Lords Sitting of 22 December 1965

Preamble
The House met at half past two of the clock, The LORD CHANCELLOR on the Woolsack.
Prayers—Read by the Lord Bishop of Oxford
The Lord Noel-Buxton—Took the Oath.

"HALF-PAY ON RETIREMENT" SCHEME
2.35 p.m.
LORD INGLEWOOD: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
[The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government what priority they now give to their declared intention to introduce a "half-pay on retirement" scheme.]
LORD BOWLES: My Lords, work on this scheme is proceeding as part of the Government's long-term reconstruction of social security, but priority has been given to the needs of existing beneficiaries and to the development of a scheme of earnings-related short-term benefits.
Lotto INGLEWOOD: My Lords, bearing in mind the amount of work known to have been done in this subject by the Labour Party, and remembering their confident statements when in Opposition, their Election Manifesto, and their many Election addresses, including that of the Prime Minister, saying that there would be no delay, does this "slow-time" mean that they are running into difficulties which they had not previously foreseen?
NOBLE LORDS: Hear, hear!
LORD BOWLES: No, it does not—it is no good noble Lords saying "Hear, hear". The Labour Party, in its Election Manifesto of 1964, spoke of the drastic reforms which were needed in our major social services to fit them for the 1960s and 1970s, and said that
1040
they would be costly in money, manpower and resources. It went on:
"This will not be achieved all at once: but, as economic expansion increases our national wealth, we shall see to it that the needs of the community are increasingly met."
LORD ERROLL OF HALE: My Lords, is not the main answer further confirmation of the fact that the Prime Minister has no time for home problems?

WING MIRRORS ON MOTOR CARS
2.38 p.m.
LORD DENHAM: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
[The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government whether they will consider making compulsory the fitting of wing mirrors to all cars.]
THE JOINT PARLIAMENTARY SECRETARY, MINISTRY OF TRANSPORT (LORD LINDGREN): My Lords, we do not consider that this would be justified or would necessarily increase safety. The important thing is that the mirror which is required by the regulations should be properly adjusted and used by the driver, as the Highway Code urges.
LORD DENHAM: My Lords, while thanking the noble Lord for that Answer, I would ask whether he is aware that there is a blind spot at which it is impossible for a driver who does not have wing mirrors on his car to see a vehicle overtaking his own; that this blind spot is particularly dangerous on a motorway when a driver wishes to move out into a fast lane, and that this problem will increase with the introduction of the 70 m.p.h. limit, which will have the effect of reducing differentials of speed and increasing the average time it takes one car to overtake another?
LORD LINDGREN: My Lords, while I think that what the noble Lord has said was true at one time, with the modern car the area of glass in the rear window has been extended and the blind spots are not so extensive or so frequent as they were with older cars. It is undoubtedly true that the wing mirror, correctly focused and properly used, is

1041
an additional precaution; but, so far as requirement by regulations is concerned, I am advised that the Department feel that maintenance of the interior mirror used as recommended in the Highway Code is better.
LORD DERWENT: My Lords, is that not a most extraordinary statement to be made by the Minister? First of all, he said that wing mirrors do not help road safety. May I ask him what is the basis of that rather extraordinary remark? The other matter is this: does he think that all cars on the road are new cars?
LORD LINDGREN: My Lords, I do not think I said that wing mirrors did not make for any safety: if I did, I would correct it. I thought I said that they might contribute. So far as the present-day car is concerned, the rear window has a much bigger sweep than used to be the case, and therefore there are fewer blind spots on the car. In regard to wing mirrors, there are two types, the convex and the flat. I understand that with the convex type there is a tendency to distort the image of the approaching vehicle, and that with the flat mirror the driver's view is restricted. Equally, in the bad weather conditions of to-day, with wet and mud on the wing mirrors, they are not, of course, as efficient as when they are dry and clean.
LORD DERWENT: My Lords, would the noble Lord have another look at this matter, because there are many old cars which could be fitted with wing mirrors, and that would add to their safety?
LORD LUCAS OF CHILWORTH: My Lords, is the noble Lord aware that the greatest contributor to safety would be not the wing mirror but the proper ventilation of the interior of the modern motor car? The rear window of the modern motor car is always misted when one wants to see through it, and the only safe device to have is the wing mirror. If the noble Lord would use his best endeavours with the car manufacturers to persuade them to ventilate the interiors of their motor cars properly, then the motorist's vision through the rear window would be much enhanced.
LORD LINDGREN: My Lords, the old-fashioned method of keeping the side window open keeps both the front window and the rear window clear.
LORD LUCAS OF CHILWORTH: Yes, and it freezes you at the same time.
LORD LINDGREN: So far as wing mirrors are concerned, the Department have been going into this question over a period of time. On buses and lorries, where the rear view is obscured as a result of the construction of the vehicle, the question to be decided is whether there should be one or two outside mirrors. But we do not think it necessary to make wing mirrors obligatory on private cars. If anyone wants to use them, and knows how to use them, good luck to him!
LORD AILWYN: My Lords, is my noble friend aware that there is a general demand to-day for these wing mirrors? Is he further aware (though I do not see why he should be) that I have a modern car without wing mirrors and that I have had very near shaves on motorways through my being unable to see, however carefully I drive, because of that horrible blind spot? There is no way one can get away from it, and I would ask him to give this matter further thought.
LORD LINDGREN: My Lords, we will certainly give this question further thought, but in fairness to the House I ought to say again that present indications within the Ministry are that it would not add to safety.
LORD SOMERS: My Lords, would the noble Lord not agree that, even with the most modern of cars, there is a point, when a car is overtaking one and is practically abreast, when it cannot be seen either in the interior mirror or directly?
LORD LINDGREN: But, my Lords, if the recommendations of the Highway Code are followed strictly, a driver would not get into that very awkward predicament. One should never move until one is sure that it is safe to do so.

COMMONWEALTH PREFERENCE AND RHODESIAN TOBACCO
2.44 p.m.
LORD AMPTHILL: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper. In doing so, I must in accordance with my usual practice, declare my interest as a tobacco manufacturer.
[The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government when they propose to introduce an amendment to the Commonwealth Preference Orders 1954 and 1957 to ensure that Commonwealth Preference applies to all Rhodesian Tobaccos from the 1965 crop purchased and paid for, but not completely packed and shipped before the U.D.I. on November 11.]
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, before answering the noble Lord's Question which is on Rhodesia, I should like, if I may, to refer to two points which I made last night in a long speech—a long speech not of my choice—in which I may have given two wrong impressions. I said in the course of my speech that Southern Rhodesia was outside the Commonwealth. Strictly, of course, under an illegal régime Southern Rhodesia would be outside the Commonwealth, but in view of the enabling Act which your Lordships recently passed we have made it clear that Southern Rhodesia is within the Commonwealth.
The second point is that I said that the Parliament of Southern Rhodesia had not been dismissed. It is true that it has not been dismissed, but under the Southern Rhodesia Constitution Order its powers to act have been withdrawn. So, in fact, it exists, but it has no powers. I thought it right to correct those two points in view of any possible misunderstandings.
In regard to the Question which the noble Lord has asked, I would reply as follows. The Southern Rhodesia (Withdrawal of Commonwealth Preference) Order 1965 provided that the termination of Preference should apply to all Rhodesian goods which were not entered with the Customs before November 19; but after consideration of representations, the Southern Rhodesia (Withdrawal of Commonwealth Preference) (No. 2) Order 1965 was made which extended entitle-
1044
ment to any Rhodesian goods which were shipped from the ports of Beira and LourenÇo Marques before November 19. It is not practicable to go further than this. The termination of entitlement to preference is a legislative act applying to all imports from this territory, and it must be on a basis which is both precisely definable and fully verifiable.
LORD AMPTHILL: My Lords, I thank the noble Lord for his Answer, which I am afraid I do not find entirely satisfactory. Can he explain to me why there is any difficulty about identifying tobacco from the 1965 crop shipped from Beira to England after November 19? Perhaps the noble Lord will remember that I covered this point fully when I addressed the House on the subject several weeks ago.
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, the noble Lord is obviously, because of his connections, thinking in terms of tobacco. If he will look at the reply that I have given, he will see that the two Orders refer to all goods from Rhodesia. It would be quite wrong to withdraw a preference on goods from Rhodesia to take into account tobacco, on the one hand, and manufactured or raw materials and food and the like, on the other. There must be one Order, and it would be utterly wrong to give preference to one particular product and not to another. Therefore, the noble Lord will see that while it might be practicable—and I emphasise the word "might"—to deal with tobacco, since it passes through relatively few hands, it would be quite a different matter to deal with all the other commodities and articles despatched from Rhodesia. The noble Lord will understand and appreciate that we considered the representations made by his trade in regard to goods despatched from Rhodesia or from the ports, and in the end we took the view that these Orders should operate on goods shipped from the ports.
LORD AMPTHILL: My Lords, is the noble Lord aware that I have checked through my company with the Customs and Excise authorities with whom we deal, and they have stated quite categorically that there is no difficulty whatsoever in identifying the packages of tobacco from the 1965 crop?
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, the noble Lord is still not recognising that, in all justice—and this is what we want —these Orders must apply to all goods. Preference cannot be given to one particular trade, which is what the noble Lord is asking, and I am quite sure the House will agree that and particular trade should not be treated any differently from another.
LORD CARRINGTON: My Lords, may I ask the noble Lord, Lord Shepherd, what proportion of the goods shipped from Beira is tobacco, and what proportion is anything else?
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, I am afraid that I cannot answer that question without notice. But undoubtedly tobacco is the major part.
LORD CARRINGTON: My Lords, but is this not really the point? Am I not right in thinking that this Order unamended, as it now stands, will put a bill for something like an extra £1½ million on the cost of the tobacco, and have an effect on our balance of payments? Surely this is not very sensible. The only people it hurts are ourselves. It does not hurt Mr. Smith. Would there not be something to be said for making a distinction in the case of tobacco?
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, the noble Lord's assumption would be right, and there would be this extra sum on the cost of tobacco, if tobacco were used immediately. But the general practice—I am sure that the noble Lord, Lord Ampthill, would confirm this—is that tobacco comes into bond in this country, and it does not have to bear any added ditties that arise until it is taken out of bond. My information is that tobacco normally remains in bond for two years. It may well be—and I am quite sure that on all sides of the House we hope this will be so—that, by the end of that time Southern Rhodesia will have returned to constitutional government, in which case the Preferences which they previously enjoyed would be restored to them. In that case, the matter would be looked at again in order to see whether this particular crop which the noble Lord, Lord Ampthill, has in mind should or should not enjoy the Preference.
LORD AMPTHILL: My Lords, is the noble Lord aware that the actual prac-
1046
tical working of this business in the tobacco industry is that the 1965 crop, with its added £l½ million will be brought into what is called leaf average, and will therefore have an immediate effect on the cost of the blends? Further, can I ask the noble Lord what purpose is served by this boomerang sanction by way of bringing Mr. Smith and his colleagues back into the paths of legality? Why should the tobacco manufacturers and importers of this country contribute over £1 million to this useless boomerang sanction?
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, the noble Lord, if he wishes, will have an opportunity to add his voice to the debate that we shall have again this evening on this general matter of sanctions.
SEVERAL NOBLE LORDS: Not on tobacco.
LORD SHEPHERD: In the past this House has gone a good deal wider than the Motion on the Order Paper, and will no doubt do so again. But I think it is true, as I said yesterday, that economic sanctions are a blunt instrument, and such an instrument is infinitely better than the sharp sword, but with a blunt instrument many people are hurt. But when you impose this particular sanction, which involves a form of taxation or the raising of revenue, you must have, as I said in my original reply, a date which is definable and fully verifiable. You cannot make adjustments between one trade and another. You must make a stand. Some gain, some lose. In the circumstances, think there is nothing further that we can usefully say on this matter.
LORD INGLEWOOD: My Lords, would it not be simplest, healthiest and most effective from the point of view of sanctions and the balance of payments if we all gave up smoking?
LORD BLYTON: My Lords, is my noble friend aware that many of us are getting tired of hearing noble Lords comforting the Queen's enemies?
LORD AMPTHILL: My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Shepherd, cannot be aware that I have risen from a bed of sickness to be here to ask this Question to-day, so I shall not be able to remain

1047
for the rest of the debate. In any case, I am sure the noble Lord would not want me to mix tobacco with oil.

COST OF NEW HOUSES
2.54 p.m.
LORD ERROLL OF HALE: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
[The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government what steps they propose to take in order to stabilise the cost of new houses.]
THE JOINT PARLIAMENTARY SECRETARY, MINISTRY OF LAND AND NATURAL RESOURCES (LORD MITCHISON): My Lords, the Government's aim, as announced in the recent White Paper (Cmnd. 2838), is to plan, with the co-operation of the building societies, representatives of the builders and of the local authorities, for a steadily rising house-building programme. Stability in house prices will be encouraged by relating the housing programme in this way to the resources available; by securing increases in productivity, particularly through the use of industrialised building techniques; by ensuring that land is available for housing at the right time, and by controlling inessential building.
LORD ERROLL OF HALE: My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord for his reply, but, as increasing wage costs are the biggest single factor putting up house prices, can the noble Lord give any indication as to what the Government are going to do in that matter?
LORD MITCHISON: My Lords, that, with respect, is a different question, and goes far beyond that which is on the Order Paper. But perhaps I might remind the noble Lord that the Government of which he was so distinguished a member met with precisely the same difficulty, and that since about the beginning of 1960 the costs of house building, whether of private houses or of council houses, have risen at much the same rate at which they have been rising in recent months. It is not a tendency that anyone wants to encourage, and the measures I have just recited are destined to discourage it.
LORD WADE: My Lords, would the noble Lord agree that the costs of new houses are in fact still continuing to rise?
LORD MITCHISON: Yes, my Lords; they have been rising since the beginning of 1960, and it will take time for these measures to operate. I think they are on the right lines. I do not think you can try to control the price of houses by clamping down on trade union activities, or any nonsense of that sort. I think the right way to deal with it is on the lines I set out in answer to the Question.

FUTURE OF FAIRFIELDS SHIPYARD
2.56 p.m.
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, I am sure it would be for the convenience of the House if I were to repeat a Statement which has been made by my right honourable friend the First Secretary in regard to the Fairfields Shipyard. These are his words:
"Although I am not yet in a position to give the House the details, I am glad to be able to say that arrangements have been made to safeguard the future of Fairfields shipyard. This will reassure not only the people working in the yard, but also the shipowners who, from a sense of patriotism and generosity, have kept orders with the yard, and sub-contractors who have continued to supply equipment to the yard despite the uncertainty which has clouded its future.
"I am glad to say that we have now the foundation for a financial partnership between the Government, private enterprise and the trade unions as a result of which this shipyard can continue. The private enterprise partners will consist of Mr. kin Stewart and his associates; Lord Thomson of Fleet; Sir Isaac Wolfson; and others with whom we are currently discussing the position. In addition, two of our major trade unions have expressed their intention of participating, and discussions are going on with others.
"The Government will hold half of the equity of the new company, to be known as Fairfield (Glasgow) Ltd. The other half will be shared between the

1049
other partners. This will enable the shipyard to operate as a commercial concern. The shipyard will need, in addition to the equity, loan capital, and this the Government are prepared to provide on normal terms. These arrangements do not extend to the engineering works, Fairfield-Rowan Ltd.
"The Chairman of the new Company will be Mr. Iain Stewart, whose wide business interests are already closely associated with the West of Scotland, and Govan in particular.
"In backing this new concept in British business all the partners, the Government, private enterprise and the trade unions, are relying on the men in the yard to co-operate unreservedly in working the yard as efficiently as possible and, in particular, in achieving the flexible manning arrangements and interchangeability of workers which are essential. If this co-operation were not forthcoming this whole scheme involving the combined support of Government, the unions and private enterprise would fall to the ground and the shipyard would have to close.
"I am sure the House will welcome our action as a quite new partnership, not only between Government and private enterprise, but now between Government, private enterprise and the trade unions; the motive being not merely to save a recently modernised Scottish shipyard from extinction, important as that would be, but, in addition to provide a proving-ground for new relations in the shipbuilding industry which could change the whole image of our country."
3.0 p.m.
LORD CARRINGTON: My Lords, I am grateful to the Chief Whip for having made that Statement to the House. We shall study with great care the details of the proposals when they are known. May I put two questions to the noble Lord? First, why did the Government consider it necessary to take a 50 percent. equity interest in this undertaking, rather than provide loan capital? Is this not really nationalisation by the back door, as demonstrated very clearly in the Labour Party Pamphlet,Signpost to the 'Sixties?Secondly, may I ask whether the sentence
1050
in the Statement in which we are told that the unions are
"relying on the men in the yard to cooperate unreservedly in working the yard as efficiently as possible and, in particular, in achieving the flexible manning arrangements",
and, lastly, that the motive is
"to provide a proving-ground for new relations in the shipbuilding industry",
mean that the unions are prepared to do away with the rule book? If that is so, why is it possible to do it only at Fair-field's and not at other shipyards?
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, I am partially grateful, I think, for the welcome that the noble Lord has given to this Statement. This is not a question of nationalisation. Here was an important and modern shipyard which was, for one reason or another, in difficulties and faced with extinction. The Government thought it right, particularly in view of the fact that we have not yet received the Geddes Report, that this yard should not close. The Government offered £1 million to the Company when it was in the hands of a manager and receiver to keep the yard going. The Government had consultations to see whether there was a future for the yard at all. It was clear that, unless the Government were prepared to take part, there was no future for the yard. The Government therefore took the view that they should become a shareholder in what was a possible operation for new capital, and as noble Lords will see, we have been able to succeed in forming a broad and wide partnership consisiting of private enterprise and the trade unions.
This is quite new, and in the field of co-operation it may well have some significant pointers to the future, particularly in regard to the point that the noble Lord, Lord Carrington made, the cooperation of the trade unions. We know of the difficulties that confront the trade unions and management in regard to restrictive practices from, I would say, both sides of industry. A great deal has been done and, no doubt, will have to be done, but these situations cannot be transformed overnight. We believe—and I certainly hope that this will be so—that the workers of Fairfields, being faced with the stark realities of their own industry, and their particular effect on their own company, will realise that if

1051
we are to be able to play our part in world competition, most of the restrictive practices that exist throughout the shipbuilding industry—and, I would say here, throughout all industry—should be reduced. But that will not be done by a sweep of a pen or a declaration; it will be done only by solid consistent work by both sides of industry.
LORD BALFOUR OF INCHRYE: My Lords, may I ask the Minister one question on this very welcome news? Does the new arrangement mean the discharge of the receiver and manager who is at present in charge, on behalf of the creditors? And will the infusion of the new capital be such that the creditors will be satisfied either wholly or in part?
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, in regard to the shareholders, I obviously cannot speak for them as to whether they are satisfied or dissatisfied. But I understand that the receiver and manager is in agreement with the final proposals, once the final arrangements have been made as to the distribution of the 50 per cent. shareholding between private enterprise—Lord Thomson of Fleet and Sir Isaac Wolfson, the trade unions, Mr. Iain Stewart and others. I may say that, apart from the initial capital, which will be provided by all the parties involved, there will be sufficient Government backing to see that this company is viable and that it will be able to meet the fairly large and welcome orders that have been placed with the yard.
LORD BLYTON: My Lords, could my noble friend say whether, with this experiment of the trade unions coining into this undertaking, there will be experimentation to end the lines of demarcation which may spread to other shipyards if the experiment proves successful?
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, I am sure that this is so. We are living in a period of change. I think change is extraordinarily welcome. One does not know how management and trade unions will evolve; but I, for one, believe that the future of this country will rest very much on the spirit that exists between unions and management and that the type of experiment now being conducted at Fair-fields will be a decisive pointer to it.
LORD CONESFORD: My Lords, I wish only to ask a question on this last
1052
point. Is the noble Lord aware that many of us will agree with him that this question of demarcation practices is not altogether simple? But the point raised by my noble Leader is, in the view of some of us, very important indeed. Am I right in assuming that Her Majesty's Government expect the unions throughout all the shipyards to behave in exactly the same way as regards demarcation as has been promised in the case of this particular shipyard?
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, the noble Lord has been in the public eye sufficiently long to know one of the reasons why there are restrictive practices on both sides of industry. It is largely a question of fear. The Government hope that in time we shall be able to reduce this fear on both sides. Once we have done that, the reduction of most of these restrictive practices will follow. But in the end it is the question of spirit; and we believe that this new experiment in Fairfield, where management and trade unions, representing the workers, can work in harmony and give security and decent standards of employment, will set an example not only to the rest of the shipbuilding industry but to the whole of the industries of this country.
LORD CONESFORD: My Lords, I am reluctant to ask anything further; but the Minister has not quite met the point I have in mind. The trade unions concerned are presumably the same trade unions as operate in all other yards. Whatever the motive of making the experiment, it should, should it not, in the view of the Government, apply forthwith to all shipyards.
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, the noble Lord will remember that I referred to the particular trade unions taking part in this experiment. As the noble Lord knows, there are many more unions connected with shipbuilding. But this is a question of spirit; certainly the trade unions and the Government particularly through D.E.A., will do their utmost to see that this spirit of enterprise will go through the whole of the shipbuilding industry.
EARL FORTESCUE: My Lords, may I ask what will be the proportion of union participation?
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, that I could not answer at the moment. I would say that the Government participation would be 50 per cent.

THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS
3.10 p.m.
THE PARLIAMENTARY SECRETARY, MINISTRY OF TECHNOLOGY (LORD SNOW): My Lords, with the leave of the House, perhaps I might take this opportunity to repeat a Statement made earlier to-day in another place by my right honourable friend the Secretary of State for Education and Science:
"The Government have already announced that they propose to set up a Public Schools Commission. I am glad to be able to tell the House that Sir John Newsom has accepted my right honourable friend's invitation to be Chairman of the Commission.
"The main function of the Commission, which will cover Scotland as well as England and Wales, will be to advise on the best way of integrating the public schools with the State system of education. The Government are determined that the public schools should make the maximum contribution to meeting the educational needs of the country, and that this should be done in such a way as to reduce the socially divisive influence which they now exert. This implies that the schools should, like other parts of the educational system, become progressively open to boys and girls irrespective of the incomes of their parents; that they should move towards a wider range of academic attainment, so that the public school sector may increasingly play its own part in the national movement towards comprehensive education; and, in particular, that they should seek to meet any unsatisfied need for boarding education among wider sections of the population.
"For the immediate purpose of the Commission, public schools are defined as those independent schools now in membership of the Headmasters' Conference, Governing Bodies' Association or Governing Bodies of Girls' Schools Association. But the Commission will also be asked to recom-
1054
mend in due course whether any action is needed in respect of other independent schools.
"The Commission will be expected to collect and assess all relevant information about the public schools and the need and existing provision for boarding education; to work out the rôle which individual schools might play in national and local schemes of integration; to initiate, subject to my right honourable friend's approval, experimental schemes; and to recommend a national plan for integrating the schools with the maintained sector of education.
"The Commission's detailed terms of reference and a list of the schools concerned will be circulated in the OFFICIAL REPORT."
Following are the Terms of Reference and list of schools referrd to:
TERMS OF REFERENCE
The main function of the Commission will be to advise on the best way of integrating the public schools with the State system of education. For the immediate purpose of the Commission, public schools are defined as those independent schools now in membership of the Headmasters' Conference, Governing Bodies' Association or Governing Bodies of Girls' Schools Association.
The Commission will be expected to carry out the following tasks:

(a) To collect and assess information about the public schools and about the need and existing provision for boarding education; forms of collaboration between the schools (in the first instance the boarding schools) and the maintained system.

(b) To work out the rôle which individual schools might play in national and local schemes of integration.

(c) If it so wishes, and subject to the approval of the Secretary of State, to initiate experimental schemes matching existing provision with different types of need.

(d) To recommend a national plan for integrating the schools with the maintained sector of education.

(e) To recommend whether any action is needed in respect of other independent schools, whether secondary or primary.

In carrying out its tasks the Commission will be expected (while respecting the denominational character of the schools), to pay special attention to the following objectives:

(a) To ensure that the public schools should make their maximum contribution to meeting national educational needs, and in the first instance any unsatisfied need for

1055
boarding education in the light of the Martin and Newsom Reports.(*)

(b) To create a socially mixed entry into the schools in order both to achieve (a) above and to reduce the divisive influence which they now exert.

(c) To move towards a progressively wider range of academic attainment amongst public school pupils, so that the public school sector may increasingly conform with the national policy for the maintained sector.

(d) To co-operate closely with local education authorities in seeking to match provision with need for boarding education.

(e) To ensure the progressive application of the principle that the pubic schools, like other parts of the educational system, should be open to boys and girls irrespective of the income of their parents.

(*) Report of the Working Party on Assistance with the Cost of Boarding Education, published 1960.Half Our Future. A report of the Central Advisory Council for Education (England), published 1963.
LIST OF SCHOOLS MENTIONED IN THE TERMS OF REFERENCE
Abbotsholme, Ackworth, Aldenham, All-hallows, Ampleforth, Ardingly, Beaumont, Bedales, Bedford, Berkhampstead, Bishop's Stortford, Bloxham, Blundell's, Bootham, Bradfield, Brighton, Bromsgrove, Bryanston, Canford, Carmel, Charterhouse, Cheltenham, Chigwell, Christ's College, Brecon, Christ's Hospital, City of London, Clayesmore, Clifton, Colston's Boys', Cranleigh, Dean Close, Denstone, Douai, Dover, Downside, Dulwich, Durham, Eastbourne, Edinburgh Academy, Ellesmere, Epsom, Eton, Felsted, Fettes, Forest, Friends', Giggleswick, Glasgow Academy, Glenalmond, Trinity College, Gordonstoun, Grenville, Gresham's, Haileybury and I.S.C., Harrow, Harrow, Lower School of John Lyon, Highgate, Hurstpierpoint College, Ipswich, Kelly College, Tavistock, King's College School, Wimbledon, King's College, Taunton, King's School, Bruton Somerset. King's School, Canterbury, King's School, Ely, Cambs., King's School, Gloucester, King's School, Macclesfield, King's School, Rochester, Kingswood, Lancing College, Langley School, Leighton Park, Leys, Liverpool, Llandovery, Lord Wandsworth, Loretto, Malvern, Marlborough, Merchant Taylors', Merchiston Castle School, Mill Hill, Milton Abbey, Monkton Combe, Mount St. Mary's, Nautical College, Pangbourne. Nottingham, Oratory, Oswestry, Oundle, Prior Park, Queen's College, Taunton, Radley, Ratcliffe, Reed's Rendcomb, Repton, Rishworth, Rossall, Royal Masonic, Royal Merchant Navy School, Rugby, Ruthin, Rydal, St. Bees, St. Benedict's, St. Dunstan's, St. Edmunds, Canterbury, St. Edward's, St. George's, Harpenden, St. George's, Weybridge, St. John's, Leatherhead, St. Lawrence, St. Paul's, St. Peter's, Scarborough, Sebright, Sedbergh, Sevenoaks, Sherbourne, Shrewsbury, Silcoates. Solihull, Stonyhurst, Stowe, Strathallan, Sutton Valence, Taunton, Tettenhall College, Tonbridge, Trent, Truro Cathedral School, University College
1056
School, Hampstead, Uppingham, Warwick King's School, Wellingborough, Wellington, Westminster, Whitgift, Winchester, Worksop, Wrekin, Wycliffe, The Abbey, Malvern Wells, Abbot's Hill, Hemel Hempstead, Alice Ottley School, Worcester, Ancaster House School, Bexhill, Ashford School, Kent, Atherley School, Southampton, Badminton School, Westbury-onTrym, Bedford High School, Bedgebury Park, Goudhurst, Benenden School, Cranbrook, Berkhamsted School for Girls, Brentwood School, Southport, Bruton School for Girls, Burgess Hill P.N.E.U. School, Casterton School, Kirkby Lonsdale, Channing School, Highgate, Charters Towers School, Bexhill, Cheltenham Ladies' College, Christ's Hospital Girls' School, Hertford, City of London School for Girls, Claremount School, Esher, Cleveland School, Stockton-on-Tees, Clifton High School, Convent of the Holy Child Jesus, Edgbaston, Convent of the Sacred Heart, Hove, Convent of the Sacred Heart, Woldingham, Cranborne Chase School, Tisbury, Croft House School, Shillingstone, Croham Hurst School, S. Croydon, Derby High School, Downe House, Newbury, Durham High School, East Anglian School, Bury St. Edmunds, Edgbaston Church of England College, Edgbaston High School, Ellerslie, Great Malvern, Elmslie Girls' School, Blackpool, Eothen School, Caterham, Esdaile School, Edinburgh, Farnborough Hill Convent College, Farringtons Girls' School, Chislehurst, Felixstowe College, Francis Holland School. N.W.1, Francis Holland School, S.W.1. Gardenhurst School, Burnham-on-Sea, Godolphin School, Salisbury, Greenacre School for Girls, Banstead, The Grove School, Hindhead, Guildford High School, Harrogate College, Hawnes School, Haynes Park, Headington School, Oxford, Heathfield School, Ascot, Hollington Park School, St. Leonards-on-Sea, Howell's School, Denbigh, Hull High School. Hunmanby Hall, Filey, Huyton College, Liverpool, James Allen's Girls' School, Dulwich, Kent College, Pembury, Kingsley School, Leamington Spa, Lady Eleanor Holles School, Hampton, Lawnside School, Malvern. Lewes High School, Lillesden School, Hawkhurst, Lowther College, Rhyl, Malvern Girls' College, Micklefleld School, Seaford, Moira House School, Eastbourne, Moreton Hall, Oswestry, Mount School, Mill Hill. Mount School, York, Newcastle-on-Tyne Church High School, Northwood College, Oakdene, Beaconsfield, Ockbrook School, Derby, Overstone School, Northampton, Parsons Mead, Ashtead, Penrhos College, Colwyn Bay, Pipers Corner School, High Wycombe, Polam Hall, Darlington, Princess Helena College, Hitchin, Prior's Field, Godalming, Queen Anne's School, Caversham, Queen Ethelhurga's School, Harrogate, Queen Margaret's School, Esrick, Queen's College, London, W.1, Queenswood, Hatfield, Roedean School, Brighton, Royal Masonic School for Girls, Rickmansworth, Royal Naval School, Haslemere, Royal School, Bath, St. Albans High School, St. Audries School. West Quantoxhead, St. Brandon's School, Clevedon, St. Catherine's School, Bramley, St. Clare's School, Penzance, St. Dunstan's Abbey, Plymouth. St. Elphin's School, Darley Dale, St. Felix School, Southwold, St. George's School, Edinburgh, St. Helen's School, Northwood, St. Hilary's School, Alderley Edge, St. James' School, West

1057
Malvern, St. Joseph's Convent, Reading, St. Leonards-Mayfield School, Mayfield, St. Leonards and St. Katherine's, St. Andrews, St. Margaret's School, Exeter, St. Martin's School, Solihull, St. Mary's Convent, Ascot, St. Mary's Convent, Shaftesbury, St. Mary's Hall, Brighton, St. Mary's School, Calne, St. Mary's School, Gerrards Cross, St. Mary's School, Wantage, St. Michael's School, Limpsfield, St. Michael's School, Petworth, St. Monica's School, Clacton, St. Paul's Girls' School, W.6, St. Stephen's College, Broadstairs, St. Swithun's School. Winchester, St. Winifred's School, Llanfairfechan, School of S. Mary and S. Anne, Abbots Bromley, Sherborne School for Girls, Skellfield School, Thirsk, Stonar School, Melksham, Stover School. Newton Abbot. Stratford House School, Bickley, Sunderland High School, Surbiton High School, Tormead School. Guildford, Trinity Hall, Southport. Tudor Hall School, Banbury, Uplands School, Parkstone, Upper Chine School, Shanklin, Upton Hall Convent, Upton, Wirral, Wadhurst College, Welsh Girls' School, Ashford. Middlesex, Wentworth Collegiate School, Bournemouth, West Cornwall School, Penzance, Westonbirt School, Tetbury, Westwood House School, Peterborough, Winceby House School, Bexhill, Winterbourne House Collegiate School, Bristol, Wycombe Abbey School, York College.
LORD ABERDARE: My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Snow, for repeating that Statement, although I cannot give it a very warm welcome. It seems to me a further example of how the Government have their priorities wrong in the sphere of education. In our opinion, the real priorities lie in the school curriculum, the provision and training of teachers and the building of schools; whereas the Government have gone for the red herring of comprehensive education, in which they have put our grammar schools at risk, and are now seeking to interfere with the public schools. I need not remind your Lordships that in these two sectors, grammar and public schools, lie most of the outstanding schools in this country. The only glimmer of hope in the Statement, and something which I welcome, is the appointment of Sir John Newsom as the Commission's Chairman. Those of us who know Sir John Newsom certainly have confidence in his judgment. I hope that under his chairmanship the Commission will act with wisdom.
May I ask the noble Lord whether he can go a little further in defining what is meant by the word "integrate". The Secretary of State has said on several occasions that he has no intention of interfering with the freedom of people to educate their children privately, should they so wish. Can the noble Lord then
1058
confirm that by "integration" there is no intention of taking over the public schools, of interfering with their internal independence of government, or of interfering with the standards of entry which they set?
LORD REA: My Lords, may I also welcome the Statement, and thank the noble Lord for making it? May I join with the noble Lord in welcoming Sir John Newsom as Chairman of this Commission. I understand that a list of the schools concerned, as well as the Commission's terms of reference, is to be published in the Official Report. If that means to-morrow, may I ask whether we are also to have the names of those who will be serving with Sir John Newsom, whom we so much welcome? I ask this because it has come to the notice of some of us who have a certain interest in public schools that certain representatives, if not officials, of the Ministry of Education have come round investigating, and in one case I know of they said they were making a complete survey of the public school system within a period of two months. This seemed to me quite ridiculous, in view of the very widespread and traditional effect that these schools have. I take it that there is no limit to the time which the Commission may spend on this inquiry, but we should like to know, and to be reassured by knowing the names of the other members of the Commission.
LORD SNOW: My Lords, the list of schools and the terms of reference will appear in the OFFICIAL REPORT tomorrow, and we hope to give the names of the other members to noble Lords within a few days. I can assure the noble Lord, Lord Rea, that, misguided we may be; mad we are not. We have not suggested that two months would be a reasonable time for any such Commission to work. In fact, the time we have thought provisionally in which it might be able to report is about two years, which seems to me a relatively reasonable time.
On the point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Aberdare, I think it would be for the Commission to suggest what integration really means. I can reiterate the statement of my right honourable friend that there is no intention of interfering with the right of parents to educate their children privately. I should like to

1059
say further—on this I am a little sensitive—that it is unreasonable of a noble Lord, who is usually a very reasonable man, to suggest that many Members on these Benches, including myself if I may say so, are completely insensitive to the needs of quality in secondary education.
THE LORD BISHOP OF CHESTER: My Lords, may I ask the noble Lord whether it is intended to include within the purview of the Commission the direct-grant schools?
LORD SNOW: No, my Lords; I have to tell the right reverend Prelate that my right honourable friend is very happy about the present co-operation of the direct-grant schools and the local authorities, and he proposes to leave that there for the moment. He believes that to bring them within the purview of this Commission would be to confuse the issue.
TIIE LORD BISHOP OF CHESTER: My Lords, may I follow that up by asking that this point may be very carefully considered? A great many of the direct-grant schools consider themselves to be public schools. Their headmasters are members of the Headmasters' Conference, and I think that great harm might be done if the welfare and the contribution of the direct-grant schools were not included in this general survey of the public school system.
LORD SNOW: My Lords, I will certainly communicate to my right honourable friend the views of the right reverend Prelate, but I am afraid that I ought not to raise false hopes. This point has been deeply considered, and I think it unlikely that my right honourable friend will feel able to alter his decision.
LORD CONESFORD: My Lords, if the Government have chosen distinguished men to serve on this Commission on whom they rely, as I assume is the case, why cannot they be left to make up their own minds on whether there should be comprehensive schools or not, and on how far the public schools entering a comprehensive system would improve the quality of education?
LORD SNOW: My Lords, I can assure the noble Lord, Lord Conesford, that in fact the Commission will be given the fullest liberty to express any views on almost any subject relating to secondary education.
LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, may I ask the noble Lord, Lord Snow, this? He is talking about the integration of independent schools. Will the noble Lord ensure that, whatever integration means, it does not mean the loss of independence? Would he agree that independence means the right to choose your master, your teachers; the right to choose your pupils, and the right to determine your own curriculum?
LORD SNOW: These are clearly things which the Commission will have most carefully to consider.
LORD OGMORE: My Lords, I must declare my interest as I am a governor of an independent school with a long history of independence in the days when education was very much the prerogative of the State and the State Church. May I ask the noble Lord whether the governors and the views of the governors of independent schools will be considered, and whether, if any particular school does not wish to enter a comprehensive system, it will be able to stay out?
LORD SNOW: To the first question, I can give a simple, "Yes". My right honourable friend is most anxious that the Joint Committee of the Headmasters' Conference and the Governing Bodies' Association should be associated with the Commission during its activities. To the second question I must say that this would be a matter for the Commission to suggest recommendations to Her Majesty's Government. But there is no immediate intention of introducing legislation unless in fact the Commission suggests this is the only method by which we can operate.

LENGTH OF DEBATES
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, I wonder whether I may inform the House that, in view of the length of business for to-day, dinners will be available between 7.30 and 9 p.m. I gathered on Monday that the usual channels have some influence in the House and, in view of the fact that there are fifteen speakers in this important debate and then an important Order to deal with, I wonder whether noble Lords who take part this afternoon would bear this in mind and be as concise as possible.

HUNTINGDON AND PETERBOROUGH (AMENDMENT) ORDER 1965
3.21 p.m.
LORD MITCHISON: My Lords, perhaps I can be concise about this matter. Huntingdon had a greyhound racing track and Peterborough had another greyhound racing track, and so long as they were two counties they could each have separate betting days and even separate special betting days under the Betting, Gaming and Lotteries Act 1963. They have now been amalgamated, with the result that where there were two licensing districts there is now only one. Accordingly, a special Order is required to allow these two greyhound racing tracks to preserve the measure of separation in the matter of their betting clays that they have hitherto enjoyed. The Order is made under a provision in general terms, Section 38 of the Local Government Act, and my right honourable friend is advised that he has power to do it in this way. Indeed, there was a somewhat similar provision—a provision, that is, practically amending a Statute in a small particular —in the West Midlands Order which your Lordships passed the other day. I beg to move that the Order be approved.
Moved, That the Huntingdon and Peterborough (Amendment) Order 1965, he approved.—(Lord Mitchison.)
LORD HASTINGS: My Lords, I see that the Special Orders Committee said that in their opinion this Order raises an important question of policy and principle and that it cannot be passed by the House without special attention. I think that the Parliamentary Secretary has given it the special attention it requires and I do not propose to pay any more attention to it.
LORD DERWENT: My Lords, may I ask the noble Lord, because I have also read the Order, if he understands it?
LORD MITCHISON: My Lords, I am not to be tempted. Sub-paragraph (2) of paragraph 4 of the Order is the operative sub-paragraph, and I can only say that a fruitier instance of choctaw for bookies I have never met.
On Question, Motion agreed to.

REDEVELOPMENT OF WHITEHALL
3.24 p.m.
EARL JELLICOE EARL JELLICOE rose to call attention to the reports by Sir Leslie Martin and Mr. Colin Buchanan on the redevelopment of Whitehall; and to move for Papers. The noble Earl said: My Lords, my purpose in moving this Motion this afternoon is very simple. We have all seen great changes in London since the war. We have seen some marvellous opportunities missed and some great monstrosities perpetrated. Now a major change is impeding for the whole Westminster area. These changes could further dignify and embellish some of the most precious acres in this country. Or they could irretrievably mar them. I am very glad that Sir Leslie Martin and Professor Buchanan were invited to report on this vital matter. No better men, I think, could have been chosen and they could not have produced a better Report. I recommend it to your Lordships as this year's best Christmas bargain, marvellously produced book, worth £2 10s.—for your Lordships, quite free.
Sir Leslie Martin rightly says in the Report:
"Final decisions and choices are ultimately for the Government and others".
There are many others, including not least the Civic Trust who have already played a valuable part in focusing public attention on these Reports. But first among the "others" is Parliament, and especially your Lordships' House. We usually make quite a good fist of these things and, myself excluded, I am certain that we shall make a good fist of them to-day, not least because there are following me two planner-achitects of international reputation. So, very conscious of my lay status in these matters, I shall plunge straight in and concentrate my remarks on the first six recommendations of Sir Leslie Martin's Report, which are to be found on pages 5 and 6 of the Report. Perhaps I should remind those noble Lords who find this layman hard to follow that there is a model illustrating the scheme in the Royal Gallery now, by the kind arrangement of the noble Lord, Lord Mitchison.
We are told in the first recommendation that we now have the chance to give this whole area of London a new

1063
and better environment. Clearly, we should try not to lose this chance. We have bungled far too many opportunities in London since the war. Just look at that tired straggle of gamma-minus buildings from Lambeth Bridge to Vauxhall Bridge across the river. Let us do what we now have to do in Whitehall and do it really well. Then there is the second and vital recommendation that we can create the right environment here only if we plan to draw off progressively all irrelevant traffic from Whitehall and more especially from Parliament Square. I hope we can all cordially agree that Parliament Square should be a place in which the student can stroll and the politician potter. We really ought not to have to court suicide underneath a 59A every time we try to cross New Palace Yard. But platonic agreement with Martin and Buchanan is one thing. Willing the means and the money is quite another.
We were told, I think last July, that the Greater London Council were being asked to have an urgent look at the two proposals which, when they were executed, could immediately draw off some 70 per cent. of the traffic through Parliament Square. The first of these proposals is for a riverside tunnel along the Embankment outside this Palace of Westminster. I know there are some, and they include some very distinguished people, who feel that the tunnel scheme could spoil the lovely view from the South Bank of this Palace of Westminster, rising, as it does, like Venus from the incestuous embrace of Father Thames. But can the noble Lord tell us how far this examination of the scheme is going? Is it feasible? Does it need possibly extending farther South? And if this is a good scheme—and I personally am inclined to think that it may be—should we not consider promoting it a little higher on the Martin batting order?
I also hope that the noble Lord can tell us about the Horseferry Road proposals. They are pretty big beer, as Professor Buchanan feels that a dual three-way highway may be needed in this area. Is this, in the Government's view, really a starter? Whilst I am on the question of the traffic implications of the Report, could I ask the noble Lord: are the Government happy about
1064
the interim proposal which would mean that there would be a lot more traffic surging around the South-East rim, the rim nearer the House, of St. James's Park? What about the more far-reaching traffic implications of the Buchanan Report?
The third clutch of recommendations are simpler; no competition for the Abbey and these Houses of Parliament from new tall buildings—cordially agreed, so far as I am concerned. No change in the outward appearance of this Palace of Westminster—agreed again. Finally, the preservation of almost all the finest buildings in Whitehall. I certainly do not quarrel with what is on the list, but I am worried about some of the omissions. I assume that poor, neglected Richmond Terrace is to go; and I shall have a little more to say about the Foreign Office building in a few moments. But I should like to put in a special plea for Gwydyr House. But, generally speaking, as one would expect from Sir Leslie Martin, I should feel that the preservation balance in Whitehall has been quite fairly struck.
The next recommendation is that the Bridge Street site, to one's right as one comes over Westminster Bridge should be reserved for the new Parliamentary building and for proposed new Government offices, and that the Broad Sanctuary site, at the West end of Parliament Square, should be earmarked for a large new building for a number of purposes. The Bridge Street site is, I think, a pretty sorry mess at present, and I, for one, rather like the look of the new proposals for it. They have the special measure of consigning to a deserved limbo the Select Committee's neo-Gothic aberration. But since the other place do sometimes indulge in these flights of fancy, I hope that the noble Lord will be able to tell us this afternoon that this House will be given a proper opportunity of making its views known on the designs of the whole of this Bridge Street site, not only the Parliamentary building, but this important office building as well.
I am a good deal less happy about the Broad Sanctuary scheme. It would sweep away that charming building, the Middlesex Guildhall. Surely we should find some appropriate, and perhaps Parliamentary use for that building. It would

1065
also mean that two unborn buildings of great potential promise would never see the light of day. Instead we should get a large general-purpose building. One of the purposes of that building would be to provide a major international conference centre. We may need one, but I wonder whether it is wise to plonk it down just around the corner from Whitehall. And would the great, wide, windy new Parliament Square that we should thereby create be better than the two rather more intimate affairs that we have at present? I confess that this layman just does not know. But what I do know is that these particular proposals could well do with a considerable amount of further study.
The fifth set of recommendations are, in my view, the most debatable of all. I like the proposal to develop the whole area around and behind Central Hall. A good new scheme there could improve a rather scrappy area. But it will clearly need to be related to what is decided eventually about the Broad Sanctuary site. However, I must confess that at first sight, I am far from enamoured of the plan for a larger residential block of flats—some 450 bed-sitters for M.P.s —stretching between Great Peter Street and Great College Street right down to the river. I wonder whether the 450 M.P.s themselves would want to be herded together in this Parliamentary dormitory? This artificial fence across Millbank would close a good view of the entrance to Parliament Square. It would also lop off a large chunk of the enlarged Victoria Tower Gardens. Above all, I find it hard to see how it could be reconciled with the character of Lord North Street and of those other lovely Georgian enclaves to the North of it. I hope that the noble Lord can tell us that the Government are in no wise committed at the moment to this particular project.
This brings me to perhaps the most important and most debatable single proposal, the plan to build a vast Ziggurat of (I think they have been termed) Government offices on the sites now occupied by Scott's Palmerstonian Foreign Office and the Edwardian building next door—that empire on the corner of Great George Street over which Dame Evelyn Sharp, with a little help, or hindrance, from Mr. Crossman, now reigns. I am on a
1066
bit of a spot here, having had, against my better taste, to defend the last Government's decision to knock down the whole Foreign Office building. Having this weight of former guilt lying rather heavily on my shoulders, I cannot press this point as hard as I should like to. But even at this late hour, I hope the Government will at least pause before destroying one of the loveliest urban landscapes in the world, the view from St. James's Park towards the North-West facade of the Foreign Office building. Is there no possibility of preserving at least this North-West wing of the building?
Be that as it may, I am certain that I can press the Government not to commit themselves now, and without further inquiry, to the total scheme for this complex of Government offices at the South end of Whitehall. The two new buildings would together cover an area twice the size of Waterloo Station, and they would enclose nine Selfridges'. I wonder whether an architectural giant of this size would really lie down in architectural peace with this Palace and with the Abbey, which are of a quite different scale. We must remember, too, that this complex will be part and parcel of the new offices in Bridge Street, and linked to them by a bridge straddling and spanning the southern end of Whitehall. One would have thought that this umbilical cord hung over Whitehall must be bound to obstruct the views up and down it. Again, can the noble Lord give us the assurance that the Government are not yet committed to this bridging operation?
On purely æsthetic grounds, therefore, I would ask the Government to scratch their heads very hard indeed before they finally decide to pull down all of this great Victorian building, and this not unworthy Edwardian building. We rightly criticise our Victorian and Edwardian predecessors for the havoc they wrought to Georgian London. Before we, in our turn, destroy their better buildings, let us be absolutely certain that they will be replaced by something better.
There are also very serious planning problems involved here. The gravest problem, however, is the explosion of a vast population in Whitehall which this scheme would provoke. It would add another 10,000 or 12,000 to the 15,000

1067
civil servants who already ply their pens in Whitehall. "That is quite all right", the Government seem to say. "We are only decanting civil servants into Whitehall from expensive outlying tenanted properties. We are not adding to the total number." But do the Government propose to stop other office workers moving into these vacated properties? If so, will the Government foot the resulting Bill for compensation? If not, would not this policy of deliberately provoking a dramatic increase of the office population at the heart of London be clean contrary to this Government's—and, indeed, the previous Government's—declared policy?
Finally, my Lords, there is the recommendation that a thorough study should be made of the Trafalgar Square area before we embark on radical changes at the North end of Whitehall. I am sure that this is absolutely right, and I trust that the noble Lord can tell us that the Government are commissioning such a study, preferably by this well-tried team of Martin and Buchanan. More plans are, I believe, incubating for Central London than at any other period in its history. Possibly the right answer might be to build, as Martin and Buchanan half suggest, a great northern extension of Whitehall, past Charing Cross, by Covent Garden, right as far as the British Museum, completely by-passing Trafalgar Square. It could be called, if it is started in the lifetime of the present Government, the "Boulevard Charles Pannell".
In any event, this area around the northern end of Whitehall has a key part to play in all these maturing plans. It could also, I believe, play a crucial part in the plans for the southern end of Whitehall. On both sides of Whitehall, near Trafalgar Square and in and around Northumberland Avenue, there is an absolute forest of fourth-rate architecture. Could we not take advantage of this if we decide to retain, say, a part of the Foreign Office building? If we hesitate to pull down the Great George Street building, if this site, therefore, becomes too small for Lord Gladwyn's new Ministry of External Affairs, might not the old ducal site of Northumberland House be the ideal place on which to build the new Palais Gladwyn?But, quite seriously, I
1068
trust that the Government will not proceed too far with their plans for this huge Government complex at the South end of Whitehall until we see whether part of it, at least, could be accommodated further to the North.
My Lords, much of what I have said may have sounded critical of these Reports. But that is not my intention. I believe that they will provide the general framework and discipline within which the shape of the new Whitehall will emerge. Yet this does not mean that the scheme, in all its particulars, should be regarded as immutable. What I would therefore urge is that we should now, at this moment, try to distinguish between what is indispensable and must be done straight away, and what is more debatable and longer-term. Let us, therefore, go ahead with the Bridge Street site scheme and, if it is sound, with the riverside tunnel scheme. But let the Government think very hard indeed before finally committing themselves, and all the rest of us, to the remainder of this great scheme at this stage.
In certain cases, we still need to know more facts. Do we really, for example, need to add a full division to the monstrous army of civil servants who already occupy Whitehall? In other instances, we may well need the fruits of further studies—for example, that on the possibilities around the northern pole of Whitehall. Moreover, where the Government are themselves the developers and the planning authority at one and the same time, we need to evolve some machinery by which the play of competing interests -—and there must be a great many competing interests and considerations involved here—can be resolved. Above all, we need to pool the best ideas and the best minds which can be brought to bear on this problem. To assist this cerebral process, I therefore believe—and I believe this very strongly—that the Government would be wise to hold a public inquiry, or a series of inquiries, preferably not of too judicial or too formal a character, into those aspects of this scheme which are debatable and longer-term. I hope that, with a little persuasion—I have seen some signs of it recently—the Government will come round to some such idea.
In conclusion, I can find no better text for what I have tried to say than some

1069
words from Professor Buchanan's Report,Traffic in Towns This is what he said of Norwich; and I think it applies equally well to Whitehall:
"There is a great deal at stake; it is not a question of retaining a few old buildings, but of conserving, in the face of the onslaught of motor traffic, a major part of the heritage of the English-speaking world of which this country is the guardian."
My Lords, I beg to move for Papers.
3.45 p.m.
LORD HOLFORD: My Lords, I had never intended to weary your Lordships with lengthy comments on this plan, and the timing of the Royal Commission at 4 o'clock fits in exactly with my own wish to be brief. I should therefore like to begin by saying that I am grateful to the noble Earl, Lord Jellicoe, not only for raising this Motion, but also for allowing me ample time for my few comments before the Royal Commission.
Your Lordships will, I think, understand me when I say that it is natural that I should have followed with very close interest the making of the Report on the preservation and change in Whitehall by Sir Leslie Martin and Professor Buchanan, and also that, knowing and respecting them both, I should welcome it now that it is made. I think this is the first time in nearly a century that the framework of a plan has been created for Parliament and for the headquarters of the Civil Service, for it was three years ago that the Minister of Public Building and Works in the last Government asked me to make what would be called, in the current jargon of the day, a feasibility study of the Bridge Street site, that is, the site immediately to our North. This site is bounded by Bridge Street on the South and by Richmond Terrace on the North side, and on the other two sides of the quadrilateral by Parliament Street and the Embankment.
He wanted to know, first, whether it was practicable, without damaging the views up and down Whitehall, or of the Houses of Parliament, or in fact of the riverside, to build there a moderate extension of the accommodation for Members of the House of Commons, and also a new building which in those days was intended for the Home Office; and to do this while retaining the buildings then occupied by Scotland Yard, and also rebuilding Cannon Row Police Station and
1070
some other police buildings, and some shops and service buildings. Secondly, the Minister wanted to know whether it was physically possible to augment the car parking in New Palace Yard by connecting it with an underground annex on the North side of Bridge Street. Those of your Lordships who can picture in your mind's eye the convolutions of the Metropolitan Line and other services, realise that this was not an easy matter to establish.
Finally, the Minister wanted to make certain that there was a case for acquiring certain property in private ownership in the Bridge Street site, on the assumption that a comprehensive rebuilding scheme for that site would be approved. And, of course, he wanted to know the order of cost of the whole project. I think I may say that I satisfied the Minister on these points. But, while I was undertaking a general survey of the site, I was making in fact a technical exercise, and certainly not an architectural design. However, when the Report was debated in another place, it was, I fear, treated as a design, although no designs had in fact ever been made. It was found inadequate on two counts in particular: first, it did not provide enough expansion space for Members of Parliament and, secondly, the scheme was not grand enough.
It was pointed out this was the last opportunity this century for an extension to the Palace of Westminster, and there was even a flirtation (as the noble Earl has commented) with the idea that this extension should be in the Gothic style. This flirtation was not followed by any formal engagement. I was personally, however, very relieved when the Minister decided that neither the extension of Parliament nor the redevelopment of the Bridge Street site should be considered, as it were, in isolation, but should be considered as an integral part of the centre of Government as a whole.
It was then that Sir Leslie Martin and Professor Buchanan were appointed. Now, at least, we have a plan, a plan for the whole of the Whitehall area. To me, this plan appears as a set of inter-connected ideas. First, there is the idea for circulation of traffic. I am not going to say, in view of the circulation of traffic problems of other parts of London and other cities in this country, whether this

1071
particular scheme should have the resources or the priorities that its authors are seeking for it. That is one of the questions of policy to which I shall come in a moment, but there is an idea here, and a very good one, for the circulation of traffic within Whitehall. Secondly, there is an idea for accommodation, or perhaps I should describe it as a system of accommodation, for Government offices. Thirdly, there is an idea for relating buildings and open spaces in the City of Westminster as a whole—a piece of urban scenery, if you like to call it so, preserving and enhancing the views and equipping the area to face the very strident demands of the 20th century.
I repeat that this is a plan; it is not a specification. The plan does not say that all the 40,000 civil servants working in Westminster shall be concentrated in Whitehall. It does show, however, how space for, at present 15,000 or so civil servants working in Whitehall itself could be increased for 26,000; in other words, how two-fifths of the total of civil servants in Westminster could be turned into three-fifths. Should that be the decision that the Government eventually take? There is a case, I submit, for a certain amount of concentration. In spite of what the noble Earl, Lord Jellicoe, has said about its being formidable, it is not really a very large increase and this is, after all, the centre of Government and the one place in the country where one would expect to find the highest and most efficient concentration of Government offices.
Always assuming that there is a decision to do so, and presumably to evacuate some of the outworn and more outlying offices in Westminster at present occupied, if that is taken as a decision of policy it seems to me that the next step is to get down to actual figures; and this is where Sir Leslie Martin's last recommendation regarding the area of Whitehall, including the old War Office site, should obviously be scrutinised in great detail. It would be ironical if, after the passing of the Control of Office and Industrial Development Act, we should have in fact the vacated offices of Government reoccupied, at possibly even a higher density than before.
Secondly, to give one other example, the plan does not say that the Foreign
1072
Office must be totally demolished forthwith. Instead it follows the brief which was provided by the Government, which was quite clear and told Sir Leslie Martin that the building should be regarded as eventually obsolete and eventually expendable. That was in his brief; it was not for him to say whether or not it should be demolished, but the plan did show how a new and much more rational system of Government office building could be started on the Bridge Street site, and if it were found to be a better system than that of the rather monumental Victorian buildings which it was replacing, that system could be extended across to the western side of Whitehall, or it could be modified, or in fact it could be superseded by an even better system in ten, twelve or fifteen years' time. In this regard, I think the plan is suggesting methods and systems based on a far more rational concept of how to house civil servants, how to work Government Departments, how to place conference rooms, than anything that we have had before because the last big survey of Whitehall really considered buildings with monumental outsides, with a few very important rooms inside, but the general average run of office and service accommodation was hardly considered at all.
In short, then, the plan is a framework that hangs together, and so long as it hangs together it can provide what I think is most badly needed—namely, something to guide decisions and choices. When we have seen the first development on the Bridge Street site we shall have a far more logical and clear idea of whether it is worth while to pull down the whole of the Foreign Office, to pull down part of it, or in fact to adapt it in certain parts to other uses; and I should like to corroborate what the noble Earl, Lord Jellicoe, said about the particular value of the buildings facing St. James's Park. Meanwhile, it seems that a good deal of research and development is required, and I think it would be interesting if the noble Lord who is replying to this debate could indicate the manner in which the detailed briefs are to be considered and this research and development in fact begun.
There are many details in the plan which I think are open to question, as the noble Earl has just said. I myself

1073
find it difficult to see why we should preserve the Houses of Parliament with their riverside setting and then deprive them of an integral part of that setting, namely the River Thames—the reflections in the water, the privacy of the terrace and the feeling that the Palace stands open to the public on one side, but in partial retreat on the other. This is a valuable characteristic, which has been copied in other countries, and it seems to me a pity to take a public road across at ground level. If, however, it is taken in a tunnel, which is quite within the possibilities envisaged by the plan, obviously there must be a great deal of work done as to the level at which it will come out. It will possibly be much nearer the Tate Gallery than Lambeth Bridge, but this is an illustration of the kind of work that has to be done.
I conclude by suggesting that, although a general statement has already been made and could not be improved by a vast public inquiry at which all the ideas would be thrown into the air and it would be very difficult to reach a decision, it is nevertheless essential to have some means by which the individual parts of this scheme could in fact be considered in detail and carried forward. May I just say that I do not consider the scale of these proposals in Sir Leslie Martin's plan to be so vast. They are no more vast than the scale, for example, of Carlton House Terrace or Chester Terrace in Regent's Park; two Regency terraces, each 1,000 feet long; and if you take Sir Leslie's proposal, the whole length along the South side is precisely 1,000 feet. None of the buildings is proposed to be higher than 80 feet, and although personally I think we can do without the bridge over Whitehall, I am not in the least appalled about the scale of the proposition.
What does worry me is that during these last few years over 3 million square feet have been provided in commercial accommodation along Victoria Street and 1,900,000 square feet are to come, so 5 million square feet of new accommodation is being provided piecemeal, without relation to any great design and without in fact contributing at all to the grandeur and mystery and the homeliness of this wonderful City of Westminster. We certainly should not allow the provision of that kind of accommodation
1074
to be repeated over the next twenty or thirty years in the Westminster precincts itself, and therefore I hope noble Lord will give a welcome to the framework and the principles of the plan, and reserve their situation on the manner in which some of the detailed proposals have to be further studied.
House adjourned during pleasure.
House resumed.

ROYAL COMMISSION
4.10 p.m.
The following Bills and Measure received the Royal Assent:

Expiring Laws Continuance,

Pensions (Increase),

Workmen's Compensation and Benefit (Amendment),

Rural Water Supplies and Sewerage,

Housing (Slum Clearance Compensation),Coal Industry,

Teachers' Superannuation,

Corporation of the Trinity House of Leith Order Confirmation,

Clyde Navigation (Superanuation) Order Confirmation,

Clyde Port Authority Order Confirmation,

Glasgow Corporation (No. 2) Order Confirmation,

Heriot-Watt College Order Confirmation,

Prayer Book (Versions of the Bible) Measure.

House adjourned during pleasure.
House resumed.

REDEVELOPMENT OF WHITEHALL
4.19 p.m.
Debate resumed.
LORD MITCHISON: My Lords, I should like to begin by thanking Lord Jellicoe, first of all, for giving us the opportunity of discussing this subject;

1075
secondly, for a most reasonable and helpful speech about it, and, thirdly, for his courtesy in giving me a short indication beforehand of what he was going to say. I should like, too, to thank Lord Holford for a similarly helpful speech, from someone with unrivalled experience in this sort of matter. If I may humbly say so, there were two excellent speeches, and there are other noble Lords who wish to speak. I will try to be as concise as possible. I do not propose to inflict on your Lordships my aesthetic views on any matter; I feel that the views of other noble Lords would be of more value. But what I will do is to speak in the same way as a building owner might speak if this were a case of a single building. It is, of course, not a case of a single building.
May I say something about the history of the whole business?—and it is a history of divers proposals going back over many years. What Mr. Geoffrey Rippon, the then Minister of Public Building and Works, in April, 1964, instructed Sir Leslie Martin to do as a consultant was:
"to ensure that the various proposals which are under consideration for redevelopment in the Whitehall area are related to each other and to have regard to the general architectural character of the area, taking relevant traffic considerations into account".
The terms of reference went on to identify the area and to refer specifically to some parts of it. About a year later, Professor Colin Buchanan having been added as a consultant on traffic, the Martin-Buchanan Plan, as it is convenient to call it, was produced, and published in July, 1965. I would willingly accept and adopt two phrases of the noble Lord, Lord Holford, about that so-called Plan. It is a set of interconnected ideas—I agree. It is a framework that hangs together—I agree. I suggest that we should bear that in mind, and that we should also bear in mind the terms in which the Government welcomed the Plan.
How right they were to welcome it! To have produced such clear-sighted and inspiring Reports within about a year was indeed a remarkable achievement by the two distinguished authors. The Government—here I quote from the statements made in both Houses—regarded the Reports:
"as the broad framework within which the future development of the buildings in the
1076
Whitehall and Parliament Square areas should take place".
The Government were in sympathy with the concept of a precinct in and around Parliament Square from which traffic not serving the area should be gradually withdrawn. The Government took the view that plans for removing traffic from Parliament Square must be looked at in the context of London traffic as a whole, and they invited the Greater London Council to give urgent consideration to two major traffic points, to which I will shortly refer, and to examine the proposal for a primary road network in Central London. The next two sentences are also important, and I quote:
"The Government accept in principle the proposal for a new building for Parliamentary purposes on the Bridge Street site and recognise the need to develop the remainder of the site for Government offices as a necessary part of the redevelopment of the Foreign Office site. Planning will be set in hand as soon as possible."
The Martin/Buchanan proposals were well received. The Guardian urged the Government, having welcomed them in principle, to welcome them in practice, too, It said:
"No doubt other planners could produce other plans for Whitehall every bit as imaginative, but there is no longer time for that. The Martin/Buchanan proposals are sensible and lucid."
The paper went on to refer to London traffic problems, and the last sentence of its leader was:
"London cannot be left to the mercy of its traffic".
The Times was rather more cautious, describing the Plan as "at first sight attractive", but its criticism was really confined to suggesting that there were also other important commitments in city redevelopment and urban renewal. The Evening Standard saw" a tremendously-exciting prospect", suggested that the Government was dragging its feet, and pointed out that the new, efficient Whitehall offices are essential. It went on:
"If the vision is a good one, and it certainly seems to be, let us get it into existence and enjoy it".
The Daily Telegraph offered some bouquets and threw some brickbats, but on the whole it agreed with the welcome given by the Government to the Plan, and pointed out that its own bouquets were more numerous than its brickbats.

1077
No doubt encouraged by this welcome and by the strong general support which the Royal Fine Art Commission gave later, the Government proposed on November 3, 1965,
"to take firm second steps about the architectural arrangements for three main buildings which will form the first stages of development."
These were the new Parliamentary building and the new Government offices on the Bridge Street and Richmond Terrace site, and the redevelopment of the Foreign Office site. They pointed out that the three projects must form a coherent development, and Sir Leslie Martin was invited to continue to work with my right honourable friend's Department as Planning Consultant for the area as a whole. They also made proposals about the appointment of architects and assessors.
Until last month, then, there had been not only a general acceptance of the Plan but a very proper stress on the need to get it started; and having regard to the original terms of reference and to the Reports themselves, starting meant full planning, followed by architectural designs for the urgent features of the Plan, as well as the consideration of some urgent traffic arrangements. Quite recently the Civic Trust, which has done very valuable work on this and on similar questions and of which Mr. Duncan Sandys is the President, brought a distinguished deputation to see my right honourable friend and sought a public inquiry. Neither at the actual interview nor in the published report of it did any of them make clear what the particular question or questions were which were to be considered at such an inquiry.
Earlier there had been a conference convened by the Civic Trust and reported in the Architects Journal of November 17, 1965. I regard the report as somewhat too selective for quotation, but, looking at it, it does not appear as if any further suggestion was made there as to the scope or terms of reference of any such general inquiry.
LORD REA: My Lords, surely it was to be a complete scope.
LORD MITCHISON: Yes, but what is the question—what is the inquiry to be about? I think the noble Lord might like me to finish what I have to say upon the matter. The long and the short of
1078
it is that those who at this late stage asked for a public inquiry seemed to have in mind an inquiry of a roving character or—shall I say?—a fishing character, with no particular aspect of the matter to consider. I shudder to think at the number of witnesses, the number of counsel, the variety of opinions and the length of time which such an inquiry would involve. I am afraid that it would serve the purpose only of delaying further some matters which are really urgent and of drowning a certain nobility of the planning in a morass of divergent opinions. That is not in my opinion the right way to serve the interests of the public. I may remind your Lordships that the Abercrombie Plan of 1943, an earlier and very valuable contribution to the whole planning of London, never came to fruition. There were too man: comments and too little action. Your Lordships will no doubt sympathise with the centipede which was never able to move forward because it could not decide which foot to put first. I doubt if a public inquiry would have helped it.
Before I turn to particular aspects of the Plan, I should like to say a word or two about my right honourable friend, not only because I have known him for many years and have a personal admiration for him, but also because I think we happen to have the best possible Minister of Works for getting this project under way. He is essentially a practical man, with a healthy respect both for expert advice and for public opinion. Perhaps he has learned all that from a lifetime of distinguished service not only in the trade union movement but also in local government. Perhaps, too, as regards one aspect of this Plan, he learnt some of it by serving on the Stokes Committee, which considered the improvement of Parliamentary facilities. One of his ambitions in the world is to enable Members of Parliament—in both Houses may I say—to have tolerable working conditions, with room enough to do their job.
I turn first to three major planning proposals in relation to buildings, all three of which have been accepted in principle, and to one traffic proposal which also has been accepted, subject to feasibility. As Sir Leslie Martin indicates, the traffic proposals are parallel with the proposals relating to buildings and, in a sense, independent of them, since

1079
either series of proposals can be carried into execution more or less independently of the other.
The provision of further Parliamentary accommodation is an urgent matter. In recent years there have been no fewer than five Committees. Some of their recommendations have been implemented; others are in progress, and others have not been proceeded with. All this is therefore either being executed at present or at least under detailed consideration, and it has not been a main subject of the proposals in the Plan. Work here will continue, and due regard will, of course, be paid to some suggestions made in the Reports. There will be consultation with another place about their part of the Palace, where most work is required, but your Lordships will be glad to hear that Members of this House will get extra accommodation in the buildings opposite the entrances of the House—Nos. 6 and 7 Old Palace Yard. I may perhaps add that my right honourable friend has always been ready, and will still remain ready, to receive suggestions about your Lordships' requirements. He is really a sympathetic soul.
The second area, geographically and in point of time, is the quadrangle bounded by Bridge Street, Parliament Street, Richmond Terrace and the Embankment. Here the Government are committed to an office block on the broad lines of Sir Leslie Martin's proposals. This, however, does not include any commitments as regards the shape, exact size or architectural form of the building. As regards the rest of the block, which still contains some private property, I need say no more than that the Martin Plan will be followed in providing for the continuance of shopping, Underground railway and similar facilities, but that beyond that there is no present commitment. In particular, the Plan provides for a bridge across Parliament Street from this block to the present Ministry of Housing; but this bridge is not regarded by Sir Leslie Martin or accepted by the Government as an essential part of the Plan. I may add, in case your Lordships make any hasty assumptions, that there will continue to be a police station in this area. Where else would our friendly policemen come from?
The third committal is the redevelopment of the Foreign Office block, which
1080
includes the present Home Office, the present Foreign Office, and the other Departments in that area. Sir Leslie Martin's plans cover both this area and the adjacent area, in which are the Ministry of Housing, the Department of Economic Affairs and other departments. As regards that latter part of the area, there is no commitment in detail.
On the Foreign Office, I have two observations to make. The first is that the proposals to demolish and reconstruct the Foreign Office followed on a series of varying decisions, the first of which was reaffirmed in 1955. One after another has been considered, sometimes approved and then abandoned, and always for the same reason—that they did not provide sufficient accommodation for a growing Foreign Office in a reasonably convenient area. Finally, in November, 1963, the previous Administration announced their decision to demolish and reconstruct the whole building. That was one of their sensible decisions, and my right honourable friend, having re-examined the whole question, sees no reason to disturb it. It is therefore quite definite that the Foreign Office is coming down, facade and all. My second observation is that the plans for the rest of the area are bound to be affected by the treatment of the Foreign Office site, and accordingly the first step is to get architectural plans for that site. The previous Administration had indeed got as far as considering the appointment of an architect, but it does not follow that we shall adopt their arrangements on this point.
My Lords, these are the three most urgent proposals relating to buildings. Meanwhile, it is high time to begin to cope with the traffic problem. The broad intention of the Plan is gradually to get all passing traffic out of the precinct of Parliament Square; but not, of course, traffic that comes there on business. The Reports estimated that 40 per cent. of the traffic could be removed by a tunnel between the Houses of Parliament and the river. This would enlarge the space in front of the Houses, where the tunnel would be roofed over. This proposal obviously raises technical questions, and an inquiry is now proceeding on the matter. The inquiry is being conducted by the highway authority, the Greater London Council, with the assistance of experts from the Ministry of Transport. It involves, of course, a judgment as to

1081
the feasibility of what is proposed; but, subject to that judgment, my right honourable friend approves of the idea. No doubt the views expressed at the end of the inquiry may go beyond the strict question, the narrow question, of whether it is feasible or not.
EARL JELLICOE: My Lords, may I interrupt the noble Lord for one second? Will the results of that inquiry be published?
LORD MITCHISON: My Lords, I think we had better wait and see what happens. It is an inquiry by the highway authority, the Greater London Council, and no doubt they will consider the advisability of publishing the results. But I do not think it is for me to say whether they do or whether they do not. If any Ministry were concerned, it would be the Ministry of Transport.
LORD ILFORD: My Lords, before the noble Lord leaves that point, may ask him whether it is proposed that the tunnel should be below the level of the river at all stages of the tide?
LORD MITCHISON: My Lords, I never remember exactly how high the river comes. But the proposal is that the roof of the tunnel should be level with the Terrace as it is at present, so that the Terrace could be continued out into the river. The view, which was rightly praised by many people, would then be not from just the Terrace but from a rather wider space. I think that is as far as I can go.
VISCOUNT STUART OF FINDHORN: My Lords, may I intervene, because there is one question which I wanted to ask on this matter? If this tunnel is going to be totally submerged, surely it will interfere with the free flow of the water down the river. That is what happened with the building up of the South Bank, which I have always said merely makes the channel for the water narrower and thereby leads to flooding. Indeed, in the 1930's there was drowning of persons living on the Embankment.
LORD MITCHISON: My Lords, may I say at once that I welcome any intervention from noble Lords. We are not here, as I see it, to take part in a debate but to consider in common council something which concerns all of us. On that
1082
particular point, I should have thought that this was a question which the Greater London Council and the Ministry of Transport would be bound to consider. I rather hedged a little on the narrow word "feasibility", because this is the kind of question that must also be brought into consideration. I certainly am not competent to express an opinion on it.
I now turn, as succinctly as I can, to other proposals in the Plan which in point of time are likely to follow the three specially urgent projects which I have mentioned and which are not elaborated in any great detail in the Reports. Some of these projects would appear, therefore, to be suitable for public inquiries, if such inquiries are required. But I must emphasise that any such inquiries must relate to a particular, defined part of the proposals, and must therefore deal with questions relating to that part. There must, in fact, be terms of reference, as there would be under a planning inquiry of the usual local character.
The areas I have in mind are, first, the Broad Sanctuary area. The phrase is not always exact, but I take it as bounded by Prince's Street, Storey's Gate, Great George Street and Parliament Square. Here, the Plan raises a number of points, some of which affect neighbouring areas. Moreover, there is a planning application in existence in respect of the Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors' building, and some architectural plans have been prepared. There are other institutes along Great George Street. There is the Middlesex Guildhall; and someone said to me the other day, "Why are you floodlighting it if you propose to pull it down?" In the short time available, all I can say about this is that there is no Government committal and that my right honourable friend, while appreciating and following Sir Leslie's suggestions, is contemplating a special inquiry for the whole of this area. Indeed, he hopes that this may be held in the coming spring. Exceptionally, this will be rather wider than the type of inquiry I have already indicated.
EARL JELLICOE: My Lords, I apologise for interrupting the noble Lord again, but, as he says, we are in common council, as it were; and I should like to say how glad I am to hear the

1083
announcement he has just made about this special inquiry into the Broad Sanctuary area. I gathered from what he said that this would probably not include the comprehensive development area around and about Central Hall, which is the other side of Princes Street. I wonder whether this is the case, or whether it could be brought within this inquiry.
LORD MITCHISON: I shall, if I may, pass on the noble Earl's suggestion, but I was referring for the moment to the area which is bounded in that direction by Prince's Street and the continuation of it, Storey's Gate.
Last, in order of time (perhaps this meets the noble Earl's point), appear to be the Old Queen Street area, behind the Central Hall, and the project for what Sir Leslie calls "the South wall of the precinct"; that is to say, living accommodation in the long and large area along Great Peter Street and across Victoria Tower Gardens. I expect some comments on this part of the Plan, but the time even for its acceptance in principle is hardly yet. It will be affected, for instance, by what happens about the tunnel. All I can usefully say is that my right honourable friend will not rule out public inquiries in this sector; and I may add that those who feel the loss of a piece of Victoria Tower Gardens may be consoled by the additional ground on top of the tunnel. I am afraid that I am not going to console one Member of the House.
Lastly, I turn to a few general remarks about traffic. The tunnel is intended to deal with North-South traffic, and there are two proposals in the Reports for canalising East-West traffic, partly along the line of Lambeth Bridge and Horseferry Road and partly by a scheme of a rather tentative character further North, Professor Colin Buchanan stresses, in particular, the interdependence of traffic proposals in this part of London, and I can assure your Lordships that this is fully appreciated both by my right honourable friend and by other Ministers concerned, especially the Minister of Transport. The Greater London Council are obviously involved. I think, therefore, that all I can usefully say is that at this stage your Lordships must rely on that assurance.
1084
Perhaps I might add that my right honourable friend expects a preliminary report—and I stress the word "preliminary"—from the Greater London Council and the Ministry of Transport towards the end of this year. I hope your Lordships will take it from me, if you do not already notice it, that he has a habit of getting a move on.
My Lords, so much for the Plan, There was one point raised, as I might have expected, in the course of the two previous speeches about which I should like to say a word or two, and that is the question of the accommodation of civil servants in this part of London. I hope your Lordships will realise that the vast majority of civil servants who may be moved into this part of London will come from leased property outside the Whitehall area of London. Leased property is both expensive and inconvenient, and, without going into figures at this stage—I will give what I can if asked—it is perhaps sufficient to say that the amount of rent is considerable, and the inconvenience is, I think, obvious to everyone.
I was just a little shocked to hear a General (whether he is retired or on furlough I am not quite sure) describe his former army of civil servants as "monstrous". I am bound to say I do not so regard them, and perhaps I ought not to take the epithet too seriously. But, after all, the business of Government has to be carried on, whatever Party is in power, and it must, I suggest, be for the Government of the day to decide questions about the number and the accommodation of civil servants, subject to the proper control that one gets in both Houses of Parliament from questions and discussions.
It is then said, "What are you going to do with the buildings which have been leased and which will be vacated by these civil servants?" My answer to that is that I do not think that that is a question for my right honourable friend the Minister of Public Building and Works. It is a matter which concerns those who are planning housing and other matters in London, and, therefore, hardly a question which arises in the debate we are having today. I hope your Lordships will not feel that I am dodging anything. It is true that I am trying to save time; but these buildings, when vacant, will be

1085
much like other buildings which have been vacated, and they will have to be considered on their merits for the best local use under the quite elaborate arrangements we have for dealing with this kind of thing.
My Lords, I have said as succinctly as I can, with the terror of the Whips behind me, what I had to say. I hope that I have not expressed any æsthetic opinions at all: I repeat that mine would be quite valueless. I have therefore spoken as what the noble Earl, Lord Jellicoe, has called a layman. However, I thought it right to give your Lordships the Government's attitude on these matters and to show that, far front being obdurate or difficult, we are, in fact, proceeding in accordance with public opinion as we have had reason to sense it on the major projects, following in one point a decision that had been come to over the years about the Foreign Office; and that we would welcome any suggestions to be made, whether now or at public inquiries later.
I suggest, however, that we must move over this matter. You have only to try to get across the road-crossing outside to see the problem to-day. I do not know that the 59A buses are worse than any other buses: there are plenty to choose from. But one sees London's traffic growing under one's eyes. This is indeed a very urgent question. On the other hand, it is no use making traffic arrangements if you do not know what is to happen in the area. These are really two parallel line advances. I have indicated the position. I have indicated, too—I hope clearly—that we do not regard our traffic proposals for this particular area of London as anything but part of a general plan for London traffic, on which, of course, the primary authorities to be concerned, in a framework of authorities, are the Greater London Council and the Ministry of Transport. This is a very complicated matter. The inquiry covered a large scope. I can truly say that I am fully conscious that I have not met every possible point. I have merely tried to see what the framework is and on what points further development is possible. I feel inclined to sit down and say that we are here in common council. I have done my best; I do not think your Lordships should "shoot the pianist": I hope you will not try.
4.51 p.m.
VISOUNT ESHER: My Lords, as the noble Lord has said, this subject is closely bound up with the whole future of inner London and so typical of the problem that faces all cities, and therefore I am glad that the noble Earl has introduced this debate. Anyone who cares about architecture must be deeply concerned. One is bound to have mixed feelings about this whole problem—in my case, so mixed that I found it difficult to arrive at a consistent view. One thing, I think, is clear. Mr. Geoffrey Rippon, in appointing Sir Leslie Martin and Professor Buchanan, chose as strong a team as could be found, I would say, anywhere in the world. If they have not solved the problem, it could only be that something was wrong with the problem.
The strictly architectural aspect of Sir Leslie Martin's plan was, to my mind, the least of these problems. His brief was extremely narrowly drawn. It was—and I quote:
"to ensure that the various proposals which are under consideration for redevelopment in the Whitehall area are related to each other and have regard to the general architectural character of the area taking relevant traffic considerations into account."
It seems to me, however, that he met this requirement handsomely. He has drawn a carefully-scaled, three-dimensional grid within which it is still open to us to keep, possibly, the St. James's Park frontage of the Foreign Office or the Middlesex Guildhall; both of which I hope we shall keep. Certainly nothing in the master design prevents our keeping both.
This great grid has a pedigree which he traces in his Report and which goes back through Charles Barrie to Wren and Inigo Jones. He has also, in a very Baroche manner, tried to tie-in his central concept with some of the other historical landmarks of London, rather in the way Pope Sixtus the Fifth did in Rome. This was a thing never done in London except by John Nash, whose great terraces—Carlton House Terrace and some of the terraces around Regent's Park—are similar in scale to Sir Leslie Martin's project. Certainly so far as the scale goes, I find nothing to be afraid of in this scheme. It seems to me eminently suited and adjusted to Westminster; nor does it threaten at all the Houses of Parliament or the Abbey.

1087
But, as Sir Leslie Martin Says,
"rebuilding is only one part of the total operation".
It is when one begins to look at the other part, which is, of course, the traffic aspect, that the ripples begin to spread across London and, in fact, across England. It is at this point, I think, that the inadequacy of his brief reveals itself in the rather pathetic sentence:
"in respect of traffic the surrounding area may have to be brought into consideration."
One is bound to be critical not merely of this absurd use of the word "may", but also of the fundamental fact that there were no plans into which Sir Leslie Martin could dovetail his scheme. There were Press reports of a so-called "motorway box" some miles out from the centre, but apart from this Professor Buchanan had nothing to go by except the beginning of the London Traffic Survey. There were no plans. He had to make his own assumption as to the tolerable level of traffic and, having made these assumptions, he had to imagine how Central London might be altered to carry it. His assumptions, on present traffic projections, were conservative. Even so, they included—and I mention only two of them—an eight-lane, multilevel interchange at Hyde Park Corner, a crossing of four eight-lane roads at this point, and, of course, the motorway to which the noble Lord referred between this building and the river.
We have to ask ourselves three elementary questions about operations of this kind in the historic centre of London. First, can we afford them? Second, can we face the physical process of putting them into effect? And, third, should we be happy with the job once it has been completed? First, the question of cost. In accepting the Whitehall Report, the Minister of Public Building and Works has presumably accepted in broad outline and in principle its financial implications. Otherwise, of course, it would be irresponsible to embark on this project at all. If these financial implications are acceptable, they can be programmed; the two things go inescapably together. Conversely, if we cannot programme, we are embarking on a journey which may have no ending or may end very unhappily.
1088
Secondly, there is the question of "disturbance", to use the traditional mild word for the mess and congestion that Professor Buchanan himself mentioned in his Report. Hyde Park Corner has only just begun to settle down after the last great upheaval, during which it was only just possible to keep traffic moving while the job went on. Are we prepared to face this all over again on the same spot? Are we capable of dealing with the problem of the much greater volume of road traffic we shall now have to carry while the process takes place? Thirdly, and most important of all, do we truly want the ceremonial part of London to contain—indeed, do we think it capable of containing—without the unacceptable loss of its beauty and character, these great traffic interchanges, not only at Hyde Park Corner but also at Trafalgar Square and at the points where the new riverside motorway has to make its connection with its distributor roads? It is one thing to build a motorway some miles out of the centre, in twilight areas, alongside or above railway tracks which many of us did not even know existed. It is quite another thing to introduce works of this scale into the middle of what Professor Buchanan and all of us know to be one of the great environmental areas of the world.
The road between the Palace of Westminster and the river raises these mixed feelings in their sharpest form. On the one hand I believe that all architects have an immense respect for Professor Buchanan and for the principles for which he stands—not as vulgarly thought, the building of monster, American-styled highways but the rescue of our human environment—and for which he has spoken up so often, so clearly and so movingly. If ever there was a civic space that needed this rescue, it is Parliament Square. On the other hand, the Palace of Westminster and the river have a relationship which is world-famous and equally moving. Such scenes are now becoming so rare in London that the question is whether we ought not to make the principle that we never let them go any more; that not one is let go merely in the interests of practical convenience.
My Lords, we must face these questions, even if in doing so we may seem to be adopting a purely negative position.

1089
Professor Buchanan faces them himself (when in his Report he says:
"We have been unable to see any clear way out of the dilemma which faces Central London; that is to say, a situation in which major works are urgently required but are apparently impossible of achievement."
He does not leave it there, and, of course, nor do I. He goes on to demonstrate 'what he calls a coherent set of propositions—" no matter how difficult or costly they may be". And, of course, his propositions are one road that we could take.
But are we certain that there is no escape from this dilemma, in particular the dilemma to which I have just referred around here in Westminster? I could not, for example, find any reference in the Report to the tunnel under this building which, as noble Lords will know, lies directly in line with the Victoria Embankment. I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Mitchison, will be able to tell us whether this has had any consideration or whether it is totally impracticable. We must, surely, look at the thing more broadly. We must not forget that in fact we have three complementary ways of dealing with the problem of congestion in London. Here I speak of fundamentals and not of the details of traffic management which were dealt with in the debate in this House last week. The first is the road network principle of the Buchanan Report. I notice that in the debate last Week the noble Lord, Lord Lindgren, said:
"In many of our cities it will be impossible, without tremendous capital cost and a drain on the national economy, to do more than a little towards making it possible to live with the motor car."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, Vol. 271, No. 18, col. 589; 13/12/65.]
Of course, we can see that that is what is going on. The Hyde Park Corner improvement and the present work in Euston Road is only a little, a very little, compared with what Buchanan had in mind. But still, something can be done in this direction; nobody would question that.
The second fundamental cure for congestion is the use of new kinds of vehicles and an entirely new relationship between public and private transport. The third is decentralisation, a decentralisation far more radical than has so far been publicly discussed. Should we regard—to take the most fundamental question of all—as I
1090
think most of us would, the location of Parliament itself as fixed, as immutable as the location of this island off the coast of Europe? Or ought the alternatives (there are alternatives almost as historic and appropriate as Westminster) to be at least examined and evaluated? If we do decide, as I think we should and will, not to examine such ideas at all, it becomes all the more vital that we should look harder at other forms of decentralisation and be much bolder than we have been hitherto with the diffusion of the work of Government. If we are not able, or do not want, to bring the motorway into the historic parts of our cities, we have to take a lot of what goes on in those historic centres out to the motorways; the ultimate aim in every case being to get as close as we can to a balance between homes and workplaces so that far more people may walk from one to the other. The City of London with the Barbican project has taken a notable step in that direction, and Sir Leslie Martin proposes another with his flats—to my mind, not a very adequate step. If his brief had covered the whole of what has been called ceremonial London, he might have been able to make a quantitative assessment and struck a better balance.
This is only one aspect of decentralisation. There are many others. For example, there is the Port of London, which is one of the main causes of congestion in London streets. It works, as everyone knows, under severe physical handicaps. If, as seems possible from work at present going on, we could build a deep-water port and a city about the size of Rotterdam, and with the functions of Rotterdam, in the Wash, that would be a powerful agent to decentralisation. All these possibilities are, I think, relative to this Whitehall plan, and need to be stated before anyone can evaluate it properly. I know that there is something irritating about people who insist on broadening the context of every urgent decision. As Auriel said: "A man who wants to see perfectly clearly before making up his mind never makes up his mind at all"—
"Qui n'accepte pas le requet n'accepte pas lavie."
We have to recognise that all decisions have to be made in what we used to call "the fog of war". The "fog of peace"

1091
seem sometimes almost as thick. We cannot of course look impracticably far ahead. No doubt it would be perfectly safe to make a start on the Bridge Street site which, after all, is the immediate objective. But equally urgent are these radical reappraisals of the two other and complementary means of achieving a solution to the problem of congestion, so that we can work towards a calculated balance of all three: roads, vehicles and decentralisation.
Meanwhile, my Lords, I should like to ask some questions which I think are essential. Do the Government accept that the freeing of Parliament Square from traffic is the first and fundamental objective of this whole exercise? Secondly, if so, is it accepted that the riverside motorway is the best way of achieving this objective? If so, can this work be programmed realistically? And finally, assuming that there is some difficulty about introducing the programming of this work, what other steps do they propose to achieve the objective?
My Lords, I am not sure that a public inquiry is the way to deal with this matter. Despite its name, it is not a place where questions such as those suggested are asked. It is a place where statements are made, a great many of them predictable. Therefore I would not support the noble Earl in calling for this inquiry, but I would suggest that a Select Committee of both Houses should be set up to ask the fundamental questions that I have tried to suggest and, of course, many others that must follow, and in due time to have them answered. Until this is done, until these much deeper questions than those that can be dealt with in this Report have been asked and answered, it is difficult to feel much faith in the planning context, without which nowadays no architecture has any value.
5.10 p.m.
LORD EGREMONT: My Lords, I will be very brief. We have had animadversions from two distinguished experts, the noble Lords, Lord Holford and Lord Esher, on the question of an inquiry, and the noble Lord, Lord Mitchison, has gone a long way to meet what many of us were worried about in regard to inquiries. This question is one that will have to be carefully hammered out. The great thing is to avoid any appearance that whatever is
1092
decided about this great scheme has been decided by somebody in Whitehall who thinks he knows best—I am referring to Her Majesty's Government, whoever they may be at the time.
Your Lordships will remember the tale of the pobble who had no toes. When the pobble was in the water, some unidentified creatures came and ate his toes off, and when he got home his Aunt Jobiska said:
"It is a fact that the whole world knows,
A pobble is happier without his toes."
My recollection of Governments is that they are out to take away your toes, or whatever it may be, and tell you that you are happier without them. This is the sort of thing we want to avoid in this case. Otherwise, we shall denounce the members of the Government as pobbles' aunts—as Aunt Jobiskas. The noble Lord, Lord Mitchison, has gone a long way to meet the fears of many of us. I understand that, apart from Bridge Street and the Foreign Office, the Government are not committed. There is to be some sort of inquiry into the island site and also, I hope, into the buildings alongside Central Hall; but perhaps that will be done anyway.
My second point is this. The noble Lord, Lord Mitchison, has referred to the expensive outlay on leasehold buildings. What about the rest of the Government's freeholds in London? While we are talking about planning Whitehall and Westminster as a w hole, why do we not get on with planning the Government's freeholds in London as a whole, taking into account their aesthetic value, their usefulness and their advantages? Can we enlarge our minds beyond Whitehall, as the noble Viscount, Lord Esher, suggested?
Let me give your Lordships two examples—prisons and barracks within the London area. The prisons at Brixton, Holloway, Pentonville, Wandsworth and Wormwood Scrubs, the Ashford Remand Centre. Latchmere Detention Centre and Feltham Borstal are all highly valuable sites—but for prisons, I wonder? Then, think of the barracks! Of course there must be retained in the London area accommodation for soldiers, not only for ceremonial services, which we all find agreeable, but also against the possibility of civil disturbance. But do we really need all these barracks and prisons in London? Cannot we make better use

1093
of them and put the chaps somewhere else, possibly more comfortably?—I mean the soldiers, not the convicts.
I will sum up by making three simple points. First of all, we are all agreed that the future of Whitehall needs looking into: but equally, I say, so does the rest of the Government's estate in London. All these problems should be taken as a whole and not piecemeal.
5.17 p.m.
LORD CONESFORD: My Lords, I congratulate my noble friend Lord Jellicoe on initiating this important debate. I propose to confine myself to a few topics, not least because of the important debate that is to follow. I, too, greatly rejoiced when Sir Leslie Martin and Professor Buchanan were appointed to report on these great matters. I do not think that two better men could have been appointed, and I agree with what has been said on that by my distinguished friends Lord Holford and Lord Esher.
What we ought not to forget is that we are concerned with perhaps the most important area in the whole Commonwealth, and we cannot afford to make mistakes merely because people think it urgent to get on with the job. I am not going to say a word against Ministers who wish to get on with their jobs, but I do not think that the urgency of a matter can be used as an argument against having adequate inquiry into projects that fill some of the most influential critics with genuine alarm. We really cannot afford to make important mistakes in this matter.
Recently, an important deputation asked the Minister to grant a public inquiry. The Minister turned down that suggestion and said he knew of no basis at present for a public inquiry into the general concept of the Reports. Let me say at once, as one with some ministerial experience in this sphere, that I quite understand what the Minister then said. I agree with my noble friend Lord Esher that an ordinary public inquiry to look into all aspects of this Plan under an inspector appointed by the Minister of Housing and Local Government would not be a practical proposition. I can understand why the Minister and Her Majesty's Government have turned down that proposal. But the turning down of that proposal does not, in my view, imply
1094
that many aspects of this great Plan do not need to be sifted before a tribunal capable of hearing evidence and argument. I do not wish to specify exactly what form this inquiry, or these inquiries, should take. If I put forward a specific proposal, the Government, I know, would find it easier to turn it down. I am therefore, asking the Government themselves to co-operate in devising the sort of examination which would satisfy a great many people on some of those issues so well raised by Lord Holford and Lord Esher. This would be, in my view, in the interest of the Government themselves.
As so often happens, the popular view has been very well stated by my friend Osbert Lancaster. It is sometimes stated by what he says or writes; it is sometimes stated in what Maudie Littlehampton is depicted as saying. Osbert Lancaster has a peculiar capacity for hitting the nail on the head and being right on some of these great issues. Although he may have appeared to ask for a public inquiry of the usual sort, such as, I quite agree with the Minister, would be quite inappropriate in this case, I should like to read what he said:
"It is very important that the Whitehall Plan should have public support and in order that the public shall support it the public must know about it. There is no better way of ventilating what is intended—the objections and the answers to them—than a public inquiry. Unfortunately, the arguments based on the increased convenience of civil servants and Members of Parliament lack a little cogency when presented to the man in the street. Nothing would alienate public opinion more quickly than any idea that this was a plan drawn up by Members of Parliament and civil servants for Members of Parliament and civil servants. Nothing will give wider currency to that idea than any marked reluctance on the part of the Government to hold a public inquiry."
With a great deal of that I agree, though I admit straight away that the ordinary form of public inquiry, as I have already said, and as Lord Esher said, would be inappropriate.
Let me give some examples of the matters that must be further considered if profound mistakes are not to be made. This is generally referred to as the Martin-Buchanan Report, and the Buchanan part of the Report is often thought of as a mere adjunct to Sir Leslie Martin's proposals for the buildings. Actually, the two are of at least equal

1095
importance, and some people think, not unreasonably, that the question of traffic, the Buchanan part of these proposals, is even the more important of the two.
The noble Lord, Lord Mitchison, gave some examples of articles that appeared in the Press on the very morrow of the publication of the Report. I am not sure that they should be considered in isolation. I think we should give at least equal weight to what has subsequently appeared in the Architect's Journal, in Country Life,and in articles by Reyner Banham, in particular, in the New Statesman. All these journals—and I could mention many others—have raised very important points indeed, on which I believe it is vital that further evidence should be taken. We should be quite certain that we are on the right lines before even the admirable proposals of these distinguished men are carried out in Westminster.
Let me mention a few of those matters. First, there is the great concentration of civil servants in the new buildings to be erected in this immediate neighbourhood. The noble Lord, Lord Mitchison, has given various reasons of convenience why the Government would like to have them. The noble Lord may well be right; there is great force in what he said. But then he realised that he might be accused of being evasive—and I am afraid he was—because he did not deal with the quite vital point, namely what, if all these additional civil servants are to be housed in this immediate neighbourhood, is to happen to the office buildings in which they are housed at this moment. He said that this was a matter for the planning authority, and that it did not arise at this stage. But, of course, it arises acutely if we are considering the merits of the traffic proposals, and the merits of this whole Plan.
In May, 1963, I successfully divided this House against a Government of my own Party on the question of the use of railway property for further office building in London. That Government tried to put me off, as the present Government have done, by pretending that these questions do not matter. My Lords, they matter vitally. My noble friend Lord Esher pointed out the appalling effects of traffic on the amenities and future of London. But the problem is not merely how you are going to cope with that
1096
traffic by roads, and so on. The problem is how you are going to use your planning powers to see that you do not cause unnecessary travel through commuting.
Not unnaturally, Sir William Fiske, the leader of the Greater London Council, has raised this point about what is to happen to these offices; and in my view it is absolutely vital that the Government should tell us, if they want us to approve this Plan which we are discussing this afternoon. After all, until we know the answer to that problem, we do not know one of the vital facts necessary to enable us to judge this Plan. I believe that anybody with any experience of town planning would say that I am right in this. I believe that this traffic problem, which, as we know from other debates, is wholly unsolved, is not limited to London. What is done in the South-East becomes relevant. If I may say so, the insane proposal, at present being considered in another connection, of a third airport for London is directly relevant to what is going to happen in London and Whitehall.
I do not know what is the right form of body that should inquire into these matters, but that there should be the means of having an inquiry, and that there should be people who can call for evidence, and in the light of that evidence and their own conclusions advise the Minister, is, in my view, essential if we are not to lose things of priceless value in our capital.
I have not mentioned the esthetic matters, because here I find myself in so much agreement with two noble Lords whose views will carry so much more weight than mine, Lord Holford and Lord Esher. But do not let us treat as unimportant the effect on the amenities of Parliament, and on the architectural merits of the Palace of Westminster, if we stop it rising, as it does now, from the very waters of the Thames itself. If we really separate it by this platform, or whatever you call it, we are doing something of enormous importance so far as the architectural appearance and amenities of this House are concerned.
I venture on a further prophecy. Of course, it is said that, if you do all this, you will take a lot of traffic out of Parliament Square. Yes; but for how

1097
long? At the present moment we have the amenities of the river. We are protected completely in the Palace of Westminster from disturbance on that side, though we have the traffic on the other. But suppose we do what is now proposed and separate the Palace of Westminster from the river by the roof of the tunnel, and suppose then that the traffic proposals for London as a whole prove wholly inadequate—as Professor Buchanan, of course, prophesies they will unless a whole multitude of things are done, which have not yet been attempted —the very motive for having this traffic interposed between the Palace and the river will be defeated, for the tunnel will prove inadequate, and the precinct will have to be invaded in due course. This question of the effect of the office development and the traffic problem must be considered both on their own ground and for the effect on æsthetics that the whole proposal will have.
I think most of the other points were mentioned in the admirable opening speech of my noble friend; and the noble Lord, Lord Mitchison, pointed out, of course, that there will be many further opportunities of considering such matters as the buildings across the Victoria Tower Gardens. I do not profess to have studied this plan of Sir Leslie Martin and Professor Buchanan sufficiently; I have not had enough time recently to study it in detail, and I do not wish to comment on it. My noble friend Lord Esher has mentioned the terms of reference, and the rather pathetic remark of Sir Leslie himself, in the course of this debate. I think both authors have done admirably within their terms of reference. But what I say quite firmly to this House is that the inquiry that has taken place hitherto is not sufficient. Further inquiry on some aspects is absolutely essential. On those matters the public are not going to accept the ipse dixit of the Minister, however high their opinion of the Minister may be.
The noble Lord, Lord Mitchison, mentioned some points of detail. He mentioned a public inquiry that was to take place, and in a useful intervention by my noble friend Lord Jellicoe he was asked whether another part of the land concerned could be included in the inquiry. I understood from the noble
1098
Lord, Lord Mitchison, that he would consider that, and that the area of the inquiry had not been definitely decided. So far as I can see, if that extra land were included in the inquiry which the noble Lord, Lord Mitchison, himself mentioned, it would be a useful improvement.
I think nobody has mentioned to-day another matter which arises out of a more recent statement of Lord Mitchison about the actual architectural proposals—the choice of architects, for the three building projects on which the Government have already made an announcement. I do not wish to enlarge my speech this afternoon by dealing with that, except to say that I think it may be necessary for Parliament as a whole to maintain its control of this matter. That is to say, I very much doubt whether it can be assumed that Parliament will accept the result of a competition automatically, if they are not allowed to express an opinion or to judge it in any way. I do not wish to enter on that this afternoon. I merely want to say that we are dealing perhaps' with the most precious and important part of our whole Commonwealth, the very heart of our City, and we cannot really afford, by absence of inquiry, to risk making a mistake simply on the plea that we must do something.
I remember years ago as a boy reading H. G. Wells. He rather ridiculed in a book certain people, I think it was in the Socialist Party, which he generally supported, but with which he was having at the moment a quarrel. He called them the "God-sakers", the people who said "For God's sake, let us get on with the job!" irrespective of whether the way it was proposed to get on with the job was foolish or not. I am at least as eager as any Member in this House to get on with the necessary jobs, but I want to get the priorities right. I say that this House, and the country, will be making a fantastic mistake, which future generations will regret, if they accept a plan which does something to try to appease the traffic demands, but appeases them unsuccessfully.
There are certain traffic proposals and certain traffic problems in London which have to be solved before we can judge the merit of this plan at all, and among the matters which arise at once is the question of this enormous increase in the

1099
concentration of civil servants in this area, coupled with the absolute uncertainty as to what is to happen to the office buildings which they at present occupy.
LORD CHESHAM: My Lords, before my noble friend sits down, may I say that I have been listening to him alluding to an occasion on which he claimed to have successfully divided the House against a previous Government on the subject of railway property development. That he divided the House is indisputable, but would he agree with me that whether it was successful or not is a matter of opinion, and one of which history will be the judge?
LORD CONESFORD: My Lords, I am most content that history should be the judge. My Amendment was admirable, and on that occasion the House carried it, I am glad to say, with the support of the Opposition, the Party which is now the Government. The Government of which my noble friend was a member, but I was not, withdrew my most useful new Amendment and substituted their own version of what they wanted, which is now in the Act. They themselves have taken pride subsequently in the new clause in the Act which was directly due to my Amendment. I am willing to be judged by the merit of the Amendment which I carried, and I am absolutely happy that planners to-day, and in the future, will only criticise my Amendment, if they criticise it at all, on the ground that it did not go far enough.
5.40 p.m.
LORD SILKIN: My Lords, I do not propose to intervene in this internecine dispute, but I would begin by thanking the noble Earl for having introduced this Motion, and for having done so with a stimulating, informed and, I think, objective speech. This is not a Party matter, and I certainly do not propose to deal with it in any partisan spirit. I believe that the redevelopment of this part of London is one of the most important pieces of redevelopment to be undertaken for more than a century. I feel very strongly about it, as one who has lived my now fairly long life in London.
I was born in London, and I have lived in London all my life; my sons are living in London, and my grandsons, and
1100
I look at this redevelopment of London not as a matter for Sir Leslie Martin, with all respect to him, or Professor Buchanan, or even Mr. Pannell, but as something which affects all of us—all of us who are living here and all those future generations who are going to live in London, and all the people who are coming to visit London from the Provinces and from the Commonwealth and abroad. While I am not suggesting that people abroad, or even from the Commonwealth or the Provinces necessarily should have any voice in the determination of what is to take place in London, nevertheless I do feel that it is a matter for the people of this country as a whole.
Arising from that, I think we ought to understand what is in the Plan. We ought to understand what is proposed, and we ought to have an opportunity, once we understand it, of expressing our views about it. I want to say, quite frankly and honestly, that I have read the Report—I think I have read every word of it. I have even studied the pictures and the diagrams. I think I understand the pictures; but I do not understand the diagrams, though I tried very hard. I may be stupid, but I do not understand them; and there is a good deal of the Report, too, that I do not understand. And to impose on a public a Report which is unintelligible to some people—and I do not imagine that I am the most stupid person in this country (I think that would be taking it rather far)—is not good enough. If people like myself, with long experience in public affairs, deliberately give up two week-ends to study a Report, and then, at the end of the day, find that we still have not fully grasped it, that is not a firm basis upon which to impose a Report upon the general public.
Yet we are told that the Government have committed themselves to the recommendations of the Report as the broad framework within which the future development of buildings in the Whitehall and Parliament Square areas should take place. In these circumstances, it sounds monstrous that the Government should be prepared to commit themselves to this development as the broad framework. Have the Government had any encouragement to accept these proposals as a broad framework? Judging by the Press comments and criticisms, certainly not: there

1101
is a good deal of conflict among the Press themselves about this scheme. Judging from the comments to-day, certainly not. There is not one of the proposals in the Martin-Buchanan Report which has not been the subject of some criticism in this House to-day, with the possible exception of the Bridge Street development. I am not even sure about that: we have not yet heard all the speeches, and criticism of that may come along.
I am not going to keep the House very long, but may I illustrate one or two of my own personal difficulties in understanding the Report? They are only illustrations. We are told that by means of the two road proposals, the tunnel and the Lambeth Bridge-Horseferry Road scheme, we shall get rid of 70 per cent. of the through-traffic. I am not going into the question of how this figure has been arrived at. No doubt there are ways and means of discovering what is through-traffic and how it would react if these alternative proposals were available. But what is to happen about the other 30 per cent. of the through-traffic? Nothing is said about that at all.
Then, if we are to create a precinct and try to keep traffic out of Whitehall and the area of Parliament Square, what is to happen to the 30 per cent. of through-traffic which will not react to the new roads, together with, of course, the local traffic which obviously cannot be diverted under these proposals? There may be a very simple answer, but that answer is not available in the Report itself; nor has anybody yet given us the answer.
The other question is one that was put by the noble Earl, and, with great respect to my noble friend, who usually faces the batting quite courageously, it was ducked by him—I mean, what is to happen to the offices which are at present occupied by the Government and which would be vacated under these proposals? Are they to be re-let?
LORD CONESFORD: They must be.
LORD SILKIN: My noble friend said that that has nothing to do with the Minister of Public Building and Works. I do not know—I have not studied his terms of reference—but they are certainly something to do with the Government, which are concerned with ensuring a
1102
reduction in the office population of London. It surely must concern them, and I think we are entitled to know what is to happen.
These are just two illustrations, of matters which call for inquiry. Surely, if you get a scheme to which the Government want to commit themselves, and in respect of which every individual item has been the subject of criticism, there is a case for an inquiry. Surely the public ought to have an opportunity of expressing their views? With the powerful hacking of the Civic Trust, a body of most important individuals, members of all Parties, advocating an inquiry, it seems to me most reprehensible that we are being fobbed off with an offer of a series of individual inquiries about individual proposals. We want to examine as a whole this broad framework to which the Government want to commit themselves; and, as I have said, we want first to understand it, and then we want to be able to comment on it.
My noble friend is afraid of the difficulties that might be involved in such an inquiry, and in delay. I think he is quite right to be afraid of that, but the Government have never up to now been afraid of inquiries of this kind. The County of London Plan was the subject of an inquiry that lasted for many months. And it took the Government several years to make up their minds about it.
LORD MITCHISON: Was it ever carried out?
LORD SILKIN: They had an inquiry.
LORD MITCHISON: My Lords, may I ask my noble friend whether the County of London Plan was ever carried out?
LORD SILKIN: I am not talking of the County of London Plan by Professor Abercrombie. I am talking of the County of London Plan as prepared under the 1947 Act. And we have had similar inquiries all over the country which have taken months, with many counsel appearing, at great expense, with decisions taking months, if not years, to be arrived at. This is a general problem; it is not a problem which would be related to this particular inquiry. If the Government are concerned about inquiries of this kind, why do they not do something to ensure that these inquiries are

1103
streamlined and conducted in a sensible way? I should be quite content if the Government were to say no lawyers will appear at the inquiries, although I should be very much out of pocket. That would be a comprehensible position. It might curtail proceedings or it might not.
However, the Government are doing nothing about it: they are accepting the position that inquiries are bound to take time and bound to be expensive. But, surely, in a matter which, as I have said, is going to affect the lives of future generations, the way in which they are going to live and work and enjoy their recreation, it really is worth while having a full-scale inquiry, letting everybody who has any comment to make make it, even if the comment is stupid. But at the end of the day, have a person, not an official of the Ministry but an independent inspector, to try and draw together the observations of the various persons who have given evidence at the inquiry and present to the Minister a comprehensive report showing what is the trend of opinion and what kind of case has been made.
I hope that the Government will have second thoughts about this matter and not dismiss it as lightly as my noble friend has done hitherto or as the Minister has done. It is something in which democracy is involved. This is something we do not want the Minister to decide for us, and I feel that at least at the end of the day he ought to have before him the views of the public as a whole after the fullest opportunity has been given for those views to be stated.
LORD CONESFORD: My Lords, before the noble Lord sits down, I wonder if he noticed a statement I proposed to mention which strongly supports the general argument he has put forward. It was an article in the Economist last week, December 11, which starts:
"By refusing the Civic Trust's demands for an inquiry into the development proposals for Whitehall and Parliament Square, the Government could be making a disastrous mistake as well as appearing unnecessarily arrogant".
LORD SILKIN: My Lords, I would fully endorse that.
5.55 p.m.
LORD MOLSON: My Lords, on most occasions I find myself in very considerable agreement on all planning matters with the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, but
1104
to-day I can go very much further than he in giving praise to this great conception and approval to the general spirit of the Government in accepting its outlines. This is the joint work of a most distinguished architect planner and of the foremost thinker on traffic. This is the first opportunity to apply in practice the new doctrine which Professor Buchanan laid down in his great report Traffic in Towns.
Let me begin by setting out quite briefly what I believe to be the great merits of this scheme. First, it establishes in this part of London a precinct, by the exclusion of through traffic. Secondly, it aims at the preservation of historic buildings in a specially designed framework. Thirdly, it proposes the addition of further monumental buildings of modern design, which should be a monument for future generations to see of the best architecture of our generation. Fourthly, it imposes a ban on high buildings. And, fifthly, it says that there should be no disfiguring annex appended to this Parliament of Westminster. When there are five great merits of that kind, it is in general outline a fine scheme which we should adopt.
If I go on now to express criticisms and doubts, I shall do so in as constructive a spirit as I can. No one should dogmatise in matters of taste. That is one of the great arguments in favour of there being appropriate inquiries into the proposals. In the first place, I cannot think it desirable that there should be this great mass of Government buildings covering the whole of the area, not only the Foreign Office but also the other Great George Street buildings, connected by a bridge over Whitehall and covering the whole of the Bridge Street site. I think it would be quite disproportionate to the rest of the precinct. I know that the Pyramids are a great block of masonry and have been admired for thousands of years, but at any rate they have a great desert as their background. Anyone who looks at the bird's eye view which is set out in the plan, the bird's eye view of these future Government offices, must surely be reminded of a similar bird's eye view of great car assembly plants in the United States of America. Is it really necessary to have such ponderous buildings for the assembling of files?

1105
Anyone who looks from St. James's Park, who looks, as people will, from the bridge across the lake, where at present there is one of the most sublime views in all London, will see, as this plan indicates, a vast pile of masonry, ponderous, dull and menacing. I have dissociated myself from my amenity friends in the past in asking for the preservation of the Foreign Office or even of the façade. I said, "Let us see what it is proposed to put in its place and then we will decide whether it is desirable to keep what we have". When I see what it is proposed to put in its place I am quite sure we should preserve what we have. That fine Victorian façade of the Foreign Office could be kept there, and I am sure it would do much to add variety and interest to a building which otherwise, I fear, would be far too heavy.
I pass to a planning requirement without which this scheme should not be accepted. It has been mentioned before. We should have from the Government an assurance that this is not going to mean a net increase in office accommodation, or a net increase in the number of civil servants in London. I think the noble Lord, Lord Mitchison, evaded this point. It really is not quite good enough to say that that is not the responsibility of his right honourable friend the Minister of Works. In this House questions are addressed to the Government as a whole, and certainly Mr. Jay, who grudgingly issues licences for the buildings of new offices in London under the legislation which we passed earlier this year, and Mr. Crossman, who is concerned about not having too large a congregation of inhabitants in the South East, are affected by this issue; and it would be completely wrong and most improper to have a proposal put forward by the Minister of Public Building and Works which resulted in the Government's adopting a policy which they are doing all they can to prevent other people from following.
LORD MITCHISON: My Lords, may I intervene for one moment? The reason I referred to my right honourable friend the Minister of Public Building and Works is that what we are considering is a Report made to him about matters within the purview of his Department.
LORD MOLSON: Yes, that is, of course, quite true; and what the noble Lord was doing was not only discussing the Report but also telling us what the Government's attitude was towards it. In most matters I regard the Government's attitude as being extremely satisfactory—indeed, I am glad that the noble Lord was able to make the speech he did this afternoon. I am pointing out, however, that this is one of the most important of planning considerations, and on that we have not yet had a satisfactory answer. And while any—if he will not mind my using the word—brief prepared by the Ministry of Public Building and Works can hardly take those considerations into account, it clearly is a matter which the Government, in its corporate capacity, will have to consider and will have to deal with on satisfactory lines.
LORD MITCHISON: My Lords, I wrote my own speech.
LORD MOLSON: I apologise to the noble Lord. He says that he wrote his own speech. The happy, literary tone of it indicated to me that he had actually written it himself. He will hardly deny, however, that the facts and figures upon which it was based were necessarily prepared by the Department of the Minister primarily concerned.
The third point is that there must be no bridge across Whitehall. I think Sir Leslie Martin is a little obsessed by the idea of bridges. There is to be not only a bridge across Whitehall; there is to be another bridge across Great George Street, in order that those working in the Government offices can get to the recreation building without going out of doors. And there is to be another one, far more objectionable, from No. 10, Downing Street to the office building which is to take the place of the Foreign Office. No one who remembers the bridge that connects part of Hertford College with another part of Hertford College at Oxford, an imitation of the Bridge of Sighs, and which spoils the view of New College, will have any great sympathy with these bridges across roads.
The fourth point is the proposal for a monumental building on the Broad Sanctuary site. I take a special interest in this, as it was in my time as Minister that it was decided that in the redevelopment of the old Westminster Hospital

1107
site the line should be drawn back, in order, as we thought, to give a better view of Westminster Abbey. I should doubt whether it was desirable for there to be too large a building on that island site. I do not object to the building being monumental, provided that it is not too massive.
When this matter is being considered —and I was glad to note the promise of the noble Lord, Lord Mitchison, that there would be an inquiry into this matter before the redevelopment of the island site is carried out—I hope the Government will go a little further, and there will also be an inquiry into the redevelopment of the area on the other side of Princes Street, behind and along the Central Hall. I am inclined to think that legally it would be necessary under the Town and Country Planning legislation for there to be an inquiry.
LORD M1TCHISON: My Lords, I dealt with this matter. I called it "the Old Queen Street"
LORD MOLSON: But was there a clear promise of a public inquiry;
LORD MITCHISON: No. I will give the noble Lord, if he would like, the detail of what I said, or I will read it out again.
LORD MOLSON: If the noble Lord pleases.
LORD MITCHISON: What I said was:
"Last in order of time appear to be the Old Queen Street area"—
and then something about the South wall of the precinct. Then
"I expect some comments on this part of the Plan. but the time, even for its acceptance in principle, is hardly yet."—
that is the South side, particularly.
"All I can usefully say is, that my right honourable friend will not rule out public inquiries in this sector."—
and then I added a comment which applies particularly to the Southern side. It was intended to refer to both those, the last parts of the general Plan. I used the word "inquiries"—in the plural.
LORD MOLSON: My Lords, of course it is naturally satisfactory to know that the noble Lord's right honourable friend
1108
does not rule it out. It would be more satisfactory to have an express promise that his right honourable friend will see that there is a public inquiry, and I ask him to pass on that request to his right honourable friend.
The fifth point is that I cannot help doubting whether it is desirable for there to be the contemplated enlargement of Parliament Square. This matter was considered by the Government of that time, and there was a proposal greatly to enlarge Parliament Square. After careful consideration we came to the conclusion—I am not saying it was necessarily the right conclusion—that the effect of enlarging Parliament Square would be to dwarf the Abbey and Westminster Hall and to detract from their general attractiveness. That is again the kind of question about which no one should dogmatise but on which I think it really would be a good thing to have an inquiry at which expert, æsthetic opinion could be expressed. I do not know what other noble Lords feel, but I always feel that the Place de la Concorde in Paris is too large, and I should not want to see anything of that kind here in London.
One matter upon which I do not think there is any need for a public inquiry—it is the sixth matter that I want to criticise—is the proposal for a block of fiats over Victoria Gardens. I think that to reduce the existing open space, even if there is going to be an extension as a result of the tunnel, would be a most unfortunate thing to do at the present time. I always greatly admire the view of the Southern front of this Palace from down at Lambeth Bridge, and equally there is a most beautiful view down the river from Victoria Gardens. Anything of that kind I think would be completely wrong.
I do not intend to say much about the architects and the architecture of this Plan, because the schemes, the pictures and the diagrams are not intended to deal in detail with the particular form of architecture to be chosen. I want to say only this: that the experience of the Ministry of Public Building and Works has been that public competition for buildings has in fact practically never been successful. Over the last one hundred years I think only one prize-winning composition has ever been built, and that was

1109
the present Defence Buildings, designed by Vincent Harris when he won a competition as a young man in 1911 or 1912, and they were in fact begun after two World Wars. I hope there will be no undertaking that the prize winner for the Parliamentary building will necessarily be given the opportunity to build it. It is essential that the Government should keep a completely free hand in the matter, but I believe that there are some restrictive covenants which are applied by the Royal Institute of British Architects.
I will now turn briefly to the traffic proposals. These should be carried out simultaneously with, and preferably even before, the rebuilding operations. Parliament Square is one of the six busiest intersections of London, and whatever may be necessary elsewhere, as the noble Viscount, Lord Esher, has said, we must begin somewhere; and in this great historical area that, obviously, is the place to begin. The riverside tunnel at present is stage five. I am very glad to know from the Minister that an inquiry has already been put in hand, because obviously this is one of the first things that requires to be done, if it is practicable. I am sure that it will have to be on a larger scale than is provided for in the Report. The tunnel will have to pass under Lambeth Bridge; traffic will have to be able to go over Lambeth Bridge and to go in the opposite direction.
I would draw the Government's attention to the fact that when Covent Garden has been transferred to the Nine Elms site there will be a great increase in the amount of traffic from that part of London to the centre. Therefore this is a matter which really brooks no delay. I do not want to commit myself to the exact form of inquiry which should take place. I do not want an inquiry into whether this plan shall be carried out: I want an inquiry as to how some of its applications are to be put into operation. I believe that the Minister accepts the principle of it; I congratulate him on his enterprise and foresight. But paragraph 167 of the Report says that the order of the works can be changed, that some stages can be carried out concurrently, and that road proposals can be re-phased. Those matters, and the actual development of particular sites, are all matters which should be inquired into in order that
1110
expert and public opinion may be taken into acount.
Most of the suggestions made in this debate to-day have been constructive. They need examination. I know that when the Minister addressed the conference organised by the Civic Trust he turned down a proposal for a general inquiry. The Minister will only enhance his reputation by listening to the helpful and constructive suggestions made by those of us who wish him and his enterprise well.
6.15 p.m.
LORD FARINGDON: My Lords, this remarkable Report gives rise in my mind to certain disquietude. There are, in fact, four grounds on which I am doubtful or alarmed, but they have all been mentioned by other Members of your Lordships' House to-day, and therefore I will not repeat the arguments. My first anxiety is in regard to the net increase in the number of office workers brought into the central area—a result which seems inevitable and which has been dealt with by the noble Lord, Lord Conesford, and by my noble friend Lord Silkin.
The bulk of the proposed new building on the Foreign Office site has been mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Molson, and I agree with him entirely. I cannot share the indifference of the noble Lord, Lord Holford, nor his welcome of this particular monster. The Victoria Gardens building has also been mentioned by Lord Molson. I personally regret this proposal on quite another score than the one given by the noble Lord; I refer to the destruction of the small houses in the little streets between the Abbey and Smith Square which would be entailed by this proposed new building.
My fourth objection is to the destruction of the Foreign Office. A great many people have regretted its proposed destruction, but some of them, including, I feel, the noble Earl who initiated the debate, have been a little pusillanimous about it. Frankly, the building is a Victorian building of first-class importance. I suggest that it is a part of the London background which is familiar to all of us. It is a part of the background of the London way of life, and I am convinced that every conceivable measure should be taken to preserve it, and also

1111
Richmond Terrace—though nobody seems to have had a word to say about poor Richmond Terrace. These matters have all been mentioned by other speakers and I am not going to expatiate on them. On the other hand, I would ask the noble Lord, Lord Mitchison, when he comes to wind up for the Government, to say whether he does not agree that the priorities in this scheme are wrong. Nobody would deny part one, the Parliamentary necessity. As to part two, I should like it to be up to, and not including, Richmond Terrace. I hope that it may still be possible for this singularly elegant terrace to be preserved.
Then we come to the Foreign Office, which is the crux of the argument. On this question one finds considerable opposition. I know nobody who views the destruction of the Foreign Office with equanimity. Since the reason for its destruction appears to be the need for additional office space, I cannot help wondering whether it would not be possible for the destruction of the Foreign Office (a step which Lord Mitchison said was inevitably tied up with phases one and two) to be postponed until the open space in Broad Sanctuary has been filled and the rather disreputable area behind Westminster Hall redeveloped. It might then be found to be possible to house all the workers needed. It might be nice to do it, but I see no reason for building a vast building on a large site for conferences. If something must go, let this proposed conference building go, and let the additional accommodation, which is given as the reason for the destruction of the Foreign Office, be built and used for those purposes. My Lords, I said that I would be brief, and I have been; and I hope that my suggestion is a helpful one.
6.20 p.m.
LORD CACCIA: My Lords, as time is short I shall restrict myself to the point of special interest to me, which I confess is the Foreign Office. I should like to tell the noble Lord, Lord Mitchison, straight away that in me, at least, he has one wholly satisfied client; satisfied because, since I joined the Foreign Office in 1929, the interior of the building in which that Department is working has become more and more shabby and disreputable to carry on the business of
1112
representing us to the foreigners who call upon not only the Secretary of State—who, properly, has a dignified room—but the many other officials with whom they have to do their business.
Even in 1929, when I joined the Foreign Office, it was necessary to interview many people of importance, whether foreign representatives or business people who came in, on horsehair sofas in the corridors. The American Ambassador, who sometimes had to come to the department in which I worked, and had to take the lift, was heard to observe to the liftman," I would have you know that in my country trees grow faster than your elevator." That was the situation in 1929.
After the war, in 1945, the then Foreign Secretary, Mr. Bevin, who had a very sharp eye to administrative problems and the impact they had on the smooth operation of his Department, appointed me as his Assistant Under-Secretary of State to look into the question of a new building which he thought then, in 1945–46, to be a crying requirement. It was decided upon; plans were made; an architect was appointed, and the scheme was approved by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. It had to be shelved, for reasons that had nothing to do with the desirability of the building; but of course because of shortage of money and other such considerations.
I returned to the Foreign Office in 1954, and once again the problem was raised of the building which had then run down even further than in 1945, let alone in 1929. Once again the decision was taken, as the noble Lord, Lord Mitchison, has reminded us, that something must be done. Once again, for reasons of finance and building, nothing could be done.
I came back to the Foreign Office again in 1961. Once more the problem was raised, and once more a decision was taken by the last Government that something must be done. May I say how much I welcome the fact that this Government have also undertaken so categorically that now something shall be done, because I read what the Minister of Public Building and Works said in another place on December 20, that firm decisions have been taken on the Foreign Office. But I was not quite clear what those decisions were until I heard what the noble Lord, Lord Mitchison, had to say. Therefore, may I repeat that I am one wholly

1113
satisfied client? To take the phrase of the noble Viscount, Lord Esher, of course if this entails that the view from the bridge across St. James's Park has to go, I shall, like anyone else, regret it. Perhaps I shall regret it more than any of your Lordships, because this is a view that I have carried with me all my working life, at home and abroad. But, of course, as the noble Viscount, Lord Esher, reminded us, "Qui n'accepte pas le regret, n'accepte pas la vie", and I would prefer to accept life.
LORD SOMERS: My Lords, before the noble Lord sits down, may I ask him whether he is of the opinion that it would be impossible to improve the Foreign Office inside without destroying the present outside?
LORD CACCIA: Yes, my Lords. Perhaps the noble Lord, Lord Mitchison, could speak with more authority, but that question was gone into very carefully before the Government made their decision in 1963. The answer is that you would spend many millions of pounds, and you would end up with something which would be patchwork, last for about twenty years, and be grossly inefficient at that.
EARL JELLICOE: My Lords, before the noble Lord finally sits down, could this pusillanimous Peer ask him a question? Does he feel that it is absolutely essential that the future Foreign Office need necessarily be accommodated on the existing Foreign Office site?
LORD CACCIA: My Lords, the quick answer is that it should be somewhere near the heart of Government, because the Foreign Secretary will wish to go and see the Prime Minister on urgent matters, and it is a great advantage if he can do so on foot. So the present site is an ideal site, but if you could start afresh, if it were atabula rasa and you could just choose—which I do not think is a possibility—then I suppose you could say that, so long as it is within so many hundred yards, it would not matter if it was overlooking St. James's Park or overlooking Whitehall.
EARL JELLICOE: But I, in fact, proffered a suggestion to the noble Lord —I thought it was an admirable one—and that was the Palais Gladwyn in
1114
Northumberland Avenue. Permanent Secretaries are very agile and athletic, as we know, and if this site were called the Palazzo Caccia, for example, then surely the noble Lord would accept that this would be within reasonable walking distance of Downing Street.
LORD CACCIA: My Lords, I would accept that. But I would also have in my heart the leaden feeling that this would once again be another reason for postponing something Mr. Bevin wished to do in 1945, which should have been done perhaps in 1929, and which might not in fact be done until I do not know when.
6.26 p.m.
LORD TAYLOR: My Lords, in this very interesting exchange between the noble Earl and the noble Lord, Lord Caccia, I am afraid that I am entirely on Lord Caccia's side. I fear that if any change were made now the scheme just would not happen at all. Sir Leslie Martin and Professor Buchanan's ears must have been burning a good deal this afternoon, but I must confess that I am a little in sympathy with my noble friend Lord Silkin. I found this Report a little difficult both to handle and to understand. I hope that when we have another of these Reports it will not be of this size or this shape. It would be so much easier if it were printed like an ordinary book, and in ordinary type. Architects have a love of sans serif, which is extremely difficult to read. Architects, I also understand, do not read: they only look at pictures or draw pictures. In consequence, they always use this sans serif type. It is disgusting stuff, and I would appeal for decent printing, better presentation and much clearer diagrams.
Some of these diagrams are quite incomprehensible, and I should like to ask my noble friend Lord Mitchison to explain to me what on earth the diagrams on pages 106 and 107 mean. Across the first of these there runs a series of small circles, transected by a line exactly like a London Underground sign, and in the second diagram, on page 107, they follow the route of the Underground underneath Parliament Square. In the first picture on page 106, the lines pursue most extraordinary courses, and I have a suspicion that they must on this occasion represent the Underground. But there is no explanation of what they are representing.

1115
Can my noble friend, perhaps, explain what they mean?
THE MINISTER WITHOUT PORTFOLIO (LORD CHAMPION): I hope my noble friend will not rise to this bait.
LORD TAYLOR: I do not think he has a clue. I certainly do not, and I very much doubt whether anybody who seriously looked at the Report would know.
LORD M1TCHISON: The explanation is at the side.
LORD TAYLOR: The explanation does not make sense. It does not mention what this diagram is supposed to mean. One might have thought that in a traffic-free precinct there would be no buses; but, so far as I can see, turning to page 160, figure 33, there is a flow of buses through this precinct. I do not mind, but I should like to know what the diagrams mean.
Time and again, one cannot follow the traffic explanations. I cannot discover where one gets into or out of the tunnel; how one gets off Westminster Bridge in future except by turning to the right whether there is, in fact, any flow into Parliament Square at all; what happens at the end of Whitehall; where the traffic ceases in Whitehall, or, indeed, how people are to get to all these great new Government offices. All this is extremely hard to follow, though the designs themselves are fascinating and, I must confess, very good.
I should now like to come to the actual hard facts, the actual buildings that are to be got rid of. First, there are the Bridge Street buildings. Apart from New Scotland Yard, the buildings have no merits whatever; the sooner they are knocked down, the better. They are a ghastly collection of buildings. Secondly, there is the Ministry of Housing—Dame Evelyn Sharpe's Palace, as the noble Earl said—in Gt. James Street. Externally that has a certain magnificence: internally it is absolutely abominable, without any virtues whatsoever. The whole of the Treasury Building and the Ministry of Housing is absolutely disgraceful, and the sooner it is bulldozed the better. It contains inside it two courts and seventeen wells, on to which people, or
1116
corridors, look, and where unfortunate civil servants have to work. It is a disgraceful environment; a terrible working environment. I would have no regrets, and I am sure your Lordships would have no regrets, in seeing that building go, despite its not unattractive exterior and the great strength with which it is built.
Now the Foreign Office building, The Foreign Office—Home Office—C.R.O. —India Office Building is really a problem. This, in fact, is the only building in the whole scheme that presents a major problem. "Palmerston's sumptuous Renaissance Palace" it has been called, and I agree: it takes part in one of the most grandly picturesque urban landscapes in Britain. But I see no reason whatever why it should not be equally grand and picturesque when viewed from the Park. It is a delightful skyline, and there is nothing very peculiar in the Foreign Office skyline, except for a little square tower, when viewed from the Park; the rest of it is very largely obscured. But inside it contains some magnificent features and some remarkable features which have to be seen to be believed. The Secretary of State's rooms and the Permanent Secretary's rooms are finely proportioned, one can say. The grand staircase of the Foreign Office, with murals by the late Sir Sigismund Goetze, done in 1920, are remarkable. I have never seen anthing more grotesque or horrible in my life. The only treatment for them is a spraygun, and I should recommend that treatment in the interim, before the place is pulled down. It is really terrible. If this is what people, Ambassadors and the like, think Britain is like when they get here, it is a bad outlook.
The rest of the building, as the noble Lord, Lord Caccia, knows so well, consists of great suites of rooms —wonderful rooms originally but now, alas! sub-divided. These suites of rooms culminate in a wonderful place called the India Office Durbar Hall, which is a court in the building roofed over with glass and ironmongery, where Durbars used to be held in the very early days when it was built. It now contains a hut underneath this great roof. It is all watertight, but there is the hut. I do not know what it is used for, but the thing is amazing. Digby Wyatt's 'India Office staircase really is rather good; it is quite nice. There is the old India Office

1117
Boardroom, which contains Georgian chimney pieces from East India House, and these are worth saving. That is about all. Apart from these things, you have about "had it".
How could the Foreign Office be used? If one really wanted to save it, if one was absolutely convinced one had to save it, the only thing to do, again, would be to convert it into a ceremonial building; to make these halls what they are—ceremonial halls for the signing of great treaties and the holding of great parties. But we already have the Banqueting Hall, we have Marlborough House and we have Lancaster House. I do not think it is really needed. These halls are an anachronism. As for using it as offices, its present condition is absolutely disgusting. I speak only from intimate knowledge of the Commonwealth Relations Office. The working conditions of the staff there are simply terrible. The lavatories would, in my opinion, be condemned by the sanitary inspector were it not a Government building. It was designed for 80 desk officers, and I think it has now got 1,500 in it. Whatever happens, in my opinion it needs £100,000 spent on it now. Even if it is only going to last five years, I should say it was worth spending this amount. The place is simply terrible. This Government have an interest in office working conditions, and this is the place where they ought to be setting the best example. It is just terrible.
If one did want to use it as an office building, one fundamental decision would be needed. The only answer would be to slice through every Government Department working there, transversely, as it were, at the level of Assistant Secretary, and to say that everybody over Assistant Secretary is going to stay in Whitehall but everybody under that level is going off to a new "Whitehall" somewhere else. This could be done. I do not say it should be done, but it could be done. It is quite useless to move bits of the existing building out. Already in the case of the Commonwealth Relations Office 400 out of 900 have moved out, and they are in seven separate buildings scattered around London. I have no doubt the Foreign Office is even worse in this respect. This is insanity: it is quite insane. There is a case, if you like, for a planned decentralisation of all the lower levels in Whitehall, and for keeping only acorps
1118
d'élite adjacent to the Cabinet and Downing Street.
I can see that working, and there is something to be said for it, particularly with modern methods of electronic closed-circuit television communication. It would, however, mean that every Assistant Secretary would have to work in two places. He would have to work in Whitehall, where he served his superiors, and he would have to work in the new "Whitehall", where he looked after his inferiors. This is not impossible, and it is the sort of decision that every office faces when it is told to decentralise out of London. As I say, it could be done. That is the only way in which I can conceive of making the Foreign Office, the C.R.O., the Home Office and the India Office work. But I do not for one moment think it will be done, because everybody will resist having their Department cut in two.
There are two things to be said for it. First, it would force out of Whitehall a great deal of the paperwork, and would entail the intake and analyse of material, as well as the execution of policy, being done somewhere else, and would leave simply policy formation to be done in Whitehall. Secondly, I think one has to remember that Government Departments are Parkinsonian; that is to say, they tend to grow, and, whatever buildings we have ultimately in Whitehall, they will still overflow, I am afraid; and one might therefore plan on this basis from the start. Something else that is just worth remembering is that this plan is going to be tremendously expensive. I would make a "pot-shot" at £150 million; most of which would be for subterranean roadworks and communications. That is my "pot-shot" at it, but I may be wrong on this. I hope my noble friend Lord Mitchison will correct me if I am wildly out. It is not too much to spend if the decision is right; but if one cared to move Whitehall to the Elephant and Castle and to build a new Whitehall at the Elephant and Castle, one would probably do it for £25 million, and then reconstruct. But I do not think it will happen. I think, on balance, the Martin plan will go through.
I want to say one thing about the buildings themselves. I think they are first class, and that they are first class

1119
because they are based on two principles. The first principle is that a unit of about 20 people constitutes a working office. I think it was the Foreign Office that produced this admirable idea, and it is about right. A 20-person functional unit, with an Assistant Secretary or whoever it may be in charge of it, is a very sound functional unit; and the whole establishment is built up cellularly on this basis. Incidentally, it is built up so that all the people who work in it get a remarkable amount of fresh air and light, and it is not one of these awful monoliths with either closed-in walls or all the offices artificially illuminated.
The second factor about it that is so good is that it is extremely flexible. It inevitably happens that Government Departments go up and down in importance.
A NOBLE LORD: Only up.
LORD TAYLOR: And this is right. This is as it should be. They move in or out towards Downing Street or away from it. The Ministry of Health, for example, has moved out from the Ministry of Housing and Local Government building, first to Savile Row and then to the Elephant and Castle. This sort of thing has been going on through history. I have no doubt that there may come a time when economic affairs or something else will be dominant and they will want to move in or expand or contract. This great building is eminently flexible. I think the bridges add to its flexibility and I hope they stay in. There is one thing which is absolutely out: that is, to do nothing. That would be a ghastly situation. For people to have to go on working in the buildings in Whitehall is just terrible; to go on with the Foreign Office, the Commonwealth Relations Office and the other Departments scattered about all over the place is just silly.
The sooner we get going on this the better. Although I dare say the Greater London Council will understand the transport proposals, I certainly do not; although I presume the Government understood them before they approved them. But, given the situation, the sooner we start seeing things happen the better: the sooner the Bridge Street site is developed, the better; because it will
1120
be essential to decant out the Foreign Office and the Home Office into the Bridge Street site when the Foreign Office is being razed; and the same thing must happen with the Ministry of Housing and Local Government and the Treasury. Chaos will reign inevitably for, perhaps, five to seven years; it might be even longer. But the sooner we start, the sooner it is done and the sooner we shall have a first-class organisation for our machinery of government.
6.43 p.m.
LORD ILFORD: My Lords, I regret to hear that the work of Mr. Sigismund Goetze made so little appeal to the noble Lord, Lord Taylor. But I am sure he would not justify pulling down the Foreign Office on that ground alone. If I should appear to be critical of these proposals to-night, I hope it will not be thought that I have failed to recognise the great achievement and genius of this plan. Indeed, I join with my noble friend who introduced this debate in acknowledging the great work which Sir Leslie Martin and Professor Buchanan have undertaken.
Much has been said about the traffic aspect of these proposals. I think we cannot disregard the warning which has been given so plainly by Professor Buchanan. I hope that it may be possible to carry out the traffic proposals, or perhaps some of them, before we undertake the architectural proposals that Sir Leslie Martin has suggested. In some cases, I suppose, the architectural proposals are dependent on the traffic proposals. I think that is not so in every case. I hope that we may start with the traffic proposals without delay, and certainly without any unnecessary delay caused by linking them with the architectural proposals.
My Lords, I wish to say something about the architectural aspects of this plan. I should like to know why it has been decided to entrust the design of these new buildings to three architects. The new Parliamentary building is to be carried out by an architect who will be selected by competition; the Government offices in Bridge Street are to be entrusted to the Ministry of Public Building and Works; and the Foreign Office is to be entrusted to a distinguished private architect. I should have thought that if ever there was a scheme which called for

1121
uniformity of treatment, these proposals for redesigning Parliament Square was that scheme. Co-ordination, even by Sir Leslie Martin, is not likely to produce the harmony and uniformity of treatment which this scheme seems to demand.
I do not recall that when Sir Edwin Lutyens was building New Delhi, his work was made subject to the co-ordination of another architect and with the work of other architects. If that proposal had been put to him I think I know how he would have answered. His answer would certainly not have been suitable for repetition in your Lordships' House. "Co-ordination" is one of those expressions, like "integration", which arouse my deepest suspicions, because they are always employed when no one has seriously thought out what it is that is to be done. Co-ordination is an acceptable alternative to compromise. Compromises are not, as a rule, successful. They are particularly unsuccessful in matters of planning and architecture.
It is particularly unfortunate that London is being rebuilt at a time when the standard of architectural design is not high. The design of a modern building has ceased, to a very large extent, to be determined by the architect: it is determined rather by the steel construction of the building, which is in the hands of the structural engineer. And to that extent, architects have lost something in their status. The success of the architect is no longer measured by the merits of his design; it is measured rather by his ability to induce the planning authority to accept his plans—in other words, to persuade them to do something they ought not to do. Nevertheless, I do not despair that we shall find an architect who may he equal to the magnitude and, indeed, the majesty, of this great task and, I would add, that we may well find him in a Government Department. It is always easy to say: "Let us have an architect in private practice; then we shall get a good building". But some very good buildings have been erected since the war by architects, not in private practice but employed by the public authorities. And if we have competitions for these buildings, let us at least allow those in the public service to take part in them.
My Lords, I desire now to make a protest against what seems to me to be
1122
the ruthless fashion in which we are prepared to sweep away existing buildings of architectural and historic interest. Scott's Foreign Office is to be swept away with hardly an apology or a tear of regret. Indeed, its departure will be hailed with delight by the noble Lord, Lord Caccia, who has spent so many years there. I would say, first, about the Foreign Office building, as the noble Lord has told us, that it has been under sentence of death for about twenty years, and when a building, particularly a public building, comes under sentence of death, and one Minister after another says that it must be taken down and something else must take its place, not very much is spent on the comfort and convenience of the interior. I think that before we part with Scott's building, we ought to be quite sure that the Ministry of Public Building and Works, which does this work so well, is unable to make the Foreign Office a more comfortable place than it is at present.
Like the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, I have done my best with this Report, but I cannot find in it any reason why these buildings should be swept away. The Foreign Office is a particularly unfortunate building. This proposal for its destruction has come at a time when its merits, and the style and aesthetic appreciation which created it, are, I suppose, at their lowest ebb in public estimation. That, unfortunately, is the fate which overtakes every building. When it reaches a certain age it passes through a phase in which it is without friends anywhere. The danger is that at that moment it will be destroyed, and people will not be conscious that something has been destroyed which was worth preserving. That happened to many of the eighteenth century buildings in London. They were swept away because they ceased to appeal to public taste. To-day the wheel has gone full circle and they are recognised as one of the great achievements of English architecture. So it may well prove to be with these Victorian buildings. When another generation takes our place we shall be regarded as the vandals who destroyed these works of merit because of the inconvenience of the interior, or for some other reason of that kind.
My Lords, I wish to make a few observations about Richmond Terrace

1123
which, oddly enough, was built in the early years of the nineteenth century. It is a remarkable extension of the classical taste of the eighteenth century into the nineteenth century. Richmond Terrace is a neat little terrace with classical features very pleasing in its general character. There has been some slight alteration to the parapet since it was built, but otherwise it presents the same aspect to-day as it has always presented. It contains some fine, handsome rooms for which I should have thought a useful purpose could still be found in the public service. It has had many distinguished visitors, most of them connected with Parliament. Huskisson once lived there and so did Quintin Hogg, the founder of the Polytechnic I so did Thomas Tooke, one of the earliest scientific economists who wrote The History of Prices,which, I believe, is still read by students of economics. It seems to me that unless some strong case can be made out for destroying this handsome little bit of old London architecture, it ought to be left as it is.
So far as I can see from my study of the plan, the only reason why Richmond Terrace has to go is the desire of the architects for a bigger building on the Bridge Street site. Here I think the planners have fallen into a major planning error. I believe that the idea that the number of administrative civil service staff who have to be accommodated in the new building should be very much increased is completely mistaken. What will be the result of concentrating 25,000 (I think that is the number) administrative civil service staff in these new buildings? Inevitably it will overload the streets with public transport; it will be more difficult to get on the Underground trains or the buses than it is to-day.
It is not really a question whether the Government are proposing to increase the number of civil servants working in London. The proposal is that their number should be increased substantially at a certain point within a very limited area. This may bring consequences almost as unfortunate as a general overall increase inside London. My Lords, that is a major planning error, and I hope that it will be corrected. I think that the noble Lords who have done so were right to point out that the offices from which their staff will be taken will
1124
inevitably be used again for office purposes, and so the number of persons employed in Central London will undoubtedly increase. Most of the buildings in the City, or in different parts of the West End, which are occupied by Government Departments are unfit for any purpose except for use as offices. It would seem that once a Government Department has moved out, the planning authority must give consent for the buildings to be used again for office purposes; there is nothing else which may be done with them.
I hope that eventually this plan will be accepted and that, when it is, we shall be able to carry it out within some measurable or foreseeable period of time. Nothing could be worse than to undertake a plan of this sort for reconstruction of a certain area, carry out parts of the work, and then say, "The rest of it must be postponed for twenty or twenty-five years."
We have had some unfortunate experiences in London of that method of reconstruction. The Quadrant of Piccadilly Circus was re-laid out at the end of the First World War on these lines. The Fire Insurance building and Swan & Edgars were intended to set the pattern to be followed all round Piccadilly Circus. Very much the same thing happened on the South Bank. The noble Lord, Lord Silkin, will correct me if I am wrong, but I think the present County Hall was a competition building. When County Hall was built it was anticipated that the redevelopment of the South Bank would proceed on the same lines and in the same style architecture as County Hall. County Hall. it was expected, would set the pattern to which the redevelopment of the South Bank would be carried out. Twenty years later, public taste had completely changed. The methods of building had completely changed and imposed upon its an altogether different design, with the result that the original intention that County Hall should be the prototype of the buildings on the South Bank had to be abandoned and something entirely different took its place.
In the case of this plan, I hope that we shall not make this mistake again, and that we shall not begin to carry it out until we are satisfied that we can complete it before standards of taste and architecture change again and we have to do

1125
something which is entirely inconsistent with the work that has already been done.
7.1 p.m.
LORD ANNAN: My Lords, the noble Earl, Lord Jellicoe, moved this Motion in a speech of such charm that it was difficult to realise half way through that he reminded one of the mediæval picture of the smiler with a knife in his hand, and that before he had finished he had emasculated and dissected the whole of the plan. When he ended with a request for a public inquiry of some kind, it suggested to me that this way of discussing a plan of this kind is not necessarily the best way. When I asked myself why there is a demand for a public inquiry now, I was puzzled, because piecemeal development has taken place around Whitehall, particularly in Victoria Street, and there has never been a demand for a public inquiry for any one of the commercial buildings that have gone up. Only now, when we have a comprehensive Plan, does everybody suddenly become aware of the problem and say that a public inquiry must be instituted.
It seems to me that the sort of public inquiry with which we are most familiar is just about the worst administrative way of dealing with an architectural and planning problem of this kind. Every interested party puts forward their objections in the most intransigent form possible. Learned counsel are briefed and argue to their briefs with great fervour and accuracy. Therefore, if the object of a public inquiry is to produce a consensus among the interested parties, this is the worst possible way of trying to do it. Learned counsel make it perfectly clear that by the end no one interested party is on speaking terms with another interested party. In Cambridge, in the last decade, £100,000, or more, has been spent on public inquiries. The result is that the City, the County and University are on the most strained terms whenever any planning problem comes up for discussion. What the situation is in Oxford I am not prepared to say.
The cost of all these inquiries is enormous, and the time taken is lengthy. When one building was discussed in Piccadilly Circus, the public inquiry took twelve days. If a public inquiry is designed to inform the public, it seems to me that there are far better ways of doing it. If, on the other hand, a public
1126
inquiry is designed to bring out the objections to a plan, it seems to me that the objectors have themselves to submit to cross-examination, not by counsel or other interested parties, but by the architects and planners who have produced the plan. In fact, if they are more than individuals or interest groups, if they purport to represent aesthetic or town planning considerations, then they have to be prepared to put forward alternative solutions.
I have great sympathy with the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, when he says that he found parts of the Plan extremely difficult to understand. · I must admit that I also found this the case, and particularly pages 50 to 55, dealing with plot ratios. This is a highly complicated matter, and it is not only this that is difficult. Very technical problems are being dealt with. When Sir Leslie Martin came to consider the kind of buildings which ought to be put up in place of the Foreign Office and the Great George Street office, the building which the noble Earl referred to as a "Ziggurat", he was faced, when he made his calculations, with 60,000 possible choices. He put these variables through a computer and got an answer. It may be the wrong answer, but if we are going to attack that answer, it must be attacked with the same kind of technical expertise as Sir Leslie Martin was using at that particular point.
It may be that another architect, aided by another traffic expert, could produce a better answer. It may be that on a matter of such importance as the planning of this Great central Government site a second opinion should be obtained, but it must be a second opinion from experts as expert as Martin and Buchanan. It may be that another team should be commissioned to work over this problem, but I find it difficult to follow the arguments of the Civic Trust, for example, that all that is required is a public inquiry; that you simply let the dogs out into the arena, they fight with each other, and that is bound to produce light. What it will produce is heat; but it will not necessarily produce light. What is more, if the Civic Trust opposes this scheme, it must take the matter more seriously: it must not just call for a public inquiry, but must put forward alternative solutions, or at least use these sophisticated techniques which Sir Leslie Martin and

1127
Professor Buchanan are using. Otherwise, it is bound to produce an ill-informed opinion on the Plan as a whole.
The Martin-Buchanan Plan is a Plan of the kind which I understand the Prime Minister had in mind when he called for a modernisation of our outlook towards these problems in which technological considerations come so much to the forefront. I am afraid that some of the criticisms made suggest that the object which people have in mind is simply to attack individual parts, and then to say, "We can leave the rest as it is, but just alter this little part." The point about a plan is that it hangs together as a whole. By all means adopt another plan, if you like; but do not think one can lop off, emasculate or dissect a plan and expect it to work in the end.
The noble Lord, Lord Taylor, thought that the total cost of the plan would run into something like £150 million. That may be so, but the Bridge Street building, which was to have accommodation for 300 cars under it, came to only £11 million. I say "only", because it seems to me that this is a small cost compared with the cost involved if the Foreign Office were to be preserved. I have always believed that it was the preservation of No. 10 Downing Street, rather than anything the previous Government had done, which led to an autumn Budget last year. For such a historic building the cost of that operation was entirely justified, but after what the noble Lord, Lord Caccia, has told us this afternoon, I think that the preservation of a broken building like the Foreign Office, although it has great charm, particularly on the skyline, cannot be justified.
LORD ILFORD: My Lords, it is not a building which is structurally unsound in any way, as was No. 10 Downing Street.
LORD ANNAN: My Lords, it is structurally unsound, surely, in the sense that the interior of it is unable to fulfil any function which it is now required to fulfil. If I may apologise for this Philistine view, that this noble monument should go, I would say this: when we think of the skyline from St. James's Park, the Foreign Office is one enchanting part of it; another is the flats at Whitehall Court, but when we look at those
1128
towers, I do not know if anyone can say that that building should be preserved in perpetuity. This is the difficulty we run into with preservation.
If I might make one last defence of Sir Leslie Martin's "Ziggurat", it seems to me to be an extraordinarily humane building. Unlike American modern architects, who simply say: "Office people work in artificial light; therefore, why give them windows at all?" and who rationalise the whole of office life to a degree which de-humanises it, Sir Leslie Martin's Plan is, I think, a most ingenious way of getting an extraordinary amount of people, offices and facilities on a site without having to build high. Also in regard to the question of the bridge going across Whitehall, one must take into account the whole idea of the precinct, almost a walled medieval precinct.
What I like about this Plan is that it strikes a good balance between the modern and the past. It is not romantic about the past in trying to preserve the unpreservable; but, at the same time, it has a passion and a feeling for the past. Nor is it romantic about the future, and putting enormous great traffic flows right across Parliament Square. It seems to me to have this beautiful balance. I entirely sympathise with the wish of the noble Earl, Lord Jellicoe, that it should be exposed to more criticism and more examination, but I hope that this will be done within the structure of Government. Therefore, I very much hope that the noble Lord, Lord Mitchison, will assure us that we are not going to have to face the full panoply of the public inquiry on this matter.
7.11 p.m.
LORD SHERFIELD: My Lords, I wish to intervene in this debate for the sole purpose of firing a second barrel in support of the line which the noble Lord, Lord Caccia, took in regard to the accommodation of the Foreign Office. It is true that the noble Lord, Lord Taylor, discharged a blunderbuss ahead of me, but as he failed to demolish the noble Lord, Lord Ilford, and even the noble Lord, Lord Annan, did not finish him off, perhaps I may be allowed to make a further comment.
It has always seemed to me that those who oppose the demolition of the present Foreign Office building can never have

1129
worked in it, although it is true that the noble Earl, Lord Jellicoe, is an outstanding exception. Having myself worked for four years in a small plywood box erected in a corner of the old Locarno Room, I can assure noble Lords that the Foreign Office is as about as inefficient and inconvenient a working place as could be imagined, and that the India Office is, if anything, worse. Moreover, the accommodation available in the two buildings is insufficient to house the Foreign Service, which spills over into other buildings in London. It was only yesterday that we had a debate in which much stress was laid on the need for an efficiently working Foreign Service. Conversion behind existing walls has I believe been looked into on a number of occasions and has been considered to be impracticable.
The Foreign Office is one of two or three Departments which must be close to Downing Street, the Ministry of Defence and the Treasury. In the absence of any obvious alternative, there must be a powerful case for rehousing it on its present site. There is, of course, a body of opinion that feels that the Foreign Office should be preserved—it has been most forcibly voiced this afternoon by the noble Lord, Lord Faringdon, and others—and that some delaying action, such as the appointment of a Committee of Inquiry, should be taken. I am, by inclination, and without claiming any expertise in the matter, a conservationist in respect of buildings of every age and style. Indeed, it would be most agreeable if the façade with which we have all lived all our lives could be preserved. But some reasonable balance has to be struck in these matters, and I find it difficult to believe that the Foreign Office building is of such artistic merit as to outweigh the compelling reasons for which it ought to be demolished and rebuilt at the earliest possible moment. In saying that, I am prepared to face the wrath of noble Lords who have said the contrary.
What we, who have an interest in the welfare and efficiency of the Foreign Service, have most at heart after twenty years is that there should be some certainty about the future. I am glad that to-day we have been told of a firm decision on this matter. In final comment on what the noble Lord, Lord Ilford, said, I trust that there will be no reprieve.
7.16 p.m.
LORD SAYE AND SELE: My Lords, may I remind your Lordships, to begin with, of a saying which often comes to my mind when I think of pulling down old buildings:
"We think our fathers fools, as so wise we grow".
Our sons in turn will no doubt think us so. This may be the case, but I hope that if it ever comes to getting on with this building affair, you will avoid the presence of your sons. The other point that I want to draw to your Lordships' attention is that the only person who has made any reference to the amount of mud and mess that is made is my noble friend Lord Esher. At this moment I have a little job with builders going on at my back door, and I have to put on my Wellington boots every time I go in and out. I rather fancy that it will be the same in your Lordships' case, but I shall not be here to see it.
7.17 p.m.
LORD MITCHISON: My Lords, this has been an interesting debate, and I draw one consolation from it: there is hardly anything in the proposals which has not been criticised by somebody, and there is hardly anything in the speeches of any noble Lord which has not been criticised by another noble Lord. This illustrates, I think, the dangers of a public inquiry of a roving or fishing character. This is exactly what we should get. We should get people expressing widely different points of view. It would be far more complicated and elaborate because it would be a kind of public inquiry, and things would just be held up.
I quite agree that there is a question of balance in all these things. There is a balance between standing still and doing nothing whatever, and doing something and taking the risks involved. The best way, I suggest, that one can deal with a complicated problem like this is to find out what the problem is, to get expert advice—on broad lines first—and then to see what ought to be done and to do it by stages with reasonable expedition. That is really what is happening in this case. I feel that the spirit of my pet centipede has brooded over all our proceedings to-day. In case some of your Lordships were not here, may I remind you of the animal? He

1131
was in the difficulty that he could never move because he could not decide which foot to put first; and I think we were disposed to agree earlier that a public inquiry would not have helped him. I think that is the case here.
I think that the order in which we begin this matter, at any rate, is dictated by questions of real urgency. The first one is the need to give Members of Parliament in both Houses more room in which to do their work properly. It is plain, simple, working conditions. The same goes for a lot of civil servants℄I will give a little more detail in a moment.
First of all it is really impossible, so far as I can understand, for anybody other than a few people at the top to do their job properly in the Foreign Office building as it is. It was not intended for its present purpose. The character of the Service has undoubtedly changed, and the volume of opinion℄and, if I may say so, the opinion of people who live there and work there most of their lives is surely worth hearing℄is quite definite about this. It is no good trying to adapt the Foreign Office. Attempts were made earlier, as we were told to-day by the noble Lord, Lord Caccia, and they were abandoned.
Then there was the proposal to move the Office to somewhere else some way away, to Carlton House Terrace, I think it was, and that was abandoned. One way or another every alternative has been tried, and here I stand defending a decision of the last Administration. I am always doing it. I was here the other day defending the decisions of Mr. Duncan Sandys and Mr. Enoch Powell from savage attacks by other Conservatives. I think this business of public splitting in Opposition℄of which, after all, the Labour Party has had some experience℄has been carried a little too far, and I am sorry that I should be called upon again to defend what I am sure was a sound decision at the time. That is two things.
The third one is the broad general question: what is to be done on the Foreign Office site? I am not going into the merits of this question. I am simply going to say as regards that proposal℄and the noble Earl opposite can call it a "Ziggurat" or anything else he likes℄
1132
that it had a vision in it. It had an appreciation of the realities, and I can say now, what I was a little reluctant to say at first, that this is rather a great Plan by these two distinguished gentlemen. I think I have a good deal of support from some people well qualified to know better than I do, and I take it in that spirit. There are the questions of urgency.
Then I turn for a moment to the question of traffic which was raised. On the traffic question, it is perfectly true that I have dealt, as I think the Minister has dealt from time to time, with the building proposals in the first place and, in the second place, with the traffic proposals. But my right honourable friend has made it clear, notably on July 19℄I hope made it clear; it is certainly clear in the Reports themselves℄that neither Sir Leslie Martin nor Professor Colin Buchanan consider the proposals like the traffic tunnel, the way across Lambeth Bridge and the Horseferry Road proposal, as anything but part of a scheme for dealing with London traffic as a whole. Your Lordships will remember that the present inquiry into the tunnel, if I may so describe it, is being accompanied, or followed by, the inquiry into what I think is called the central network. That has appeared in a public announcement.
I can assure your Lordships that, difficult though these traffic problems are, and although they cover a far wider area than the proposals of Sir Leslie Martin, we fully recognise that the London traffic problem is one problem, and that it is not to be solved by doing the little bits, and little bits only, without regard to what is happening in other places. I feel, therefore, that this question of traffic, which disturbed the noble Viscount, Lord Esher℄to whose speech I listened with great attention, the more so because he had been very courteous to me and let me know beforehand what he was going to say℄is a perfectly real one, but it is a larger and a longer-dated question, and is bound to be, I am afraid (I am not neglecting its urgency), than the particular point we have been considering to-day which arises in the Whitehall area. I hope I have made myself perfectly clear: I do not for one moment underrate the importance in all this of traffic considerations. They are perfectly vital. I do not

1133
for a moment suppose that traffic considerations can be treated as quite separate matters; but I do say that, like the centipede, one must make up one's mind where to move first. You have to begin somewhere.
I want to say one more word about the Report itself. I said that I thought it was a great Report. I was a bit puzzled, I confess at once, by some idiograms in it. I find these a little difficult to follow. But I think your Lordships must remember that a Report of this kind is not merely directed to the lay student or politician; it is also directed to people who have particular knowledge and who will find it much easier to follow. I did not feel at the end of the day that I was in any real doubt as to the broad purpose of the Report.
I return for one moment to two other questions, and then I have a word to say about civil servants. One is money. The process of buying a pig should always involve seeing the pig first. If you buy it in a poke it is notorious that you may pay too much. This particular pig has not quite enough shape yet to put a price on him, and his lack of shape is partly a lack of contour, if I may put it in that way, and partly a question of how long things are going to take. After all, if we are going to look ahead, it is notorious that building costs ten or twenty years ahead are not easy to estimate, and it would not be much help to estimate them at to-day's prices if you could.
If you take the three urgent proposals I had in mind, the highly provisional time we are considering is something of the order of up to 1977 for those three urgent things alone, and the others come later. This reconstruction has to be proceeded with with determination, and nobody supposes that it can or should be a really rapid process. For one thing, there is the business of decanting, and I would say to my noble friend Lord Taylor that while I hope the chaos will not by any means be as bad as he supposes, the price of trying to avoid the confusion that might otherwise be caused may he to take the plans a little more slowly. You must strike a balance here between throwing everything upside down in an attempt to do things rather too quickly, or giving yourself a reasonable time to get on. The essential thing is that the proposals should
1134
have public support. I believe they have. I read the passages in the papers to indicate that.
I turn from that finally to the question about civil servants. The figures have, I think, been considerably exaggerated. Mention has been made of 10,000 new civil servants coming into the area. That figure is arrived at, however, by extending the boundary beyond the limits of the Martin Buchanan Plan to include a good deal north of the present area. The actual figure is about 7,000 new arrivals ℄provided that you do not take into account the present position of clerical workers in part of the area, the Bridge Street area. If you do, the increase is probably about 5,000. But if we take 7,000 for a minute, the corresponding figures I have here are much larger than that. At present, of headquarters staff, excluding the Post Office, there are about 72,000 in Central London, 13,000 in the rest of London, and 30,000 outside London. It is intended to push more people outside London. This is, as your Lordships are aware, Government policy. The result of that would be to reduce Central London staff to 64,000, in the rest of London the number would be much the same at 14,000, and outside London there would be 37,000. The total in both cases is 115,000; and, therefore, while the movement involved in these proposals represents a substantial addition to the monstrous army of civil servants, which inspired the noble Earl, Lord Jellicoe, to criticise them, the number is not really monstrous in size, and certainly not so having regard to the needs of modern Government.
EARL JELLICOE: My Lords, I apologise for interrupting the noble Lord, but since he has taken me up twice on this phrase I thought he should realise that I said it with half a smile.
LORD MITCHISON: I hope the criticism came with half a smile; it was certainly intended to. I was not for a moment suggesting that the noble Earl, Lord Jellicoe, really thought all civil servants were monstrous. One may jest occasionally.
My Lords, I have not tried to answer the detailed comments that were made, but I can assure noble Lords that it is part of the purpose of this discussion and of the attempts we have made to

1135
arrange it℄because we tried very hard to do so℄that everything that has been said here should be carefully considered. I am sure your Lordships would agree that it would also be right for this matter to be discussed in another place, and in this way we shall get a great deal of informed comment and lay comment, both of which will be valued highly. I sit down, saying again my very real thanks, not only to the noble Earl, Lord Jellicoe, but to all the noble Lords who have contributed from their varying points of view℄indeed, every conceivable point of view, I think℄in discussing this matter.
May I add just one small point? There are some houses at the back of the Broad Sanctuary, in the area round about Princes Street, and I have been asked to say something about them. What I propose to do is to see, as it were, in which inquiry they could best be included. I think I covered the ground fairly well as regards inquiries, and if it is desired to include them, and I understand there is reason for doing so, I will suggest to my right honourable friend℄I suppose I can hardly pledge him℄that they should be so included. The object of these inquiries is not, of course, to examine the Plan as a whole; it is to examine particular parts of it and specific questions arising in those particular parts.
7.33 p.m.
EARL JELLICOE: My Lords, your Lordships are about to embark upon an important discussion, and I do not propose to stand between you and that discussion for more than an instant or two. I, too, should like to thank all noble Lords from every quarter of your Lordships' House who have taken part in our discussion on this really important matter this afternoon, and I would particularly thank the noble Lord, Lord Mitchison. I think he has added quite considerably to our knowledge of what the Government have in mind as regards this Plan, and in many ways I have found what he had to say reasonably reassuring. As I understand it, the Government are at this stage finally and firmly committed only to three aspects of this: the principle of the Parliamentary precinct and what goes with it; the Bridge Street site, and the destruction, regretted by some of your Lordships' House, of the present Foreign Office building.
LORD MITCHISON: My Lords, I might just acid that we are also committed to the tunnel, subject to the qualifications I mentioned about feasibility, and so on, and of course to the Plan as a whole, as a framework.
EARL JELLICOE: Yes, I fully understand that. In my mind the Parliamentary precinct embraces the tunnel. I am particularly glad to learn that the Government intend to mount an early inquiry into the Broad Sanctuary project, and I was grateful for what the noble Lord had to tell your Lordships' House just now about including in some inquiry the area proposed in the Plan for comprehensive development West of Princes Street.
LORD MITCHISON: Not necessarily early.
EARL JELLICOE: No, I understand that. I would suggest to the noble Lord that the inquiry it best marries up with would be the Broad Sanctuary one, but I understand he will be looking into this question with his right honourable friend later.
I was a little sorry that the noble Lord was not able to say that the Government were undertaking and mounting an early study of the northern end of Whitehall, as both Sir Leslie Martin and Professor Buchanan have drawn attention and emphasised the extreme urgency of dealing with this comprehensively, and I should have thought the centipede could get to work on that particular inquiry fairly soon. I only hope℄and I am encouraged by what the noble Lord has said℄that the Government, too, may find some of the suggestions which have been made useful in their further study of this subject. With those words, my Lords, I beg leave to withdraw my Motion.
Motion for Papers, by leave, withdrawn.

PERSONAL STATEMENT ON BEHALF OF LORD BARNBY
7.36 p.m.
LORD MILVERTON: My Lords, with the permission of the House I ask leave, on behalf of my noble friend Lord Barnby, to make a rather important correction. In column 997 of Hansard of December 21, Lord Barnby quoted from the House of Commons Hansard of

1137
December 14, column 1207. He quoted the Chief Secretary to the Treasury as saying:
"… we, the British Government, own the assets or funds of the Reserve Bank of Rhodesia."
As a matter of fact, the Chief Secretary to the Treasury said the precise reverse of this, because before the words quoted the Chief Secretary's sentence began:
"It is absolutely inaccurate℄"
and then he broke off℄
"I hope that my honourable and learned friend will not mind my being quite clear in my reply℄"
and then returned to the beginning of the sentence and said:
"that we, the British Government, own the assets or funds of the Reserve Bank of Rhodesia."℄[OFFICIAL REPORT, Commons, Vol. 722 (No. 26), col. 1207; 14 /12 /65.]
The latter words belong, of course, to the words "it is absolutely inaccurate". It is obvious that the noble Lord, Lord Barnby, inadvertently misread this passage owing to this interpolation which occurred, and I have taken this opportunity of correcting his error and of expressing the regret which I am sure the noble Lord would have been the first to wish to convey himself had he been able to be here to-day.

SOUTHERN RHODESIA (PETROLEUM) ORDER 1965
7.38 p.m.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR (LORD GARDINER): My Lords, I beg to move that the Southern Rhodesia (Petrôleum) Order 1965 be approved. The object of this Order is to prohibit British subjects from exporting petroleum to Rhodesia and to forbid any person to import petroleum into Rhodesia. It is made under the Southern Rhodesia Act 1965, which gives power to Her Majesty in Council to
"make such provision in relation to Southern Rhodesia, or persons or things in any way belonging to or connected with Southern Rhodesia, as appears to… be necessary or expedient in consequence of the unconstitutional action taken"
in that country.
As my right honourable friend the Prime Minister said in his statement on Monday, Her Majesty's Government were
1138
not willing to act unilaterally to restrict oil supplies, but once it became clear that the United States Government were in full agreement with the oil embargo against Rhodesia, and were willing and able to give full co-operation and support, both in stopping the flow of oil to Rhodesia and in obtaining an airlift to Zambia, Her Majesty's Government did not hesitate to make this Order which is necessary to hasten the return of Rhodesia to constitutional rule.
The Order was made on the evening of Friday, December 17, and came into operation immediately. I shall hope later, if your Lordships will allow me, to say a further word as to the reasons why, in the view of Her Majesty's Government, it was desirable to make this Order. But it may be of more assistance to the House if I first explain its detailed provisions. The House will recall that Orders in Council made under the Act may extend to Southern Rhodesia and the Colonies as well as to the United Kingdom. This Order applies to the United Kingdom and, in part, to Southern Rhodesia. There is also power in article 7(3) to extend it to the Channel Islands, the Isle of Man and colonies and protectorates in relation to the carriage of petroleum by ships and aircraft to Southern Rhodesia.
Article 1 operates solely as part of the law of the United Kingdom. It for bids any person, except under authority of a licence granted by the Minister of Power, to supply or deliver, or agree to supply or deliver, petroleum to any person in Rhodesia, or to any person whom he knows or has reasonable cause to believe will deliver it to Rhodesia, or to do anything, such as acting as an agent, calculated to promote the supply of oil. Under the article any person, of whatever nationality or citizenship, who contravenes these provisions within the United Kingdom is committing a criminal offence. Further, contravention of this article anywhere in the world is an offence by a citizen of the United Kingdom and colonies ordinarily resident here.
I understand that the question has been asked: is not this a rather limited jurisdiction and ought it not to have applied to a wider body of persons? The limits of the provision are determined by International Law, constitutional practice and the desire to avoid casting

1139
the net wider than the situation required. Since the article operates as part of the law of the United Kingdom, the opening words of paragraph (2) establish that contraventions committed in the United Kingdom by any person, of whatever nationality, are offences against the Order.
That leaves contraventions committed outside the United Kingdom. International Law does not permit us to legislate for things done by foreigners in foreign countries. They are, therefore, left to be dealt with by their own law, or by the law of the country where the act in question takes place. International Law would not prevent us from legislating for things done by foreigners within our overseas territories, but it is our general contitutional practice to leave the Legislatures of such territories to pass the necessary laws to cover this, and also, of course, to cover things done by their own citizens while actually in the territory.
This leaves a theoretical gap, in the case of things done in a foreign country by a United Kingdom citizen or a British protected person not ordinarily resident in the United Kingdom. The existence of this gap is recognised, but we considered that it was not of sufficient practical importance in the present context to warrant special provision. The basis of the provision is, in fact, substantially the same as that adopted in Section 5 of the Emergency Laws (Re-enactment and Repeals) Act 1964.
Article 2, which also operates as part of the law of the United Kingdom, prohibits the use, except under licence, of any ship or aircraft registered in the United Kingdom or colonies for the carriage of petroleum to Rhodesia. Under paragraph (2) the owner and master of any ship, or the operator and commander of any aircraft, which has been used in contravention of the Order will be guilty of an offence unless he can prove that he did not know, and had no reason to suppose, that the oil was destined for Rhodesia.
Article 3 also operates as part of the law of the United Kingdom, but in addition, by virtue of Article 7(2), it also operates as part of the law of Southern Rhodesia. It prohibits any person, except under regulations made by the
1140
Secretary of State, from importing petroleum into Rhodesia or from taking delivery outside Rhodesia of oil destined to be imported therein. Any Rhodesian, therefore, or any other person in Rhodesia who seeks to import oil will be committing a criminal offence both under United Kingdom law and under Rhodesian law and will be liable to be punished by either the Rhodesian courts or, if he comes within the jurisdiction, by the courts of this country.
Noble Lords will observe that the effect of this Order is to establish criminal sanctions against any person in this country or Rhodesia, and against any citizen of the United Kingdom and colonies, or of Rhodesia, anywhere who seeks to supply oil to Rhodesia, but no such sanctions have yet been imposed against, for example, a citizen of the United States who acts in this way while outside this country or Rhodesia. This, of course, is true for the simple reason that we have no power to legislate for such a purpose. However, as my right honourable friend the Prime Minister said in another place on Monday, a great many other countries are also giving us their support. It is for each country to decide the methods by which it will give effect to that support. This Order will undoubtedly assist the Governments of those other countries to arrange for their support of the embargo.
The prohibition of the import of oil into Rhodesia may well render ineffective any future contracts for the supply of oil to Rhodesia and relieve the foreign contractor of his obligations under existing ones. I have mentioned the fact that the Secretary of State has power by regulations to grant dispensations, and if your Lordships ask the sort of purpose for which that will be used perhaps I may say that the Secretary of State has already, by regulations, granted a dispensation in the case of petrol imported by aeroplanes otherwise than as cargo; that is to say, the petrol which the aeroplane is using for its own purposes.
Article 4 prescribes the penalties for a conviction either summarily or on indictment and paragraph (2) contains the common form provision relating to the liability of a director, manager or other officer for the offences of a body corporate. Article 5 provides that the Minister may grant either general or

1141
special licences, subject to or without conditions. Article 6 deals with interpretation and is, I think, self-explanatory. Article 7 deals with citation, commencement and extent. As I have mentioned already, Article 3 and the relevant provisions of Articles 4 and 6 are extended to Rhodesia and there is power in paragraph (3) to extend Article 2 to the Colonies and protectorates with such modifications as may be necessary. Paragraph (4) provides that Orders in Council under the preceding paragraph are to be laid before Parliament after being made.
I think some questions have been asked on Article 7, which may at first sight seem a little complex. First of all, in relation to paragraph (2) of that article the question may be asked: how does this work in relation to proceedings before Rhodesian courts? Article 3, covering Rhodesian law, relates to acts done inside Rhodesia, but it may also apply the Order to acts done outside Rhodesia. Article 4 lays down the rules for proceedings in the United Kingdom courts, and Article 7(2) says, in effect, that in its operation as part of the law of Rhodesia the references in Article 4 to the United Kingdom are to be construed as references to Rhodesia. This means that where an offence against Rhodesian law is committed outside Rhodesia the offender may be prosecuted before a Rhodesian court of summary jurisdiction at any time within twelve months after he first returns to Rhodesia.
As to paragraph (3) of Article 7, it may be asked why such a provision was necessary and what use is intended to be made of it. As a matter of general practice we do not usually legislate for Colonies and protectorates on matters within their own legislative competence. There are some matters, however (of which merchant shipping and aircraft are two), for which it has been customary for the Imperial Parliament to legislate. Accordingly, if legislation is necessary in the Colonies corresponding to Articles 1 and 3 of the Order, they must make it themselves and we shall not make it for them. But they cannot make legislation corresponding to Article 2: only we can do that. Hence, the power conferred by paragraph (3) of Article 7. We are, in fact, in touch with all Colonies and protectorates that are likely to be concerned about the desirability of our making an Order extending Article 2 to them and
1142
also about their passing legislation of their own accord.
Lastly, with regard to paragraph (4) of Article 7, it may be asked why the Orders there referred to are not subject to Affirmative Resolution. The reason is that this is not a power to make new provisions which Parliament would rightly expect to have an opportunity to consider; it is merely a power to extend to certain territories, for the purposes I have mentioned, and with whatever modification the circumstances of those territories may require provisions which,ex hypothesi,Parliament will already have approved. And the only reason why this is being done by Order in Council at all, rather than being left to the local Legislatures, is, as I have said, that Colonial Legislatures are probably not competent on technical grounds to make this sort of law about ships and aircraft.
My Lords, if I have adequately explained the detailed provisions of the Order, perhaps your Lordships will allow me to add a few words as to the reasons for making it. Perhaps I may remind your Lordships that my right honourable friend the Prime Minister in another place yesterday said
"… if we do not get a quick solution it is much more likely to lead to force being applied externally℄not by us but by others℄and in conditions which will present this country with a most appalling dilemma.ߪ But the additional reasons why I say that we want these measures to be quickly effective is. first, that the hardship will be less than if there were a long-drawn-out agony of slow-working sanctions; secondly, it will be much easier to reconstruct the economy when Rhodesia has returned to constitutional rule and we could cut off the economic sanctions very quickly—as quickly as we imposed them; thirdly, the more quickly a solution is reached the less bitterness there will be and, therefore, the greater the opportunity of creating the multiracial harmony on which we all agree and on which any permanent solution of the Rhodesian problem must depend. As I have said, the quicker the solution, the less danger there is of grave external action.… In our view, these measures are necessary to deny the munitions of rebellion to the Smith régime and to speed the day of the return of constitutional methods."℄[OFFICIAL REPORT, Commons, Vol. 722 (No. 31), col. 1917.]
I know that in your Lordships' House there are some who are opposed to Orders of this kind; and I recognise fully the honesty and sincerity of their views. But perhaps I may just say this to them: it has always seemed to me that this was a situation in which one could take only one of three courses of action. The first

1143
course possible would have been to abandon the 4 million Africans to their fate, take no exception to the fact that this valuable and prosperous Colony was one which a comparatively few men had seized, being the Government at the time; to raise no objection to their seizing it; and to let the remaining African counties and the United Nations do what they liked while we sat quietly at home. I should not have thought that this was a course which would commend itself to any Government of this country. It is certainly not the view of the Government that that course should have been pursued; nor, as I understand it, is it the view of the Opposition, or of the Liberal Party.
The second course would have been to take such financial and economic measures as would result in members of the Rhodesian Front coming to the conclusion that they had made a mistake, and saying, "We thought that this was going to be a nine-days' wonder. We regarded the present British Government as effete. We did not think they would ever in fact do the things which they said they would do. We thought that, when it came to the point, they would not in fact do anything, and that we should get away with it. We see now that this was not right. In fact, they have done all, and more than all, of the things they said they would do. We see now that the course which our Government followed (though it had no express mandate for it) is one which may lead to the break-up of the whole of the Commonwealth. We see, further, that it may lead to a black and white war in Africa; and we see now that the opinion of virtually the whole world is against us. We see, unemployment coming, and we recognise that we have made a mistake, that we shall not do any good, so long as we pursue the path of illegality. We see that there is no threat that African majority rule will be imposed on us, either to-day or to-morrow; that if we return to the path of legality there will be no recriminations, and accordingly that is what we will do." That, then, was the second course possible; and it was, I think, the course supported by every Party in this country: that we should take such steps, financial or economic, as would lead to a return to constitutional government in Rhodesia.
1144
The third course would have been to remove the illegal régime by military action. This was a course strongly supported by many African countries, and by other people in the world besides. They said, "If you had, in fact, gone straight in with military forces, there would have been no fighting. This is exactly what you would have done if the rebels had been black. This is what you did in Kenya. This is what you are doing now in Aden. It is only because they are your own kith and kin that you are not doing it." But the African countries, not unnaturally, say, "We also have kith and kin in Rhodesia, 4 million of them. Your sanctions are not going to be effective, or they are going to be too slow, and accordingly it is this third course of military force which you ought to have followed." There again, Her Majesty's Government have always said throughout that they will not use military force to impose a Constitution on Rhodesia. That is still their position. I believe that also to be the position of the Opposition. I am not quite sure about the Liberal Party, but they will speak for themselves.
My Lords, I appreciate that those who take a different view in your Lordships' House say, "Well, the action taken will not really be effective for the purposes you have in mind. On the contrary, it is much more likely to make everybody in Rhodesia stick together; and the more you do this sort of thing, the more obstinate they will get and the less likely they will be to return to constitutional rule." Of course, we have always appreciated that the first reaction after an illegal declaration of independence would be that some Rhodesians, while not really supporting it, would say, "Now it has been done, we had better all stick together."
But if one is to ask, "What is to be the future effect of financial or economic measures of this kind?" then, while I recognise that those who take a different view have interests in Rhodesia, or know Rhodesia well, I should have thought that the opinions on that point—that is to say, the likely effect of these measures on members of the Rhodesian Front—was best known to Rhodesians who have spent their lives in Rhodesia and who mix with members of the Rhodesian Front every day. And on this point the

1145
information of the Government is very clear. These men who ought to know (and we must remember that they are the most educated and intelligent people in Rhodesia; these are all the moderates, the recent Opposition in Parliament; men of considerable political and Parliamentary experience led by Mr. Butler; men from the churches, the universities, the leading businessmen) are all of the opinion that the way to end this rebel régime is to take measures of this kind.
I may say that individual members of the Government who have personal friends in Rhodesia all receive letters to the same effect saying: "Step up your sanctions; make them as strong as you can, and make them short and sharp, rather than very long drawn out. If you will do that, members of the Rhodesian Front—perhaps not immediately, but as sanctions begin to take effect; as they find shortages all round, unemployment, and face a world in which no substantial sale of any kind of their tobacco crops is going to be made—will say, as reasonable men ' We were wrong. We thought things would turn out otherwise. We were persuaded by Mr. Smith that this was the thing to do. We were never actually asked to vote for this in an Election; we have never actually given a mandate for it. As it has turned out, the thing has gone wrong and we must get back again to constitutional government'."
It may be that, before this evening's debate is over, those who take this different view will tell us what course they think we ought to have followed. If they say, "Our position really is exactly the same as Mr. Smith's", I would remind them that the Rhodesian Front have said that they do not believe in majority rule, certainly not in their lifetime; they have worked very hard and done a good job developing the country economically; they have high living standards, cars, swimming pools, cheap African labour and cheap African servants, and a higher living standard than they would have here, and have no intention of giving it up.
I do not know whether those who disapprove of any of the steps which have been taken share that view. If so, they would, I suppose, have been in favour of the first course—that is to say, of
1146
doing absolutely nothing at all; of just leaving the matter to the United Nations and letting this handful of men seize this British Colony. But if they do not take that view, then I am not clear on what grounds they do not take the view that the second course ought to have been taken. If one is to apply sanctions at all, I should not have thought that there is any real case to be made for saying, "Yes, we approve of sanctions, so long as they are ineffective." This would merely be the worst of both worlds and would mean falling between two stools.
My Lords, this is going to be a long debate, and I do not want to keep your Lordships any later. We appreciate to the full the very strong emotions on the part of all the African countries, but we must ask them to be patient and to give sanctions an opportunity to take effect, which I think will not now be long. May I conclude by reminding your Lordships of another observation made by my right honourable friend the Prime Minister, because it is very important—and I think we should continue to assert and make it plain whenever we speak on the subject: that the view which was so widely promulgated by the Smith Government, that there was no alternative between an illegal seizure of power and African majority rule to-morrow, is one which never had any foundation and stiff has no foundation; and that if only they will return to constitutional government, we shall be anxious to it down with representatives of all peoples and Parties in Rhodesia to consider what the future of that country ought to be. If I may remind the House of what my right honourable friend said yesterday, it was this [col. 1931]:
"I think that this illegal action will come to an end only when the hardships and inconvenience resulting from the economic measures which have been taken—that is which Mr. Smith has taken—begin to loom larger in the minds of the Rhodesian people than the fears they feel—geniune fears, though unjustified—about the consequences of a return to constitutional rule.
"We have said, and we mean, that once constitutional rule returns we shall immediately act to reverse the economic measures that we have taken—this can be done quickly—and approach the problem of reconstruction, not in any punitive or backward-looking spirit, but constructively. But every week that passes increases the dangers, and I hope that Rhodesians will respond quickly to what we have in mind."

1147
My Lords, I beg to move.
Moved, That the Southern Rhodesia (Petrôleum) Order 1965 be approved.℄ (The Lord Chancellor.)
8.6 p.m.
LORD CARRINGTON: My Lords, I think I am right in saying, and I have no doubt I shall be corrected if I am wrong, that it has just been announced that the noble Earl the Leader of the House has been appointed Colonial Secretary. On behalf of all those who sit on these Benches, I should like to congratulate him most warmly on his appointment and to wish him every good fortune.
SEVERAL NOBLE LORDS: Hear, hear!
LORD CARRINGTON: I understand at the same time that he is no longer Lord Privy Seal. I remember that when my right honourable friend the Leader of the Opposition was Lord Privy Seal, he had great difficulty in explaining what a Lord Privy Seal was. He started off by saying that he was neither a Lord, nor a Privy, nor a Seal. The noble Earl will not be a Privy or a Seal, but he is still a Lord, and I hope very much that his new appointment will not mean that he is seen less in your Lordships' House.
Once again we are debating important issues connected with Rhodesia. I hope your Lordship will allow me on this occasion, as the noble and learned Lord did, to stray wider than the issue of oil on which to-day's debate is based. I comfort myself that I do so at the invitation of the Chief Whip who, oddly enough, considering his position, seems to think that we do not already stray far enough from the Rules of Order. I stray this evening because I think it is impossible to consider each individual Order or sanction in isolation. It is perfectly proper for us to look at this situation in the round when discussing and deciding issues of such magnitude.
It has been the object of those who sit on these Benches to support the Government and to maintain the unity of the country in this grave emergency whenever possible, though many of us have had doubts what the outcome of the Government's policy would be. I agree with the noble and learned Lord that it would have been impossible that Mr. Smith's Government should not suffer serious consequences as a result of their illegal
1148
declaration of independence. If force was out of the question, as it was, and still is, then it seems to me that it was necessary to impose sanctions. If sanctions were to be imposed, then it really was quite impossible to differentiate between punitive sanctions and sanctions which were not punitive, since it was hoped that sanctions would bring home to Mr. Smith and his colleagues the consequences of his act of rebellion, and so impress the people of Rhodesia with the gravity of the situation that moderate men could emerge and take over the Government.
I am bound to say, though I know that this view is not shared by some of my noble friends, that oil sanctions do not seem to me to be very different in kind from the other sanctions which have already been imposed. But all along most of us, at any rate on this side, have had misgivings about the effect of sanctions upon the Rhodesian people; and this was said by the noble and learned Lord earlier on this evening. There was, and is, a danger that measures of this kind would unite the Rhodesians behind the Government of Mr. Smith. For myself, I doubt very much whether it was possible to avoid this danger, though it can be aggravated by provocative speeches, by insulting language and by demands for unconditional surrender, none of which we had this evening from the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor.
The Government clearly had to take into account not only the reaction of the Rhodesians themselves, but the reaction of the Africans, the Commonwealth and the rest of the Free World. To do less than to impose sanctions might well have created a situation in the United Nations and in Africa which could have got out of control, and perhaps would have entailed the mounting of expeditionary forces, the intervention by mandatory Resolution of the United Nations, and other such catastrophies which up to now have been avoided. It was a balance of disadvantage.
Your Lordships will all no doubt have read the report of the debate which took place in the House of Commons yesterday. The object of my right honourable friends, when they attempted to move their Motion yesterday, was to make it perfectly clear to the Government, although we had supported them

1149
thus far in the action they had taken on Rhodesia, that in no circumstances could the Conservative Party accept the use of force to settle the Rhodesian problem. Some felt that the Government are being dragged, no doubt very unwillingly, into just such a situation. Step by step, it seems, the Prime Minister and the Government have been pushed a little further towards more extreme measures℄pushed by African opinion, by United Nations opinion and perhaps by United States opinion. Each step so far, I think, has been justifiable; but each step, so far as I am concerned, was agreed to each time with more misgiving.
The object of the debate yesterday in another place was, as I said, to make it quite clear to the Prime Minister and the Government at what point the Conservative Party, and I judge the vast majority of the people in this country, would be prepared to support their policy, and also to emphasise that in the end it will be necessary both to conciliate and negotiate. I shall have more to say about this a little later.
The Daily Telegraph,in its report this morning of that debate, said this:
"three things…[are]…clearer than they have been since the Rhodesian crisis began: The Government is not seeking a mandate from Parliament to use military force. Its decision to impose oil sanctions will not lead to a blockade of the Portuguese port of Beira, Mozambique. It is prepared to enter into negotiations for a peaceful constitutional settlement."
If that is the situation—and I ask the noble Earl the Leader of the House if it is—I am extremely glad to hear it. But I wonder whether he would confirm those three points, since I am bound to say that I did not entirely receive the same impression from all that I read of the debate in another place yesterday.
For example, I understood the Prime Minister to say that, though we had no intention of blockading Beira, it might well be the decision of the United Nations to do so. In what circumstances would the Government support such a proposal? Would it not be in their power to oppose it, if it did not commend itself to them—ultimately, if they so wished, by use of the veto? Would they, for example, acquiesce in such a blockade against the wishes of Portugal? How could such a blockade operate when oil supplies to Mozambique would have to be maintained? These and many other
1150
questions would need to be answered before the Government could be absolved from their responsibility by acquiescing in such action, or, indeed, from their responsibility, the British responsibility, for Rhodesia.
Lastly, I turn to the question of negotiations for a peaceful settlement. One of the things that has been worrying me and, I think, most of us on this side of the House is this. How can you expect moderate Rhodesians, or indeed immoderate Rhodesians, to return to the path of constitutional government if no indication is given to them of the terms which would be acceptable to the British Government? Of course, I realise how difficult it is for the Prime Minister to make overtures to Mr. Smith. It might very well be misunderstood all over the world, and be taken by Mr. Smith as a sign of weakness. Equally, one must appreciate how difficult it is for Mr. Smith or anyone else in Rhodesia to make overtures to us. And it is made doubly difficult if the Prime Minister and the Government are to insist on what one might call "unconditional surrender".
I would think that the experience that we have had with this unhappy phrase does not give us much confidence that it is the right course of action to follow in this case. When people are told that they will have to surrender unconditionally—even if those words are not used they are implied—it is much more likely to firm their resolve to resist until the last moment. In this case, resistance until the last moment will bring with it the most appalling dangers, not only of a complete collapse in the economy of Rhodesia, but indeed, ultimately, the danger of the use of force. I have no doubt that some way must be found of making plain to Rhodesia the sort of terms upon which we can begin negotiating.
I fear, too, that the Prime Minister's insistence upon a return for a period to direct rule can have nothing but a damaging effect, upon even the most moderate elements in Rhodesia. After so many years of internal self-government, I would not have thought that any Rhodesian would view a return to direct rule with anything but implacable opposition. I do not know whether I was right in detecting yesterday that the Prime Minister's attitude on these matters is becoming less

1151
rigid. I very much hope that it is, because I am quite sure that the imposition of sanctions by itself will have no effect, unless it is accompanied by a clear statement of the terms on which we can begin a new chapter in the history of Rhodesia.
I think it will be seen from what I have said that I myself am not prepared to vote against the imposition of oil sanctions, and for the reasons I have given. I have made it clear, too, that I think force must not be used for the settlement of the Rhodesian problem, and that it is essential to negotiate and essential to create conditions which will make that possible. I know very well that there are those who sit on the Conservative Benches who do not share my views, and I do not flatter myself that anything I have said this evening is likely to convince them. But I would ask them before they vote against this Order to consider this.
We in this House are in a very extraordinary position. Because of our composition, it is more than likely that if the Opposition decided to vote against the Government their vote would be successful. All of us have in the past tried to lay down certain guide lines as to how the House of Lords should conduct itself in situations of deep Party controversy. There is no precedent for the situation in which we find ourselves today. Nevertheless, if this Order were rejected by the House, although it has passed the Commons with a large majority, certain consequences would follow. The decision of the Government, taken in concert with the United States and supported by a number of other European Powers and by the Commonwealth, would seem to be rendered inoperative on a vote taken by this House in defiance, in opposition, to the elected Chamber. Of course, the House is entitled to do that; but, my Lords, surely no Government could passively accept such an adverse vote. Either the powers of the House would be further curtailed or, more likely, there would be a very drastic reform of both the powers and the composition of the House.
Noble Lords who feel strongly on this matter should, I think, make up their minds whether this issue is one on which the House of Lords should decide to use
1152
its ultimate power. Will not those who dislike these sanctions have made their opinion abundantly clear by the end of the evening? What can they hope to achieve by a vote? Is this really an issue on which, or is this the right moment, to face a constitutional crisis? To me, my Lords, the answer is clearly, "No"; and, if I have carried any of your Lordships on these Benches with me in anything I have said this evening, I would earnestly beg you not to oppose this Order by voting, but to abstain, as I and my colleagues who sit beside me on this Bench propose to do.
8.21 p.m.
LORD REA: My Lords, after that penetrating and thoughtful speech by the noble Lord the Leader of the Opposition, I think there is probably very little to say, although there are a great many of your Lordships who are going to say it. But I, for one, propose to be really brief. I should first of all like to join with the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, in congratulating the noble Earl the Leader of the House on his new office as Secretary of State, one of the highest Cabinet ranks there is, and in a subject matter in which I am sure his great gifts will be very well used. We are delighted, of course, that there is no further change in his status, because we very much value him here as our Leader.
My Lords, I must say that I regret these oil sanctions. As Leader of the Liberal Party, I think I can say that. I regret all sanctions. I think they are all most unfortunate. But, unfortunately, we must support them, and this evening we are going to support the Government in this Motion. They impose hardships and difficulty—that is why we loathe them. They impose hardships and difficulty not only on innocent people, but on people who have worked very hard for the good of the country and are yet in a minority position which does not give them the reason to have our respect or our support now that they have gone out of constitutional government.
These are unusual circumstances, and therefore we must use unusual methods to deal with them. It is most illiberal, in the historical sense of the word, that we should have to do these things, but there are special circumstances. There are circumstances in this country where we have to guard certain criminals not

1153
only with the police force but with soldiers and machine guns. This goes against the grain of all of us, but it happens. And here we have an extraordinary circumstance, where we have had to impose these sanctions. Having set our hand to the plough (I dislike using this cliché), I do not think we can turn back. We must go on with these oil sanctions, unpleasant as they are, because they will lead to a quicker settlement, which all sides in this question want in the long run—the peaceful settlement of things in Rhodesia. We know that if the Government of Mr. Smith get their way, it will, in the opinion of most people in the world, lead to chaos—or, if it does not lead to chaos, it will be a very long time before things come right, far longer than we who take the other point of view like to see happening.
My Lords, if you decide to take these disciplinary actions, you have to take them properly. I do not know if any of your Lordships are old-fashioned enough to beat your sons when they have been thoroughly naughty, but if you do I suggest that some of you, if you do not like doing this sort of thing, should take care to beat them with a feather duster because then you go through the actions. Justice will have been seen to be done, but will not have been done. No effect will cover this business at all if this Motion and these sanctions are not put through. If they are defeated there will be humiliation, of course, but, I think, not only humiliation for Her Majesty's present Government, but humiliation, unfortunately, for this country in the eyes of the whole world.
We have been asked why we do not negotiate; we have been asked, "Can we negotiate?"—and here I do have one critical query of the Government. We read and hear every day of the objections to the Government's policy; but I do not think we hear enough, and we do not hear daily, of what remedies there are. I ask that the Prime Minister (or somebody delegated by him) should not merely indicate that when Mr. Smith and his Government show signs of grace we can get into touch with them. What does an ordinary Rhodesian, one like you and me, who wants to be loyal to the Governor, to the Government, to the Queen and to Great Britain, do personally to help things? Cannot the Government put out
1154
some little schedule of procedure that he can get on with? Is there not to be a mission of people from here out to Rhodesia to support the Governor and consult with him, and possibly set up a new Government? Is there no bridge across to some neighbouring country of people of like minds? I think, if I may say so, that in the Press and the publicity of this country we are not giving enough lead about how to come back into the fold. I am quite sure there are hundreds and thousands of white Rhodesians who want to come back into the fold, and I should like to help them far more than we are doing.
I was asked the question: Does the Liberal Party stand for force? They do not stand for force. I think it the most illiberal thing there is, hut I think we admire the brave statement of the most reverend Primate the Archbishop of Canterbury who put forward a hypothetical case. If some moral issue arises which must take force with it, then, reluctantly, we will agree to force. We do not wish it any more than the Government or the Opposition or anybody else, but if things are going to get out of hand, if immediate force is going to save further bloodshed later on, then reluctantly, sorrowfully and regretfully, we might have to support it. In the meantime, all I can say is that we support the Government to-night.
8.27 p.m.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: My Lords, in rising to oppose the Order which is now before your Lordships, I think I should begin by making something in the nature of a personal explanation. On the last occasion this House discussed Rhodesia I believe the noble Lord, Lord Wells-Pestell, criticised noble Lords who had financial interests in Rhodesia and did not disclose them. Though he did not mention any names, I understand that the impression was gained in the House that I might be one of the chief targets at which his shafts were directed. I want to say at once that I make no complaint whatever against his having spoken as he did, whether it was directed at me or at anybody else. He is perfectly entitled, as a Member of your Lordships' House, to say whatever he thinks right. That is our privilege in this place. But I am sure that those who have known me

1155
over the years in this House will absolve me of any intention to conceal anything from your Lordships. The fact is, as some of your Lordships know, I had disclosed such an interest less than a fortnight before and on various occasions before that, and I thought the House did not need reminding once again. If, however, I was at fault, I make my most sincere apologies. However, the noble Lord, Lord Wells-Pestell, having spoken as he did, I think I ought to go a little rather more into detail as to the nature of my interest, in order that the House may be fully satisfied.
How it came about was that during the Second World War it was my good fortune to occupy successively the posts of Dominions Secretary and Colonial Secretary. As a result of this, I became deeply interested in the development of our Dependencies overseas; and when an opportunity occurred shortly after the end of the war of acquiring a share in two farming properties in Rhodesia which were to be developed, I jumped at it. From the purely financial point of view, I must confess they have not been very profitable investments. Indeed, up to now I have never had a penny of interest from either of them. But I have never regretted my decision, because the estates have in fact been greatly improved. One is to-day one of the best cattle ranches in the country, with one of the best cattlemen in charge; and we give employment to a small number of Europeans and a large number of Africans, all of whom, so far as I know, are happy and contented.
I think the House was entitled to those facts; and I hope your Lordships will forgive my going into them at such length. At the same time I would not agree, if I may say so with all deference, that the fact that people like myself have special connections with Rhodesia debars them from expressing their views in this House, any more than they should be debarred from expressing their views on Kenya, where I, for instance, have no connections. Indeed, if one's special experience brings one to any conclusions, I think it is perfectly proper that one should express them to your Lordships.
And one of the conclusions to which I have come is that the African in Rhodesia is not yet ready for majority
1156
rule over a large multiracial community. I do not say that he never will be ready; I do not say it will be necessarily long before he is ready; but he is not yet ready. After all, that is not surprising. We tend to forget nowadays how short a time it is since the Africans in Rhodesia first had contact with Western civilisation—indeed, with civilisation at all. I remember talking to an old lady in Salisbury not many years ago—only a few years ago, in fact—who had lived as a child with her father, who was a missionary, in the kraal of King Lobenguela in the years preceding the arrival of Cecil Rhodes. She gave a vivid picture of Matabele warriors in their war-dress, with head-dresses of ostrich feathers and great shields and assegais, moving forward and backward in a great circle before the King, until he gave his word of command by point with his hand; and off they went to a raid on one of the neighbouring tribes. Splendid human figures, but quite barbaric. That was almost within the lifetime of people of my age.
How far Rhodesia has moved since then! And I think it can be fairly claimed that it has moved so far almost entirely as a result of work done by Europeans in the last seventy or eighty years. And the Africans have moved forward, too. I believe I am right in saying that more money has been spent on African education in Rhodesia during recent years than in any of the African Territories administered by the Colonial Office℄and it was all done with the Rhodesians' own money. I do not say that more could not have been done. Of course, it is always possible to do more, but what has been done is a very considerable achievement.
My Lords, in these circumstances one can but wonder: does a dispute concerned not with the fact of African advance but with the pace of African advance justify the mobilisation of the whole world against these people to whom alone, it is generally believed, the greatly improved conditions of the African in their country are due℄without whom, indeed, the Africans would be relatively in the same condition in which they were before the Europeans first came there? If it is pointed out to me that the Rhodesian Government have also done something very wrong in unilaterally

1157
declaring their independence, I would reply: That may well be so. I think they were wrong to do it. But that is a matter which concerns Rhodesia and us alone. It does not, or should not, concern any other nation.
The white Rhodesians, apparently, in the eyes of the Prime Minister and possibly some, at any rate, of the Members in this House, have put themselves beyond the pale by what they have done. They have become, as it were, the embodiment of evil; and the war against them, although up to now it has been cold, has become regarded as a Holy War, a war in which there can be no compromise but only unconditional surrender. One sanction has been piled on another. First, there has been the denial of the automatic economic advantages that flow from membership of the Commonwealth. That, I think all would agree, the Rhodesians have brought on themselves. Then there was the embargo on the purchase of sugar and tobacco, the two main products of the country. Then there was the embargo on the purchase of 95 per cent. (I think it was) of the other products of the country. Then there was the embargo on all trade between the two countries, and the embargo on the transfer of monies from one country to another. And finally, there was the seizure of the reserves of the Reserve Bank of Rhodesia.
The noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor (perhaps I did not hear him correctly: I am getting a little deaf, and I hope that he will correct me if I am wrong) said to-night, I think, that all the solid information which has reached the Government was to the effect that sanctions were already, to some extent at any rate, succeeding. My information is exactly the opposite; and I suspect, with all deference to the noble and learned Lord, that my information is more correct. Why otherwise are we now told by the Prime Minister that he has decided to resort, without any previous consultations with Parliament, on the harshest, cruellest and most dangerous of all sanctions, the oil sanctions?
My Lords, I seem to remember that there was a suggestion at one time—at the time of Suez— that we should cut off oil from Egypt. Apparently it was
1158
not at all an impossible operation. But it was vetoed because it was regarded as just too cruel. But it is not, apparently, regarded as too cruel for the Rhodesians. This may be a cold war, but it is a total war, all the same. I have said that the oil sanction is cruel, because nowadays oil comes so much into the lives even of quite poor families. But it is also, I submit, a far more dangerous sanction, for it is liable at any time to bring nations to the verge of war. Take the present case. I imagine that the purpose of the Government is, if that is possible by arrangement with the exporting countries, to prevent oil from being embarked for Rhodesia at all. They hope not to have to stop ships on the high seas, for that would mean a blockade not of Rhodesian ports but of ports of nations at present not involved in the dispute at all: and surely the blockade of ports of friendly nations is almost an act of war against those countries.
Or take another not too far-fetched possibility. Let us suppose that a tanker flying what I believe is called a "flag of convenience" tries to run the blockade; and suppose that, being hailed by the blockading warship, she refuses to stop. What does the blockading warship do? Does it sink the tanker? I hope that supporters of the Government will not regard that as the height of absurdity. It is not really an absurdity at all. It is something which might well flow quite inevitably from the imposition of oil sanctions and might take place even before your Lordships meet again after Christmas. For I would remind your Lordships that we are rising to-day for the Christmas Recess, and it may be that we shall be away for a month. And in a dispute of this kind, especially at the stage it has now reached, much may happen in a month. I thought, if I may say so, that the Leader of the House gave some fairly evasive replies yesterday as to the conditions under which the Government would agree to an earlier recall of Parliament.
Noble Lords opposite may say, quite fairly, that I am barking up the wrong tree. They may point out that the Prime Minister, in his speech yesterday, has already abjured the use of force. They may quote the words of the Prime Minister speaking of the possibility of a

1159
blockade. I will quote him myself. This is what the Prime Minister said:
"He"—
that is, Mr. Heath—
"fears it will lead to a Naval blockade of Beira. It will not."
But I could not but feel, like the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, that these words should be read in the light of another passage in the speech of the Prime Minister when he said:
"If the matter was raised at the United Nations, and there was a decision to stop oil tankers from going into Beira, that would be an international decision."—
which is, apparently, in his mind, quite a different thing. To be quite fair, he added [OFFICIAL REPORT, Commons, Vol. 722 (No. 31), col. 1919]:
"We do not ourselves propose to seek such a resolution."
But he did not say that we would veto such a decision. He rather indicated, as I understood him, that we should feel unable to resist it.
This, to my mind, is the most formidable and even sinister aspect of the present situation; for the Prime Minister's objective may be comparatively limited in its aim; limited to getting rid of (I am glad to see that he has dropped the word "traitor") the illegal régime in Rhodesia. But the Afro-Asians, who are to-day making the running in the United Nations on this subject, do not care a row of beans for Mr. Smith. They do not care whether he is legal or illegal. They would feel just the same about a Government headed by Sir Roy Welensky or by Mr. Winston Field. Their object is quite different and much more far-reaching. It is, to use a graphic phrase once coined by Mr. Tom Mboya, to "make the white man scram out of Africa". That is their objective; and if they can create chaos and ruin in Rhodesia, they will have gone far to achieve it.
If we, my Lords, by approving oil sanctions, open the door to a United Nations—if not to a United Kingdom—blockade, we shall have gone far to facilitate their schemes. But if we in Britain decide not to approve them, they will, if they intend to pursue their blockade with a view to creating chaos in Rhodesia, have to come out in their true colours and not merely behind the stalking horse of Her Majesty's Govern-
1160
ment. Such being the position with which we to-day are faced—I hope that I have not misrepresented it—I appeal most earnestly to your Lordships to pause before allowing this Order to pass into law.
My Lords, the Chancellor has said that the Government had no practical alternative. But this imposition of oil sanctions which Parliament is to-day being asked to approve may well, I believe, be one of those moments of fate which sometimes occur in the history of countries—what, in the world of the air, is called "the point of no return". The only hope now, I believe, of avoiding an even greater conflagration is not further to intensify sanctions. That, apart from bringing nearer the wider dangers of which I have just spoken, could only create such bitterness that no Rhodesian, whether he was pro-Smith or anti-Smith, would sit down at a conference table with a representative of the United Kingdom Government.
The imperative need now is for a return to the paths of conciliation and negotiation, of which Sir Alec Douglas-Home spoke so wisely yesterday in another place. This is no time for saying, "I won't speak to Mr. A or Mr. B"—or even, my Lords, to "Mr. S". It is a time for saying, "I will speak to anyone if it will serve the cause of peace." But if we agree to these sanctions I believe that the situation will pass out of our control. We shall be swept forward, inevitably, into rapids infinitely dangerous both to our Commonwealth and to our country; into the realm of force, with all that implies.
And, my Lords, it is not only I who see these greater perils looming before us. It will, I am sure, not have escaped the notice of your Lordships that some of the newspapers, even those hitherto most favourable to the Government's ideas, or willing to accept them, have begun to show in the last two or three day a very considerable nervousness as to the shoals and rapids into which the country is now being led. The Daily Telegraph which has always supported—rather to my regret—a bipartisan policy, is beginning to talk about the "slippery slope on which we are all embarking"; and even The Times, which up to now, has supported fully the policy of the Government, is beginning to suspect that the Prime Minister has reached a point

1161
when he is seriously considering the use of force, at any rate by someone, if not by himself.
If there are, therefore, any other noble Lords besides myself in this House who share my anxieties, I most earnestly hope that they will vote against this Order tonight, not simply because it will be harmful to the Rhodesians—that is something about which I fully recognise there may well be great differences of view—but because it contains in it, I believe, the seeds of danger, and possibly imminent danger, to peace. And once peace is broken, my Lords, who knows to where the red tide of war may spread? That is why I am afraid that I personally—I speak for no one but myself—still feel that I must vote in accordance with my conscience and convictions. I believe the issues involved, the very wide issues which I have tried, however indifferently, to describe, are so important that we in this House must take all the risks involved. After all, my Lords, if we are never to vote according to our consciences, we had much better not be here at all.
LORD ROYLE: My Lords, although mine is the next name on the list, and much as I should have liked to cross swords with the noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury, I would just say, with a great sense of sacrifice, and my eye on the clock, that I do not intend to detain your Lordships with a speech from my lips. I am quite confident that I can leave the reply to the noble Marquess to my noble Leader.
8.46 p.m.
LORD AILWYN: My Lords, perhaps your Lordships will allow a voice to be heard for a very few moments expressing the view of one with no special knowledge of, or personal interest in, Rhodesia or its people; but one who has followed, as all your Lordships have, the recent events and the situation leading up to them, with ever-increasing interest and concern. My Lords, it is recorded in the Scriptures that at the end of a somewhat lengthy and ponderous speech addressed to Job by one of his so-called comforters, the Lord, answering Job out of the whirlwind, said,
"Who is this that darkeneth counsel by words without knowledge?"
My Lords, I hope devoutly that it will not be my fate to deserve or receive any
1162
such imputation this evening. Nevertheless I have something to say.
I find myself, most regrettably, out of step with many of my noble friends on this side of the House and, in particular, with some of those sitting below the gangway, with whom over the years until quite recently I have always found myself in general, and very often in close, agreement. I yield to no one in the great admiration I have felt for the noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury, over the years; for his leadership both in Government and Opposition; for his courage, and for his statesmanship. One remembers the circumstances of his resignation, together with his Chief, from the Foreign Office in protest against the Government appeasement of Mussolini's aggression in Abyssinia; and how one applauded his action. One remembers his resignation, many years later, at the time of the release of Archbishop Makarios from internment in the Seychelles, in protest against what he considered was Government appeasement during the Cyprus troubles of that time. One applauded his action again, even if one was not completely convinced that such drastic action was called for.
But now, my Lords, we find him fighting against measures—or at least fighting against some of the things—expressly designed to bring back into constitutional relationship an erring community whose leaders have been guilty of a grossly illegal act against the Crown. In other words, after rejecting appeasement stoutly on two major occasions in the past—and no doubt on many more occasions in his long political life—he and his friends now seek to stop, or at least to water down, measures which, in other circumstances, he would have enthusiastically supported. I just do not understand it. Opponents of these Government measures talk about non-punitive sanctions. My Lords, there are no such things. They are a contradiction in terms. Some sanctions are more penal than others, but they are punitive. What point is in them otherwise? It seems to me that if we are going to impose sanctions at all, we must put them on in order to hurt, in the hope that such imposition will bring about the results we are seeking at the earliest possible moment. There is no room for sentiment here and certainly none for a type of sentimentality which, if I may respectfully say so, seems

1163
to have coloured lately the views of some of my noble friends on this side of the House. Milk-and-water sanctions are just a waste of time and are likely to result in hard words, such as "pusillanimity", being addressed to those who are fainthearted in imposing them.
For the reasons I have given, like the noble Lord the Leader of the Liberal Party, I do not dissent from the statement of the most reverend Primate, which received such publicity and criticism a month ago. I thought at the time, and still think, that it was misinterpreted and misunderstood. There is one way to ensure that innocent people do not suffer as a result of their Government's misdeeds —that is, for them to repudiate their leaders who have brought them to that impasse. Far better still would be the solution advocated yesterday by my noble and gallant friend Lord Fraser of North Cape—I do not think I see him here this evening—the top boy of my term in the old "Britannia" some 63 years ago. I echo my noble and gallant friend in saying how wonderful it would be if a message could go out to Rhodesia from this House, "Turn back, Mr. Smith. Retrace your steps from the quagmire into which you are fast leading your gallant people and from which, if you persist, you will sooner or later be powerless to extricate yourselves and will go down in complete disaster. Mr. Smith, you cannot win. For God's sake, take heed in time!" I have done. I do not know whether I have darkened counsel or not, and I hope that I shall be absolved of that: but I have no doubt whatever that we should support the Government in the Motion before the House.
8.54 p.m.
LORD SEGAL: My Lords, my one excuse for inflicting any remarks of mine at this late stage of the debate is that I am one of the few Members on either side of the House who have previously refrained from participating in any of the debates on Rhodesia, and tonight, in extenuation, I propose to be as brief as possible.
As the days go on, each succeeding day full of uncertainty and foreboding, I feel that less and less can now be gained by harking back to the past. My chief concern at the moment is the crucial question: What is to happen now? Those
1164
of us who listened to yesterday's debate in another place—and I was one of those who sat through the two main speeches—can only have come away with the feeling of profound uneasiness at the increasing gravity of the whole situation. No tribute ought to be withheld from both the Prime Minister and I think also the Leader of the Opposition, for the attitudes they have taken in this gravest constitutional crisis that has faced our country for the last 200 years.
The Prime Minister was quite right in stressing again and again in another place that the problem of Southern Rhodesia is not only a world issue, but is fundamentally a moral issue. But how does that help us now? If we turn to other areas of conflict in the world to-day such as Vietnam, is that not also fundamentally a moral issue? Our minds almost reel at the moral implications involved in the bombing and brutalities now taking place in that area. But does the dragging in of moral issues really help towards a settlement in Vietnam? Rather the reverse. Is there not a real danger that the raising of moral issues may help to delay rather than to hasten a settlement in Vietnam? Is there nothing still left that we can do, here and now, to help towards a settlement in Southern Rhodesia? To Mr. Smith this is no longer a question of saving his face, but of saving Rhodesia. I would suggest, first of all, a truce to recrimination. That is an exercise in which more than two can indulge, and abuse, recrimination, and misrepresentation, from whatever quarter they may come, can only delay a settlement.
By outlook and temperament I have always been inclined towards the healing of wounds. How can we to-day try and help to heal a wounded Rhodesia? Her wounds, let me hasten to add, largely self-inflicted, seem to grow deeper day after day, and if allowed to run on might well prove fatal to her whole future. Can we do anything to-day in any direction to try to ease the tension between our two countries? I suggest that all our efforts should be centred on one man, the legally appointed Governor of Rhodesia, Sir Humphrey Gibbs, who through the whole of this sad controversy is almost the one Rhodesian who has emerged with increased stature and with added prestige. To-day, he still remains

1165
the rock upon which all our hopes for a happier future for Rhodesia must be centred. It is to him that in the end, or, as we all hope, long before the end, Mr. Smith will have to turn for advice and for help.
It took our own country nine years and required the advent of a new Government before we could attempt to heal the memory of Suez. The policy of our Government towards President Nasser was to let bygones be bygones. So we sent out the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Mr. George Thompson, on a mission of reconciliation to Cairo. The fact that he was rebuffed by Nasser does not detract from the rightness of our action. Over Suez, too, very deep moral issues were involved, and the moral issues were not on one side only. The seizure of the Suez Canal, and its closure to international shipping of all nations, also involved a very deep moral issue. But despite all that has happened at Suez and Port Said, at Aden and in the Yemen, we tried honourably to convince Nasser of our desire to let bygones be bygones.
I would very seriously ask the Government this question. Is not the time shortly to come when we should also be able to say to Mr. Smith, "Let bygones be bygones"? Ought we not very soon to let the dead past bury its dead, before —if I may use a grim Irishism—it has any dead to bury? Must we wait for another nine years and the advent of another Government—and a Tory Government may take even longer than nine years to come into power℄before we deal with Mr. Smith on the basis of, "Let bygones be bygones"? Cannot we offer him petrol rationing with one hand, and an olive branch with the other?
Indeed, after all that has happened since November 11, it is quite possible even for Mr. Smith, deep down, now to have second thoughts. He knows that his illegal act of U.D.I. has been condemned by all political Parties in this country, by the Commonwealth, by the whole United Nations, united on this issue almost as never before, and by the whole of world opinion. Cannot we say to him now, "Let bygones be bygones. Turn to the one rock of Rhodesian constitutional law, to your own Governor, and, with him, try to save Rhodesia before it is too late. You may have to reconstitute your
1166
present Government. You may have to widen its appeal. You may have to bring into your Government other sections of Rhodesian opinion, more progressive, more moderate and less extreme. But this may be your only alternative to direct rule. For this now is really the moment of destiny for Rhodesia. And your country's destiny still remains in the hands of your legally appointed constitutional Governor, Sir Humphrey Gibbs."?
For Mr. Smith it must never be made too late by us (as has already been said by the noble Lord, Lord Ailwyn, in the words that I intended to use) to retrace his steps back to the Governor, and to lead his country back to before November 11. We may very well fail now in our attempt at reconciliation, as we failed with President Nasser; but that, at least, was an honourable failure.
And so I would conclude with an earnest appeal to the Government, as we pass this Southern Rhodesian Petroleum Order to-day, to express their willingness to attempt a new approach between the Governor and Mr. Smith, in order to bring peace to their sorely stricken country, and also to bring peace of mind to our own people here at home.
9.2 p.m.
LORD SALTER: My Lords, there is much in the spirit of the speech to which we have just listened to which I think all of us will feel a warm response. I rise now, however, not to follow the noble Lord's precise line, but to raise just one point. I am hoping that the noble Earl who will wind up this debate (I am very glad to see that, while he has accepted to-day a new responsibility very relevant to our discussion, he is still remaining Leader of our House) will be able to make some useful comment on the point I am going to put.
The Prime Minister last night stated more explicitly and with more conclusive reasons than he ever has before why he has ruled out force altogether in relation to any idea of an invasion of Rhodesia. There have, however, been various suggestions from time to time that perhaps the United Nations would pass a mandatory resolution which might change the position. My Lords, I would point out that the only body at the United Nations which can pass a binding mandatory resolution is the Security Council,

1167
and that it cannot do so without the concurrence of this country. I need hardly remind your Lordships that, while the General Assembly may pass resolutions, they have no legal power to make mandatory decisions.
From the beginning of this trouble in Rhodesia, the position of the Government has always been that this country has a special responsibility in relation to Rhodesia which other countries have not. In those circumstances, can we assume that if some country should try at the United Nations to pass a resolution which is directly inconsistent with what the Prime Minister has stated to be the fundamental position of this country, his Government would exercise the power that it possesses to prevent that resolution from becoming binding and mandatory? Perhaps the noble Earl may be able to make some comment on the point I have raised when he comes to reply at the end of the debate.
9.5 p.m.
LORD STRABOLGI: My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Salter, has raised a most interesting point, and we shall look forward to hearing the reply to it from my noble friend the Leader of the House. This is a long debate, and I shall be quite brief. I may say at the outset how much I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Ailwyn (and it is not the first time) in his most persuasive speech about the question of sanctions. I think everything that the noble Lord has said is absolutely right. I have never been able to understand the point of sanctions if they are not to be fully effective. The whole idea of bringing in sanctions is so that they will have their fullest impact, and thus make the illegal Government in Southern Rhodesia realise the wrong course they have taken and, one would hope, bring them back to reality.
If sanctions are not to be stringent, if one is to have a choice between them and only bring in those that do not hurt, we are in danger of making the same mistake that we made in the 'thirties in the Spanish Civil War, when we had non-intervention which was little more than a mockery. If we are going to have sanctions which are not really stringent, then the only alternative, surely, is that we have to use force. It has been generally agreed by the Government, by the Opposition and by most countries of the
1168
world in the United Nations that the present situation in Rhodesia cannot be allowed to continue. Therefore the only alternative would be that we should have to go in and use force. It has been agreed that this is a course that we should not take. It has been agreed by Her Majesty's Government, and it has been agreed by the Opposition. Therefore, the wisest course, and the one that Her Majesty's Government are taking, is to bring in effective sanctions.
We on this side of the House recognise that on the other Benches there are certain noble Lords who hold views about this crisis. We recognise that their views are sincerely felt, and they have been most eloquently put. But, if I may say so with the greatest respect, I think the great failure of noble Lords opposite who hold these views, however sincerely, is the fact that they cannot see Rhodesia as part of the world scene. They see her as an isolated country taken out of relation to any other part of the Continent, or even of the world. That is really the great problem of Rhodesia to-day.
I think Mr. Smith little knew what he was starting when he took this action. The results of it, of course, will be incalculable. The whole future of the Commonwealth as we know it to-day may be affected, because we are living not in the 19th century, not in the 17th century, but in the 20th century. We are living in the 1960's. We are seeing tremendous changes. We are seeing the wish for independence of people who have never had it before. We have seen the way the world is beginning to divide up in different sentimental ways between races of different colours. We are living in a century of tremendous turmoil, and Rhodesia has to be seen in that background.
Let us not also forget that the responsibility for U.D.I. rested with the Government of Mr. Smith. It was not in any way due to action taken by Her Majesty's Government; it was action taken by the Government of Rhodesia. Indeed, nobody could have done more than Her Majesty's Government, right up to the eve of this illegal declaration, to try to persuade the Smith Government to reconsider their actions. But it appears that they were determined to make this hasty, illegal and, indeed, highly foolhardly

1169
declaration, and they cannot be allowed to get away with it—no responsible Government could permit that. Of course, as has been said before in these debates, we are the trustees for the whole Rhodesian people, for the European stock and for the great majority of Africans as well. It is not a choice between white or African majority rule, but of leading Rhodesia along the path where one day there will come a time when it can be ruled in a majority way of this kind. But, as my noble and learned friend on the Woolsack has put so cogently, it is not a choice at the moment between those two alternatives.
I agree with my noble friend Lord Segal that the way is open for reconciliation. Her Majesty's Government have made that quite clear: that is the only hope. But the wish for reconciliation which has been extended by the Mother Country must also come from the illegal Government of Rhodesia. I understand that Her Majesty's Government are willing to negotiate and to talk to any responsible factions in the country, including the party of Mr. Smith. But it is essential that before this there must be a sincere wish to negotiate, and that the Party of Mr. Smith must realise that the course they are taking is one that is not tenable, and cannot be acceptable in the 20th century. I support the Government in this Order for oil sanctions, and I think it is only through making these really effective that we can bring Rhodesia back to the path of reality, and thus ensure a lasting peace, a stable Government, and the progress of all her people.
9.14 p.m.
LORD COLYTON: My Lords, I spoke yesterday on the subject of Rhodesia, and I have spoken two or three times in your Lordships' House in the last few weeks. Yesterday, in deference to the noble Earl, the Leader of the House, I again declared my very limited interest in Rhodesia. I had not intended to speak again to-day, and I shall do so only briefly. I am doing so only because I have serious fears arising out of some of the things which the Prime Minister said in another place yesterday, and I am speaking in particular in regard to the possible international blockade of the port of Beira.
1170
I said yesterday, and I repeat to-day, and I think noble Lords in all parts of the House know it very well, that I am opposed to sanctions except for those which were consequential upon the illegal declaration of independence. This oil sanction which we are debating this evening is a particularly bad sanction. It is bad in itself because I believe it to be unenforceable. I remember that the Prime Minister originally said he was not prepared to go in for oil sanctions unilaterally; he said they must be multilateral. So I take it that now that we have decided on this action, this is regarded as a multilateral sanction. We seem to have achieved some form of support from the United States, though I understand that their legislation in fact does not cover an oil embargo. We seem also to have achieved some sort of support from France and Germany and now, I believe, the Netherlands.
But I wonder, when we are told by the Americans that they will give us support and assistance in enforcing an oil sanction of this kind, whether they may perhaps have in mind the sort of assistance that we gave them in enforcing their oil embargo on Cuba. I do not know whether any of your Lordships know the port of Ceuta. It is a Spanish port in North Africa, but if you care to go there you will see tankers flying the British flag, under charter to the Soviet Union, taking up oil from the Spanish refinery to deliver to Fidel Castro in Cuba. That is happening any day throughout the summer that you care to go to that port. I merely mention that as an illustration of how easy it is to defeat an oil embargo. I can think of a dozen ways in which this particular oil embargo on Rhodesia could be defeated. I can see only one way in which an oil embargo could be enforced, and that is by imposing a full-scale naval blockade on the port of Beira and the South African ports.
Although I thought the Prime Minister tended yesterday in his remarks to minimise the importance of the danger of a blockade, a blockade is in fact an act of war. I think we should hesitate a very long time before we take an action which, if it is to be enforceable, may lead us into a situation of war against Portugal and South Africa. I am completely convinced of the Prime Minister's sincerity when he originally said that he had no intention

1171
of using force to coerce the people of Rhodesia into a constitutional line of conduct. I am quite sure that he is still sincere. But I do believe, as was said before by my noble friend, Lord Salisbury, that these oil sanctions are bringing us to the last stage of the slippery slope which could lead us into the use of force and into war.
I would just mention that there is a small clique of people in New York who, from the very beginning of this affair, have been saying that they wanted to use force; a small clique of people—I would call them the same self-deluded fanatics who perpetrated the Congo fiasco —in these rather rarefied international circles surrounding the United Nations, where every one of the events which we have heard of these past few weeks was prophesied, to my knowledge, within a few days of the declaration of independence. The whole lot: the call for British troops to go into Zambia, the call for a force to occupy Kariba, the call for oil sanctions, the call for a blockade, and, at the end of it, the use of force. And that, my Lords, I suggest is something which we should at all costs—at all costs —seek to avoid.
I do not believe that the people of this country would forgive the Government, would forgive the Prime Minister, or would forgive Parliament if we did something which led us into the use of force and, above all, in the last resort into conflict, physical conflict, with our own flesh and blood in Rhodesia—and, indeed, in South Africa, for do not let us forget (as we sometimes do tend to forget) that there are at least a million people of our own British stock in the Republic of South Africa. I think it is something we must have in mind: that there are people who are using Rhodesia, who have used Rhodesia, as part of a plan for a concerted attack on the whole of South Africa. I do not want to be unduly pessimistic, but I can see this happening. That is why I feel myself bound, if a Division is called tonight, to vote against these oil sanctions.
May I, in conclusion, say one word on the constitutional point which my noble friend the Leader of the Opposition mentioned in his speech? He referred to the fact that if we were to defeat this Order to-night it would place the Govern-
1172
ment in a humiliating position—I think somebody used that expression—and it would place this House in a very difficult position. I would beg leave to draw the attention of your Lordships to Section 5(2) of the Southern Rhodesia Act 1965, which we passed into law on October 15 and which said specifically that if an Order in Council under this Act fell there was a power to make a new Order the next day. So it is true we should have expressed our disapproval of the policy of sanctions, but it would not, as I understand it, prevent the Government from immediately making a fresh Order in Council the next day.
9.22 p.m.
LORD GLADWYN: My Lords, in supporting the Government on this issue, which as a member of the Liberal Party I am bound to do, I should like to make a very few remarks from the angle of the United Nations. But before doing so, I would say what a tragedy it is that we have not been able, or apparently will not be able, to arrive at a common, I might even say a national, policy on this tremendous issue. With a little good will it might even be possible to get such unanimity or apparent unanimity tonight, and I do greatly hope that the noble Marquess will not divide the House in spite of what he has said in his speech, to which I listened with such great attention.
From the point of view of the United Nations, the position is this. The Security Council either decides, under Article 39 of the Charter, which is the beginning of Chapter 7, called the enforcement chapter, that this matter is a threat to international peace and security, or it does not. It has not done so yet, but of course one day it might. it is not impossible. If this situation drags on, the pressure on everybody in New York may be very great, and it is quite possible that the point will come up before the Council. If it does pass it, it must pass order to be valid, with the consenting voices of the five permanent members, including ourselves. But under a practice which has been observed for a long time in the United Nations, an abstention is equal to a consenting voice. Therefore, if it does come up, the point really is whether or not the Americans come to the conclusion that this is a threat to international peace and security.

1173
At the moment, I think there is not much likelihood that they would come to such a conclusion; but, on the other hand, it is always possible that they might. If they did, given the obvious sentiments of the other members of the Security Council, it seems to me pretty clear that no Government in this country could possibly veto the proposal that this is a threat to international peace and security, for pretty evident reasons. Members of your Lordships' House sitting below the gangway may think we should veto it, but I suggest we could not do so in practice, for one very simple reason.
For if we got to the point at which the United States said that, in its view, it was a threat to international peace and security, and we vetoed, what exactly would happen? Under the Resolution "Uniting for Peace" this matter would at once go to the General Assembly; and since there would be virtual unanimity, apart from ourselves, presumably under the leadership of the United States, that it was a threat, then the Assembly would be in order in taking all the measures that are necessary in order to bring Mr. Smith to heel, for that would clearly be the object of the exercise. Of course, action would not be actually mandatory under the Resolution "Uniting for Peace" on any member of the United Nations, but in practice, under that Resolution, any States which wanted to could vote for the nomination of a United Nations Commander in charge of a United Nations force—this is all laid down in the Resolution. I do not say that it would be right, but they would in such circumstances undoubtedly take the action which was required. There is no doubt about it at all.
So it seems to me that, at the moment, all we can do is to see what the effect of these new sanctions is upon Mr. Smith. I think the great majority of your Lordships agree with what the noble and learned Lord who sits on the Woolsack said, that in practice we could not have avoided, even if we had wanted to, taking some sanctions against Mr. Smith. The middle course that he said the Government took, and which it seems to me that everybody should agree to, was the only reasonable course that could have been taken now. If that is so, then you take sanctions and presumably you want them to have some effect, otherwise you would
1174
not take them. In a sense, therefore, any sanctions mean using a sort of force in order to bring Mr. Smith into line with what you think is desirable. But if that is so, and the sanctions taken, including oil sanctions which we are now proposing should be approved in this House tonight, do not take immediate effect, not even in a few months—which I think is quite probable because, after all, enough oil to keep them alive will probably get in somehow or other through the Union or through Beira or somewhere else—then we shall in a few months' time be in a position in which Mr. Smith is still there defying everybody, including ourselves.
In those circumstances, I think it is quite possible that the really crucial issue —namely, whether it is a threat to international peace or security or not—will come up in the Security Council of the United Nations. And at that moment we shall have to show our hand. We shall have to say whether we are going to veto or whether we are not. I think we ought to think clearly about our attitude now. I hope and believe that the Government are indeed now thinking about it. I rather doubt whether the Americans will go so far as to say that in their view it is a threat to international peace and security, but if so we go on as we are now: no particular harm would have been done; there would be no more, and no less, danger of war than there is now. But supposing the Americans do come to the conclusion that a threat exists, I think that what we should have to do then would be to abstain, and not to veto. Having then shown willing, so to speak, to go along with the majority view, I think we ought to turn to Mr. Smith and say, "Mr Smith, the game is up. It is either the Ethiopians or the Scots Guards. Which would you prefer?" Personally, I believe that he would choose the Scots Guards.
9.30 p.m.
VISCOUNT MASSEREENE AND FERRARD: My Lords, I shall not detain your Lordships long, but I feel that I must speak on this matter for a short time because, as I have said previously, I have many friends in Rhodesia, though I myself have no interest there. In a previous debate in November, I expressed the view that an oil embargo would not be practicable; and I have not changed that view. I did not vote against what

1175
I shall call the consequential sanctions, such as the withdrawal of Imperial Preference,et cetera,but, personally, I think that if those consequential sanctions had had a chance they might have brought the Rhodesians back to what is called constitutional rule, provided that Her Majesty's Government had at the same time said, perhaps not publicly but through private channels, on what terms; but they should had been prepared to climb down—to give way a bit.
We in this country have a great reputation for compromise, and I should like to see the Prime Minister prepared to compromise here. But he does not appear to wish to do so. Although I completely appreciate what my noble friend the Leader of the Opposition has said—and if I were in his shoes (which, of course, I shall never be) I should probably have said exactly the same—my own conscience tells me that if this Order goes to a Division, I shall have to back up the noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury.
I am really frightened of this oil embargo, because one of two things will happen. Either it will be very successful, or it will be a farce. If it is successful, the economy of Rhodesia, presumably, will be completely ruined and there will then be great disorder. If there is great disorder, and a breakdown of the existing Government in Rhodesia, what will Her Majesty's Government do? They will have to rule that country through the Colonial Office, and they will probably have to do so for a long time. I am perfectly convinced that the Rhodesians —and by "Rhodesians" I do not necessarily mean white Rhodesians—will be so disgusted with Her Majesty's Government that the Government will find it very difficult to get any co-operation. They will be able to find a few university professors, I suppose, and a few Leftist dissidents, but they will not have the people behind such a Government. So I fear that it would be disastrous if the oil embargo is successful. If it is not successful, it will only be, as I say, a farce; and it will bring nothing but humiliation to Her Majesty's Government. And none of us wants to see that. Although it is a Labour Government, it is still the Government of Great Britain; and I should certainly not want to see Her Majesty's Government humiliated.
1176
We are always reading in the Press that we must have the restoration of law and order. I receive quite a lot of correspondence from Rhodesia, and I am told that since the unilateral declaration of independence—which, as I said in previous debates, I regret—Rhodesia has been the most peaceful place in the whole of Africa. I could read your Lordships several letters which I have on me, but I will not weary you with them. But apparently, owing to the state of emergency which the illegal Government presumably had to call, the agitators, backed by Communist Party funds, have been restricted, and the African can now go about his daily work without being terrorised and without his home being stoned or his children being molested. I believe Her Majesty's Government are making a great mistake if they think that the whole African population are behind them in their attitude, because I can assure Her Majesty's Government, from my information, that hundreds of thousands of Africans are behind Mr. Smith's Government.
The noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor said in his speech that we had two choices: either to abandon 4 million Africans to their fate—though he did not say what their fate would be—or to take the steps which Her Majesty's Government are taking. The fate of those Rhodesian Africans is to have the highest standard of living in Africa, apart from South Africa. In our last debate the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor gave some figures about the average income of the African and the European in Rhodesia. I am only quoting from memory, so perhaps the noble and learned Lord will forgive me if I am wrong, but I understood him to say that the average income of the African in Rhodesia was £120 a year, and the average income of the white settler was £1,200 a year. But what the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor did not go on to say was that the average income of the African in the independent republics is only £30 a year. That is a very important point.
I quite agree that it must be a great disappointment to so many Leftish intellectuals in this country, that there has not been a spontaneous uprising in Rhodesia. People will say that it has become a Police State, but if we call

1177
Rhodesia a Police State, what on earth can we call the other States to the North of her? In those countries, without any need for emergency laws, their leaders have for years thrown their political opponents into gaol to rot, and have rigged elections and generally carried on in a manner entirely abhorrent to our way of thinking. I really plead here for some fairness, because I do not like injustice, and the amount of hypocrisy and cant that you read in the Press, and which is spoken in both Houses of Parliament, over this Rhodesian question is disgraceful. It does democracy no good.
Regarding this question of calling Rhodesia a police state, I should like to quote Lord Lambton's article in the Evening Standard of December 13. I see the noble Lord at the Bar of the House. He wrote:
"When I drove past the Prime Minister's House …"℄
of course, he was talking about Rhodesia℄
"…at eight o'clock in the evening there was no guard on his gate, and when I talked to Mr. Rudland, the Minister for Trade, any African, if he had wanted, could have walked straight into the room".
My Lords, how can you say it is a Police State? Do you think that President Nkrumah or Dr. Banda or the Premier of the Sudan—any of those men—can live in their houses without guards? I have been in one or two of these countries. If they had no guards they would be murdered within an hour. Yet we accuse Rhodesia of being a Police State. We really must not be so hypocritical. I think it is utterly disgraceful.
I must cut out some of my speech; but I should like the Prime Minister to come out of his fairyland and to look realities in the face. He appears to have been doing his best to frighten the British electorate. He speaks of Russians wearing blue berets, and all that sort of nonsense. But the Prime Minister knows perfectly well that there cannot be any question of Russians wearing blue berets because, as everybody in this House knows, under the laws of the United Nations, the Big Five (or is it three?; I always forget)—the Permanent Members of the Security Council; and we are one—have to agree to any action of that sort. What is the Prime Minister frightened of? Is he frightened of the
1178
Organisation of African States? But they have been proved to be men of straw. I cannot see why the Prime Minister has retreated in this manner. I only wish he would tell us. We hear a lot about the whole of the world being against Rhodesia, but I do not believe this is so. As I have said before, this situation has been built up by the Prime Minister—in my opinion, quite unnecessarily—into a world crisis.
To conclude, I would say that if we are to make the oil embargo effective it will mean blockading South Africa and the Portuguese territories in Africa; and, if we do that, we shall be in a state of war. It is perfectly absurd to imagine that we can go to war with Portugal, our oldest ally and one of our allies in NATO, and at the same time go to war with South Africa, which is our greatest market for exports. This really is Alice in Wonderland;this is Cloud Cuckoo-Land: it is complete nonsense.
When the Labour Government came into office I said that, whatever the Prime Minister might be, he was evidently not an eccentric. But now I am beginning to think he must be. He is obviously a very intelligent man, but I cannot understand his attitude on this matter. I would ask the Prime Minister to move Heaven and earth to negotiate, before it is too late—because time is running out. Of course, if you are going to negotiate, you must negotiate with the people in power. You cannot negotiate with a few university professors who have nobody behind them. You must negotiate with the people in power. I personally think that the Prime Minister is getting out of his depth, and that if he is not careful he will end up like Robespierre—who died by the monster he created. I do not say that the Prime Minister has created a monster; but he is creating a situation which may, if he is not very careful, destroy him. As time is short I will sit down.
9.46 p.m.
LORD MACPHERSON OF DRUMOCHTER: My Lords, I have addressed your Lordships on only two previous occasions, and each time on the subject of Rhodesia. I must admit that so far I have not been very successful; but, perhaps, given time, I may gain from the eloquence of some noble Lords

1179
and be able to make my points more clearly. Yesterday I listened with great interest to the noble Lord, Lord Shepherd, and I should like to congratulate him on the way he replied to the Motion. I think he showed great patience and skill in answering most of the points put to him and, at times, in dealing with a virtual barrage of questions. I may hope that the noble Earl, to whom I should like to add my congratulations, will despite the late hour deal with the points I raise.
In my maiden speech on November 15, I suggested that a delegation from Parliament should go to Rhodesia to try to resolve the terrible position. The noble Lord, Lord Shepherd, reminded us yesterday in his reply that this problem was not a Party matter. I was very glad to hear this. I had thought that my suggestion that Sir Alec Douglas-Home should lead a non-Party group to Rhodesia would not be acceptable as, if successful, it could mean political kudos for the Conservative Party. Therefore, in view of Lord Shepherd's remarks, my suggestion may now perhaps be given some serious thought by Her Majesty's Government.
I was even less successful the second time I addressed your Lordships. On that occasion I tried to elicit from Her Majesty's Government the basis on which this matter could be resolved. The brief reply I received was that that can be considered only when constitutional government has been re-established. Unfortunately, the matter was then taken out of my hands by other and more capable noble Lords. I cannot see this problem being resolved until the people of Rhodesia know under what conditions they will have to live in the future. Mr. Heath stressed again and again to the Prime Minister in another place the need to state the path by which Rhodesia can come back to legal constitutional government. I am sure that a return to constitutional government—which I know is what all noble Lords desire—is not helped by the threat that the first step would be a dictatorship from London.
I should like particularly to address myself to the noble and learned Lord who sits on the Woolsack because, having listened to and read everything that he
1180
has said on Rhodesia, I am convinced that he has a very thorough knowledge of the situation. My Lords, all my efforts in and out of this House have been directed, not to the embarrassment of Her Majesty's Government, nor to the support of Mr. Smith and his Party, but to stress the need to settle this matter as quickly as possible. The longer it is left, the worse it will become and the more embarrassing it will be for Her Majesty's Government. Yesterday the noble Lord, Lord Balfour of Inchrye, stated, rightly, that the Rhodesians are not material that will quickly capitulate, despite the sanctions which we are now told are beginning to bite"—what a horrible word! May I suggest "to have effect"? But, please, not "bite". We are not vicious animals and I am sure that we do not wish to bite anyone.
THE EARL OF IDDESLEIGH: My Lords, may I suggest to the noble Lord that we leave biting to the police dogs?
LORD MACPHERSON OF DRUMOCHTER: Thank you. I cannot help wondering at the wisdom of this particular sanction, the oil embargo, as the Prime Minister stated in another place that it must be multilateral. I know that he further stated, when he was pressed, that it was a joint operation taken by Britain with the full support of America. But we are still bringing foreigners into what is really a family problem. The next possible development could be that the matter will be taken out of our hands, and then anything could happen. This is the trouble when you try to resolve this type of issue by force—maybe not yet by force of arms, but sanctions of this kind are force. This unhappy and desperate problem will finally be resolved only round the conference table.
Lastly, my Lords, may I humbly beg permission from the Leader of the House to say how much we in this House admire the courage and maturity shown so far by President Kaunda in these troubled times, which are going to be made even more difficult by the oil embargo? He has resisted heavy pressure both from inside and from outside his country and, as one of the newspapers stated, from hotheads who want a crusade rather than a solution.
9.53 p.m.
THE EARL OF LYTTON: My Lords, I wish to start by offering the noble Earl, Lord Longford, my congratulations and to say that I hope for great things from his new appointment. Secondly I should like to refer to a quotation made by the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor during his speech. This afternoon he quoted the Africans as saying, "If they"—the white Rhodesians— "had been black you would have sent your armies in and crushed them." I think, and I will say it to my own African friends, that if they look at the circumstances carefully they will see beyond a question of doubt that had the white Africans been black instead of white they would have been granted independence at once; and moreover they would have been the first country in Africa to receive independence instead of the last. It is in order that the black African may come into his own inheritance that we have done what we have done.
My Lords, a month ago I came my usual 400-mile round trip in order to support Her Majesty's Government in the handling of the Rhodesian problem, and, as I understood it, the three main planks for doing so—that there should be no military operations to crush the Rhodesians; that the matter should be kept in British hands; that sanctions should be applied in co-operation with other countries at our request. I have come to-day to do the same as last time, but to express the fact that I share misgivings about the use of force which have been expressed most eloquently by the noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury, and also by the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, and in the legal sense by other noble Lords.
I think the use of force is contemplated as a possibility in four different circumstances. First of all, the United Kingdom might go in; and that we have said we will not do. Secondly, the United Nations might pass a resolution to that effect; and I think most of us assume that, if necessary, we should use the veto to stop it. Thirdly, the Organisation of African Unity, self-appointed constables of Africa, might move in something themselves; and in those circumstances, I personally have assumed—and I would not ask for confirmation because it is a military matter which should be secret—that the Scots Guards would go in, not as an
1182
alternative to the Ethiopians, but in the unlikely event of Mr. Smith not being able to deal with them, to keep them out.
There is one other possibility about the use of force, and that is the naval blockade, which I personally regard with extreme apprehension. I assume that it is not the intention to allow a United Nations force to blockade Beira, South Africa or anywhere else. In any case, I do not myself think it is proper to ask for what is really information about military decisions and dispositions at the present time. I am here on these Cross Benches because of force being used at Suez. I have heard the professions of the other side that they intend by every possible means to keep force out; I trust them to do this, and, therefore, again I shall vote for them.
There is one further matter, however, and it is that I agree with those who say that these sanctions will not be likely to have a decisive result. I understand that, although the word "penal" is now accepted—whereas it was used with anxiety, and people tried to avoid using it, in the last debate—it is not intended that these sanctions should be ruinous. The intention is to produce keen discomfort so that every Rhodesian knows that the world is against him, and that every circumstance of his life reminds him of it, so that he contributes to the decision of the future. But from this, I do not see that it is intended to bring the Rhodesians to stark and horrible economic ruin.
But hand in hand with that, a month has gone by, Mr. Smith is still in the saddle, and it is our custom to deal with the de facto authority, whoever it may be. There have been many people with blood on their hands—and Mr. Smith has none—with whom we have negotiated and dealt. Surely this is the time to do it, and to put forward that question which divides us—time. We are all agreed, I think, as most of the Rhodesians are, that in time majority rule must come. The difference is this: if it is more than five years, the Africans will be passionate with anger, and if it is less than twenty years, there will be no co-operation from the Rhodesians. However, that is the gap to be bridged, and we must go in and negotiate so that something is there before they are asked to come in and eat

1183
humble pie and be constitutional once more. If Mr. Smith does not agree, then let our plans be known, and perhaps somebody called Jones will come up and agree with us.
9.59 p.m.
LORD REAY: My Lords, I should like very much to add my congratulations to the noble Earl the Leader of the House on his new appointment. An embargo on the supply of oil to Rhodesia has always looked a good sanction if it could be effective, and since no striking event has occurred since Mr. Smith's declaration of independence, to make it look more likely to be effective now than it looked then, one's principal surprise is at the delay in its imposition. I assume that the responsibility lies either in the dilatoriness of Government initiative, or in the dilatoriness of the United States response, or in some indication that Her Majesty's Government have received that, contrary to what would earlier have been the case, South Africa is unlikely to do all she could to assist the Rhodesian Front. If the latter reason forms any part of this explanation, then it is highly germane to this debate, and I hope we shall hear from the Government something on this matter. An embargo on oil has looked a good sanction because it would, in the case of Rhodesia, combine the minimum disruption of industry with the maximum inconvenience to Smith's ordinary supporters.
Oil is not the principal source of power in industry in Rhodesia, but white Rhodesians are highly dependent on their cars, and Smith will be forced to impose stringent rationing. It reinforces the prospect that Smith's supporters will desert him on a review of where their better economic interests lie, it being perhaps for them the first indication they can feel of the determination of British policy and of its consequences to them. It is far better if a situation of disintegrating support for Smith, and of deteriorating confidence in his capacity to guarantee them their standard of life, can be exploited for the purposes of negotiating the re-entry of Rhodesia into effective constitutional government, than that such negotiations should have to proceed from a situation in which law and order had collapsed.
1184
Before considering the question of a threatened escalation into physical intervention in one form or another—which in general terms has so aroused the indignation of Her Majesty's Opposition—it is proper to pay attention to the degree of effectiveness that we could arrange or expect for this embargo on oil, short of the imposition of a naval blockade. In this respect, I shall have certain questions to put to Her Majesty's Government. Given certain factors, and given the vigour of Her Majesty's Government in the exercise of their influence in certain respects that I shall attempt to specify, there are grounds for a reasonable optimism about the effect of an embargo without a naval blockade.
In the first place, there is the question of Rhodesia's current stocks of oil. It has recently been widely believed that these stood at around six months' supply. But according to to-day'sFinancial Times,there is evidence for believing that Rhodesia's oil stocks, including crude at Beira and in the pipe-line between Beira and Umtali, are not sufficient to last her for more than eleven weeks. Perhaps Her Majesty's Government could let us have their own estimate on this point. For Rhodesia to acquire additional supplies, the routes along which they could come pass, with one exception, either through Portuguese territory or British protectorate territory. Portugal has a very good reason for not being seen to give Smith conspicuous help. Because of her long frontiers with Zambia, both from Mozambique and from Angola; because she is already stretched by her military commitments to holding over 100,000 troops in Africa, and because of the frightening possibility, to them, of the extension to her Zambian frontiers of what she already suffers along her Tanzanian frontier behind which militant Nationalist camps operate under Tanzanian sponsorship, Portugal is naturally susceptible to external pressure.
Will Her Majesty's Government (and the United Kingdom and the United States together form Portugal's principal customers) exert all possible influence on the Portuguese Government to deny the passage of oil into Rhodesia, either along the railway from South Africa via Lou-renço Marques, or along the pipe-line from Beira, if there were grounds for believing such a passage was occurring?

1185
The only direct line with South Africa that does not pass through Portuguese territory passes through the British Protectorate of Bechuanaland. I understand that the Protectorate Government has announced that it will not deny transit rights to South Africa, including the right of transit of oil. Could we therefore have an indication of Her Majesty's Government's policy in this respect'? In particular, I should like to ask Her Majesty's Government whether they will give a categorical affirmation that, in the event of their knowledge that without their intervention oil is, in fact, passing along this railway, or is likely to pass, they will instruct the Government of Bechuanaland to prevent its further passage? The exception I referred to earlier is the broken railroad link through Beitbridge, which is the only method by which oil could pass from South Africa to Rhodesia without going through either of the territories I have mentioned. Perhaps we could have Her Majesty's Government's estimates of the practical feasibility and the political likelihood of its use in any substantial rescue operation of the Rhodesian Front?
To turn now to non-African factors of influence in this situation, I should like first to ask Her Majesty's Government about the policies of other nations towards this embargo. It is now reported that Belgium, Holland, Italy, France and Japan have agreed to join the embargo on oil. Would Her Majesty's Government confirm this? Would they also indicate whether these Governments have already secured the compliance of their respective national oil companies in the embargo or whether, at least, Her Majesty's Government are satisfied that they rapidly will?
Secondly, I should like to ask Her Majesty's Government what is the number of British Nationals working at the Umtali Oil Refinery and what is their position in view of the conflicting instructions they have received: on the one hand, under the British Order in Council to discontinue their work at the refinery, and on the other hand, by the declared threat of sanctions to be applied against them if they follow these instructions, announced yesterday by Smith? Further to this, will Her Majesty's Government reveal whether the consortium of oil companies that own the refinery at Umtali have accepted and
1186
themselves issued instructions for the closure of this refinery, and if not, why not? And further to that, will Her Majesty's Government reveal whether the British company of Lonhro, which has a majority holding in the company owning the pipe-line which runs between Beira and Umtali, has itself accepted and issued instructions for the closure of this pipe-line?
My Lords, this is a matter of great importance. If the route by which oil can reach Rhodesia across the lands of Africa can be closed, by instruction where Her Majesty's Government have power to instruct, by the exercise of pressure where they have not the power to instruct, for they are in the position to exert powerful pressure in all relevant respects, then action on the sea will not be necessary. And even if there were the small, high-priced, bootlegged leakage of oil into Rhodesia, it might even be wiser to let Smith further exhaust his foreign exchange in buying it. But, my Lords, if in the end—and I should like to emphasise that I believe there is a good chance that the necessity for this can be avoided—it should be necessary to divert tankers from reaching Beira by physical intervention, then this course should unquestionably be adopted.
The word "force" encompasses an enormous range of imaginable operations, some large, some small—small for the protection of the Governor's person, or for the provision of Javelins to Zambia; large for the re-establishment of order on a chaotic Copper Belt—some defensive, some offensive: defensive for the protection of the Zambia frontier, offensive for the seizure of Salisbury. The justification of any physical operation must be made or denied by arguments derived from the circumstances at the time. When we consider physical intervention where that might be putting at risk the lives of British soldiers, or of white Rhodesians, we must remember on the other hand the quality of political life under the Rhodesian Front, we must remember those hundreds or thousands in the Rhodesian detention camps, whose numbers are not published and whose names it is a criminal offence to mention. Above all, we must calculate the consequences of any failure to act, and of any threat that might contain of lawlessness, disorder, impoverishment, and death.

1187
Suppose that at some stage we were to withdraw from this confrontation because our further participation involved the despatch of our troops to Africa, and suppose that the risks of our withdrawal were seen to be the destruction of Kariba, or the cut-off of electricity to the Copper Belt, and its consequent incapacity, or the explosion of racial rioting in Zambia or Rhodesia—if, in short, we were to leave this problem to its solution by the interaction of inflamed and irreconcilable local forces, and suppose that these were the consequences that followed, then, my Lords, who would be prepared to stand up in this House and say that we were right to withdraw from this engagement because for us to have continued to attempt to contain these consequences of our withdrawal would have involved us in the use of "force"?
VISCOUNT MASSEREENE AND FERRARD: My Lords, may I point out to the noble Lord that before you commit forces to do battle you have to be reasonably sure they have their heart in the fight. It is a matter for argument if you ask forces to fight their own blood—
SEVERAL NOBLE LORDS: Order, order!
LORD REAY: My Lords, this could possibly be something for a future occasion. I was saying that when one talked about force, there were a great many things one could mean, and it was necessary to be precise when one did talk about it.
10.10 p.m.
LORD COLERAINE: My Lords, the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor opened the debate with a speech with a lucidity which I can only envy and a fairness of mind which I hope I shall always seek to emulate. The noble and learned Lord suggested quite fairly that those of us who disagreed with the course which the Government had taken over the past six weeks should state what we should have done had we been in their place. I hope the noble and learned Lord will believe me when I say that I could answer that question, but everybody is trying to curtail their speeches to-night, and perhaps I could leave the answer to some other time or give it to him privately.
There is, however, one point on which I should like to take up the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor. He
1188
said—this is, of course, a paraphrase of his words—that we who disagreed with Government policy should reflect whether the Government did not have better sources of information than we had; we should reflect on the fact that leaders of business, leaders of the churches, the judiciary, all the most intelligent elements in the country, had consistently assured the Government that the policy of sanctions, of the ever-tightening screw, which they have been pursuing was the right one. By a very curious chance I had lunch to-day with a man who had just returned from Rhodesia. He was a man who knew the country well—as well as those individuals whom the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor mentioned. He was himself a leading businessman, and he told me that he wished, beyond anything, that the view which the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor expressed this evening was right. He told me that in his judgment this minority of intelligent men in Rhodesia were living in a world of pure illusion. These sanctions were going to bite; they were going to bite harder and harder; but they were not going to have the result that the Government's advisers in Rhodesia expected they would have. And I must say that I think there is some evidence to support this view against that of the Government.
What has happened? I remember well being in the Gallery of another place on November 12, six weeks ago. I remember hearing the Prime Minister say that the tobacco embargo, though it would not become effective for some months, must have an immediate effect upon Mr. Smith, because the whole financial structure of the Government and of the country revolved round tobacco. I heard the Prime Minister say that there would be no need to introduce any further measures, because the measures then being introduced on November 12 would be swift, merciful and decisive. The Prime Minister then was presumably relying on the same advice on which he relies to-day. That advice was proved to be wrong then; I believe myself that it is wrong now.
THE EARL OF LONGFORD: My Lords, since the noble Lord is giving the House the gist of what he recalls of the Prime Minister's remarks, would he care to quote them? I can quote them.
LORD COLERAINE: My Lords, they may not be the same remarks. I am procuring the document, and perhaps I shall be able to satisfy the noble Earl later.
I realise that in recent weeks, at any rate, I have been one of the heaviest crosses that the noble Earl, the Colonial Secretary, has had to bear. Nevertheless, I hope he will allow me, before I put the couple of questions that I have to put to him, to congratulate him on his appointment. I hope that it does not mean we shall lose him as Leader of the House, but, equally, I hope that we shall not have him, or anybody else from his Party, for much longer.
The questions that I put to the noble Earl are mainly two. I think I am right in saying that the communiqué from Washington explaining the support of the United States for the oil embargo used the word "advise". It said that the President would advise American oil companies not to send oil to Rhodesia. Has that word "advise" any significance? I would assume that it has. I may be wrong. The noble Earl will probably remember that some weeks ago I suggested to him that in fact the President had no constitutional power to force American oil companies to refrain from exporting oil. At that time the noble Earl did not know the answer, and I had not given him notice. But I have no doubt that he must know the answer now.
Is it, or is it not, the case that the President of the United States cannot enforce oil sanctions against American oil companies; that he can only recommend a certain course of action? That is one of the questions that I wanted to put to the noble Earl. The other is this, and it concerns the airlift to Zambia. Is he satisfied that the condition of the runways at Zambian airfields is such that they can carry this airlift? If not, what is the position of Zambia going to be under the oil embargo? I have put two questions to the noble Earl, and I have no doubt that he will be able to answer them quite easily. But there is another question which we ought to ask ourselves and it is this: what was it that made the Prime Minister change his mind about an oil embargo? When he left London Airport last week he was reported as saying, if my memory serves me, that he
1190
would have an oil embargo only if it was universal in its application. Within 48 hours the announcement was made that there was to be an oil embargo which was not universal but which everybody hoped everybody else would muscle in behind.
THE EARL OF LONGFORD: My Lords, I am sorry to interrupt the noble Lord, because it might prolong his speech, much as we like to hear him, while more documents are produced, but could he quote the Prime Minister on that?
LORD COLERAINE: I suggest it is common knowledge that the Prime Minister has always taken the line that an oil embargo would be of no effect unless it was universally applied.
SEVERAL NOBLE LORDS: Multilaterally.
LORD COLERAINE: It may have been multilaterally, but I should have said that there was a very marked change of policy, and I think most of your Lordships will agree with me. I do not believe this change of policy was dictated at all by the consideration of increasing pressure upon Rhodesia. I think it was dictated by the walk-out of the African States before the Prime Minister's speech at the United Nations. It was an attempt to relieve the pressure to which the Prime Minister was being subjected by the African States and to free him from the odium which he had evidently incurred with those States. I suggest to your Lordships that that was the reason, not the effect on Rhodesia, which prompted this deflection of policy.
If that is so, it will have bought off the hostility of the African States for a week, two weeks, or perhaps three weeks, but the bill will come in again, and next time they will not be fobbed off with sanctions. Next time they will demand force. I cannot help wondering what the Prime Minister will do then. I am sure the Prime Minister does not mean to use force, but I am equally sure in my own mind that, unless he changes his policy, he will be driven into a position where, if he does not use force himself, he will have to invoke the force of others. That is the dilemma which faces him and which, unfortunately, faces us. My noble friend and Leader, or occasional Leader,

1191
Lord Carrington, asked why we fastened on this Order for our opposition.
LORD CARRINGTON: No, I did not.
LORD COLERAINE: I am sorry; I thought the noble Lord had said that. I must have confused him with somebody else. I need not pursue that argument. This oil sanction seems to me to represent a milestone. I think it marks the end of the road, so far as any possibility of a negotiated settlement is concerned. I think it marks the beginning of the road to war.
My noble friend Lord Salisbury explained why, in his view, this sanction differed from the others—the question of the blockade, the question of enforcing it on recalcitrant countries who wanted to send oil in to Beira. But there is another aspect of it, and of all these sanctions, and of this policy of which the oil sanction is now the sort of spearhead. The noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor, when he spoke, was confident that these sanctions would work. But how soon does the most optimistic among us suppose that they will work? I imagine that most people would say that it is very unlikely that they will produce the desired result before the tobacco auctions in March. Others would say that they will work, but it will take six months. Others would say that it may take nine months.
We have not got the time. The sand is running out of the glass. The situation is not standing still. The world is not going to wait while our sanctions begin to bite. Somebody is going to move into Rhodesia. The noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, hopes that it will be the Scots Guards—I do not. But somebody—the Organisation of African Unity, the United Arab Republic, troops from the Congo—will move in in the intervening months, and once that happens no one can see the end. South Africa cannot stand by, Russia will probably move in, the United States may move in. You have started a war which you cannot confine to Africa and of which no one can see the end.
There is only one wav out of this impasse, out of this deadlock: it is to negotiate together to an accommodation. And there is only one man, only one Government, with which you can come to an accommodation, and that is the de facto Government in Southern
1192
Rhodesia. This insistence of Her Majesty's Government in saying that they will not negotiate with Mr. Smith, or, if they do, only on procedural matters, on matters of mechanics; and that he and his colleagues are not to be trusted—that attitude of mind rules out negotiation altogether. I can assure the noble Earl that he is going to be faced with a choice between war, of which no one can see the end, and negotiation with the de facto Government. If he is faced with that choice, I suggest it would be very much better to begin negotiations sooner, rather than later, because there may not be a later.
My noble friend Lord Carrington has given his advice to your Lordships on this side of the House. He has developed the constitutional argument, of which I can see the force. It is not for me to advise your Lordships. I can only say what I will do myself. If there is a Division I will vote against this Order. I will vote against it, because I believe it to be highly dangerous. I believe it to be leading us down a slope at the end of which there is a precipice. There are some issues, I think, on which one can consider only the merits of the issue itself: one cannot afford to be led away into subsidiary considerations. There was such an issue in 1938 and in the early months of the war. One had to take one's stand then, no matter what the consequences might be. I believe, my Lords, for my own part, that this is another of those occasions when one has to do what in one's judgment one believes to be right, and leave the issue to fate.
10.31 p.m.
BARONESS GAITSKELL: My Lords, I apologise for a very brief intervention, but not more than an hour and a half ago I stepped off the plane from New York, having come from the United Nations, and I wish to refer to the Afro-Asian walk-out, which has produced such a flurry in the Press. I was there when the Prime Minister made his speech, and, whether or not it was because it was badly stage-managed—because they began to walk out before the Prime Minister spoke and while he was receiving the most tremendous round of applause—I do not know, but in the General Assembly the walk-out was really rather a failure, and the speech was extraordinarily well received by everyone.
10.32 p.m.
THE LORD BISHOP OF SOUTHWARK: My Lords, my intervention will be very brief, but I think that, because of the nature of the debate, it might be appropriate that those of us who sit on this Bench should express a view. But before I do so, may I, on behalf of the Members of this Bench, say to the noble Earl how much we join with other noble Lords in the House in congratulating him on his appointment? We on this Bench know that a flight to the Colonies usually demands a stop at Rome en route, but, even so, we warmly congratulate him, though he make that stop.
My Lords, when I spoke on Rhodesia a month or so ago, I said that my own motive then was that of conciliation, not least because, like many of your Lordships, I have friends in Rhodesia, both white and coloured. At this time, one's whole thoughts and heart go out to them. That they should be divided, or that one should do anything to increase division, is a matter of pain. Nevertheless, speaking as I do from this Bench, and I believe on behalf of most of the Prelates, if not all, who sit here. I wholeheartedly support Her Majesty's Government in what they are doing with regard to oil sanctions.
May I very briefly take one or two of the points of the noble Marquess—and I am sure he will understand how, even though we may differ from him in this debate from time to time, we hold him in the highest regard and respect? Yet the question I kept asking myself as he was speaking was: what do you want? What is your answer? You say that the Africans are not yet ready for majority rule. I do not think many people have said that it should now be "One man, one vote": it is a question of motive.
Not long ago in your Lordships' House, just before the U.D.I., I was asked to meet a deputation of Rhodesian business men. I went into the bar to meet them. They had arrived before I had. I walked across the bar. A man got up and looked at me and he said: "I thought I was going to meet the Bishop of Southwark. You are Mr. Stockwell." I replied: "I happen to be both." He said: "You used to teach me thirty years ago." I said: "That is splendid, beause this puts us now on the right basis to talk. Put away all those files you have on all the facts
1194
and figures. These things mean nothing. You could produce a housing estate under the Hitler régime in Germany or a housing estate under Stalin in Russia. Facts and figures of this kind mean nothing. I want to know just one thing. What is your motive? Do you or do you not believe that coloured people are second-class citizens and that white people are to stay in a position of permanent supremacy? That is the one and only question to which I want an answer. Facts and figures mean nothing at all to me. Give an answer to this question." He said: "I cannot lie to you."
I put this question to the noble Marquess. I say to him that I respect his point of view and honour him; but does he really believe that the white people represented in the Smith Government believe that the day will come when the white people will no longer be in a position of supremacy? What is their attitude towards education? I would agree with the noble Marquess in what he said about the need for going slowly; but I would say that, if you want to go slowly and to make progress, the first thing to do is to educate the Africans to take over positions of responsibility. This is the one thing that the Smith régime is not doing. What it ought to be doing is precisely that. That is the question I have kept on asking myself as the noble Marquess was speaking.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: My Lords, may I make an intervention merely to say that the African Nationalist Party never tried to work with the 1961 Constitution at all.
THE LORD BISHOP OF SOUTHWARK: I am not wholly briefed at this moment. I am just dealing with one point and one point only. It is: Is the Smith régime really trying—
LORD COLYTON: My Lords, I am sorry to interrupt. But is the right reverend Prelate aware that last year the Smith Government doubled the amount of money spent on African education? It now represents by far the biggest item in the Rhodesian Budget.
THE LORD BISHOP OF SOUTHWARK: My Lords, I learned all the fact about that before I came here this evening. I am asking this one question. Does the noble Lord really believe that the Smith

1195
régime is preparing the Africans to take over Rhodesia'? Answer.
LORD COLYTON: Yes.
THE LORD BISHOP OF SOUTHWARK: The noble Lord says "Yes".
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: I certainly do think that if the Africans were willing to play their part the advance towards taking over would be a much more rapid one. Any noble Lord who has been to Rhodesia knows that the Africans have never really co-operated. That is the reason why they have made no advance in co-operating in the Government.
THE LORD BISHOP OF SOUTHWARK: My Lords, the noble Marquess says that they will not co-operate. I ask him (and, I repeat, I respect his point of view), if he were in the African position, what would his reaction be. Would he want to cooperate?
May I point out to the noble Marquess that these are facts which I am sure he knows already. We in the Church are well-briefed by the Church in Rhodesia. We know what is happening out there. Take the instance recently when 239 boys demonstrated against the Smith régime, the sort of demonstration that most of us at university either took part in or witnessed ourselves when we were undergraduates. What happened? They were all caned on their bottoms by policemen. Does the noble Marquess approve of that sort of thing?
T1IE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: Would the right reverend Prelate tell us about a little of what is happening in Ghana and in other places?
THE LORD BISHOP OF SOUTHWARK: It so happens that I have this written down, and therefore I am not putting it in my speech to please the noble Marquess. There are many things that happen in Ghana, in Russia, in Franco Spain and in South America of which, as a Christian, I strongly disapprove. But one thing wrong does not make another thing right. Also we are being told by the noble Marquess that these Africans were more or less savages about a generation ago. If that is true, perhaps they may be excused for their uncivilised behaviour. But the white people, we
1196
assume, have many generations of civilisation behind them, and I say to the noble Marquess straight out that their conduct is not as excusable as that of the coloured people—the noble Marquess is hoist on his own petard.
My Lords, I do say, with respect to the noble Marques and to others, that if one was in the position of the Africans could one expect them to want to cooperate with us? This is a serious point, and I can speak with first-hand experience. One of the great griefs to me in my diocese at the moment is that my clergy are telling me that in places like Brixton coloured people who were formerly members of our churches and came to the Sacrament are now withdrawing and are no longer coming to the Communion table because they believe that we, the white people, are not in earnest and that we are turning Christ into a white man's God. That is happening. It may disturb your Lordships or it may annoy you; but as a pastor I have to deal with this situation. They just do not believe that we are in earnest in this matter. I agree with the noble Marquess in that. I understand completely what he means when he talks about Ghana and the excesses on the other side. But I would say that surely we, who have the benefits of a long history and great traditions, have a heavy responsibility put upon us.
To the noble Lord, Lord Colyton, who has talked about flesh and blood and British stock, may I say, with respect, that he cannot expect sympathy from this Bench? We are not concerned, as members of the Episcopal Bench, with British stock and flesh and blood. We stand for something else. We are reminded of something which will happen in two nights' time. In 48 hours many of your Lordships, like myself, will be going on your way to our churches and cathedrals. I make no apology whatever for bringing this up just a few days before Christmas. This is not sentiment; I believe that the Christian way is the only way to deal with this situation realistically. On Christmas Eve we shall be making our way to our churches and cathedrals for the Midnight Mass, when we shall be reminded of an occasion when, according to legend, three Kings, white, black and yellow, gathered together before the Child who was the Prince of Peace. To me

1197
"flesh and blood" means being a member of that catholic community, and I stand here as a member of a Christian community which takes precedence over all other loyalties, and I believe that that would be the view of most of us in any case on Christmas Eye That is what we shall say when we say the Creed, that we believe—
LORD COLYTON: My Lords—
THE LORD BISHOP OF SOUTHWARK: No; I am not going to give way—that we believe in the Catholic Church. So it is for this reason that I look forward to a conciliation, to a move towards this community—perhaps by way of a committee which will be comprised of people from different Parties, different groups, both in this and in the other House. But let our whole purpose be the conciliation which will bring white and coloured together in one living community.
LORD COLYTON: My Lords, before the right reverend Prelate sits down—
SEVERAL NOBLE LORDS: Order!
LORD COLYTON: I must say this, because I am sure he would not want to misquote me. When I referred to British flesh and blood, I said that we did not want to kill one another. That is all.
10.40 p.m.
THE EARL OF KILMUIR: My Lords, I hope that even at this late hour your Lordships will bear with me for a few moments; I have not spoken here before on the Rhodesia issue. I cannot help feeling that when we look to the future it is possible to find a united position. I ought to say to the noble Earl the Leader of the House that I have a minute interest: a company of which I am chairman has one-quarter of one per cent. of its net assets in Rhodesia. Otherwise, I have no further interest. I want to say something—and I think I can—of the view of the ordinary person on these issues. I would ask my noble friends who are sitting near to me to consider the view that I say affects the ordinary person. He is, first and foremost, determined that this country and its people will not be pressurised (use any phrase you like) by Mr. Smith taking illegal action and using illegal means to form a Government. Equally, he is not going to be pressurised by the attempt to change the whole back
1198
ground of our Commonwealth and its relations.
Here I would ask my noble friend Lord Salisbury to consider once again the point that he made. He said that this is not a question of stopping an advance of Africans; he said it was a question of timing. But I would put to my noble friend that if you come to a position when you say, as Mr. Smith has said, "This is not going to open in my lifetime", or, as one of his colleagues has said, "This is a matter of two hundred years", you move from a matter of degree into a difference in kind.
Where I differ from my noble friend Lord Coleraine is that I am extremely proud of the rôle that the British Commonwealth has taken over the last few years. I think it is the greatest nation-making mechanism that the world has ever seen, and that—I do not say it boastfully—no other empire of the past can compare with the work we have done in that way. To us it is matter of being asked to go back on the creation of a multiracial country, to give up what we have worked for and towards, unless we can see that there is acceptance of a gradual advance within a reasonable time. That is the difference.
We had to show that these things were wrong; and I believe the Government had to take action by way of sanctions in order to demonstrate that they thought that these things were wrong. But at the same time I want to make the point that this country is determined not to be pressurised into the use of force against Rhodesia. We will not have any countries, wherever they are, using us as the cat to take their chestnuts out of the fire of war—and that gives us the other side of the picture. In these circumstances, I find it difficult to see what the alternative to sanctions could be, and I find it difficult to suppose that if you are going to impose sanctions they should be any other than effective sanctions.
I now come to the point which again I would ask my noble friends to reconsider. I believe that the two things are not alternatives; that it was necessary to show our disapproval of the action taken and the attitude behind it. But, at the same time, I profoundly believe that we ought to take the preparatory steps for negotiation. I think that the Government

1199
should be ready now to show us the broad lines on which negotiations should take place. I am without responsibility. May I give my own suggestions? The noble Earl can pay to them what attention he thinks they deserve. I should say you start from the 1961 Constitution. It is, though I say it who should not, as I was one of those who helped to frame it, a good Con on, and I think it is generally accepted. Chen you must now, as the distrust has arisen, get some basis for ensuring that the Government of Rhodesia will not depart from that Constitution. You could, of course, have a treaty and the undertaking. I think now you would have to go further. I think you would have to get to the blocking third in the Constitution, by which the Constitution could not be altered to the disadvantage of the Africans by a Resolution of the Legislative Council.
That is my only suggestion—others can be found. Surely some basis can be found to-day on which there will be respect and honour, but also the guarantees that you must have when you have moved into such a position. That is my middle way—compromise, if you like. I say the sanctions are right. It is necessary to have oil sanctions to make them effective, but, surely, the time has come when we can simultaneously do something to restore peace.
By a curious chance, one of Mr. Smith's Ministers is a Member of your Lordships' House whom some of us have heard speak here, the Duke of Montrose. His most famous ancestor in the history of my country, known as the Great Marquess, had the distinction that at a time of unexampled faction and political and religious differences, he stood just as fiercely and strongly for moderation as any fanatic stood for his extreme. I do ask all Members of the House, and especially my noble friends with whom I have worked in the past, to consider whether, even at this moment, it is too late to find that middle course, to find the marking of our disapprobation, but at the same time the basis of negotiation. My Lords, that is the message I venture to put to your Lordships to-night.
10.55 p.m.
LORD SOMERS: My Lords, I shall not detain your Lordships more than
1200
two minutes, but I should like to raise just one point which I think has not been mentioned during the entire debate but which I feel is of the greatest importance. I am not arguing whether sanctions are the right method, or whether they be successful: the decision to apply them has been taken. But supposing that they are successful, supposing the Smith Government is crushed and has to resign, I think the Government should bear in mind what will be the first thing that will happen. To my mind it is just this. The African Nationalists who are there, just waiting for this to happen, will rush in at once, take control of the country and will thereafter consider themselves the Government of Rhodesia. On what Her Majesty's Government intend to do after that I do not presume to advise them; but that is a fact which in my view should be borne in mind.
10.57 p.m.
EARL JELLICOE: My Lords, I have been at this Despatch Box rather too long to-day. Because of this, and because we have had a long discussion, I am going to be very brief—though I will prolong my few words for a moment by offering the noble Earl the Leader of the House my sincere and affectionate congratulations on his new appointment.
I rise to ask my colleagues on these Benches not to follow my noble friend Lord Salisbury, should be decide to divide your Lordships' House this evening, and I would still express the hope that he may decide not to do so. Like my noble friend Lord Ailwyn, I have a deep respect for the noble Marquess, and it is deeply distasteful for me to ask my noble friends on these Benches not to follow his advice. I recognise full well the passionate sincerity with which he and those who feel like him have spoken. I recognise that that sincerity and those feelings are based on a deep and intimate knowledge of Rhodesia and the Rhodesians. I cannot claim such knowledge. Yet, my Lords, I can claim to speak with equal sincerity, if less passion, because we are all keenly and intimately caught up; and whether or not we have special knowledge of this problem, we are all deeply and intimately involved in it.
On sanctions, I find myself very close to the position which has been taken up

1201
by my noble friend Lord Kilmuir, yet on this issue I share many of the doubts and qualms which have been expressed. Like my noble friend Lord Coleraine, I am concerned about how the path of conciliation can now, in these circumstances, be found, and whether, indeed, it is really consistently being sought. I am worried, too, whether we are not approaching the point of no return. I do not feel, like my noble friend Lord Salisbury, that we have yet reached, or that we are about to reach, that point; yet we are certainly very close indeed to the brink of the slippery slope which could lead to the use of force, which we all, or almost all of us, wish to avoid.
I have some doubts, but this will not lead me to vote against this Order. That is because of two main reasons. The first is the constitutional point which was advanced earlier by my noble friend the Leader of the Opposition. He put it so well that I will not elaborate on it. But my noble friend Lord Colyton made the point that, under the Southern Rhodesia Act, 1965, if we reject this Order—if your Lordships' House were to reject it—the Government could always reintroduce it. But I do not see how that advances his argument. Surely then, my noble friend, and those who feel like him, would again move to reject the new Order. I cannot believe that the constitutional issue can be dodged in this way. So I must ask my noble friends: do they now really wish to precipitate that constitutional issue?
My second and concluding reason—I will put it quite bluntly—is this: I should like to emphasise the dangers of allowing national unity to be broken, perhaps irretrievably, on this issue. I have my doubts on this Order, and I have expressed some of them. Yet I say to those who share my doubts, perhaps in an accentuated form: let us pause before we break national unity on this matter. Let us just recall (and it is perhaps particularly fitting that Members of your Lordships' House should recall) how British policy on another great issue many years ago, yet within the memory of some Members of your Lordships' House, and I speak of Ireland—how our policy on Ireland was darkened and bedevilled over the years by lack of a united national will; and how our ability to influence and control events there was weakened by that lack of national will.
1202
The moral which I should like to draw is that responsible members of a responsible Party must feel utterly and completely convinced that the British Government of the day are wrong, and dead wrong, before we break, or contribute to a breach, on a major issue of real international gravity—and, Heaven knows! this is such an issue. My noble friend Lord Salisbury appealed to your Lordships to pause before allowing this Order to pass. I should like to appeal to those noble Lords who may feel inclined to follow my noble friend into the Lobby, should be go into the Lobby, to pause and to consider most carefully, not only the almost inevitable and fateful constitutional consequences of their action should they succeed in defeating this Order, but also—and this is equally important, and it applies whether they defeat it or not—the consequences abroad of such a visible breach in national unity.
11.4 p.m.
THE EARL OF LONGFORD: My Lords, the noble Earl, Lord Jellicoe, has shown a statesmanship which I would venture to compare with that of the noble Lord, Lord Carrington. But I must be careful not to bestow these compliments too freely, because I may not make his task any easier to-night, or on any other occasion. We certainly feel that most sincerely on our side, and I believe that it will be felt on all sides of the House.
I should like at the beginning to thank noble Lords, beginning with the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, who congratulated me, as did the noble Earl, on my new appointment. Naturally, I regard it as one of the utmost honour, and I feel that perhaps the House will be glad to see one of these great Departments of State, so to speak, restored to your Lordships' House.
SEVERAL NOBLE LORDS: Hear, hear!
THE EARL OF LONGFORD: It is a particular privilege for me to feel that in past times this office was held with such distinction by the noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury, the noble Earl, Lord Swinton, and other Members of the House.
I will not thank any noble Lord more than any other for his references to me, except that I should like to say how much I appreciate the particular type of compliment that came from the right reverent Prelate. I only regret that I

1203
was not confirmed, or prepared for confirmation, at any rate, by him, though I feel that it might have been a traumatic experience. Certainly we all admire very much what he said to-night. I should like, also, to thank in particular the noble Lord, Lord Coleraine, for what he said about me. I can assure him, although he said he might have been a cross of mine in the last few weeks, that if I never suffered any heavier cross than that, my life would be almost indecently free of spiritual mortification. But I am very grateful to him for his observations. We were all very pleased to see the noble and learned Earl, Lord Kilmuir, back in such cogent form, and the noble Baroness who has at this very moment returned from New York. We were also, of course, very pleased to listen to many other speakers.
With the permission of the House, I shall not seek to reply in any kind of detail to many of the points. I hope that those who feel they have not been answered will therefore tackle me in one way or another, and I will try to give them all satisfaction later. One reason for not dwelling at length on the Government's case, is that it was explained both clearly and effectively by the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor at the beginning of the debate, and supported later from this side by the noble Lord, Lord Segal, and the noble Lord, Lord Strabolgi.
If I may say so, invoking someone who sits opposite, I have never heard the noble Lord, Lord Ailwyn, speak more powerfully. I am not sure whether I was surprised or not, to hear that in his particular form, and in his term, the noble Lord, Lord Fraser of North Cape, was ahead of him. He was in fact top, and I think the noble Lord, Lord Ailwyn, was second. After the speech yesterday of the noble Lord, Lord Fraser of North Cape, I think I can say that it is very hard to choose between them. At any rate, we have had many notable speeches—I cannot, of course, acknowledge them all in detail—including the speeches from the noble Lord, Lord Rea, and his Liberal colleagues.
My Lords, there is one aspect of the discussion on which I find it unnecessary to say any more than was said by the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, and that is
1204
on what may be called the constitutional aspect. Some Members of the House, particularly the older ones, perhaps remember that passage in Tom Brown's Schooldays in which Tom Brown's father is wondering what to say to Tom Brown as he goes off to Rugby for the first time. Father Brown, Mr. Brown, says something like this: "I will not tell him to say his prayers. If he will not say them for his mother's sake, he will not say them for mine." I venture to say, as regards noble Lords opposite, who may be in some doubt as to whether to vote against this Motion, and particularly who wonder what would be the future of the House if this Motion were rejected, that if they will not listen to the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, they will not listen to me. So I think that I would simply wish to underline all that he said, and then underline it again.
But certain questions which were quite central to our discussion were raised by the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, and I hope he will not mind if I answer them rather briefly out of the mouth of the Prime Minister. I have been accused at least once in recent weeks (though mercifully, perhaps, only once, in all these simultaneous Statements that I make alongside the Prime Minister) of departing from his language. I will not pursue that with the noble Lord, Lord Grimston of Westbury, now: hut, at any rate, the Prime Minister did speak at considerable length yesterday, and anybody who really wants to know where the Government stand on a great many of these matters will no doubt have read, or will read, the very full statement of the Prime Minister. But the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, who I think found the Prime Minister's statement, on the whole, encouraging, raised three particular points which I would venture to think were answered in summary yesterday. I would therefore just repeat what the Prime Minister said on three of the noble Lord's points to-day.
There was first the question of military force. The Prime Minister said it was suggested
"that we are asking for a mandate from this House to use military force. We are not asking for that mandate."℄(OFFICIAL REPORT, Commons, Vol. 722 (No. 31), col. 1933: 21/12/65.]
The Prime Minister made that plain again yesterday, and it is my duty to make it

1205
plain yet again to-day. We are eschewing military force. I gave an answer yesterday, and I will give it again now. I think there is no doubt in the minds of Members of the House. Even those who were critical of the Government to-night, I believe—the noble Lord, Lord Coleraine, and the noble Lord, Lord Colyton—will agree that even on their analysis the Prime Minister is most anxious to avoid military force.
Then there was the question of the blockade. The Prime Minister said:
"He fears that we plan a British naval blockade of Beira, but we do not." [OFFICIAL RFPORT, Commons, Vol. 722 (No. 31), col. 1933: 21/12/65.]
Again, I repeat what I said in this House yesterday: that there is no question of our undertaking or promoting a blockade ourselves. Finally, upon the question of negotiations—and I shall have a little more to say about that at the end—the Prime Minister said:
"He fears that we are not prepared to enter into negotiations with those who can bring peaceful constitutional rule to Rhodesia. We are prepared."
Nothing could be much plainer than that. That is the brief answer given by the Prime Minister to some of the issues which have been raised by the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, and which are in the minds of many noble Lords to-night.
I come to the wider issue of sanctions. We have discussed it so often in recent weeks that perhaps the principle does not need much more underlining to-night. The noble Earl, Lord Kilmuir, summed up the matter perhaps as effectively as anyone, as did the noble Lord, Lord Ailwyn, earlier; and, of course, those who believe in this course of sanctions℄and that applies to the vast majority of the House, on past showing℄all take this point of view: that these sanctions, if they are going to be any use at all, if they are going to be in any way justified, must be effective. I do not know that that was put better than it was put by the noble and learned Viscount, Lord Dilhorne. I did not give him notice of this, but, at least, it is entirely to his credit, so I do not think I need apologise for my mentioning it when he is not here. But he said at the beginning that we should apply this test to sanctions: are they likely to be effective, and effective quickly? That was the test applied by
1206
the noble and learned Viscount, Lord Dilhorne, from the very beginning of these discussions, and it is applied by all of us who support sanctions to-night.
So we come to the oil sanctions; and, as the Lord Chancellor explained, and as many other speakers explained, if sanctions are going to be effective, they must include oil sanctions. The noble Lord, Lord Colyton, whose speech I followed, as I always do, with exceptional attention, because he gives so very much thought to anything he says on these matters to the House, if I may say so, rather disparaged, scoffed at, the amount of help we were likely to obtain from the Americans. He asked whether that is to be compared with our own attitude in respect to Cuba. He was obviously pouring cold water on the idea that the Americans were likely to give us great help. That is not at all the view of the Government, or of their advisers. We consider that this American assistance will make the whole difference. After all, we must bear in mind that they are going to help with the airlift, which is a tremendous event in co-operation between our two countries.
The noble Lord, Lord Colyton, asked me a particular point about the legal position. I am perfectly ready to give him a full legal answer afterwards, but I think that perhaps I can put it briefly in this way. There are certain legal difficulties, as we understood it, which stand in the way of the Americans giving legislative effect to an oil embargo in the United States. It is not, in fact, impossible. There are ways in which it could be done, but there are these difficulties and the ways which are, in fact, open would not seem appropriate. But the Americans assure us that they will use their best endeavours to ensure that U.S. oil companies subscribe to an oil embargo on a voluntary basis. They drew the attention of the American companies to the British Order in Council. This is a point which I want to place before the noble Lord, Lord Coleraine, and particularly the noble Lord, Lord Colyton, because he seemed to play down the help that the Americans were likely to give or would wish to give or are able to give. The reality of the collaboration has been demonstrated in the last 24 hours by the stopping of an American company's cargo of oil on its

1207
way to Beira. We must not minimise this, since in the view of the Government it makes the whole difference.
I was asked about the attitude of other countries. The only other major country about whose attitude there is any uncertainty at the present time is the Netherlands; but in other cases the collaboration is forthcoming or is about to be. So I think we can take it—and certainly this is the view of the Government, and one which I am convinced is right—that this oil embargo is going to be effective. It will be very surprising if it requires a blockade, very surprising. I should be amazed if it requires a blockade.
LORD CARRINGTON: My Lords, may I interrupt the noble Earl the Leader of the House? This is a very important point. He says he would be very surprised if it required a blockade. I understood the Prime Minister to say that he has no intention of imposing a blockade. On the other hand, he left a loophole by saying that it might be rather a different matter if there were an international blockade by the United Nations. I asked the noble Earl a number of questions about that which he has not answered. It may be that he cannot answer this evening; but I should tell him that these questions will require an answer at some time.
THE EARL OF LONGFORD: My Lords, I am not quite sure how profitable it is to anybody to spell out the conditions under which an oil embargo would be rendered ineffective in the absence of a blockade; but certainly if one or two countries were actively engaged in frustrating it, it would be difficult to make it effective without a blockade.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: My Lords, may I interrupt?
THE EARL OF LONGFORD: May I finish the point I was making? I return to the point that we do not in any way desire to have a blockade. I can do nothing more than repeat what the Prime Minister has said; that we shall play no part in promoting it.
TILE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: My Lords, all I was going to ask was: Are we to understand to-night that it is the intention of Her Majesty's Government
1208
that we shall not institute a blockade in any circumstances? I do not say that that would alter my previous view; but it might alter several other people's previous views. If we are going to vote on this, we ought to have a clear and definite answer to-night, and not merely be told that some day we shall have a good answer.
THE EARL OF LONGFORD: I was trying to paraphrase, which is dangerous, what the Prime Minister said yesterday. There is no secret about what he said. Perhaps I could just read out what he said. I am not trying to add anything new. I cannot find it.
LORD CARRINGTON: It is in column 1919.
THE EARL OF LONGFORD: I seem to be more lucky than the noble Lord, Lord Coleraine, with his documents, which never arrived—I see they have arrived now—but he had no collaborator.
LORD CARRINGTON: It is half-way down the second paragraph in the column.
THE EARL OF LONGFORD: Here it is. I am most grateful to the noble Lord. The Prime Minister said:
"I hope, therefore, that there will not be the seepage or leakage which was referred to in the quotation from my broadcast last night. If there is, we shall have to decide how it must be handled, and it will be decided internationally. Certainly we have no intention of imposing a naval blockade round Beira, and we never have had. I do not know whether that is the fear that the right hon. Gentleman had. "℄[OFFICIAL REPORT, Commons, Col. 722 (No. 31) col. 1919: 21/12/65.]
He then goes on to explain that it is not a matter in which we should take the initiative ourselves in the United Nations. I hope that has made it plain, in case there is any possible argument afterwards that I said something different from the the Prime Minister. I am simply trying to repeat to the House what the Prime said yesterday, so there is no question of my modifying, or altering, or altering, to something he said.
LORD CARRINGTON: My Lords, I think that this is an important point. The Prime Minister then went on. if I may say so, rather to obscure the issue. In the same paragraph (I will quote it if I may) he went on to say:
"If there is a decision under Chapter VII in which it is suggested that a couple of frigates

1209
be placed outside Beira to stop oil tankers going through, this is what will happen, and it will happen by international decision. We do not ourselves propose to seek such a resolution. We certainly do not propose to take individual unilateral action to blockade Beira."—[OFFICIAL REPORT,ibid.]
Does that mean that the Government will not in any circumstances be party to a blockade, or does it mean that they would be party to a United Nations blockade?
THE EARL OF LONGFORD: My Lords, if I may say so, the noble Lord, who is very experienced, knows that am not in a position to add to the words used by the Prime Minister. That is, I think, perfectly obvious to everybody in the House. I think that the meaning is perfectly plain. Everybody may not have read the Prime Minister's speech, but the meaning is perfectly plain; that we would not in any circumstances welcome a blockade. We would not take steps to promote a blockade. If the whole world decided on a blockade, we should have to cope with that situation when it arose. We cannot give guarantees, but we do make it plain that we are not in the least enamoured of a blockade in any circumstances. I honestly do not think that noble Lords will want me to go further than that to-night.
My Lords, the House wants to vote and I shall not say much more. There is just this question of our attitude to the peace. Here I hope that I shall not be regarded as treading on ground so well covered by the right reverend Prelate. But we are approaching Christmas. I do not mind saying that I pray for our leaders in this situation. I pray for our own Prime Minister night and morning, and I pray for Mr. Smith. I do not know whether that is thought to be the right thing or the wrong thing. I am only indicating what I mean by the Christian approach to the Rhodesian issue. I do not know what is the future for Mr. Smith or for anyone else, but we must approach this whole matter without any trace of vindictiveness or a desire to defeat or crush a noble people like the Rhodesian people.
Here I must pay tribute outside this House to the leaders of the other Parties. The Prime Minister paid one yesterday to Mr. Heath, and I pay one to him again, and also to Mr. Grimond. But this is a national policy. I think there are many difficulties before the Government, and the difficulties before the Opposition Parties have perhaps been almost greater, but we have all tried, it seems to me, to collaborate. There are some noble Lords here who feel that they cannot join in that act of collaboration. It would be impertinent, in a matter of this kind, for me to try even to suggest to noble Lords opposite how they should vote. I cannot tell what the consequences would be of any vote in any form which it took in this House. But I am sure of one thing. Throughout the world the unity of the British people on this issue is a tremendous source of strength, and I should think that the disunity of the British people would be a crushing blow to those who care for justice and for absolute equality between human beings of all races, whether they be white, black, yellow or brown.
It is not for me to make a final appeal to noble Lords whose consciences are disturbed by this Order. It is absolutely essential to have this Order, in the interests of the agreed national policy of trying to bring Rhodesia back to a constitutional position. I am sure there cannot be any two minds about that. I can only hope that if this question is pressed to a Division—I hope it will not be, but if it is—the message that will go out from this House will not be just a triumph for one Government or one man, even a great Prime Minister like Mr. Wilson—that is the last thing that he would want—but that it will be a message of British conviction that there is a duty to be performed and that we must see the job through without breaking our ranks.
11.24 p.m.
On Question, Whether the said Motion shall be agreed to?
Their Lordships divided:℄Contents, 108; Not-Contents, 19.

CONTENTS

Addison, V.

Amherst, E.

Asquith of Yarnbury, Bs

Ailwyn, L.

Annan, L.

Auckland, L.

Airedale, L.

Archibald, L.

Barrington, V.

Aldington, L.

Arwyn, L.

Beeching, L.

Beswick, L.

Hughes, L.

Rochester, L.

Bowles, L. [Teller.]

Hurcomb, L.

Royle, L.

Brown, L.

Iddesleigh, E.

Sainsbury, L.

Burton of Coventry, Bs.

James of Rusholme, L.

St. Davids, V.

Byers, L.

Kennet, L.

St. Just, L.

Carnock, L.

Latham, L.

Saye and Sele, L

Chalfont, L.

Layton, L.

Segal, L.

Champion, L.

Leatherland, L.

Shackleton, L.

Chorley, L.

Lilford, L.

Shannon, E.

Citrine, L.

Lindgren, L.

Shepherd, L.

Clwyd, L.

Listowel, E.

Sherfield, L.

Cohen of Brighton, L.

Llewelyn-Davies, L.

Silkin, L.

Cole, L.

Lloyd of Hampstead, L.

Simey, L.

Collison, L.

Longford, E. (L. Privy Seal.)

Simon, V.

Crook, L.

Lucas of Chilworth, L.

Snow, L.

Darwen, L.

Lytton, E.

Soper, L.

Egremont, L.

Mitchison, L.

Sorensen, L. [Teller.]

Esher, V.

Morris of Kenwood, L.

Southwark, L. Bp.

Falkland, V.

Nathan, L.

Stonham, L.

Fraser of North Cape, L.

Noel-Buxton, L.

Strabolgi, L.

Gaitskell, Bs.

Norwich, V.

Strang, L.

Gardiner, L. (L. Chancellor.)

Nunburnholme, L.

Strathcarron, L.

Gifford, L.

Peddie, L.

Summerskill, Bs

Gladwyn, L.

Phillips, Bs.

Swanborough, Bs.

Goodman, L.

Piercy, L.

Swaythling, L.

Granville-West, L.

Plummer, Bs.

Tangley, L.

Haire of Whiteabbey, L.

Rathcreedan, L.

Taylor, L.

Hanworth, V.

Rea, L.

Terrington, L.

Henderson, L.

Reay, L.

Wells-Pestell, L.

Henley, L.

Rhodes, L.

Willis, L.

Hilton of Upton, L.

Robbins, L.

Windlesham, L.

Holford, L.

Robertson of Oakridge, L.

Winterbottom, L.

NOT-CONTENTS

Balfour of Inchrye, L.

Grimston of Westbury, L. [Teller.]

Onslow, E.

Coleraine, L.

Portal of Hungerford, V.

Colyton, L.

Massereene and Ferrard, V. [Teller.]

Russell of Liverpool, L.

Effingham, E.

Salisbury, M.

Ellenborough, L.

Milverton, L.

Verulam, E.

Greenway, L.

Monk Bretton, L.

Waleran, L.

Gridley, L.

Monson, L.

Woolton, E.

Resolved in the affirmative, and Motion agreed to accordingly.