HL Deb 16 December 1965 vol 271 cc811-4

2.36 p.m.

LORD MACPHERSON OF DRUMOCHTER

My Lords, I beg leave to ask the first Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.

[The Question was as follows:

To ask Her Majesty's Government what are the additional clauses they propose to add to the Rhodesian 1961 Constitution, and what is the reason for the delay in making known these clauses.]

THE PARLIAMENTARY UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS AND FOR THE COLONIES (LORD BESWICK)

My Lords, the noble Lord is referring to amendments which might be required to be made to the 1961 Constitution in order to enable Rhodesia to proceed towards constitutional independence, that can be considered only when constitutional government has been re-established.

THE EARL OF SWINTON

My Lords, may I ask the noble Earl the Leader of the House if he does not realise that, unless the Government state what are the amendments that we require in the 1961 Constitution, the vast majority of people in Rhodesia believe that there is no alternative between supporting U.D.I. and unconditional surrender? Surely that is not the result the Government desire.

LORD BESWICK

My Lords, I do not know what the noble Earl means by "the vast majority of people in Rhodesia". We have no evidence to suggest that the vast majority are thinking along the lines he indicates. With regard to the Amendment which would be required, as I understood him to say, in the event of a return to a constitutional position as a dependent Territory, I think my right honour- able friend the Prime Minister made the position clear in the statement which he made last Friday.

THE EARL OF SWINTON

My Lords, I am sorry to press the noble Lord. Certainly his information may be different from mine; but is he aware that a vast number of white Rhodesians who were strongly opposed to U.D.I. have now got into the hopeless state of mind that there is no choice between unconditional surrender and supporting U.D.I.? Do the Government not realise that to call for an unconditional return makes it almost impossible to get the negotiations going which the Prime Minister said he wished to get started?

LORD BESWICK

My Lords, again I am not quite sure what the noble Earl means by "unconditional surrender". If he means that the régime in Rhodesia, which is an illegal régime, must unconditionally return to constitutional government, then surely this is something upon which we are all agreed on both sides of the House.

THE EARL OF SWINTON

My Lords, again I am sorry to press the noble Lord, but this matter is so serious and the time is so short. Is the position of the Government this; that by "return to constitutional government" they mean that a sufficient number of people in Rhodesia should say that they are willing to work the 1961 Constitution and go hack to the status quo as it was before the negotiations were broken off? Is that the position of the Government?

LORD BESWICK

My Lords, what is required, in the first place, is that the régime now illegally holding the machinery of power must unconditionally give up that machinery. That is quite clear. The position then would be as the Prime Minister indicated: that there must be an interim period in which there would be direct rule by the Governor, supported possibly by responsible people in Rhodesia, during which time the details of any constitutional changes can be discussed.

LORD COLERAINE

My Lords, is that not in fact unconditional surrender?

LORD MACPHERSON OF DRUMOCHTER

My Lords, while thanking the noble Lord for his Answer to me, I have read what the Prime Minister has said in another place and I should like to ask the noble Lord whether he is basing his reply on the five principles

LORD BESWICK

My Lords, I am basing my reply upon the Statement which the Prime Minister made in another place, but in the course of that Statement he said that once a constitutional Government is re-established in Rhodesia, it will be necessary to sort out, as he put it, in the period of direct rule, amendments on the basis of the five principles.

LORD SALTOUN

My Lords, may I ask Her Majesty's Government a question—although I am by no means an expert on Rhodesia—simply as a psychological problem, in which Her Majesty's Government have probably had more experience in the past than anyone else? We are here in the position of a strike. Do Her Majesty's Government think that the people in Rhodesia are less determined and less persistent than those who carried on a strike in this country in the past, probably for years and years, and won admiration, rightly or wrongly, for the way in which they held out? And do not Her Majesty's Government think that it would be psychologically advisable to make some sort of terms for ending the strike which might be acceptable to the strikers?

LORD BESWICK

My Lords, I believe that on both sides of the House there will be some sympathy with what the noble Lord has just said. It would be useful if one could precisely say what the terms are, but it depends in part on the circumstances under which Smith and his régime—

SEVERAL NOBLE LORDS

Mr. Smith.

LORD BESWICK

—give up the power that they illegally hold.

LORD CARRINGTON

My Lords, I do not want to trespass on the House, because we have Rules and we must not ask too many supplementary questions; but I should like to ask the noble Lord one question. Does what he said mean that in no circumstances will the Government negotiate about Rhodesia, with Mr. Smith or without Mr. Smith, until Mr. Smith has left office?

LORD BESWICK

My Lords, I think that that will possibly arise under the next Question, but what I can make quite clear is that Her Majesty's Government cannot negotiate with the present illegal Government in Rhodesia.

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