RHODESIA (Hansard, 5 December 1966)

§ THE LORD PRIVY SEAL (THE EARL OF LONGFORD)
My Lords, perhaps I should make an apology to the House, if some apology is needed, but I have not received a copy of the Prime Minister's Statement. I have been in touch with the Prime Minister during the evening. I apologise to the House, but I am afraid I must ask the House to continue with existing business until the Statement arrives.

§ LORD CARRINGTON
My Lords, in that case I think that, instead of going back into Committee and starting on a fresh Amendment, it would be better if the House adjourned during pleasure.

§ LORD CHAMPION
My Lords, my only difficulty in this matter is that of getting the Members back when the Statement arrives. I hope there will not be any difficulty about this. I will, of course, do the best I can to see that everybody is informed. I therefore beg to move that the House do adjourn during pleasure.

§ THE EARL OF LONGFORD
My Lords, with permission I should like to repeat a Statement which my right honourable friend the Prime Minister is making in another place. I should like to offer an apology to the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, and to the noble Lord, Lord 1015 Ogmore, acting Leader of the Liberals, for not being able to supply them, according to our usual custom, with an advance copy. I think the House will understand the circumstances, and will perhaps forgive me if at times I read it with less than complete assurance.
The Prime Minister said: "Since my announcement of April 27 that informal talks were to be held the House has been extremely patient and has recognised my inability to give information on the progress of the talks which it had agreed would be confidential. The time has now come when the House must be put in full possession of the facts as they now stand, more than seven months after Mr. Smith indicated to the Governor his desire to engage in informal talks.
"Altogether three series of talks were held in London and Salisbury at official level before the first visit of my right honourable friend the Commonwealth Secretary to Salisbury with my right honourable and learned friend the Attorney General in September. These talks were mainly directed to two main issues.
"First, the method and conditions of a return to legal and Constitutional rule in Rhodesia, and the determination of the question with whom official negotiations could subsequently take place. Second, an informal exploration in detail of Constitutional problems to see what amendments would be needed to the 1961 Constitution to give effect to the Principles which had been the basis of discussions with the legal Rhodesian Government up to November 11, 1965.
"Practically the whole of the discussion during this period was on the problem of an ultimate constitutional settlement, though the representatives of Her Majesty's Government made it plain at the outset and repeatedly warned that a settlement would have to be reached on the problem of a return to legality and that before independence could be granted a fair and free test of Rhodesian public opinion would have to be carried out under a constitutional government. Mr. Smith through his officials insisted on discussing the constitutional proposals first, 1016 indicating that he needed to be satisfied about the ultimate constitutional settlement before being ready to discuss what he regarded as a purely procedural matter of the return to constitutional rule. We insisted that before any settlement could be reached both issues would need to be dealt with.
"By the time of the visit of my right honourable friends in September no progress had been made in the constitutional talks. Nor indeed, though my right honourable friends' visit was extremely useful in informing a wide section of Rhodesian political opinion of our requirements and proposals for a settlement, was there any advance whatsoever on either the constitutional settlement or on the conditions for a return to legality.
"Mr. Smith and his colleagues were left in no doubt of our intention to act within the terms of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers'Communiqué, or about the fact that while adequate time remained for a settlement if the will was there, the programme envisaged in the Communiqué did not admit of unlimited time or of wasted time.
"It was not in fact until my right honourable friend again took the initiative in visiting Salisbury on November 25 to November 27, just as we were getting very near the operation of the timetable of which Mr. Smith had been informed, that any signs of movement were detected.
"My right honourable friend returned with a report indicating for the first time a real possibility that a satisfactory agreement might be reached on the Constitutional issues which would give full guaranteed effect to the Six Principles on which we insisted. The report also indicated, very much for the first time, some sign of movement on the question of return to legality. Mr. Smith had, in fact, indicated that he was prepared to consider returning to the legal 1961 Constitution if a satisfactory Constitutional settlement could be agreed. Mr. Smith said in fact to my right honourable friend that, given a satisfactory solution, he would be prepared to consider surrendering what he called his independence by returning to the legal 1961 Constitution—provided that a 1017 satisfactory Constitutional settlement I could be agreed.
"Despite all disappointments—and I can put it no higher—of every round of discussions, which we, and indeed our predecessors, have had with Mr. Smith and his colleagues, the Government decided that before we finally had to report to the House, with all the consequences that would ensue, that there was no prospect of an agreement, one last effort should be made.
"Accordingly, last Tuesday, Mr. Smith was informed that my friends and I would be prepared to meet him on the clear understanding that the purpose of such a meeting would be to reach a final settlement, if it proved possible to reach agreement both on the terms of a Constitutional settlement and on satisfactory arrangements for the return to legality. He was informed that I"—
that is, the Prime Minister—
"should have full powers for this purpose, and that it was essential that Mr. Smith should have similar powers, and should be authorised to reach a final agreement, if the basis for a settlement were seen to exist.
"As the House knows, we met him, and the Governor of Rhodesia, who was accompanied by the Chief Justice, for two days of intensive talks in H.M.S. 'Tiger' at the end of last week.
"I will not weary the House with the successive twists and turns of these discussions, but their outcome was that we both signed at midnight on Saturday a working document setting out in detail all the essentials for a settlement. On the amendments necessary to the 1961 Constitution which would be required to give effect to the Six Principles, we reached complete agreement. As honourable Members will see when the White Paper is available later this evening, the requirements of the Six Principles have been met in full with effective Constitutional and external guarantees.
"On the return to Constitutional rule, again, the document set out in detail what is required. A programme envisages that an Order in Council would be made immediately to give 1018 the Governor the constitutional powers required for setting up an interim Government. He would then have appointed a broad-based interim Government, to be headed by Mr. Smith. Mr. Smith and I indeed agreed, subject to a condition which he laid down which I will come to later, possible names for the five non-Rhodesian Front Ministers, European and African, to be included in this interim Administration. The existing Legislature would have been dissolved and the Governor would have exercised full legislative authority. During this period the test of acceptability under the fifth principle would then have been carried out and, provided it had been completed, fresh elections would have been held not later than four months from the date of restoration of Constitutional rule.
"Agreement was also reached, again in detail, about the procedure, as distinct from the timing, of testing the acceptability of the proposals for an independence Constitution to the Rhodesian people as a whole. This was to be done by Royal Commission to be appointed by the British Government, after consultation with the new Rhodesian Government. Censorship would have been lifted and freedom of political association and activity on democratic lines would have been permitted. We agreed also on a procedure to give effect to the requirement laid down in the Commonwealth Prime Ministers'Communiqué for the release of political detainees. A judicial tribunal was to have been appointed by the legal Rhodesian Government, but including a British representative nominated by the Lord Chancellor, to consider the detention and restriction of persons on security grounds. Such detention and restriction would only have been authorised if the tribunal were satisfied that the persons concerned had committed, or had incited the committing of, acts of violence or intimidation.
"It was agreed that if as a result of the Report of the Royal Commission the British Government were satisfied that the proposed Constitutional settlement was acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole immediate effect would be given to it 1019 by legislation we undertook to introduce in this House, the Agreement to he further underwritten by a Treaty binding both of us to maintain the Constitution. This Treaty, as I explained to Mr. Smith, would be registered, as we are required to register it, with the United Nations. And any breach of this Treaty, such as a coup d'état, either by European or by African extremists, would entitle, indeed require, us to seek from the United Nations mandatory sanctions, under Chapter 7, not necessarily confined to economic sanctions.
"If as a result of the Report of the Royal Commission the British Government decided that the proposed Constitution was not acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole, there would still have been a legal Government with whom we could have explored alternative new proposals for an Independence Constitution.
"After all that has happened, the House will understand my anxiety that in these circumstances Mr. Smith would once again illegally declare independence. Nor did Mr. Smith's reply to my expression of anxiety do anything to dispel my suspicions. This would mean that while we had ended the sanctions—as we were ready to do this week if Rhodesia returned to Constitutional rule—he might once again return to illegality, an easier operation, he might think, than the reimposition of sanctions. I thought it right in these circumstances to leave him in no doubt that if this were to happen we would go immediately and without any preliminaries to the United Nations for effective mandatory sanctions. Equally I thought it right to warn him that in conditions of a second U.D.I. he could no longer in all circumstances count on, still less abuse, the assurance I had given before the first declaration that we would in any circumstances not use force, for example to reinforce economic sanctions. And in the condition envisaged in the breach of the Treaty to which I have just referred, including a possible coup d'état, equally we would not have considered ourselves bound by our earlier pledge that force would never be used.
1020 "Mr. Speaker"—
said the Prime Minister—
"by 5 p.m. last Saturday it was open to Mr.Smith to sign an Agreement covering all the issues, providing for an immediate return to Constitutional rule, the immediate unwinding of our sanctions provisions, and the urgent initiation of all the procedures leading to Independence on terms which would have no hesitation in recommending to this House as fully implementing all the Six Principles, and that of the guarantees, internal and external, that this House has the right to demand and as equally implementing the terms of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Communiqué.
Mr. Smith, who had throughout indicated his willingness, within the authority he had been given, to reach agreement on the terms of an appropriate Independence Constitution, continued, as he had every right to do, to reserve his position on two points related to the return to Constitutional rule.
"First, while he was prepared to discuss the procedures for an immediate return to legality—which he had told my right honourable friend a week earlier he was prepared to consider—he had yet to make up his mind whether he could accept a situation in which he gave up his independence with only the hope and not the certainty that the Independence Constitution we had agreed would be shown by the Royal Commission to be acceptable to the Rhodesian people as a whole.
"While he was confident that it was acceptable there was, he felt, the possibility that the final verdict might go against him. He continued to insist that the illegal Government should continue, sanctions being lifted, until he knew where he stood as a result of the Royal Commission report.
"I told him that a fair and convincing test of acceptability would be quite impossible in circumstances where an illegal régime was possessed of emergency powers and executive control including broadcasting and television, and that we were not prepared to grant even interim recognition which he demanded particularly since it was clear that, if the verdict went against him, 1021 he would insist on maintaining his present illegal powers indefinitely. No British Government and few, if any, honourable Gentlemen, could have agreed to such a proposal.
"Equally, though we discussed in great detail the composition of the broad-based Government, including the outgoing as well as the incoming personalities, he said that he had not yet accepted the principle that a broad-based Government should be created.
"It was understood that, having the document as a whole now before him, he would inform me whether it was acceptable in its entirety or not.
"However, after a delay of some hours Mr. Smith informed me that he had no authority whatsoever from his colleagues to give his agreement on either of these two proposals, or even to commend our agreed working document to his colleagues. Knowing his difficulties—and I did not under-rate them—I agreed that instead of reaching a final settlement, which I had authority to do—and understood that he had come on the same basis—he should return to Salisbury without any commitment on his part either to sign the document as a whole, or even to agree to recommend it to his colleagues. It was therefore agreed that the documents should be considered both by the British Government and by Mr. Smith and his colleagues, on the clear understanding that it must be accepted or rejected as a whole, and a straight answer given, 'Yes' or 'No' by this morning. It was therefore understood and agreed that there could be no question of further amendment of the document which expressed clearly a decision on the Principles and issues of policy which have been discussed time and time and time again between the British Government and the Rhodesians for many months—indeed many of them for years—and which could not, as we both agreed, be 'fluffed' by any form of words which sought to evade that decision.
"Before he returned to Salisbury, Mr. Smith in the presence of the Governor was left in no doubt about the consequences of any refusal or failure to accept the document. He was told that the consequences set out 1022 in paragraphs 10A and 10B of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Communiqué—on the conditions laid down in those paragraphs—would be set in motion. He was told what this would mean for Rhodesia, and of the immense dangers for Africa and even more widely, if he and his régime whose claim to legality has not been recognised by a single country in the world, insisted in continuing on a course which has earned the condemnation of practically the whole of mankind. He was left in no doubt about the action which we would take, and which would be taken internationally. Equally he was left in no doubt about our resolve—however long it might take—to bring to an end a situation which when he created it he said would be a nine-days' wonder.
"The House knows Her Majesty's Government announced yesterday their acceptance in its entirety of the document Mr. Smith and I worked out. This evening the House will have heard with sadness that it has been rejected by Mr.Smith and his colleagues. They have confirmed that they insist on maintaining their illegality until, in conditions in which no free expression of Rhodesian opinion would be possible, a Royal Commission has reported and Independence has been granted.
"They have announced that they have accepted the principal changes in the 1961 Constitution set out in the document as a basis for Independence. Their refusal to accept the settlement as a whole stems from their insistence on their refusal to return to legality unless they themselves can remain in power while the agreed Constitutional settlement is being tested by Rhodesian opinion. The implications of this are obvious. And no one in this House would be ready to accept these implications. If reports from Rhodesia are correct, they have also rejected any concept of sharing power with representatives even of a wider section of Rhodesian European opinion, and have rejected the proposal that two respected Africans should become part of the interim broad-based Government that we have proposed.
"At least the House—and Mr Speaker the world—have been left in no doubt about the issues which are at 1023 stake, after all that has happened since last Thursday. It is clear that power for its own sake and the insistence on retaining that power in the hands of a small unrepresentative minority have dictated the outcome.
"I believe it was right to try to reach a settlement which we could defend consistently with the principles we have proclaimed and with our honourboth in this House and before the bar of world opinion. No one—including many in Rhodesia who have previously put their trust in that group of men—could condone their refusal to accept the settlement which would have provided for them an honourable way out of the situation the illegal régime created. For us to have accepted what they were demanding would have been a betrayal of the principles on which our own democracy is based. It would have been unacceptable not only to the British Government and to this House but also to the multiracial Commonwealth as a whole and to the United Nations.
"When my right honourable friends and I decided to hold this parley, we knew that some might say we were mistaken. I believe that we were justified in what we did. The fact that the hand we proffered has been rejected does not alter my conviction. From that rejection certain inevitable consequences must now follow in accordance with the programme that we agreed with our Commonwealth colleagues in September. Mr. Smith was clearly warned of this in terms he clearly understood. He knew that we, the British Government, and this House, were not prepared to suffer the destruction of our principles—or of the Commonwealth—for the sake of safeguarding from world opinion the actions of a small and irresponsible minority.
"My right honourable friend the Foreign Secretary will be flying to New York to-morrow to take personal charge, so far as Her Majesty's Government are concerned, of the actions which must follow in the United Nations. My noble friend Lord Caradon has been instructed to ask for an early meeting of the Security Council.
1024 "I regret to have had to present this report to the House. I believe we could have done no more."

§ LORD CARRINGTON
My Lords, I think there will be the greatest disappointment in all quarters of the House at the news that the noble Earl the Leader of the House has read out to us. It appeared at one time that it might be possible to reach an agreement, and it seems tragic that it has been impossible to do so even at this late hour. I think it is impossible for anybody who has listened to the very complicated and detailed Statement that the noble Earl has read out to grasp it all, and I do not suppose it would be any use asking questions of the Leader of the House, since he must be in nearly the same position as we are, at any rate as regards the Statement.
But I would say two things: first, that though we have read only what has appeared on the tape outside your Lordships' House, there are a number of questions which arise as a result of what Mr. Smith is reported on the tape to have said which do not seem to be entirely in agreement with the Statement which the noble Earl has given the House this evening, and we shall have to ask later on about that. Secondly, I think I must say now, and say quite categorically, that certainly we on this side of the House do not accept as either inevitable or desirable the next steps which the noble Earl the Leader of the House has outlined that the Government are going to take.
We shall obviously want an early debate on this subject. I understand that it was originally suggested that we should have this debate on Wednesday. I imagine that there will be a White Paper which your Lordships will be able to study—I do not know whether I am right in assuming that—but presumably it would be a White Paper of some length and of some complexity. I do not know whether I speak for my noble friends behind me, but I have a feeling that it would be better if we did not have our debate on Wednesday, but that we postponed it for a day. After all, this is quite late on Monday night, and we could have two days in which to reflect upon what has happened, and start the 1025 debate on Thursday. I therefore ask the noble Earl the Leader of the House whether he would be prepared to agree to that.

§ LORD OGMORE
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Earl for reading out this long Statement to us. It is with very heavy hearts that we on these Benches have heard this Statement of the breakdown of the negotiations and there being no agreement. I entirely agree with the noble Lord the Leader of the Opposition that this is not the right time to ask a number of questions, and I do not propose to do so. I will restrain myself until we come to the debate. I also agree with the noble Lord that Wednesday would give far too short a time for us to be properly prepared. We have to consult our colleagues, and we have to study the whole question; not only what has happened in the past, but the proposed action by the Government in the future. For these reasons, I should like to ask that the debate be postponed until Thursday.

§ THE EARL OF LONGFORD
My Lords, I am grateful to both noble Lords who have spoken for the reserve they have shown. I hope that when we debate these matters I shall be able to clear away some of the difficulties, if not perhaps all of them. After consultation with my colleagues, I entirely agree that Thursday would be a better day than Wednesday, so I would suggest that, subject to arrangements through the usual channels, we make our plans in terms of a debate about Rhodesia on Thursday.

§ THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY
My Lords, I am sure this is a very sad moment for all of us, whatever views we have formerly expressed on this subject, for I cannot but think that there are innumerable people in this country who will regard it, as the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, has said, as a great disaster if the Prime Minister takes the step which is now envisaged of submitting this problem to the United Nations. I have the impression from the Statement which the noble Earl read out that the Prime Minister believes his attitude to have been a generous one. I am afraid it gave me the impression of the terms which would be properly imposed upon a beaten 1026 enemy. That is the impression it made on me and which I think it will make on many other people. It is one of the things which I think will embitter the situation and make a settlement now even more difficult. It is a very melancholy outlook, and on that we are all agreed.
I do not propose to say anything more about it to-day, because we are to have another opportunity. I concur most heartily in what the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, has said about having a debate on Thursday if possible, instead of Wednesday, so as to give us time to assimilate what we have heard.

§ LORD BROCKWAY
My Lords, in view of what has been said, may I ask the noble Earl the Leader of the House whether he is aware that many of us take the view that the Prime Minister has leaned over backwards to reach an agreement with Mr. Smith, and we should be disappointed if, after the rejection of these very reasonable terms, the Government were not to take this issue to the United Nations, in view of the categorical promise which the Government made to the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference. We recognise the seriousness of this position, but we shall lose the confidence not only of Africa but of the world if we do not maintain the principles which are included in the Statement which has been read.

§ LORD ALPORT
My Lords, may I ask the noble Earl the Leader of the House whether it was his understanding that when we last discussed this matter in the House the Government undertook that Parliament should debate any recourse to the United Nations before the Government made a decision to submit the matter to the United Nations? Is it not possible, before the action which is proposed in the Statement is taken, which is in fact to-morrow, for a full Parliamentary debate to take place? Secondly, does the noble Earl realise that one of the problems of the last few days has been an attempt to produce against time an answer to what I regard as an almost insoluble problem, and in view of the fact that we are going to be with this problem for many months to come, for better or for worse, would it not be wise to give the Government and the Opposition, and I the country in general, a breathing space 1027 before the final decision and actions are taken?
Finally, may I ask the Minister whether he realises that once recourse has been had to the United Nations any chance of any reaction against the Smith régime within Rhodesia is at an end, and the only hope that remains, some of us will think, of averting a catastrophe there will have gone?

§ THE EARL OF LONGFORD
My Lords, if I may say so, each of the noble Lords who has spoken is, of course, specially well qualified to address your Lordships on this subject. The noble Marquess, if I may say so, leans rather far to one side in this argument and the noble Lord, Lord Brockway, leans in the other direction. I feel that we have tried to pursue a middle course. I do not think anybody could deny that the Prime Minister has laboured with phenomenal spirit to bring about a settlement. I think the noble Marquess could not deny the energy and initiative that the Prime Minister has shown in this matter. Then we are told that these terms were not the terms that could be offered to a country which had illegally declared its independence. Frankly, I feel that that is something we must discuss when we come to the debate, but not this evening. However, I should like to assure the noble Marquess that, with his championship of the rule of law over many years, I should have been surprised if he had felt inclined to treat an illegal régime in a different way.
The noble Lord, Lord Alport, has shown a great independence of mind, apart from his long background of knowledge, and one must pay special attention to his views. I feel rather that the House as a whole would regard a careful consideration of the issues, including any White Paper, as more important than an attempt to organise a debate, as it were, to-morrow, and the balance of advantage, as I think the noble Marquess recognised, seems to lie in favour of a debate on Thursday.

§ THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY
My Lords, could not action be held for just two days, until after the debate?

§ THE EARL OF LONGFORD
My Lords, perhaps I could pick up a point 1028 mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Alport. He asked whether some promise had been given that there would be a full Parliamentary discussion before this matter was taken to the United Nations. I am afraid that I have not the precise date or reference when the Prime Minister indicated in the House of Commons that he would certainly do all in his power to make certain no irrevocable decision was taken at the United Nations, but certain steps had to be taken if the machinery was to be set in motion, and in that sense it must go forward to the United Nations now.

§ THE EARL OF SWINTON
My Lords, if the Foreign Secretary is sent off, and if a meeting of the Security Council is summoned, would not the matter then pass out of the hands and the control of the Government—because it will not rest with the Government to decide what action the United Nations and Security Council will take'? Is it not only common sense, and as this Parliament in this country is responsible, is it not the bounden duty of the Government, to delay any action with the United Nations—it is only, after all, Thursday—until Parliament has had a chance of expressing an opinion?

§ THE EARL OF LONGFORD
My Lords, I can only repeat what I said just now and refer the House, including the noble Earl, to the statement of the Prime Minister about irrevocable decisions. With great respect to the noble Earl and others who feel like him, I would point out that we are approaching a deadline. We have in fact delayed action beyond the point when many of our supporters might have wished action to be taken. These things have to be borne in mind.

§ LORD CARRINGTON
My Lords, I do not wish to press the noble Earl, but he said there was a pledge that Parliament would be allowed to debate it before "irrevocable" steps are taken. What is an irrevocable step in this case? Is it not irrevocable that the Foreign Secretary should bring this matter before the Security Council?

§ THE EARL OF LONGFORD
My Lords, as I say, I had better refer the noble Lord to the Prime Minister's Statement in another place. Perhaps I might add that the White Paper, Proposals for Settlement, is now available, and I think it right to draw the attention of the House to that.

§ LORD CARRINGTON
With great respect to the noble Earl, he is not answering my question. What is an "irrevocable" step? If, as the Chief Whip says, sitting in his seat, it is moving a motion, is not the Foreign Secretary going to do precisely that to-morrow?

§ THE EARL OF LONGFORD
I do not know about references to the Chief Whip—he seems to be lying in his seat, rather than sitting. I think he was speaking informally. I do not know whether one can define an "irrevocable" step, but the noble Lord is well aware of the proceedings in the United Nations, and we cannot do more than return to the Statement of the Prime Minister about that.

§ LORD HARLECH
My Lords, is it not a fact that all that appeared in the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Cornmuniqué was that action would be taken in the Security Council before the end of the year and is it not a fact that the Security Council can be summoned into session at any time and is not dependent on the Assembly?

§ THE EARL OF LONGFORD
My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Harlech, is particularly well informed about the proceedings in the Security Council. But if action is to be taken before the end of the year one cannot delay very much longer.

§ LORD GRIMSTON OF WESTBURY
My Lords, are we really being told that a delay of two or three days is going to make all that difference, in face of a step which might prove utterly disastrous in the long run: that we cannot, particularly after what the noble Lord, Lord Harlech, has said, delay the matter three or four days? Are we being told that?

§ THE EARL OF LONGFORD
The noble Lord must be a little more generous to the realities of the situation. It was generally understood, and I think Mr. Smith was informed (though I do not know that a public pledge was given), that we would proceed to the United Nations on November 30 if agreement had not been reached. In fact we have delayed for the best part of a week since then, so I hope that the House will recognise that we have been quite long-suffering.

§ LORD CARRINGTON
My Lords, we have been very gentle with the noble Earl 1030 the Leader of the House, and I absolutely recognise his difficulties. But the Prime Minister, as I understand it, gave a pledge that no irrevocable steps would be taken before Parliament had had an opportunity of discussing the matter. Surely one could not say that after the Foreign Secretary has been to the United Nations and, as I understand, moved a resolution, that is not an irrevocable step. How could it be withdrawn if the Foreign Secretary has moved a resolution? Surely this is really a sham.

§ THE EARL OF LONGFORD
My Lords, I think we had better see what steps the Foreign Secretary takes when he arrives in the United Nations. But so far as the House is concerned, we are here prepared to debate these matters at any time. Do not let anybody suggest that we are delaying. If noble Lords insist on a debate to-morrow they can have it.

§ THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY
My Lords, the difficulty of having it tomorrow is that we shall not have all the facts of the White Paper. We are asking for the minimum period after that. Surely it is not long to consider an issue of this importance. One gets a distinct impression that the Government do not really care whether Parliament discusses it or not.

§ LORD SORENSEN
Shame!

§ THE EARL OF LONGFORD
My Lords, the noble Marquess's observations have been greeted, at any rate from my side, with cries of "Shame!" If those observations had not flowed from the noble Marquess, I would have joined in that form of tribute. As it is, I hope that we shall listen to him, as I know we shall, with great interest when the debate arrives.

§ LORD CONESFORD
My Lords, does the noble Earl recollect that during the war, when matters were very urgent indeed, our Prime Minister found it possible to pay the greatest respect to Parliament? Does he really think that respect is being paid to Parliament if, on what I admit freely to the noble Earl is a most difficult issue, the Prime Minister takes a step that is quite irrevocable before Parliament has had time to express its opinion upon it?

§ THE EARL OF LONGFORD
My Lords, I always salute the noble Lord's reminiscences of the war-time Government, because he is the only member who resigned from it, and that I think does him great credit. But as regards a debate, we can have one to-morrow if the noble Lord wishes it.

§ LORD CARRINGTON
My Lords, I do not wish to be unreasonable about this, and I hope that the noble Earl will not be unreasonable. It would be totally unreasonable. After all, there have been seven months of negotiations in regard to which the House has been kept absolutely in the dark. None of us knows what was done in these seven months. I think it would really he most unreasonable to ask Parliament to discuss this matter at a moment's notice. I think the noble Earl would agree about that. But he will also agree that we on this side of the House feel quite strongly that a pledge was made. I hope that he will be good enough to convey to the Prime Minister that we feel rather strongly about this, and that there is a way in which our wishes can be met.

§ THE EARL OF LONGFORD
My Lords, that is an entirely reasonable request, and I will make sure that the 1032 strong feelings, of which there has been evidence on the other side of the House, are conveyed to the Prime Minister to-morrow morning.

§ LORD GRIMSTON OF WESTBURY
My Lords, for the sake of the record, did the noble Earl say that the Foreign Secretary was leaving to-morrow morning? In that case, we should have to debate the matter to-night.

§ THE EARL OF LONGFORD
My Lords, I do not quite follow the logic of that, because, after all, however fast he moves, he cannot take irrevocable steps in New York if he leaves to-morrow morning.

§ LORD GRIMSTON OF WESTBURY
My Lords, the noble Earl was offering a debate to-morrow. It would be quite useless from the point of meeting us over our having a debate before the Foreign Secretary leaves.

§ THE EARL OF LONGFORD
My Lords, I think I have made my point and I am sure that the House would not benefit from its being made again.