A MINISTRY OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

HL Deb 21 December 1965 vol 271 cc1012-35

6.10 p.m.

LORD GLADWYN rose to ask Her Majesty's Government whether they have come to the conclusion that the time has now arrived for the establishment of a single Ministry of External Affairs. The noble Lord said: My Lords, I shall be very brief, but some of your Lordships may remember that, when I introduced a Motion on this subject on April 7, 1964, I said that at approximately yearly intervals I proposed to put down either a Motion or an Unstarred Question, in order to draw your Lordships' attention to what, in my view, would become more and more a burning political necessity. In asking this Question I am therefore simply fulfilling my undertaking.

May I say at once that the last thing I want to do is to get this issue mixed up with Party politics? In April, 1964, I sat on the Cross Benches: now I am a Liberal. But I do not see that this debars me from speaking occasionally on technical matters, as I think this is, which do not involve Party politics and on which it is quite possible that even my own Party does not have a unanimous view. So I hope that your Lordships will consider what I have to say quite dispassionately and on its merits. So far as I can see, indeed, no Party issue is involved here: no Election pledges will be violated, whatever line your Lordships may take this evening. I trust, therefore, that, though the Government are no doubt obliged to have a line on what is, after all, an important matter of administrative reform, the official Opposition, at any rate, will be free to say what they like. Surely this is a matter on which the House might live up to its already great reputation as a body of impartial experts. I am all for Party politics; but everybody agrees that on some issues noble Lords should be encouraged to express individual views, and I must say that I should have thought that this was one of them.

My Lords, a year and a half ago I made the very simple point that the expert and distinguished signatories of the Plowden Report on Representational Services Overseas were unanimous—I repeat, unanimous—in holding that what they called the "unique feature of Britain's method of handling her external affairs" —namely, "one mechanism for dealing with Commonwealth affairs and another for dealing with foreign affairs"—was, as they said, "inconvenient, wasteful and at times inefficient". The most serious of these shortcomings—the shortcomings of our then existing system—was the division of the world, they thought, for representational purposes, into Commonwealth and non-Commonwealth countries, which, as they rightly said, "impeded the development and execution of a coherent foreign policy". The Report continued: Membership of the Commonwealth is only one of the factors which helps to shape the policy of a Commonwealth country and it is rarely the decisive one. We need a system which recognises that individual Commonwealth countries have developed regional interests and relationships of their own and cannot regard their relationship with Britain as paramount".

Nor could we ever, as Lord Plowden and his colleagues believed, work out a coherent foreign policy unless we were able to take fully into account the non-Commonwealth interest of Commonwealth countries and deal with them in their regional and world contexts. With two Ministries"— and here again I am quoting the Report— the process of trying to hammer out a sensible world-wide policy is…a wasteful and time-consuming process. At times of crisis these shortcomings can prove disastrous. The division of responsibility is becoming an anachronism. The logic of events points to an amalgamation of the Commonwealth Relations Office and the Foreign Office.

All this, my Lords, was the unanimous —I repeat, unanimous—conclusion of the authors of the Report, including the noble Lord, Lord Henderson, and Sir Percivale Liesching, ex-Head of the C.R.O. Only one reason was advanced for not recommending an actual fusion of the two Ministries: To take such a fundamental step now could be misinterpreted as implying a loss of interest in the Commonwealth partnership. No other argument of any kind was brought forward in support of a conclusion which clearly contradicted all the available evidence and, to put it bluntly, represented the triumph of emotion over reason. It was quite frankly an effort to appease an unthinking majority who had not studied the question and who instinctively felt, I imagine, that the creation of a Ministry of External Affairs meant that there would in some way be less red on the map. As I said at the time, I could understand such a decision being taken by Party politicians on the eve of an Election, but I have never felt that it was worthy of the experts who in all other respects had produced a wholly admirable Report on a matter of great administrative importance.

Now, my Lords, what is the position to-day? When we last discussed this question my suggestion that the Government should do what the Commission obviously thought was the right thing to do—or, at least, to name a date by which the amalgamated services would be followed by an amalgamated Ministry—was supported by only two noble Lords: the noble Lord, Lord Strang (whom I am very glad to see in his place), and the late Lord Killearn; and to some extent, I rather think, the noble Lord, Lord Robertson of Oakridge.

A great many of your Lordships held that I was a pretty subversive fellow. One noble Lord accused me of having written an article in The Times describing the Commonwealth as a farce—a suggestion which I said, unlike Mr. Enoch Powell, I could formally deny. I received a tremendous castigation from the noble and learned Viscount who then sat on the Woolsack—and I am sure that he has not changed his views in the interval, for, as we all know, the noble Viscount seldom does. He insinuated—quite unjustifiably, I thought—that I was out to abolish the Commonwealth, which in his view was, as he said, a "growing and developing" reality. The noble Viscount, Lord Amory, said that he had always admired my apparent ability to succeed in foreign affairs without ever really trying, which I thought, on the whole, was a rather back-handed compliment. Indeed, I almost began to doubt the rightness of my thesis, such was the tremendous weight of contrary opinion. But, my Lords, let us look for a moment at what has happened since April, 1964.

Since your Lordships last discussed the Plowden Report we have experienced intensive and prolonged armed hostilities —a virtual war—between two Commonwealth members; the collapse of a scheme for Commonwealth mediation in Vietnam; the rupture of diplomatic relations between ourselves and several other members of the Commonwealth; an apparent plot by one Commonwealth member to annex another; the virtual, if temporary, expulsion or exclusion of yet another member; and the creation of a situation within the Commonwealth which brings us, unfortunately, to the verge of racial war. I need hardly say that all these events closely concern our general foreign policy, and none of them gives any grounds for supposing there was such a thing as a Commonwealth which was a political entity.

Just think, my Lords, at the moment when we are so concerned with Rhodesia, how much less difficult a solution of this problem would have been if for the last few years it had been handled by one Minister of External Affairs and had not been confused (as I think) by largely irrelevant considerations connected with a vanished Empire and our own so-called "kith and kin". Yet we still have a system whereby there are two Ministries, with all their attendent panoply of Ministers and officials, for dealing with one aspect of our relations with other countries and one great Ministry with another.

This is an absurd and increasingly dangerous anomaly: not so much, of course, because it gives rise, as I think it must, to administrative confusion. That can no doubt be ironed out, with good will, however great the cost in general frustration and the lack of efficiency. Our Byzantine system of Interdepartmental committees and Cabinet sub-Committees groans on, like a rather elementary computer, but nevertheless grinds out pretty sensible conclusions in the end. The fusion of the two services, which was the result of the Plowden Report, is clearly a help; and, likewise, the fact that the Prime Minister himself does most of the real work in all these Commonwealth crises. The real danger is less here than in the fact that the perpetuation of the present system tends to preserve a very dangerous illusion, if not, as I think, a kind of living lie. This is that the Commonwealth, whatever its merits as a sort of multi-racial club, has any political or any considerable economic content. So long as this illusion persists, we shall never be able to get our foreign policy straight. And the very existence of a separate Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations is one of the best ways to preserve it. I believe, incidentally, that the conception of the Commonwealth as an inter-racial club would be strengthened, and not weakened, if the Commonwealth Relations Office were abolished altogether.

A section of the Labour Party which in so many respects and so touchingly represents our great Victorian past may indeed still believe that illusion is reality; but I cannot imagine that this view is shared by the Party's younger and more intelligent members. Nor can I seriously believe that it is the dominant view in the Tory Party, now moving in its mysterious and instinctive way towards an acceptance by this country of full European responsibilities. How long, then, will it take this great and ancient country to come to terms with reality? I do not know. But when the Leader of this House gets up on the Front Bench and reads out a Statement made by the Prime Minister in another place, to the effect that, perhaps as a result of yet another Report, the Government have decided to set up one Ministry for dealing with all external affairs I shall feel that it has really done so. But not before. Always supposing, therefore, that the Government are not yet prepared to follow the dictates of reason, I again give notice of my intention to put down a similar Parliamentary Question approximately one year from now or, alternatively, to try to get a debate arranged, and to move for Papers.

6.25 p.m.

LORD CACCIA

My Lords, I do not wish to detain you for long as I have already declared my interest in this subject and have urged this theme in this House. Indeed, long before that I had given evidence to the same effect to the Plowden Committee, when it was sitting, on the representation of services abroad; and to my mind the arguments against the present system were decisively stated by Lord Plowden when he presented his Committee's Report about two years ago. None of those arguments was in any sense against the Commonwealth. And none of them sought in any way to diminish its significance or the importance we should give to relations with it. Quite the contrary, I would here declare another interest in that my mother was born in New Zealand. Far be it from me, therefore, to stand up here and say anything which would seem to imply that I wish to diminish those interests in any way.

Lord Plowden only hesitated, as the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, reminded us, to recommend the establishment of a single Department of External Affairs at that time, at the time his Report was published. Of course, I accept William Penn's dictum that there is a time and place for everything; and it is right under our system of Government for the Executive to choose the time. I shall, therefore, restrict myself to some reflections on timing in the confident expectation that this is the only issue and that Her Majesty's Government do not have any lingering doubt about the wisdom of the long-needed change at some time.

First, has anything happened in the last two years to give weight to the arguments for delay? Surely not. The crises that have had to be dealt with have not been neatly divided into those areas which are handled by the Commonwealth Relations Office and those by the Foreign Office. Confrontation in Malaysia has necessitated, in fact, the setting-up of a joint Commonwealth Relations Office—Foreign Office Department. Even with the best will in the world and much corridor-bashing, nothing else would possibly work. In Cyprus and Rhodesia, the story is the same. Even over Kashmir the external elements, in so far as they did not involve relations with the British Government or with other Commonwealth Governments, had to be dealt with by the Foreign Office; that is to say, with regard to the United Nations, the U.S.A., Russia and China, as well as CENTO and SEATO. In a sentence, external affairs, like peace, is not now divisible.

Secondly, is this pattern likely to change? We cannot know everything about the future and we should always allow a margin for the unknown quantity. But having said this, one of the things that can be foretold with a degree of certainty is that the areas of instability and concern in the coming years are going to be Africa, Southern and South Eastern Asia, and Latin America. The impact of the population explosion alone is reason enough for this. Its trends for the next thirty-five years are already plainly foreseeable. These are the areas where we should work out a policy towards Africa, Asia and the Southern American hemisphere within a single Department; and we only handicap ourselves by dividing these areas artificially between two Departments of State. If we do it to impress ourselves or others, I am clear from my own experience that we only delude ourselves and that we fool nobody else. Beyond these shores, at least, we give the impression by such continuing acts that we have not yet learned —and seem determined not to learn—the time of day.

Imagine yourself a representative of the U.S.A. or United Nations coming to this country wishing to discuss, say, Cyprus. You arrive and announce your intent and you ask whom you should see. You have to be asked, "What aspect of Cyrus? Do you want to talk about internal affairs of Cyprus or the relations of Cyprus with the United Kingdom? In that case, please turn to the right. If, on the contrary, you wish to talk about the Cyprus problem as it affects Greece or as it affects Turkey or the United Nations, would you please turn to the left." "But", your interlocutor would say, "I want to discuss this thing in the round and I wish to discuss it on its own merits as a problem." You would have to say, "That is a splendid thing to want to do, but we in London run our affairs somewhat differently. We divide them up in order to deal with them." I assure your Lordships that any foreigner faced with this state of affairs would say to himself," Well, it looks to me a crazy way to run a railroad. I only hope that there are no collisions and no injuries".

All is well, even so, provided that we go from success to success, from triumph to triumph. But it is against human probability that any country in dealing with foreign affairs can have undiluted success. We should not expect this. So when inevitably we run into difficulties, foreigners say, "Well, we thought there was something funny about the way in which things were done. Now we are sure. Now we understand a little better why, for instance, this great country occasionally has to come forward and ask for something of the order of £1,000 million to keep afloat." The simple question is: Do we want our organisation of Government to be geared to what is and what we know to be coming, or do we want it to remain an outdated model built to deal with a world which ceased to exist twenty years ago at the end of the war?

My Lords, this Government set off to modernise Britain. This Government, like the last, properly conceives it to be the duty of Government to urge us all, in business and in unions alike, as a matter of national survival, to discard outworn lines of demarcation and to cut out waste, particularly of skilled personnel who are in short supply, and streamline our affairs. I agree. But does this not apply equally to the organisation of Government itself? Is not example the best precept?

Many of your Lordships will have read the Thurber and White classic, Why You Feel the Way you Do. In it there is a tale of a child back from summer camp where the boys were issued with pets. He arrives agog at home to tell his parents about his pet. They kept putting him off with such excuses as, "Not now"; "Not at meal times", and so on. Finally, in exasperation, this otherwise dutiful child explodes with the phrase, "What in the blank is the matter with right now?" May I, in conclusion then, and without disrespect, ask the Minister who is to reply the same question—whether he can explain to us, "What is the matter with right now?"

6.33 p.m.

THE EARL OF SELKIRK

My Lords, I hesitate to take part in a debate in which most of the noble Lords who have spoken have done so with great experience of life in the Foreign Service. In fact, this is not really a technical matter: it is an extremely simple matter. I believe that the Plowden Report has been fully implemented, or at any rate substantially implemented, except for one recommendation which, as the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, said, stands out as clear as crystal. It is whether the amalgamation of the Departments should he carried out now, or whether that would be misinterpreted. My Lords, it is clear that those who would misinterpret it are the people of this country and not other members of the Commonwealth at all. This is the only question which remains from this Report, which, as the noble Lord, Lord Caccia, has said, recommends this urgent administrative reform.

I looked through the debate in January, 1964, to which the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, referred. In that debate, two points were made. The first was that such a Ministry would indicate a loss of confidence in the future of the Commonwealth. The second was that it would be too much for one man. I believe that it would be the opposite so far as the Commonwealth is concerned; that, far from being the slightest indication of weakness, it would serve to blow away many of the cobwebs which have gathered round the Commonwealth and it would remove misconceptions which are actually weakening the Commonwealth at the present time. In the second place, as has been said, nearly all the Commonwealth countries are intensely interested in their neighbours. It is inevitable that they should be, and in many ways they are more interested in their neighbours than in this country; and it is proper that we should have one Department to look after these matters.

May I take your Lordships on a short journey round South and East Asia? I start at Saigon, in a country that is the concern of the Foreign Office; Kuala Lumpur is the concern of the Commonwealth Relations Office; Manila comes under the Foreign Office; Singapore under Commonwealth Relations; Jakarta under the Foreign Office and Canberra under Commonwealth Relations. My Lords, it is impossible to have one coordinated policy in those circumstances. It is a sheer anachronism which should be abolished as soon as possible. It is the duty of Parliament to see that the Commonwealth with which we are associated works through the easiest possible machinery, and this machinery clearly is not easy. The Commonwealth affairs are an integral part of the foreign policy with which every member of the Foreign Service should consider himself personally associated and concerned; he should not be concerned simply with foreign relations.

The other point made was that this work would be too much for one Minister. If one reads the paper, one finds that half-a-million letters and 150,000 telegrams are received at the Foreign Office every year. Clearly, that is too much for one man, and any man, I imagine, could easily kill himself at the Foreign Office as it is at present. I sincerely hope that the Secretary of State will not be overdoing things with his visits to Tokyo, Moscow, Germany, Washington, and now to South America. It is easy to do that. But I do not think it would be any more difficult if the Commonwealth Relations responsibilities were fully added, because it would make for a more coherent and convenient system of working. If another Minister were required, it would not be difficult to find one. We have had many new Ministers appointed recently, and whatever appropriate status was required would be given to him. The Minister must know what is going on in Commonwealth Relations, and it is proper that he should; but if a division is to take place and if the Department is too big or clumsy, let the division be geographical. I am not recommending that, but if anyone says that the Ministry is too much for one man, that is a far more rational and proper division.

May I emphasise that the Commonwealth would not be affronted by this policy? As long ago as 1925 Vincent Massey wrote this to Mr. Dawson of The Times: One essential step towards better understanding is to bring Dominion representatives into direct contact with the Foreign Office itself. Ten years later he wrote in his diary: What good purpose does the Dominion Office serve? Could not its functions be better performed by a Dominion section of the Foreign Office with a Secretary of State to be known as the Secretary of State for Foreign and Dominion Affairs? It is for that reason that I am quite certain none of the Commonwealth countries would regard this amalgamation as in any way an affront. Indeed they would want to do what they have always wanted to do, which is to go to see the head man. Any head man can, of course, see only a limited number of people according to his time. For that reason I hope that this urgent step of modernisation may be undertaken soon. I know that the noble Lord may say that it is a little awkward and that there are a number of things happening currently which make the present not the most expedient moment at which to do it. We shall excuse the noble Lord an element of equivocation when he replies, provided that we may have a real indication that a further step is being taken in this matter, which I agree is one of urgency.

6.38 p.m.

LORD INCHYRA

My Lords, if it were not that I feel strongly on the subject, I should prefer not to take part in this debate. It is rather embarrassing that nearly all the speakers so far have been connected in one way or another with the Foreign Office, and it rather gives the impression that some intrigue or plot is afoot for a takeover bid by the Foreign Office of the C.R.O. That is not the case. All that I am concerned with, as I am sure all my former colleagues are, is the efficiency of the governmental machine at Whitehall.

At the moment, the machinery for dealing with overseas affairs is quite intolerable. As the noble Lord, Lord Caccia, said, it is plumb crazy. At the end of my career, I had five years in the middle of that machine. It was bad enough then, and I have no reason to suppose that it is not worse now. It was quite hopeless, when one tried to deal with questions like Cyprus or South-East Asia or the Congo, to have two Departments dealing with different aspects of the same problem. I imagine that it is even worse now with regard to Rhodesia and Malaysia.

I have no doubt at all that something must be done to put this situation right before much longer. It is not only inefficient and time-wasting, but also calculated to arouse serious misunderstandings between the two Departments primarily concerned—I am glad to say that friction between them hardly ever occurs— and also with other Government Departments in Whitehall, who never quite understand why it is that two Departments should be dealing with virtually the same problem. And, as the noble Lord, Lord Caccia, said, foreigners are absolutely defeated by the whole business.

As various noble Lords have said, the noble Lord, Lord Plowden and his Committee, of which I had the privilege of being a member, said definitely that in their opinion amalgamation of the Foreign Office and the Commonwealth Relations Office should be the ultimate aim. They went on to say that they hesitated to recommend that this step should be taken forthwith. The reason for that was not altogether, as the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, suggested, appeasement. It was really that the Committee felt that, if they were to make such radical recommendations which would entail structural alterations of the Government, this proposal would inevitably cause a good deal of controversy, entail prolonged debates in Parliament and elsewhere, and would distract attention and hold up the implementation of the Committee's other recommendations dealing with the more practical aspects of the future of the Diplomatic Service.

These recommendations, the Committee felt, were really of the very first importance if the new Diplomatic Service were to be in a position to fulfil the increased and more complicated duties which the Committee foresaw they would have to undertake in the coining years. We were very concerned that these practical recommendations of ours, about conditions of service, recruitment, training and so forth, should be implemented with the minimum delay, otherwise we faced the possibility of the Diplomatic Services of the Foreign Office and the Commonwealth Relations Service, as they then were, running into the sand. Therefore, we attached great importance to ensuring that these recommendations got the best possible wind from the Government and public opinion when our Report was presented. That, I think, was really the main reason why we thought it would be a mistake to complicate matters' by recommending the immediate amalgamation of the two Government Departments.

The second consideration—and one which certainly I had very much in mind —was that the Committee felt that if and when a single combined Department of External Affairs was set up, it would have a better chance of making a good start, and the transitional period would be likely to be smoother, if the officers who were to serve in that Department—that is to say, the members of the existing Foreign Service and Commonwealth Relations Service—were by that time to be members of a combined service. We thought that the first step was to amalgamate the two services and subsequently come on to the amalgamation of the two Ministries.

My own feeling is that expressed by the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn that—times have changed. This recommendation was made about two and a half years ago. Circumstances have altered since then. First of all, the Foreign and Commonwealth Services have been amalgamated, and to the best of my information that process is going ahead very satisfactorily and perhaps more smoothly than even the most optimistic expected. Furthermore, the other recommendations about terms of service, pensions and so on, to which I referred, have been accepted in principle by Her Majesty's Government and are, I hope—or most of them, at all events—now in process of implementation. So, from both those points of view, there is no reason why amalgamation of the two Ministries should be any longer deferred.

I suppose that the considerations which now have to be taken into account are, first of all, the attitude of public opinion in this country, and then, the probable attitude of the Governments of the Commonwealth countries, or at least of such of those Governments as still attach importance to their relations with this country. As regard public opinion at home, I would not venture to express any opinion, but I should have thought that informed opinion was more and more coming to realise that all major questions affecting relations between this country and the Commonwealth countries were really the great questions of foreign policy, not affecting only Commonwealth countries, but affecting the world at large. It is really quite illogical to continue a system which divides these things into two watertight compartments.

As regards the attitude of the Commonwealth Governments, I would venture to share entirely the view of the noble Earl, Lord Selkirk, who said that they would welcome a change. I could quote a few examples to support that statement. I can say that even five years ago, when I was in the Foreign Office, it was common for some of the Commonwealth High Commissions in London, when they wanted information about the attitude of Her Majesty's Government towards an issue of particular interest to their Government, to come direct to the Foreign Office. Very often they would come to me and say, "What instructions are you going to send your man at the United Nations about this point?" or, "How do you look at this problem which is likely to arise in NATO next week?" They wanted to get information from the source, from the man who drafted the instructions. They did not want to get a hashed-up version at second hand from some other Government Department. They wanted to discuss matters in detail and to ask such questions as, "Why put in that paragraph?" and, "What is the meaning of that sentence?" They did not want someone to say, "Oh, well, the Foreign Office drafted that. We do not quite know—perhaps you are right." No doubt that system still goes on. If that is so, I feel sure that the Commonwealth Governments would welcome the changeover to a single Department.

The second point I would make is this. When on a tour as a member of the Plowden Committee, to look at our missions in some foreign countries, I remember asking a distinguished Commonwealth Ambassador, who had previously spent several years in London, what he thought about our ideas for reforming the Diplomatic and Commonwealth Relations Services. Immediately, without any hesitation, he said, "But, my dear chap, you are going the wrong way about it. You have got the wrong end of the stick. You are putting the cart before the horse. For goodness' sake, begin at the other end and set up one Department for External Affairs in London, and then you will solve the whole problem." I feel sure that that attitude will be shared by a great number of officials in Commonwealth Governments.

I know that it is frequently said that if we had one Department of External Affairs, Commonwealth Governments would somehow lose the special treatment which they get and the special relations which they now enjoy through the existence of the Commonwealth Relations Office. I do not think that that suggestion really holds water. After all, the Foreign Office do not treat all foreign Governments on a level. We have special arrangements for our NATO allies. We talk in rather different ways to our EFTA friends and some others. We do not equate the United States with China. If the Commonwealth Governments had to deal with one Department of External Affairs, there is no earthly reason why they could not enjoy just the same preferential treatment and good terms as they do now.

Then, again, I think it has been said that one of the privileges which the Commonwealth Governments enjoy at the moment, and which they might lose, is that of their Prime Ministers being able on occasion to communicate directly with our own Prime Minister. But I see no reason why the substitution of a Ministry of External Affairs for the Commonwealth Relations Office should have any effect on that. It is not abnormal at the present time, or it used not to be in my day, for our Prime Minister to receive messages direct from other Heads of Government.

Again, we are told—I remember hearing this argument several times—that the Commonwealth Governments would be most unhappy if they no longer felt that they had a special Minister sitting in the Cabinet, and in a position in the Cabinet to advance, if necessary, not the Commonwealth point of view, but Commonwealth considerations. That may be quite a good point. But it should surely not be impossible in a Department of External Affairs, where the Secretary of State would certainly have to have several Ministers to help him in his day-to-day work, for one of those Ministers to be given, if it were thought desirable, Cabinet rank. We had the same sort of system under the late Government, when the present Leader of the Opposition was Lord Privy Seal and sat in the Cabinet and was in a position, when the case called for it, to explain particular points on the European questions with which he was dealing. I should have thought that it would be quite simple to have some similar arrangement for a Minister to sit in the Cabinet and, so to speak, be responsible for advancing particular considerations affecting the Commonwealth.

My own view is that really the time for change has come. Apart from the question of timing and not making a change when both Departments are overloaded with work, and possibly also paying some attention to the future of the Colonial Office, my only doubt about making an immediate change is whether it would or would not be wiser to allow the amalgamated Diplomatic Service—that is to say, the amalgamation of the former Foreign Service and Commonwealth Relations Service—a little longer in which to settle down. That is a point on which I would not press to know the answer. But, subject to that, I would certainly endorse the proposal which has been made, that the sooner the Government can fix a definite target date when the two Departments should be combined, the better: and not only the better for the machine in Whitehall, but, I think, the better for our relations with foreign Governments and with Commonwealth Governments.

6.54 p.m.

LORD SHERFIELD

My Lords, I am moved to join the queue of former Permanent Under-Secretaries and Deputy Under-Secretaries of State and to intervene in this debate, partly because I have in the past been involved in two attempts under two Secretaries of State to bring about the amalgamation of the Commonwealth Relations and Foreign Services into one External Affairs Service. The first attempt was under Mr. Bevin. The second attempt was under Sir Anthony Eden, as he then was. So I have an impeccable bipartisan experience of this subject. These attempts failed for reasons with which I will not weary your Lordships. The circumstances were not propitious, though I still do not think that the attempts were premature.

However, the arguments for amalgamation finally prevailed in the Plowden Committee Report, and having, if I may say so, made a faultless round of the course, they blundered into the last fence for reasons which have not been very clearly explained. As the noble Lord, Lord Inchyra, has suggested, this probably did not flatter too much during the period in which the amalgamation of the two Services in the field and the streamlining of administrative arrangements at the centre were being undertaken. But now this process is, I imagine, almost complete, and there appears to be no reason, either in practice or in logic, why the amalgamation of the two Offices need be further postponed.

I do not see why a single Office should not be so organised as not to put an additional burden on the Secretary of State. I know that policy is made in Cabinets, and that its threads are in the hands of the Prime Minister. But, however closely the working arrangements are between the Departments, some polarisation is inevitable when there are two Ministers of equal status operating in the same field: because it has become the same field. There are two Permanent Secretaries of State, two Accounting Officers and two channels up which the files flow. So that on grounds of policy-making, financial control, and administrative practice the arguments are in favour of amalgamation.

There remains the one reason given by the Plowden Committee—namely, the possibility of misinterpretation of the action as showing a loss of interest in the Commonwealth partnership. Noble Lords who have preceded me have given many reasons why this argument has very much lost its force. I would add just one more: that if there is any misunderstanding of this kind in Commonwealth countries, then the recent formation of a Commonwealth Secretariat should reassure them that they have a channel in London through which their views can be represented. I think that in every other Commonwealth country there is a single Ministry for External Affairs. If the reason given is that it is necessary to keep the two Departments because amalgamation might lead to misunderstanding in this country, then I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, and other noble Lords who have said that it would be a pity to perpetuate what in fact is an illusion in the present circumstances.

I could dilate a good deal further on all these points, but fortunately the case was put for me in a nutshell by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs yesterday, when he gave as a reason for speaking on the Rhodesian issue in the Foreign Affairs debate in another place the fact that this was much more than a question between the United Kingdom and Rhodesia. It was a question, he said, on the solution of which would turn the vital matter of relations between the different sections of mankind in the future. I can give no better ground for ending the existing dichotomy in the field of external affairs between two Secretaries of State.

6.59 p.m.

LORD HANKEY

My Lords, I apologise for intervening so late in this debate, but I should like to add one or two points to the strong arguments which have already been raised. I believe, as has been urged, that some such measure as this is necessary for the most efficient conduct both of our foreign affairs and of our Commonwealth relations. Personally, I am a European, and I think that the United Kingdom ought somehow to enter the Common Market, with its associates. On the other hand, I believe that it is essential not to lose sight of realities.

For some reason the Commonwealth does not seem to be very fashionable in some quarters at present. But the fact remains that it contains 25 per cent. of humanity, about 730 million people, almost all self-governing and independent. It does 25 per cent. of world trade, and I believe that it is still of great importance to this country. We do about 35 per cent. of our trade with the Commonwealth. We live by trade, and I do not believe that we can afford to prejudice that important section of our economy. It is true that that trade has not been growing, but that is our own fault, because our economy has been so extremely soggy. If we had put our economy in order years ago, as in my opinion we should have done, then I believe that our trade with the Commonwealth would not have been soggy either, and that we should have proved a more attractive market to members of the Commonwealth who would not feel it necessary to deal so extensively with other markets.

I believe that this situation could still be put right, but in any case I think it is essential that our Commonwealth relations should be taken into account perhaps in a greater degree than was the case last time, when we again begin negotiations one day for entering the Common Market. For that purpose, it is desirable that there should be a well-unified consideration of both Commonwealth and foreign affairs. Therefore, in spite of all the difficulties in the Commonwealth, it is extremely important, in my view, that we preserve it as much as we can.

One of the features of the period into which we are entering is going to be the difficulties and the developments in the relations between the developed countries and the underdeveloped countries. The Commonwealth represents in many ways a remarkable mechanism, or a system—it is more of a system—for contacts between the developed and the underdeveloped countries, because the Commonwealth includes a number of highly developed countries and a large number of underdeveloped ones, and a very large population in some of them. I believe that that system of contacts is essential to the new Europe which is undoubtedly going to come about. I believe that Europe without such a system of relations with the outside world would be a rather futile area, and that the system which has been developed in Brussels is of great interest to anybody interested in Commonwealth relations. But this is just a way of saying that these things ought to be considered together, and I entirely agree with what the noble Lord, Lord Sherfield, said: that the formation of the Commonwealth Secretariat in London is of particular importance in that connection.

In my view, it is very important that, whatever system we arrange when this is done—and I am sure that it will be done —we should not overload the Foreign Secretary. I have been Private Secretary in the past to a very well known Foreign Secretary, and I must say on behalf of the Foreign Service that we very nearly killed him. So it was with other Foreign Secretaries with whom I have been closely associated.

If the Foreign Secretary had to go around Africa and other parts of the Commonwealth, and not only sort out the futile and absurd difficulties which occur in some of these areas, as well as the futile and absurd difficulties which occur in the United Nations, not at all in the Commonwealth connection, but including Commonwealth countries, I think that we should prejudice the health of our Foreign Secretaries to an unreasonable degree. Therefore, I am sure that, if we made this change, a system would be necessary whereby there would have to be an extra Minister in the Foreign Office. Perhaps he ought to attend the Cabinet—but that may be looking too far ahead. I only want to say that, in supporting this proposal, I do not want it to be thought that I have not thought of the difficulties.

7.5 p.m.

LORD WALSTON

My Lords, this has been a remarkable debate, for two reasons. One is, I think, that even in your Lordships' House, with all the men of distinction who customarily speak here, it is rare to find in one short debate two Permanent Under-Secretaries of the Foreign Office, one Joint Permanent Secretary of the Treasury, one Commissioner General for South-East Asia, two Ambassadors to Washington, one Ambassador to France and one Ambassador to Bonn—positions formerly held among many other distinguished positions—taking part in this debate. No wonder the standard of the debate has been high!

It is also, to my mind, rather peculiar in that one generally expects the champions of change to be the politicians without a full knowledge of all the difficulties, while those who counsel caution are the permanent officials who know all the problems that any change entails. Today the rôles seem to be somewhat reversed. Here we have the three Graces —if I may so call them—sitting on the Cross Benches, and others, all speaking with their mighty experience in favour of almost immediate change, whereas you find the one (if I may so describe myself) professional politician among the speakers giving the reasons why this change cannot take place immediately.

The arguments for the change I think fall roughly under two heads: first, the Commonwealth reasons, which were the burden of the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn; and the others, which were emphasised more by later speakers, although not in any way ignored by the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn—the reasons of efficiency. With regard to the first, I unashamedly align myself with those whom the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, described—members of the Labour Party who still suffer under the illusions of our great Victorian past. He felt possibly that those illusions were not shared by the younger and more intelligent members of my Party. That being so, I am afraid I cannot be either one of the younger or more intelligent members. But I would say that I do not consider myself under any illusions. I was glad that in particular the noble Lord, Lord Inchyra, also mentioned the value of the Commonwealth and its importance, in addition to the noble Lord, Lord Hankey, in his valuable last minute intervention.

I think we derive many practical advantages from the Commonwealth, albeit that it suffers from the difficulties we are seeing at the present time. We ourselves should be the losers if the Commonwealth were to disintegrate. Therefore, we must look with great care at any action which might tend to loosen the bonds of the Commonwealth.

I am somewhat open-minded in this matter of how a co-ordination of the two Offices would affect this aspect. I know perfectly well that there are many Commonwealth countries which would in no way be upset about the merger. Some of them would positively welcome it. Some of them would prefer to be regarded, in this context, at least on a par with any other foreign country, although in other respects they believe they have a special relationship—just as, as was pointed out, we can have special relationships with certain of our special friends among foreign countries. There are others, I know, who value the existence of the Commonwealth Relations Office and the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, to whom they can speak directly and in a somewhat different way than they can speak to a Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, or of External Relations. So that is, I believe, a reason to which we must pay a great deal of attention. It is a contra-indication to any hasty move in this matter, and the reason why any move towards the closer integration of the two Offices could be done only after close consultation with our fellow members of the Commonwealth.

When we come to the question of efficiency, I think that those who propose this move are on very much stronger around. I say quite frankly that when this subject was last debated in April, 1964, I took a very strong Commonwealth line and a very strong line opposed to any further amalgamation than that which was put forward by the Plowden Committee. Having had now something over a year working in one of the two Departments concerned, I am well aware of the need for the closest possible co-operation and co-ordination in the work of the two Departments. I have no doubt that in many ways efficiency would better be served if there were simply one Department of External Affairs, but there are many difficulties attaching to this, not the least being the one which has been mentioned with engaging frankness by the noble Lord, Lord Hankey, namely, the strain which would be put on the Secretary of State. There are ways of overcoming this. Noble Lords have suggested that there might be two Ministers of Cabinet rank, one senior and the other junior. But, for all that, there can be only one man ultimately responsible, and the wider his sphere the greater is his responsibility and therefore the greater the strain put upon him. I do not say that rules it out completely, but it is something which has to be borne in mind.

The other reasons against a hasty move, I do not say an ultimate move, are simply the practical problems of carrying out this merger. I know that from the point of view of the outsider looking at it objectively— the foreigner—as the noble Lord, Lord Caccia, mentioned, we seem to have a cockeyed system. I think the noble Lord, Lord Inchyra, said that foreigners must be defeated by it. Some people would say it is the job of the Foreign Office to defeat foreigners. Although it is confusing for them I think they get by all right. But I do not want to give the impression that we are resolutely turning our faces against any further progress along this line.

The Government of the day and the Opposition, as it then was, accepted and supported the Report of the Plowden Committee, and the main recommendations have now been put into force—that is, the creation of an integrated Diplomatic Service. That has been operating under one head who at the moment is at the same time the Permanent Secretary of the Commonwealth Relations Office. It has been operating since January 1, and during that time there have been 88 members of the former Foreign Service who have been posted to Commonwealth Relations Office posts and 42 members of the Commonwealth Relations Office who have been posted to Foreign Office posts. A total of 130 in less than twelve months have been cross-posted in this way, which I think is a significant achievement in a relatively short space of time. As that works out and makes itself felt increasingly, as the noble Lord, Lord Inchyra, pointed out, it will make any later, closer integration of the Offices very much more effective.

That is not the end of the unification which has taken place. There have been some relatively minor changes. There has been the unification of the communications system and of the cyphers, which has added greatly to efficiency. There has been unification of the information services in the two Offices. There are now joint resident clerks for both the Commonwealth Relations Office and the Foreign Office. All these, though they are not epoch-making or shattering in any way, are moves towards integration and towards greater efficiency.

However, there still remains the actual operational, efficient policy-making and the implementation of policy. Here, too, significant progress has been made. The noble Earl, Lord Selkirk, taking us quickly around South-East Asia (though I felt that he went on somewhat a roundabout way, when he went from Malaya to Manila and then back to Singapore: it might have been easier to go from Kuala Lumpur to Singapore and then across to Manila), rightly hit on the most important nonsense of the present situation: that when we have a situation such as has been going on, with confrontation between Indonesia, a foreign country, and Malaysia, a Commonwealth country, the two Departments are very closely involved.

In the present situation in Rhodesia, Rhodesia is the responsibility of the Commonwealth Relations Office, Addis Ababa, which is an O.A.U. country, and the United Nations are the responsibility of the Foreign Office, and there is clearly a very great interest to both Departments. At the highest level it is, after all, Cabinet decisions which matter, and there we have both Secretaries of State sitting in the Cabinet with their colleagues, jointly responsible for the highest policy.

At the lower levels there have been set up, and are working extremely well, both a Malaysian Committee and a Rhodesian Committee—joint Committees of officials in the Commonwealth Relations Office and the Foreign Office—in order to work out the day-to-day problems and to promote far greater cohesion and efficiency. At the junior Ministerial level, while there is no official organisation, there is very close co-operation between the junior Ministers in both of those Departments on a purely informal and day-to-day basis. This means that the apparent divisions between these two Departments are very much less than would appear to the foreigner, or even to some of our own people.

I have, in fact, a brief here from the present Permanent Under-Secretary at the Commonwealth Relations Office in which there is an indication of how well this "getting together" is now working. For, whereas in the days of (as he writes) Sir Harold Caccia, they used to exchange letters, now there is no need to do that with Lord Caccia's successor. Whether that means, as one might take it, that there is no communication whatsoever, even by letter, or, as I suspect, that in fact they are so close together there is no need for letters to pass backwards and forwards, because they will think with each other and communicate with each other in an informal way, this is a very good indication of the way in which progress has been made.

My Lords, I am afraid that I cannot give the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, an assurance that when next year comes round and it is time for him to put down his Question again there will be no need to do it because the merger will already have taken place. But I can assure him, and other noble Lords who have spoken to-day that the points they have made have been fully taken and that already, in advance of this debate, as I have attempted to show, a great deal has been done in a practical if unspectacular way to bring these two Departments closer together. Whether they will ever eventually become one, and if so when, is not for me to say; but the inefficiencies which appeared to be inevitable in this system are gradually being removed, and we are working towards an organisation in which, whether or not there are two Departments of State and two Secretaries of State, at least the co-operation between the two is such that the inefficiencies and the illogicalities have very largely disappeared.