherited problems of our making.
These West Indian Islands and Guyana form a relatively poor, fragmented archipelago and have appalling pressures of population on their limited land and natural resources. Their economies are for the most part competing with each other and all compete with the larger economies of the Southern states of America and all the big Latin American countries. British trade and aid are still critically important to them, and so is access here for their export crops, such as sugar, citrus and bananas. It seems to me that we owe it to their peoples to ensure that their Governments are fully consulted and informed at every stage of our E.E.C. negotiations, to assure them beyond a peradventure that their vital interests in and relationship with Britain, and perhaps eventually Britain in Europe, will be fully protected. It would be fatally easy to sacrifice those countries unheedingly because they are small and poor and far away.
6.6 p.m.
THE MARQUESS OF ABERDEEN AND TEMAIR: My Lords, with the kind permission of the noble Lord, Lord St. Oswald I have a very few words to say, and it is about EFTA, which has been referred to by the noble Viscount, Lord Hall. Its importance in the discussions which have taken place is not, to my mind, realised. We are members of that Association by a perfectly clear and definite Treaty, and when, to suit ourselves, and without previous warning, a surcharge was made on imports from our EFTA associates it was a definite breach of contract. They took it pretty well, but obviously it caused some bitterness. For instance, there was some little difficulty in our trade exhibition in Oslo. The surcharge is now to be reduced, but some bitterness must remain.
If we are to negotiate with our friends when we put our case to the Common Market, we must get the full sanction of the members of our Association, which is the only one to which we are so closely bound. Let us not make that slight discontent even greater by deserting them and ignoring them in this very important matter. The noble Earl the Leader of the House will know from where I am quoting, perhaps slightly paraphrased:
"The perfect man is he who will not break an agreement with his neighbour though it were to his own hindrance".
6.8 p.m.
LORD ST. OSWALD: My Lords, I was particularly grateful for the late intervention of the noble Baroness, Lady Gaitskell. I was grateful that she gave us that assurance about a man with whom I used to speak frequently on train journeys, he to his constituency and I to my home, and for whom, as I think she knows, I had a very great admiration—as all of us did. I believe that his opposition was based on an illusion, and I must say this because I shall be making it clear in the course of what I say. But the noble Baroness has made it clear that it was an honest illusion; indeed, he was a man incapable of anything but honesty. The important thing for us to know is that he was in principle in favour; he just thought there was not a hope.
My Lords, in ancient mythology Europa was depicted as sitting on the
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back of a white bull. The noble Lord, Lord Boothby, makes an undeniably fine bull and Homer would be satisfied with him. He cast himself to-day as the proper vehicle for Europa. Unclassically there was a second bull, or a second Zeus disguised as a bull, in the form of the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, a beast of a somewhat different style and tone, but also formidable. When pondering upon this early case history I recalled the unfortunate sequel. Zeus, in his disguise, having discovered Europa gathering flowers in a meadow, no sooner persuaded her to climb upon his back than he swam rapidly out to sea. On reaching Crete he resumed his proper shape and induced the infatuated nymph to discard her vows of perpetual celibacy and bear him three sons, whom he then deserted, together with their mother. She was taken pity on by King Asterius of Crete, who married her and adopted her sons. Just how Archbishop Makarios would come into this re-enactment of the legend I am unable to see. However, this is the way the mesmeric urbanity of the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, sets my imagination to work. So suave, so silky-coated, so obviously utterly a bull of the world is the noble Lord that I grow apprehensive as to Europa's fate, were she to surrender entirely, and of course understandably, to his charms. Needless to say, I have no cause to suspect that there is any touch of philandering in his own already celebrated courtship.
My Lords, even before this debate there could be little doubt as to the European-minded nature of your Lordships, at least on this side of the House. On three successive Wednesdays in this month Europe will have been a theme of the main debate. Last week, from this Dispatch Box, my noble friend Lord Nugent of Guildford, urged the Government to pay special attention to the harmonising of our agricultural system with that of the Common Market, with a view to joining it. To-day, we have been discussing for several hours the particular issue of our entry. Next Wednesday, we shall be debating the problems and the future of NATO.
With the best and friendliest will in the world, it could not be said that the noble Lord, Lord Champion, gave a heartening reply to my noble friend Lord Nugent of Guildford last week. My noble

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friend behind me has already drawn attention to this, but I will do the same. In response to my noble friend's direct request, he said that he did not want to go into it too deeply, although there was a fair amount that he could say about it. In the passage which followed these cryptic, somewhat ominous words (the passage is recorded at column 386 of Hansard for June 22) he made it pretty plain that whatever he might have said, had he been so minded, would have been markedly unfavourable. He also declared—and here is a fairly telling quote (col. 385):
"…this we must consider in connection with the whole business of, perhaps, going into the European Economic Community. We must consider this as a factor and we dare not lose sight of it."
There is a fine, positive, dynamic approach, if ever I heard one! There is something to warm—
LORD CHAMPION: My Lords, what is the noble Lord complaining of: that I came forth treading delicately, like Agag? I should have thought that was my function.
LORD ST. OSWALD: My Lords, what I am saying is that there was nothing very much in that to warm the cockles of the hearts of our friends across the Channel, or to persuade them of our burning sincerity:
"We dare not lose sight of it"—
for fear, one gathers, of what they might be getting up to across the water. I can only equate this remark with the revealing headline which I once saw in a London evening paper: "Fog in Channel. Continent isolated". I am aware, as I say this, that flippancy in such a context may be inexpedient. Here I am not referring to a newspaper headline; I am speaking of a ministerial attitude—and ministerial attitudes concern us very deeply at this time.
The last occasion on which your Lordship's attention was focused on the main issue of our relations with the Community was on the third day of the debate on the Humble Address, which was April 27. On that day, the noble Earl the Leader of the House made one or two forthcoming—(or should I say "frank"?) observations. Among other things, he said, most quotably and commendably, I recall that:
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"success in entering the Common Market is the firm objective of the Government"—[OFFICIAL REPORT, Vol. 274 (No. 5), col. 154.]
He also said (col. 150):
"We in the Government agree entirely that it would he to our political and economic advantage to join the Community."
Were we truly entitled to take these reassuring remarks, separate them and decontaminate them from the main corpus of ministerial utterance on the subject: could we safely regard them as the Tablets of Stone, accepted and revered by the whole of the Government and their supporters, then there would be less need for me to speak doubtfully and probingly to-day about the Government's proposed course of action or inaction in this vital area? It is true that the mood of the noble Earl on that occasion was one of pained surprise that anyone could possibly doubt that that was the attitude of the Government; and when the noble Earl expresses pain and surprise, as he frequently does, his mobile features portray greater agony than most men could bear.
I am not forgetting that, by way of backing up his personal pledge, the noble Earl referred the same day to two other well-disposed statements, made in the course of the same week by two other Cabinet Ministers. In qualification he said (col. 211):
"I should be much surprised if those views expressed were not those of the Prime Minister."
The trouble is, of course, that Ministers in the present Government are continually surprising each other, and the Prime Minister—that is, when the Prime Minister is not astounding them. So, unhappily, although the sincerity of the noble Earl is a byword, inside and outside this House, we cannot separate the attitude professed by him on that occasion from the quite opposite dicta issued by other Ministers on other occasions, most strikingly by the Prime Minister, and not, as yet, corrected or withdrawn by "the boss" himself.
There were, we recollect, those earlier, slighting references to "a rich man's club" which Britain was "not going to join, whatever the terms". There was Mr. Wilson's dynamic, forceful influence in that Labour Party Conference in the critical autumn of 1962. Since he obtained leadership and power, Mr. Wilson's statements on the Common Market have been

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at best of a caginess cautious enough to confine his own field of action, and to implant in the minds of others the impression of a most uncertain-tempered political animal, self-confined but probably, on the whole, better kept behind bars, for the health and safety of the Community.
At the EFTA Summit meeting in Vienna, in May of last year, attended by 30 Ministers, including six Prime Ministers, he spoke blandly of building bridges between EFTA and E.E.C. "or else digging tunnels". When Mr. Harold Wilson begins digging a tunnel, the devil alone knows where he is likely to surface; and I do not think anyone, on either side of the Channel, or the Atlantic, would care to lay a bet. More lately, and far more gravely, in the Election campaign three months ago, he delivered that utterly deplorable, almost lethally damaging Bristol speech, by which his attitude is identified in Europe to-day. After virtually blackballing himself and his Administration from leading us into the Common Market, he said, in a typical piece of fanfaronade:
"Of course we shall negotiate, with our heads held high, not crawl in."
What, in essence, he was demanding in that same speech was that the six Governments themselves should go down on their knees, to beg him to enter, like some portly Sultan from the Arabian Nights.
He came as close as he could, from a purely Party political platform—though speaking as Prime Minister—to proclaiming the ban upon his own intrusion into a powerful and proud, existing and expanding community of nations. That sort of capering will not get us into Europe. However, a lot of what is said on Socialist political platforms is, in charity, forgiven and forgotten. He was not content with such forgiveness. On May 5, in the House of Commons, he explicitly ratified the terms of that hustings speech as Government policy. That, I fear, was bound to eclipse the comforting words of the noble Earl delivered nine days earlier in this House.
LORD BOOTHBY: My Lords, would the noble Lord forgive me for interrupting, just to say that you cannot go into a tunnel with head held high, you have to crawl in.
LORD ST. OSWALD: My Lords, that, of course, is a good point. It is not the first of the good points that we have heard from the noble Lord, Lord Boothby, and I hope that the Prime Minister will hoist it in.
There is one point on which I must myself directly contradict the noble Earl; that is, in telling him that we in the Conservative Party are in a position to advise the Government on what will take us into Europe. In that speech of the noble Earl from which I have already quoted, he also said, referring to our endeavours four years before (col. 151):
"I would point out that they failed to get in. So I am afraid that we cannot turn to them for information on how entry should be secured…"
This was an error both of implication and of judgment. In fact, the element of success in that endeavour was one, I should think, that he is intellectually best able to appreciate. It was a moral and a technical triumph. Out of the six Governments scrutinising our application, five at least believed—and still believe—that agreement could have been reached; so indeed did we, and do we, as my noble friend Lord Dundee has already said. The implementation of that majority belief and desire was prevented. We were disqualified by a purely political decision, made in Paris—and not in Brussels—at a point when the remaining technical obstacles had been stripped of their credibility. We were disqualified and excluded for the time being.
Our two purposes had been to seek conditions for entry suitable to Britain's interests, and to convince the Six member countries that our entry, on such conditions, would benefit Europe. Five, as I say, were openly convinced; the sixth was perhaps also convinced of the benefit to Europe, but more exacting on purely national grounds.
THE EARL OF LONGFORD: My Lords, perhaps this might be a good moment for me to interrupt the noble Lord. I gather he is correcting me about something. He said I made some false statement.
LORD ST. OSWALD: No; that you made a false judgment.
THE EARL OF LONGFORD: No, a false statement and a false judgment. I

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was told that I had said something incorrect in announcing that the noble Lords opposite had failed to get in. I gather they won what is called a moral triumph, but they did not get in; so I am afraid I was right.
LORD ST. OSWALD: If the noble Earl reads my words with an even more subtle mind than any of his companions, he will see the point that I am making. It was not the sort of judgment which I should expect to come from him. The statement that we had nothing to offer to the present Government by way of advice on how to get in, simply because we were excluded by this political decision, does not in fact make any sense. Moreover, Ministers of the present Government, leaders and spokesmen of that Government, have certainly done themselves no service by falsifying the evidence and pretending publicly that our purpose then or our purpose now has ever been to seek entry without conditions. They have done themselves extensive damage by pretending that they might possibly force an entry for Britain, through a breach in the Treaty of Rome.
This volume which I have in my hand entitled The Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community and Connected Documents is composed, physically, of two almost exactly equal halves. The first half is the Treaty of Rome itself, 248 Articles. These have remained inviolate since the signing in March, 1957, and will remain inviolable certainly at the hands of any new country seeking membership. Ministers must not deceive themselves or the country as to this. Any postulant will have to accept the Treaty as it stands. The Community cannot be pressurised from without. The rest of the volume, the second half, contains the conventions, and these were negotiated separately, with each of the founder members putting forward its own special interests—firmly, persuasively—and seeking, from its co-negotiators, acceptance of those special needs and interests. This mechanism, this means of incorporating special requirements of an individual country into the processes of the Community, is still at the disposal of any new candidate. It is presumed by all existing members that this machinery would be called into action by any candidate in a period of negotiation, such
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as we undertook with such a high measure of success in 1961. Every doubt expressed by present Ministers as to our own potential under the Treaty as it stands is a doubt cast directly on their own negotiating skills.
When the Prime Minister uttered those brash and braggart words about holding our heads high, not crawling in, his only effect was to sicken and dishearten those whom, in wisdom, he should he trying to impress—those friends in the Community who remember best the talks which ended, so sadly for so many, in January, 1963. What our negotiators achieved—and this I think answers the noble Lord's point and objection to a very large extent—during those 15 months (and I am thinking in particular of my right honourable friends Mr. Edward Heath and Mr. Christopher Soames) was of true and enduring value. They established themselves in the minds and hearts of the other participants as hardy, shrewd and skilful defenders of their country's standing, but also as sincere and dedicated Europeans. When a thorny problem was presented, their attack upon that problem was to demand, "What is the best solution for all of us?" They sought a method most beneficial to a Community including Britain, not along lines of "special pleading" for a new member alone. They recognised from the start that the common good would contain within it the benefit they sought for the individual member.
It is a proud thing, travelling in the countries of the Community to-day, to witness the manner in which these two British negotiators, and their advisers at the time, are spoken of, after what the noble Earl has been pleased to call "their failure". In the minds of all within the Community they stood, and still stand, as two European statesmen. Let me remind your Lordships of the words of Mr. Edward Heath in the moment of setback, which no loyal European saw fit to gloat upon. His closing words, which deeply moved some of the toughest bargainers at the table, were these:
"We in Britain are not going to turn our backs on the mainland of Europe; or on the countries of the Community. We are part of Europe; by geography, tradition, history, culture and civilisation. We shall continue to work with all our friends in Europe for the true unity and strength of this continent".

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Those words and the impression left by those words are part of the inheritance now paid over to the present Government of Britain. I hope they will turn it to good account.
Some Ministers, we know, would sincerely wish to; and the noble Earl is certainly one of them. Yet it must be said that up to this moment the Government of noble Lords opposite have not produced one statesman of the calibre, insight and prestige in Europe of either of my two right honourable friends. They have not provided a voice which could echo those words with equal power or equal conviction. They had not done so before, three months ago, they began to toy more amiably with the concept of Britain in the Community. They have not done so since. I pray they will neither squander, nor allow to devalue by negligence, the moral credit contained in that bequest from their predecessors.
To sustain this advantage more will be required than simply tying the label of "Minister for Europe" round the neck of some amenable politician, even with all the Scottish qualities attributed to him by the noble Lord, Lord Caccia. Labels as such do not impress. The mentality, the conviction, the insight and the energy of the man so designated may impress. None of this implies any discourtesy to Mr. George Thomson, whom everyone appears to like and who seems anxious to learn about the facts of European life. It is no fault of his that he has been given as yet no opportunity to impress. The men, the Ministers, the Governments he has to deal with on the Continent will want to know what strength of purpose, what sincerity, lies behind his appointment and behind his approaches, the first of which was made yesterday.
Of late it has become clear that the mood of this country is more favourable to entry than before, despite the bashfulness or reticence of the key Ministers of the day. Unhappily this improvement has been coeval with a weakening of our economic position. There has been a panic and uncertainty since Autumn 1964, panic paraded before the world. It will not be so effortless to hold our heads high as it was on the previous occasion. In 1961 our heads were not
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bowed beneath the debt of £900 million to other countries. The industries which we now need to help us fight our way back to solvency were not crippled and bewildered as they find themselves today.
In the meantime, the trade and production figures in the Community have outstripped all estimates, and the internal reduction of tariffs is impressively ahead of schedule. Since 1963 the rise in the rate of industrial production has doubled, an increase from 119 to 132. Exports have risen by 23 points. Gold reserves in the Common Market have gone up by 1,414 million dollars. Both absolutely and relatively to the Common Market we are not so strong as we were. But that should not deter us from stating now our readiness to enter, and it seems that it has not.
There is good and immediate reason for this. Ministers have grown wretchedly aware that our word weighs less than it did in the councils of the world, since their assumption of power. There are many places in the world where we are treated with less than courtesy, as the past months have shown; where we are considered a spent force, a withered influence, in world affairs. All the Prime Minister's rhetoric has not altered this false belief. There is one important part of the world where that belief is rejected; that is, among our European neighbours. They have known us too long, they have shared too many sacrifices over the centuries, to accept so quickly and easily our apparent decline. They see it not as a decline in national character, but only as a patch of bad leadership which is more simply remedied, or so they hope. They are holding open for us the option to reclaim our influence and their regard.
The disturbing fact is that at least some senior Ministers seem so utterly oblivious of all this. I do not know, in all honesty, whether the Prime Minister understands very much about the world beyond the Scilly Isles. There is so little sign that he perceives the need for the launching of this magnificent European enterprise. While in Opposition, there was nobody so vociferous or so baleful in complaint about American pre-potency within the Free World. To-day the rectifying of that balance is being effected, and it behoves Britain under whatever leadership to strengthen that

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process. The slogan which I offer to Her Majesty's Government, waiving all claim to copyright, is "Stop ticking! Get weaving!"
Not since the days of the Roman Empire has the civilised world been so dominated by a single great Power—so reliant upon that one great Power to make all major decisions, to protect the remainder from the barbarian forces threatening all freedom and all achievement. It is the boon of our civilisation, the saving factor, that this great Power of our epoch, the United States, does not wish to dominate selfishly. Her own innate scruples make her loath to occupy this all-providing, all-deciding, monolithic role among responsible, civilised mankind. Most happily of all, the United States does not wish to devour the weaker peoples as other great Powers past and present have desired. Her own ambition, so often demonstrated, is that the smaller Powers should grow stronger.
By their own historic experience, the Americans know that such strength comes from a combining of interests and aspirations. This was the meaning of Marshall Aid, and the insistence that Europe should form her own indigenous council and authority for the sharing out of that restoring aid. It was part of the American design, part of the terms of Marshall Aid, that O.E.C.D. was formed, which was mentioned by the noble Viscount, Lord Hall. So we, the peoples of post-war stricken Europe, had our first plain, practical incentive and opportunity to combine. We had the splendid voice of Winston Churchill, identified with triumph through adversity, describing the unity which could be ours. In weakness we discovered the means to strength. It would be a disaster and a disgrace if, once this strength had been won back as it has, we should forget the new lessons and return to weakness. Such strength as Europe now possesses is still only relative to the exhaustion from which it grew. It is healthy only in contrast to the sickness of the war years. It is purposeful in comparison to the aimless greed of bygone rulers. Unless the present rulers of Europe, including our own, can appreciate this, then all that has been achieved could be illusory, ephemeral unmerited.
At this point I feel impelled to say something of an aspect which is more
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constantly in my mind, perhaps, than in the minds of other equally thoughtful but more significant men of affairs. When we speak of Europe, in the context of this debate, for example, we tend to mean Western Europe—the countries and the peoples on the lucky side of the Iron Curtain. We commit, to that extent, an error and an injustice. I have tried hard to excuse myself for describing what is at present a token Europe as if it were the whole, because I believe that one day it will be.
Unless we believe that, in the full dawn of the Europe we are working for, the now captive nations will be free and desirous to join the expanding Community, there is bound to be something incongruous, something invidious, in this use of the term "Europe". So long as it is a Europe limited to Six or Seven or Eleven, or even the whole score of countries now formed of free men, it remains incomplete. It is still a Europe bereft of nations which provided so much, and until so recently, of the rich store of culture and civilisation which we have inherited, and which we could ignore only at our own considerable loss. This is an undoubtedly heavy-tongued way of saying that I believe in the wholeness of Europe, to embrace ourselves and those other nations with an equal and historic claim to the standards and responsibilities of being a European. That concept is at all times in my mind, when the vast and valuable puissance of this Continent—our Continent—stirs my imagination.
I totally disagree with the 80 Labour Members of Parliament, who also touched upon the idea in general terms of an all-embracing Europe, in the declaration last Monday—the declaration referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, as "octogenarian mutterings". They assumed it was necessary, to make way for their new order, for the whole of the present foundation of the Community to be demolished; for a new start to be made. Should such a destructive work be carried out, I do not believe that building would begin again in our lifetime, perhaps in many lifetimes. To realise the dream of a whole Europe, we cannot evaporate the present success; we have to expand it.
To-morrow morning I shall fly to Bonn to attend a conference of the Central

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and Eastern European Commission of the European Movement. We shall be discussing, in particular, the possibilities of closer links with the satellite countries, as they are at present governed. We shall undoubtedly be speaking of another conference to take place in February in Brussels under the auspices of ELEC—the European League for Economic Cooperation. That will be attended by key men in the Eastern European countries—directors of planning, bankers, leading economics experts, and the heads of branches in the main industries. The purpose will be to discuss economic relations, and it will be the first such discussion, called by an organisation concerned with European unity, to have representatives from the countries of Eastern Europe. It is hoped that it may open the way to a wider dialogue within the framework of such European unity. In doing this, the organisers are trying to prepare the ground ahead for a far later stage, a long span beyond that step from which our Government—at least until yesterday—appeared to be shrinking.
Let me specify, as my noble friend Lord Dundee specified earlier, that we look to the Government now for a credible declaration of good faith, in specific and practical terms, towards the Community. In the light of Mr. de Broglie's encouraging remarks in Brussels yesterday, the moment for such an application may be earlier than it appeared. Next week M. Pompidou and Mr. Couve de Murville arrive in London. This must be significant. It could be fruitful, especially if the Daily Telegraph is right in deducing that the first full-scale studies of British problems of entry will take place when M. Pompidou meets Mr. Wilson on July 7. Perhaps the noble Earl will be able to confirm this report. Certainly, the meeting will allow a peaceful reconnaissance patrol into French thinking at this stage. If only the noble Earl, in a few minutes' time, could be more definite than Mr. Thomson about our acceptance of the Treaty, that patrol would have an easier time and the way forward into Europe might become clearer.
Now I have, against the wishes of Lord Caccia, called for a declaration of good faith couched in specific and convincing terms. I hope that the noble Earl does
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not think that this is terribly caddish. It is not a case, as Lord Caccia suggested, of requiring a declaration every week or two. The worrying factor is that when the Prime Minister has pronounced on these matters the effect has been very disturbing. We hope that he has had a change of heart, and we hope that the noble Earl will tell us so. To compare the Prime Minister's speech at Bristol with Mr. Thomson's words yesterday is to compare chalk with cheese. We are so accustomed to the Prime Minister having a card up his sleeve, to produce with aflourish to discomfort his opponents: but we are not gambling with opponents here, we are negotiating with friends. There are certain cards which could kill the game, if not the dealer.
Has a Cabinet decision been taken to seek entry into Europe? If so, it would be pleasing to hear it in Parliament as well as to infer it from Press reports. Suppose it has: what is the next move? What are the terms that the Government anticipate, and what are the objections they have withdrawn? Will they accept the common agricultural policy? And again I ask: what is the next move? All these things the noble Earl can tell us to-day, and I lay particular stress on the last of these questions.
It may well be in the hands of Her Majesty's Government to carry this endeavour forward to success. Will they therefore, I ask the noble Earl, endorse to-day the words, so well remembered in Europe, spoken by my right honourable friend Mr. Heath when he opened the first negotiations on October 10, 1961—the negotiations with which yesterday's words have been compared? He said:
"We are ready to accept and play our full part in the institutions established under Article 4 and other Articles of the Treaty. We fully share the aims and objectives, political and otherwise, of those who drew up this declaration, and we shall be anxious, once we are members of the Community, to work with you in a positive spirit, to reinforce the unity you have already achieved."
LORD CHAMPION: We did not get in.
LORD ST. OSWALD: I am asking the noble Earl to-day—and it is a straight question, satisfied by a simple, "Yes": Would his Government at least endorse now those words on behalf of the British people? Nothing less will do. When the noble Lord, Lord Champion, mocks me

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again by saying, "We did not get in", perhaps they think that they will have to say something more, but they can say nothing less. It will not be enough, I fear, for the noble Earl to repeat in this instance that he would be surprised if those were not the views of the Prime Minister. Plenty of people would be very surprised indeed—though it would be a happy surprise. For the words of the noble Earl to have significance to-day, they must commit the Government in a clearer and more specific manner than has been done so far.
LORD BOOTHBY: Why did you not do it?
LORD ST. OSWALD: I missed the noble Lord's question. Would he repeat it?
LORD BOOTHBY: I said: Why did you not commit the Government? You had ten years in which to do it.
LORD ST. OSWALD: We went into fifteen months of negotiation. If that is not committing the Government, I should like to know what is.
LORD BOOTHBY: You are not going to get away with it.
LORD ST. OSWALD: My Lords, in one respect I think I may find myself in agreement with the noble Earl. He smiles disbelievingly. If Britain cannot be expected to enter the Common Market without any conditions, as we all agree, still less can Britain or any other nation attempt to set a rigid pattern for the future of the Community. I am not ready to say that Europe, five, ten or fifty years hence, must conform or could conform complaisantly to a design drawn up by one highly intelligent man at one particular stage of its development—or even by a group of highly intelligent men. I believe in an evolving Europe, and I insist that Britain ought to influence that evolution from within—the sooner the better.
I do not and cannot believe in a prefabricated Europe constructed from an arbitrary blueprint dated 1966. That cannot be our duty to posterity. It is inviting posterity to laugh at us, rather as we tend to laugh at dusty copies of Baedeker's Europe to-day. Lord Gladwyn's book, which has been described by the Leader of the House him-
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self as "a small classic", begins with Charlemagne and ends with Gladwyn. I am not positive that he draws any clear distinction in his mind between the two. I regret to say that this particular Roland would find it hard to accept a post among his Paladins.
My Lords, in closing, I wish to put it to the Government, through the noble Earl who will reply, that there can be political guilt in omission as well as commission. For Britain to flutter nervously or negligently outside this emerging Europe would make a culprit of every serving Minister.
LORD BOOTHBY: Which we did for ten years.
LORD ST. OSWALD: Living as we do in the second half of the twentieth century, inertia in this issue can be classified as a political offence. We can apply one very extreme, one violent but telling comparison within the political memory of most of us. Twenty-one years ago it was enough for a British Government, in Cabinet, to decide that Hitler and his all-conquering savagery should be stemmed, should not be any longer licensed by our apathy to continue plundering the lives and liberties and decencies of human existence. It was a decision between world war and a kind of peace—peace in an ever-expanding concentration camp which would have engulfed the whole of Europe, as well as Britain. It was Britain which decided, at this climacteric, upon war instead of slow surrender, and the world followed us into war on one side or the other.
To-day, what sort of comparable choice could be made by us or by any one European country? The naked answer is, "None." Many noble Lords present—perhaps the majority—will say that this is an excellent thing in itself. I am not here to mourn the fact: I am simply stating it as a touchstone of all political life in this decade. It seems undeniable to me that what applies in the power to declare war applies also in the power to prevent war. It applies in the power to make a decision of any magnitude, of any significance whatever, for the well being, the elevation, even the maintenance, of man on this planet. Yet, knowing as we do that Europe is the repository of so much accumulated experience, wisdom, culture and love of freedom, we should be betraying our duty to those

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who follow if we allowed the voice of Europe to be neglected, dissipated among a score of quarrelling tongues.
This Continent, to which we are linked by bonds far stronger than any bridge of earth, has inherited the secret of survival in the face of catastrophe, repeated times without number. We must pass on that secret to a world beset to-day by dangers of a scale never dreamed of before. We must pass it on, obviously without threats, yet with authority—an authority rooted in conviction and reinforced by unity. This congenital wisdom of Europe, born from so much death and misery and survival, cannot conceivably urge us to build unity in order to create a Third Force to defy America, and so divide the Free World. That would be madness, and we are speaking, very precisely, of sanity. Sanity will create a Europe to share the effort and responsibility of peaceful advance: to share it on equal terms with America and with any other great Power which may turn from the aims of domination to the aims of brotherhood.
I say that we owe this not only to ourselves and our history, and to the world at large, but also, in a private sense, to the United States. For what a friend that nation has been to Europe and to every European! Yet now we see that the greatest mortal Power humanity has ever known can feel lonely, faced by humanity's present problems. Twice in our lifetimes the New World has come to the aid of the Old. Now is the turn of the Old World to come to the aid of the New. Now is the turn. Now is the opportunity. This great, mutually powerful partnership is what the wisest leaders of America have urged us repeatedly to create, out of our own resources, spiritual, intellectual and material. This equally, has been the aim and aspiration of the wisest leaders, the great political philosophers and statesmen of Europe. Here is the rendezvous of great minds, great men and great nations. That is a rendezvous which Britain must keep.
6.51 p.m.
THE EARL OF LONGFORD: My Lords, this debate was initiated some hours ago by three most earnest, well-informed speeches by the noble Lord, Lord Boothby, the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn,
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and, from the Front Bench opposite, the noble Earl, Lord Dundee. It was continued on the same level by other speakers. I find it hard to comment on the speech to which we have just listened. It hardly rose to the same level, and at times it sank slightly lower than is usual for speeches from either Front Benches. I will leave out the audacity of the noble Lord's suggestion that, in some way, his good friends won a moral triumph in their European policy. Very belatedly they did what they could, but they were, of course, defeated.
LORD ST. OSWALD: My Lords—
THE EARL OF LONGFORD: The noble Lord has addressed us at some considerable length. Perhaps he will let me continue.
LORD ST. OSWALD: The noble Earl challenged me.
THE EARL OF LONGFORD: I am going to challenge the noble Lord a good deal more. He is not finished with yet. What I am afraid was much more repugnant to many in the House was the extraordinary tone of personal abuse, very carefully prepared with the help of midnight oil, that he found necessary to adopt towards the Prime Minister. He achieved the miraculous feat of being frivolous and ponderous at the same time to an extent that I cannot recall being equalled in this House. So I should only hope that the noble Lord (whom we all like) will think twice and spend still more midnight oil over the next speech of this character before he decides to inflict it upon us in quite that form. It was a very unpleasant experience to have sat through it for some who admire the Prime Minister and, indeed, for most of us who have any feeling for the House. So much, just by way of friendly comment on the speech of the noble Lord, Lord St. Oswald. I now return to the grave issues—
LORD ST. OSWALD: My Lords, may I now accept the challenge?
THE EARL OF LONGFORD: Later on. I think the noble Lord has had a good spell. Someone said he had spoken for an hour, but I think that was an exaggeration.
LORD BOOTHBY: It seemed like an hour.
THE EARL OF LONGFORD: There will be plenty of opportunity later on. Perhaps the noble Lord will allow me to get under way with some of the other speakers.
The noble Lords, Lord Gladwyn and Lord Boothby, have, of course, contributed enormously to this cause. If it has advanced a considerable way in recent times, I suppose there are no two Britishers (I was going to say "Englishmen" but I assume that would not be quite correct in the case of the noble Lord, Lord Boothby) who have done more than those two noble Lords. If any cause with which I myself had been identified had made as much progress as theirs has, I should be very complacent. I will try to answer some of the points made by the noble Lord, Lord St. Oswald, clearing the personal issues out of the way. He made it difficult for me in one respect, for he treated me as a well-meaning person, at one moment of great significance (as now, apparently) but as of no significance on past occasions. He wants me to make some great declaration; although as soon as I make it he is going to tell me that it does not amount to anything.
LORD ST. OSWALD: My Lords, I hope it will not be contradicted nine days later by the Prime Minister.
THE EARL OF LONGFORD: Nothing have said has been contradicted by the Prime Minister. I am afraid the noble Lord must look up the Prime Minister's speeches and he will see that what I say is correct. I have said nothing in this House that has been contradicted by the Prime Minister.
May we see what we can say on this subject? I am bound to say that I, at least, found a good deal of wisdom in the remarks of the noble Lord, Lord Caccia, who has been compelled to leave the House before the end of the debate. He pointed out that it was rather difficult for a Government to make a fresh statement of their attitude or intentions every few weeks. It is not so very long ago since I made a very careful, deliberate statement in your Lordships' House of our whole philosophy in this matter, and other Ministers have spoken freely since. The most important speech recently was by the right honourable Mr. George Brown. There have been all these statements
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and it is impossible for me to advance beyond them. I hope that the noble Lord, Lord St. Oswald, or others will not think that I am retreating from them. Our attitude cannot be said to have changed. In that sense it has not moved since the last discussion on these matters. That I must make plain.
The question now is not the broad one of whether membership of the European Economic Community is desirable for Britain. That is now accepted. The noble Lords, Lord Boothby and Lord Gladwyn, are preaching to the converted. I must beg the noble Lord, Lord St. Oswald, who is so sceptical about this, if he attaches any importance to my words to accept that re-statement. The question of principle is accepted. It is now simply a question of the terms. It may also be said to be a question of timing and skill in negotiation. Naturally, these questions have been raised to-day and I am going to try to deal with some of those terms.
The noble Earl, Lord Dundee, was very courteous and gentle; and I hope he will allow me to say that I found some parts of his speech a little difficult to follow. He was saying, in effect, that we ought to indicate, lay an emphasis on, our readiness to enter—and that we have already done—but that we ought not to lay any stress on the conditions that there ought to be. He called them platitudes and said that they ought in some way to be taken for granted. I must apologise to the noble Earl, but in a debate of this kind it is my duty to spell out the conditions or difficulties or platitudes. Because once we are all agreed on the objective—I say "all": the noble Lord, Lord Wells-Pestell was the only speaker (and I was glad we had the other point of view) who, so to speak, disagreed (I think that is a fair way of putting it) with the objective—then, if we are going to have any further debate at all, I must deal with some of the conditions; otherwise I might as well sit down now after reaffirming our desire to enter.
May we look at some of these conditions? I think we were all moved by the speech of the noble Baroness, Lady Gaitskell. If I have been too offensive to the noble Lord, Lord St. Oswald, let me apologise for that. May I join in what he said about Mr. Hugh Gaitskell, who was one of the most splendid

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Englishmen of our time, a man who was taken away from us on the threshold of greatness. I think it would be rather impertinent of me to add any more about Hugh Gaitskell's point of view to what was said by the noble Baroness. I am sure she would not disagree with this way of putting it. We try to find different ways of saying the same thing. Perhaps this new way of referring to the five conditions will help to make things plain.
We regard them as a convenient yardstick of our requirements which must be viewed in the light of circumstances at the time we reopen negotiations. What the noble Baroness said is conclusive about Hugh Gaitskell's attitude. It is also the attitude of the Government. They are not five reasons why we should not join. Some of them now seem easier of attainment then they did when the conditions were formulated. That comment also may be offered as some reply to the noble Lord, Lord Wells-Pestell. May we just look at some of these conditions and other points of difficulty? We have said that we are ready and willing to join the European Economic Community provided that certain essential interests are safeguarded. That is surely obvious, that particular statement: every Government tries to safeguard its national interests. I agree with the noble Earl, Lord Dundee, in calling that a platitude; but it is necessary to labour it in this connection only because all the other countries are consulting their own interests, and if we had said we were so ready to join that we were going to neglect our own interests then we should be behaving in a way which would be despised by other countries and would not get us anywhere at all.
My Lords, may I just deal with one or two of the difficult points? There is agriculture. The noble Earl, Lord Dundee, and the noble Lord, Lord St. Oswald, and others, are agricultural experts. I am certainly not an agricultural expert, but it is necessary, at any rate for the Record, to point out why there are certain difficulties about agriculture when we come to join the Common Market. They have been mentioned many times before, but I will touch on them briefly without spelling them out. First—and here we must all agree—if we change over, as we should presumably have to, from the British system
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of agricultural support to the system used in the Community, there would undoubtedly be a great deal of disturbance. That must be accepted. It would be a far-reaching disturbance.
Secondly, after that, so to speak, was completed, there would be a significant distortion in the present pattern of production in Britain. Producer prices would rise, but so in many cases would producer costs, and that again is going to create difficulties. It is not for me to say that you cannot overcome these difficulties, but difficulties would be found here. Our consumers, clearly, would have to pay more, however you like to work it out. This would mean a substantial rise in the cost of living. Furthermore, if the system recently agreed for financing the Community's common agricultural fund were applied to Britain in its present form, it would impose an exceptionally heavy burden on our balance of payments. That is a fact, so far as anything which is an economic calculation is a fact. It is a painful fact, but obviously we must take account of it when we are deciding what terms are acceptable.
THE EARL OF DUNDEE: My Lords, may I ask the noble Earl this on a point of clarification? Is he now saying that we shall have to change our agricultural policy when we do go in? That is one of the points which I particularly wanted cleared up, because some of the statements which have been made by the Prime Minister implied that we could go in only if we did not agree to the agricultural policy which has been established by the Six. We all recognise the practical difficulties which would follow, and some adjustment might have to be made, but it is important to get this principle clear. Does the noble Earl now agree that if we go in we shall have to accept the agricultural policy which has been already adopted?
THE EARL OF LONGFORD: No, my Lords, I am not giving a pledge of that kind; and I am not giving a pledge in the opposite direction. It would be a matter for negotiation and discussion.
THE EARL OF DUNDEE: My Lords, if the noble Earl will not answer that, surely it shows how undesirable it is to have these conditions stated when nobody knows what they mean.
THE EARL OF LONGFORD: My Lords, I am explaining the agricultural difficulties. I am afraid that here I cannot follow the noble Earl at all. If he was negotiating himself, he would have to state these difficulties. Whether or not he stated them in public would be for his own judgment. In fact, with a nation-wide international argument going on they would be bound to be stated in public; they could not be kept up one's sleeve. The difficulties are obvious. At the moment I am not trying to explain how the problems would be solved; I am only mentioning that this is the most difficult area. I should have hoped that the noble Earl, who is an agriculturist and understands these matters, would agree that our difficulties are to be found in this field; that is all. I cannot be thought to be labouring it unduly, I am speaking as briefly as possible about it.
THE EARL OF DUNDEE: My Lords, with respect, everybody knows there are difficulties. What we want to know is, are we trying to get in, are we hoping to get in, are the Government hoping to get in and still to maintain our present deficiency payment system and not adopt the system of the Common Market? If so, they are entertaining an impossible hope.
THE EARL OF LONGFORD: My Lords, anything the noble Earl says about that is well worth attention, but the answer to his question is that this is a matter for negotiation. I am afraid that the noble Earl and I are not understanding each other as well as usual. I am really saying something so obvious that I should not have thought it was capable of argument. It may not be very interesting, but it seems to me perfectly obvious that there is a difficult problem. We are not adopting a dogmatic attitude about the solution. It is a matter for negotiation and discussion. Perhaps I may point out a few of the other difficulties which arise.
LORD ST. OSWALD: My Lords, I think that it is the noble Earl, Lord Long ford, who is not grasping the point. We accepted the common agricultural policy before we went into negotiations. We are asking him: does he accept the common agricultural policy before he goes into negotiations?
THE EARL OF LONGFORD: My Lords, we are ready to discuss the whole matter in the negotiations. If the noble Lord cannot understand that, one of us is below par to-day, because it is one of the most obvious points that any public man can offer to another. May I proceed—after half an hour of brisk interruption—with the rest of my speech?
Let us take the question of the Commonwealth. Lord Campbell of Eskan raised a particular point about the West Indies, but he has been compelled to leave the debate. I would say about the Commonwealth that one would hope that there the problems would be lesser. I am saying, frankly, that from our point of view (I am not talking as an expert on this, I am talking as someone with a great deal of advice available to him), the agricultural side of it is the hardest. Assuming that one problem is harder than another, this, in our opinion, is the hardest aspect of it.
If you take the Commonwealth, there are problems there, but we would say that they are somewhat easier than they were. Let me say—I have not been particularly chivalrous to the efforts of the noble Lord and his colleagues in 1961 and 1963—that I would agree that there, in the case of the Common Market, a good many plans were provisionally worked out; and one would hope that arrangements of that kind, or at least as good, would be available. And in other areas there have been developments since that time which again suggest that the problem will be somewhat easier.
The more intractable problem is presented by Commonwealth countries that export temperate products—Canada, Australia and particularly New Zealand. But I want to stress that we do not regard these problems, these difficulties, as insuperable. But to stand up here and announce what we would and would not accept, to conduct a sort of public negotiation with our European friends while we are at the same time disclosing all our methods and bargaining positions in public, would, I should have thought, be impossible, and certainly such a course was not adopted by the noble Lords opposite.
Then again there is EFTA, which was mentioned by a number of speakers. I

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know that the noble Earl, Lord Dundee, has always taken a great interest in EFTA, and the matter was stressed by the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, and the noble Marquess, Lord Aberdeen and Temair, who has had to leave the debate. I am advised that the position there is that certain EFTA countries have indicated their readiness to join us in negotiations for entry and that others are less willing to do so. But it seems not unreasonable to suppose that, if they did wish, it would probably be open to them to negotiate agreements of association. So that there again I think one can draw some encouragement from recent events.
At the recent EFTA ministerial meeting at Bergen our partners showed a very full understanding of our position, as we did of theirs. The EFTA Ministers pledged their Governments to pursue by all available means their objective of European integration and undertook to keep each other fully informed of their individual efforts and to remain in close consultation at all stages. So we can be reasonably optimistic about developments on that front.
THE EARL OF DUNDEE: My Lords, that has always been so.
THE EARL OF LONGFORD: Well, my Lords, I think that things are going better now. I am not trying at this stage—if the noble Earl will forgive me—to make a Party point and say that we have been doing something which other noble Lords would not have thought of doing. But there has, in fact, been progress. It may be that it would have been made by the noble Earl but, it is—if I am allowed to offer any opinion—
THE EARL OF DUNDEE: But, my Lords—
THE EARL OF LONGFORD: May I finish my sentence? Because it has a bad effect on me if I stop in the middle of a sentence. I was saying that the situation is now easier than it was in 1963, so it appears. We consider that progress has been made. The noble Earl shakes his head, but I am only giving what I regard as the best information available, and I am afraid that there is not much more that we can clear up between us.
THE EARL OF DUNDEE: My Lords, I was intervening only on the point about
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EFTA. That was exactly the position in 1961 and 1962. We always knew, and always said, that we would not go in unless EFTA would come in; and it was understood that those members of EFTA who belong to NATO would probably be full members, and those who were not would probably be associates. There has been no change at all.
THE EARL OF LONGFORD: My Lords, there has been a change. I am sorry: the noble Earl misunderstands me. Perhaps this microphone is not working, though I am only a few feet away from it. There has been progress since 1963. The noble Earl can disbelieve it, but I am called on to make statements on behalf of the Government with expert advice. I am telling him where the difficulties are, and I am challenged on those; and where it is becoming a little easier and I am challenged on that. I am finding the noble Earl very difficult this evening. But, in our view, I repeat, there has been progress since 1963. And I am not making a Party point—after all, the noble Earl may have made it himself.
Now let me come to the issue of negotiations. I should have thought that noble Lords opposite—I think this is certainly true of the noble Lords, Lord Boothby and Lord Gladwyn—would not expect me to enunciate in detail the negotiating terms that we shall be seeking. Here I must say something which I do not think should discourage those who are closest to the situation. We do not intend to embark on formal negotiations in the immediate future, but what we want to emphasise—and I hope these words will carry outside this House—is that the objectives we shall pursue are moderate and reasonable, and I hope that our partners in the negotiations will display similar moderation and common sense.
What of the timing? Here I would ask your Lordships to ponder some factors. We have got to look carefully at all the implications of joining the Community, and on this the Government have already embarked. To some extent we can take advantage of the experience of previous negotiations. When I say that they failed, I do not deride them. We will certainly take advantage of what was learned in the course of that failure. But in three years a good deal has

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happened, and there are many new developments that must be taken into account—not least the consolidation of the Community. We now have an external problem, in addition to our own internal studies and investigations, of probing the views and, attitudes of our potential future partners. We must satisfy ourselves, not only that adequate and viable solutions to the problems involved can be found, but also that there is a fair prospect that they will prove acceptable to our partners in the Community. We must assure ourselves that the Six are anxious as we are that negotiations should not this time go un-rewarded. In other words, we cannot afford another open failure. If it be at all feasible—and I hope that this will seem reasonable to your Lordships—we should prefer to discuss well in advance how the major obstacles can be overcome, so that when the formal negotiations can begin, they can be brought quickly to a happy conclusion.
My noble friend Lord Silkin expressed the hope that negotiations would not drag on. I should also hope so, in the sense that when they are started I hope they will be rapidly concluded. I believe he will agree with me that a very careful and long period of initial discussion is necessary in order that formal negotiations can be embarked upon. Accordingly, we have taken every opportunity to have discussions with the Governments directly concerned. If anybody asked me here and now, as a straight question what we are doing about it, the answer is clear and positive. We are engaging in active, but informal, discussions with the countries in question. They cannot be called negotiations.
In this connection, may I particularly welcome the forthcoming visit of the French Prime Minister and Foreign Minister. I am sure that the words that fell from the noble Lord, Lord Boothby, about France will be particularly acceptable at a time when their feelings may be a little sensitive. We shall naturally be having conversations with our French visitors over a very wide field, including the matters I have mentioned, and a great many related considerations, such as collaboration in technical work. We look forward to hearing at first hand the views of the French Government.
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If anyone asks me what is our attitude to France, I feel that to satisfy the noble Lord, Lord St. Oswald, completely I had better quote what the Prime Minister said yesterday, and he will feel that he is getting the authentic voice:
"While, as the House knows, there are differences of view between ourselves and the French Government on questions affecting the organisation of the Atlantic Alliance, it is our constant purpose to maintain the best possible relations with France."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, Commons, Vol. 730 (No. 42), col. 1592 28/6/66.]
He went on to say that he was looking forward to the visit of the French Prime Minister as a welcome opportunity for improving these relations. I do not think that I need say any more. I recognise that the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, must be regarded as the greatest expert on France in this House. I think he would feel, in his old diplomatic capacity, that what I have said is all that can be said this afternoon.
On their side, the Community have emerged fairly recently from a prolonged crisis, which has left them with a heavy backlog of work. In all the circumstances, it does not look as if they would be ready immediately for formal negotiations. In other words, whatever we did or did not do, it does not seem that the Six themselves would be ready for formal negotiations in the immediate future. No doubt they will be a little further on.
My noble friend Lord Silkin, the noble Earl, Lord Selkirk, and other noble Lords, raised the large question of sovereignty. I do not feel qualified, either on behalf of Her Majesty's Government or even as an individual, to make a world-shaking pronouncement on this subject this afternoon. My noble friend Lord Stow Hill, who has had to go—and I would pay tribute to his extremely interesting spech—dealt with that theoretical issue and also made practical points of the first importance. My noble friend Lord Silkin and I for many years have been members of a Party which has always stood for the ultimate disappearance of national sovereignty. Nobody, unless it be my noble friend Lord Attlee, has worked as hard for World Government as my noble friend, and if I say that his objective and mine are identical, I think that he will understand me very well. And to some extent this also answers the noble Earl, Lord Selkirk.

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I would agree very warmly with what the noble Earl, Lord Selkirk, said about Europe becoming an outward-looking community. I should like to underline his precise words. When my remarks are read in Hansard—if they are read—I hope that the reader will turn back and read what the noble Earl said on this subject. I am afraid that I cannot reply to my noble friend Lord Hall as I wish to. He raised some points of special interest, and I shall write to him or communicate with him in another way.
We come to the terminology of the Motion in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn. He suggests that your Lordships should draw the Government's attention to the desirability of working towards a number of specific political objectives, in addition to joining the E.E.C.—at least, that is how I interpret it. My noble friend Lord Hall referred—I thought happily—to this objective as "a bull's-eye on a distant target." That seems to me to be a reasonable description of it. We all salute the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, not only for his persistence, but for his views in these matters. But, speaking for the Government, I must ask him whether he believes that the purpose he has in mind would best be served by a specific declaration on these lines at this time by the Government.
I am not for a moment questioning the wisdom of the noble Lord in raising this issue, but I am asking him seriously whether it would be prudent for the Government to make a declaration on these lines at this time. Indeed, I am not sure that the noble Earl, Lord Dundee, agreed with him, or that the noble Baroness, Lady Emmet of Amberley, who spoke so well about these matters, agreed with him. Unless I misunderstood the noble Earl, he was very doubtful about the wisdom of a statement of the kind called for by the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn. It is no secret that the views implicit in such a declaration are not shared by all the present members of the Community. That is common knowledge. One is bound to ask whether the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, really believes that we should be more likely to overcome the difficulties which arose last time if we took sides in a dispute or difference of view within the Community. So from the prudential point
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of view, apart from any other, I must put it to the noble Lord that it would apparently be wiser for the Government to steer clear of contentious issues such as the one he has raised.
What I have said may seem to emphasise the negative rather than the positive aspects of the Government's intentions. There is a difficulty about doing anything else. The phrases required to indicate our desire to enter the Common Market have been used, and used more than once, and one cannot go on repeating them indefinitely. Because I have pointed out the difficulties—obviously my remarks will be read by some persons abroad, and it is my duty to call attention to those difficulties—I do not want anybody to suppose that the Government are not fully conscious of the great benefits that might flow to us once we have become members of a large European community; and not only the benefits to our own economy, though we believe they will be manifest, but benefits to Europe, as a whole (and when I say "to Europe as a whole", I do not mean only Western Europe) and benefits to a strengthened Europe, which will help Europe to play a greater part in giving help to the underdeveloped countries of the world.
In order to avoid misunderstanding, I should say that I hope nobody abroad who reads my remarks will suppose that we are using the Common Market as it were to bail ourselves out of our difficulties. We are determined, with the help of the whole nation—and there is no Party issue here—to put our own economy right, and that must be achieved whether or not we manage to enter the Common Market in the foreseeable future. So it is not a question of a country in difficulties scrambling into the Common Market in order to get out of them; it is a question of a country that recognises the loftiness of this ideal, and the untold benefits, material and moral, that could accrue, not only to us but to others as well.
To sum up, we want to see an expanded European Economic Community; we want to be a member of it. We shall do our best to find a basis on which such entry may be possible, and we intend to ensure that our efforts are in the end crowned with success. The noble Lord, Lord St. Oswald, asked me whether we

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accept the Treaty of Rome. As I said two years ago, quoting the Foreign Secretary,
"Our membership of the Community, if we can achieve it, will involve acceptance of the objects that are in the minds of those that framed the Treaty of Rome".
It is no good my going beyond that statement—it goes as far as anybody can go, I think—but I willingly reaffirm it, if there is any doubt about it in the mind of any noble Lord. I end as I began by thanking the noble Lord, Lord Boothby, and the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, for starting this debate, and all who have taken part in it, and by apologising again to the noble Lord, Lord St. Oswald, if I was a little rough with him, but assuring anyone who is anxious to see this country enter Europe that our heads are ceaselessly active and our hearts are in the right place.
7.23 p.m.
LORD BOOTHBY: My Lords, I should like to thank the noble Earl the Leader of the House for his gracious and generous speech. I think we have had, on the whole, an interesting and constructive debate, although it has made me a little sad. I am bound to say that I thought the speech of the noble Lord, Lord St. Oswald, was the worst that I have ever heard in my life; and that is saying a good deal. I was a delegate to the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe from 1949 to 1957, and I can tell the noble Lord quite straight the names of the two men who smashed the Council of Europe and refused any kind of British participation. They were the noble Earl, Lord Avon, and the noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury. That is what we were up against. For the Conservative Party to try and "cash in" on what I can only regard as a disgraceful vote-catching racket now—well, they will not get away with it as long as there is breath in my body: I will go to every town in the country, and tell the truth.
LORD BESWICK: Hear, hear!
LORD BOOTHBY: It is too late now. It was absolute torture in the Council of Europe.
LORD BESWICK: Rub it in.
LORD BOOTHBY: Avon and Salisbury were both against us, and Churchill was ostensibly in favour, but had not got the guts to stand up to them.
LORD ST. OSWALD: My Lords, I am armed against any "rubbing in" by the fact that we did enter into negotiations and sustained them for fifteen months, and, as I said, five of the participants thought that we should have succeeded but for a political decision.
LORD BOOTHBY: Years too late; years too late! Churchill had demanded in the Council of Europe a European army in which we should all bear a worthy and honourable part. Avon went to Rome and at a Press conference said that we would not touch a European army, although Lord Kilmuir had said on that same day at Strasbourg that there was no question of any British refusal. If the noble Lord wants the facts of this, he can get them from my books; but I do not want the royalties. I commend him, strongly, to the autobiography of the noble Earl, Lord Kilmuir, because they are all there. The facts are absolutely horrible. I had to suffer; he did not. He is now converted, and he makes a passionate speech about going into Europe, with declarations of intent and the like; but for ten years the Tory Party smashed it all up, and that is what they cannot get out of.
The year 1962 was too late; we had missed the boat; de Gaulle was there. We could have got in on our own terms at any time during the previous ten years. I am sorry to speak so passionately about this, but I did give something like ten years of my life to it; and I know what I am talking about. The noble Lord, Lord St. Oswald, does not know a thing about what he is talking; he has not got a clue. I simply wanted to say that; and, having done so, I beg leave to withdraw my Motion.
Motion, for Papers, by leave, withdrawn.
7.28 p.m.
LORD GLADWYN: My Lords, owing to the fact that there could not be two Motions before the House, I could not move my Motion earlier, and I was told that, since I was expected to say a few words for about three minutes at the end of the debate, the technical procedure was for me to move my Motion then, which I now do. We have had an interesting and passionate debate, full of sur-

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prises. I must say that the most staggering allegation I heard was that I was aspiring to the throne of Charlemagne, and that when I achieved this high dignity it was apparently thought by the noble Lord, Lord St. Oswald, that he would not, on the whole, like to serve as one of my Ministers. I assure the noble Lord that if I did achieve that eminence, and there was any question of this, he would quite likely be disappointed.
I have the impression, above all things, that the European idea, in principle, has made an enormous advance in this country in the last five years, since I began to urge our joining the European Community in 1961. I assure the noble Earl the Leader of the House that I do not intend to harry him or to harass him, and I am sorry if I ever appeared to do such a thing; and I do not even intend to harry or harass the Government. I do not think I am doing that. All I really want to put across is this. I am not asking the Government to come out with a full statement in the sense of my Motion, and to say that they agree with all the points that I made in my Motion as an ideal solution for Europe—although it may appear that I was doing this—but simply to make noises, as it were, that are not inconsistent with that kind of development. Here I join forces with the noble Lord, Lord St. Oswald, and I hope that they will avoid statements such as that made by the Prime Minister in Bristol, which seem to me quite disastrous and inconsistent with any such solution, even if it was consistent with the idea of a Europe of States.
I said that the European idea was making progress, but if you say that, you come back to what is the idea. The idea is of immense importance. I know the British hate ideas; we cannot bear them; we dislike talking about them. I think that was represented in the powerful speech of the noble Lord, Lord Caccia, who seemed to think that it was almost disrespectful to the Government for us even to discuss long-term policy at the present time. That, without any disrespect, is the voice of official pragmatism—the idea that you put something from the in-tray into the out-tray and at any rate for the time being it will not come up again at you, and that is that. You do not welcome any outside advice.
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Ideas of this kind should be debated constantly in this House, even if they sometimes embarrass the Government—and we are not trying to do that at all. We are trying to get the national will in favour of a national long-term idea, and I cannot see that that is harassing or stupid or anything like that. I think it is something we ought to do in this House, because that is what we are here for.
I know that many people still do not want to join the Community at all—the noble Lord, Lord Wells-Pestell, clearly did not want to join the Community as such—and I respect their views. I think it is a diminishing view, and I feel that they cannot have examined all the relevant facts which have now succeeded in persuading the Government that we must come in, if we can. Here again, I do not myself accuse the Government of not having made a statement of intention, which I remember urging on their predecessors about two years ago. I think they have come effectively to the point where they have made that declaration of intention. I think that has been recognised by de Broglie in the W.E.U. the other day, so far as I can understand it. That is a good thing: we have arrived at a certain point.
I think that many people, perhaps an increasing number of people, who want us to get into the E.E.C. quite genuinely are oblivious of the fact that a great ideological dispute (if you like to put it this way) has been, and still is, raging on the Continent of Europe where, after all, unlike us, they take ideas seriously. The dispute is as to the kind of Community which they want to create. Quite a few maintain, and, incidentally, many of our best friends, that the present French nationalistic thesis would, if adopted, mean that the whole thing would not and could not work, and would eventually crash, even if we did come in. That is what they maintain, rightly or wrongly, and the Government must understand that.
There is also a danger which is apparent to my friends and me if to nobody else. If the Government by any chance should accept the Gaullist proposals as regards NATO as some kind of price for our admittance into the Community, that would be really dangerous, for it would almost certainly mean either that

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the German problem would become insoluble or absolutely impoisoned or that the Russians would eventually have Western Europe at their feet. It is useless to try to ignore these horrid possibilities, and to say that the only thing is that by hook or by crook we must get into the show and then we can do what we like once we are in. That is extremely short-sighted and dangerous, because if we come in on the wrong foot I assure your Lordships that these horrible possibilities might arise.
This, in any case, is the point of the declaration already signed by over 200 Parliamentarians, soon, I hope, to be many more. It has been hailed by those great Europeans, MM. Spaak and Monet, as an event of great importance and significance. That is what they said.
This is entirely in harmony, or course, with the Motion now before your Lordships which, since it is has now served its purpose, I have much pleasure in asking leave to withdraw.
Motion for Papers, by leave, withdrawn.

LAW REFORM (MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS) (SCOTLAND) BILL
Brought from the Commons; read 1a, and to be printed.
POST OFFICE (SUBWAY) BILL
Reported, without amendment, and recommitted to a Committee of the Whole House.
SAINT MARY, EALING BILL
Brought from the Commons; read 1a, and referred to the Examiners.
ROYAL ALBERT HALL BILL [H.L.]
Returned from the Commons, agreed to.