VIETNAM

HL Deb 30 June 1965 vol 267 cc962-1010

8.22 p.m.

LORD BROCKWAY rose to ask Her Majesty's Government what action has been taken to initiate negotiations to end the war in Vietnam. The noble Lord said: My Lords, I rise to put the Question which is on the Order Paper in my name. I regret that at this comparatively late hour I am initiating another debate. The House has for a considerable period been discussing the subject of Defence. We are now passing to a subject very closely related to peace; and peace in the world will determine whether that Defence will be necessary. I think all Members of this House will hope that we shall move towards increasing security of peace so that the preparations for Defence will never be called upon.

In any approach to the problem of Vietnam I must begin by referring to the Geneva Conference eleven years ago. That Conference was concentrated on the problem of Indo-China, including Vietnam, but it also became a great occasion for peace in the world. Already in this House I have paid my tribute to the influence which the noble Earl, Lord Avon, contributed as a Chairman of that Conference. We were then full of hope; we spoke of the spirit of Geneva as promising peace to the world. It is a little tragic that the subject of Indo-China, to which we believed the Geneva Conference had contributed a settlement, should now be not only a problem in itself but a danger to the peace of the world. There has been that complete reversal in cause and effect since the Geneva Conference of eleven years ago.

The agreement which was reached at Geneva was accepted by the United Kingdom, by Russia, by China and by nine other Governments, by 12 of the 14 Powers whose representatives met there. It was not accepted by the Government of the United States of America or the Government of Saigon. I think I can fairly summarise the decisions of the Geneva Conference in this way: first, Vietnam was recognised as a sovereign state; the military demarcation line on the Seventeenth Parallel was not to constitute a political boundary, and the establishment of a Government for a reunified Vietnam was to be permitted by a general election, under international supervision in July, 1956; that was, two years later. Secondly, there were to be no military bases in Vietnam, and no military alliances with other countries, and the prohibition of the introduction of foreign troops or war materials.

Those two principles are still to-day the principles on which the problem of Vietnam must be settled. We should take very great hope from the fact that this is now recognised by all the Governments and all the parties which are involved in the war in Vietnam. It is accepted not only by the Government of North Vietnam, by the National Liberation Front, the Viet Cong in South Vietnam: it is accepted by China; it is accepted by Russia. A further development, of great promise, is that although the Government of the United States declined to accept the principle eleven years ago, that Government also now accepts these conditions for a political settlement. President Johnson on March 25 used these words: We seek no more than a return to the essentials of the agreements of 1954, a reliable arrangement guaranteeing the independence and security of all in South-East Asia". Therefore, looking at the problem of peace in Vietnam, we can now begin with at least the hope that all the Governments and parties concerned accept the agreement that was reached at Geneva.

U Thant, the Secretary-General of the United Nations on April 15 indicated the promise that was in this fact. He used these words: There appears to be a consensus at least on the need to return to the essentials of the 1954 Geneva Agreement. President Johnson on March 25 stated his willingness, and Premier Pham Van Dong"— that is the Prime Minister of North Vietnam— indicated on April 14 that his Government would be in favour of this procedure.

U Thant said: I think this is a clue to the settlement of the Vietnam problem. It is a sad thing that U Thant, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, is not now able to contribute to peace, as we should all desire, because China has been excluded from the United Nations. If China were in the United Nations, and if the agreement at Geneva had been carried out from 1954 onwards, there would be no war in Vietnam now.

My Question, however, is directed mainly to our own Government, and I should like to emphasise that they, too, have laid down terms for a political settlement which holds out the possibility of agreement. I do not think that the words of our Foreign Secretary, Mr. Michael Stewart in another place on June 3, which were repeated at the Oxford University "teach-in", have received sufficient notice, either in this country or from the Governments involved in the conflict in Vietnam. I will read what he said: There is no reason, in common sense or in humanity, why the following sequence of events should not occur. First, a conference under whatever auspices can be agreed; a cease-fire could either precede such a conference or be achieved at the conference. Next, a settlement which would assure South Vietnam against any form of aggression. Once so assured, South Vietnam would be a country in which there were no foreign troops or bases, and which was tied to no military alliance. Her citizens would then have the opportunity to repair the ravages of war and to determine, freely and in peace, their form of Government. The future relationship between North and South Vietnam should be a matter for free decisions by the peoples of both countries."—[OFFICIAL REPORT (Commons), Vol. 713 (No. 129) col. 1967, Thursday. June 3, 1965.]

I wish those words could reach all the Governments concerned. It seems to me that that declaration of intention for a settlement would lead to a solution of that problem which would be just to the people of Vietnam and would bring the promise of peace.

Why is it, when there is all this basis of agreement, that agreement is not reached? It is held up by some obstruction on both sides, both on the American side and on the Chinese and North Vietnam side. The obstruction on the American side is, first, the insistence on the independence of South Vietnam. The President is stated to have made an offer of unconditional discussions. One has only to look at his declaration on that occasion to see that he insisted that the independence of South Vietnam must be maintained.

My Lords, in my view, this problem is, nevertheless, negotiable. Both the Government of North Vietnam and the National Liberation Front in South Vietnam have said that for a considerable period they are prepared to accept two Governments for North and South Vietnam during the period of re-settlement, during a period of reconciliation; and various terms, varying from five to twelve years, have been suggested as appropriate for that period. Our Foreign Secretary has indicated that after a period those two peoples should be allowed freely to decide their relationship. The Geneva Agreement laid down that within two years from the Agreement they should have that opportunity; it insisted that South and North Vietnam are one nation. If the American Government stands by its view that there can be no settlement unless the independence of South Vietnam is maintained, despite what President Johnson has said, it is not keeping to the essentials of the Geneva Agreement.

The second obstruction which the American Government is putting in the way of negotiations is that it is not prepared to negotiate with the National Liberation Front, which it has termed "Viet Cong". It has indicated—and I want to pay tribute to the influence which I am sure our Government have exerted in bringing it to this position—that if there were members of a delegation of the North Vietnamese Government, then they would accept them. I am quite sure, however, that the National Liberation Front will ask that their representatives shall be directly in any discussions. They now control two-thirds of the territory of South Vietnam. I doubt whether anyone with knowledge of that territory would deny that they are more representative than the series of Governments which we have had in Saigon.

Whether that is an accurate picture of South Vietnam or not, it is unrealistic to think that it is possible to have any solution of the problem in Vietnam without negotiating directly with the representatives of the National Liberation Front. There are precedents which will be in our minds. A number of Members of this House are old enough, as I am, to have been engaged in political activities at the time of the Sinn Fein revolution in Ireland. Mr. Lloyd George had to negotiate with General Collins. It is true that General Collins was not a direct representative of the Sinn Fein Move- ment, but he spoke for them; he acted for them. There would have been no solution of that problem unless Mr. Lloyd George had negotiated with one of the leaders of those who were then termed "rebels".

But there is a much closer precedent, the case of General de Gaulle and Algeria. There would have been no solution to the problem in Algeria if General de Gaulle had not agreed to negotiate with the representatives of the F.L.N. I appreciate that when I am urging this upon America I do not have to convert our own Government. I believe that it is clear now that they understand the necessity to negotiate with the National Liberation Front.

Those are the two obstacles by America to peaceful negotiation. There are also obstacles on the side of China, North Vietnam and the National Liberation Front. They are asking, first, that there shall be a complete withdrawal of the United States forces from Vietnam territory. They may ask for that on the basis of the Geneva Agreement, but again I do not think that it is immediately realistic. I believe that they have the right to ask that bombing shall cease upon North Vietnam—and here, too, I do not think that I have to urge this upon our Government. If my information is correct, the Government, as a result of discussions with the African and Caribbean representatives of the Commonwealth Mission, have themselves urged this course upon America.

I should like to see that proposal go a little further, in order to secure the psychological conditions under which a cease-fire could take place. I think that it would be reasonable to ask, as a condition of the cease-fire, that American jets and the American warships which have been firing from the coast should be withdrawn from North Vietnam territory and waters. From the point of view of military preparations it would not be a very great demand to make, but it would have a very considerable effect on the psychology and preparation towards a cease-fire. If a cease-fire could be obtained by a change of psychology through actions of that kind, one could make as an essential part of that ceasefire a condition that North Vietnam, should stop its aid to the National Liberation Front in South Vietnam. I very much hope that the British Government not only will continue to press America, as it has done, in the case of the bombing of North Vietnam, but will extend that proposal in order to prepare the conditions for a cease-fire.

The second reason why China, North Vietnam and the National Liberation Front are not prepared to enter into negotiations immediately is that they are in a strong military position and are likely to become in a stronger military position. It is the period of the monsoon in Vietnam, when the advantages will all be with guerrilla fighting. I think all of us would wish to reject the view that peace should be postponed because of military advantages of that character. But we must be fair. If North Vietnam and the National Liberation Front are now tending to resist negotiations, one must remember that it was only a few months ago when the American Government commenced its bombing of North Vietnam and equally resisted negotiations at that period. The American Government took the view then that the Vietnamese must be brought to agree to negotiations as a result of the effects of American bombing of North Vietnam.

I should like to make an appeal to China, to North Vietnam and to the National Liberation Front, as I would make an appeal to the American Government. There can be no military solution of the problem in Vietnam. The guerrillas of North Vietnam may advance during the period of the monsoon, but American prestige is at stake. America has made it clear that she will be prepared, if necessary, to continue that war for five years, pouring in her ground troops to meet the guerrillas. At the end of all that, there will be destruction, devastation and the bitterness upon which no future of Vietnam can be built. To that appeal I add this rational argument: why continue the fighting for one day if peace is now possible on the basis of the Geneva Agreement, which all the Governments and parties have accepted, and on the basis of the British proposals, which would give North Vietnam and the National Liberation Front the opportunity to reunify after a period of resettlement, which they themselves are prepared to accept?

It is necessary to refer to the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Mission of Peace. I welcomed it. It was a great imaginative idea. It has changed the whole political picture, so that we are now thinking in terms of ways of finding peace in Vietnam. But I should not be honest with myself if I did not say that I think that the Mission has been gravely prejudiced by the support which the British Government have given to the United States in the past, and by the fact that Australian troops are there, though I am glad that the Prime Minister of New Zealand has postponed the sending of troops in order to give the Mission an opportunity. I must say, quite frankly, that many of us have been disturbed to the depths by the support which the British Government have been giving to the United States throughout all this period. It has apparently been based on the view that North Vietnam has been guilty of aggression on South Vietnam.

SEVERAL NOBLE LORDS

They have.

LORD BROCKWAY

But the Geneva Agreement recognised the unity of North Vietnam and South Vietnam. It was the United States Government which, after refusing to accept that Agreement, by the presence of its military commission in South Vietnam and other acts, sabotaged over the years the hope of the union of North and South Vietnam. Furthermore, the Government of Saigon has not a shred of representative or democratic authority. It changes nearly every month. It is a Government of intriguing generals, a Government of their hangers-on, a Government of rich barons of the land who have grown wealthy by the exploitation of the peasants of Vietnam, a Government which has never been elected, a Government which is changed overnight by palace intrigues. How can you possibly say that the aggression is being committed against another Government which we should recognise when no one who knows South Vietnam doubts now that the National Liberation Front has far greater support among the people than this little clique which jumps into office in Saigon?

Having said that—and I should not have been true to my own conscience if I had not said it; and it is not just I who feel these things, for the Government know how deep and wide the feeling is throughout the whole of our Labour movement—I want to welcome the Prime Minister's statement that the Commonwealth Peace Mission will be unaligned and that, as Chairman, he would act in that unaligned capacity. The newspapers this afternoon take a pessimistic view regarding the future of the Mission. I do not think that it should be written off. There are already illustrations of its success in influencing the American Government. The phrase "urging military restraint" undoubtedly means that bombing of North Vietnam should cease. The phrase "discussion with all parties" indicates that our Government are in favour of negotiations with the National Liberation Front.

I should just like to ask the Minister whether he could give us the latest information regarding the attitude of North Vietnam, the National Liberation Front and Russia. I do not take the view, whatever they may be saying at the moment, that as time passes it may not be possible to get their readiness to consult with the Commonwealth Mission. I want to make four suggestions which perhaps would help towards that. I should like to see the British Government demonstrating their desire to act as an impartial mediator by the withdrawal of the British police who have been placed at the disposal of the Saigon Government. I should also like to see the British Government end the training of Saigon troops by British officers in Malaya.

Thirdly, I should like to suggest that as the Commonwealth Mission begins its work it should use its members in those countries, and with those Governments, where they would be most influential. Mr. Harold Wilson would obviously be of influence with America. Dr. Eric Williams, the Prime Minister of a Caribbean country, would also be of influence with America. Dr. Nkrumah and the Prime Minister of Nigeria would be of influence with North Vietnam and with China and with the National Liberation Front. I appreciate that they are one Mission and that they must act together, but I quite seriously make the suggestion that in the initial stages members of that Mission should approach those Governments who are most likely to respond to their appeal. The fourth suggestion I want to make is this. Why does our Government not recognise the Government in North Vietnam? We recognise these utterly unrepresentative Governments which jump up and down in Saigon. The Government in North Vietnam is a de factoGovernment of stability, and to give some recognition to it would greatly help us in an approach.

I apologise to the House for raising a further point, hut this subject is serious and I just want to end by asking our Government to give support to other approaches to peace which may be made. Owing to the lamentable events in Algiers, the Afro-Asian Conference has been postponed until November. China, North Vietnam and the National Liberation Front would have been represented there, and it would have been a great opportunity for the non-aligned nations to negotiate with them. It will be meeting on November 5, but I hope that steps towards peace by the non-aligned Governments will not be postponed until that date. Indeed, I think one can say positively that they will be taking place, and I hope our Government will give them support.

The other possibility of peace is one which I believe will in the next few weeks, and certainly in the next few months, become more and more important. I am increasingly doubtful whether America, with all its military power, will be able to maintain in Saigon the unrepresentative Governments which are being selected and rejected almost week by week. Dr. Quoit, who was the last Prime Minister of the Government of Saigon, was dismissed because he was in favour of negotiations for peace with the National Liberation Front; he wanted to go to the Afro-Asian Conference. As soon as those views were known, Dr. Quoit was out of the Government. There will be other Dr. Quoits. He may return. We shall find before long in South Vietnam that America will be unable to maintain those entirely artificial Governments which we recognise and which now speak for South Vietnam, but which have no representative authority at all. In the end it may well be the Vietnamese people themselves who will make peace in Vietnam, and that may be the best peace. I hope that as then situations develop our Government will be prepared to take action independent of America.

We are at the crossroads. We are reaching the decisive point. Either there is to be peace and a settlement in Vietnam, or America will proceed with the intensification not only of its bombing, not only of its modern weapons and its napalm, but with the extension of its ground forces—70,000 now, 90,000 by August, mounting and mounting and mounting. As that situation develops, does anyone in this House believe that we are going to avoid world war as a result?

SEVERAL NOBLE LORDS

Yes.

LORD BROCKWAY

I do not think those who say "Yes" have a real reading of the situation. I think, inevitably, that if that situation develops China will become involved and Russia will become involved. I shall not put it higher than this: there will be very great danger of war, and my appeal to the Government is to follow up the initiative they have taken, by devoting every influence and every activity towards a solution of the Vietnam problem, not only for the Vietnamese but for the peace of the world.

8.57 p.m.

THE EARL OF DUNDEE

My Lords, many of your Lordships have known the noble Lord, Lord Brockway, for as long as forty or even forty-five years in another place and here. We have always respected and liked the noble Lord as a man of great kindness and good will, and we all realise that his desire for peace is both deep and sincere. I was so glad that the noble Lord in the speech which he has just made quoted part of the most admirable address by the Foreign Secretary, Mr. Stewart, at Oxford a week or two ago, in which Mr. Stewart rightly said that there was no reason in common sense why the 1954 Geneva Agreement should not be carried out, and why peace should not be immediately restored and established to-morrow.

If the noble Lord had gone on to quote some more of the speech of Mr. Stewart, which I wish he had done, he would have been able to show your Lordships, as the Foreign Secretary said, that there is one reason—not a reason of common sense but, unfortunately, an active reason—why this thing cannot happen which we all desire to happen; and that is the inexorable determination of Chinese and Asiatic Communism, by ruthless aggression and terrorism, to conquer and destroy liberty not only in South Vietnam but in the whole of South-East Asia. That is the problem which we, and I hope the Government, should be considering in relation to this matter. The noble Lord is fully entitled to express his opinions. I am also entitled to express mine; and the great respect which I have for him personally I cannot equally extend to that body of opinion in this country with some of whose views, although I hope not with all, the noble Lord sometimes appears to agree—if, indeed, the phrase "body of opinion" can be applied to such an amorphous, flabby, moist mess of gullibility.

We have been accustomed to it for so long in this country now—thirty or forty years: the processions of long-haired, cocksure, ignorant silliness; the odd, the curiously odd, psychosis which runs through quite a number of people's minds that any kind of atrocity, of aggression, of terrorism, provided it is committed by a Communist or at least a very Left-wing Government abroad, a long way from us, has always got some good high moral foundation, and that we are wrong and failing in understanding if we oppose and condemn it. We are accustomed by now to reconcile ourselves to thinking that this psychosis can exist in an educated democracy; and I hope, my Lords, that the angels, who are wiser than we are. think so too. But it makes me think of the proud man in Measure for Measure: Most ignorant of what he's most assured, His glassy essence like an angry ape, Plays such fantastic tricks before high heaven As make the angels weep. Who with our spleens, would all themselves laugh mortal". As for the academic flapdoodle now going on here and in the United States, it makes us see, I think, that in some academic circles an egghead and a bonehead are very much the same thing—stubborn, perverse, purblind. How gullible; and how easily and constantly they are taken advantage of and used by the Communist propaganda machine, which is so ready to take advantage of that kind of gullibility all over the world, and with such very good effect and with so much encouragement and comfort to those who are perpetrating acts of aggression in so many parts of the world ! As one American newspaper put it: Professors ought to be leading their students in the paths of truth instead of through the back-alleys of propaganda.", which is exactly what they are doing.

The noble Lord, Lord Brockway, referred with some approval to the Prime Minister's recent attempt to get a Commonwealth delegation accepted as mediators in this affair. We know, of course, that there are some people who thought that this move on the part of the Prime Minister may have been tactically misconceived; that it ought to have been more carefully prepared and thought out beforehand; and that perhaps more use should have been made of the existing machinery surviving from Geneva. But, my Lords, I am not going to pursue that. The only thing I want to say about this move made a week ago by the Prime Minister is this: that the very next day it was immediately and cordially accepted by the United States Administration and by the Government of Saigon. It was contemptuously, rudely, rejected by all the Communist Governments and authorities concerned.

My Lords, we will never give up hope, but I am afraid that this confirms the bitter lesson which some people will never learn but which most of us have been compelled to learn over the last thirty or forty years: that this type of totalitarian aggressor, particularly the Communist aggressor, will negotiate if a condition of negotiation is the complete surrender of his antagonists and the delivery to him of the victims, whom he can get more cheaply by surrender than by conquest, but that he will negotiate only if and when he finds that he is not going to win by aggression. That has been the lesson, surely, that all men who have got realistic minds have learnt by now—and that is the truth about what is happening now in Vietnam. If the Americans were to agree to withdraw their military support—and that is what is implied, I must tell the noble Lord, Lord Brockway, in the suggestions which he has made—as a pre-condition of negotiations, that would immediately mean the triumph of aggression, the conquest of South Vietnam, and would be followed by similar aggression and, if not resisted by other help, similar conquest in every other free country in South-East Asia. My Lords, that is not the way to peace: it is the way to ensure that there will be no peace, either in South-East Asia or, perhaps, in the rest of the world, for the remainder of our time.

9.7 p.m.

LORD GLADWYN

My Lords, I am sure you will all agree that, on Vietnam, we must all try to be as objective as possible; and this is remarkably difficult when passions are roused by such a war as has now been let loose. But we should make the effort. Sometimes I think that we in this country seem to be divided by emotion rather than by reason. What are the two schools of thought which now, unhappily, seem to divide us? On the one hand, there is the feeling, which is obviously shared by the noble Earl, Lord Dundee but not by the noble Lord, Lord Brockway, that, whatever their mistakes may have been in the past—and there have no doubt been many; I myself think it was probably a mistake (and here I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Brockway) not to have accepted the agreement of 1954—if the Americans are forced to evacuate South Vietnam in anything like humiliating circumstances, some kind of Communism (call it that, if you like) will take over not only the whole of Vietnam but also the neighbouring countries.

That is a fear which is generally shared. It is sometimes associated with the idea that such a Communist movement will be directly controlled by China and therefore it will, in fact, be China who will take over the whole of South-East Asia in the circumstances contemplated, and no doubt would make some kind of special arrangement with Japan as well. In other words, Japan would then move out of the orbit of America and into the orbit of China. It cannot be denied that this is a possibility.

It is true that the Chinese are, generally speaking, unpopular in South-East Asia; but it must be admitted also that they have important and rich colonies in most of the countries concerned and particularly in Malaysia which, incidentally, can hardly be successfully defended in the circumstances we are contemplating—and all Parties think that Malaysia should be defended. They have these important colonies in Malaysia and elsewhere; and there is no reason why the Peking Government should not be regarded as a kind of "Big Brother" by any Left-wing Government that might come into power in any of these countries, as they probably would after a short delay. At the very least, nobody could put his hand on his heart and say that all this was not a possibility if a Communist Government representing the whole of Vietnam were firmly established in Saigon. Realistically considered, it is very probable.

There are those who see such a development as this to be the logic of history. They consider that the West would eventually be able to come to term with Communist regimes in South-East Asia in the same way as we have come to terms with the Communist Government in Yugoslavia. That is the optimistic view. Indeed, it may happen in the long run. But I suggest that it is an illusion to think that the West could get on easily, if at all, with the kind of Government or régimes that would come into power, in Siam, Malaysia and Indonesia, if the Americans now withdrew unconditionally from South Vietnam. Such régimes, in the nature of things, would be likely to be violently anti-Western in tendency and would leave Japan sided with a South-East Asia that had fallen under Chinese influence. The effect on India, too, could well be disastrous. We might well be on the way to some kind of general racial conflict which could tear the whole world apart. It is a solemn thought.

With all respect to the noble Lord, Lord Brockway, there surely would not be, in the long run, a tendency to encourage peace. It would be very much the reverse. So one thing must be prevented—and here this I think most of us could agree—and that is that America should withdraw from South Vietnam in anything approaching humiliating circumstances. If they are to withdraw, as one day they will withdraw, it can, therefore, be only as a result of some negotiation—and we should all agree on that—which would provide for the neutralisation of the whole new united Vietnam, whose Government would then be established by free elections, perhaps internationally supervised, or perhaps—and this is a new thought, but I throw it in—after some kind of plebiscite in South Vietnam, also internationally controlled and supervised, after the removal of the present Viet Cong reign of terror in the villages, to decide on whether the country wishes to join up with the North or would prefer to remain a separate entity in the South.

All this may seem unlikely now. I dare say it is. But the war now raging in Vietnam, which is, perhaps, no more and no less horrible than civil wars in history always have been, is also a trial of strength between the United States and China. In this trial of strength we should in no way underestimate the essential weakness not only of the South, which is obvious, but also of the North Vietnam position, for the following reasons.

Cut off from the South, which usually supplies a great deal of their food, the North Vietnamese are suffering from a severe food shortage. This is increased by the usual Communist inability to increase agricultural production, at all events sufficiently to catch up with the frightful increase in the population, which is advancing, perhaps, at the rate of 3.4 per cent. per annum.

The North Vietnamese industry is small and inefficient and hampered by a lack of raw material and the inability of the Chinese to supply the necessary technical aid. The break with the Russians has in this respect been pretty disastrous from the point of view of the North Vietnamese. As we all know, faced with the choice of either signing or not signing the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, Ho Chi-minh, the ruler of North Vietnam, after long hesitation, eventually took the Chinese point of view, and all aid from the Soviet Union and the Soviet satellites was promptly discontinued.

On top of all that, it seems that pilfering, sabotage and black market operations prevail. I got this information from a book published recently by a man who has been recently in North Vietnam and talked with people and should know what he is talking about. The bulk of the people, he says, seemed to be in a state of sullen despair and would be quite prepared to revolt against their Communist masters, were it not that they believe that if they did the Chinese would simply walk in and the West would do nothing about it, as happened in the case of Hungary.

In these circumstances a victory, and a fairly early victory, in South Vietnam is almost essential for the survival of the North Vietnam régime. Apart from anything else, it would give the necessary food and outlet for their surplus population, and they would also have a great, though perhaps rather undeserved, Nationalist triumph. No one denies that many of the North Vietnamese guerrilla leaders who have been sent to South Vietnam are brave and devoted men. Of course they are. Equally, nobody would deny that the Viet Cong has imposed itself on the population of South Vietnam in the villages by sheer terror.

I think there is no doubt that once this r égime of terror is broken, if it can be broken, the South Vietnamese would probably settle down happily, whatever the exact nature of their Government, even if there were no strong Government in Saigon. Hence, though the position in South Vietnam may be quite lamentable politically, the position in North Vietnam is probably little stronger. Revisionism in Hanoi is now a positive force. If it is the Chinese rather than the Americans who in the popular imagination may become paper tigers, this kind of revisionism may quite likely get the upper hand. That is why the whole present trial of strength is absolutely crucial.

The object of American bombing of bridges, arms dumps and, I believe, certain isolated factories, and so on, is obviously to increase this weakness, this weak tendency in North Vietnam, if it is humanly possible, and thus produce a situation in which the unpopular North Vietnamese régime may practically cease to operate. That is their declared intention and they may be able to do it. This may, or may not, be a desirable policy. It may be criticised for various reasons, but at least from the point of view of the struggle for power it is entirely comprehensible. I think it is difficult to see how it can be criticised, except, of course, by those who think the Americans, on moral or on general grounds, ought to clear out in order to allow what is often regarded in this country—perhaps even the noble Lord, Lord Brockway, regards it so—as "the wave of the future".

I seem to remember that we heard much the same argument during the horrible civil war which raged twenty years ago in Greece. I remember distinctly that Mr. Churchill was urged by many of those who even now are violently attacking American policy in South Vietnam to consent to the triumph in Athens of what even then were described as the "popular emergent forces".

It remains to consider how this lamentable situation, because of course everyone agrees that it is lamentable, is likely to work out and what are the dangers of its spreading into wider or even into a global war. Here there is no need to be pessimistic. The position is that whatever noises they may make off-stage and in public, the Russians have now very largely disengaged themselves from Vietnam, and if the forward policy of the Chinese, which is the basic reason for the recent rift between China and the Soviet Union, is changed or is indeed reversed, no one would be happier than the Russians to be able to say with justice to Mao Tse-tung, "I told you so".

As for China itself, and here again I am trying to be entirely objective, it is arguable that the recent Chinese success in exploding a nuclear device or two may make them think far harder than they have before about the desirability of any physical invasion of North Vietnam. Pouring Chinese Armies through the passes into the North would be unlikely to achieve anything except further ruination of the North Vietnamese economy. Such a Chinese invasion would not necessarily stop the bombing of industrial and strategic targets in North Vietnam, and if the Chinese forces themselves come into contact with the American troops on the Seventeenth Parallel a situation would be produced in which it would be highly unlikely that the Chinese, with their long military communications extending right down the peninsula and subject to intensive American air attack, would he victorious. The Chinese are perfectly reasonable people and no doubt this has already occurred to them. More than that, if there was a state of war existing between the United States and China, it is at least possible that the Chinese might fear an American attack on their great nuclear establishments and atomic diffusion plant at Lan Chow and therefore the end of Chinese nuclear hopes, at any rate for a great number of years.

All this suggests to my mind that the Americans probably still have a number of cards in their hands, though in order to play them they would need to have the will, if necessary, to send a much larger army to South Vietnam, even during an interim period, and if the worst happens, virtually to take over the administration of this unfortunate country. Additionally or alternatively, they must discover, if they can, some Vietnamese with administrative talent and give him a free hand, even if this may be taking a very considerable risk. Whether they will do all this remains to be seen. Whether they have the will is quite open to doubt. It would be highly unpopular in America, but of course it cannot be ruled out.

What is probably now wanted, as Senator Fulbright says in a recent article, is a holding operation and a determination to seek negotiations again after the situation has been held for a definite period. The chances of this whole deplorable conflict "escalating" (as the appalling modern jargon has it) are not great and certainly not so great as sometimes represented. Yet, if some peaceful solution for the war in South Vietnam is nevertheless to be found, some negotiations with the adversary, which I think must be defined as the North Vietnamese Government and their agents in South Vietnam, including the leaders of the Viet Cong, must come about by some means or another. Whether the Americans should actually negotiate with the so-called National Liberation Front is open to doubt. It is very difficult to disentangle the National Liberation Front, so-called, from the considerable number of agents who have come in from the North. They are all Vietnamese and members of the Vietnam Communist Party—that is what it comes down to. If they are to negotiate with the North Vietnamese, they will be negotiating with the Vietnam Communist Party, which is a solid body able to make itself felt in negotiations. I think that it is a false distinction to say that they must also negotiate with the National Liberation Front as such.

Negotiations would, of course, come about only if there was first of all some agreed truce in South Vietnam, coupled necessarily with the cessation of American bombing in the North plus agreement on the introduction, it is hoped under the auspices of the United Nations, of impartial agents into all the provinces and villages of South Vietnam, who would arrange evacuation—this is essential—to the North of all non-South Vietnamese armed elements and the subsequent organisation of some kind of plebiscite or elections. On all these points the Leader of the Liberal Party in another place is going to table an Early Day Motion, which I trust will give rise to a profitable debate. Until this situation comes about—and, with the best will in the world, I can hardly see it come about just yet—it is not evident how the war can be ended except as the result of some total American defeat or surrender. That, as I have already tried to establish, would, I think, be disastrous, not only for South-East Asia as a whole, but also in years to come for all those people in Western Europe who wish to have good relations with South-East Asia as a whole.

So it remains to consider how we in this country could help to produce such a situation. I should have thought that we might at least have said—possibly, for all I know, we have already done so—that, in our view, an internationally inspected plebiscite to gauge the feelings of the South Vietnamese, pending free elections in the whole of Vietnam, might well be the declared object of American policy, once a truce had been declared and once the invaders of South Vietnam—and, of course, they are invaders—have retired north of the Seventeenth Parallel.

Further than that, I doubt if we can profitably go at the present time. It seems to me to be little use for us to send missions round the world consisting of at least some persons who greatly prefer the Chinese to the American thesis. In any case, it is fairly obvious that neither North Vietnam nor China—or, for that matter, Russia—is at present in a mood to think about negotiating at all. Should Mr. Wilson or his colleagues get to Peking, or even to Hanoi, there would then be hope, I think, because that would show Ho Chi Minh that the present game was up and that the only thing left for him was to negotiate his way out of the present mess, in spite of the well-known views of China.

It is possible (here I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Brockway) that the political situation in South Vietnam is becoming so bad that some local government might on its own attempt to negotiate directly with the North Vietnamese, over the heads of the Americans. But if this happened, and if the negotiations were successful, it could be only on the assumption, I fear, that the North Vietnamese objectives have already been practically attained and that the American position was impossible. Unless, therefore, we take the view that the North Vietnamese are morally right, and that the Viet Cong are simple nationalists with but one idea, that of liberating their country and nothing else, we have no option but to support the Americans in their struggle in a general way, but always emphasising that they should make it clear that, whatever the consequences, a free plebiscite will be held in South Vietnam, at any rate as soon as the necessary conditions are present in which it might conceivably be organised.

In saying all this, I assume—and I hope that it is a correct assumption—that the bombing of North Vietnam will be limited to economic and strategic objectives, designed to weaken the general position of the North Vietnamese Government, and will never include the bombing of populated places. I think, also, that the Americans might do well to offer to stop the bombing for a period, as they have before, pending the possible achievement of negotiations. If it is not clear at present that it is not their intention to bomb large towns or populated places, then I think it should be made clear; and our advice to the Americans should be to that effect. Any advice that we give to the Americans should surely include the desirability of their stating that, whatever happens, they will not go further than they have done already in the way of bombing in the North, and notably that they will not enlarge the scope of such bombing by making what could only then be represented, I think, as the equivalent of terrorist attacks on towns. Such a policy, I think we shall all agree, would be self-defeating.

My Lords, that is all I have to say. Beyond giving this general advice which I have suggested, I do not see what we in this country can profitably do. The situation is one which we can in no way control. We wish that this horrible war should stop. We should do everything we can to see that it at least ends without a victory for a cause which is, after all, hostile to all that we stand for. But we should not despair if this cannot immediately be achieved; and we must be reconciled, I am afraid, to the fact that the struggle will probably be a long one but will eventually, with luck, end in a draw, which will enable a stable peace to be negotiated, not only in South Vietnam but also in the whole of South-East Asia.

9.31 p.m.

LORD MILFORD

My Lords, it was with great pleasure that I listened to the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Brockway—such a statesmanlike speech, a speech based on a tremendous desire for peace. If we had more people in the Government who based themselves firmly on peace above all else, the world would be a very different place to-day. I should like to say about the noble Earl, Lord Dundee, exactly the opposite. I am very grateful that he and his Party are not in power, because if the remarks that he put forward were the policy of the British Government I think that by now we should be in a world nuclear war.

THE EARL OF DUNDEE

My Lords, does not the noble Lord think that the world might be a better place if there were a few Communists who tried to talk peace?

LORD MILFORD

The last time we debated Vietnam in this House Lord Carrington, speaking for the Opposition, exhorted us to say nothing to upset the Americans, and asked us to support what they were doing in Vietnam. Mr. Stewart, the Foreign Secretary, has also asked us not to say anything in haste to impair our friendship. It is a terrible blow to our political honesty to-day if we cannot criticise an Ally when we believe them to be in the wrong.

Moreover, I am afraid that by "America" some people are thinking only of the White House and the Pentagon. But America is not just the President and the militarists, or the armament industry: it covers also millions of ordinary, decent men and women who want peace and friendship, and want the world to respect them for their peaceful achievements. According to the Gallup Poll, the majority of the population in America are against the bombing of North Vietnam; are horrified at what their Government is doing in their name. Leading this demand for peace, reason and justice, are the youth, the students; and that is very largely true in this country to-day. I think that the noble Earl, Lord Dundee, was patronising when he labelled all those people who came to London from all over the British Isles to-day to show their horror at what is being perpetrated in Vietnam as just an amorphous mass.

THE EARL OF DUNDEE

I said "mess", not "mass".

LORD MILFORD

The great hope of humanity for to-day and the future is in these boys and girls.

There comes a time when one has to speak frankly from one's conscience and disregard the opportunism of personal or Chauvinistic considerations, and judge a situation by the way it affects humanity, families, women, children and homes. To-day is such a time. What man is doing to man is so horrifying, and the danger of a total catastrophe to the whole human race is now so acute, that expediency about the pound, the need for loans—if such opportunist reasons could dictate policy and blind our judgments—stands for nothing. An uprising against a totally corrupt Government imposed from without has developed into a full-scale war, with open outside participation by one of the most powerful military forces in the history of mankind. Thousands of helpless, hard-working peasant families are being blasted with napalm, "lazy dog" and every conceivable modern horror weapon short of, as yet, nuclear bombs. How long have we to wait for that, as the war escalates?

Why, and for what, is all this happening? Since the Prime Minister and his Foreign Secretary have again and again categorically stated that the Government unreservedly support the policy of Ameri- can interference with all these horror weapons they must answer "Why?" clearly, and back it with a really convincing moral argument, and to date I do not think they have. There is a big revolt up and down the country, and in Parliament itself, against the present policy of condoning this ghastly war, and the people want to know "Why?"

Mr. Stewart went to the Oxford "teach-in", but he did not answer straightforwardly. He twisted and evaded, as much of our Press remarked the next day. Openly the American Government calls it a war against Communist aggression, to prevent the spread of Communism; but the New York Herald Tribunesays it is not a war of the Communist North Vietnam against South Vietnam, but an American war against an Asiatic nation fighting for liberation. If our policy is to follow the Pentagon whatever they may do, is it also British policy to say that any movement of a backward country anywhere in the world to get rid of colonialism, feudalism, to overthrow a completely unwanted, corrupt Government, to get rid of foreign domination, comes under the heading of "Communist aggression" and must be blasted out of existence by every modern powerful weapon?

We have recently seen the British Government acquiescing in a similar situation in the Caribbean, where again people rose to get rid of the corrupt, undemocratic government. My Lords, for two hundred years the people of Indo-China have been struggling to throw off foreign oppression which has bled their country—one of the richest in the world in minerals—to the status of one of the poorest.

I should like to put the question squarely to the Minister who is going to reply to this debate. Is it the policy of the British Government, for one reason or another, to tag along behind the American Government and the Pentagon policy of confronting the liberation movement with a modern, powerful, armed force in the name of combating Communist threats and Communist aggression? If it is, I am sure it will not pay off. In the end the whole of humanity will rise against it and it will end in disaster, and Britain's name will be smeared with hatred.

Why is our Government so eager to acquiesce in the undoing of all that Britain succeeded in achieving by getting the Geneva Agreement through in 1954? As the noble Lord, Lord Brockway, said, that Agreement laid it down that the foreign troops must be out of the whole of Vietnam and all bases dismantled, and the temporary division of Vietnam into North and South should last for only two years, after which there should be a general election to unite and I repeat, to unite—the whole country under one Government—that was paragraph 7 of the Geneva Agreement. We in Britain guaranteed this Agreement. Is our guarantee worthless? Do we tear it up? Why do we not stand by it to-day? Why should the Foreign Secretary distort and speak in half truths, and allow them to be repeated again and again on radio and television? For instance, why did he quote only the International Control Commission's Report as accusing the North of breaking the Geneva Agreement, when in fact that Commission accused the South and America as well? Why did he say that the trouble started in 1959 when the North decided to intervene, when in fact the rebellion started in 1957 after an election had been refused and a bloody repression started by Diem's Government—Diem who was imposed on them by the Americans; Diem the collaborator with the Japanese?

On the question of the general election which never took place, our Foreign Secretary dismissed it in his Oxford speech by saying that the country "was not settled enough to hold one". It is well known that Dulles refused to sign the Geneva Agreement, making it clear that he could not accept the right of the people of Vietnam to choose to unify by free elections because in that case the Communists would win. President Eisenhower said in his Mandate for Change, The White House Years, at page 372: I have never talked or corresponded with a person knowledgeable in Indo-Chinese affairs who did not agree that had an election been held as of the time of fighting possibly 80 per cent. of the population would have voted for the Communist Ho Chi Minh. On April 21, 1956, the United Press News Agency quoted Diem's Minister of Information as saying at a conference: General elections will not take place. We have triumphed. On December 17, 1954, the year of the Agreement, Stassen, the President of the Commission for Aid to Foreign Countries said: It is unlikely that there will be free general elections in Vietnam. Mr. Stewart's performance in evading all this does not give confidence to anyone who likes to study foreign policy. If the people had voted, why would the majority have voted for the Communists? Because the Communists were creating in practice a real land reform, building schools and hospitals, while 90 per cent. of the money America was pouring into the South was being spent for arms and paying the colossal army.

What are the prospects of a united independent Vietnam, North and South united, as called for by the Geneva Agreement? Paragraph 12 of the Geneva Agreement says: To respect the sovereignty, the independence, the unity and the territorial integrity of Vietnam and to refrain from any interference in its internal affairs. And Britain, under Sir Anthony Eden (as he was then), was the chief architect of this Agreement. Can the Minister, in his reply, tell us whether it is now British policy to build a divided Vietnam? For President Johnson has recently said, concerning his unconditional discussions: We will finally settle for no less than an independent South Vietnam. Does our appeasement policy, or our hatred of the struggle of backward countries to throw off colonialism lead us to following the White House on this point, too? What a glorious picture we are already getting of this new sixth democratic free Government of South Vietnam in whose interest we are aligned with the Pentagon and the White House, and for which some Commonwealth countries are sending troops actually to fight, shoot, and kill Vietnamese people—I think Australia is already doing so. A hundred Pressmen walked out in disgust at this Government's first Press conference—a Government which has no basis whatever except American bombs and American troops.

Meanwhile, what does the South Vietnam National Liberation Front—nicknamed "Viet Cong" by the Americans, to make it sound more sinister—consist of? Lord Gladwyn referred to it as "this so-called National Liberation Front". It comprises a broad alliance of parties and organisations which came together in 1960 to lead and co-ordinate the opposition to the Diem dictatorship. At its first Congress delegates were present from the Radical Socialist Party, the South Vietnam Democratic Party, the Vietnamese Revolutionary Party, the Students' and Pupils' Union for Liberation, The Women's Union for Liberation, the Labour Union for Liberation, the Peasants' Union for Liberation, the Youth Union for Liberation, and many more other such bodies, including the Writers' and Artists' Association. Who are we to sneer at this National Liberation Front and call it the "so-called" this that and the other?

Among the members of its executive committee are lawyers, teachers, chief Buddhists and other religious sects, and many professional men. In their programme is "No participation in any militarybloc". These people have liberated 80 per cent. of the territory, yet the Americans refuse to negotiate with them. In fact, they can be likened to the Resistance Movement against the Nazi occupation of France in World War II. And it is a little ironic that the only other major Power that supports the White House and us in our policy is Western Germany.

Now, because of the terrific pressure of the British people (this amorphous mass, according to Lord Dundee) and the anger of at least a hundred Labour M.P.s, the Prime Minister has produced the Commonwealth Mission. He has had to convince the British people that at last the Government are making an effort for peace. He has also had to placate strong pressure from the Commonwealth Prime Ministers. But he has done nothing to show that he has altered his complete subservience to the White House. And Mr. Stewart still unequivocally supports all its policies and actions. He has denied nothing. So how can the suggested Commonwealth Mission, led by Mr. Wilson, be welcomed by the Liberation Movement in the South, or, for that matter, by their friends in the North, of whom the bombing with napalm Messrs. Wilson and Stewart condone?

In the present dangerous situation any step in the search for peace is extremely welcome. But is the proposed Mission, as it now stands, going to achieve it? I am afraid that I do not think so. Ho Chi Minh said in an interview on June 26 that Mr. Wilson cannot engage in peace negotiations since he has himself supported the American policy of aggression and expansion of the Vietnamese war. He said that: Mr. Wilson has not correctly carried out his obligations as co-Chairman of the 1954 Geneva Conference on Vietnam. The Russians have also answered that they cannot discuss with the proposed Wilson Mission, since no one has given them any right to negotiate. This puts the Vietnam position in its proper perspective. The British Government's propaganda tries to make the situation a struggle between two power blocsand their satellites, with the Vietnamese as stooges of one side or the other. The struggle should be settled by the Vietnamese themselves. Everybody else should get out.

SEVERAL NOBLE LORDS

Oh!

LORD MILFORD

Well, it is their country. They want to unify, and should settle the matter themselves.

Britain itself has a direct responsibility for the war in Vietnam, and so to bring it to an end. But before she can hold her head up as a determined peacemaker and regain the trust of Asians, Africans and South Americans, she must denounce American bombing, must demand that it be stopped, along with all further escalation of the war, and that the National Liberation Front must be invited to go to any peace talks. Peace can be established only by the withdrawal of the American troops from South Vietnam. Let the Vietnamese determine their own future, without the presence of any foreign armies on their soil, which was one of the central points of the Geneva Agreement.

I hope that as at present the peace talks are in abeyance the Minister will not ask who now is responsible for the continuation of the shooting, as I think he did in Southampton, for the answer is still squarely: the Americans. To have expected a Mission based on American policy and approval to be accepted is naïve, and no politician could possibly accept his assumption if he still stands by it. "Back to the full implementation of the Geneva Agreement" should be the starting point of any attempt to reach a peaceful settlement.

I hope Mr. Wilson will take another look behind him to-day and realise that that is what the British people want him to do. The elected Members of Parliament are clearly being shown that this is the will of the vast majority of the people in Britain, by the lobby which has been going on. Coaches from every industrial centre are bringing delegates from trade councils, shop stewards; cars are coming with professional people, women's organisation, church organisations, peace organisations and a vast representation of the youth of this country. They are fed up with the degrading of Britain's foreign policy, and its subservience to America's militarists—and I say militarists, not the American people.

I am very proud indeed to be associated in any way with Lord Brockway's tremendous initiative in organising and assembling this public voice of protest. For it is a voice of sanity. Before it is too late, let our Labour Government link up with all those in America who voted for President Johnson against the threat of a Goldwater foreign policy, but who, to their dismay, now find themselves smeared by that very policy. Apart from humane reasons and dictates of justice, any thinking person must realise the acute danger of the present situation. The American Air Force is now bombing close to the Chinese frontier. Where will the mad Pentagon and Chinese lobby stop? The appalling danger of a nuclear war is getting very near indeed. By supporting those who are promoting this danger, and who have no moral right on their side to do so, Mr. Stewart and our Prime Minister are betraying the security of all of us in this country, risking the lives of our children and our grandchildren.

I urge our Government to reverse their policy, which is the continuation of that of the Tories. Demand the return to the full implementation of the Geneva Agreement; stop supporting, and instead condemn, American interference in a Vietnamese civil war, and demand that America withdraws her troops from South Vietnam. Let the Vietnamese choose any Government they want, by democratic elections supervised by Britain or anybody else. Then Britain will really contribute towards the peace of the world and, I believe, gain high moral standing among all the nations and save mankind from, perhaps, the acute danger of world nuclear war.

9.56 p.m.

BARONESS GAITSKELL

My Lords, I was most interested in the speech of my noble friend Lord Brockway. In the first part of it he gave me much with which to agree, and then he took it all back again at the end. As for the noble Lord, Lord Milford, I want to mention only one point: his insistence that youth is always right. Young people are sometimes right, but they are certainly not al-way right politically, and I should like to remind him of the Hitler Youth, that organisation which was in the forefront of the last war.

LORD MILFORD

May I interrupt?

BARONESS GAITSKELL

No, I shall not give way. The noble Lord has spoken long enough. I want to get back to the wording of Lord Brockway's Question. He said that he wanted to know what action Her Majesty's Government were going to take, particularly to initiate negotiations. The conflict in Vietnam has been going on for some time and Her Majesty's Government have been very concerned about it. There are always some people who use the word "initiate" as if it had a magic quality; as if by speaking the words "to initiate negotiations" this carried with it a solution to a problem and a guarantee of its success. Anyone with experience of foreign affairs—and my noble friend Lord Brockway, who I am sorry to say is not here, has had a great experience of foreign affairs—knows that where there is a military struggle the situation is not usually resolved by a conjurer's act accompanied by magic words. It is achieved by years of patient negotiation.

There are many examples of this, but the partial Test Ban Treaty is one of the best. We became very familiar during those negotiations with the Russian word for, "No". That is not to say that no one ever tries a fresh and original approach, such as we have now from the Prime Minister in the Commonwealth Peace Mission, to which point I shall return later. Implicit in Lord Brock-way's Question is the idea that Her Majesty's Government have been dilatory about trying to get the Governments engaged in the conflict to negotiate. So, first, we should ask ourselves what exactly the British Government have the power to do in present circumstances.

Britain has never had the power to impose any policy on Vietnam, but this is not to say that we have not continued to urge all those concerned in the struggle to stop the fighting and to start negotiating. The Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary tried to persuade Mr. Gromyko to use his influence in March, but with no success. He refused again when approached as co-Chairman of the Geneva Conference. The Foreign Secretary then approached the other Governments who had taken part in the Geneva Conference. Few of them replied and the Chinese answer was an adamant, "No".

After that came Mr. Gordon Walker's fact-finding tour of the area. The Chinese and the North Vietnamese boycotted him—no credit to any Power which seeks peace urgently. But, my Lords, I see from a piece in the Press last night that, with the knowledge that Mr. Gordon Walker acquired on this tour, he has been able to state bluntly in America recently why the Americans should negotiate with the Viet Cong. I myself felt that it was rather sad that, after a short cessation of hostilities, and after President Johnson had gone so far as to announce that the United States Government were ready for unconditional discussions, he did not go just one step further and say that he was ready to include the Viet Cong. But I hear no criticism from anti-Americans like Lord Milford by way of blame on the Viet Cong for not grasping this initiative and starting bargaining with the Americans.

A concession made by one side can easily be widened when the other side accepts it prior to talking. But the Chinese have at every stage said, "No". In fact, the Communist Powers have all along refused to negotiate; and they have given the "brush-off" to France, to the Secretary General of the U.N. and to many uncommitted countries. Is it not better, when the phrase "unconditional discussions" is used, to take it at its face value, instead of branding it as—and I quote A worn-out trick of deceit, and a threat"? After such a reception, how can we even counsel our friends to surrender, as some people urge?

These same people advise us to proclaim our differences, our anxieties, and to speak up when we have doubts. They say that the Americans were forthright when they disagreed with us over Suez. But we cannot compare Suez with Vietnam. What is not universally realised is that the Americans were invited into South Vietnam to help them. Whatever our views about the Government there and the Government in the North, this is a fact that we should remember. We do not have the same view as the Americans over Chinese entry into the United Nations, or over the recognition of China. We have our differences. When we have anxieties about our American friends, we talk to them privately and frankly. I have not noticed that such diplomatic exchanges are advertised in running lights over Piccadilly or over Times Square in New York. These discussions are conducted privately and frankly, but it is a thankless task because they do not get into the Press.

Now I come to the last big initiative, the Commonwealth Peace Mission. I notice that Lord Milford has rejected it. He said, "It will not succeed; it is no good; we need not try". So far, every Western initiative has been brushed aside by the Communist Powers as a swindle and as a threat: unconditional withdrawal and surrender are demanded as a condition for a conference. We have to see what this imaginative proposal from the Commonwealth, the Commonwealth peace proposal, can achieve. The Communist Powers cannot accuse it of being biased towards America. I will just go through the document, which has been published, and copies of which could be obtained though Lord Milford does not appear to have read it. A quick glance at the principles which are set up to guide the Mission dispels this idea entirely.

This document says there are doubts about an early or final military solution to the conflict; it asks for a comprehensive cease-fire as a pre-condition for a conference; it ask for a suspension of all United States air attacks on North Vietnam and for the North Vietnamese to stop their military incursions into South Vietnam. It desires a total ceasefire on all sides to enable a conference to be convened. And the objectives of the conference to end the war are: the withdrawal of all foreign troops from the territories; the neutralisation of the area; the establishment of an international police force; the eventual unification of the country through free and internationally supervised elections.

My Lords, any country that refuses entry to this Mission stands condemned as one which seeks only the military solution to this very complicated and tragic conflict. One can only pray that out of this last initiative of Her Majesty's Government there will be an end to aggression on all sides.

10.7 p.m.

LORD ROYLE

My Lords, many of the things I had intended to say have been said already this evening by my noble friend Lady Gaitskell. Perhaps I am not prepared to go quite as full-bloodedly in support of the United States position as she is and, at the same time, I am a bit concerned tonight by—if your Lordships will allow me to say so—the oversimplification of the situation by the noble Earl, Lord Dundee. This applies, on the other side, in much greater degree to the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Milford. But I do not share the utter pessimism of the latter or the semi-pessimism of the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, so far as the Commonwealth effort is concerned.

I speak with some inhibitions at this late hour, but it seems to me that it is important that your Lordships' House should have the opportunity of discussing the present situation so that it might be known in the country how some of us feel. I feel that it is the duty of anyone taking part in a debate of this character to try to strike a balance in their thoughts on the contending forces and to try to see the points of view of both the United States and the Communist countries. At the same time, with all the enthusiasm that one can muster, one should express appreciation of our own Prime Minister and the Commonwealth Prime Ministers in their courageous initiative in establishing the mission which we are hearing about. I will come back to that latter aspect later on.

I should be boring noble Lords by going over the whole history of the unhappy country we are considering. My noble friend Lord Brockway to some extent went over that history in the course of his speech: the history from the time of the Japanese invasion of Vietnam in the World War—a period which discouraged and discredited everybody, thinking in terms of the French Colonial authorities—right down to the present time. Your Lordships know that history. It is sufficient to remind you that Vietnam has not known peace for at least twenty-five years.

In addition, I must remind your Lordships that it was the Communist Vietnam who first fought the Japanese invasion, although later on it became a national cause. Because of the Chinese Nationalist support against Japan it was natural that there was greater activity in the North of the country, and it was there, when the Chinese Communist revolution came about, that Communism prospered. So, my Lords, it has become with the use of the Vietnamese forces opposing, an ideological conflict, as was rightly said by the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, between China and the United States, with all the resulting bloodshed and misery and the threat to world peace.

Eleven years ago and immediately after the Geneva Agreement I had the opportunity to spend five or six weeks in Communist China. During that visit our party had the opportunity of a session with Chou En-lai. The other day I was looking at my diary for that period, to recall my impressions of the man, the times and the circumstances. The impression with which I came away was of a deep respect shown by him for the British people and his terrible hatred of the United States. At that time, in 1954, he was ready to accept an invitation to join the United Nations; but the attitude of the United States on the question of the off-shore Islands and Formosa, plus its insistence that Nationalist China should be the China of the United Nations, trade Chinese leaders the haters of the United States. I shall always believe, with my noble friend Lord Brockway, that if China had been admitted to the United Nations at that time, or even later, the present situation in South-East Asia would never had arisen. That, as I see it, is the Chinese position. I would sum it up by saying that the Chinese are afraid of what they call American imperialism in Asia.

On the other hand, to hold the balance, I know that the United States is in constant fear of the geographical and ideological spread of Communism. They have justification, arising from the signs and actions of the Communist countries since the end of the Second World War. So we are faced with a position that the hatreds and suspicions of two opposing ideologies bring about the deaths of thousands of innocent people in Vietnam. We have seen in the Press the horrible photographs taken over past weeks. What a crazy world it is in which we live! We face to-night the existing position that, for her own reasons, Russia refuses to accept responsibility for the co-Chairmanship of the Geneva Conference. Because China is not a member, the United Nations Organisation is powerless to act. Therefore it is necessary that at this stage a new, powerful unit, a peace-making force, should come into being. Surely your Lordships' House believes that there can be no better unit than the Commonwealth, with its mixture of Asia, Africa, the Antipodes, North and Central America and, in our own case, Europe, differing loyalties and ideals and differing outlooks towards Communism and capitalism.

On June 24, my right honourable friend the Prime Minister said this in another place: The reason why the Commonwealth had to take action is that we are not only very representative of the world in general but we have so many different views amongst ourselves… And he continued, after an interruption: So far from being a weakness, this is a strength because a mission undertaken on behalf of the whole Commonwealth, aligned to no particular interpretation of the fighting in Vietnam, can be a very powerful force for securing mediation, particularly at a time when tragically it is not possible for the United Nations itself to intervene."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, Commons, Vol. 714 (No. 139), col. 1943, June 24, 1965.] I had intended at this point of my speech to quote the document which has just been quoted by my noble friend Lady Gaitskell, the Statement of Guidance for the Commonwealth Mission, issued by the Commonwealth Prime Ministers. In view of the fact that she quoted some of the details of that document, I will not weary your Lordships by repeating them. But it is of the utmost possible importance that those things were said and the position of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers made perfectly clear as to what the approach should be. I cannot hide—and it has not been said in perhaps such strong terms to-night—my unqualified joy that it was a Labour Prime Minister of the United Kingdom who initiated that move. He has never stood so high in my estimation as he stands in this matter; and I assure your Lordships that that is saying a great deal. The very mention of the Commonwealth Mission has an impact, I believe, in that it has shown the united determination of the Commonwealth that this problem must be settled by negotiation. It cannot be settled in any other way. At last there has emerged a force, the British Commonwealth of Nations—are we not proud of the term?—which is determined, not only that the conflict shall not continue or escalate, but also that something must be done to make it realised that here is a serious poisoning of the world atmosphere which is preventing progress towards the easing of East—West tensions. I hope that no Member of your Lordships' House fails to welcome that great initiative. Whatever reservations I have about the faults lying with one side or another, or with both, I see in this move the only hope that the world possesses at this moment for settling this terrible conflict.

In spite of the events of this week, with all their horror, my prayer is that in the very near future the Mission initiated by my right honourable friend may be heard and that its efforts will ultimately succeed. I do not feel that I want to say anything more at this hour of the night. I feel very strongly, and with every other Member of your Lordships' House I am terribly worried, about this situation. Our voices must be joined with the voices of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers in their great endeavour to do something, at all events, towards settling this conflict.

10.20 p.m.

LORD KENNET

My Lords, it has been a remarkable debate, in that something has happened which does not often happen in your Lordships' House, and that is that we have heard two speeches which, in my opinion, were perfectly disgraceful. I hope that those two speeches will not be taken up by the Press, because if they are, I fear it will do harm to the reputation of your Lordships' House in the country. I refer to the speeches made by the noble Lord, Lord Milford, and the noble Earl, Lord Dundee. Lord Milford's speech, it seemed to me, was one of ignorance and bigoted partisanship. I apologise for my strong words. I will not dwell further on it, because I think that many of your Lordships may well agree with that estimate. Let me take him up on just one point. I was at the Oxford "teach-in", where I did not see him, and I did not share his impression that Mr. Stewart had twisted and evaded at that meeting: nor do I believe anybody else who was present shared that impression. Certainly he did not carry the majority of his audience with him, but I think that all his audience would endorse what I am about to say, which is that his performance was one of high intelligence and obvious integrity.

Let me now turn to the speech of the noble Earl, Lord Dundee, which is another matter altogether, since he held office in the previous Government. This, it seemed to me, was not a matter of bigoted partisanship, but it was a speech of enraged Philistinism. If he had been at the London and Oxford "teach-ins", as I was privileged to be—and I say "privileged" advisedly, because they sought my advice in organising them, and I am proud of this—it may be that he would have seen an amorphous, flabby, moist mass of gullibility; that he would have called it "academic flapdoodle", and that he would have maintained his judgment that an egghead is a bonehead. It strikes me as familiar language. Where do we hear this railing at universities; where do we hear attacks levelled at the structure of education; where do we hear protests against the attempts of university teachers and university students to understand the world?

THE EARL OF DUNDEE

My Lords, may I ask the noble Lord whether he is suggesting that this is applicable to everybody at universities? I never suggested that it was.

LORD KENNET

I am suggesting that the audiences at these two "teach-ins" were a pretty typical cross-section of that portion of the student population which is interested in international affairs. There were audiences of about 1,000 at each of these "teach-ins". As the noble Earl will know, the meetings are open to any student who wishes to come, and to any university teacher who wishes to come, and many students and teachers of all political colours, holding all sorts of beliefs on the question of Vietnam, did come, did speak, were questioned and did engage in a free and full discussion, which I venture to assert is one of the most beneficial traditions of this country, and I deeply regret seeing it attacked in this House.

THE EARL OF DUNDEE

My Lords, I did not suggest that everybody who attended these university conferences took the same view.

LORD KENNET

I thought I detected a note of regret in what the noble Earl said, that these meetings should have taken place. "Flapdoodling" is a fairly strong word to use in describing them.

Now to turn to the Question on the Order Paper, I should like to ask my noble friend Lord Walston, when he comes to reply, whether he could give us some information about the reception which has so far greeted the Commonwealth initiative. Many speakers have agreed that this was a most important thing. I agree with that judgment. For a long time it seemed to me and many people like me that our Government were depriving themselves of the opportunity of taking a beneficial initiative in the Vietnam war by their determination, continued over many months, not to dissociate themselves from American action there. It may be that American action was right; but a Government which hopes to play the role of peace-maker cannot continue without exception to back one side in the dispute and condemn the other side. A certain element of dissociation has to be introduced before any Government in the world can hope to mediate in a war.

That element has been introduced. In two respects the Commonwealth Statement is a change in former British Government policy, and in two respects it shows a degree of dissociation from American policy. These respects are both set out in the Annex to the Commonwealth Statement which has been mentioned many times. First is the stated intention to meet with all the parties concerned, and at an earlier date the Mission declared its wish to meet with all the Governments concerned. This distinction was introduced partly to include the National Liberation Front in South Vietnam. The second element of distinction is that the first of the four preliminary conditions which the plenary meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers laid down for their Mission was the cessation of American bombing (that is paragraph 3a of that Annex) and the second is the cessation of North Vietnamese armed supplies for the rebels. This is a significant and, in my view, profoundly hopeful and welcome change in Government policy.

Those of us who, like me, spend many hours every day trying to find out what is going on in Asia have been reading very carefully the public pronouncements of the relevant political organisms out there, the Viet Cong, the North Vietnamese Government, the Chinese Government and, to a lesser extent, the Soviet Government. It is very hard to assess what they are saying. Their statements are voluminous, and they are abusive towards this country, but they do not—or not all of them do—make clear statements that they will not receive this Mission and do not think the Mission can do anything.

Only today there became available a broadcast from the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Political Committee of the South Vietnamese Liberation Front. This is not Hanoi. This is what is called Liberation Radio in the South Vietnamese jungle, which once again was abusive. But if you read it carefully you find that the one thing it did not say was that the Viet Cong will not agree to discuss with this Mission. It seems that the reaction time of the rebels in South Vietnam—and this is extremely important—is very slow. It takes them a long time to get news, to discuss news, and to decide what they are going to do about it. Even now they have not got the Commonwealth initiative straight. They used the words in their broadcast yesterday that the Commonwealth initiative is consistent with the United States' imperialist plot. If, as one may assume, in what they call the United States imperialist plot they include the bombing, then they are of course in error, because the Commonwealth initiative is not consistent with the continuation of American bombing. It may be that they have not read our text carefully enough. At any rate, we read their text clearly, and what I should like to ask my noble friend to do would be, if he has time—it is terribly late—to give us an account of what he holds to be the governing words in the Statements from the Viet Cong, and from Hanoi, about their views of the Commonwealth Mission. Have they slammed the door on it? If they have not slammed the door, what indications have they given of their attitude over future weeks and months?—because I think that one of the most rightly conceived elements of this whole initiative is that, even if the Mission does not get away in that chartered aircraft in a couple of weeks. as was at first hoped, yet it will remain in being as an international phenomenon. and will be able to pick up the slightest chink of agreement to meet and discuss from the Communist side in South-East Asia.

10.28 p.m.

THE PARLIAMENTARY UNDERSECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (LORD WALSTON)

My Lords, it is late, but I am afraid I am going to keep you later. We have listened to many speeches, some long, some short. We have listened to some fine and moving expressions. We have listened to some wise and well-meaning suggestions. We have listened to some arrant nonsense. But all that we have heard, or almost all, has been inspired, I hope, by a genuine wish to bring this fighting to an end. It has been inspired, I believe, because noble Lords here, and most people outside—though not, I am afraid, all—realise that we are dealing here with a question of ordinary human beings who are being terrorised and, in many cases, killed without themselves having stirred a finger to bring such a fate upon themselves; and who are being denied the sort of life, the sort of freedoms that we in this country cherish and want to see spread throughout the world. It is because of our concern for those human beings that we are primarily moved to bring this ghastly tragedy to an end.

I am glad that tonight so little time has been spent in recriminations about the past; about whose fault it was, and who started what; because although it has some relevance it is not the primary concern at the present time. I am certainly not going back into the past—the history of the Geneva Convention, and all the rest of it. All I would say about the past is that there is no doubt whatsoever in my mind, and I think there can be little doubt in the minds of any objective students of this problem, that, had it not been for the United States' coming to the aid of South Vietnam, South Vietnam itself would now be a country, as is North Vietnam, with a one-party system of government and with no chance of free elections or of changing that Government, or having any say in their future whatsoever.

I freely admit that today in South Vietnam there is no opportunity of free elections, that the Government in Saigon cannot represent itself as being the true voice of the people of South Vietnam, and I am not saying that that is so; though by the same token I would remind your Lordships that it cannot he asserted that the National Liberation Front has any more right to speak for the people than has the Government in Saigon. But what I do say is that the objectives of the Americans, and also of ourselves, are to see that there should be restored as quickly as possible, at least to South Vietnam, and we hope to North Vietnam also, the opportunities of having these free and democratic elections.

The specific Question asked by my noble friend Lord Brockway is What action has been taken to initiate negotiations to end the war in Vietnam? That question has already, to a large extent, been answered, in a very able manner, by my noble friend Lady Gaitskell. I am sorry that my noble friend Lord Brockway was not here to listen to her admirable speech, and other speeches which we have had. I will not waste your Lordships' time by going over in any detail the ground covered by my noble friend Lady Gaitskell. I will repeat, mainly for the benefit of my noble friend Lord Brockway, the fact that Her Majesty's Government—or, rather, my right honourable friend the Foreign Secretary—recognising his responsibility as co-Chairman of the Geneva Conference, asked his fellow co-Chairman in the Soviet Union (this was in March) to join with him in issuing an invitation to a further Geneva Convention. The Russian co-Chairman refused to do so.

That was the first main public initiative—there had previously been many private and quiet initiatives—taken by Her Majesty's Government. When that effort failed as a result of the refusal of Mr. Gromyko, my right honourable friend acted on his own. He approached the members of the 1954 Geneva Conference and, in addition, the three members of the International Control Commission—Poland, India and Canada—and, as my noble friend Lady Gaitskell said, met with a refusal. There have been other initiatives: the support of the appeal by the seventeen unaligned countries, led by President Tito; the support of the appeal initiated by the President of India; the sending of Mr. Gordon Walker. So, during the time from March until the middle of June, there has been constant activity and several initiatives, of one kind or another, have been taken.

We then come to the present initiative, the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' appeal. In passing, I would answer one specific question—perhaps I should have done it before—from the noble Lord, Lord Milford. He asked; it is the policy of Her Majesty's Government to tag along behind the United States? The answer to that is, very clearly and very definitely, No; it is not. It is the policy of Her Majesty's Government to stand with her Allies in the fight for freedom and in the preservation of the Free World, and not simply to enjoy these things selfishly ourselves. The privilege of belonging to a minority party and of speaking in public whenever one wishes is an important privilege which we in this country enjoy, and one that we hope other countries also will enjoy, even South Vietnam, North Vietnam and China. It is Her Majesty's Government's policy, in so far as it is within our ability to do so, to see that these privileges are enjoyed elsewhere and not only selfishly at home.

Let me come back to the Commonwealth Prime Minister's Conference. These proposals have been criticised on many grounds. The noble Earl, Lord Dundee, mentioned some criticisms, without necessarily associating himself with them. I hope that he may dissociate himself from them. Some people have said that it was done too quickly, and some of those people who say that have criticised us for going too slowly in the past. Some people have said that it was purely a "gimmick", done in order to bring more kudos to the Prime Minister; others have said that it was to bring more kudos to the Labour Party, or to pacify Labour Back-Benchers. All sorts of reasons have been given. I wonder whether people who put forward these denigrations realise that not only are they throwing a little mud at our Prime Minister, as a politician in this country (that is fair enough), or at the Labour Party—and that also is fair enough—but they are also throwing a good deal of mud at the Prime Ministers of the Commonwealth, suggesting that they are no more than stooges of the British Prime Minister and prepared to go along, without really wishing to do so, simply because they have been bamboozled into it. I do not think that people really mean that.

Therefore I would state very clearly that this initiative, although started by the Prime Minister of this country—and of that I, like Lord Royle, am proud; and I hope that many people, of all Parties, are proud of that—is an initiative of the Commonwealth. It is a Commonwealth decision and not solely a decision of one member country. Let us remember that the Commonwealth, as such, is uncommitted in this struggle. Various of its members have already expressed where there allegiances lie. There is no doubt at all how we stand with regard to the United States and the Government of South Vietnam. We know that Australia has already a contingent in South Vietnam. We know that New Zealand was about to send one, but that in the interest of Commonwealth unity, in the interest of giving this proposal a good start, she agreed to withhold the despatch of those troops at the present time—a very fine gesture. These are what I might call some of the committed members of the Commonwealth. There are also members of the Commonwealth who, while perhaps not being so closely committed to the other side, are able to speak freely with Peking. Pakistan, for example, can speak freely with Peking; and Ghana can speak freely with Peking. They are members of the Commonwealth who have supported this initiative. And in between there is a whole range of Commonwealth countries who are genuinely uncommitted. Therefore, my Lords, I think that anybody who says that this Commonwealth proposal is doomed to failure because it is sponsored by a committed Government is misreading the whole concept of the Commonwealth and the whole concept of this new approach.

The terms of this approach have been read out to your Lordships. I will repeat only one of them, because it relates to a question raised, I think, by my noble friend Lord Brockway, and he was not here to hear the answer given by my noble friend Lady Gaitskell. It was a question of what we felt about the eventual unification of Vietnam—whether we adhered to the Geneva Conference or whether we believed that North and South Vietnam should be separate countries. One of the ultimate objectives laid down by the Commonwealth Prime Ministers was that there should be established principles for the eventual unification of the country through free and internationally supervised elections.

LORD BROCKWAY

My Lords, may I interrupt for one moment? I do not think I raised that question at all so far as the Government are concerned. I quoted the Foreign Secretary as saying that he accepted that.

LORD WALSTON

I beg my noble friend's pardon.

LORD MILFORD

I raised it.

LORD WALSTON

It was the noble Lord, Lord Milford. It was my writing that I was unable to read. I am sorry about that. However, I hope that I have answered the noble Lord's question adequately. But I think my noble friend Lord Brockway did raise a question (I may come back to it later, but I will deal with it now) concerning the United States, and whether President Johnson accepted this objective. What I can say to my noble friend is that these terms are well known to the American Government. They have been published; they have been read; the American Government has welcomed the initiative, and is prepared to negotiate and to receive the Commonwealth Prime Ministers. There is, therefore, every reason to think that it is prepared to endorse the whole of the proposals put here, or at least to discuss them. It is not turning them down out of hand; it has not said, "No" to them. That, I think, is an important step forward.

LORD BROCKWAY

It was the word "endorsed" that I queried.

LORD WALSTON

We hope that that will come. I do not think there can be many noble Lords present who would criticise any of these proposals that have been put forward. I have not heard a word of criticism of them this evening. So it is interesting now to look and see what response we have actually had to these proposals. My noble friend Lord Kennet specifically asked what response we had had. Well, as your Lordships will know, we had a quick and favourable answer from Washington and from Saigon. They both said that they were willing to receive this delegation at any time—two positive responses. And, of course—we must not forget this—the United Nations Secretary-General has also said the same; so that there are three positive responses.

Moscow took rather longer to reply, and the answer was not a categorical "No". It was a firm "No", but I think one can detect a slight hesitation in it. The reason given for the "No" was that it was no concern of theirs and that we should address ourselves to Hanoi—in other words, washing their hands of this whole matter. From Peking we got a categorical "No"—no doubt about it at all; they would have nothing whatsoever to do with it. From Hanoi we are still awaiting an answer. Our Consul-General in Hanoi had a conversation with the Director of the Foreign Affairs Bureau on June 28, three days ago, when he was given an acknowledgement of our proposals, but was not given any final reply. In other words, contact has been made; there has been no refusal and there has been no acceptance. That is the position at present. At the risk of upsetting the noble Lord, Lord Milford—

LORD KENNET

My Lords, before the noble Lord leaves that point, could he say anything about the response from the Viet Cong as opposed to Hanoi?

LORD WALSTON

There has been no response from the Viet Cong other than what comes over the radio, to which the noble Lord has already referred.

THE EARL OF SELKIRK

Has the noble Lord addressed himself to the Viet Cong directly?

LORD WALSTON

Not directly, but through Hanoi. They are not very easy people to get at. I ask your Lordships—although Lord Milford may object to this—to ask yourselves: who is to blame now if this conference does not get off the ground? Is it Washington? Is it the United Nations? Is it Saigon?—all of whom have said Yes. Is it Moscow, who have said No? Is it Peking, who have said No? Is it Hanoi, who have not yet answered? In the interests of accuracy, I would point out to Lord Milford that I have not been in Southampton for some seventeen years or more. Possibly that gives an indication of the accuracy of some of the other information with which the noble Lord regaled your Lordships this evening.

Lord Brockway stated in his remarks, very honestly and very fairly, that it might well be—I do not want to misrepresent him in this—that because North Vietnam and the Viet Cong are having success in the fighting at present they will not enter into negotiations because they think they can win without any talk at all. It is perfectly natural if people think they can win. It is not very estimable for people who are peace-lovers, or who profess to be peace-lovers, if they are prepared to talk peace when they are losing but are prepared to go on fighting when they think they are winning.

LORD BROCKWAY

The noble Lord has stated accurately the point I took. What he omitted was that when America thought it was in a strong position and when it thought that by bombing North Vietnam it would make the Vietnamese surrender, it also was opposed to negotiations on peace at that point.

SEVERAL NOBLE LORDS

No.

LORD WALSTON

I do not recall any offer from North Vietnam, Peking or Moscow at that time asking the Americans to talk. Therefore, they were unable to say, "No" Whether they would have said "No" to a suggestion of peace is a hypothetical question. But they did not reply to offers of peace talks because no offers were made at that time.

I want it to be very clear to noble Lords within this Chamber, and outside, that the choice today for the North Vietnamese and the National Liberation Front is not a choice between either talking or having victory. It is rather a choice between having talks or a continuation of, which may well mean an escalation of, the war. That is the choice which is before them. It is up to any of us who are sincere in our desire for peace in Vietnam and who have any influence at all, which I regretfully have not, with China or North Vietnam or the Viet Cong to make them fully aware of that; in other words, that they are not going to win an easy or even a difficult victory, even while the monsoon is on. The war will continue stubbornly and brutally. We know that from what others have said. It is not of our making or desire, but that is the choice that they are faced with and that we are faced with. They can either have a continuation of the war or have talks, which have been offered to them.

May I turn briefly to some of the questions which Lord Brockway asked me? One I have already dealt with—the question of the independence of South Vietnam. At the moment, of course, there is a desire on the part of the Americans that there should be independence in South Vietnam, but it is not eternal. The Commonwealth Prime Ministers have said the same thing, but say it should lead to eventual reunification if the people of both sides so desire it.

The other question which Lord Brockway asked (I did not, I am afraid, write it down very cleary) was: With whom were the Americans prepared to negotiate? It is difficult to know with whom to negotiate. Russia says they should negotiate with Hanoi. Hanoi is still, as I have told your Lordships, pondering its answer. The noble Lord, Lord Brockway, says that they should negotiate with the National Liberation Front. The Commonwealth Prime Ministers say that we should negotiate with the parties principally concerned; and that view has, as I say, been welcomed by the United States. Although the National Liberation Front may be involved in these talks, do not let us run away with the idea that it is the constitutionally elected Government of South Vietnam, or, indeed, that it has given any proof whatsoever that it is representative of the majority of the people of South Vietnam. It may control the major part of the country, but if it does do that it controls that area not because of the free will of the people who have invited them in, but because of terrorism and the force of arms. I myself have been to a village some 70 miles from Saigon which by day was a model village, a New Life hamlet showing how good things were there. By night it was controlled by the Viet Cong. The people did not change their minds by day or night, so that they wanted one at one time and the other at another. In both cases it was force of arms which controlled that village, and that is the only rule, unfortunately, which obtains today in the whole of South Vietnam and, I suspect, in the whole of North Vietnam.

The noble Lord, Lord Brockway, finished by putting forward three proposals and I think he asked me specifically for my views on those. He asked that we should withdraw the people who train the police in South Vietnam, though I would remind him that those are civilians, and the police are used for maintaining law and order and security and in military operations; and, also, that we should forgo training facilities in Malaysia. That was his first request. The second was that the Commonwealth Mission should visit those countries according to where each member has most influence; in other words, they should split up into two and those who have influence with China should go there and those who have influence with Washington should go there. Thirdly, he asked that we should recognise the North Vietnamese Government. I cannot hold out very much hope that we can do any of these things.

I hope that as the discussions progress there will be a great relaxation of many of the things which go on, but at this present stage it would be, I believe, wrong and unwise for us to make these unilateral concessions. The recognition, after all, of North Vietnam, for which he asks, would be a recognition that there are two countries, which is just what he does not ask for. In the early part of his speech he said that there is only one Vietnam. At the end of his speech he said, "Recognise North Vietnam as a separate Government." That I consider somewhat inconsistent, and at the present stage of negotiations it would be, in my view. unhelpful.

LORD BROCKWAY

I do not suggest—

LORD WALSTON

May I continue? It is getting late now and there is little more that I have to say. I think it would be wrong, also, for us to withdraw the very small but valuable police training facilities which we offer, and also the training facilities in Malaysia, which are offered, of course, to other countries in South-East Asia also.

When it comes to the Commonwealth Mission and to whether they should visit separately, that I suggest is something for the Commonwealth Prime Ministers themselves to decide; it is not for us to decide that. It is a Mission of four which has been set up by the Commonwealth Prime Ministers, to go together, hand in hand, to all the capitals concerned to talk to all the people concerned. If they had thought collectively that they had more chance of success by separating the Mission they would doubtless have said so. They did not at the time, and at this stage nothing has happened, so far as I know, to make them change their minds.

My Lords, as I said at the beginning, we all want peace in Vietnam. But what we also want is a just peace. Peace at any price is not what we want out there; it must be a peace that will conform to our ideas of justice and a peace that will allow the people of that country to choose their own Government, their own way of life. I believe that we are more likely to achieve this by bringing such pressure as can be brought upon Peking and Hanoi—the two areas or two capitals, if you want to use that word of them, which have either refused or are still hesitating—rather than by trying to bring pressure on us at home to do something different from what we are doing. I believe that the initiatives which Her Majesty's Government have taken over the months that we have been in office have been the right initiatives. So far they have borne no fruit, or no visible fruit; but I believe that this present initiative, taken in conjunction with the Commonwealth, is more likely than anything so far proposed to bear fruit; and I hope that we all wish it well.