RHODESIA: THE GOVERNMENT'S TERMS (Hansard, 25 January 1966)

§ THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES (THE EARL OF LONGFORD)
My Lords, may I be allowed, with the consent of the House, to make a Statement about Rhodesia? I should like to repeat a Statement which my right honorable friend the Prime Minister is making in another place. These are the words of the Prime Minister, which I quote:
"The first aim of the British Government is to bring the Rhodesian rebellion to an end as quickly as possible, without lasting damage to the country. To this end, they will maintain and, if necessary, intensify economic measures with a view to a 29 Speedy settlement. But it is equally the purpose of the British Government to help the people of Rhodesia, without rancour or recrimination, in making a fresh start towards establishing (in the words of the Lagos communiqué) ' a just society based on equality of opportunity to which all sections of the community could contribute their full potential and from which all could enjoy the benefits due to them without discrimination or unjust impediment '. "This fresh start must begin with an unqualified return to constitutional rule. It must also engage from the outset the capacities of all Rhodesians of good will in the work of overcoming the fears and antagonisms of the past and of setting Rhodesia on the road to independence in a spirit of inter-racial trust and collaboration.
"The illegal declaration of independence and the subsequent actions of the rebel regime have created a new situation. Rhodesia's future course cannot be negotiated with the régime which illegally claims to govern the country. There is no confidence inside or outside Rhodesia that they could be relied on to lead the country forward to independence in which racial harmony would be ensured. The Governor is authorized to receive from the regime any proposals about the means by which the rebellion is to be brought to an end. But discussion of Rhodesia's constitutional future must be with responsible persons representing all the people.
"Rhodesia obviously cannot proceed at one step from rebellion to independence. For all the reasons given by Her Majesty's Government repeatedly, inside and outside Rhodesia, and as I said at the United Nations on December 16, 1965, 'a return to constitutional rule would not and could not mean an immediate advance to majority rule '. That process must be renewed without delay or impediment: but it can come only with time—and time measured by African advancement and achievement.
"Once there has been a return to the rule of law and the Constitution, the British Government will immediately act to reverse the economic measures taken during the rebellion, in order to 30 permit the resumption of Rhodesia's external trade, the reopening of markets for her exports, the inward flow of essential supplies such as oil and petrol, and the renewal of investment and the planned development of the country. The necessary statutory instruments are ready and could be made effective immediately.
"This will be the first step in a period of economic and political rehabilitation during which passions may cool, the economic and social strength of the country may be restored, and the energies of all Rhodesians may be enlisted in the tasks of reconstruction.
"Assuming that there is a speedy and peaceful return to constitutional rule, the best provision for the first stage after this return would appear to be for the Governor to form an interim Government of Rhodesians, responsible to him, comprising the widest possible spectrum of public opinion of all races in the country and constituting a representative Government for reconstruction. During this period, the police and military forces will come under the direct responsibility of the Governor.
"The first responsibility of this interim Government, as of any Government, will be the maintenance of law and order. This will require not only the normal precautions against domestic disturbance and illegality but also, in the special circumstances of Rhodesia, guarantees to prevent a repetition of the rebellion and to protect human rights. The British Parliament will need to be assured about the adequacy and effectiveness of these guarantees.
"Urgent action will be needed to restore the Rhodesian economy. The British Government will be ready to contribute to the economic needs of the country and in particular to assist, in co-operation with other Commonwealth Governments, with schemes for the advancement, education and training of Africans so that they may as soon as possible play their full part in the development of the country's economic and political institutions.
"Problems of political rehabilitation will also have to be tackled. Persons restricted or detained for 31 Purely political reasons will have to be released provided that they give guarantees that their political activities will be conducted constitutionally. The aim is to create conditions in which, while law and order is maintained, political activities may be conducted in security and freedom from intimidation from any quarter.
"How long this period of interim government may last cannot immediately be foreseen; neither can the date at which Parliamentary institutions can be restored. Clearly the period of interim government will last until conditions can be stabilized and the social and political wounds inflicted on the country can be healed. The views of the people of Rhodesia will have to be sought on the amendments and changes necessary in the 1961 Constitution to secure a resumption of full constitutional government on the basis of the five principles which have been proclaimed by successive British Governments. To these must now be added a sixth principle, namely, the need to ensure that, regardless of race, there is no oppression of majority by minority or of minority by majority.
" The course of constitutional development in Rhodesia after this towards independence must be based on the implementation of these principles and it will be necessary in due course to consider the means of ensuring this, for example by a Royal Commission in preparation for a Constitutional Conference, which will in any case need to be held before independence can be achieved.
"The British Government have maintained throughout that, while Rhodesia is a matter of world concern, it remains a British responsibility and they continue to accept their full responsibility. They intend to discharge their task in the interests of all the people of Rhodesia. The British Government are convinced that there cannot be lasting peace, freedom or prosperity in Rhodesia until constitutional rule is resumed and the country is fairly set on paths leading to a just and democratic society in which full equality of opportunity is assured, racial discrimination is removed and 32 the rights of Europeans and Africans alike are safeguarded.
"Every week that passes while the rebellion continues increases the economic and political strains within Rhodesia and makes the eventual task of reconstruction more difficult. It now rests with all responsible Rhodesians who have the true welfare of their country at heart to bring the rebellion to an end before it is too late and to support the representative of The Queen in upholding constitutional law in Rhodesia."
That concludes the Statement being made by the Prime Minister. Following are the five principles which were expounded by the Prime Minister in another place on November 1, 1965:

1. The principle and intention of unimpeded progress to majority rule, already enshrined in the 1961 Constitution, would have to be maintained and guaranteed.

2. There would also have to be guarantees against retrogressive amendment of the Constitution.

3. There would have to be immediate improvement in the political status of the African population.

4. There would have to be progress towards ending racial discrimination.

5. The British Government would need to be satisfied that any basis proposed for independence was acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole.

§ LORD CARRINGTON
My Lords, the whole House will be grateful to the noble Earl, the Leader of the House, for having repeated the Prime Minister's Statement. It is a very long and detailed one and all your Lordships will, I know, want to study it with great care. But I must say there does not seem at first blush to be anything very new in it; it seem to me in some respects not at all clear, and I should like, if I may, to ask the noble Earl one or two questions. First of all, when the Statement says in paragraph 2 that a fresh start must begin with an unqualified return to constitutional rule ", what exactly does that mean? To what Constitution does that refer, if it refers to a Constitution at all, or does it perhaps mean merely a retraction of the unilateral declaration of independence? This is very important and I think we should know exactly what that phrase means. 33 Secondly, does the statement that Rhodesia's future course cannot be negotiated with the régime which illegally claims to govern the country mean that the Government will, or will not in any circumstances, negotiate with Mr. Smith or any of his Ministers? Here, again, I think we must have a categorical answer from the noble Earl the Leader of the House. Thirdly, in paragraph 7 of the Statement we are told: Assuming that there is a speedy and peaceful return to constitutional rule, the best provision for the first stage after this return would appear to be for the Governor to form an interim Government of Rhodesians, responsible to him ". What exactly does this mean? Does it mean direct rule under the Governor? If so, it may well be regarded as an instrument of the British Government. Or does it not mean direct rule? This is very important, as any suggestion of direct rule would, I should have thought, be totally unacceptable to all shades of Rhodesian opinion.
Lastly, I imagine that the Statement is meant to be helpful and restrained and encouraging to moderate opinion in Rhodesia, but I must say that I think some of the language used is not exactly likely to achieve that end, nor, indeed, is what seems to be a demand for unconditional surrender either sensible or very wise.

§ THE EARL OF LONGFORD
My Lords, I am, I confess, a little disappointed that the noble Lord, who has shown so much statesmanship in these very difficult matters, should have taken a rather pessimistic view of this Statement. I hope that when he has more time to consider it he may come to revise that opinion. However, my task is to try to answer his questions. The House will realize by now that I cannot add to the Statement, but the House is entitled to ask me to clarify anything which is not sufficiently clear already. When the noble Lord the Leader of the Opposition asks about the meaning of "constitutional rule", subject to the views of the Lord Chancellor I would say that what is meant is an end of illegality. We are all agreed—I know the noble Lord and the noble Viscount, Lord Dilhorne, and I think the House as a whole, are agreed—that the régime are behaving in a totally illegal way. They have put 34 themselves for the time being out of court in the legal sense, and what one is asking for there, insisting on, is a return to legal paths. One is not there referring to the precise Constitution or any particular adaptation of the 1961 Constitution, which is referred to later on.
Then the noble Lord asked me what is admittedly a very delicate question, the question of whether any negotiations are conceivable with Mr. Smith and his colleagues. There I must repeat the actual language used in the Statement, which has obviously been drafted with extreme care. For the benefit of Members of the House, most of whom have not seen this Statement—the noble Lord has seen it only for a few moments—may I repeat what is actually said on the point? The Governor is authorized to receive from the régime any proposals about the means by which the rebellion is to be brought to an end. So some discussions are clearly envisaged as possible between the Governor and Mr. Smith and his colleagues as to how this rebellion is to come to an end. The Statement goes on to say: The discussion of Rhodesia's constitutional future must be with responsible persons representing all the people. Perhaps I may go a little further and repeat what conies in paragraph 7, because I think this bears on the problem. It is suggested that the best provision for the first stage after the return to constitutional law, or legal methods, would appear to be for the Governor—here I am quoting— to form an interim Government of Rhodesians, responsible to him, comprising the widest possible spectrum of public opinion of all races in the country and constituting a representative Government for reconstruction. So when the noble Lord asks me whether one could negotiate with the régime, the answer is No, in the sense that he has in mind, but, equally, no one is excluded from the plan suggested in paragraph 7. In paragraph 7 it is suggested that the Governor will form a council of representatives of all sections of opinion, and no one would be excluded, although anyone who was included in the Governor's Council would clearly have to accept constitutional methods and, incidentally, accept the five, or as they are now, six propositions.
The noble Lord asks me, in regard to the same paragraph, whether this is direct 35 rule. The phrase "direct rule", I am told again, subject to the Lord Chancellor's opinion, has not any clear legal meaning, and it seems to have given rise to a certain amount of misunderstanding. There has been an implication in some minds that a number of people would come out from England and rule the country. It is clear here that the Governor would form an interim Government of Rhodesians.

§ THE EARL OF SWINTON
My Lords, under the Secretary of State for the Colonies, or the Commonwealth Relations Office, or under the Governor without any direction from here?

§ THE EARL OF LONGFORD
My Lords, the Governor of course is a servant of Her Majesty's Government in these matters; but at any rate it would be a Government of Rhodesians. It may well be that the phrase "direct rule", which may have been employed on some earlier occasion, is not the most happy one to describe what is intended and is set out clearly here.

LORD REA
My Lords, may I also thank the noble Earl the Leader of the House for that long and interesting Statement? I would join with the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, and say that I am indeed pessimistic and disappointed. It has been a month since we have discussed this matter, and what the noble Earl has told us to-day I am sure has our full agreement and our support, but it seems to me that we have not got a single step further forward. One of the last speeches made when we last met was by myself when I said, "What are we doing to get across to the ordinary, normal, loyal Rhodesian what he can do to help to put things as they should be?" We know there are millions of them. I do not mean only the blacks. There are a great many whites, not millions, but a tremendous majority, who are not satisfied in regard to this extremely uncomfortable and cruel position. No indication whatever has been given by Her Majesty's Government in the whole of this month of what any single man is to do. If any of your Lordships were a private citizen in Rhodesia, what action could you take?
The noble Lord tells us that the Governor is authorized to receive proposals. If that is news, it means that a 36 month ago he was not authorized to receive proposals. Is there really any advance? I am sure he was authorized even in December. Nothing really has been done—not enough to let the people of Rhodesia know what they can do. We are quite sure that Sir Humphrey knows what he can do. He is doing his best. But what about the ordinary people? Has there been no bridgehead made, either from a Government Department or through some other Commonwealth country, or, if necessary, through foreign countries, to let good people in Rhodesia know that we admire them, we like them and we sympathize with them, and we want to see their house in order as much as they do?

§ THE EARL OF LONGFORD
My Lords, I can only say that I am just as disappointed at the observations of the noble Lord as I was at those of the Leader of the official Opposition. I realize that the noble Lord has not had long to study this Statement, which is a long one, but I think it would be a mistake to say that there is nothing new in this. I must not keep reading through the same paragraphs, but in paragraph 7 we have this plan for the Governor to form an interim Government of Rhodesians, responsible, and comprising the widest possible spectrum of public opinion of all races in the country and constituting a representative Government for reconstruction ". If there is nothing else new, that idea is set out a great deal more clearly than it was set out on a previous occasion.

LORD REA
How is he to do it?

§ THE EARL OF LONGFORD
My Lords, I should have thought it was quite obvious how he would do it.

§ VISCOUNT DILHORNE
My Lords, the noble Earl in his first answer to my noble friend, made mention of my name on the question of the return to constitutional rule. I am not at all clear, from what the noble Earl has said, what this Statement means, and I daresay that those who are intended to understand it will be in much the same difficulty. The noble Earl said that he would endeavour to clarify it. As I understand it, the first step to be taken, before any progress can be made, under this Statement, is that A fresh start must begin with an unqualified return to constitutional rule. 37 I would ask the noble Earl to say what that means. Does it mean, as I think, on the language, it must do, a retraction of U.D.I.—namely, unconditional surrender? If it does not mean that, it is most important, I should have thought, that that should be made clear to the people of Rhodesia.
I listened to the noble Earl's answer to the second question put by my noble friend, and. I would put this question to him—because I assume that this Statement is meant to lead to a possible solution of this problem and it is vital to know whether or not the Government are prepared to talk with Mr. Smith. Let there be no misunderstanding about that. The answer which the noble Earl gave on that point does not add any clarity to the Statement. I should like to put one further question to the noble Earl, which again I regard as most important. Is this statement of Government policy one which has the support of the Governor of Rhodesia and the Chief Justice?

§ THE EARL OF LONGFORD
My Lords, I do not think it would be natural or normal to answer the last question. I do not think that would be at all in accordance with practice, and I cannot say anything about the Governor. As noble Lords well know, Sir Hugh Beadle has been in this country and has made valuable suggestions. I think it would be wrong to commit him to these proposals in any way, but I should be much surprised if he was highly critical of them. But I think it would be quite wrong to tie up or associate any great public servant like Sir Hugh Beadle or the Governor with the proposals of Her Majesty's Government.
It seemed to me that the noble and learned Viscount was not showing himself to be quite so acute as usual. Surely it was fairly obvious what was meant by "return to constitutional rule". He asked whether it would mean a calling off of U.D.I. That at least, certainly. I am sure that is what the noble Viscount would wish, because he has been as firm as any of us in regard to bringing about that result. If he wants to call that unconditional surrender I cannot stop him. But it seems to me that, in this situation, if you are trying to persuade someone to undo the very foolish thing he has done, to call it unconditional surrender is 38 not a service. I do not myself think that it is the best way to persuade Mr. Smith to see the error of his ways. I personally should be anxious to avoid what is only a phrase, and I think a dangerous one. The noble Viscount is keeping up a rumbling commentary—

§ VISCOUNT DILHORNE
If the noble Earl is going to make that comment, I would point (I meant to draw attention to it) to the frequent use in this Statement of the word "rebellion", and the use, more than once, of the words "rebel régime". I should not have thought that that was helpful to a solution.

§ THE EARL OF LONGFORD
I thought that the noble Viscount had already made his full contribution on this subject. I have been proved wrong. I should like to try to answer the points he was making. I would not think it useful to drag in here the reference to "unconditional surrender". I cannot stop him from using those words, but a return to constitutional rule must mean the complete cancellation of U.D.I. It also follows that we cannot talk to Mr. Smith, except about ending the rebellion, in any negotiating sense while he purports to be the Prime Minister. He is setting himself up as the Prime Minister of a régime without any legal authority at all, and it would be impossible to negotiate with him, or with the régime, in that situation. I hope that I have answered the noble Viscount's points. If I have failed to deal with any of them, I am open to answer a further one.

§ LORD CARRINGTON
My Lords, I think that this is very important in relation to Mr. Smith. I am sure that the noble Earl the Leader of the House would agree that if one is trying to make somebody undo something that was unwise, one must make clear to him one's point of view as to what one is prepared to accept. I think that the Statement does not make clear what is the relationship between Her Majesty's Government and Mr. Smith. Is it—and I put this to see whether I have correctly understood what the noble Earl is saying that the Government will not be prepared to negotiate with Smith until such time as he has retracted the U.D.I., but that, after U.D.I. has been retracted, there is nothing to stop Mr. Smith from taking part in the government of the country, under the Governor or anyone else?

§ THE EARL OF LONGFORD
My Lords, the last statement as to the Government's position would, I think, be correct, with this qualification. As I explained, it is the intention that the Governor should call together representative Rhodesians, and no individual, whether Mr. Smith or anybody else, would be excluded automatically. So that in that sense the noble Lord has formulated correctly what is in the Government's mind. But, as I said in reply to one of his earlier questions, it must be assumed that anybody who is asked to share in the Governor's Council at that point is himself prepared to accept constitutional rule and the five principles. Therefore, it would not be right to say, in an unqualified sense, that Mr. Smith could serve; but with that qualification he would not be ruled out.

§ LORD CONESFORD
My Lords, I am sure the noble Earl the Leader of the House appreciates the difficulty of some of us in understanding exactly what is proposed. The questions put by my noble Leader cover very well what I am eager to find out. May I give this example of the difficulty? The noble Earl talked about the Governor collecting what the noble Earl the Leader of the House called a responsible Government. What we are anxious to know is: responsible to whom? If they are a responsible Government, what can they do? Are they responsible for government but not under any Constitution, or are they under the control of Parliament here? What is meant by saying that the Governor would consider them responsible citizens? Does the noble Earl appreciate that the difficulty we feel is that, whatever else one thinks about Mr. Smith, he is an elected person—somebody in Rhodesia has elected him. But this proposed responsible Government of Rhodesians will have been elected by nobody at all, but will merely be chosen by the Governor. Can the noble Earl indicate what he means by responsible Government? To whom are they responsible, and what can they do?

§ THE EARL OF LONGFORD
My Lords, the trouble about these Statements is that I have a copy which I have studied for some time, as have one or two others, but most noble Lords, such as the noble Lord who has just spoken, 40 have to try to take it in as it comes. The noble Lord's question is based on faulty articulation, or on his mishearing, or on the conditions under which we work. But here is an important point in the Statement: …the best provision for the first stage after this return would appear to be for the Governor to form an interim Government of Rhodesians, responsible to him…". I did not say "a responsible Government". "A responsible Government" suggests a Government responsible to the Parliament of a country: in the interim period this is precisely the opposite. I am glad the noble Lord has asked the question again, because I was anxious to read out yet again, and more articulately, what I had said before.

§ THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY
My Lords, as I understand it, the interim Government which is envisaged by Her Majesty's Government here would be responsible only to the Governor, but would this Government which was responsible to the Governor have also to repudiate the U.D.I. before they could be negotiated with? I do not believe that the Governor will find anybody who will satisfy that condition.

§ THE EARL OF LONGFORD
The answer would be, yes. It is for the Governor to choose these individuals and I am assuming that he would not choose anybody to serve on his Council who had not repudiated U.D.I. It would be inconceivable that he could choose somebody who still stood up for U.D.I.

§ LORD CACCIA
My Lords, may I ask the noble Earl a question which may have arisen from my having misheard him? The question is: to whom is the Governor responsible? My hearing of the noble Earl's answer was that he would be responsible to Her Majesty's Government. Is that right?

§ THE EARL OF LONGFORD
My Lords, I shall ask the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor to answer that from a purely constitutional point of view; but in one sense, in practice, he is.

§ THE LORD CHANCELLOR
Yes, that is right under the Constitution of 1961, as Parliament has altered it.

§ LORD WADE
My Lords, I understood the Leader of the House to say 41 that the views of the people of Rhodesia will have to be sought on the amendments and changes necessary in the 1961 Constitution to secure a resumption of full constitutional Government. I think it is not unfair to say that there are those in Rhodesia, and certainly many Africans in Rhodesia, who do not regard the Parliament elected under the present franchise as sufficiently representative of the views of all the people in Rhodesia. It would be helpful to know how the views of the Rhodesian people as a whole will be ascertained in order to find out what amendments should be made to, and what changes are necessary in, the 1961 Constitution.

§ THE EARL OF LONGFORD
My Lords, I think that is a most relevant question. It is not one I should imagine anybody would try to answer in a black and white fashion to-day. I hope that the noble Lord and other noble Lords will contribute ideas as we proceed. This is not something which is going to happen immediately.

§ THE EARL OF SWINTON
My Lords, as I understood him—and it is important that we should get this right—the Lord Chancellor said that the Governor of Rhodesia is responsible to Her Majesty's Government here under the 1961 Constitution. I would ask the Lord Chancellor this. Is it not clearly laid down in the 1961 Constitution that any theoretical right of interference or direction, which there was in theory when my noble friend and I in turn were responsible but which was never exercised by the 1961 Constitution, was deliberately abandoned by law under the Constitution for all time? In place of that, with the assent of all the Africans who took part in the negotiations 'in London, there was substituted for that theoretical right an absolute provision that the Government here could not interfere. There was set up, in place of any such right, that the Secretary of State might have a constitutional council, and if the Government of Rhodesia did not accept any proposal there was a right of appeal to the Privy Council. Therefore, if we go back to the 1961 Constitution, which is the sensible thing to do, there would be no power under that Constitution for the Government here to give the Governor of Rhodesia any instructions at all.

§ THE LORD CHANCELLOR
My Lords, with great respect to him, the 42 noble Earl is entirely wrong. We—that is to say, the Crown—never gave up our right in law to alter the Constitution of Southern Rhodesia. But we did consider ourselves bound by a convention, that so long as they acted constitutionally we would not, in fact, interfere with their powers under the 1961 Constitution as it was then. Of course, Parliament since then, and after the illegal action which the regime took, has in fact made certain alterations in the 1961 Constitution and has suspended other parts of that Constitution; and the legal Constitution of Rhodesia to-day is the 1961 Constitution as altered or suspended recently by Parliament.

§ THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY
My Lords, may I ask one important question which I think is relevant? It is about the conversations with Sir Hugh Beadle, and it is this. Are we to have a White Paper giving what was said on both sides? I ask this question. because it seems to me that it is very difficult for us to come to sensible conclusions unless we know what Sir Hugh Beadle—who, presumably, speaks also for the Governor—really said during his visit to London. Sometimes I have a feeling that we are told just what the Government think it is good for us to know. We were told all about the telephone conversation with Mr. Smith, because the Government thought it good for us to know that. We are not being told anything about these conversations, and I should like to ask the Leader of the House to give consideration, or to ask his colleagues to give consideration. to whether Parliament does not have a right to know what were the views expressed by Sir Hugh Beadle.

§ THE EARL OF LONGFORD
My Lords, any request for the consideration of an idea coming from the noble Marquess in this House, most of all, would always be given very careful attention, and I will of course convey what he said to the Prime Minister and my colleagues. But I should be surprised if with all his experience, the noble Marques would seriously argue that, when a great public servant like Sir Hugh Beadle comes and talks in confidence to the Government, he would expect to see the conversations published. In this case, I gather, Sir Hugh Beadle also talked in equal confidence to leaders of the Opposition, so this is not a question of only the 43 Government knowing the ideas of Sir Hugh Beadle.

§ LORD CARRINGTON
My Lords, we are, of course, in danger of getting into a debate on this subject. The noble Earl has been very patient and courteous in answering questions, but may I ask him one more question to clear up a doubt in my mind? It is on this interim Government of which we have been talking, and the question of direct rule. Would Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom be able to give directions to those responsible Rhodesian citizens through the Governor of Rhodesia?

§ THE EARL OF LONGFORD
My Lords, on any constitutional point I would naturally turn to the Lord Chancellor. When we talk of giving directions, I take it, subject to the views of the Lord Chancellor, that the Governor would be subject to our instructions, but these others would, of course, be free to join or leave his Government as required. They would not be under Government orders as citizens.