§ THE LORD PRIVY SEAL (THE EARL OF LONGFORD)My Lords, with the permission of the House I should like to repeat a Statement which the Prime Minister has just made in another place.
Before doing so, I hope the House will feel it appropriate if I pay a brief tribute to the memory of Mr. Adlai Stevenson. His sudden death has removed from world affairs a great American whose service in the cause of world peace and whose noble eloquence on behalf of human freedom everywhere will long be remembered. I am sure the House will wish me to extend our heartfelt sympathy to his family and to the people of the United States in their immense loss.
I now come to the words that are being used by the Prime Minister:
"My honourable friend, the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Pensions and National Insurance, returned from Hanoi yesterday and has given the Foreign Secretary and myself a full report on his discussions there. As the House is already aware, Mr. Davies was unable to see any North Vietnamese Ministers or to obtain any undertaking that the Commonwealth Mission would be received in Hanoi. Nevertheless, during his five-day stay, he was able to impress on the officials 260 of the Fatherland Front and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, with whom he had protracted conversations, the views of Her Majesty's Government and of the Commonwealth Mission. My honourable friend tells me that copious notes were taken throughout these meetings, and I have no doubt that the arguments which my honourable friend urged with all his accustomed fluency and persistence will be passed on to the leaders of North Vietnam.
"In presenting his arguments in favour of receiving the Commonwealth Mission, my honourable friend had to struggle against the evident conviction on the part of his North Vietnamese hearers that their prospects of victory were too imminent for it to be worth their while to forsake the battlefield for the conference table. In such an atmosphere it is scarcely surprising that he was unable to bring back any word of encouragement, but I am extremely glad that the arguments, which are not only our arguments but those of the Commonwealth and of much of the world—in favour of peace and negotiations—should at last, and for the first time, have been fully and faithfully expounded to the North Vietnamese in the artificial isolation of their own capital. The arguments may not have exerted an immediate and visible effect, but I believe the passage of time will reinforce them and that there will be a general recognition of what I believe to be self-evident: that the Vietnam problem will not be solved by military means alone. As soon as this occurs, as soon as the North Vietnamese are ready to receive the Commonwealth Mission, or as soon as they are prepare to facilitate the reconvening of the Geneva Conference, then I believe we shall be on the way to the political solution which alone can bring the fighting to an end. I believe that my honourable friend has contributed in no small measure to advancing the day when all the parties concerned can get round a table to reach agreement on such a solution."
That concludes the Statement of the Prime Minister.
§ LORD CARRINGTONMy Lords, may I first of all associate all those who 261 sit on these Benches with the tribute which the noble Earl the Leader of the House paid to Mr. Adlai Stevenson. He was a great world statesman. He was a great servant of the American people and he will be sadly missed by everyone in the Free World, not least all those who work so closely in the United Nations.
With regard to the Statement, made by the Prime Minister in another place, which the noble Earl has repeated, he will know that some of us had misgivings about this Mission which were not entirely allayed by the answers he gave the other day in this House. But, whatever our feelings, we are, of course, all very disappointed that the Mission has failed, not so much because the failure was unexpected but because it shows the intransigence of the North Vietnamese authorities; their attitude will be noted by all those who are really interested in a peaceful settlement in Vietnam, and it will be noted with concern and with sorrow. May I ask the noble Earl the Leader of the House if he can say whether the Report that I read in several of the newspapers, that it was proposed that Mr. Davies should return once again to Hanoi, is likely to be true or not.
§ THE EARL OF LONGFORDMy Lords, so far as I know, there is no truth in that suggestion. If that or any other course seemed useful I have no doubt it would be adopted, but I have no reason whatever to think that is a likely possibility. I appreciate the care with which the noble Lord the Leader of the Opposition has spoken, but I am afraid I do not in any way accept the view that this Mission was a failure. In any case, it would be too early to know what the results were. I believe it has been of assistance in bringing home to those secluded rulers in Hanoi what is the attitude of the Free World.
§ LORD GLADWYNMy Lords, speaking from these Benches on behalf of my noble friends, I should first of all like to say one word, in addition to those tributes so eloquently made by the noble Earl the Leader of the House, and the noble Lord the Leader of the Opposition, about Mr. Adlai Stevenson, who was a great personal friend of mine. I would simply recall that I first met Mr. Stevenson in Church House, over the way, when he 262 was the American representative to the Preparatory Commission of the United Nations and I was Secretary. He brought into those meetings a breath of fresh air in the rather stale atmosphere of the immediate post-war period, and we quickly discovered that we had with us a brilliant and sparkling political figure of great significance. So for that reason, if no other, I should like to associate myself with the tributes made to this great figure and representative of all that is best in our Western civilisation.
With regard to the Statement just made, I would just say this. Nobody, I am sure, would be opposed to any efforts to get negotiations going in Vietnam and thus put an end to this appalling war; certainly nobody in the Liberal Party would take that view. But surely there is something to be said for caution in these matters. It may always be better to have tried and failed than never to have tried at all, but such efforts should be made in relation to the actual political situation before us. Was it a good thing to send Mr. Davies at all? The Government say that certain advantages have been gained. But, again, there are certain disadvantages. Anything which can be presented as not furthering the object—the object being to get the reconvening of the Geneva Conference—anything, I say, which tends in that direction and does not seem to achieve it tends to put the clock back. Surely that also applies to the Commonwealth Mission. Unless there is real reason to suppose that the Commonwealth Mission would come back with some success, it would be far better not to send it out in the general hope that the arguments adduced might have some effect on the Government of Hanoi or indeed the Government of Peking.
Finally, I would suggest that if there is no particular reason to suppose you can go forward by these means, it would be far better not to send somebody out representing the Government, at whatever level, but to try to send somebody without any publicity at all. Alternatively, if it is simply a question of putting forward arguments that might appeal to the Government in Hanoi, why not put them forward through our perfectly able Consul-General who is quite capable of employing them without any publicity? So I would merely put in a word of caution not to plunge ahead, whatever 263 the publicity value may be, on some exercise that may not bring immediately good results.
§ THE EARL OF LONGFORDMy Lords, I should like to say how much I know the words of both the noble Lord the Leader of the Opposition and the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, concerning Mr. Adlai Stevenson will be appreciated here and in the United States.
I cannot feel that the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, was arguing with his usual lucidity in the comments he has just offered. I found him rather difficult to follow. My own opinion is that the great majority of the people in this country, whatever their Party, consider this effort and similar efforts are, and will continue to be, worth while making.
§ LORD ALPORTMy Lords, may I ask the noble Earl whether the object of the exercise was the impression it would make upon the people of this country, or whether it was an effort to try to ensure the earliest possible improvement in the situation in Vietnam?
§ THE EARL OF LONGFORDI am grateful to the noble Lord for what I hope is the reasonable implication in favour of the second supposition. There is no doubt that the object was to try to secure a visit of the Commonwealth Mission to Vietnam. What the noble Lord may not be aware of is that it would appear to have been the intention of the Government of Hanoi to do all the talking and let Mr. Davies do the listening. In fact, however, Mr. Davies is not a tremendously silent person. He is a great talker, and he talked to them for about nine hours.