Lords Sitting of 25 November 1965

Preamble
The House met at three of the clock, The LORD CHANCELLOR on the Woolsack.
Prayers—Read by the Lord Bishop of Chichester

ZAMBIAN AND RHODESIAN JOINTLY OWNED ORGANISATIONS
3.6 p.m.
LORD BROCKWAY: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
[The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government what action has been taken to safeguard Zambia's joint ownership of the Kariba hydro-electric power plant, the Rhodesia railways and the Central Africa Airways Corporation, and the continued service of these assets to Zambia.]
THE PARLIAMENTARY UNDERSECRETARY OF STATE FOR COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS AND FOR THE COLONIES (LORD BESWICK): My Lords, Her Majesty's Government are naturally watching closely the position of the Central African joint organisations. These organisations do not at present appear to be threatened, and we hope that this state of affairs will continue.
LORD BROCKWAY: My Lords, I thank my noble friend for that Answer. While I do not want to reveal discussions in this delicate situation, could he confirm that Mr. Malcolm MacDonald, the Special Representative to East and Central Africa, is now in consultation with the Government of Zambia on these proposals? And could I ask particularly what are the arrangements by which Lockhead Hercules Transport is to load petrol to Zambia and to export twenty tons of copper bar from Zambia? Also have Her Majesty's Government any plans for the protection of the inter-racial university at Salisbury, which is now threatened, and particularly of the Kariba power station, whose electricity supplies may be threatened?
LORD BESWICK: My Lords, I can confirm that there have been discussions between Mr. Malcolm MacDonald and the President of Zambia. So far as any arrangements regarding transport undertakings are concerned, I think it would be much better if the noble Lord were to put down a Question. I have nothing to add on the third point that he raised.
LORD BROCKWAY: My Lords, is it not the case that the Question which I have on the Order Paper refers to these wider matters?
LORD BESWICK: My Lords, the noble Lord is asking a particular question about a particular air operation. If the noble Lord wants detailed information, it would be better to put down a Question.
LORD BROCKWAY: What about the Kariba power station, which is mentioned in my Question?

HOSPITALS AND POWER CUTS
3.8 p.m.
LORD AUCKLAND: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
[The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government what facilities are available to hospitals in the event of power cuts which put undue pressure upon their own generating system.]
LORD SORENSEN: My Lords, detailed guidance was given to hospitals in 1963 and 1964 on the extent of the emergency provision they should make. Arrangements have been made with the Ministry of Defence for the loan of service generators when hospitals are in difficulty, and the number of generating sets in hospitals has been substantially increased. I should also inform the noble Lord that the advice was given in a Technical Memorandum entitled Emergency Electrical Services.
LORD AUCKLAND: My Lords, I thank the noble Lord for his reply, but may I ask him whether he is aware that recently in Crawley Hospital an ice cream van had to be brought into service because neither the Army nor any local services could provide sufficient power for

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an emergency operation; and would he take steps to ensure that this situation is not repeated?
LORD SORENSEN: My Lords, I was not personally aware of what took place at Crawley Hospital, though, of course, we all very much regret it. But I am assured that all hospitals where emergency electricity facilities are essential to operating theatres do in fact have such facilities, and that, in addition to that, new hospitals under construction or being designed include the necessary standby and distribution facilities. I believe that over £1 million was spent in 1963, in addition to other expenditure, on emergency arrangements in hospitals, and everything is being done to forestall the calamity such as that to which the noble Lord referred.

RHODESIA: USE OF GOVERNMENT FUNDS
2.38 p.m.
LORD REAY: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
[The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government what steps they are taking to safeguard the funds standing in the name of the Government of Rhodesia in the Reserve Bank of Rhodesia from any use other than that authorised by Her. Majesty's Government.]
LORD BESWICK: My Lords, Her Majesty's Government are considering whether any action along these lines would be practicable.
LORD REAY: My Lords, while thanking the noble Lord for his Answer, and while recognising that Her Majesty's Government might wish to recognise the propriety of using funds standing in their name in the Reserve Bank of Rhodesia for the ordinary purposes of maintaining law and order, may I ask whether they would not consider specifying certain uses, such as, for instance, expenditure on detention camps or on certain military or police purposes for which Her Majesty's Government would decline to authorise the use of funds accruing to the legal Government of Rhodesia. Secondly, in an effort to give effect to these instructions, would Her Majesty's Government
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consider seeking an injunction in the Rhodesian courts restraining the governor of the Reserve Bank from releasing funds unless Her Majesty's Government were satisfied that they were not to be used for these purposes; or, failing that, would Her Majesty's Government at least make it clear to the governor of the Reserve Bank that they would hold the Reserve Bank liable, to the equivalent value of the funds that they had released for these purposes for which they had not been authorised, to whatever legal Government subsequently re-acquired legal control?
LORD BESWICK: My Lords, the noble Lord makes some interesting points which I will undertake to see are considered. At the present time, the fact is that we have no means of physically preventing the allocation of funds held in Rhodesia.

PUBLICATION OF "CRIMINAL STATISTICS" FOR 1964
3.13 p.m.
LORD DERWENT: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
[The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government why Criminal Statistics, 1964, were not published until the middle of November, 1965.]
THE JOINT PARLIAMENTARY UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE, HOME OFFICE (LORD STONHAM): My Lords, it was originally planned to start computer processing in February, 1964, of information reported by the police from the beginning of the year. Because of a six-months' delay in the delivery of the computer (from May to November, 1963), and consequential adjustments in programming arrangements, it was impossible to begin processing the criminal statistics until August, 1964. The use of new recording forms necessitated by the introduction of the computer and the more refined checks on accuracy which are now possible revealed on this occasion an unusual number of errors, and the need to correct them made it impossible to regain the lost time. Despite these handicaps the statistics were published a month earlier than in 1964. I am glad to say that the teething

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troubles are now over, and I have every reason to think that the 1965 Criminal Statistics will be ready for publication much earlier than those for 1964.
LORD DERWENT: My Lords, does the noble Lord recollect that until last year these statistics were always published in July? Would it not be better to sell the computer and go back to the old system?
LORD STONHAM: No my Lords; the noble Lord is not as accurate as usual. Last year the statistics were published in December; the year before they were published in September, and it is rare for them to be published as early as July, although certainly that is the target we have for next year. But I cannot, of course, be committed. I would remind the noble Lord that, apart from the reasons I gave for this present delay, we are now producing a 280-page book, instead of 150 pages, not because of the increase in the number of crimes but because of a far fuller analysis and because much more information is given about the statistics.

BUSINESS
VISCOUNT DILHORNE: My Lords, I have given Notice to the noble Lord of a Private Notice Question about the situation in regard to the supply of bread. I understand that a similar Question is being asked in another place, and it will probably be convenient for the noble Lord to reply to my Question when the Question in another place has been answered, so that we shall have precisely the same Answer.
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, I am glad to see that the noble and learned Viscount is in a most conciliatory and helpful mood this afternoon. I have to make a Statement on the pay of the Armed Forces and of the Higher Civil Service, and I shall be making it as shortly after 3.30 p.m. as possible.

HOUSE OF LORDS OFFICERS
THE CHAIRMAN OF COMMITTEES (THE EARL OF LISTOWEL): My Lords, I beg to move the Motion standing in my name on the Order Paper.
Moved, The appointment of the Committee on the House of Lords Officers; and that the Lords following, with the Lord Chancellor and the Chairman of Committees, be named of the Committee:

D. Wellington,

M. Cholmondeley,

M. Lansdowne,

M. Salisbury,

M. Willingdon,

E. Attlee,

E. De La Warr,

E. Dundee,

E. Longford,

E. St. Aldwyn,

E. Scarbrough,

E. Swinton,

V. Bridgeman,

V. Dilhorne,

V. Goschen,

V. Simonds,

V. Soulbury,

L. Ailwyn,

L. Airedale,

L. Amulree,

L. Balfour of Burleigh,

L. Bowles,

L. Bridges,

L. Burden,

L. Carrington,

L. Champion,

L. Chorley,

L. Conesford,

L. Hawke,

L. Henderson,

L. Henley,

L. Inchyra,

L. Jessel,

L. Kennet,

L. Lucas of Chilworth,

L. Mancroft,

L. Morton of Henryton,

L. Newton,

L. Ogmore,

L. Rea,

L. Reid,

L. Robertson of Oakridge,

L. Sainsbury,

L. Saltoun,

L. Shackleton,

L. Shepherd,

L. Sherwood,

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L. Silkin,

L. Strang,

B. Summerskill,

B. Swanborough,

L. Wade,

L. Wise,

B. Wootton of Abinger.

—(The Earl of Listowel.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.
Leave given to the Committee to report from time to time.
CLYDE NAVIGATION (SUPERANNUATION) ORDER CONFIRMATION BILL
CLYDE PORT AUTHORITY ORDER CONFIRMATION BILL
GLASGOW CORPORATION (No. 2) ORDER CONFIRMATION BILL
Brought from the Commons; read 1a and (pursuant to the Private Legislation Procedure (Scotland) Act, 1936), deemed to have been read 2a and reported from the Committee.

CHURCH OF ENGLAND CONVOCATIONS BILL [H.L.]
3.15 p.m.
Order of the Day for the Second Reading read.
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords I have it in command from Her Majesty the Queen to acquaint the House that Her Majesty, having been informed of the purport of the Church of England Convocations Bill, has consented to place Her prerogative and interest, so far as they are affected by the Bill, at the disposal of Parliament for the purposes of the Bill.
LORD STONHAM: My Lords, I beg to move that this Bill be read a second time. This is a modest Bill, with only one substantive clause, but it is of considerable historical and constitutional interest. It is a further step in the relationship which has developed over the centuries between the Mother of Parliaments and the ancient provincial assemblies of the clergy of England. The English nation achieved unity in its ecclesiastical life long before it was
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politically united as one kingdom, and the first national assemblies in our country were ecclesiastical. Before the Norman Conquest the great nobles attended from time to time with the bishops, and the custom developed of transacting Church and State business in the same mixed assembly; but soon after 1066 this practice was abandoned, and the senior clergy met to discuss religious questions alone.
In the thirteenth century, there were further developments which profoundly affected our Constitution and national history. At that time the Convocations of clergy became concerned with the raising of money, and the practice developed of summoning to them representatives or proctors for the lower clergy. This recognition of the principle of "no taxation without representation", undoubtedly influenced the subsequent development of Parliamentary government. In this way, too, the need to grant supply brought about an association between Parliament and Convocation which has survived to this day, notwithstanding the acceptance by the clergy in the seventeenth century of taxation in Parliament.
Not surprisingly, the association was not initially welcome to the Church. The issue of Writs by the Crown addressed to diocesan Archbishops and Bishops commanding them to attend as a kind of "third estate" in Parliament, together with their deans and archdeacons and the whole clergy of their diocese, was violently resisted by the clergy as an invasion of their liberties. Protests were made and the form of the Writs was modified so that the two Primates were ordered themselves to summon their clergy to attend the meeting of Parliament. This form of Writ survives to this day in the praemunientes clause which is included in the summons of every Bishop to your Lordships' House at the beginning of a new Parliament.
In obedience to these Writs the clergy attended the debates and meetings of Parliament for a number of years, under protest, complaining of the waste of time, which ought to have been spent in spiritual duties. From the early fourteenth century their attendance was not insisted on, although they continued to be summoned in accordance with ancient practice. Noble Lords will be aware that our

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Standing Order 6 requires an explanation of any alteration in the form or style of the Writ of Summons. It may be that, with the passing of this Bill, it will prove necessary to consider some modification of the form of the Bishops' Writ of Summons. If this should prove to be the case I hope that your Lordships will feel able to accept this statement of mine as sufficient compliance with the Standing Order.
The dislike of the lower clergy of the Crown's action in calling on them to attend the meeting of Parliament led to the practice of issuing, besides the personal Writs of Summons to Parliament, contemporaneous supplementary Writs also to each Archbishop, requiring him to summon his suffragans, together with the deans, archdeacons and the whole clergy of his Province, to meet under his presidency to consider, for example, the grant of subsidies and such other matters as might be thought proper. Thereupon the Archbishop issued his mandate to the diocesans of his Province summoning the inferior clergy by the mode of representation mentioned in the Parliamentary Writs addressed to the Bishops individually. In this way the first "Convocation Writ" of 1315 effected a compromise between the King and the clergy enabling Convocations to discuss among themselves the King's business which they were unwilling to discuss in Parliament at the behest of a secular authority. It is by this procedure that the Convocations are called together to this day.
Some of the practices of the Convocations seem to reflect Parliamentary forms and traditions. The Bishops and lower clergy ordinarily meet separately; just as they attended in different Houses when, in early times, they both went to Parliament. But I understand that for more formal business—for example, the solemn making of Canons and formal Acts of Convocation the two Ecclesiastical Houses meet together, as to-day and the Members of another place attend in this Chamber to hear the reading of Royal Assent to Bills agreed on by both Houses of Parliament.
In modern times it is no longer appropriate to insist on a common life for both Parliament and the Convocations of the Church. Since the Restoration
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the clergy have been agreeable to their taxation in Parliament, although I am informed that in theory they retain the right to tax themselves in Convocation. This change of practice diminished the constitutional importance of the Convocations and for a time their meetings became very infrequent; indeed, they were virtually suspended for the whole period between 1717 and 1852. As the House knows, however, the Convocations to-day meet frequently to discuss ecclesiastical business and from time to time to discuss issues of social importance in which the Church is interested in expressing a considered view. Obviously the dissolution of Parliament for reasons quite unconnected with the interests of the Church can under the present arrangements (whereby the Convocations are not only summoned, but also dissolved at the same time as Parliament) lead to unnecessary interruption of ecclesiastical business and the unwelcome expense of new elections of representative clergy. But this practice has now become firmly established, and can be modified properly only by legislation. That is the reason for this Bill now before the House, which the Government have introduced into Parliament, at the request of the two Archbishops, after consultation with their clergy in Convocation.
The Bill makes provision for the severance of the association of the sittings of the Convocations with those of Parliament. With this object in view, it provides in subsection (1) of Clause 1 that the power of Her Majesty to dissolve and summon Convocations shall be exerciseable independently of powers to dissolve and summon Parliament; it goes on in subsection (2) to provide that the maximum life of Convocations shall be five years—six years in the case of the present Convocations so as to enable them to be dissolved in 1970 at the same time as the House of Laity of the Church Assembly, which was elected for five years in September this year. Subsection (3) provides for the continuance of the present practice whereby the election of the representative members of the new Convocations and the calling together of those bodies takes place as soon as convenient after the dissolution of the old Convocations. The reference in the subsection to the powers being exercised "as heretofore" is intended to refer to

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the timing of the reassembly of Convocations and not to the detailed procedures under which the Crown, by Order in Council, causes Writs to issue for the meeting of new Convocations. As I mentioned earlier, it is possible, but I am unable to be quite categorical at this stage, that the form of the Parliamentary Writ of Summons to diocesan Bishops may need to be reviewed if the Bill passes into law.
Subsection (4) of Clause 1 removes any doubt as to whether Convocations may continue to sit notwithstanding the demise of the Crown. The Representation of the People Act 1876 provides for the continuance of Parliament in such circumstances, and it has been the practice since that time to apply the same principle to Convocations. The subsection, which is in declaratory terms, confirms these arrangements.
I am glad to have had the privilege of presenting this Bill for the approval of your Lordships, in the knowledge that its provisions have commended themselves to the Convocations as appropriate to the circumstances and needs of the Church in modern times. My Lords, I beg to move.
Moved, That the Bill be now read 2a.—(Lord Stonham.)
THE LORD BISHOP OF LONDON: My Lords, my first task is, on behalf of the Convocations, to express our gratitude to the Government for finding time for this modest Bill, as the noble Lord described it. We are also grateful to the noble Lord for his most interesting historical survey and for the information he has given us, as well as for the terms in which he proposed this Bill. From the point of view of the Church, it will be extremely helpful to have the duration of Convocations linked to the lifetime of the House of Laity of the Church Assembly rather than to that of Parliament. It might have been possible—indeed, it has sometimes been stated—that before the enabling Act Parliament was, in a sense, the House of Laity of the Church. That is no longer the case in the old sense, and we are moving within the Church of England to some form of synodical government in which the House of Laity will be more closely associated with the Convocations than is possible under the
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present enabling Bill in the Church Assembly.
It is therefore clearly desirable that the lifetime of the House of Clergy, which is, in effect, the Lower House of the Convocations of Canterbury and of York, and the House of Laity of the Church Assembly, should coincide. We believe also that, with the greatest security of tenure which this Bill will provide, the work of the Convocations will be facilitated and that we shall be able to accomplish our business more efficiently and more speedily.
On Question, Bill read 2a, and committed to a Committee of the Whole House.

SOUTHERN RHODESIA CONSTITUTION ORDER 1965
3.31 p.m.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR (LORD GARDINER): My Lords, I beg to move that the Southern Rhodesia Constitution Order 1965 be approved. Before outlining the case for the Special Order standing in my name on the Order Paper, perhaps it would be for the convenience of the House if I were to outline the way in which we propose to ask the House to consider the eight Special Orders concerning Southern Rhodesia which are due for consideration this afternoon. As it would clearly make for a rather ragged debate if each Order were to be debated separately, I hope that the House will agree to the following arrangement.
I will move the first Order, and this will be fully debated. Thereafter, my noble friend Lord Champion will speak to the three Orders which stand in his name on the Order Paper, and they will be fully debated together. Finally, my noble friend Lord Stonham will move the four Orders which stand in his name on the Order Paper and they will be fully debated together. It would, I apprehend, be necessary for the House to have the Question put to the House on each Order separately, but the net effect of this arrangement would be to reduce the debate on these eight Orders to a total of three. I hope that the House will consider that this is a convenient way to proceed this afternoon.
The first Order, the Southern Rhodesia Constitution Order 1965, is brought

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before the House for approval as required by Section 2(5) of the Southern Rhodesia Act, 1965, passed last week. Its primary purpose is to make certain amendments in the provisions of the Southern Rhodesia Constitution, 1961, which, I need hardly remind the House, is still the legally and only valid Constitution for Rhodesia, notwithstanding the illegal declaration of independence and the purported grant by the illegal régime of a new Constitution.
As the House knows, there has been a demand from some quarters that, in view of the illegal declaration of independence, the 1961 Constitution should be wholly suspended. It seemed to us that this was not the correct course to take and, as the House will remember, we did not ask for powers to do this. There are certain important parts of the 1961 Constitution which must be left as they are. There are, for example, the provisions relating to the powers and the authority of the Governor. There is Chapter 5, which deals with the courts and the Judiciary; there is the all-important Declaration of Rights, or Bill of Rights, in Chapter 6; and there are also Chapter 7, establishing the Constitutional Council and prescribing its functions for the purpose of enforcing the Bill of Rights, and Chapter 8, protecting the tribal trust lands. All of these parts of the Constitution are left unamended by this Order, save in so far as they are necessarily affected by particular provisions to which I will come.
On the other hand, there are parts of the 1961 Constitution which we thought it most desirable to amend, or rather suspend—indeed, I would emphasise the word "suspend", because in fact, as the House will notice, the three sections of the Order, Sections 3, 4 and 5, which affect the 1961 Constitution, are prefaced by the phrase
"So long as this section is in operation",
to bring out the point that we are not attempting to abrogate any part of the 1961 Constitution. But there are certain matters that we could not leave alone. For example, the Legislative Assembly is composed, in the vast majority, of members of the Rhodesian Front, Mr. Smith's Party, the Party that has lead Rhodesia into this state of rebellion and attempted overthrow of the authority of the United Kingdom. We have there-
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fore invalidated in advance any laws which that Assembly may attempt to pass, and any other business which it may transact. We have filled in the gap by enabling Her Majesty to legislate for Rhodesia by Order in Council.
Further, we have in the executive field made such provision as seemed proper to enable loyal authorities to continue to function. We have freed the Governor from his constitutional obligation to act in accordance with the advice of Rhodesian Ministers. We have also empowered the United Kingdom Government to exercise, or control the exercise of, various functions of officers and authorities of the Government of Rhodesia; but the Order does not impose any duty on the United Kingdom Government to exercise any particular functions in any particular case. The question whether and how we should act is left to be decided by considerations of what is practicable, and what is right and helpful, in the circumstances of each particular case.
I should also mention now, as another object of the Order, the declaration which it contains as to the invalidity of the new Constitution which Mr. Smith and his collegues purported to grant to Southern Rhodesia on November 11. This, the House will remember, was done simply in the name of Mr. Smith and his colleagues in the Ministry before that Ministry was dismissed. It was, of course, done without any shred of legal authority and was wholly invalid. Indeed, it may be doubted whether in the whole history of Constitutions given, at any rate in recent times, there is any precedent for this somewhat bizarre action, whereby a group of a dozen men, without even pretending to act with the authority or approval of the people of the country, purported to grant a whole new Constitution to their country. However that may be, we thought it right expressly to declare the action void.
While I am on the point of alternative invalid Governments, it may be right that I should draw the attention of the House to an Act of the Southern Rhodesia Legislature of which your Lordships may not he aware. I refer to an Act called "The Preservation of Constitutional Government Act" which was passed by Mr. Smith's Government in 1963 Questions have been raised as to whether certain acts, either here or in Southern Rhodesia, might or might not constitute treason. But this

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Act which was passed by themselves appears, your Lordships may think, to fit like a glove precisely what Mr. Smith and his colleagues have done.
It provides that
"Any person who is a resident of Southern Rhodesia and who, either within or outside Southern Rhodesia, organises or sets up, or helps to organise or set up, or advocates, urges or suggests the organisation or setting up, of any group or body with a view to that group or body

(i) overthrowing, or attempting to overthrow, the Government by unconstitutional means, or

(ii) taking over, or attempting to take over, the Government of Southern Rhodesia by unconstitutional means, or usurping the functions of government in Southern Rhodesia or supports or assists any such group or body in doing or attempting to do any of the things described above, or in any manner seeks to enlist the aid of any person, group or body, whether such person, group or body is within or outside Southern Rhodesia, in doing or attempting to do any of the things described in the preceding sub-paragraphs"

shall be guilty of an offence, and liable to imprisonment for a period not exceeding twenty years.
"Unconstitutional" is defined in the Act in this way:
"'unconstitutional' means any process which is not a process provided for in the Constitution and which is contrary to any law".
The Act then provides that anyone doing any of those things that I have read out shall be guilty of an offence and liable to imprisonment for a period not exceeding twenty years. It may be a matter for comment that these gentlemen should themselves have promulgated an Act which seems so closely to fit precisely what they have done.
My Lords, I hope that I have made clear to the House the main purpose in making this Constitutional Order in Council, which may be summarised as to make the minimum temporary amendments required by the actions of the illegal régime and to give us the powers we may require to exercise as a result. But I should also tell the House of a further purpose which we had in mind in making this Order. It is to enable the British Government to keep under their own hand the necessary constitutional powers in Rhodesia and thus enable us to resist any attempt to set up any alternative illegal Government. We have
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made it clear in the Security Council and elsewhere that we consider the Rhodesian problem to be our responsibility and we want to keep control of events. If some group were to try to set up an alternative Government, either inside or outside Rhodesia, such action, however well-intentioned, would be bound, in our opinion, to lead to uncertainty, confusion and dissipation of effort, and thus militate against the achievement of what it can be assumed would be the common objective—namely, the displacement of the present illegal régime. Accordingly, this Order in Council, which confers powers to make laws of Rhodesia by further Order in Council, and confers executive powers on the Secretary of State, provides the means of making it clear that the responsibility and the powers, as and when they may be effectively exercised, are ours.
I now turn to a scrutiny of the detailed provisions of the Order. Section 1 deals with purely technical matters of citation and rules of interpretation and commencement. Section 2 is declaratory. This declares, for the avoidance of doubt, the invalidity of the purported new Constitution and of any other so-called Constitution which the illegal régime may attempt to establish. This section came into operation as soon as the Order was made, and by virtue of the authority conferred by Section 2(3) of the Southern Rhodesia Act, 1965, was given retrospective effect from November 11. This was necessary to establish, beyond doubt and at the earliest possible moment, that the purported new Constitution was, and always had been, invalid.
Section 3 deals with the Legislature and with the legislative powers. Subsection (1)(a) is relevant because, first, Section 6 of the Constitution establishes a Legislature consisting of Her Majesty, usually represented by the Governor, and a Legislative Assembly. Chapter II of the Constitution deals with the composition, powers and procedure of the Legislature and the summoning, prorogation and dissolution of the Legislative Assembly. Chapter III deals with the delimitation of constituencies and electoral districts. Section 3(1)(a) of the Order prohibits the making of laws by the Legislature—this may have been an excess of caution as the Governor would not co-operate with the Legislative Assembly for this purpose—and the

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transaction of any other business by the Legislative Assembly. It thus prevents what must be regarded as a rebel-dominated body from purporting to act in support of the illegal régime. Subsection (1)(a) also prohibits the holding of elections for the Legislative Assembly and any steps in connection with such elections, for example the delimitation of constituencies. Chapters II and III of the Constitution are required to take effect accordingly.
Regarding Section 3(1)(b), the power to prorogue the Legislative Assembly is, by Section 34 of the Constitution, vested in the Governor, Section 3(1)(b) of the Order expressly vests the power in the Secretary of State. This was considered necessary in case prorogation became desirable and the Governor was prevented from proroguing the Legislative Assembly himself. Section 3(1)(c) confers on Her Majesty in Council complete legislative powers for Southern Rhodesia. This power is exactly equivalent to, and is intended to be in substitution for, the power vested in the Legislature under the Constitution. The provision is necessary because there is no prospect of the Legislature's being able to make laws so long as the rebellion lasts, and we cannot leave Southern Rhodesia without some legitimate legislative body. Subsection (2) of Section 3 may be unnecessary because it may be covered by Section 3(1)(c), but it was thought desirable to put beyond doubt that Orders in Council under Section 3(1)(c) can authorise subordinate legislation, for example, Governor's regulations. Subsection (3) is purely interpretative, designed to cover such provisions, for example, as Sections 42 and 55 of the Constitution. On Section 3(4), laws of Southern Rhodesia's Legislature are not, of course, subject in ordinary circumstances to scrutiny by the United Kingdom Parliament. It was nevertheless recognised that it was desirable that laws made by Her Majesty in Council in substitution for the Southern Rhodesian Legislature should be subject to such scrutiny. The Act does not expressly require this, but advantage has been taken of the power conferred by Section 2(3) to require all such laws to be laid before Parliament.
LORD COLERAINE: My Lords, would the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor allow me to ask him a
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question, in further elucidation of the point about the Statutory Instruments Act 1946? I think I am right in saying that, under Section 4 of that Act, Orders are to be laid before Parliament but are not subject to annulment. Under Section 5 they may be laid subject, I think, to Negative Resolution procedure. Could the noble and learned Lord say which section of the Act will apply in this case?
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: These would be laid before Parliament, but would not be subject to annulment by Negative Resolution procedure.
LORD COLERAINE: Would Parliament be able to discuss them?
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: Only by putting down a Motion or a Motion of Censure in the ordinary way. These are really the equivalent of Statutory Orders which might be made in Rhodesia and would not, of course, in the ordinary way be subject to the survey of this Parliament at all. Perhaps I might deal with that point a little later.
As to Section 3(5), this brought Section 3 into operation as soon as the Order was made and, again by virtue of the authority conferred by Section 2(3) of the Act, gave it retrospective effect from November 11, 1965. This was necessary in order to establish at the earliest possible moment that things done by the Legislative Assembly in furtherance of the illegal Declaration of Independence were, and always had been, wholly invalid.
Section 4 deals with executive powers. Section 4(2) of the Constitution vests the executive authority of Southern Rhodesia in Her Majesty and permits it to be exercised on Her Majesty's behalf by the Governor or such other persons as may be authorised in that behalf by the Governor or by any law of the Legislature. This means that, in so far as there are things to be done in the executive field by the Government of Southern Rhodesia—entering into contracts, giving orders to officers, and so forth—and where the relevant powers are not expressly vested by some provision of law in a particular officer or authority, they may be done on Her Majesty's behalf by the Governor or his delegate. It was considered that it might be convenient for the Secretary of State to have this power

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concurrently with the Governor, and this paragraph so provides.
Section 4(1)(b) suspends the ministerial system. The sections of the Constitution which are referred to in Section 4(1)(b)—namely, 43, 44, 45 and 46—in substance cover the ministerial system. This suspends the ministerial system and thus relieves the Governor of the obligation to try to find somebody to form a new Ministry commanding the support of a majority in the Legislative Assembly. Section 4(1)(c), dealing with the dismissal of Ministers coupled with the suspension of the ministerial system, probably relieves the Governor of his obligation to seek an Act in accordance with the advice of Ministers in the exercise of his various functions, because if there are no Ministers it may be said that he obviously cannot and therefore need not. But it was considered desirable to kill any doubt on the point.
As regards Section 4(1)(d) many, perhaps most, of the executive functions of the Government of Southern Rhodesia are now vested by the particular laws that create them in the Minister. The dismissal of Ministers and the suspension of the ministerial system would mean that there was nobody capable of exercising such functions. To enable this gap to be filled—for example, where the Minister's consent is needed for some transaction or where property under control is legally disposable of only by the Minister—this paragraph permits a Secretary of State to exercise the Minister's functions. That property might be, in fact, under our control.
Section 4(1)(e) enables a Secretary of State to take over and exercise, or to prohibit or restrict the exercise of, the functions vested by the Constitution or some other law in an officer or authority of the Government of Southern Rhodesia, including the Governor himself. This will enable a Secretary of State not merely to ensure the discharge of functions where the relevant office is vacant and cannot lawfully be filled, but also to act instead of an officer or authority who is likely to exercise the function concerned in a manner favourable to the rebellion. There is no obligation to exercise a power where it is not likely to be effective or useful. This paragraph also provides authority for the
1044
dissolution of the Legislative Assembly if we chose to use it.
Subsection (2) exempts a Secretary of State, in exercising the powers of a Minister or other officer or authority of the Government of Southern Rhodesia, from having to undertake the same process of consultation as would be binding on that Minister. This is necessary in case a Secretary of State cannot communicate with the person concerned, or in case that person is himself actively participating in the rebellion. Subsection (3), I think, speaks for itself. As regards subsection (4), the reference to "an officer of the Government of Southern Rhodesia" occurs in Sections 4(1)(e) and 4(2).
Turning to Section 5, I would point out that Section 113(3) of the Constitution, as recently amended by Section 15 of the Constitution Amendment Act, 1965, regulates the manner in which monies may be withdrawn from the Consolidated Revenue Fund of Southern Rhodesia. The effect is that no monies may he so withdrawn except to meet expenditure which has been charged on the Fund by the Constitution or by some law of the Legislature, or where those monies have been voted by the Legislature. Section 5 of the Order permits monies to be issued on the authority of a warrant issued by a Secretary of State or by the Governor, in pursuance of instructions from Her Majesty through a Secretary of State. It is unlikely that this power can be effectively used, unless and until the officers of the Treasury of the Government of Southern Rhodesia choose to defy the illegal régime. The time may come when it would be a useful power to have. Section 6 is purely declaratory. It is designed to scotch any argument that prohibitions and restrictions imposed by, or under, Sections 3(1)(a) or 4(1)(e) are merely directory, and that things done in neglect or defiance of them are nevertheless validly done.
When your Lordships discuss the Order, if any questions are raised as to the construction of the Order, I shall be happy at the end to do my best to deal with them. On those grounds I commend the Order to your Lordships' House and beg to move accordingly.
Moved, That the Southern Rhodesia Constitution Order 1965 be approved.—(The Lord Chancellor.)

THE BAKING TRADE DISPUTE
3.56 p.m.
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, perhaps it will be convenient if I now answer the Private Notice Question which the noble and learned Viscount asked at the beginning of business. If I may, I will use the same words as my right honourable friend the Minister of Labour:
"It has been decided to refer the claim by the Bakers' Union to the National Board for Prices and Incomes. I am seeing"
—that is, the Minister of Labour is seeing—
"the President and General Secretary of the Union later to-day."
VISCOUNT DILHORNE: My Lords, while thanking the noble Lord for answering the Private Notice Question in this House, may I ask him whether it is not the case that there is now what is known as an industrial dispute in this industry? May I also ask him whether this answer does not mean that the whole of the machinery established over many years, traditional machinery, exercised by the Ministry of Labour for the settlement of industrial disputes, is being superseded?
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, the noble and learned Viscount is right in one respect, but he will appreciate that when the other machinery was created and used the National Board for Prices and Incomes did not exist. The Government decided to send this particular dispute to the Board for the simple reason that the Board had itself investigated and reported on the bakery industry early this year. It was felt, in the light of the facts and knowledge that would be available to the Board, that a speedy report and decision could be given.
VISCOUNT DILHORNE: My Lords, does this mean, then, that where the Board have made a review of a particular industry and an industrial dispute subsequently arises, this will be a precedent which will be followed, for taking a
1046
matter out of the hands of the Ministry of Labour and putting it in the hands of an outside body?
LORD SHEPHERD: No, my Lords, it is not being used as a precedent. But in view of the fact—and I am quite sure the noble and learned Viscount will appreciate this—that many millions of people are going to be put to inconvenience and hardship this weekend, the Government felt (and I am quite sure the House would agree with this) that we should use all the machinery which will produce a speedy end to this inconvenience and hardship.
VISCOUNT DILHORNE: My Lords, I want to ask the noble Lord about that, if I may. Does he think that the reference to the Prices and Incomes Board will produce a speedy end, and a more speedy end than the Ministry of Labour could achieve? Does the noble Lord hold out any hope of a quick alleviation of the difficulties of the British public to which he referred?
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, we hope that good sense will prevail in this matter, and that the meeting of the Minister of Labour with the President and General Secretary will find a solution. But I think the noble and learned Viscount would be quite wrong to assume that the machinery under the Ministry of Labour, which has been so useful in the past, will in any way be superseded.
LORD ERROL OF HALE: My Lords, if I may intervene for a moment, would the noble Lord tell me how, in view of the union leader's having already said that he did not wish this matter to go to the Prices and Incomes Board, the investigation by the Board can produce a conciliatory result? After all, it is the duty of the Board—is it not?—to pontificate, not to consolidate.
LORD SHEPHERD: The noble Lord will be aware that in many disputes there have been hard views on both sides, and yet, eventually, an independent body has succeeded in bringing the two sides together. The Board is an independent body, and the Government are confident that it will produce the right solution.

PAY OF THE ARMED FORCES AND HIGHER CIVIL SERVICE
4.0 p.m.
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, it might be convenient for me now to repeat a Statement which has just been made in another place by my right honourable friend the First Secretary of State. It is as follows:
"With permission, Mr. Speaker, I should like to make a statement about the pay of the Armed Forces and of the higher Civil Service.
"As the House will be aware, the Government are committed to carrying out a review of the pay of the Armed Forces at two-yearly intervals in accordance with the procedure described in Cmnd. 945, dated February, 1960. The current review has been proceeding on the basis of Cmnd. 945 which provides first, that changes in the pay of Service officers would in future be governed broadly by the relative changes in the pay of comparable grades in the home Civil Service, and secondly, that changes in the pay of sailors, soldiers and airmen would be governed broadly by changes in the average earnings and wages in manufacturing and certain other industries as notified by the Ministry of Labour. Before reaching a decision about the current review the Government are requesting the National Board for Prices and Incomes to advise them whether the increase in pay produced by the application of these formulae are, in relation to total emoluments, consistent with Part I of the White Paper on Prices and Incomes Policy (Cmnd. 2639) and in particular with the criteria laid down in paragraph 15. The Board is being asked to pay special regard to the need of the Services to recruit and retain on a voluntary basis sufficient men to meet the commitments of the Services and the special features of Service life.
"The Board is being asked to report not later than 18th January, 1966, so as to allow the new rates of pay to be implemented on 1st April, 1966.
"I should also inform the House that the Standing Advisory Committee on the Pay of the Higher Civil Service has recently conducted a review and
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has recommended increases in salaries for the grades concerned. The Government are also requesting the National Board for Prices and Incomes to examine and report on the Committee's recommendations in relation to the considerations set out in Part I of the White Paper on Prices and Incomes Policy.
"I will, with permission, circulate the text of the Standing Advisory Committee's Report in the OFFICIAL REPORT. I am also placing copies of it in the Library this afternoon."
Following is the text of the Standing Advisory Committee's Report:
STANDING ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON THE PAY OF THE HIGHER CIVIL SERVICE
Seventh Report
I am writing to report to you the conclusions and recommendations reached by the Standing Advisory Committee on the Pay of the Higher Civil Service as a result of the further general review, the decision to embark upon which I reported when I wrote to you on 19th January last.
2. We conducted our last general review of the pay of the Higher Civil Service in 1963. As a result of our recommendations the salaries of the Administrative grades in the Higher Civil Service were increased with effect from 1st August 1963 to the rates shown below, and the salaries of other classes and grades in the Higher Civil Service were correspondingly increased.

National rates £

Joint Permanent Secretaries to the Treasury and Secretary of the Cabinet

8,800

Other Permanent Secretaries

8,200

Deputy Secretaries

5,800

Under-Secretaries

4,700

Assistant Secretaries

3,050–3,900

At that time the London weighting payable over and above those national rates of pay for staff working in London was £65 for staff employed in Inner London (up to three miles from Charing Cross) and £60 for staff employed in Outer London (up to sixteen miles from Charing Cross). From 1st January 1964 these amounts were raised to £85 for staff employed in Inner London (up to four miles from Charing Cross) and £65 for staff employed in Outer London.
3. In June 1964 the National Whitley Council reported to us a pay agreement of 6th February 1964, providing for the pay of most grades in the non-industrial Civil Service with salary scales whose maxima did not exceed that of the Principals' scale to be increased by 3 per cent. from 1st January 1964, 3½ per cent. from 1st January 1965 and 3½ per cent. from 1st January 1966. The agreement provided that for any grade which was on any of

1049
these dates the subject of a pay research survey (or was linked for pay purposes to such a grade) the payment of the central pay increase due on that date should be deferred, and only made if by the following 30th June negotiations on the survey had not produced either a settlement or a decision to go to arbitration. The Administrative and Executive Classes were being surveyed on 1st January 1964 so that the Principals and a number of other grades did not immediately become entitled to the first of the three increases. The agreement was not in fact reported to us until it had become clear that negotiations on the Administrative and Executive Class pay research surveys could not be completed by 30th June 1964 and that the central pay increase would therefore become payable to the Principals and the other grades concerned with effect from 1st January 1964.
4. In December 1964 the Treasury, the Association of First Division Civil Servants and the Society of Civil Servants informed us that, following pay research surveys for the Administrative and Executive Classes, agreements had been reached to increase the Principals' salary scale to £2,100–£2,900 (national rates) and the Chief Executive Officers' salary scale to £2,400–£2,800 (National rates) with effect from 1st January 1964, and invited us to recommend new salary scales with effect from 1st January 1964 for the Higher Civil Service grades covered by these surveys, as follows—

National rates

£

Assistant Secretaries

3,300–4,300

Principal Executive Officers

3,800

Senior Chief Executive Officers

2,950–3,300

At the same time we were invited to recommend corresponding increases for other Higher Civil Service grades at comparable levels.
5. We accepted these proposals, and recommended accordingly on 19th January 1965; our recommendations were in due course accepted and put into effect. In reporting them we stated that we thought that the new differential thus created between the Assistant Secretaries' maximum and the Under-Secretaries' rate was too small to be allowed to persist. We also took into account the steady narrowing of the differential between the Principals' maximum and the Assistant Secretaries' minimum as a result of the 1965 and 1966 central pay increases under the agreement referred to in paragraph 3 above: the Principals' maximum rose from £2,900 to £3,002 from 1st January 1965, and will rise again to £3,107 from 1st January 1966. It was in these circumstances that we decided that the time had come to embark on a further general review of the pay of the Higher Civil Service.
6. The Staff Side of the National Whitley Council have suggested to us that the problems created by the narrowing of differentials as a result of applying central pay increases up to the Principals' maximum but not to the Higher Civil Service could be avoided by applying central pay increases right to the top of the Civil Service. They point out that, at a time of relatively frequent move-
1050
ments of pay in the rest of the Civil Service, to adjust Higher Civil Service salaries only once every four or five years not only gives rise to constant difficulties with differentials between the Higher Civil Service and the rest of the Civil Service, but also means that members of the Higher Civil Service receive less total pay than they otherwise would and tends to have an adverse effect upon retirement benefits, which are calculated on average salary over the last three years of service. The National Staff Side suggest that, if it is felt undesirable to extend central pay settlements to the very highest ranks of the Higher Civil Service, they should at least be extended to grades and posts up to and including the Under-Secretary and there should be biennial reviews of salaries above that level.
7. The Treasury agree that, since central pay settlements are now given more frequently than was envisaged by the Royal Commission on the Civil Service 1953–55 (from whose recommendations the existing arrangements stem), there would be advantage if Higher Civil Service grades up to and including the Under-Secretary received the equivalent of central pay increases. They consider, however, that above that level there should be no commitment to annual or biennial reviews, since they believe as a matter of principle that the higher the grade in the public service the greater the desirability that its pay should move relatively infrequently, and then only as a result of weighty and specific investigation.
8. We accept that Higher Civil Service grades up to and including the Under-Secretary should in future receive the equivalent of central pay increases. The evidence which we have collected suggests that both in other public services and in employment outside the public service the salaries of senior staff now tend to move more or less in parallel with those of subordinate salaried staff, save at the highest levels in industry. On the other hand it seems to us that the special considerations which the Royal Commission identified as entering into assessments of the pay of the Higher Civil Service are particularly important in relation to the highest ranks (those whose rate exceeds that of the Under-Secretary), and that at those levels salaries should not as a matter of course follow salary movements lower down. We consider therefore that central pay increases should not apply to grades above the level of Under-Secretary.
9. If the limit for central pay increases is raised as we propose, the technical problems created by narrowing of differentials as a result of central pay increases will no longer arise in the area directly above the Principals' maximum. They will to some extent be recreated in the area directly above the Under-Secretaries' rate. At that level, however, the number of grades and posts affected is much smaller and the gaps between rates are wider. Some temporary narrowing of differentials is therefore easier to accommodate at that level.
10. Since the pay of the Higher Civil Service is determined under different arrangements from the pay of the rest of the non-industrial Civil Service, it would not be

1051
appropriate to include Higher Civil Service grades up to and including the Under-Secretary in National Whitley Council central pay agreements. We therefore recommend that in future central pay increases for grades up to and including the Principal should be reported to us, on the understanding that when central pay increases are received by Principals we shall normally recommend similar increases for grades and posts in the Higher Civil Service whose fixed rates or scale maxima do not exceed the Under-Secretary rate, which wilt involve appropriate adjustments for grades and posts between under-Secretary and Deputy Secretary level. In considering our recommendations on new rates of pay we have assumed that this recommendation will be accepted.
11. It does not seem to us to be necessary or desirable to fix the frequency of reviews of other Higher Civil Service salaries. Under the present arrangements reviews of the pay of the Higher Civil Service can be undertaken either at the Government's request or on our own initiative; the Government are free to request, and we are free to initiate, reviews at any time they, or we, think right. We therefore recommend no other changes in these arrangements. It is clear, however, that the pay of Assistant Secretaries, Principal Executive Officers and Senior Chief Executive Officers will have to be reviewed when the results of pay research surveys for the Administrative and Executive Classes are known, and we expect (without seeking to bind the Government or ourselves in any way) that those reviews may well provide suitable occasions for reviewing the pay of the Higher Civil Service as a whole.
12. The Treasury and the National Staff Side have invited us to frame our recommendations on this occasion and in future for salaries at and above the level of the Deputy Secretary on the basis that London weighting will not be payable at these levels and that salaries should take account of this fact. They point out that only a very few posts at these levels are outside London to all intents and purposes the effective rate of pay for almost all of those concerned is the amount payable to those employed in Inner London. We agree that the arguments for a system of London weighting on national rates hardly apply to staff at these salary levels virtually all of whom work in London. Accordingly we recommend that London weighting should from 1st September, 1965, cease to be payable to Deputy Secretaries or to staff in any other grade or post on a flat rate or with a scale maximum which is the same as or more than the Deputy Secretary's rate. In considering our recommendations on new rates of pay we have assumed that this recommendation will be accepted.
13. We decided to embark upon this review mainly on account of the compression of differentials between Principals, Assistant Secretaries and Under-Secretaries and between grades at corresponding levels in other classes, and our main concern in this review has been to restore a workable pattern of salary relationships in the Higher Civil Service. We have also taken the opportunity of collecting
1052
information about how salaries in other public services and in broadly comparable employment outside the public service have moved since our last general review. We acknowledge gratefully the help we have received from those of whom we have made inquiries for this purpose.
14. We have also had regard to the general economic situation in which our recommendations are made. We are not specifically required to do so by our terms of reference: indeed we recognise that one of the purposes of establishing the Committee was to provide a source of independent advice to Governments who might on occasion find it difficult to balance their obligations as employers of senior civil servants against their wider responsibilities for management of the economy. On this occasion, however, we have felt that our view of the economic problems confronting the country must lead us to modify views based on other considerations about the pay of the highest grades of civil servants. We believe that our recommendations will establish a pattern of salary relationships which can be regarded as workable and tolerable for the time being; but the new rates, particularly at the highest levels, do not fully reflect our assessment of what would constitute fair and reasonable remuneration for the grades in question, because in our judgment at those levels in the Civil Service what is appropriate to the general state of the economy must for the time being override other considerations. We should not, however, think it right for those concerned to be indefinitely penalised by a decision taken in the light of a particular economic situation, and we therefore intend to review the salaries of these grades earlier than would otherwise be the case.
15. Taking all these considerations into account we recommend the following new rates for the administrative grades in the Higher Civil Service, to take effect from 1st September, 1965—

£

Joint Permanent Secretaries to the Treasury and Secretary of the Cabinet

9,200

(*)

Other Permanent Secretaries

8,600

(*)

Deputy Secretaries

6,300

(*)

Under-Secretaries

5,250

(National)

Assistant Secretaries

3,500–4,500

(National)

* In accordance with our recommendation in paragraph 12 the rates marked with an asterisk will not attract London weighting: these will be the rates payable to the staff concerned whether they are employed in London or elsewhere.

We recommend that rates of pay for other classes and grades in the Higher Civil Service should be revised from the same date to give corresponding increases at comparable salary levels. These recommendations take account of the central pay increases that are due under the agreement of 16th February 1964 to come into effect on 1st January 1966 for grades up to and including the Principal, and we do not intend to recommend any further adjustment of pay in the Higher Civil Service on that account.
16. We have received a submission from the Society of Civil Servants inviting us to recommend that Principal Executive Officers should be paid on a scale rather than on a flat rate and that the level of their pay should be raised in relation to that of Assistant Secretaries. We have carefully considered both this submission and a counter-submission by the Treasury, but we have come to the conclusion, having regard to the definition of our scope and functions laid down by the Royal Commission on the Civil Service (Cmd. 9613, paragraphs 386 to 389), that these are not sufficiently major matters to warrant our intervention, arid we therefore make no recommendations on them.
(Signed) FRANKS.
The Rt. Hon. Harold Wilson, O.B.E., M.P., 10 Downing Street,
London, S.W.1.
EARL JELLICOE: My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord for repeating this Statement, but I cannot honestly say that I am glad to hear it. What is more, I doubt very much whether the Armed Forces, to whom we paid tribute in this House only two days ago, will be particularly glad to hear it. So far as the Armed Forces are concerned, I find this Statement at best puzzling, and at worst disturbing. So far as the Higher Civil Service is concerned, there is a very long Report from the Standing Advisory Committee, which we have not yet had a chance to read. Therefore, I should like to confine my questions to that part which relates to the Armed Forces.
May I say why I find the Statement puzzling, and in particular the reference to paragraph 15 of Cmnd. 2639? May I remind your Lordships of some of what paragraph 15 says? It says:
"Exceptional pay increases should be confined to the following circumstances…"
Do the Government feel that these biennial increases in Service pay are exceptional? Are they not, in fact, regular increases, following the regular and approved Grigg machinery?
Then there are the criteria in subsections (1), (2) and (4) of paragraph 15. Subsection (1) says:
"Where the employers concerned"—
this is a justification for a wage increase—
"make a direct contribution towards increasing productivity in a particular firm or industry…"
What possible relevance have the Armed Forces to that particular criterion? Subsection (2) talks of:
1054
"Where it is essential in the national interest to secure a change in the distribution of manpower…"
Do the Government feel that the Prices and Incomes Board can in fact be the arbiters of our correct Service manpower? Subsection (4) talks of:
"Where there is a widespread recognition that the pay of a certain group of workers has fallen seriously out of line with the level of remuneration for similar work…"
My Lords, what workers in this country do work similar to that of the Armed Forces? I should be grateful for anything which the noble Lord can say to tell us what relevance this paragraph of this Command Paper has to the Armed Forces.
Finally, my Lords, I said that, at worst, I found this Statement disturbing. I find it disturbing if, in fact, behind this Statement, the Government are proposing to retreat from Grigg. Can the noble Lord assure us that there is not in fact going to be a retreat from the Grigg principles; and would he agree with me that, if there were, this would seriously affect morale in the Armed Forces and recruiting to them?
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, I am sure that noble Lords on all sides of the House share in the tributes that we have paid on regular occasions to the Armed Forces, and I am also quite sure that the Armed Forces would not wish, in the present circumstances, to be considered or treated differently from the working people of this country. The noble Earl will be aware that we are trying to establish, for very obvious reasons, an incomes policy. The recommendations that have arisen through discussions between the Treasury and the Defence Department are such that the Government feel that, in all the circumstances, it would be right to send them to an independent body. The noble Earl is quite right: it is hard to reconcile the relationship between soldiers, particularly those on active service, and the workers; but the Government still feel that the criteria in paragraph 15, and particularly subsection (4), are relevant.
However, to make the position perfectly clear as to what the Government have in mind, I would repeat the words of the Statement:
"The Board is being asked to pay special regard to the need of the Services to recruit

1055
and retain on a voluntary basis sufficient men to meet the commitments of the Services"—
and perhaps the noble Earl will not mind being reminded of the last words—
"and the special features of service life".
I am quite sure that the Board will look into this matter with expedition, and will see that a just assessment is made.
EARL JELLICOE: My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord for his further reply, but does this not mean that the Prices and Incomes Board are in fact going to be the arbiters of Service pay and, therefore, of some of our Defence commitments? And can he give us the fundamental assurance that the Government agree with Grigg: that it is essential that inflation should not be allowed to eat away the real value of Service emoluments? Can the noble Lord confirm that the Government agree with that principle?
LORD SHEPHERD: Yes, my Lords. I think I should remind the noble Earl that in 1960, I think it was, the Government, of which I believe he was then a distinguished member, felt it necessary to alter the Grigg proposals, when they spread the recommendations over two years. That was a case in which they acted, as a Government, arbitrarily. This Government is not acting arbitrarily: they are sending it to an independent body. But, as the noble Earl will recognise—he has been in this House long enough to know—it is, in the end, the Government and Parliament that make the decisions.
EARL JELLICOE: My Lords, I agree with that, but may I remind the noble Lord that when the last Government took that decision in 1962 it was not a departure from the Grigg principle; it was, rightly or wrongly, splitting it into two stages. May I remind him of what his right honourable friend, the present First Secretary, said on that occasion. He said:
"Here the Minister has cheated in one important respect. I make the charge deliberately, for the whole basis of the. Grigg Report was that there should be a biennial review."
He went on to say:
"The Minister has unilaterally broken what I regard as an honourable agreement."
Can the noble Lord confirm, in the light of those statements, that the present Gov-
1056
ernment are not going to depart from Grigg?
LORD SHEPHERD: The Government are not acting unilaterally in this matter. It has been referred to the Board. We shall await the Board's Report and then, perhaps, if the noble Earl is still of the same mind about it, he can raise the subject in a debate.
THE LORD PRIVY SEAL (THE EARL OF LONGFORD): My Lords, may I, with great deference, suggest that this is already becoming a debate? It may be doubtful whether it would not be better to proceed.
EARL JELLICOE: My Lords, may I say, with great deference to the Leader of the House, that the career and financial prospects of 400,000 men and women in our Armed Forces are at stake here? I think it would be a very good thing if we had a debate at greater length, but I agree that it should be on another occasion.

SOUTHERN RHODESIA CONSTITUTION ORDER 1965
4.12 p.m.
Debate resumed.
VISCOUNT DILHORNE: My Lords, perhaps we can now return to the debate on this important Order. I am sure that we are all grateful that this statement should have been made by the Lord Chancellor. This is the first Order to come before Parliament since the passing last week of the Southern Rhodesia Act, and I think it is the most important of the Orders that we shall be considering this afternoon. I am sure the House will agree to the suggestion of the noble and learned Lord as to the way in which we should handle our debates on these various Orders.
I have a number of questions that I wish to put on this Order, and a number of comments, some of them critical, which I want to make with regard to it and to the possible exercise of the power it gives. But I do not want to be misunderstood, and therefore I wish to preface my observations by saying that we recognise that a Constitution Order is necessary. We shall not, therefore,

1057
oppose the passage of this Order; but if it be shown that there is substance in our criticisms, I hope that the Government will give serious consideration to tabling an amending Order in Council.
I think it is important to make clear that this so-called new Constitution of Southern Rhodesia—imposed, as the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor has said, on the people of that territory by a dozen or so men who were formerly Her Majesty's Ministers, without reference to the people of Rhodesia, and, so far as I am aware, without the approval of the legislative assembly—is void and of no legal effect. It matters not to what extent this so-called Constitution differs from or resembles the lawful 1961 Constitution: it is a nullity. And while the approval of the Legislative Assembly to this so-called new Constitution could not give it validity, it is not, I think, without some significance that these men who have by their own acts usurped power, did not even trouble to seek the approval of the Legislative Assembly. So I support and have no criticism to make of Section 2 of this Order.
But, my Lords, when we turn to Section 3 we see that it is very far reaching, and it certainly deserves, in my opinion, very careful consideration; for it seeks to deprive the legislature of Southern Rhodesia of all power to make laws and transfers to Her Majesty in Council full power to do so. Now, under the 1961 Constitution, Section 29, no Bill passed by the Legislative Assembly can become law without the Governor's assent. I recognise that, in the light of what has happened, the Governor's powers under the Constitution to refuse his consent to a Bill might require to be enlarged. But power is given by the Constitution itself to amend Section 29. That can be done by the Privy Council, under the 1961 Constitution. So, for the purpose of preventing laws from being made by the Legislative Assembly, it would not, I think, be necessary to do more than to amend Section 29 by exercising the power given by Article 111 of the Constitution.
I do not myself quarrel with the proposition that it should not, now and for the time being, be possible for the Legislature of Southern Rhodesia to make laws. But the result of what the Govern-
1058
ment have done by transferring the legislative and, indeed, the executive power to the Secretary of State and to themselves is, I think, serious, and must be recognised as such. First of all, for the first time for over forty years the United Kingdom is taking power to exercise direct rule over the people of Rhodesia; so it cannot be denied, I think, that we are increasing our responsibilities for that territory and, at the same time, it would seem, accepting responsibilities which we have not in fact the power to discharge.
Secondly, my Lords, this complete abrogation of the powers of the Southern Rhodesia Legislature may appear to lend some support to the view that in reality the 1961 Constitution has gone, at least for the time being. The noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor drew attention to the words at the beginning of Section 3 of this Order, "So long as this section is in operation." I think it is very important to stress that this abrogation is intended to be only of temporary duration, and also that as soon as it is possible to secure a return to constitutional Government the 1961 Constitution (which the noble and learned Lord has just said, and rightly said, is still the legal and only valid Constitution) will again come into operation.
I hope that this fact will be stressed; for there may be people—and I hope their numbers are increasing, and will increase—who want to return to lawful constitutional Government under the 1961 Constitution. But if the choice is simply between rule by the illegal régime and direct rule from Whitehall, it is perhaps possible that they might prefer the former. That is why I stress both the desirability of making it clear beyond doubt that this abrogation is temporary and the need to say what the Constitution will be immediately constitutional Government can return to Rhodesia. It does not, of course, mean that there will not, in time to come, be amendments, we hope agreed amendments, to that Constitution.
My Lords, Section 3(1) not only deprives the Legislature of Southern Rhodesia of the ability to make laws: it goes on to say
"…no business may be transacted by the Legislative Assembly…."
Then Section 3(1)(b) gives the Secretary of State power to prorogue the Legislative Assembly. The noble and learned

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Lord the Lord Chancellor characterised that Assembly as now a rebel Assembly. The members of it were, of course, duly elected under the Constitution, and there are precedents of some antiquity for preventing a Legislative Assembly from deliberating. Speaking personally, I must confess that I feel some doubts about the wisdom of saying that "no business may be transacted by the Legislative Assembly". It is, surely, one thing to make sure that no laws can be passed by the Assembly at the present time (and that, as I have said, could be done without this Order), but quite another to silence that Assembly entirely.
I know—and the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor has reminded us—that the Assembly is composed almost entirely of those who are at present supporters of the Rhodesian Front. But surely we want an Opposition to this illegal régime to emerge. May it not be the case that some of those members of the Assembly who supported U.D.I. are already regretting it? I wonder whether, by stifling the Assembly as is now proposed, we may not be stifling the growth of opposition to the present régime. I should like to hear the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor, on this point. If he thinks that there is force in the observation that the Assembly might be allowed to function, not in its law-making capacity but for the purpose of discussing the state of affairs in Southern Rhodesia, and as a sounding board for the people of Rhodesia, then it might be necessary, and indeed desirable, to make some modification of this Order. Speaking personally, I feel considerable doubt as to the wisdom of that particular step.
I wish to ask your Lordships (it is rather technical but I do not think it unimportant) to consider this Order in the light of the terms of the Southern Rhodesia Act which we passed last week. Section 3(1)(c) of this Order in Council says:
"Her Majesty in Council may make laws for the peace, order and good government of Southern Rhodesia, including laws having extraterritorial operation."
As I read it, Her Majesty in Council has already been given powers to do all that by Section 2(1) of the Southern Rhodesia Act, which was passed last week. That section reads:
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"Her Majesty may by Order in Council make such provision in relation to Southern Rhodesia, or persons or things in any way belonging to or connected with Southern Rhodesia, as appears to Her to be necessary or expedient in consequence of any unconstitutional action taken therein."
Those are the very widest powers. And here in this first Order made in the exercise of those powers, we find a power taken, not to make subordinate instruments—orders, rules, regulations—but a power taken to make Orders in Council.
I cannot remember any Order in Council which in itself gave a power to make an Order in Council, and the effect of this, in my submission, is extremely significant. An Order in Council made under the Act is subject to Affirmative Resolution; it has to be approved by Parliament within 28 days. This House will recollect the importance that was attached to that particular provision. I believe that originally it was contemplated that there should be only the Negative Resolution procedure, with power to pray against the Order, and that it was as a result of a suggestion made by my right honourable friend Mr. Heath that the Government acceded, quite rightly, to this Affirmative Resolution procedure whereby some Parliamentary control can still be retained.
So, my Lords, if a law was made by Her Majesty in Council under that legislation as it stood, that Order would have to be approved by the Resolution of each House. But what has happened here is this. An Order has been made giving Her Majesty power by Order in Council to
"make laws for the peace, order and good government of Southern Rhodesia."
Those Orders will not come before this House for Affirmative Resolution; they have merely to be laid before Parliament. And my noble friend Lord Coleraine drew attention to the fact that laying them before Parliament does not mean that they are subject to the Negative or the Affirmative Resolution procedure.
I think it very wrong that power should be taken in this way to avoid consideration by Parliament of laws which will apply to the whole of the population of Rhodesia. I hope that the Government will think again about this point. It is no answer for the Lord Chancellor to say that this Parliament has never considered or taken into account, or had

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any part in passing, laws applicable within Southern Rhodesia. That is no answer when we are taking over, by this Order, the function of legislating and the function of governing for Southern Rhodesia (when I say "we", I mean the Executive); and if the Executive take over that responsibility, I suggest that we ought—it is the duty of Parliament—to see that it is properly exercised.
When one goes on to read this Order in Council that we are asked to approve one sees that Section 3(2) says:
"Orders in Council made under subsection (1)(c) of this section may confer powers (including the power to make laws) and impose ditties upon persons and authorities as well outside as within Southern Rhodesia."
That is a very wide power of delegating law-making powers. There is no limit to it at all, and if that delegation is made, as this Order in Council would permit, the person to whom the power of legislating is delegated can cover (I do not say that this is intended, but it is so worded) the whole field which could be covered by an Order in Council. If he does so, there is no requirement whatsoever for any such law made by such a person to whom authority is delegated to be laid before Parliament. I confess that I feel very dubious about the vires of that particular provision, and indeed some doubt about the vires of Section 3(1)(c), because under Section 2(2) of the Act of 1965, there is power for an Order in Council to provide only for the making of such incidental, supplemental and consequential provisions as appear to Her Majesty to be expedient for the purposes of the Order.
This complete power of delegation may be intended to be only for incidental, supplemental and consequential provisions, but it is not so expressed in this Order; nor is there anything that I can find in the Act of 1965 which suggests for one moment that under the Act it is possible by an Order in Council to give power to make another Order in Council to deal with matters which the First Order in Council would have dealt with, and by making another Order in Council to avoid the operation of Section 3(2) of the Act which lays down the Affirmative Resolution procedure. I do not suppose for one moment that these defects—and I think that they are serious defects—were deliberately intended. But
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I must say that I think that the Order is defective in these respects.
I should like the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor to deal with these points and, if he cannot answer them to-day, at least to say that he will bring in an amending Order at the earliest possible opportunity to put this matter right. I do not think that there is anything else in Section 3 to which I need draw attention. Section 4 deals with the complete transfer of all executive powers. So the position is that the United Kingdom will take not only full legislative powers but also full executive powers. I hope that I have made my points clear.
To sum up, my Lords, I feel grave doubts about the desirability of not leaving the Legislative Assembly as a forum for debate; about the vires of Section 3(1)(c) and Section 3(2); about the power by Order in Council to make Orders in Council, and about the very wide power of delegating powers, including the power to make law. We shall not oppose the passage of this Order, for in my view it is right that the illegal régime should be deprived of any appearance of legality, and that it should be made as clear as possible that it has no legal powers. But I would ask the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor to give serious consideration to points of criticism of this Order that I have raised, points which I think are of some considerable constitutional importance.
4.33 p.m.
LORD COLERAINE: My Lords, when I was a boy, I was taught to believe that we in this country had some kind of special political aptitude, some kind of sixth sense, which was denied to other people, which allowed us to get to the core of a problem and which allowed us to get behind legal formalities and come to the reality. Not for us the logic of written Constitutions. For us, rather, that deeper logic, the understanding of the human heart and of human motives. All that has gone to-day.
If your Lordships will allow me to say so, the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor—and I should like to thank him for his courtesy when I interrupted his speech—in something he said this afternoon, seemed to underline and emphasise what I am trying to say

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to your Lordships now. He drew attention to the Constitution Act which has been passed by the Legislature in Rhodesia. He took it to be a confession of guilt on the part of the de facto Government of Southern Rhodesia. I must say that the reflections which passed through my mind were very different. It seemed to me that what Mr. Smith was doing with that Act in the Legislature in Salisbury is precisely what we in the British Parliament have been doing with the Act which we passed last week, the Orders under which we are discussing to-day.
We are tied up in a mass of constitutional propriety. That is not the real question that is facing us now. It is a question of men and women, of their loyalties, of what they believe, of what they stand for and of what they will fight for. Certainly, we have lost that old aptitude. For years one Government after another in this country have striven in vain to shake a handful of our fellow countrymen in Southern Rhodesia from their belief—let us call it, if you like, a contemptible belief—that they know more about Rhodesia than we do.
We have responsibility to the African majority in Rhodesia. Of course, we have. I know of no one who would deny it. But what I ask myself, and what I would ask noble Lords to ask themeselves, is: do we really discharge that responsibility when we have given the African the vote? It would seem to me to be as reasonable for a parent to imagine that he had discharged his responsibility to his fifteen-year-old son, when he had given him a driving licence and an Aston Martin and let him loose on the M.1. For my own part, I sometimes wish we had never gone into Africa at all. I wish, sometimes, that we had left them to themselves in the life they knew—cruel, disease-ridden, slave-ridden, but, at any rate, the life that they understood. What are we doing to them now? We have raised them from that life and now we are dropping them like a pebble into a slavery worse than anything they have ever known, because it is a slavery enhanced by all the apparatus of a mechanical civilisation.
THE EARL OF LONGFORD: My Lords, may I interrupt the noble Lord? He is always the soul of courtesy. But I
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am afraid that I must put this to him. Does he feel that what he is saying now is strictly relevant to the Order? I think it is generally agreed that this should not be an occasion for a general debate on Rhodesia.
LORD COLERAINE: My Lords, the noble Earl has asked me with perfect courtesy a perfectly courteous question and I hope I may give him a perfectly courteous reply. I do feel that everything I am saying is directed towards the Order, and I hope that, when I have concluded by argument, he will agree with me.
I was asking: what have we dropped them into now? I was talking last week to a friend of mine, who had recently come back from a prolonged visit to Nigeria. That, as I think your Lordships would agree, is one of the newly independent territories and it is at least trying. This witness I believe to be credible; I believe him to be reliable; and I have no doubt—though I have not asked him—that if the noble Earl wished, he would testify to the noble Earl as he has to me. This witness told me that he visited the slave market in Lagos. He told me that he followed in the trail of a slave caravan for some hundreds of miles across Africa. He did not catch up with it, but he knew he was on the right track, because every so many miles he found the bodies of the elderly and of children lying there. I think we might well, all of us, ask ourselves just how we are discharging our obligation to the African by giving him the vote. I feel that we have lost the sixth sense about which I was speaking.
What are we to make of this piece of paper, this Order, that we are discussing now? What do your Lordships suppose the world makes of it, with its paper teeth and paper claws? I have no doubt whatever that it is seen as a paper tiger, perhaps as a British lion reborn in papier-mâché. I was astonished, if he will allow me to say so, by something that my noble friend Lord Dilhorne said in the interesting speech he has just made to your Lordships. He said, "Would it not be better to allow the Legislature in Salisbury"—
VISCOUNT DILHORNE: No. With respect, I did not say "the Legislature";

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I said "the Legislative Assembly", which is a different thing.
LORD COLERAINE: He said, "Would it not be better to allow the Legislative Assembly in Salisbury to discuss, at any rate, general principles, even if we forbade them to pass legislation?". Can my noble friend really believe that this piece of paper, this Order, is effectively going to forbid anyone from doing anything, or is going to permit anyone to do anything? I have one main criticism to make of this Order, and it is that it does not really exist—it is nothing. If I had any influence with your Lordships, I might have thought of dividing the House on this Order. But I will not do so, because I do not think you can vote either for or against nothing: it still remains nothing at the end of the day.
There is a new theory being put about regarding all this, and it is that those of us who believe that it is right for the people of this country, and for this Parliament, to try to understand both sides of the case are appeasing. I do not think that that is where the charge of appeasement can lie. What is the main argument in favour of the Government's policy, but that at all costs we must appease world opinion? What is world opinion? Let us not confuse it with world conscience. And who but ourselves pays any attention to world opinion? Does Russia? Does the United States, except when world opinion supports American policy? Is the United States paying much attention to world opinion in South Vietnam? Does France consult world opinion? Does India consult world opinion on Goa or on Kashmir? We are the only ones who pay any attention to world opinion.
Is it not time that we began to have an opinion of our own? And would we not perhaps do rather better for ourselves, for the white Rhodesian and for the African Rhodesian, if we did? I remember a long time ago—a long time in my life, but not so long in the eyes of history—sitting in another place and hearing somebody say:
"…if the British Empire and its Commonwealth last for a thousand years, men will still say: 'This was their finest hour'."
The British Empire and its Commonwealth has not endured for a thousand years; it has not endured for twenty- 1066
five. And here we are. My Lords, what are we? This once great country is no more than a nervous reflex transmitting to others external impulses which we receive. Can we not ask ourselves this question: Is history just something to be endured; or is history something that is made and influenced by men, and sometimes even by Englishmen?
4.48 p.m.
LORD HASTINGS: My Lords, I rise to make a few comments in support of my noble and learned friend Lord Dilhorne. I should like, first of all, to refer to a remark of the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor when he was talking of the new so-called Constitution, and also to something that my noble friend said when he referred to this new so-called Constitution—the Smith Constitution, as we know it. He said that it did not really matter very much to what extent the Constitution differed from the 1961 Constitution, because it was, in any case, illegal. That is perfectly true: it is illegal. But I feel that when we are discussing this matter of Constitution we should really know what we are talking about. The Prime Minister, in his Statement on Tuesday last, said:
"In so far as Mr. Smith and his colleagues purport to be a Government, they have replaced it by an entirely new so-called Constitution."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, Vol. 270 (No. 8), col. 804; 23/11/65.]
But, when pressed upon this point, the noble Earl the Leader of the House, in reply to the noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury, said that he, the noble Earl, was given to understand that the changes were very slight.
I know that that document is to be found in the Library of your Lordships' House now. I have looked at it, but of course, it is a very bulky document, as indeed is the original 1961 Constitution. I would ask the noble and learned Lord whether it would not be possible for your Lordships to be given the information in what respects precisely the Smith Constitution does differ. If it is very slight, I think it has some bearing on matters when we speak of this de facto, illegal Government in Rhodesia, because it gives one some idea as to the line of thought of the people of the so-called Government out there. I feel it is too much to ask anybody to wade through two very long

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Constitutions in order to find out what are the very small differences. It would be a great help if some précis or note could be made available to your Lordships so that we should know just what those differences are.
My noble and learned friend Lord Dilhorne pointed out that we are debating an Order in Council made under an enabling Act which we passed last week, which said that we should be able to discuss any Orders in Council the Government wished to bring before Parliament, subject to Affirmative Resolution. But as my noble friend pointed out, this particular Order in Council in theory will give carte blanche to the Secretary of State to govern Rhodesia; and that refers not only to the Legislative Assembly dealt with in Section 3 of this Order in Council, but also to the executive powers dealt with under Section 4. The Secretary of State will not have to consult any other person or authority before making an order, and he may make an order in writing under his hand. Apparently he may do these things without any reference to Parliament at all. I hope the noble and learned Lord will consider most carefully what my noble friend has said in this respect, because it seems to me that it is an extraordinary thing for the Secretary of State, representing the Cabinet and the Government here, to attempt to govern Rhodesia without reference to Parliament in this country.
There is another thing which worries me very much, and that is again a matter to which my noble and learned friend Lord Dilhorne referred. That is the wisdom of doing what the Government wish to do to-day. It seems that it is much more likely to strengthen the hand of the Smith Government than to weaken it. After all, as the noble Lord, Lord Coleraine, has pointed out, this is a piece of paper. The noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor and, in a Question earlier this afternoon, the noble Lord, Lord Beswick, referred to the impracticability of doing many of these things in connection with the funds of the Reserve Bank of Rhodesia, in connection with this Order itself. There is very little that is practicable that we can do under this Order in Council. If that be so, then the de facto Government of
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Rhodesia are bound to feel reinforced. I think the Government are making it very much more difficult for themselves to carry out what is said to be their policy. Here again I would quote from the Prime Minister's Statement yesterday:
"When the Governor is able to report that the people of Rhodesia are willing and able to work on constitutional paths we are prepared to work together with their leaders to make a new start." [col. 806.]
That seems to be leaving the initiative entirely to the Governor and people of Rhodesia. I am sure this matter will arise again when we discuss the question of sanctions, which will come up under the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement and which is in everybody's mind all the time.
It seems to me most important that the Government themselves should take the initiative and, following upon the admirable suggestion of the noble Lord, Lord Caccia, when we debated this subject last week, and that of my noble friend Lord Alport, I beseech the Government to take the initiative, and to put forward their own proposals; because if they do not, I am quite sure we shall never get any proposals from the other side. I feel sure that this Order in Council will strengthen the feeling of the de facto Government in Rhodesia that it can carry on just as it pleases, because it knows, in point of fact, that nothing that is put into this Order in Council can be carried out effectively. Therefore I hope that the noble and learned Lord will consider these matters in that light and give us all the feeling that the Government of this country are going to do something rather more creative than they appear to be doing at the moment.
4.58 p.m.
LORD McNAIR: My Lords, I shall be very brief. I wish to assure the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor that noble Lords who sit on these Benches are entirely of the view that it is necessary to equip the Government with the powers referred to in this Order. Put very shortly, it is an Order designed to enable Her Majesty's Government to fill the legal vacuum which has been created by Mr. Smith and his colleagues. This Order confers upon Her Majesty's Government full legislative and executive powers but, of course, it does not follow that they will exercise all the powers given to them by this Order.

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As an illustration of what is happening in this legal vacuum, and of the need of arming the Government with the powers which, perhaps not to-day, but sooner or later, they will be able to exercise, I wish to refer to a statement which appears in The Times and other newspapers this morning regarding the action taken against a certain Mr. Leo Baron, an attorney practising in Bulawayo, who has been in practice for fourteen years. I have no means of verifying this statement, and I have no reason for throwing any doubt upon it. Her Majesty's Government will be able, I hope, to verify it.
Let me continue. This attorney, nine minutes after Mr. Smith began his unilateral declaration of independence broadcast, was arrested, and since then has been held in solitary confinement without trial. If that is true, it is a very grave matter—not only a grave personal matter affecting Mr. Leon Baron, but a grave threat to the administration of justice in Southern Rhodesia—because if solicitors and other legal representatives are liable to be arrested in this fashion and detained, how can we expect any proper administration of the law?
Therefore I venture to beg the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor to institute inquiries to the best of the Government's ability in order to ascertain whether this statement is correct, and, if so, to use the Government's utmost powers of persuasion and otherwise to put an end to Mr. Baron's imprisonment.
5.1 p.m.
LORD BROCKWAY: My Lords, on this occasion I propose to speak very briefly and to direct most of my remarks to the scope of the discussion which I believe has been agreed upon between the two Houses. I want to make only a brief reference to what the noble Lord, Lord Coleraine, has said. Again I want to repeat what I have said before, that I appreciate the depth of feeling and the depth of sincerity of those who take his point of view. I want to say at once that I believe that human beings, their feelings and their loyalties, are more important than the legalistic issues which we are discussing. I recognise that those of whom he is thinking have these deep emotions to which he has referred. I want to put to him points of view on two matters which he has mentioned, in which
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I think he is out of tune with human developments at this time.
The first is his suggestion that the future of the African peoples in that Continent is really in the hands of the European minority and is an overall responsibility upon ourselves. I am not happy about what has happened in certain independent African States and I have used my friendship with the African leaders to influence them to courses which are more consistent with liberty and with democracy. But I would say to the noble Lord that he is completely out of touch with what is inevitable to-day in the climate of the world, if he thinks that the advance of the African peoples to their self-determination and independence can be blocked and that that can contribute to the future of the Continent of Africa. When all Africa right down to the border of Southern Rhodesia, when two-thirds of its people, has now gained its right to political and racial equality and to independence, to believe that that can be stopped at the frontier of Southern Rhodesia, where there is a minority of 220,000 Europeans among 4 million Africans, seems to me to be a complete misreading of the whole tendency of our century.
The second comment which I venture to make is on the noble Lord's remarks about the absence of recognition of international authority at this time. America, India, Russia, France, take little notice of United Nations' decisions. I would just say to him that, surely, if we are thinking of the contribution which Britain is to make for the future, we must seek a Government which understands the decreasing world in which we are living, which understands that unless we are loyal to international authority and the decisions of the United Nations this world will just go forward to conflict, disaster and, with nuclear weapons, to annihilation. Surely the aim of each one of us who wants to seek a world of peace and a world of freedom must be to contribute everything that he possibly can to the authority of the United Nations and to the international community.
I want particularly to address myself to the Deputy Leader of the Opposition (although I am sorry he is not here at the moment) on the constitutional point he raised about the Legislative Assembly in Southern Rhodesia. The noble and

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learned Viscount argued that, although the Government of Southern Rhodesia has been guilty of rebellion, and although our Government is correct in regarding it as illegal and in seeking to replace it, nevertheless that should not extend to the Legislative Assembly. I would say that in putting forward that argument he is emphasising what is coldly legalistic rather than representing the facts.
The Legislative Assembly of Southern Rhodesia is composed of 65 members. Of those 65 members, 50 are European. The Africans have the possibility of electing only 15 among the 65, and all the remaining 50 members have declared their support of the illegal Government which Mr. Smith has established in Southern Rhodesia. That small African minority—a population of 4 million Africans has 15 members, and 220,000 Europeans have 50 members—has declared its non-recognition of that Government. But in actual fact to-day the Legislative Assembly in Rhodesia, by its majority declaration that it accepts the illegal independence which Mr. Smith has declared, is just as much outside the scope of any Constitution which we can accept as is the Government itself; and I would strongly urge upon the Deputy Leader of the Opposition that when he is putting that point he is on very weak ground, even constitutionally.
I welcome very much indeed the speech which came from the Liberal Party. Under this Order Her Majesty's Government would have the right to declare that the legislation, not only that passed since the Southern Rhodesian Government became independent but, by Order of Council, even that passed before, and, as the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations has said, all the Regulations which have established the full Police State in Southern Rhodesia, shall have no authority and that those who are engaged in imposing the kind of oppression to which the noble and learned Lord, Lord McNair, referred are acting outside the law.
Mr. Ben Whitaker, who has gone to Southern Rhodesia and who has reported this case, is a friend of mine. He is a reliable person, a representative of Amnesty, himself an able lawyer, about whose words one has no doubt of the
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truth. He has reported the case of one European. There are thousands of Africans for whom this Parliament and this Government have great responsibility, and I support this section because it will enable us to say that the vicious Police State which is now being imposed upon the people of Southern Rhodesia by the Smith Administration has no authority and that those who commit these acts of aggression are committing acts which are against loyalty not only to our Government but to the Crown.
The third point I want to make is this. We are speaking here about the changes of the 1961 Constitution in the Smith Constitution. I do not believe that the maintenance of the 1961 Constitution will be any solution of this problem. Both the spokesmen for the Opposition and the spokesman for the Government have said that the solution must be a Constitution which is acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole. Does anyone believe that even the 1961 Constitution will be acceptable to the people as a whole? It may be necessary as a starting point, but I hope that our Government will go forward to the solution advocated by the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference, and by the United Nations, that finally the peoples of Rhodesia, European and African, shall be allowed in a representative constitutional conference to decide the kind of future which they desire for their country.
5.13 p.m.
LORD OAKSHOTT: My Lords, I promise not to keep your Lordships more than a very few minutes. Before I come to the two short points I want to make, may I say this? My noble and learned friend Lord Dilhorne dealt at some length with the making of further Orders under Section 3 of this Order, and reflected upon the fact that when these Orders are made they will not be subject to either the Affirmative Resolution or the Negative Resolution procedure in Parliament. I do not want to go into detail on this matter. All I should like to do, and all I can do, is to register a protest at this. As one who spent quite a lot of time in the other place, I was brought up with a healthy dislike of uncontrolled delegated legislation. I found it repugnant, and I think most people with a real regard for our Parliament and our

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Parliamentary institutions would find it repugnant, that Orders may be made over which we have no control at all, except, as the noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack said during his speech, that somebody may put down a Motion about them, and that is all.
By its very nature this Order is obviously largely negative in character. There must be an Order like this, I fully accept; I follow my noble and learned friend. We must declare null and void the illegal acts of a body of people like that. But all I would say, if I may, is that I most earnestly hope that the effect of this Order will not be to bang any doors. For surely it must be the hope of everyone, I should have thought, in your Lordships' House, to see a settlement which is both just and brought about as quickly as may be.
Under Section 3(1)(a) of this Order, which has been mentioned several times in this debate, the Legislative Assembly in Salisbury may no longer act with authority or transact any business, and so to some extent an element of direct responsibility lies fairly and squarely on this Government and this Parliament. And the question to which I can find no answer myself at the moment is, how are we to exert that authority? I confess to a feeling of unreality in a situation like this. Therefore, as part of what may flow from this Order—that obviously is certainly not the end of the story—we must, I think, look to future moves; and I would ask Her Majesty's Government to pay particular attention to two points. These are the only two things I want to say to-day, and they both, I think, flow from this Order.
First of all, on the question of communications, I would appeal to the Government, by every means that they can, to keep the lines to Salisbury open. Sooner or later, we know, situations like this have to come to discussion at the table. Sooner or later, we know, we have got to talk to someone. I have no idea who that someone will be, but all our past experience shows that this is what happens. We should remember perhaps that the Irish, too, were once called rebels; it is a long time since anyone has described them as that. India, Cyprus, Kenya—in every case we have had to come finally to talk to somebody. Therefore, it seems to me vitally important that we should
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keep some channel open, for if, through lack of a channel, lack of someone to whom we can talk, we were to lose an opportunity of reconciliation, it would be a tragedy indeed and something for which I think we should find it difficult to forgive ourselves.
My second point, which really flows from that, and it was one mentioned by my noble friend Lord Hastings a few minutes ago, is what is to follow. It seems to me it will be either very difficult or impossible to go back to the status quo of the 1961 Constitution. But we cannot leave it there, and we cannot, I think, just wait for some unspecified person or group of people in Rhodesia to approach us. I do not think that will do. We must ourselves make known, at least in outline, what we should regard as an acceptable alternative. This was said in the debate last week, in far more telling terms than I could hope to use, by the noble Lord, Lord Caccia. He was speaking from the depth of his great experience in diplomacy and negotiation.
I beg Her Majesty's Government to take heed of that very good advice and declare themselves quickly, for only they, with their knowledge of the facts, can determine what the right moment is. I beg them to declare themselves as soon as they can, for there are in Rhodesia men of good will, men of good judgment, who could exercise great influence if only they knew what the mind of Her Majesty's Government was. If they are to use their influence, then they must know this soon. I respectfully suggest to your Lordships that those two positive courses—channels of communication on the one side, and the early clarifying of our position at this end on the other—are of prime importance if we are to see a settlement of this very dark and unhappy affair.
5.20 p.m.
LORD COLYTON: My Lords, I must first of all apologise to the noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack for my inability to be here during his speech. I did, however, have the benefit of listening to the Attorney General yesterday in another place. I should like to say briefly to your Lordships why I find it impossible to support this Order. First of all it is because it is futile; and, secondly, because in certain parts it is, in my opinion, dangerous. The Order

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is futile because, whatever action may be taken under it, whether by the Privy Council, by the Secretary of State, or by the Governor, it simply cannot be enforced; and any order or law which has that effect can lead only to Parliament, and, more particularly, Her Majesty's Government, looking foolish.
I also dislike this Order because, in my view, it is dangerous, for many reasons, some of which were most eloquently given by my noble and learned friend Lord Dilhorne speaking from the Opposition Front Bench. Incidentally, I should like to remind him of the fact that, when he said that for the first time for 40 years there was a question of direct rule over Rhodesia, that is not the case, because Rhodesia has never been ruled from Whitehall at all in the whole 75 years of its history. I think it dangerous because it seems to me that this Order goes back on undertakings given by the Prime Minister and the Commonwealth Secretary in another place on a number of occasions, that they did not intend to suspend the 1961 Constitution. It is true that this Order does not suspend that Constitution, and that that would require separate legislation; but it seems to me to take so much out of that Constitution that it has the same effect.
I was glad to learn that something which I had at first feared when reading this Order, is not to take place. Yesterday, the Attorney General said that the entrenched clauses and the Declaration of Rights are not being suspended. That seems to me to be most important. Here, I should like to say how much I deprecate the flinging about of the word "traitor" and that sort of thing, as was done again by the Attorney General yesterday in another place. It seems to me that you cannot call anybody a traitor, unless he has been tried for and convicted of treason. So far as I know, that has not yet occurred.
I have here a copy of the illegal 1965 Constitution, and I should like to draw your Lordships' attention to the fact that in this document you will find the Declaration of Rights in almost, so far as I can make out, identical terms with what existed in the 1961 Constitution. You have protection of right to life, protection of right to personal liberty, protection
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from slavery and forced labour. You have protection from inhuman treatment. You have protection from deprivation of property. You have protection of privacy of the home and other property. There are provisions to ensure the protection of law. There is provision for the protection of freedom of conscience and of assembly and association. All those things are contained in this so-called illegal Constitution, and they are enforceable by appeal to the Appellate Division of the Rhodesian High Court.
I must be absolutely frank and point out that again, as in the previous Constitution, there is, in Section 78, the condition that in periods of public emergency certain sections of this Declaration are suspended. But there again—and I think this should be known in relation to the remarks which were made by the noble Lord speaking from the Liberal Benches—there is a right of appeal to a tribunal which must include among its members at least one person who holds, or has held, high judicial office in Rhodesia or elsewhere, or who is an advocate or attorney of the High Court of not less than seven years' standing. So to talk about a Police State really does not make sense.
LORD ARCHIBALD: My Lords, may I ask the noble Lord whether when he was running through the section he mentioned—perhaps I failed to hear it—freedom of the Press?
LORD COLYTON: My Lords, it is a long section and I cannot find it. But I feel sure that it is there, as it was in the old Constitution.
LORD ARCHIBALD: The noble Lord only feels sure that it is there; but he cannot refer to it.
LORD COLYTON: My Lords, I cannot find it at this moment, but I will hand the document to another noble Lord who is to speak.
The other point I want to make briefly to your Lordships is simply this—and it has already been made, far better than I could ever do it, by my noble friend Lord Dilhorne. It seems to me that it is quite wrong by this Order to suspend the Legislative Assembly which, so far as I know, has not done anything treasonable. It has not even voted or spoken on this issue at all. It appears to me that it is quite wrong to put this

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provision into an Order at this stage. I should have thought it would have been far better, as my noble friend said, to let the Members of the Assembly, including their fifteen African Members, have the opportunity of debating and stating their views in public, and taking any repressive action of this kind only should the Legislative Assembly for some reason itself misbehave. It seems to me that we are foolish in taking this action which suspends the Legislative Assembly, when its own illegal Constitution allows it to sit, and, as I think my noble friend pointed out, all the Members of that Legislative Assembly have been perfectly legally elected.
I share the views of my noble friends Lord Hastings and Lord Dilhorne about the danger of giving these wide powers by Order in Council which cannot be discussed or debated, or at any rate approved or disapproved, at all by this House or another place. I think it is a most dangerous precedent. It is dangerous only because it is a precedent; for, as I said at the beginning of my remarks, the whole of this Order is futile because it cannot be enforced at all. I conclude by endorsing everything that my noble friend Lord Oakshott has said about trying to keep open the channels of communication. I am sure that we have to do that. Indeed, I think it is the most important thing for the Government to pay attention to at this stage.
5.28 p.m.
LORD SALTER: My Lords, when I came to this House this afternoon I sincerely hoped that I should not feel it to be my duty to ask to be allowed to trespass for some time on your Lordships' discussion. I continued to cherish that hope until I heard the moving speech of my noble friend Lord Coleraine, who gave us a wide perspective, a depth, a background to this particular question that we are discussing to-day. I then felt irresistibly that it was time for other people who, like myself, have no special knowledge and no special authority on the subject, to begin to express without further delay something of what I know many to be feeling, and what I believe many more will in the near future be feeling, and feeling deeply.
Let me, to start with, say that like probably everyone in this House, I deeply regret the illegallity and the unwisdom
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of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence. I do not propose now to do what I might on another occasion do—namely, say something about what I think were among the causes which partly explain, and to some extent even mitigate, the unwisdom of that action. But I entirely agree with those who emphasise the fact that it was both illegal and unwise. Let me also say that I recognise that among the white settlers in Southern Rhodesia are a number whose attitude towards the other citizens of that country has long been indefensible and whose attitude is continued in what, I am sure, is the fantastic illusion that that attitude and the monopoly of power on which it is based can be indefinitely continued. Those things are generally and universially recognised.
However, I think that all who are concerned with responsible action should have in the back of their minds some other considerations, too. The United States think that they have had a difficult problem in handling their bi-racial problem, but those who have the greater part—though not so great a proportion as in the case of Rhodesia—of the experience and skill both in government and in the direction of economy are there ten to one. Here in this case, we have the skill and experience, both in government and in the direction of an economy in which all citizens of that country black or white share, in a monopoly not of a ten-to-one majority but of a one-to-sixteen minority. It is an extraordinarily difficult problem, perhaps an insoluble one, for those who have created and maintained a measure of good government and a measure of prosperity in that country over these years.
We ought also to bear in mind as a background to our thinking certain other considerations. We can and should learn from experience of what has happened in what were quite recently Belgian colonies and British colonies in Africa—I do not say in regard to every one of them but some of them—as to how possible it is that there should be a very rapid transition from colonialism, to chaos, to tyranny, a tyranny which has no element of real democracy and no security for freedom. That has happened frequently; it may well happen again.
In these circumstances, I suggest that it should have been the preoccupation

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of all concerned responsibly with this problem to try to secure such time for transfer or sharing of responsibility as would enable the proper preparations to be made in the minds and training and experience of those who would be taking a greater share of power. In the second place, it should have been their preoccupation to see that, during the interval so obtained, everything possible should be done in order to minimise the danger of the seizure of dominant political power by those who have no adequate experience or the knowledge required for the maintenance of what Southern Rhodesia has achieved to the advantage of all its citizens.
I do not wish to go further than this, except to say that there is one further reason I have for addressing your Lordships on this matter. I have been impressed in the discussions in this House and in another place and outside this House, and outside the country, by what seemed to me to be a wrong proportion between the different considerations which must be kept in mind. Of course, an important legal question is involved. Of course, it is true that the recent Government is no longer the legal Government. That is one factor. But legalities are not so much the dominant and exclusive factor in the whole of this problem as most of the discussions which have hitherto taken place would suggest. I suggest that it is a part of our Constitution and of our historical tradition that the rôle of law is to set the terms and limits and conditions within which when a much later political problem arises the statesmen of the time should direct and mould their own task of solving the essential political problem. It is not that the law itself should dictate directly what that solution should be.
I suggest that in this very elaborate discussion of the legal aspects of this problem there has been some tendency to overlook, or to put in inadequate perspective, the enormously difficult and important political problems which are essentially those of a statesman and not of a lawyer, to maintain something of the civilisation which, however imperfect, is much better than anything that country had ever known and much better than it may very well be in the very near future. I suggest that it is unwise to defer
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longer anything which will encourage a wider expression to be given by those who have such sentiments in their minds as my noble friend and I myself have. I think that it is dangerous for the discussion inside and outside Parliament to go on in the perspective which has governed most of what has been debated during these last few weeks.
5.38 p.m.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: My Lords, in following the deeply impressive speech of Lord Salter to which we have just listened—a speech which I thought was made the more impressive by the noble Lord's very long experience of international affairs—I do not intend to go into the details of the Order, any more than he did. Indeed, I think there would be no point in doing so; for, as we all know, Orders in Council cannot be amended. They can only be withdrawn in the light of criticism and reintroduced, and I gather that the Government would not be prepared to do that. But I should like, on this first and widest Order we are now discussing, to make a few remarks with regard to the general policy of sanctions which these Orders in Council are designed to support.
As your Lordships know, last week in this House we discussed and passed an enabling Bill to give the Government far-reaching powers to deal with the crisis in Rhodesia. On that occasion even those of us who were most unhappy as to the trend of Government policy towards that country decided not to divide against the Bill—not because we approved of all the measures which the Government had contemplated, but because we recognised that, in the situation which had arisen, there were probably some steps which simply had to be taken, and because we knew, too, that we should have a further opportunity to examine these individual measures when the Orders in Council came before the House. Now, to-day, the first batch is actually before us. That puts us all, I feel, in a position when we must take a further look not only at the measures themselves with which the Orders deal, but at the whole policy regarding Rhodesia as it has developed as a result of the Rhodesian Government's unilateral declaration of independence, and of our own country's position in relation to that.

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Like, I suppose, other noble Lords, I have tried very hard to do this, and if I trouble the House for a moment with the result of my cogitations it is not because I consider these in themselves of any importance at all, but because I believe that they represent, broadly speaking, the views, not perhaps held so strongly in Parliament, but certainly held very strongly by hundreds of thousands, and possibly millions, of people in this country. I think I can most clearly describe the conclusions to which I have come by reference to a very simple analogy, which I hope will not be regarded as too far-fetched or, indeed, too frivolous.
When, a very long time ago now, I was in charge at one moment of the Colonial Office and at another moment of the Commonwealth Relations Office, it always seemed to me that the constitutional advance of the British dependencies could fairly be compared with the advance of a child from infancy to the full maturity of manhood. Infancy—what might be called the nursery period—was represented by full Crown Colony government, when they had no share at all in the management of their affairs. Then, gradually, during what I think might be called the school period, they acquired a larger and larger measure of internal self-government, until eventually they grew up to full maturity with absolute control over their own affairs, both internal and external; in fact, as full members of the Commonwealth.
If I may pursue that analogy just a little further, I would say this. The main anxiety of some of us during recent years has been whether we in this country were, perhaps, tending to regard an increasing number of our family of nations as adult, when in fact they were still what might be called teen-age—and some of them early teen-age. But in this present case I believe that the country has erred, unusually, in exactly the opposite direction; that it has made the mistake so common as we know in many parents, of regarding its offspring as still children when they are, in fact, already quite grown up. Indeed, Rhodesia has been grown up, to my knowledge, for quite a long time. It was already practically so when I first had to do with that country over twenty years past. As far back as that, it was entirely responsible for its internal affairs, and though
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there was at that time one provision in the Constitution allowing an appeal to the Home Government over legislation that appeared to differentiate between the European and the African, that provision, so far as I know, was never used at any time; and under the 1961 Constitution, I think I am right in saying, it disappeared altogether.
Rhodesia, in fact, in all but name, had attained its majority, and these recent attempts to reassert United Kingdom control are, I believe, as a result, wholly retrograde, and are resented by the whole white population; not merely by the supporters of Mr. Smith, but even by his most convinced political opponents. It is no good saying to Rhodesia that she has got to do what her parents tell her, or she will be put back in the schoolroom, or even back in the nursery, which is, I think, the effect that the Government are trying to produce. Rhodesia will reply "We are now adult; we are now grown up, and we shall run our own life our own way." In that sense, of course, she may be described as rebel, in the same way as many young people who reach their maturity tend to rebel against undue parental control. But the Rhodesians are not rebels in any other way but that. If we recognised their maturity they would again be, as they still are, the most loyal subjects of Her Majesty the Queen. But if we continue and intensify this policy of sanctions, of which this Order is only one example; if we try, as it were, to put them back under the tutelage of children, we shall fail. We shall fail, and, what is more, we shall only rally to the present Rhodesian Government's side those other elements who on many points—perhaps on most points—may not at present agree with them but who, on this one issue, this one dominant issue of Rhodesia's maturity, are completely at one with them. The policy of sanctions, in my view, therefore, is both unrealistic and reactionary, and if we do succeed by our efforts in ruining the country—black and white alike—Rhodesia will not, I am sure, even then surrender but will go down proudly with her head held high; and it is we who will have to eat the bitter bread of humiliation.
My Lords, in such circumstances, ought those—if there are any in this House—who share my view to vote against these Orders? I have pondered

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this question very much, but I have decided against, for myself at any rate, for this very simple reason: that were we to succeed, the country would be without any policy at all; it would be left with merely a vacuum. And even a policy that fails, as I believe that this must, might be less disastrous than no policy.
But I believe (and this is the last thing I want to say) that in the long run there is only one policy that can really succeed; and that is to recognise Rhodesia's maturity, to give her her independence, and then sit down with her—not necessarily with Mr. Smith and his present Government, but with a more widely based Administration—and discuss with her, as two adults, on a basis of equality, the problem of bringing forward the African section of population, not necessarily, as the Prime Minister himself said, to-day or to-morrow, but as soon as is reasonably possible, into a truly multiracial partnership. That, I am sure, is what the great majority of people in this country of ours, in their wisdom, would like; and I believe it is that for which we must work in the years that lie ahead.
Therefore, for the reasons which I have explained, I would not suggest our voting against these Orders. If the Government are determined on them we cannot stop them going through, deplorable and, indeed, disastrous though I am afraid the policy may be. We can only protest against a policy which I believe to be so ill-judged and likely, I am afraid, to be so unhappy, even disastrous, in its results to Rhodesia and maybe to our own country as well.
LORD GIFFORD: My Lords, if I may take up the noble Marquess on his analogy of parent and child, may I ask him whether he would not agree that it is the white Rhodesian population who stand in loco parentis in this matter? It is they who have completely failed in their parental duty, and it is therefore right for the British Government, whom one might call the grandparents, to resume parental care.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: No, my Lords. I would not agree at all. I think there has been a steady advance, which can be seen in the greater prosperity of the country, in which the
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Africans share, during the period the white Rhodesians have been there.
5.48 p.m.
LORD MOLSON: My Lords, I am sure that many of your Lordships were deeply impressed by the remarkable speech made by my noble friend Lord Salter. That speech, resulting from his long administrative experience, had all the indications of coming from one who has given long thought to political theory and to history. I, for one, have no doubt that the best hopes for the future are in the emergence of a Party and some kind of Government in Southern Rhodesia with which it will be possible for this country to open negotiations and to resume friendship. But I cannot see anything inconsistent in that and the acceptance of the Order before the House at the present time. Indeed, on the contrary, I believe that it is only by adopting the kind of attitude expressed by this Order, and by taking the powers that are provided for in it, that it will be possible for this country to maintain its responsibility for Rhodesia with a view to ultimately establishing in Rhodesia the kind of bi-racial Constitution which I think my noble friend has in mind.
My Lords, consider the position as it is at the present time. We have to bear in mind the legal position. We must have the right kind of legal framework, the right kind of legal machinery, in order to arrive at that very settlement which my noble friend has in mind and has advocated. What is the position at the present time? There is no legal Government in power in Rhodesia now, and it seems to me to be essential that this country and this Legislature should take power, as is done under Section 3 of this Order, to pass and make legal such laws, rules and regulations as may prove to be necessary as events in Rhodesia gradually develop. When we have an illegal Government, one that has been dismissed, and when we have, in Rhodesia, a Legislature the overwhelming majority of which is in support of that illegal Government, then surely it is necessary that the Secretary of State and the Governor should have the legal powers to deal with the situation as it arises.
Now some noble Lords took exception to Section 4 of this Order on the ground

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that it gave to the Government unrestricted powers of administration: that there is no Parliamentary control over it. My Lords, it has always been a feature of our Constitution that the Government govern. It is not the concern of either House of Parliament to exercise direct control over executive action. That is the very thing which has brought the Government of France into such difficulty: where an emotional Legislature has sought to interfere with the exercise of executive authority by the Government. We in this country have managed always to maintain a strong Executive. The powers of this House and of another place are to call the Executive before them and to criticise, if they wish to do so, the exercise of that authority. There is all the difference in the world between interfering with the exercise of that authority and holding the Government responsible for errors that are made.
So it seems to me that this Order is, from the legal point, essential for dealing with the present situation. First, with a Government which is in open revolt, it is right and necessary to make it absolutely plain to everybody that nothing that they do has any legal validity. Secondly, it seems essential also that, when there is no legal Government in Rhodesia, the Secretary of State and the Governor should be given all the powers that are necessary to legislate in a legal manner. Thirdly, it may well prove to be necessary for this country again to exercise direct control over that territory.
LORD COLYTON: It never has.
LORD MOLSON: It never has since 1923.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: Never.
LORD COLYTON: My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend Lord Molson for giving way. This country has never exercised any control whatever in Rhodesia. From 1890 to 1923 Rhodesia was administered by the British South Africa Company.
LORD MOLSON: My noble friend is right about that, but there has not been the slightest difficulty about asserting the kind of authority over Southern Rhodesia that was exercised over, for example, Northern Rhodesia or Nyasaland before the Federation. One thing seems
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to me to be certain: that if this country does not restore its own authority over Rhodesia others will intervene from outside in order to make certain that this rebellion is not successful. My Lords, I can think of nothing more disastrous to everybody, and certainly to the peace of the African continent, than that the Afro-Asian group, supported by Communist Powers, should intervene and exercise authority in Rhodesia. I believe that through this Order it will be possible for this country, if not to re-assert then to assert for the first time its direct authority; and when that has been done I am confident that any Government in this country will desire to give to Southern Rhodesia the kind of liberal Constitution which was under discussion in all these negotiations.
The present Prime Minister has made it quite plain that there is no intention at the present time to introduce "One man, one vote" to-morrow. With that assurance from the Prime Minister, there is ample scope and opportunity for negotiation, reasoning and conciliation between the different races in Southern Rhodesia; and that can be done only under the aegis of the British Government.
5.53 p.m.
LORD GRIMSTON OF WESTBURY: My Lords, I did not mean to speak in this debate, but I felt I really had to rise and say a few words following the speech which has just been made by my noble friend Lord Molson, because it seemed to me that, in the last part of his speech, what he was asking for was for this country to use force—for there is no other way in which our writ can he exercised in Rhodesia today than by the use of force; and that is one of the reasons why I find this debate to-day rather humiliating. I so agree with what my noble friend Lord Coleraine said in his impressive speech, and with the noble Lord, Lord Salter. It seems to me most humiliating that, when we are discussing this particuar Order, these powers, we have a situation in which Rhodesia has revolted, largely through our own fault in this country, and we are now talking about taking powers to quell that revolt by these Orders, when we have not the power to do so. I can scarcely think of anything more humiliating for this country.

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In support of what I said about a lot of this being our own fault, I want to refer to what the Prime Minister said the other day in reply to a supplementary question, and I venture to quote it to your Lordships. He said—and these are his words:
"What is important to say here… is that there are too many people still in Rhodesia who think that the only alternative to this illegal action and all the economic consequences that will follow from it would be majority rule to-morrow or the day after. Repeatedly we have all said, on both sides, that this is not a runner at all, and that Rhodesia is not ready for immediate majority rule."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, Commons, Vol. 721 (No. 11), col. 259; 23/11/65.]
I wish that had been said even months ago, because we perhaps would not have seen this situation. My noble friend Lord Hastings referred to this in his (if I may say so) very able speech during our previous debate: that if what had been said at the last moment by the Prime Minister in these negotiations had been made clear two years ago, we would never be in this situation. The feelings in Rhodesia which have brought the Government to power would never have existed; and we here are to blame. And here we are, with the blame on our shoulders, humiliating ourselves by taking powers that we know we cannot enforce. We are not going to vote against this. As my noble friend said, it is nothing, whether you vote for it or not. I hope the day will come when we can recover from this humiliation; but it will come only if we keep the lines open and the communications going with our people in Rhodesia.
6.1 p.m.
LORD WELLS-PESTELL: My Lords, it is with some diffidence that I rise to participate in this debate, but I do so because of what the noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury, said during the time he was speaking. I am well aware that your Lordships do not want a re-hearing of the debate that we had on the Second Reading of the enabling Bill, but I feel quite certain that you would concede the right of a Member of this House to say what he feels he is obliged to say.
It seemed to me, listening to what has been said in this House this afternoon that there is a considerable cooling-off on the part of some noble Lords opposite in the matter of dealing effectively with
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Rhodesia; and this seems to me to be a most regrettable matter. It is generally accepted that the Smith régime has acted illegally, although I suppose there are some noble Lords opposite who would be quite willing to condone its acts. If the Smith Government acted illegally and unconstitutionally—and there is no doubt that it did—then the situation must be dealt with, in my view, with resolution and in the most effective way. There cannot be any half-hearted measures to deal with it. We must either accept what has happened and get out of Rhodesia, or establish our legal and constitutional rights and be prepared to be tough, as tough as the situation demands.
History has demonstrated that half-hearted sanctions have failed in the past to deter the aggressor, and they have certainly never succeeded in bringing the rebel to heel. Sanctions must be applied, I feel, with all possible severity; and it is nonsense to say that they must not be punitive. The whole point of sanctions surely is to punish. I am quite unashamed when I say that I think sanctions in this instance must be not only punitive but catastrophic; they have got to hurt. The Government—and I feel this strongly—must face this fact and be prepared to go to all necessary lengths. Our aim in Rhodesia must be not only to put an end to the rebels but to establish majority rule at all costs. This may well mean going to all necessary lengths and I hope that the Government will not hesitate to do so.
It is all very well for the noble Lord, Lord Colyton, to say that Rhodesia is not a Police State. It is all very well for the noble Lord to quote the Rhodesians' Declaration of Rights. I think Hitler claimed to have a Declaration of Rights. And if the noble Lord were to read the reports and statements made by the three British policemen who succeeded in escaping from Rhodesia, he would not say that it is not a Police State. Majority rule is not acceptable to the Smith group: to them it is minority government for all time—in other words, the subjection of 4 million Africans, with no hope of self-government.
LORD SOMERS: Nonsense!
LORD WELLS-PESTELL: My Lords, of course it is nonsense to those noble

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Lords who want to see minority government. This is the real moral principle behind this regrettable affair. This, I feel, is where our duty lies. Before this unfortunate business is over it may well be that armed intervention may be necessary, if peace is to be maintained in Africa—if our systems of sanctions are not effective.
Some of your Lordships may be familiar with a new publication which came out only a month or two ago. It is called The New Christian and it is representative of all religious denominations. It is an informed fortnightly publication, and I should like to quote from it. It says:
"The position in Rhodesia to-day is analogous to that of a seriously-ill patient whose life depends on an immediate operation rather than on long-term medication."
LORD SOMERS: My Lords, I feel that I cannot let the noble Lord sit down without saying a word or two about what he has said. He has, first of all, advocated the pushing of punitive sanctions to their utmost, and he says, very bravely, that we have to be tough about it. But I wonder whether the question has ever occurred to the noble Lord: Who is going to be hit hardest by that toughness? Economic sanctions are going to mean poverty, leading to unemployment and hunger, for the people of Rhodesia; but, chiefly, of course, it will be the African population who will suffer. Yet the noble Lord says that they are the ones he wants to protect.
As for majority rule, that, to my mind, is just a political catchword. It does not mean very much; it does not mean very much even in our own highly-civilised country, because the majority really know very little about what goes on in Parliament. It is always the minority of those who are politically educated who govern the country. In a country such as Rhodesia, where the great mass of the population are scarcely civilised, it means still less.
But if the noble Lord thinks that I am against the gradual education of Africans, and the gradual inclusion of African participation in government, he is entirely mistaken. I am absolutely in favour of it. In fact, it is taking place at the present time. There are Africans sitting on the Legislative Council this very day. And he has only to consult
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any of those who know Rhodesia to know that the African attitude towards the whites is that they are very willing to follow their leadership and are not anxious to take over until they feel able to do so.
6.9 p.m.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, I hope you will forgive me if I lower the temperature by returning to the subject-matter before the House, which is whether the first out of eight Orders should be approved. May I say, in further answer to the noble Lord, Lord Coleraine, who asked me a question about Section 3(4) that the reference in that subsection to the Statutory Instruments Act 1946 is a reference to Section 4 and not to Section 5. Section 4, of course, is the general section which provides for the laying of Orders before Parliament but contains no provision for a Parliamentary review, whereas Section 5 begins:
"Where by this Act or any Act passed after the commencement of this Act, it is provided that any statutory instrument shall be subject to annulment…"
and so on. Then it provides for a Parliamentary review. As those words do not apply to these Orders in Council it is Section 4 which is applicable, and not Section 5.
LORD COLERAINE: So there is no Parliamentary review.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: That is right. Then, the noble and learned Viscount, Lord Dilhorne, and also the noble Lord, Lord Hastings, raised a number of points on the Order. The noble and learned Viscount first referred to Section 2 and said he was glad of the declaration of invalidity of the so-called new Constitution, but as to subsection (1) he thought it might lend colour to the view that the 1961 Constitution had in some way gone. I venture to think that is not so, but of course I fully support what he said when he said it was necessary to stress that it was only temporary. It is because of that that it is prefaced by the words "so long as the section is in operation", so it would be very simple to return to where we were once there is a constitutional Government.
As to Section 3(1)(a) and (b), he was doubtful about the power to prorogue the Legislative Assembly and thought that it

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might have been better to let them make their laws and then rely on the Governor's powers which could be amended under the existing Constitution. In the first place, this Order is an enabling Order: it merely enables the Government to do various things. There is nothing in the Order which could in fact stop any members of the Legislative Assembly from meeting and doing what they like. But it is worthy of comment that, if we had in fact allowed the Legislative Assembly to continue, and had they made other arrangements for the position of the Governor, under the Section of the Constitution which enables us to make an Order in Council to that effect that Order in Council would not have been subject to any form of Parliamentary review.
My Lords, the only real argument, I think, has turned on Section 3(1)(c), on the ground that this ought to have been, but is not, and Orders made thereunder ought to have been but are not, subject to an Affirmative Resolution. The brief answer, I think, is that the Order itself has been made because it is necessary or expedient in consequence of the illegal Declaration of Independence. It is suggested that these Orders should be subject to Affirmative Resolution. It should be borne in mind that the Orders made under Section 3(1)(c) are what have been called "grandchildren". That is to say, we have the Act which is the parent; we have the Orders in Council made under the Act, which are the "children", and the Orders in Council which are made under an Order are the "grandchildren". Then there are the executive Acts, which may be called the "great-grandchildren". They are subject to Parliamentary scrutiny in the sense that they have to be laid before Parliament, but they do not require any Resolution because really the "grandchildren" are the equivalent of laws made by the Southern Rhodesian Legislature for the peace, order and good government of that country, and the latter are, of course, in no way subject to scrutiny of any sort by the United Kingdom Parliament.
VISCOUNT DILHORNE: My Lords, does not the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor appreciate, if I understand him correctly, that under Section 3(1)(c) the Privy Council are now
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taking over the full legislative functions of the Legislature of Southern Rhodesia to make all kinds of laws for the peace, order and good government of Southern Rhodesia? If that be so, and the Assembly is not operating, I ask the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor to appreciate that the point we are putting is that, if there is to be that exercise of legislative authority by the Privy Council, it should be subject to review by this Parliament under an Affirmative proposal.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, I do not doubt at all that these things are matters of opinion. I was only pointing out that they take the place of laws which would previously have been made by the Southern Rhodesian Legislature, which laws would not have been put before Parliament at all; whereas under the Order as made, the Orders in Council will in fact be statutory instruments which will be laid before Parliament. In point of fact, the laws which are likely to be made under Section 3(1)(c) will, after all, be of one of two characters. They will either be expressly aimed at combating the illegal Declaration of Independence, or they will be laws which are necessary to fill a gap caused by the illegal Declaration of Independence and which cannot be left unfilled.
Then, the noble Lord, Lord Hastings, referred to the illegal Constitution and appeared to think it was rather useless to take steps to declare it illegal—it did not really do anything. He asked for enlightenment whether it was right to say that this made substantial changes or whether, as my noble friend the Lord Privy Seal indicated, the changes are rather slight. If one looks at it textually, the changes are slight. That is to say, the number of sections altered is relatively small. As one noble Lord has pointed out, the whole section dealing with what has been called the Bill of Rights has been left, as indeed has the whole of that chapter. But the minor changes made include the elimination of the Governor. It starts:
"The Constitution of Southern Rhodesia 1961, granted to Rhodesia on 6th December, 1961, under the Southern Rhodesian Constitution Order in Council 1961, and the provisions of the said Order, are hereby declared to be of no force or effect in Rhodesia immediately before the appointed day and shall at such

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time be repealed and revoked by this Constitution and no longer operative in or for Rhodesia."
Then it brings into force this Constitution and replaces the Governor by the man who was going to be, or at one time was said to be, a Regent; but apparently they have given that up and now call him the Officer administering the Government.
The Officer administering the Government appears to be able to do almost anything, because by Section 140 of this document
"Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this Constitution, the Officer administering the Government may by Order published in the Gazette within six months from the appointed day modify or adapt any provision of this Constitution to such extent as may appear to him necessary or expedient"—
so he is a complete dictator—
"for the avoidance of doubt"—
I do not think that matters. Then,
"As from the appointed day, any reference in any law enforced in Rhodesia to the Governor shall be read and construed as a reference to the Officer administering the Government. The validity of this Constitution, except as provided therein, and anything done there-under shall not be inquired into in any court. Under the provisions of this Constitution, anything so done shall for all purposes be regarded as valid."
Although the changes are not very numerous textually, if the document had any validity at all they would in fact be rather important.
I am sure that your Lordships will not mind if at this hour I do not discuss the very difficult political problem of Rhodesia. We all know the depth of conviction and sincerity of the noble Lord, Lord Coleraine, in the views which he has expressed. He sparked off my noble friend Lord Brockway, of whom much the same may be said, and other noble Lords then took part. But we are really here to discuss, if I may remind your Lordships, whether or not this particular Order ought to be approved, and I do not think that your Lordships would thank me if at this hour of the evening, as we have seven more Orders to be considered, I started a general review of the problem of Rhodesia.
I would say in passing, if I may, in answer to the noble Lord, Lord Colyton, because this relates to the Order we are now discussing, that I cannot agree that
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an Order of this kind is futile and dangerous simply because it cannot be enforced, as he said. I do not believe that this is true. Take, for example, the censorship regulations—or rather the de-censorship regulations—made under this Order. If proceedings are taken against a newspaper for exercising its right of free speech in defiance of the censorship regulations passed by the illegal Government, they will presumably be charged and brought before a court. It will be the duty of that court to apply the law. The law—subject, of course, to the view of that court, because it is not for me to prejudge it—will be the law provided in the regulations which we have made. Therefore it is of great importance what the law is, if we are to assume—as I certainly do assume—that the judges of Rhodesia will loyally enforce the true law.
As to the Bill of Rights contained in the illegal Constitution, I am sure the noble Lord will bear in mind that there is in force a Declaration of Emergency under the Emergency Powers Act. There is now a Police State. Anybody can be arrested and detained in prison—it is not just a question of restriction. Nobody is allowed to publish the names of those arrested; they have no right of applying to a court, no right to be charged with an offence and no right of appeal or of application to any court, because when the terms of the Emergency Act are enforced the human rights of the old Constitution have been overridden. The only other point which I think I ought to mention is that I cannot accept the suggestion that this is our fault because we ought to have made plain months ago that we were not suggesting African majority rule to-day.
LORD GRIMSTON OF WESTBURY: My Lords, perhaps the noble and learned Lord will allow me to say that when I said "our" fault, I was not meaning his Government. I meant Britain.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, what I cannot, with great respect, pass without some degree of remonstrance is the suggestion that if only we had made plain months ago that we were not suggesting African majority rule to-day or to-morrow, this would not have happened. Months ago, when my noble friend the Colonial Secretary and I went to Rhodesia, we said to Mr. Smith, to his

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Cabinet, to the Opposition in Parliament, to the African Nationalists and to everybody whom we saw, that there was no question of African majority rule to-day or to-morrow. We said that there was no need for this atmosphere of crisis. We had not come to interfere in any way. So long as they acted constitutionally, we should act constitutionally. They might pass a law like the Law and Order Maintenance Act, with which we might disagree, but under the Constitutional Convention, so long as they acted constitutionally, we would act constitutionally too, as we always had.
All reasonable opinion—the European Opposition in Parliament, the universities and churches—agreed that, that being our position, there was no need for this emotional atmosphere of crisis, worked up by the Rhodesian Front for Party reasons, and that nobody was threatening them with anything. We made it perfectly plain that no one was going to stop them from going on under the 1961 Constitution, under which all the powers were in their hands. Therefore I cannot accept the proposition that this would have been stopped, if only we had made plain that we were not trying to procure African majority rule to-morrow.
The real difference is—while I accept a great deal of what the noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury, says—that this particular lot of Europeans, the Rhodesian Front, do not believe in African majority rule ever, and have no intention at all that it shall ever happen. They have said very plainly that if, at any time in the future, there was any real prospect of the Africans getting a majority in Parliament, they would alter the Constitution backwards in order to stop them, because theirs was the power and they have every intention of keeping it. But to those reasonable Europeans who believe that in the process of time Rhodesia ought to become a multiracial country and that this will lead, when they are fit for it, to African majority rule, there can be no excuse for this illegal seizure of power, which is the more tragic as it was so unnecessary, because they had all the power in their hands. Nobody was threatening them with anything and there was nothing to stop them from going on with the 1961 Constitution.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: My Lords, the Government have never yet said what they do mean. They have said "Not to-day or to-morrow", but they have not said what the period is. The noble and learned Lord has said that the Rhodesian Front on their side have put no period and do not ever mean to have majority rule. I am not concerned with defending the Rhodesian Front, but I do not think that the Government have even given the time limit they have in mind.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, this is essentially a question for discussion, not only with all political parties but also with all sections, of whatever colour, in Rhodesia itself. Without such consultations we are not really in a position to say that it will be x years and could not be y or z years.
LORD GRIMSTON OF WESTBURY: My Lords, I am obliged to the noble and learned Lord for being good enough to reply to what I have said. May I say that I have an answer to much that he says, but it is far too long to deploy it now. Perhaps there will be another occasion.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: Perhaps on another occasion, when we have not so many Orders.
LORD COLERAINE: My Lords, the noble and learned Lord says that it would have to be a question of consultation, but would he not agree that it would have to be more than that? It would have to be a matter of experience, of seeing how things go over possibly quite a long period of years.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, I think perhaps I ought not to embark on the ultimate solution of this difficult problem at this hour of evening. I will now put the question, that the Order be approved.
LORD CLITHEROE: My Lords, am I right in thinking—and I have listened to the whole debate—that by this Order Her Majesty's Government are taking complete dictatorial powers to govern Southern Rhodesia, if they are able to do so, which admittedly seems unlikely—just as dictatorial as any of the powers to which the noble and learned Lord referred in his speech?
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, "completely dictatorial powers" is not quite accurate, because, of course, the Governor retains his powers. But, subject to that, unless and until there is a lawful Government in Rhodesia, somebody must fill the gap; and this is a country for which we are responsible.
LORD CLITHEROE: But we in this House are to have no say in controlling these Orders.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, your Lordships will have a say. These Orders in Council, made under the Act, while coming into force at once, will have to be approved by both Houses within 28 days.
LORD COLYTON: My Lords, may I draw the attention of the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor to the fact that Section 78 of the new so-called illegal Constitution specifically lays down that, during periods of public emergency, if a person detained
"…so requests at any time during the period of that detention not earlier than 12 months after he last made such a request during that period, his case shall be submitted to a tribunal for their recommendations concerning the necessity or expediency of continuing his detention but, unless it is otherwise provided by law, the authority by whom the detention was ordered shall not be obliged to act in accordance with any such recommendations."
Would the noble and learned Lord look into that and find out, in whatever way he can, whether that is not in fact in force in Rhodesia to-day?
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, I will certainly look into that, because I shall have to have regard to the terms of the Emergency Act itself. I can certainly say that it is not carried out in Rhodesia to-day. In relation to the case referred to by the noble and learned Lord, Lord McNair, I myself saw Mr. Whitaker yesterday, who saw Mr. Baron only a few days ago, and I have every reason to think that the facts are exactly as the noble Lord said.
On Question, Motion agreed to.
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, it may he for the convenience of the House, in view of the rather late Sitting, if I inform your Lordships that arrangements have been made for light refreshments to be available in the Guest Room.

SOUTHERN RHODESIA (COMMONWEALTH SUGAR AGREEMENT) ORDER 1965
6.32 p.m.
THE MINISTER WITHOUT PORTFOLIO (LORD CHAMPION): My Lords, my noble and learned friend on the Woolsack told us of the arrangement about the course of our debates to-day on the Orders before the House. It seems to me that to this arrangement the House tacitly agreed. My task, therefore, is to move the first of the three Orders standing in my name on the Order Paper, and then to explain the purpose of all three, so that the House may have a general discussion on them; then, after the first Order has been disposed of, to move the second and the third Orders formally.
Perhaps I ought to say at the outset that these Orders are not the instrument used to ban the imports of tobacco and sugar into this country from Southern Rhodesia. As I understand it, there was in being before November 11 an open general import licence which had the effect of authorising, inter alia, the import of tobacco and sugar and related products originating in or consigned from Southern Rhodesia. The Orders of November 11 exclude these goods from the benefit of the open general licence. As the House will remember, my noble and learned friend told the House, in our debate on the Southern Rhodesia Bill, that these Orders were made under the Import, Export and Customs Powers (Defence) Act 1939, and are not subject to Parliamentary control. The Orders before us to-day are very much more limited in their scope, as I hope will emerge as I go along.
Your Lordships will have seen that the Special Orders Committee have reported on the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement Order and the first of the two Commonwealth Preference Orders as follows:
"That in their opinion the provisions of the Orders raise important questions of policy and principle, namely, whether the proposed action is desirable and effective:
"That the Orders are not founded on precedent:
"That in the opinion of the Committee, the Orders cannot be passed by the House without special attention."

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The Committee then went on to report, in regard to the No. 2 Order:
"That the Order is precedented by the Order it amends:
"That in the opinion of the Committee the Order can be passed by the House without special attention."
The first Order suspends the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement in its relation to Southern Rhodesia. It is one of the measures announced by my right honourable friend the Prime Minister in his statement to the other place on November 11. It came into operation on November 18, and, as with all Orders under the Southern Rhodesia Act, it can continue in effect only so long as the Act itself remains in force. As for our reasons for making this Order, I need only say at this stage that, although Southern Rhodesia remains part of Her Majesty's Dominions, the circumstances of the illegal declaration of independence are such that here, as with Commonwealth Preference, the Government felt obliged to withdraw the benefits which derive from Commonwealth membership.
I turn now to the provisions of the Order. Article 1(1)(a) is the main operative paragraph, and, in effect, suspends the operation of the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement in its relation to Southern Rhodesia. Because doubts have been expressed about the words,
"shall have effect as if the Rhodesia Sugar Association had not become a party",
I ought to assure the House that this is suspension and not expulsion. This I can do, because, as I have already said, the Order can exist only so long as the enabling Act is operative. Thus the action under this Order is temporary and not final.
Article 1(1)(b) simply spells out that the Sugar Board's contract to buy sugar is cancelled. Article 1(2) provides that the suspension under Article 1(1) has no effect on the validity of purchases and payments made by the Sugar Board before the Order came into operation in respect of the sugar bought by the Board at the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement negotiated price, and in respect of the payments made by the Board to the Southern Rhodesia Sugar Association in lieu of Commonwealth Preference on sugar imported for home consumption
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and not forming a part of the negotiated price quota.
The general effect of the Order is to relieve the Government, acting through the Minister of Agriculture, of their obligation under the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement to take an annual quota of sugar from Southern Rhodesia. Southern Rhodesia's quota under that Agreement was 25,000 tons a year; and its value under the Agreement was about £1·2 million. The withdrawal of the Agreement means that advantage of some £46 per ton is lost to Rhodesia on the 25,000 tons, because the free market price is now around about £16 per ton.
In addition to the 25,000 tons of quota sugar, Southern Rhodesia might have expected to sell to the United Kingdom on a free market some additional 30,000 tons, which would have carried Commonwealth Preference. This aspect of the Commonwealth Preference on sugar is something that I shall have to mention in connection with the other two Orders. I must add that the Sugar Board have already purchased some 15,000 tons out of the quota. This Order does not affect that purchase. We understand that the remaining 10,000 tons were due to be bought and loaded at the end of November, at a cost of about £450,000. This will not now be bought. But as I said before, this Order does not affect purchases made prior to the making of the Order.
I turn now to the Orders dealing with Commonwealth Preference. The first of these two Orders excludes Southern Rhodesia from the Commonwealth Preference Area. It provides that goods from Southern Rhodesia, and goods from a part of the Commonwealth Preference Area which are consigned from Southern Rhodesia, no longer qualify for Commonwealth Preference on importation into the United Kingdom and are, therefore, liable for duty at the full rate. The Order was made on November 16, and came into operation on November 19. It applies to all goods entered with Customs on or after that date. There is a reference in Article 1(b), your Lordships will have noticed, to Lourenco Marques and to Beira, because these are the ports from which nearly all goods from Southern Rhodesia are shipped, though they are not, of course, a part of the Commonwealth Preference Area. Article 2 deals with the special

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arrangements for warehousing. Under Customs law, goods which on importation are put into bonded warehouses—for example, tobacco—become chargeable with duty when they are removed from the warehouse at the rate of duty then applicable. But Article 2 of this Order provides that the goods from Southern Rhodesia which had been entered for warehousing before November 19 will be eligible for Commonwealth Preference on withdrawal from the warehouse.
By far the most important import from Southern Rhodesia which is enjoying preference is tobacco. The average value of United Kingdom imports of tobacco in the years 1962, 1963 and 1964 was £26 million out of an average total imports from Rhodesia of about £30 million. The Commonwealth Preference rate of duty is £4 5s. 10d. per lb., and this is 1s. 6½d. per lb. less than the full rate. All unmanufactured tobacco goes into bonded warehouse on importation, and the duty is not paid until it is withdrawn. Thus, although this Order provides that tobacco entered for warehousing before November 19 will be chargeable at the preferential rate on withdrawal, importers will have to pay the full rate on any tobacco entered on or after November 19 and withdrawn while Southern Rhodesia is outside the Commonwealth Preference Area—that is, on such tobacco as may come in before tobacco imports are banned.
The duty payment position will be the same for any other goods put into bonded warehouses on importation. Imports of sugar have been increasing, and are now the next most important item on the list of imports from Southern Rhodesia. The duty on raw sugar varies according to the degree of polarisation. I understand that most Rhodesian sugar is over 98° but not exceeding 99°, and on this the preferential rate is nil and the full rate is £6 18s. per ton. Other important items are asbestos, preferential rate, nil, full rate, 10 per cent.; meat products, preferential rate, nil, full rate, mainly 20 per cent.; frozen meat, preferential rate, nil, full rate, ¾d. per lb.
This Order makes no provision for charging the preferential rate on goods which were already in transit on November 11 and goods which had already been paid for, though they had not yet left Southern Rhodesia. The reason is that the Commissioners of Customs and Excise
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are responsible to Parliament for the administration of duties imposed by Parliament and must therefore apply duty changes from a precise date capable of absolute determination. Invariably in the past, therefore, when duties have changed, the change has applied at once and without exception on all goods entered with Customs on or after the date specified in the Statutory Instrument effecting the change, in contrast to import licensing under which it is normal to provide for goods in transit or under contract.
The Government have, however, reconsidered the matter in the light of the position at the date of the illegal Declaration of Independence, taking into account that at that date substantial quantities of tobacco from the 1965 Rhodesian crop were, contrary to expectations, still in transit to this country, partly because of transport hold-ups. The Chancellor of the Exchequer has agreed that, in the unique situation with which we are dealing, a limited departure from the principles and practice of fiscal legislation is justified. The Government have therefore decided that, while the date of Southern Rhodesia's removal from the Preference Area cannot be postponed, goods which can be shown to have left the seaports before November 19 should qualify for the preferential rate of duty. This is the purpose and reason for the No. 2 Order, the third Order to which I am now speaking.
This, my Lords, is a concession, but it will not cover goods from Southern Rhodesia which were in transit on November 11, but which were not shipped from a seaport before November 19. Nor, of course, will it cover goods which were purchased before the illegal Declaration of Independence, but were still in Southern Rhodesia on November 11. It is recognised that this will involve hardship for some importers as, indeed, is so often the case with fiscal changes. A date of departure from Southern Rhodesia itself, let alone a date of purchase, would not have provided a date capable of absolute determination. The amending Order is the limit to which the Government can go without weakening the impact of the exclusion of Southern Rhodesia from the Commonwealth Preference Area.
The Special Orders Committee have posed the question: Is the proposed

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action desirable, and is it likely to be effective? There can be no certain answer to the latter part of that question. The Government have given this matter the most careful and anxious thought, and they have decided that of all these possibilities immediately before us the action in the Order is best calculated to meet what is an unprecedented situation. The Government, rightly in my opinion, ruled out the use of military force to quell the rebellion. What then remained? Either to do nothing, or to impose economic sanctions. To do nothing would have flown in the face of world and Commonwealth opinion, and to have renounced our obligations to the coloured population of Southern Rhodesia. The consequences of doing nothing might have had the evil result of worsening the already strained relationships of the races in the world—perhaps a greater hazard facing the world at this time, and well into the future, than East-West relations which have so long occupied our minds.
What remains, then, is only economic sanctions. "Are they desirable?" asked the Special Orders Committee. They appear to us to be the lesser of all the evils that arise out of the unfortunate circumstances of the illegal Declaration of Independence by Southern Rhodesia. Will they be effective? This is a tremendous question for the Special Orders Committee to present to this House. Only time can answer that question, and not this House to-day. We believe they will, or we should not have imposed them. As has been said this afternoon, we realise that innocent people as well as guilty people will be hurt by them, as is the case in a war in defence of a principle—a principle we hold dear. In these circumstances innocent people are hurt, and we realise that innocent people will be hurt by this, but we think this is the best way to do what we have tried to achieve.
I do not want to enter into any argument about whether these sanctions are punitive or whether some other word would more aptly apply. What they are intended to do, and what we hope they will do, is to bring about the rejection by the people of Southern Rhodesia of the present régime and open the way to a régime which will grasp the conciliatory hand, again held out by the Prime
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Minister on behalf of the Government in his Statement on Tuesday last. My Lords, that is our prayer and our earnest hope. I beg to move.
Moved, That the Southern Rhodesia (Commonwealth Sugar Agreement) Order 1965, be approved.—(Lord Champion.)
6.51 p.m.
LORD ERROLL OF HALE: My Lords, the noble Lord has explained all these Orders with his customary clarity, and for that I, on behalf of noble Lords on this side of the House, should like to thank him. He spoke first of the Sugar Order and then of the Commonwealth Preference Orders, because that is the order in which they are down on the Order Paper. If noble Lords have no objection, I should prefer to commence my remarks by mentioning the Withdrawal of Commonwealth Preference Order, because I feel that is the one with the greatest spread, embracing tobacco, sugar and certain other commodities. The noble Lord was good enough to explain in some detail the scope of the Commonwealth Preference Order, pointing out that by far the greatest proportion in value of all imports from Rhodesia are tobacco, and that there are only one or two other exports from Rhodesia which attract preferential rates. He mentioned asbestos, canned meat and one other, a total amounting to something like £4 million compared with the £26 million worth of tobacco sent to this country.
LORD CHAMPION: My Lords, I did not mention the full list, but I have it here, and if the House should want it I shall be glad to give it. I mentioned only some of the things.
LORD ERROLL OF HALE: My Lords, my impression is that a considerable number of items from Rhodesia come in without Commonwealth preference, since there is no tariff on them coming into this country, because we pursue as far as possible the principle of bringing into Britain food and raw materials from most parts of the world duty free. Therefore the Commonwealth preference is of most value to Rhodesian exporters in the field of tobacco and sugar.
The interesting thing about this Order is that with the banning of tobacco and sugar imports, which is done by separate

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administrative action of the Government, there will, of course, be no preference to withdraw, and after a short transitional period this Order will bite on only a very small part of Rhodesia's normal exports to us. When the noble Lord referred to sanctions, to the importance of doing what we can, he presented this as a very powerful instrument, when in actual fact it will be an instrument which will spend most of its time beating the thin air because there will be no Commonwealth preferences to withdraw from exports to this country which have been banned by another action of the Government. I suggest that we can safely pass this Order, knowing that by itself this Order will have very little effect indeed.
However, there are some absurdities about the transitional period to which I referred a moment ago. These absurdities are within the power of the Government to put right by means of further amending Orders, if they are so minded to do. First of all, in the case of tobacco, they have already made one amending Order to ease the position of the British purchasers of Rhodesian tobacco. It is known that there is still some tobacco in Rhodesia which has already been bought and is in the ownership of the British importers. That tobacco, when it comes to this country and is subsequently taken out of bond, will have to pay duty at the higher, non-preferential rate, and I have been told that this additional burden will be of the order of £1 million to £1½million. One would have thought, in view of what the noble Lord has said, that this additional burden should have fallen upon the Rhodesians, but in order to hurt the Rhodesians economically the Government are, in fact, burdening the British manufacturer of tobacco products with an extra burden of £1½ million. I fail to see how this will help the cause which the noble Lord outlined in his speech. Surely it would be possible, if the Government were so minded, by means of a further amending Order, to allow tobacco which had already been so purchased to come in and attract only the Commonwealth preferential rate. This would not be helping the Rhodesians in any way, but it would be removing a manifest injustice to the British importer.
Then there is timber. In the case of timber, a number of contracts had been
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placed before U.D.I. That Rhodesian timber had been ordered, and rightly so, because it was important that as far as possible normal trade should continue, because of the hope that there would not be a U.D.I. But under the Order importers will have to pay duty on timber which they contracted to purchase from Rhodesia before U.D.I. Some of it is already on passage to the United Kingdom. The imports from Rhodesia are mainly flooring strips in species not obtainable from other sources; hitherto they have been duty free under Commonwealth preference, but in future they will attract the full 15 per cent. duty on the c.i.f. value. The trade in flooring strips from Rhodesia is not large—I think the total figure was £160,000 in 1964—but it is one in which a few importers have specialised. This material is sold forward at fixed contract prices, which means that importers will be involved in financial loss. In those circumstances the 15 per cent. duty represents a sanction not against Rhodesia but rather against the United Kingdom importers, and therefore in this respect the Order fails to achieve its purpose. I suggest that for shipments against contracts made before U.D.I. the United Kingdom importers should be spared the liability for this duty.
Turning to the Sugar Order, but before leaving the Commonwealth Preference Order, I notice that the Government naturally take care of their own, and while we are told that for reasons of fiscal respectability it would be quite impossible to go further down the tobacco road, so to speak, they have nevertheless made quite certain that their own Sugar Board is not going to be caught in the same position as the tobacco importers and the timber importers, because under the Sugar Order Article 1(2)(a) says:
"Paragraph (1) of this Article shall not have effect with respect to

(a) any sugar in which the property has passed to the Sugar Board before the date when this Order comes into force."

So any sugar which has been bought by the Sugar Board and which is still in Rhodesia will come in at the preferential rate, but any tobacco which a private importer has bought will be dunned for the full rate. This is a most undesirable and most unnecessary form of discrimination. It does nothing to harm the

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Rhodesian economy; it is merely an unfair form of discrimination between the British Sugar Board and the private importers of this country.
As regards the Sugar Order itself, it revokes, as I understand it, a contract made by the United Kingdom Sugar Board with the Rhodesian Sugar Board; and I was grateful to the noble Lord for his assurance that this is a suspension and not a cancellation. It does mean, therefore, that the purchases of Rhodesian sugar can he renewed as soon as may be when conditions are different. One may say I think, and I believe noble Lords will agree, that the Sugar Order of itself is not a ban; it represents merely the withdrawal of a subsidy to Rhodesian producers and also a withdrawal of an assured market in Britain. But for the ban, the Rhodesians would still have been able to sell their sugar had they so wished to British refineries at the lower world price. The ban stems from administrative action made under other legislation, and so this Order should not in itself be regarded as being a ban, though a withdrawal of the subsidy makes the marketing of Rhodesian sugar in this country a very much less attractive proposition than it would have been.
Three years ago Southern Rhodesia was a net importer of sugar, and the Rhodesian sugar industry is by and large a new industry, now capable of and actually exporting increasing quantities of sugar to this country. This new industry has been financed very largely by British capital; I am told the figure is £20 million of British capital invested in the industry. This Order may well do harm to a section of Rhodesia's agriculture, but it will also cause deterioration to a sizeable British investment. Though I reluctantly agree that these Orders should be passed, let us not imagine we are damaging only the Rhodesian economy. We are harming ourselves by the absurdities of the transitional period in the Commonwealth Preference Order and we are harming British capital which was quite properly invested in Britain. With those observations, I would suggest that we accept the Orders when the Motion is finally put.
7.3 p.m.
LORD CLITHEROE: My Lords, I agreed with nearly the whole of the speech of my noble friend Lord Erroll of Hale, except his conclusion. I made it quite clear when I spoke in this House on Monday of last week that I was totally opposed to economic sanctions of all kinds because I believe they will either fail or lead to war. I see no chance of their succeeding, and therefore I think that at best we shall be put in an ignominious position, and at worst they will lead to war.
If these economic sanctions are imposed, they will, of course, strike hardest at the poorest people in Rhodesia. They will strike hard at those who are earning their living in Rhodesia at the present time, those who come from Malawi and Zambia and who, if they lose their work, will have to go home. They will inconvenience the white population. They will damage the trade of this country. They will damage the trade of Rhodesia. They will risk provoking the worst of all consequences, which would be the closing of the frontier between Zambia and Southern Rhodesia, with consequences which I will not enlarge upon to-night, but which all of your Lordships who know these countries well will realise are very important. Therefore, although I agree with all the criticisms of these Orders which my noble friend Lord Erroll of Hale made in detail, I find myself unable to support him in saying that I will vote for them, and I must tell the House that I shall not be able to support the Government.
7.5 p.m.
LORD AMPTHILL: My Lords, I rise to speak about the Commonwealth Preference Orders, Orders Nos. 1954 and 1987, in so far as they refer to tobacco, and I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Champion, as I am sure your Lordships are, for the careful way in which he explained these Orders. In so far as he explained their effect on tobacco, he was nearly right, but not quite, and in the course of my few remarks I shall make it clear to your Lordships where I think he was not quite correct.
Most of your Lordships already know that I am a tobacco manufacturer, and I have thought it my duty to come down

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here to-night to give you a few facts, because I spent this morning at my office briefing myself on the latest position; and to assure your Lordships that I am right up to date, I may say that as I arrived at the office a telephone call came from our head office in Salisbury. I think there are some very cogent reasons why fresh thinking should be done on these Orders in so far as they apply to tobacco. The reasons have nothing whatever to do with the merits or demerits of sanctions. I hold very strong views on this matter (I largely agree with the noble Lord who has just spoken), but I do not propose to inflict them on you to-night.
These Orders apply, as the noble Lord, Lord Champion said, entirely to the 1965 crop. They cannot apply to the 1966 crop, first because it has not been planted, and secondly because it has not been sold, if it ever is sold. My remarks will be as brief as possible, entirely factual and based on information available to me as a tobacco manufacturer. The whole of the United Kingdom purchase of the 1965 crop, which amounted to 112 million lb. green weight—that is, about 46 per cent. of the total quantity grown in Rhodesia—was bought before the unilateral declaration of independence. All this crop was bought by the English manufacturers. Much of it, but not all, was shipped before the U.D.I.; some was in transit at Beira, awaiting shipment; some was packed waiting for railway trucks in Salisbury, and some in our factories in Salisbury awaiting processing and packing.
On November 12 all tobacco manufacturers in the United Kingdom received a letter from the Board of Trade which stated that all imports of Rhodesian tobacco were on licence forthwith; and this Order was, of course, based on 1939 legislation and restored war-time practice. Secondly, this letter stated—and I would ask you particularly to note this—that import licences would be granted in respect of tobacco for which documentary evidence could be produced showing that it had been purchased before November 12. Such evidence is, of course, available in respect of the 112 million lb. of the 1965 crop purchased by our manufacturers. In view of that letter from the Board of Trade, ships already at sea continued on their course; loading continued at Beira; processing
1110
and packing continued in Salisbury, the cases being dispatched by rail to Beira as and when railway wagons were available, and this is still the position to-day.
In parenthesis, I may add that part of the delay—which was not quite as unusual as the noble Lord, Lord Champion, implied—has been due to the fact that wagons have been in short supply in Salisbury, and I believe that this is partly due to unusual retentions by Zambia. However, some ships have arrived in U.K. ports within the last few days, and many more will arrive between now and Christmas. In fact, the last ships carrying tobacco from the 1965 crop will not arrive till late January or early February. The noble Lord, Lord Champion, said that the dispatches of the 1965 purchases from Rhodesia are rather later than expected. I am not now, because I am retired, but I was for many years, since 1935, executive director in my company, and it was part of my duty regularly to visit our bonded warehouses in Manchester and Belfast. I cannot tell you how many Januaries have seen Rhodesian tobacco being unloaded and weighed. So there is nothing unusual this year about prolonged dates in regard to deliveries from Rhodesia.
At any rate, the effect of the Orders we are now discussing is that Her Majesty's Customs and Excise started at once to withhold Commonwealth Preference, and if such action continues, as indeed it must under these Orders, the United Kingdom tobacco manufacturers must eventually be subjected to an extra liability or mulcting (I do not quite know what to call it) of between £1 million and £2 million. I am not familiar with the details of other manufacturers' shipments, but I went down to the offices of my own company this morning and made myself aware of the exact position. Here, among my papers (although I am not going to trouble your Lordships with it) I have a list of the ships, with their names, and other details of the amount of tobacco already loaded in them and they are still awaiting completion of their cargoes.
Rhodesian tobacco growers have been paid for this crop—the whole lot. None of us owes any money in Rhodesia at all now, but I do not quite know how we are going to keep paying our European and African employees. However, that is another question. So the only people

1111
to suffer from this immediate imposition of the withdrawal of Commonwealth Preference are the British importer and manufacturer, and eventually, of course, the British public.
It has been truly said by more than one person that sanctions are a blunt weapon. I personally have always agreed with that, ever since I began to think about such things. But in this case a better description of this particular sanction is a boomerang, because it is coming back to hurt us. I think the only people who will derive any pleasure or amusement from this boomerang exercise will be Mr. Smith and his rebel junta. I am afraid that the way this has worked out will expose Her Majesty's Government to a serious degree of derision and unpopularity. I do not think they want to appear like that in Southern Rhodesia at the moment; indeed, I am sure they do not; and I do not believe we want them to appear like that.
I hope that I have not taken too much of your Lordships' time. I have explained the position perfectly fairly. I beg the Government to withdraw these Orders, or to issue an amending Order to ensure that Commonwealth Preference applies to any tobacco from the 1965 crop legitimately purchased before November 11, irrespective of what date it was shipped or the date on which it arrives in this country. It is difficult to give an absolutely open date, but I think that February 1 would he the last reasonable date when all the 1965 crop would have been lodged in the bonded warehouses in this country.
7.15 p.m.
LORD COLERAINE: My Lords, I am not going to inflict on your Lordships the reasons why I object to these Orders; I will content myself with saying that I do object to them. But I derive one crumb of comfort—namely, that these Orders are in fact an admission by Her Majesty's Government that Mr. Ian Smith's Government is the de facto Government in Rhodesia. I do not think it is possible to get away from that.
I should like briefly to reinforce the lucid argument which has just been put forward by my noble friend Lord Ampthill. I have no interest in the tobacco industry, and I have no particular knowledge of it. Indeed, what I have
1112
heard of this particular problem derives, in the main, from my noble friend. When I heard of what was happening, when I heard that tobacco which had been purchased perhaps months ago, where the cash had been paid, was being charged this duty, I assumed that some mistake had been made and that, just as the first Order was an oversight inasmuch as it did not cover shipments and then a second Order was introduced, so there had been another oversight. But it appears from what the, noble Lord, Lord Champion, said in his opening speech that that was not the case; that the Government realised that this hardship had been inflicted and was not prepared to do anything about it. I do not know why not—whether it was for administrative reasons or for whatever reason.
But surely, in common justice, there is no reason at all why the tobacco companies should be charged this tax. Payment was made, tobacco was received, tobacco was in the factories before November 11. There can be no reason in justice, and I cannot see that there can be any really effective administrative reason, unless the noble Lord says that he cannot trust the British tobacco companies who have operations in Rhodesia. I cannot believe that he would say that. I would appeal to the noble Lord to think again about this matter, because, as things stand, a real injustice is being done for which there is no reason, no possible advantage to Government policy, only an injustice to the tobacco companies here, and ultimately, as my noble friend has said, to the consumer.
7.18 p.m.
LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, before the noble Lord opposite replies, I would just make an appeal to him. We quite understand the noble Lord's point that for the purpose of charging duty there must be absolute certainty as to a relevant date. But if it is the case that the relevant date in the case of sugar purchased by the Sugar Board is the date of purchase, then surely the relevant date can be the date of purchase of other goods as well. So long as the purchaser or the importer can prove with absolute certainty—and this, of course, must be left to the authorities, to Customs and Excise—that the goods were purchased

1113
on such-and-such a date, why should not those goods come in under the arrangement prior to November 19?
I put that point to him. We realise that he has gone quite a long way already in trying to reduce hardship; but I would ask him to consider whether it would not be possible to go still further. While we certainly do not intend to oppose these Orders, we hope that he will not close the door, at any rate on the possibility of looking further at this matter.
7.20 p.m.
LORD CHAMPION: My Lords, the noble Lord. Lord Erroll of Hale, has apologised to me for the fact that he has had to leave, and one understands the reason for his absence. I must deal with some of the points he made. He was right to say that this Order is not the main instrument in respect of these sanctions. He said that the Orders deal only with a transitional period; and he is, of course, quite right. In my concluding remarks I referred to the rather wider field because I thought that that was justifiable in the circumstances. He appealed to the Government, as did the noble Lord, Lord Ampthill, to do something about the tobacco which has already been purchased but which is still in Southern Rhodesia. Lord Ampthill, of course, with his exceptional knowledge of this trade, made the point very forcibly. In the No. 2 Order we have gone some way to meet the difficulties which people are experiencing, but not all the way.
In my opening speech I dealt with the difficulties of fixing a relevant date, to use the words of the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn. He, too, with his knowledge as a Minister, his past support of Governments who have had to introduce Budgets, knows the difficulty of playing about with a fixed date of this sort. And, of course, tobacco manufacturers know very well the difficulties here. Indeed, to some extent they have, of course, always in the past suffered—or in some cases, perhaps, gained—as a result of fiscal measures. I would only say that, up to now, their shares are standing up to it fairly well. However, I do not want to introduce an argument like that into what is clearly a serious matter.
The noble Lord, Lord Erroll of Hale, also mentioned timber which is on the way. I am sorry that he is not here, as
1114
I should like to know what he meant by the words "on the way". Did he mean that it had been shipped from the ports I have mentioned and was actually in transit? Clearly, this is the sort of thing which is important and relevant to the question he asked me about timber. He suggested that the United Kingdom importers should in every case be spared. I am afraid that we just cannot do this, much as we should like to. He also said that the Government were taking an unfair advantage by the action they had taken on behalf of the Sugar Board in respect of the sugar which attracts Commonwealth Preference. The Sugar Board do not buy from Rhodesia sugar which would attract a preferential rate of duty. Sugar bought from Rhodesia outside the 25,000 tons is bought by private importers.
The noble Lord, Lord Clitheroe, repeated his opposition to economic sanctions. He told us that it will strike hardest at the poorest people; that it will inconvenience the white population, and that it will hurt people in this country a great deal. We admit this. The only thing I would have asked Lord Clitheroe, had he still been here, is what he would have done in place of sanctions in this awful situation which we face in connection with the illegal declaration of independence.
To revert to the question of tobacco, and to the remarks of Lord Ampthill, the noble Lord said that there was documentary evidence of purchases made before U.D.I. I must say to him, and to the other noble Lords who have appealed to me on this matter, that I will make sure—this is no empty promise—that all that noble Lords have said about this will be brought to the attention of the Government. If the Government think that it would be wise to produce an amending Order, there is nothing to prevent their doing so and placing it before the House. There is nothing in the Southern Rhodesia Act which says that there shall be only one Order and never any amending Order. Indeed, of course, the No. 2 Order which is now before us is, to some extent, an amending Order, and was produced in order to meet some of the difficulties which had been brought to the attention of the Government. This rather proves that our minds are not absolutely fixed in that, having given a date, we will never in any circumstances depart from it. But I should be quite wrong if I held out too

1115
much hope to noble Lords about this. I am sure the noble Lord, Lord Ampthill, thoroughly understands this.
LORD AMPTHILLMy Lords, if, with the leave of the House. I may speak again, I should like to thank the noble Lord for his remarks, which encourage in me some hope. I would add that not only is there documentary proof of where every shipment of tobacco was purchased, and when it was purchased, but I understand from the Customs and Excise people with whom we deal—I will not say which ones—that there is no difficulty, from their point of view, in sorting out which tobacco was bought on which date and applying Commonwealth Preference accordingly.
LORD CHAMPION: My Lords, the noble Lord's further remarks merely cause me to give a firmer promise that this point will be looked at. If the tobacco has been purchased and is not in transit—if it has not been shipped from the port—there is the difficulty which the noble Lord recognises.
LORD COLERAINE: My Lords, would the noble Lord allow me to ask him whether he will point out to his colleagues, when he brings this matter to their notice, the fallacy, as I think it is, of thinking that this is just another tax change? In other words, this is not a tax change, but a political weapon.
LORD CHAMPION: Yes. I used the fiscal illustration merely because of the fact that in fiscal measures a date is set because of the difficulties which can arise, but I can give the noble Lord that assurance.
LORD STRANGE: My Lords, may I ask the noble Lord whether there are any figures showing the unemployment that will be caused by not growing tobacco next year?
LORD CHAMPION: I have already mentioned the fact that we are going to hurt somebody. By this action we are bound to hurt somebody, as I am sure we hurt millions when we went to war in 1939 in defence of a principle. Occasionally, one has to take these actions, in the hope that it will avert something infinitely worse, which I think deterioration of race relations in this world would bring about.
SEVERAL NOBLE LORDS: Hear, hear!
LORD CHAMPION: This is how I see it, and this is how the Government see it. I cannot pretend to be absolutely expert in this field, but if I have failed to answer any point that has been made I will carefully search the record and write to noble Lords. I hope that this House will now agree to pass the first Order that I moved.
On Question, Motion agreed to.

SOUTHERN RHODESIA (WITHDRAWAL OF COMMONWEALTH PREFERENCE) ORDER 1965
LORD CHAMPION: My Lords, I beg to move that this Order be approved.
Moved, That the Southern Rhodesia (Withdrawal of Commonwealth Preference) Order 1965, be approved.—(Lord Champion.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

SOUTHERN RHODESIA (WITHDRAWAL OF COMMONWEALTH PREFERENCE) (No. 2) ORDER 1965
LORD CHAMPION: My Lords, I beg to move approval of this Order.
Moved, That the Southern Rhodesia (Withdrawal of Commonwealth Preference) (No. 2) Order 1965, be approved.—(Lord Champion.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

SOUTHERN RHODESIA (PROPERTY IN PASSPORTS) ORDER 1965
7.32 p.m.
LORD STONHAM: My Lords, I hope it will be convenient if, with your Lordships' permission, I speak to the next four Orders in one speech, and then after debate move them separately. These four Orders are distinct from the three with which my noble friend Lord Champion has just dealt, in that they deal not with produce but, in various aspects, with persons. The one that I now move, the Southern Rhodesia (Property in Passports) Order, 1965, and the two next Orders on the Order Paper, when they were considered by the Special Orders Committee were found

1117
to be Orders which can be passed by the House without special attention.
The Committee thought that they were distinct from the Southern Rhodesia (Fugitive Offenders Act 1881) Order, where they thought it was incumbent on the Government to show whether the proposed action was desirable and effective. It is the view of the Special Orders Committee that that Order cannot be passed by the House without special attention. I hope that that will enable me to deal with the first three Orders briefly, though I trust adequately, and with the last of them in somewhat more detail in order to satisfy the comments of the Special Orders Committee.
With regard to the Property in Passports Order, the Government repudiate passports issued by the illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia, and if and when they come to official notice in the United Kingdom wish to have such passports impounded. A British passport is issued in pursuance of the Royal Prerogative and remains the property of the Crown. A duly authorised person may therefore impound such a passport. A document purporting to be a passport but issued on or after November 11, 1965, by the illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia, is only a document issued by private individuals, and could not, but for this Order, be impounded in the United Kingdom. This Order enables this document, this piece of paper, to be impounded by immigration officers, constables or other designated persons, if authorised by or on behalf of the Secretary of State.
The Order came into force on November 18, and authority to impound passports within the meaning of, and issued as mentioned in, Article 1 has been given for the purposes of Article 2 to all immigration officers; to all members of police forces in the United Kingdom; and to appropriate officials in the Government Departments concerned. An impounded passport will be sent to the Passport Office in London and, on request, will normally be replaced by a United Kingdom passport valid for six months in the first instance. If, however, there is good reason to believe that the holder is actively supporting the illegal régime in Rhodesia, the replacement may be a travel document valid only for his journey home to Rhodesia.
1118
We realise that the illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia may purport to extend the validity of a Rhodesian passport properly isued before November 11 this year. The Government would repudiate such passports. They are, however, true passports (though the purported extension would have no legal validity) and may therefore be impounded, under the Royal Prerogative, by a duly authorised person. Again, immigration officers, constables and the appropriate officials have been duly authorised for the purpose. The powers conferred by the Order do not extend beyond the United Kingdom; but we hope that most overseas Governments will deny recognition to the passports that we repudiate, so that Rhodesia citizens outside Rhodesia will be compelled to seek replacements from British posts in the countries in which they find themselves. It would be a condition of the issue of a United Kingdom passport that the repudiated document was surrendered.
I hope that that makes the position on that Order sufficiently clear and I pass to the second Order, which is the Southern Rhodesia (Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1962) Order 1965. This Order is needed for entirely technical reasons. It ensures that a Rhodesian citizen who is subject to immigration control under the Commonwealth Immigrants Act, 1962, is not exempted from that control merely because his passport has been issued or replaced by the Foreign Office in pursuance of the arrangements introduced as a result of the situation in Rhodesia.
The position is that Section 1(2) of the Commonwealth Immigrants Act, 1962, exempts from immigration control under Part I of the Act, any person who holds a United Kingdom passport issued in the United Kingdom or the Republic of Ireland. Section 1(3) provides that "United Kingdom passport" means a passport issued by the Government of the United Kingdom, not being a passport issued on behalf of the Government of any part of the Commonwealth outside the United Kingdom. For the present, Rhodesian citizens are to have passports issued or replaced by the Foreign Office as occasion arises. These passports will not be issued on behalf of a separate Rhodesian Government—because they are United Kingdom passports—and, but for this Order in Council,

1119
would exempt the holders from immigration control under the Act. I hope that the purpose of this Order is clear to noble Lords. As I said, it is a purely technical one.
The third Order which I wish to move is the Southern Rhodesia (British Nationality Act 1948) Order, 1965, which is one of a number of steps which are being taken to facilitate the acquisition of citizenship of the United Kingdom and Colonies by citizens of Southern Rhodesia who remain loyal in the present crisis. It is therefore an Order which I am sure your Lordships will agree is highly desirable and necessary. These steps were outlined by the Prime Minister in replying to the debate in another place on November 12. Some steps fall within the exercise of administrative discretion, but the subject of the present Order requires an alteration of the law. The effect of the Order is to revive, in relation to citizens of Southern Rhodesia, Section 12(6) of the British Nationality Act 1948, as amended by Section 3(1) of the British Nationality Act 1958. This provision, in its relation to the Commonwealth generally, expired at the end of 1962, but by the South Africa Act, 1962, it was continued until the end of 1965 in relation only to citizens of South Africa. The same facility is now, by this Order, extended to Rhodesians for so long as the Order is in force.
Thus, a citizen of Southern Rhodesia will be qualified to apply for United Kingdom citizenship under this Order in Council if he fulfils the following conditions. First, that he was a British subject before January 1, 1949, when the British Nationality Act 1948 came into force. Second, that he is descended in the male line from a person born or naturalised in the United Kingdom and Colonies or is connected by birth or ancestry with the territory now forming the Republic of Ireland. Alternatively, he may qualify if he was naturalised before January 1, 1949, in Southern Rhodesia or some other country which was then in the Commonwealth. A third condition is that the applicant intends to make his ordinary place of residence within the United Kingdom or Colony. Finally, the Secretary of State (or, in a Commonwealth country other than Southern Rhodesia, the High Commis-
1120
sioner) will have to be satisfied that it is fitting, by reason of his close connection with the United Kingdom and Colonies, that he should be granted its citizenship. Thus, the Order in Council provides a means by which Rhodesians connected with this country who wish to demonstrate their loyalty to the United Kingdom can acquire our citizenship without fulfilling the normal requirement of prior residence in this country.
I now come to the fourth Order which I submit for your Lordships' approval, the Southern Rhodesia (Fugitive Offenders Act 1881) Order 1965. This is the Order on which, as I have said, the Special Orders Committee considered that the Government should show "whether the proposed action is desirable and effective"; and they express the view that the Order "cannot be passed by the House without special attention."
The purpose of this Order is to ensure that a fugitive offender shall not be returned to Rhodesia, under either Part I or Part II of the Fugitive Offenders Act 1881, unless the Secretary of State or, in the case of a British possession, the Governor, is satisfied that it is not inexpedient that the fugitive should be so returned, having regard to any circumstances which may result from the unconstitutional action which has been taken in Rhodesia. As your Lordships are probably aware, the significant difference between Parts I and II of the 1881 Act is that under Part I a person for whose return an application is received from another Commonwealth country must be brought before a magistrate, who is required to consider, under Section 5 of the Act, whether there is a prima facie case against him. If so, he is committed into custody, pending the decision by the Secretary of State (or the Governor, as the case may be) to issue a warrant, under Section 6 of the Act—and I quote—
if he thinks it just",
ordering the fugitive to be returned. The fugitive may not be so returned, however, if, under Section 10 of the Act, it is made to appear to a superior court that, by reason of the trivial nature of the case, or because the application has not been made in good faith, in the interests of justice or otherwise, and having regard to all the circumstances of the case, it

1121
would be unjust, or oppressive, or too severe a punishment to return him.
Under Part II of the Act, on the other hand, which applies only to countries which are grouped together by Order in Council—and, my Lords, it is important to remember that Rhodesia is grouped with the Dependencies of Bechuanaland, Basutoland, Swaziland, Aden and Mauritius—the surrender of a fugitive can be secured simply on the basis of a warrant, backed by a magistrate in the country from which surrender is sought, without the establishment of a prima facie case. The discretion of the magistrate not to return, under Part II of the Act, is limited by Section 19 to circumstances similar to those set out in Section 10; that is, where it would seem unreasonable to do so having regard to the comparative triviality of the offence, or because the application has not been made in good faith in the interests of justice or otherwise.
My Lords, the Government have come to the view that the existing discretions not to return would not be adequate in the light of the present situation in Rhodesia, and possible further developments. It has been thought right, therefore, to ensure that wanted persons need not be returned to Rhodesia for political offences, or in circumstances where they might be the subject of political action after surrender, or indeed in any other circumstances in which it would seem in any way inexpedient to send them back. I think that is a sufficient answer to the question as to whether the action proposed by this Order is desirable.
Your Lordships will note that the Order, in effect, imposes an embargo on return unless the Secretary of State, or the Governor, is satisfied that return would not be inexpedient. The Government, however—and it is as well to point this out—have thought it right, at least in the first instance, not to impose a complete embargo because, while the courts in Rhodesia continue to operate satisfactorily—and the House will be aware of the statement by the Chief Justice of Rhodesia, Sir Hugh Beadle, on November 13 that:
"the Judges of the High Court will continue to perform their duties in accordance with the law"—
it would be undesirable to place ourselves in the position of being unable to
1122
surrender habitual or vicious non-political prisoners to Rhodesia, or to obtain their return from there.
So far as the United Kingdom is concerned, there has been no application for the return of offenders from Rhodesia in the last twelve years, and we have received only seven applications from them; but, obviously, in the existing abnormal circumstances the number of cases which might be the subject of an application could conceivably increase. Moreover, this matter is of special importance to Bechuanaland, which has a long common land boundary with Rhodesia, and where it is, in consequence, desirable to secure, for as long as it remains possible to do so, that neither of the two territories should become a haven for the criminals of the other. It seems right, therefore, in this Order, to leave the door open. But, even so, the situation in Rhodesia might so develop that it rendered the return of any offender inexpedient, and in such circumstances the return of fugitives to Rhodesia would, in effect, be suspended. My Lords, that is the background and the reason for the Order. I would now briefly explain its details.
Article 1 conveys the additional discretion to the Secretary of State, in the case of applications made for the return of fugitives from the United Kingdom, or the Governor, in the case of a colonial territory, to consider, before he orders the surrender of a fugitive to Rhodesia, whether the circumstances of the case, and the conditions there, are such that it is not inexpedient to return him. By virtue of paragraph (2) of the Article, this power may be exercised even if a warrant of surrender was issued before November 16 but the fugitive had not then been returned under it before it became apparent that circumstances in Rhodesia had become such that he should not be returned.
Article 2 provides that where an order is made by a magistrate, under Part II of the principal Act, to return a fugitive offender on the basis of a backed warrant, return shall not be effected until the Governor of the territory has satisfied himself that it is not inexpedient to take such action; and should it be inexpedient, he may, under paragraph (2) of the Article, order the prisoner's discharge.

1123
Article 3 makes special provision in relation to rendition from Basutoland. By reason of the definition of "the Governor" in Section 39 of the 1881 Act (which definition is adopted under Article 4(2)), read with that Colony's Constitution, the question of the expediency of a fugitive's return from Basutoland to Rhodesia would, under Articles 1 and 2, fall to be made by the Paramount Chief. Article 3 provides, instead, that this question should be considered by the British Government Representative in Basutoland, who is more appropriately placed to operate a quasi-political discretion of this kind.
Article 4 deals merely with the interpretation of the Order, and Article 5 provides for its coming into operation with effect from November 16. The House will appreciate that this was necessary as the circumstances in Rhodesia at that time suggested that a fugitive offender whose return was already under consideration, or had been ordered, should not be returned.
My Lords, I have tried to be brief, but to explain these Orders as clearly and as explicitly as possible. I shall be glad after the debate to answer any point that I have not yet made clear. I beg to move that the first of these Orders be approved.
Moved, That the Southern Rhodesia (Property in Passports) Order 1965 be approved.—(Lord Stonham.)
7.54 p.m.
LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, we are grateful to the noble Lord for explaining these four Orders so carefully and clearly. As he says, these are Orders which affect persons, which affect individual rights, and I think we should be failing in our duty if we did not examine the effect of them on individuals. I should therefore like to ask one or two questions arising out of them. Taking the Southern Rhodesia (Property in Passports) Order, first, could I ask these questions? When the Order says "may", does it mean "shall"? If the noble Lord will look at the Order he will see that the passport
"may be dealt with within the United Kingdom as though it were the property of Her Majesty's Government therein and, accordingly

(a) an immigration officer;

(b) a constable, or

1124

(c) any other person … by or on behalf of the Secretary of State,

may, if so authorised by or on behalf of the Secretary of State, take and retain possession of such a passport;".
As I understood the noble Lord, what is here proposed is that those who come to this country with such purported passports will still be allowed to enter, although their passports are not recognised. I hope I may be right in that. If that is so, it seems that the passports are to be impounded and are to be replaced, the noble Lord said, by a United Kingdom passport valid for six months. Why is it that in all cases (except in the special case he mentioned of what one might call a rabid Smith supporter) they are to be replaced by a United Kingdom passport? I am not quite certain how that test is going to be applied. Perhaps he ought to say a word or two about that. Why should it not be dealt with under the powers of the first Order with which we dealt this afternoon, the Constitution Order? Why should it not be possible for a Rhodesian passport to be issued under those powers rather than a temporary United Kingdom passport?
The next question I should like to ask is: What happens when a Rhodesian passport issued before November 11 expires? I should like to ask that, first in so far as it may concern anybody in this country. In that case, is it possible for that passport to be extended by the British Government? I am speaking about a valid passport. Could it not be extended by the Secretary of State under the powers given in the Southern Rhodesia (Constitution) Order? Or will the Rhodesian passport also be replaced by a United Kingdom passport? In the same way, if it so happens that the holder of the passport is abroad at the time, will the British Embassy in question be empowered to extend the passport or will that passport again be replaced by a temporary United Kingdom passport? There appears to be rather a difficulty here; and this is where the first three Orders tend to interact.
The third Order provides for those entitled to obtain British citizenship under Section 12(6) of the 1948 Act. They obtain British citizenship and, therefore, at the same time, they obtain a United Kingdom passport. I take it that

1125
those people are, so to speak, absorbed into the British life and become in every way British subjects. It is not clear how these two sets of Orders are to interact. Each is to have a United Kingdom passport; but one is to have a United Kingdom passport valid for six months only. In the type of case I was talking about, where a passport expires and has to be renewed at a British Embassy abroad, it is important to see whether the person concerned could also, if he is so entitled under the third Order, be given full British citizenship and not just a United Kingdom passport. One wants to see how this is going to work out in practice.
Then again, the Orders seem to interact also when we are considering the Commonwealth Immigration Order, and it is, of course, quite reasonable that somebody whose passport has to be renewed, either because it has expired or because it was issued by the Smith régime, should not thereby escape the provisions of the Commonwealth Immigration Act. That is perfectly clear. But what I want to know also is whether those who acquire citizenship under the third Order will be subject to the second Order. This is not clear. I am not certain it is clear in the Order, either. I am sorry to raise this technical matter, but I want to see how it affects the individual in practice.
My Lords, I wish only to make a plea that, in operating these first three Orders, it will be done with the utmost humanity and the utmost sympathy so that there will be the minimum of inconvenience to individuals. From what the noble Lord has said, I think that he has answered one question I had in mind. The point is that, under the operation of these three Orders, it is not the intention that anyone will be left documentless, passport-less. Even in the extreme case of a Smith supporter coming in with a "Smith" passport, he, I understand the noble Lord to say, will receive a travel document which would be sufficient to get him back again. I wish to be quite certain that no-one is to be left without a passport. I am thinking of the case of someone coming into this country with a "Smith" passport who is given a United Kingdom passport for six months, which will enable him to travel around, if necessary, on business in foreign countries and which will be
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wholly acceptable. One hopes, of course, that this provision will not need to last for more than six months; perhaps one cannot see further than that period at present, although one might ask why a period of six months has been chosen.
To turn to the fourth of the Orders, the Fugitive Offenders Order, I am not clear about where the request for the return comes from. Am I right in thinking that it comes from the judicial authorities in Rhodesia in such a case, and does not come from the Executive? If it came from the Executive, I take it that it would be ignored, altogether, on the ground that the Government is not recognised; but if it came from the courts then it would be entertained. I take it that this is the basis of the Order.
My Lords, the only other question I wish to ask is about the change of test from what is just to what is expedient. We saw in a previous case, which caused a great deal of political furore in this country—the Enahoro case—that what is just in any particular situation, or, rather, what is just in the opinion of the Home Secretary, can be challenged. In the same way, I take it, the Home Secretary's opinion of what is expedient will be able to be challenged in Parliament, should Parliament so desire. I think it important that Parliamentary control in this matter should remain. I am not altogether happy about the change of test from just to expedient; but we certainly would not oppose the Order in the present circumstances, provided always that Parliamentary control is retained.
8.3 p.m.
LORD STONHAM: My Lords, I am most grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, for the reception which he has given to these Orders. It is what I should normally expect of the noble Lord. I will try to answer the questions which he has put to me. He asked, when the Order says "may", does it mean "shall". When the Order says "may" it means "may" and not "shall". The position is also that we instruct the immigration officers and certain other authorised persons, whereas we authorise a police constable, to impound these passports. So, in effect, the immigration officers will certainly impound them and we believe police officers will also impound them, although they are not

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likely to come so much in contact. There is that difference.
The noble Lord also asked me why a United Kingdom passport, and not a Rhodesian passport, would be issued to people who had a Rhodesian passport—that is, those who are not what he described as "rabid Smith partisans". The reason is that the only practical scheme is to use the United Kingdom passport-issuing machinery. The noble Lord asked whether a person whose passport had been impounded would be denied entry. Certainly those persons will not be denied entry. The arrangement to replace passports will not affect entitlement to entry, and that entitlement will rest on the Commonwealth Immigrants Act, as hitherto. I think I had better make that position clear. That is the reason for the Order relating to the Commonwealth Immigrants Act.
The position of a person who—shall I say?—is in good repute with this country, because he is loyal, and who comes from Rhodesia will be subject to the same conditions with regard to the Commonwealth Immigrants Act as hitherto. The normal rules will apply with two concessions. The first of these is that an exception would be made for a Rhodesian of United Kingdom ancestry—that is, a person whose father or father's father was born here. He would be admitted, even though otherwise he was not qualified for admission under the Commonwealth Immigrants Act. Secondly, genuine political refugees, as defined in the internationally accepted sense in the Geneva Convention of 1951, would be admitted. Subject to those two concessions the normal rules would apply so far as the Commonwealth Immigrants Act is concerned, and their passports would be replaced by United Kingdom passports.
With regard to what is the test of a "rabid Smith supporter" I can only answer the noble Lord that it would be by reputation. Immigration officers are not unskilled or without information on these matters and I think it may safely be left to them to decide. The noble Lord asked whether persons whose passports had been impounded would be left passportless. The only document that they would have would be the document
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authorising a return to Rhodesia. After all, as was said by my noble friend Lord Champion, in answer to an earlier question, some people have to get hurt. We are dealing with people who, if they are rabid Smith supporters, are supporting an illegal and rebel régime.
The noble Lord also asked what happens when a valid Rhodesian passport issued before November 11 cannot be extended. We are assuming that the person concerned is a person who is loyal. The answer is that passport facilities' can certainly be extended. The expired passport would be replaced by a United Kingdom passport. As I believe I made clear in my first speech, if someone were passportless in a country other than the United Kingdom and wished to obtain the means to come to this country, he could do so if he qualified, by going to the British post in that country. The normal conditions would apply.
LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, there is only one question I wish to put. The noble Lord, Lord Stonham, used the phrase "will normally be given a United Kingdom passport valid for six months." I wanted to be quite clear that it would be given to those who are given travel documents. The noble Lord indicated that, and I wanted it to be clear that this covered the whole field and that nobody would be left passportless.
LORD STONHAM: My Lords, that is so. And that reminds me that the noble Lord asked me why the period was six months. The answer is obvious. We all hope that these arrangements, which we are, unhappily, called upon to make, will be temporary. It does not mean that people who come here from Rhodesia out of loyalty to this country and to the Crown will be safeguarded only for six months. Six months will be a sufficient period for the time being, but if necessary these arrangements can be extended.
The noble Lord also asked me whether these regulations will be administered with humanity. I have no hesitation in saying that that is our normal practice, and, difficult as these decisions are, anyone who has seen our immigration officers dealing with immigrants from the Commonwealth will know that they not only administer the regulations with complete humanity, but also, when they have

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to help someone who they are convinced is genuine, do all they can to help him. On the other hand, if they have before them someone who they think is a "phoney", they will do their utmost, without departure from the rules of warm humanity, to expose him and see that he does not get the benefit of fraud.
LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, am I right in thinking that what the noble Lord is saying is that the immigration authorities will carry on exactly as usual, using their usual humanity and vigilance, and will treat those who come in with documents of the Smith régime in exactly the same way as any other immigrants, except that their documents will be impounded?
LORD STONHAM: Most certainly, my Lords. I do not think that any would-be immigrant to this country, or any alien coming to this country, has objected, on the ground of inhumanity, to the treatment he has received at the hands of immigration officers. The complaints we have received are of lack of agreement with our policy. I can assure the noble Lord that the present practice will continue.
The noble Lord also asked what the position was in regard to fugitive offenders; and he rightly thought that application must be made to the courts. That is the case in the Commonwealth. It is different with a foreign country, where it is usually done through diplomatic channels. Since the legal courts are continuing in Rhodesia—and we hope that they will continue to do so—there is no interruption. There is no question of the illegal Government's making application. If they did, their request would be disregarded, because, so far as we are concerned, Government-wise they do not exist—and we cannot be asked by nothing. I think that I have now answered all the noble Lord's questions.
On Question, Motion agreed to.

SOUTHERN RHODESIA (COMMONWEALTH IMMIGRANTS ACT 1962) ORDER 1965.
8.14 p.m.
LORD STONHAM: My Lords, I beg to move that the Southern Rhodesia (Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1962) Order 1965, be approved.
Moved, That the Southern Rhodesia (Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1962) Order 1965, be approved.—(Lord Stonham.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

SOUTHERN RHODESIA (BRITISH NATIONALITY ACT 1948) ORDER 1965
LORD STONHAM: My Lords, I beg to move that the Southern Rhodesia (British Nationality Act 1948) Order 1965, be approved.
Moved, That the Southern Rhodesia (British Nationality Act 1948) Order 1965, be approved.—(Lord Stonham.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

SOUTHERN RHODESIA (FUGITIVE OFFENDERS ACT 1881) ORDER 1965
LORD STONHAM: My Lords, I beg to move that the Southern Rhodesia (Fugitive Offenders Act 1881) Order 1965, be approved.
Moved, That the Southern Rhodesia (Fugitive Offenders Act 1881) Order 1965, be approved.—(Lord Stonham.)
LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, may I take this opportunity of thanking the noble Lord, Lord Stonham, for the courteous way in which he has replied to my questions and for the very adequate manner in which he has dealt with them?
On Question, Motion agreed to.
House adjourned at sixteen minutes past eight o'clock.