HL Deb 02 December 1965 vol 270 cc1437-54

6.20 p.m.

THE EARL OF LYTTON rose to ask Her Majesty's Government whether they are contemplating steps to improve relations with the Somali nation, having regard to the reaction of dismay in the N.F.D. (Kenya) and in the Somali Republic when Her Majesty's former Government included a Somali province, contrary to the expressed wishes of its inhabitants, within the boundaries of the first African Administration of self-governing, later (1963) independent, Kenya. The noble Earl said: My Lords, I beg to move the Question standing in my name on the Order Paper. The first part of the Question seeks to ask Her Majesty's Government whether they are contemplating steps to improve relations with the Somali nation. This is the first time I have spoken to your Lordships on the Somali question since the present Government came into power. It is also the first time since Her Majesty ceased to possess any portion of the Somali territory. But it is the seventh time in all, and although I have in fact spoken on other subjects, this one has been raised by me more often. I think I have returned disappointed six times. It may be, if we follow what the right reverend Prelate said might happen, that I shall take more and more to alcohol. Indeed, of late I have noticed that I am less and less steady on my legs, but I hope that, at least until I burst into flames, I may be allowed to call it arthritis and not methylated spirits.

As a background to the Question, I want briefly to remind your Lordships that when Europe entered Africa they unified a number of small nations—fifty in Kenya—some of them as different as French and Germans, and in a very short historical space of time they welded these many nations into a multi-national State, which stands a very good chance, together with others, of continuing its unity. That is something which its members did not dream of seventy years ago. That is contradicted by some of the nationalists, notably by Dr. Nkrumah in his autobiography, but it is nevertheless true. In the case of the Somali nation, it was dismembered and divided into five different pieces. The dismembering was carried out mainly on British initiative and with British arms, including five substantial campaigns.

In addition our entry into Africa halted a number of movements. For some three centuries after their defeat by the Moslems, the Abyssinians were pinned down by a Northward swing of a people called Galla, who even penetrated into the ancestral kingdoms, leaving vacant territories in the desert regions which were filled by a Southward-moving drift of Somalis. This movement of Somalis was stopped by the arrival of the British. A colonial Governor as experienced as Sir Gerald Reece thinks it probable that we may have saved the whole of Kenya from a Somali occupation.

We held them up in a part called the N.F.D. where, it seems from the Somali historian, Dr. Lewis, they had been, with fluctuations of fortune, since the seventeenth century. Nevertheless, whether they were there or whether they were not, our task everywhere in Africa was to halt these movements, which were almost universal.

Mr. Kenyatta's book on the Kikuyu is a continuous record of the expansion of the Kikuyu tribe, first at the expense of some people he calls pygmies, then at the expense of the Wandorobo. These movements we halted and it was our policy to consolidate. Those who are where they are today and have been there for a generation we consider, if they are beneficial occupiers, should manage their affairs. That is the principle by and large which we have applied everywhere.

In the case of the reassembling of the Somali nation, there were quite unusual and unexpected difficulties. The Somalis have been reborn through the United Nations, who gave them their birth, first out of the portion that was taken by the Italians, to which we added the Northern of the two portions taken by us. They based their existence on the principle of self-determination which is so built into their Constitution that I must, at the risk of boring your Lordships, mention what they feel about it, so that your Lordships will know it. In the preamble of their Constitution is written: Conscious of the sacred right of self-determination solemnly consecrated in the Charter of the United Nations… The task of bringing about their own reunification of their dismembered parts is placed on them in Article 6 of their own Constitution, given them by the United Nations with our help—and they had every right to suppose that we believed in it: The Somali Republic shall promote by legal and peaceful means the union of Somali territories. The national flag and emblem is a five-pointed star, each of the points representing one of the dismembered portions, of which they now have control of two. They cannot give this up without denying themselves the very essence of their birth, their very birth certificate.

The Clause of the United Nations on which they rely is the Second Purpose: To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples. In dealing with Britons they like to point out what we have done specifically in the way of proclaiming this principle. They point to the Atlantic Charter, signed between the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom in the darkest of our dangers, on August 14, 1941. It said that the two parties desire to see no territorial changes that do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the people concerned. We go then to the first moment when the Afro-Asians realised their power and command of votes in the United Nations Assembly. Resolution 1514 of the General Assembly, dated December 14, 1960, said: All peoples have the right to self-determination. We then go to the Charter of Addis Ababa, which is the first act and deed of the Africans when they had a united organisation representing the whole of Africa. The very first words are: Convinced that it is the inalienable right of all peoples to control their own destiny… That was at the end of May 25, 1963. We then saw the resolutions of the Conference of Non-Aligned Nations—47 of them with 10 observers in Cairo—adopted on October 11, 1964. The Conference included many of the people who have not been independent before and who had not expressed their views, including many of our own Commonwealth countries. This is what they said: The right to complete independence, which is an inalienable right, must be recognised immediately and unconditionally as pertaining to all peoples in conformity with the Charter and the Resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly. It is incumbent upon all States to respect this right and facilitate its exercise. There are two more nations whose specific views we should have; one is Ethiopia, which controls a large province which is, in fact. Ethiopian Somaliland and is called the Ogaden, and the other is Kenya. The London Times of February 5, 1962, quoted the Emperor's opening address to an organisation which preceded the Organisation of African Unity, and which was called PAMFECA. He said: It is incumbent upon Britain to apply the same wisdom that it has applied to its former colonies in Africa and Asia, and speed up the political and constitutional advance of the African inhabitants of Bechuanaland, Swaziland, Basutoland and assure their early independence. Those were his views in regard to tiny landlocked enclaves with populations of between one-third of a million and one million.

Mr. Tom Mboya is a good example of what Kenya felt about these matters, because when Minister of Justice he published a book on the subject of freedom, called Tom Mboya—Freedom and After. This is what he says: In our freedom charter"— he meant the Party which he represented, and which is in power and rules Kenya to-day: we declared that the right of self-determination is God-given and no man or nation is chosen by God to determine the destiny of others. That is the kind of charter which the Somalis feel they can put forward to everybody, including ourselves, and it is what they say to ourselves that is of consequence to your Lordships.

The first apparent deviation from this, as it seemed to me and to the Prime Minister of the Somali Republic who wrote to me about it, was Mr. Macmillan's statement recorded in Hansard on April 11, 1960, when he appears to have renounced the legal right of Her Majesty's Government to bestow upon the Somali Republic the province of the Somalis in colonial Kenya, and also to have underwritten the continued dismemberment of the other two provinces. The second deviation, if that is the right word for it, was in November, 1961. The Emperor of Ethiopia met Mr. Kenyatta at a time when he was only just out of detention. He had been in detention for a good many years, had just been to London with a deputation, and returned via Addis Ababa, and there was arranged a mutual defence pact between the Emperor and the Emperor's designated future ruler of Kenya, the perhaps unsuspecting Mr. Kenyatta. Thus it was that when, a little later, in August, 1962, Mr. Kenyatta was entertained as a guest by the Somali Republic, he was unable to agree to any sort of self-determination for any part of Kenya.

The act which produced the breach of relations between Her Majesty's Government and the Somali Republic was this. The Somali representatives of the Somali Province in Kenya, generally called the N.F.D., but in fact a part of it, rather than the whole—but for convenience I refer to it as the Somali N.F.D.—arranged with Her Majesty's Government, notwithstanding protests from the leaders of Kenya, that a Commission should go there and ascertain the wishes of the people with regard to their future. This was done with full publicity, and, if it was not done with a view to granting self-determination, Heaven knows why it was done! It was a cruel thing to do, if self-determination was not intended.

The people came out openly on both sides, some saying that they detested the notion of a secession to the Somali Republic, but the vast majority being in favour of so doing. This result having been proclaimed by one Commission and endorsed by another—the Regional Boundaries Commission—Her Majesty's Government decided that they would not allow the principle of self-determination to apply to this region, but would hand it over to Kenya where these views had already been proclaimed "treason" by Mr. Kenyatta and other Kenya leaders. This is what produced the breach, and this is why I am asking tonight for the few of your Lordships who are here to recognise the injury that the' Somali people everywhere must have felt when this happened, and to do what is now possible to repair the damage.

Mr. Kenyatta, of course, has repeatedly said "Not an inch". What can he say except that? He is pledged to the Emperor who, when Mr. Kenyatta's destinies were still uncertain, pointed to him, publicly handed him a cheque for flood relief, a cheque which would normally have gone through the Ambassador through some other diplomatic channels, to help Kenya in her difficulties in a time of flood. I am not suggesting that this was a bribe. Of course it was not. It was merely the choice of Mr. Kenyatta as the Emperor's messenger, with his gift to Kenya. That was the indication to all that Mr. Kenyatta was the Emperor's choice. How could he now grant facilities for self-determination, even if he wished to do so, without betraying his word to the Emperor? That is the difficulty.

I want to say a few words on this business of the Shifta. What happened after we handed the N.F.D. to Kenya? One of the first things was that the Emperor of Ethiopia began taking taxes from the Ethiopian Somali colony of Ogaden. This resulted in a rebellion, which I followed in the few ways I could from the top of Porlock Hill: from an informed article in the New York Tinley of March 19, 1964, from numerous monitored radio broadcasts from Addis Ababa, and so on. The rebellion was followed by an assault by Ethiopian regular troops across the frontier. That, at least, was the view of the New York Times who cited many other newsmen as concurring in this view. It is believed that some thousands were killed on both sides. The Somalis are redoubtable fighters; they always have been.

The Government of Kenya have recently announced that the N.F.D., one-third of Kenya—that is their estimate of the area—is in a state of siege. They announced that since independence they have killed 400 Shifta and imprisoned 500 others. I suppose that in the previous thirty years we may have killed six—I do not know—perhaps it is none; but this is the way in which the matter has deteriorated. They have not mentioned the confiscation of stock, which has been going on by way of punishment. Every time stock is confiscated from Somalis in the N.F.D. the male population have the choice of going to Aden to make a little money or of becoming Shifta—that is to say, bandits. That is what they are being reduced to.

Meanwhile, we are still pouring money into Kenya, and giving her, according to Kenya authorities, more than they can possibly hope to get from anywhere else. We are supplying the logistics of a campaign which includes the repression of the Somalis of the N.F.D. I understand from various sources that the first pledge was for £60 million, and that recently a sum of £18 million has been added thereto. There was a time, when, according to the Kenya Digest, the cost of the airlift of supplies to the security forces of Kenya in the N.F.D., which was met by the British taxpayer, exceeded in its daily rate the total costs of the administration of the whole Province in 1961.

I have, therefore, certain suggestions to make. First of all, I hope your Lordships agree that the Somalis have been deeply injured, and that it is therefore incumbent upon the greater partner in this matter of injury to take the initiative to put matters on a proper footing. I would suggest that, through normal diplomatic channels, Her Majesty's Government should convey their desire to the Somali Government to resume diplomatic relations, and should invite the Somali Government to make such representations as they may wish on the obstacles they see to a resumption of these normal relations. Secondly, for the benefit of the Somali nation, rather than of the Somali Republic, I wonder whether it would be possible for Her Majesty's Government to repeat, or, rather, to underline, their approval of Article 6 of the Somali Constitution, thereby indicating that whatever Mr. Macmillan said in 1960 is now obsolete. Those are the two things to which I should very much hope to have the answer, "Yes".

Then there is a further matter, which is perhaps slightly beyond my competence. I have in mind that the whole of the Somali boundary will become a seething source of trouble the moment the present Emperor of Ethiopia dies. I have noticed, from the broadcasts from Ethiopia of their appeals for cash to pay for "the war against the invading Somalis", as it was called, and also from a speech made when the Emperor opened a school for orphans of Ethiopian soldiers killed in the war with the Somalis, that, astonishing though it may be, they are afraid of the Somalis. All Ethiopian Emperors have always been afraid of a Moslem assault.

Therefore, my third suggestion is that there should be a kind of resurrection of the signatories of the Tripartite Agreement of 1906—Italy, France and Britain—with a view to some approach being made to the Emperor to see whether, with our good offices, and particularly those of France (who, in a sense, hold the gateway to Ethiopia), some satisfactory solution cannot be discussed now, before we open the gateway to the revolution in the Horn of Africa. For myself, I do not foresee the capacity of the Somalis to overthrow Ethiopia. It seems to me that these fears are utter nonsense. But, with this continued ulcer growing, once the Emperor has gone from Addis Ababa, and once the British have left Aden, the revolution will move across and make a lot of trouble; and I am hoping that these troubles can be forestalled. That, then, is my third suggestion, to which I could not expect an answer to-night; but, with regard to the other two, I should hope for an answer, either to-day or to-morrow.

6.46 p.m.

LORD ST. HELENS

My Lords, should like to express my great gratitude to the noble Earl who has just spoken for his courtesy in warning me previously about the matters he proposed to raise, and I must apologise to him because I am afraid my gratitude does not extend to my supporting him in this matter. Indeed, I very much hope that Her Majesty's Government will not involve themselves in the dispute between Kenya and Somaliland.

THE EARL OF LYTTON

My Lords, may I interrupt the noble Lord and ask him whether he will confess that he was a member of the Macmillan Government at the time when Mr. Macmillan made this statement? Perhaps I should say "acknowledge"; I do not mean "confess"—it is not a sin.

LORD ST. HELENS

I am most grateful to the noble Earl. I do feel that "confess" is a rather misplaced word here. I am extremely proud to proclaim that I was a member of the Macmillan Government at the time.

My Lords, the only reason I intervene in this debate at all—and I shall do so briefly—is that a long time ago, when I was a very young man, before the Second World War, I spent some five years in the Province which we are discussing, the Northern Frontier Province of Kenya, and it was a very pleasant five years. In those days, to get there one had to walk a distance of some 400 miles. Then one spent one's time patrolling, first of all, the Abyssinian frontier, and then the Somali frontier. To me, the greatest asset in the whole of this assignment was that if any of my superiors wished to rebuke me (which they frequently did), they then had to walk the 300 miles in order to come and see me.

Now this area is one that is of little value to-day. It is an extremely arid area. It has very low rainfall, sparse grazing, very few water holes and a very, very small population when measured as so many head of population per acre in the country. In the past, people thought that it might be valuable. Indeed, when I was there there were numerous geological and other expeditions which came to see if there was within the soil any mineral or other valuable deposit, such as oil, which could be taken out; and all of them went back empty-handed. The unfortunate people who live in this area are nomads, certainly enjoying the lowest standards of life I have ever seen; and they are subject to disease, to constant famine and to constant drought.

Earlier on, when Kenya was still a Colony, this area had great value to us, because, in fact, it formed a buffer State between ourselves and Abyssinia, which was then occupied by the Italians. Indeed, it served its purpose admirably during the last World War, because there was a time, as the noble Earl remembers, when there was nothing but one brigade of colonial troops between the vast Italian Army in Abyssinia and South Africa. But there was this vast arid desert that the Italians never succeeded in crossing, though there was little opposition to them. Under modern conditions, however, a buffer State of this nature is no longer required. Under modern conditions, this territory really has no value whatsoever, and I do not believe that either side is going to get very excited about it in the long run.

Without following the noble Earl back into history, taking the position as it stands now, the Government of this country have an undoubted liability, a colonial liability, to Kenya and also have their treaties with Ethiopia. The dispute over the Northern Frontier Province is between the Somalis and the Kenyans; I personally think it would be wholly wrong for the Government, under existing considerations, to enter into the dispute. I believe that eventually the territory we are talking about will he handed over to the Somalis for the simple reason that it has no value to Kenya, and also for the reason that fundamentally the Kenyans, who are by temperament and physique accustomed to living in lush forest country, are quite unsuited to living in the Northern Frontier Province. The noble Earl knows that from his own experience. It is of no value. They do not want the country; and I am certain that eventually it will be handed over.

I remember that several years ago there was a deputation of Kenyan Members of Parliament to this country, and I talked to them about this very problem. They told me: "You do not have to worry. Sooner or later there will be some form of federation between ourselves and our neighbouring States and the problem will be amicably settled." So I would conclude, my Lords, by saying that I believe that the long-term solution must lie between the Kenyan Government and the Somali Government, and I hope very much that Her Majesty's Government will take no part in the discussions which are bound to come.

6.52 p.m.

LORD SOMERS

My Lords, I am rather surprised, I must say, to hear my noble friend Lord St. Helens say that the land of the Northern Frontier District is of no value. Perhaps that may be true as regards ourselves; I cannot say that I feel any great desire to invest in real estate in the Northern Frontier District. But it is of very great value indeed to the people who live in it; and they are the Somali people. They are nomadic by nature. It is their home country and it is the kind of country they are used to.

I must say that, in studying the history of our relations with the Somali people, I have not been impressed. I feel that this history threw no great credit on our country. So far as I can see, it is one long story of breach of faith, of the giving of treaties of protection and then, at the crucial moment, of failing to give that protection. For instance, in 1884–85 the Treaty of Protection of Somalis in the British Sector was made. In 1886 this was followed by individual treaties with individual clans. But only eleven years later, in 1897, Lord Hamilton made a statement in Parliament that the Interests in the Somaliland Protectorate were insufficient to justify our contributing to its defence or occupation. That was in spite of the fact that in the same year, 1897, an agreement had been reached between Abyssinia and Great Britain giving Abyssinia's recognition of the British Protectorate. During the years there were constant disputes between Ethiopia and the other three powers then interested in Somaliland—Great Britain, Italy and France—as to where the various boundary lines should be. But boundaries are not drawn by political agreement; they are formed by a very natural process of surrounding a people who are homogenous to the country and who are of similar original traditions and culture. That is the only really logical definition of a boundary.

Of course, in 1945, immediately after the war, all the arguments restarted. Then, as your Lordships know, in 1960 independence was granted to the Somaliland Republic. But there were still, even then, these three large parts of Somali country separated from it: French Somaliland, Ogaden, belonging to Ethiopia, and the Northern Frontier Districts about which my noble friend has spoken to-night.

I should like to quote here one or two things that have been said through the years that throw a little light on the subject. The then President of the United States, Woodrow Wilson, in a speech to Congress in 1928, gave as the second of four principles: That peoples and provinces are not to be bartered about from sovereignty to sovereignty as pawns in a game, even the great game, now forever discredited, of the balance of power. In the Atlantic Charter of 1941, which was made between Sir Winston Churchill and the President of the United States, it was said: They"— that is, Great Britain and the United States of America— respect the rights of all peoples to choose the form of Government under which they will live; and they wish to see sovereign rights and self-government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them. My noble friend quoted Section 2 of Article 1 of Chapter 1 of the United Nations Charter. Let us only hope that they mean it!

There was also a United Nations resolution of 1960 which said: The subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation constitutes a denial of fundamental human rights, is contrary to the Charter of United Nations and is an impediment to the promotion of world peace and co-operation. It says later: Any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and the territorial integrity of a country is incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations. What is the present situation but that of forcible disruption? Yet in the same year as that resolution was made, 1960, Mr. Macmillan stated: Her Majesty's Government do not, and will not, encourage or support any claim affecting the territorial integrity of French Somaliland, Kenya or Ethiopia."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, Commons, Vol. 621. col. 104; 11/4/60.] In other words, so much for our treaty of protection!

The only question that comes to me now is: Is it too late? Kenya, of course, is now independent and we have no means of forcing her to part with any part of her territory unless she wishes to do so. The only hope I have is that we can put a certain amount of financial pressure upon her. We are paying large sums to the country. Let us hope that pressure will be used.

I should like to end by quoting some words by the greatest Englishmen of this century in his last book, The Gathering Storm. They apply to a totally different situation, but it seems to me that they are equally appropriate. He says: If ever there was an opportunity of striking a decisive blow for a generous cause with the minimum risk it was here now. The fact that the nerve of the British Government was not equal to the occasion…actually played a part in leading to an infinitely more terrible war. My Lords, I am not implying that this will lead to a terrible war, or anything of that sort. None the less, the words are worth thinking about.

7.0 p.m.

LORD WALSTON

My Lords, I think that the few of your Lordships who are still here, and the many, both in this House and outside, who will read the speech of the noble Earl, Lord Lytton, will be grateful to him for raising this subject, and particularly for the great amount of erudition as well as feeling that he has put into it. We know it is something which he has studied closely and of which he has first-hand knowledge, and where both his heart and his head are closely involved. I think the problem falls under at least two headings: one is the past and the other the present. The noble Earl told us a lot of the past history and I do not wish to dispute that with him in any way.

It is true that when Her Majesty's Government gave independence to Kenya they did so with the Northern Frontier District included, and it is perfectly open to anybody to argue that that was a wrong decision to take. Although not a member of that Government—it was the Party opposite which was in power—I believe in fact that it was a right decision to take. But whether the decision was right or wrong, it was taken, and we cannot now go back on it; we cannot undo the past. But I would remind the noble Earl and the noble Lord, Lord Somers, too, that before that decision was taken a Commission went out into that area, as the noble Earl pointed out, and made an inquiry into the feelings of the people there.

We all know that it is very difficult, particularly in an area of that sort, to judge what the people want and present the facts to them. In other instances we have heard people say that referenda and plebiscites are of no use in such circumstances. I think there is a lot to be said on that side. This Commission did not resort to such means. It was composed of distinguished and experienced people and its Report was that of the six administrative districts in the Northern Frontier District, two wished not to go into Kenya but to remain independent under our protection, with perhaps eventual absorption into Somalia; two wished to remain in Kenya, and two were indeterminate. Therefore, in those circumstances, with the support of the findings of that Commission, I think Her Majesty's Government at that time were absolutely right to hand over the territory intact to our former Colony of Kenya rather than to detach a certain amount from it.

But that is all in the past, as I said, and the important thing is for us to decide what should be done in the future, or at the present time; what steps we can take. And not only what we should do but what we can do. Fortunately, this is not one of those occasions, in my view, where what we should do differs very widely—in fact it does not differ at all—from what we can do. We must accept our situation, our position, in this matter, as the noble Lord, Lord Somers, made perfectly clear. This is not a dispute between countries or States in which we are one of the champions. It is primarily a dispute between an independent country, a member of the Commonwealth—Kenya—and an independent Somalia and also independent Ethiopia. One of those countries, Kenya, is a country with which we are not only friendly but have the tie of being both members of the British Commonwealth, which gives us a somewhat special relationship, with a special obligation to regard with sympathy the legitimate views and claims of the Government of Kenya to an area of land which we handed over to them on their independence.

The second country, Ethiopia, is one with which we have friendly relations and have had friendly relations for a very long time. The third is Somalia, a country with which, unfortunately, we are not at the present time in diplomatic relations. I will come to that point in due course in answer to the three questions which the noble Earl put to me. So there we have the situation. The dispute exists between these three countries, and I think it is only reasonable that our initial sympathies—in default of any overriding evidence to the contrary—should be, in the first place, with our Commonwealth partner, and in the second place with Ethiopia, which is a friendly Power with whom we have very close and friendly relations.

That would not blind our eyes to justice at all, if there was overwhelming, or even clear, justice on the side of Somalia. But I would point out to your Lordships the evidence I have mentioned: first, the handing over of the Northern Frontier District in its entirety when Kenya was given independence, and secondly, the fact that we did what we could to satisfy ourselves that this was not in contravention of the clear wishes of the majority of the people living there.

I do not wish to detain your Lordships too long with this matter, and so I will now come directly to the three questions which the noble Earl raised. First, he asked that we should resume diplomatic relations with Somalia. My Lords, we are quite prepared to do so. We did not break off relations with Somalia; they broke them off with us. We have let it be known to them quite specifically, in an Answer to a Parliamentary Question in another place by my honourable friend the Minister of State, Foreign Office (Mr. Padley) on May 10, that we were quite ready to resume diplomatic relations with Somalia if they so wished, and there is no reason at all for the Somalia Government to be under any misapprehension as to our feeling on the matter. So the next move rests with them. If they wish to resume diplomatic relations with us, we shall be very happy to discuss this matter with them in the normal way.

THE EARL OF LYTTON

My Lords, if I may interrupt the noble Lord for a moment on that matter, may I say that what I suggested was that we should take the initiative on our side and say that we should be glad to resume diplomatic relations; and invite them to send us, through diplomatic channels, any note of any obstacles there might be to such resumption.

LORD WALSTON

My Lords, I think we have gone quite as far as we reasonably can in this matter, bearing in mind the fact that it was the Somalia Government that broke off relations with us. We have now publicly told them that we are ready to resume relations with them if they so wish. For any willing person I think that would be regarded as an invitation to come forward. The fact that they have not done so makes it seem to me that, unfortunately, they do not wish at this stage to enter into diplomatic relations with us. I would remind the noble Earl that in spite of this unfortunate rupture in our diplomatic relations we still offer British Council studentships in this country—I think it is something like 11, of which some are taken up, but not the full number. So there is no lack of evidence of goodwill on our part. I suggest to the noble Earl that it is up to the Somalia Government now to respond to such statements as we have made in public.

The noble Earl's second question concerned the self-determination of peoples. Of course we adhere to that; we always have under every Government, and we still do. But there are many different forms of self-determination, and in many cases we cannot interfere, even if we were so minded, because it is no direct concern of ours. I would suggest to the noble Earl that when we talk of the self-determination of a people, this is misleading and might lead us into serious errors, if the people of one small area of a large country want to go off and be independent or live under some other Power. It is conceivable, for example, that in some area in Scotland the Scottish nationalists might be a majority and, according to the principle of self-determination, they might draw a boundary round the area and claim that they should be allowed self-determination and become independent of the United Kingdom.

7.12 p.m.

THE EARL OF LYTTON

But, my Lords, that is exactly what I do think should be done, and it is a great injury when it is not done. One fault in regard to the arrangement in Ireland is that it put two counties on the wrong side. Why should not people be where they want to be, instead of being somewhere where people, who have nothing to do with them, think it appropriate?

LORD WALSTON

My Lords, these people are where they want to be. They are territorially on the soil that is theirs and where they wish to remain. Some of them do not like the remote Government in Nairobi that is eventually responsible for them. Others, if they were under Somalia, would not like the remote Government in Mogadishu, which would be responsible in such a case. The present situation is that the N.F.D. is part of the independent country of Kenya. Whether we wanted to or not, we could not intervene directly in a dispute which is taking place between three independent countries. But I would add that if we were invited by any of these countries to make available our good offices to help in this dispute, we should be only too happy to help; but, as things are to-day, we have no locus standi whatever for interfering with these matters.

LORD SOMERS

My Lords, I do not think that the noble Lord's simile of the Scottish Nationalists is quite a parallel one, because Scotsmen are Scotsmen, whether Nationalist or not, but the Somali people are of a totally different origin and culture from the Kenyans.

LORD WALSTON

My Lords, I will not pursue with the noble Lord an argument of a somewhat sociological nature. I adhere to my point that when one talks of self-determination of a people, one must talk of an accepted country as a whole, and not of a part cut off by an arbitrary boundary, or an arbitrary enclave in an isolated instance.

The final point of the noble Earl concerned our treaty obligations.

THE EARL OF LYTTON

My Lords, I did not mean it that way at all. I do not think that I suggested that we should intervene with Mr. Kenyatta. I think that I said that I was very sorry for him. What I did suggest was that there was a Tripartite Treaty in 1906, under which I imagine we have no obligations whatever. I think that this is as dead as the dodo and not an obligation for Ethiopia. It was a robbers' deal to preserve these boundaries of Ethiopia against any other robber, and it preserved the independence of Ethiopia for thirty years, until the Italians went in. But I imagin that it is as dead as the dodo.

I hope that those who preserved these boundaries may get together and consider what might be the final solution, especially with France, which holds the gateway—the railway. I do not think that I mentioned any treaty obligation. I do not know of any. Is not this Tripartite Treaty dead? But there are still the signatories, and because they have done so much, they might meet and do more—and better.

LORD WALSTON

My Lords, the noble Earl has largely answered what I thought was his question. In our opinion, since the independence of the British Somali Protectorate, the Treaty of 1906 is no longer operative. There are now these three independent countries, who are in dispute with each other.

In conclusion, I can only repeat that we cannot interfere with Ethiopia, Kenya or Somalia—particularly with Somalia, with whom we have no diplomatic relations. But we are always prepared, if we are asked by the disputing countries, to do what we can to help them settle this problem—a serious one, I grant, which can always fester and become worse. I am inclined to agree with the opinion of the noble Lord, Lord St. Helens, who said that, given time, this problem will settle itself, and, I believe, in a way which will be satisfactory to all concerned.