Lords Sitting of 5 August 1965

Preamble
The House met at half past two of the clock, The LORD CHANCELLOR on the Woolsack.
Prayers—Read by the Lord Bishop of Bristol

FOURTH CLERK AT THE TABLE (JUDICIAL)
2.36 p.m.
The LORD CHANCELLOR (LORD GARDINER): My Lords, I beg to move the Motion standing in my name on the Order Paper. By Statute, the appointment of Clerks at the Table is vested in the Lord Chancellor, subject to the approval of your Lordships' House, and the reasons why I propose to appoint Mr. Cave as Fourth Clerk at the Table (Judicial), subject to the approval of your Lordships, are these. Mr. Cave is the head of the Judicial Office and as such supervises the arrangements for the appellate jurisdiction of this House. He has detailed knowledge of every appeal to your Lordships' House and it is fitting, therefore, that he should be able to officiate at the Judicial Sittings of the House. Those Sittings will take place in the Chamber either when judgment is being given in the mornings or during Recesses—for example, from now until October 26—when your Lordships' House are not sitting in a legislative capacity.
When Judicial Sittings are held in the Chamber there has to be a Clerk at the Table. At present he is one of the three Clerks at the Table, although of course they have no knowledge of judicial business, while Mr. Cave, who has, has to remain behind the Bar. It would therefore, subject to your Lordships' approval, seem more sensible that Mr. Cave should be appointed Fourth Clerk at the Table so that he could assist the Lords of Appeal in Ordinary on those occasions. The appointment would be personal to Mr. Cave and is not regarded as a precedent. It would carry no prescriptive right of succession to any of the other posts at the Table, and it does not involve any increase in Mr. Cave's remuneration. My Lords, I beg to move.
Moved, That this House do approve the appointment by the Lord Chancellor, pursuant to the Clerk of the Parliaments Act 1824, of Richard Philip Cave, to be Fourth Clerk at the Table (Judicial).—(The Lord Chancellor.)
VISCOUNT DILHORNE: My Lords, I am sure that this is a very sensible proposal and will facilitate the discharge of the Business of this House. I should only like to add that from my knowledge of Mr. Cave I think this is an eminently suitable appointment.
LORD REA: My Lords, may I, as a layman, say that we on these Benches, and I think all of your Lordships, agree that this is a most excellent and sensible appointment. I hesitate to seek to correct the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor, but I think he mentioned that it was within the Lord Chancellor's province to appoint the three Clerks at the Table. I have a suspicion, however, that the Clerk of the Parliaments is appointed by the Queen. That is quite by the way, and I think that this suggestion of appointing Mr. Cave is an extremely good one.
On Question, Motion agreed to, nemine dissentiente.

"TRAFFIC BOX" EXPERIMENT
2.39 p.m.
LORD BOSSOM: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
[The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government whether the so-called "traffic boxes", such as the one in Oxford Street, have proved successful; and if so whether more of these are being introduced at other congested crossings throughout the country.]
THE PARLIAMENTARY SECRETARY, MINISTRY OF TRANSPORT (LORD LINDGREN): My Lords, generally traffic conditions have improved at those junctions in London where yellow box markings are laid down. The Greater London Council, as the traffic authority for London, is responsible for reviewing this experiment after it has had a fair period of trial. It is too early to reach comprehensive conclusions. No local authority outside London has yet decided to introduce this measure.
LORD BOSSOM: My Lords, while thanking the noble Lord for that Answer, may I ask whether it is not a fact that most accidents occur at crossings, rather than on the general straight run of the road?
LORD LINDGREN: My Lords, I think that is probably true. But the most successful of these boxes have been at busy junctions, where they have allowed an easier flow of the traffic from the side roads.
BARONESS BURTON OF COVENTRY: My Lords, while feeling that these yellow boxes have been a great success, I wonder whether I may call the attention of my noble friend to a problem that arises even where they are in operation. Is he aware that when traffic is allowed to turn right after it has crossed half the main road—in this case, Oxford Street—it is practically impossible for pedestrians to get across at all, while for elderly people it is both dangerous and difficult? May I also ask my noble friend whether he knows that by the time this traffic has finished filtering right the traffic lights have changed again, the main flow has resumed, and so far as the pedestrian is concerned this is just a continuous flow? Finally, am I not correct in saying that in New York pedestrians have the right of way under these circumstances, and that this is enforced? Could my noble friend look at this aspect of the matter?
LORD LINDGREN: Yes, my Lords. We shall be only too happy to look at it in the light of the noble Lady's statement.
EARL HOWE: My Lords, is the noble Lord aware that many people, particularly those living in the countryside, are confused and somewhat distracted by these yellow signs on the roads? Furthermore, if we do not have sufficient police to act as observers, how is the unfortunate motorist to be caught in this traffic "gimmick", in this yellow traffic box?
LORD LINDGREN: My Lords, the most frequent users, of course, are those already in town. The London police are pretty lenient, where it is obvious that the person who is using the road is not a frequent visitor, and we have had no difficulty up to the present time. I was going to say that the police are most enthusiastic, but at least they approve of this experiment because it is of considerable help to the traffic flow.
EARL HOWE: It will be interesting, my Lords, to see the result of this experiment.

VENTILATION OF THE HOUSE OF LORDS
2.42 p.m.
LORD SEGAL: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the first Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
[The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government what progress is being made towards improving the ventilation of this Chamber.]
THE JOINT PARLIAMENTARY SECRETARY, MINISTRY OF LAND AND NATURAL RESOURCES (LORD MITCHISON): My Lords, the noble Earl, Lord Jellicoe, explained to the House on March 17, 1964, that a scheme for the installation of air-conditioning in your Lordships' Chamber was being examined. On December 21, 1964, I explained to the House that my right honourable friend the Minister of Public Building and Works was pressing ahead with his examination of proposals. Some of the necessary plant has been installed and satisfactory tests have been made. Preparatory work is continuing with a view to completion of the work by the end of the Summer Recess, 1966, subject to the necessary funds being available.
LORD SEGAL: My Lords, while thanking my noble friend for his reply, may I ask him this further question? Is he aware that alternate blasts of hot and cold air have been blowing across this Chamber, between the Opposition and the Government Benches, in both directions, regardless of the temperature outside? Can he not give an assurance to the House that it will be able to meet again after the Recess under more healthy auspices?
LORD MITCHISON: My Lords, I do not think it is my right honourable friend's business to interfere with any of the political hot air to which my noble friend was referring; hut, as regards the condition of the Chamber, I am afraid that the work will not be finished before the date I indicated. I think there has already been some improvement—and so does my right

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honourable friend—and I hope that it will continue as we get the machinery going.
VISCOUNT DILHORNE: My Lords, is the noble Lord aware that, to us, it always seems that the hot air comes from that side of the House?
LORD MITCHISON: Yes, my Lords, but we think the cold feet are on the other side.
LORD BOSSOM: My Lords, is the noble Lord aware that when the House of Commons was using this Chamber this very point was raised and that it was promised that something would be done about it? That is now nearly 20 years ago, but still nothing has happened.
LORD MITCHISON: My Lords, this Government have got a move-on about it. We hope that the work will be finished by the date I indicated.

NATIONAL HEALTH SERVICE PRESCRIPTIONS COSTS
2.45 p.m.
LORD SEGAL: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the second Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.

ENGLAND AND WALES

ANALYSIS BY TYPE OF PREPARATION (a): FEBRUARY-APRIL

Estimated number of prescriptions

Estimated total net ingredient cost

Millions

Per cent.

£ Million

Per cent.

1964

1965

1964

1965

1964

1965

1964

1965

Total (b)

53·98

64·73

100·0

100·0

17·89

22·10

100·0

100·0

Non-proprietary preparations

14·60

16·52

27·1

25·5

1·07

1·34

6·0

6·1

Proprietary preparations (c)

37·88

46·19

70·2

71·4

16·17

19·82

90·4

89·7

Dressings, appliances, trusses and hosiery

1·50

2·01

2·8

3·1

0·64

0·94

3·6

4·3

(a) Except for the overall total number of prescriptions, all numbers shown are estimates based on a sample of 1 in 200 approximately, of the prescriptions dispensed in chemist contractors' establishments (including drug stores) and by appliance contractors.

(b) Figures may not add up to totals shown because of rounding.

(c) Includes prescriptions for items not specified by proprietary name available only in proprietary form.

LORD SEGAL: My Lords, while thanking my noble friend for his reply, I would ask him this question. Would he not agree that the early figures are liable to be somewhat inconclusive, and that it would be advisable to await publication of later figures before any definite conclusions can be drawn about changes in doctors' prescribing habits?
[The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government when the first analysis of prescription costs since the abolition of prescription charges can be made available, particularly with reference to proprietary and and non-proprietary medicines, and to regional variations in prescribing trends.]
THE PARLIAMENTARY UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS AND FOR THE COLONIES (LORD TAYLOR): My Lords, an analysis of the costs of proprietary and non-proprietary medicines has been made for the period from February to April, 1965, and this shows that proprietary preparations represented 90 per cent. of the cost of the pharmaceutical services in this period. There has, therefore, been no significant change in this respect from the same period in 1964. I will circulate a table giving the full figures in the OFFICIAL REPORT. As regards regional variations in prescribing trends, a detailed therapeutic group analysis of regional prescribing is made annually. The first analysis since the abolition of charges will be made for the year 1965, and will therefore not be available before the spring of 1966.
Following is the table referred to:
LORD TAYLOR: My Lords, what my noble friend says may be true, but I did point out that, in the particular respect about which he asked there appeared to have been no change.
BARONESS SUMMERSKILL: My Lords, since, both in 1964 and in the three months, February to April, this year,

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90 per cent. of the prescriptions have been for proprietary drugs, and the average cost of each prescription has now risen to a little over 10s., may I ask my noble friend when the Government are going to cry "Halt" and demand that the national formularies shall be used, where they provide an appropriate alternative?
LORD TAYLOR: My Lords, the use of national formulary preparations is appropriate in about 5 per cent. of proprietary preparations. The Committee headed by my noble friend Lord Cohen of Birkenhead drew up a list of 53 commonly prescribed proprietary preparations for which there were non-proprietary alternatives, and a new list is being prepared by the Standing Joint Committee under Professor Macgregor.
BARONESS SUMMERSKILL: My Lords, I must press my noble friend on this matter. Every time it is raised, year after year, those of us who are deeply concerned with it are put off by being told that another Committee is looking into it. Could my noble friend tell me just how many Committees have looked into the drug industry?
LORD TAYLOR: My Lords, there is a Royal Commission looking into it now, which, in my opinion, is the most effective way of all.
BARONESS SUMMERSKILL: No—because it takes five years.
LORD NEWTON: My Lords, the noble Lord based his Answer on the period February to April of this year. Can he say, comparing that with the same period last year, what difference there has been in the total number of prescriptions given?
LORD TAYLOR: I can, my Lords, but it may take me a moment to find the appropriate record. I think I had better say that the information is included in the table that we shall be circulating in the OFFICIAL REPORT.
LORD NEWTON: My Lords, can the noble Lord say whether there has been an increase or decrease, or whether the total is about the same?
LORD TAYLOR: My Lords, there has been an increase.
LORD HAWKE: My Lords, are Her Majesty's Government aware that nothing would do more to restore confidence in the pound abroad than the reimposition of prescription charges, the abolition of which appeared to our creditors abroad as an act of irresponsibility?
LORD TAYLOR: My Lords, I cannot agree with either of the suppositions of the noble Lord.

PRESS DISLOSURES OF POLICE OFFICERS' NAMES
2.49 p.m.
THE EARL OF ALBEMARLE: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
[The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government whether they do not think the pinpointing of names in the Press of police Officers, or detectives, may impede the prosecution of those believed to be in breach of the laws; also whether secrecy is self-evidently a part of security when acting against opponents.]
THE JOINT PARLIAMENTARY UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE, HOME OFFICE (LORD STONHAM): My Lords, the extent to which the names of police officers are disclosed to the Press is a matter left to the discretion of individual chief officers of police. I understand that the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis considers that, in general, the advantages of disclosing the names of officers in charge of cases greatly outweigh the disadvantages, particularly where the police can be helped by receiving information from the public; but that, where it is undesirable for names to be disclosed, steps are taken to ensure anonymity.
THE EARL OF ALBEMARLE: My Lords, may I ask a supplementary question? The noble Lord talked about the Metropolitan Police authority, but I did not understand him to say whether other police authorities have the same view as the Metropolitan authorities.
LORD STONHAM: My Lords, I was quoting the views of the Metropolitan Commissioner; and, of course, he is responsible for a number of very important cases. But when it comes to the smaller police forces, if the names of the

403
police were to be withheld it would create an impossible situation, because in court cases the names of the police have to be disclosed. Indeed, the difficulty of suppressing the names (quite apart from implication involving the freedom of the Press) would be even greater in small forces than in the Metropolis.
THE EARL OF ALBEMARLE: My Lords, I thank the noble Lord for his answer.

PROPOSED SALE OF U.S.A. COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM TO INDONESIA
LORD OGMORE: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question of which I have given Private Notice:
"Whether Her Majesty's Government have received a reply from the United States Government to their representations relating to the supply of an advanced electronic communications system to Indonesia; and, if so, what is the nature of the reply."
THE PARLIAMENTARY UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (LORD WALSTON): My Lords, there is nothing that I can at present add to the information which I gave to your Lordships' House on July 29. As I then observed, the official position of the United States Government in this matter is restricted to a question of approving or withholding an export licence. This question has not yet arisen since, so far as I am aware, no application for an export licence has yet been made. If and when it does, I have no doubt that the United States Government will give weight to our views, which have been made clear to them.
LORD OGMORE: My Lords, could the noble Lord inform us what would be the reaction of the United States Government and people to the supply by a British manufacturer of an advanced electronic communications system to President Ho Chi-minh?
LORD WALSTON: My Lords: I am afraid that I am not empowered, or indeed qualified, to state what the attitude of the United States Government would be on any matter; but I think that the noble Lord's guess as to what their attitude would be would correspond very closely to my own.

RHODESIA: TIMES ARTICLE ON MILITARY INTERVENTION
VISCOUNT DILHORNE: My Lords, I beg leave to ask Her Majesty's Government the Question of which I have given Private Notice:
Whether there is any truth in the statement published in the centre pages of yesterday's The Times that
"serious thought is being given to the problem of planning for possible military intervention in Rhodesia".
THE MINISTER OF DEFENCE FOR THE ROYAL AIR FORCE (LORD SHACKLETON): My Lords, Her Majesty's Government are not responsible for what appears in the Press. However, it would be appropriate on this occasion to say that Her Majesty's Government are surprised and sorry that this wholly speculative article with its rather sensational headlines should have been published in The Times, when the whole problem of Rhodesia is known to be in a delicate state and when negotiations are in train. I wish to make it clear that the article is inaccurate and in no way based on official sources.
VISCOUNT DILHORNE: My Lords, I should like to thank the noble Lord for his reply and to say that I agree with the sentiments that he has expressed. I would also express the hope that his answer will not be tucked away in the middle of a column but get at least equal publicity to the original statement.

HIRE-PURCHASE BILL [H.L.]
Returned from the Commons, agreed to.
HIRE-PURCHASE (SCOTLAND) BILL [H.L.]
Returned from the Commons, agreed to.
SALMON AND FRESHWATER FISHERIES BILL [H.L.]
Returned from the Commons, agreed to.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (ATTENDANCE OF WITNESSES) BILL
Returned from the Commons, with the Amendments agreed to.

CONSOLIDATED FUND (APPROPRIATION) BILL
Order of the Day for the Second Reading read.
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, I beg to move that this Bill be now read a second time.
Moved, That the Bill be now read 2ª.—(Lord Shepherd.)
On Question, Bill read 2ª; Committee negatived.
Then, Standing Order No. 41 having been suspended (pursuant to the Resolution of July 22), Bill read 3ª, and passed.

MURDER (ABOLITION OF DEATH PENALTY) BILL
2.55 p.m.
Report of Amendments received (according to Order).
VISCOUNT DILHORNE VISCOUNT DILHORNE moved, before Clause 1, to insert the following new clause:
Release on licence of those sentenced for murder
".—(1) The Secretary of State may release on licence subject to compliance with such conditions, if any, as the Secretary of State may from time to time impose, a person serving a term of imprisonment for murder who has served five years imprisonment.
(2) The Secretary of State may at any time by order recall to prison a person released on licence under this section, but without prejudice to the power of the Secretary of State to release him on licence again; and where any person is so recalled his licence shall cease to have effect and he shall, if at large, be deemed to be unlawfully at large.
The noble and learned Viscount said: My Lords, I am not really sure that we ought to be discussing this Bill to-day as, according to to-day's The Times, it has already passed through your Lordships' House. I read that with interest at breakfast this morning. Your Lordships will remember that, during the Committee stage, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Parker of Wadding-ton, moved an Amendment the effect of which was to give a Judge discretion as to the sentence he passed on a conviction of murder. That Amendment was widely supported, and supported, be it noted, by many in favour of abolition of the death sentence. I am sure that the whole House was impressed by the arguments for the Amendment which were advanced
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by the noble and learned Lord. Everyone knows that a life sentence does not ordinarily mean a man spending the rest of his life in prison; and the general impression (which is, I think, supported by statements made by the Home Secretary which I have already quoted) is that ordinarily a life sentence means something of the order of nine years, unless the prisoner would on release be a danger to society.
In view of this belief the passing of a long determinate sentence is, I think, on some occasions likely to prove a more effective deterrent. Logically there is no reason, once capital punishment has been abolished, why a Judge's powers, when a man who has murdered is found to be of diminished responsibility, should differ from his powers when the murderer has not diminished responsibility. Logically there is no reason for Judges, when sentencing for murder, having different powers from those they have when sentencing for attempted murder. The difference between the two cases is simply that in one the victim has died and, in the other, has survived.
But two criticisms were advanced on the Amendment moved by the noble Lord and carried into the Bill. The first criticism this Amendment in my name and in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Parker of Waddington, is designed to meet. The second criticism is, in my belief, largely theoretical. The first criticism is really, I think, this: under our present system, if a life sentence is passed, a man can be let out on licence at any time; whereas if a determinate sentence is passed he has to serve two-thirds of it, unless the Royal Prerogative is exercised, before he can be released on licence. As I said on Second Reading, I have long thought that this is wrong; and it is something I should like to see changed. I should like to see the Home Secretary have much wider powers of releasing on licence in all cases—and not just in murder cases—where long sentences have been imposed. But this Bill deals only with convictions and sentences for murder; and it would not be right to seek to make this Bill a vehicle for such a general change, however desirable it may be—and I think it is very desirable indeed. This Amendment, therefore, applies only to where there has been a conviction for murder.
I should like to make this clear since it may not be readily apparent from reading the terms of the Amendment. The effect of it is to superimpose on the present system a power to release on licence any person sentenced to a term of imprisonment for murder after that person has served five years in prison. The two-thirds rule will still continue to apply where two-thirds of the sentence is less than five years, but no matter what the determinate sentence may be in excess of five years, this Amendment would give the Home Secretary power to release a man on licence after five years in prison.
The present position is, I think, very unsatisfactory. If a man is sentenced to 30 years' imprisonment, he cannot be released on licence until he has served 20 years and it may not be in the public interest that he should serve this length of time. I do not doubt that sometimes it is right and necessary to pass a long sentence or a very long sentence, to mark the gravity of an offence. I do not doubt, either, that such sentences, when imposed, have an immediate deterrent effect. Everyone knows that such a sentence will mean imprisonment for a long time, and I do not think that the deterrent effect of a long sentence is affected by the fact that if the prisoner behaves himself. he will be released on licence after he has served two-thirds of it. Nor do I believe that the deterrent effect of a long sentence would be materially affected if the power of the Home Secretary to release on licence were enlarged.
I must confess that I do not know why the line was drawn at two-thirds of the sentence imposed. It seems quite arbitrary, and as I have said, I believe that it could operate contrary to the public interest. May there not be cases where, if a man could be released earlier on licence, it would help in his reformation? Suppose a man is sentenced to thirty years' imprisonment and at the end of ten years the prison authorities, the Home Secretary. the Lord Chief Justice and the trial Judge think that he has been punished enough and is not likely to go wrong again. We have it on the authority of the Home Secretary that signs of breakdown become apparent after a man has been in prison for nine years or so. Is any useful purpose served by keeping such a man in prison for another
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ten years? It may be said that I have taken an extreme case, but in all long-sentence cases may there not come a moment before the expiry of two-thirds of the sentence when, if a man was released on licence, he would lead a decent, honest life, but, if that opportunity is not taken, and he remains in prison, all chances of reformation might be lost? I think that there should be a Parole Board to advise the Home Secretary in all these cases, but I gather that does not, at present, meet with the approval of the Home Office. I must confess that I cannot understand why. I should have thought that any Home Secretary would welcome advice from an impartial, authoritative body on such questions.
I hope that I have said enough to explain the object of the Amendment. I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Parker of Waddington, for putting his name to it. If we could get this Amendment inserted in the Bill, I do not think that it would be long before this principle was generally recognised in all cases where long sentences had been imposed. This Amendment meets one criticism of a change made in the Bill in Committee; it does not attempt to meet another criticism, which is that if a determinate sentence is passed, it may result in the release, on the expiry of the sentence, of a person who would be a danger to society and who might kill again.
My Lords, I believe that that criticism is largely, if not entirely, theoretical. I should be interested to know whether it has ever happened. Is there any known case of a man convicted of attempted murder who has attempted to murder or kill on his release, after he has served his sentence? Where a Judge had any doubts about a man's future conduct in this connection I should think it certain that he would pass a life sentence, and only in exceptional cases would he pass a determinate sentence. As I have said before, I think that behind this whole matter lies an important principle. It is the function of the judiciary to decide what sentence should be imposed, but they have no discretion in relation to capital murder. I think the reason is that Judges have always been opposed to any suggestion that the grave burden of deciding whether a man should die or live should be placed on them. I can

409
see no logical reason for fettering the powers of a Judge in a capital murder case, for limiting them when the conviction is one of murder, and giving him far less power than he would have if the conviction were one of attempted murder. I think that the change, making it essential that he should pass a life sentence, and leaving it entirely to the discretion of the Home Secretary as to what that means, is a change of importance and not entirely desirable.
My Lords, I do not think I should say any more in exposition of this Amendment, but I should like to add that since it was tabled there have been tabled on the Order Paper Amendments in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Parker of Waddington, one of which reverses an Amendment which the noble and learned Lord moved in Committee. No doubt we shall learn from the noble and learned Lord what has led him to take that course. It is, I think, unusual to move an Amendment during the Committee stage and then to seek to cancel an Amendment which was carried on a Division, but if the noble and learned Lord has, for reasons which no doubt he will tell the House, changed his mind, and his Amendment (which is Amendment No. 2 on the Marshalled List) is accepted, I recognise that this Amendment will be out of place. I am sorry that the noble and learned Lord has taken that course. I thought that the Amendment which he moved in Committee was a very good one, and it was supported by a majority in this House. I think that the Amendment to-day is not nearly so good.
Whatever may happen with regard to the second Amendment I am moving this Amendment because I hope that on this occasion I may get some answer from the noble Lord, Lord Stonham, to the question about extending the powers of licensing. Your Lordships will remember that I raised the point during my speech on Second Reading, and I think that I touched on it again during the Committee stage proceedings. The noble Lord has many other matters to deal with, but so far I have not had an answer, and if any excuse is needed for raising this matter again to-day, I crave that in aid. My Lords, I move this Amendment and, whatever else may follow from it, I hope that at least I shall hear something from the noble
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Lord, Lord Stonham, amounting to a recognition of the desirability of making some change on these lines in the present system of releasing on licence. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Before Clause 1, insert the said new clause.—(Viscount Dilhorne.)
3.9 p.m.
LORD STONHAM: My Lords, I think that the noble and learned Viscount needs no excuse at all for raising this very important matter of the extension of licensing for long-term prisoners, and I can only apologise if, having raised it on several earlier stages of the Bill, the noble and learned Viscount has not had a reply from me. I will do my best to answer him on this occasion if, perhaps, not wholly to satisfy him.
Your Lordships will recall that when last week I unsuccessfully attempted to persuade your Lordships not to insert an Amendment proposed by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Parker of Waddington, I cited what I regarded as three major objections to it. The first was that, with the abolition of the mandatory life sentence, murder, in the eyes of the public, would cease to be a crime apart. Secondly, if a murderer was sentenced to a term of years, the Home Secretary would be unable to hold him in prison after that term had expired, even though there was still a serious risk that after release the prisoner might commit another murder or serious crime. My third objection is one that the noble and learned Viscount has now dealt with, that a fixed term would prevent the Home Secretary releasing a man before it had expired even if the man was fit for release. The noble and learned Viscount has now made it clear that his intention by this Amendment is to remove that last disability. The Government, and I am sure noble Lords also, warmly welcome his constructive and helpful attitude in this matter. But, in my view, even if this Amendment were accepted, it would still leave the Bill, as it stands at present, open to the two remaining objection, which I regard as serious.
The noble and learned Viscount asked me if there was any one case of a man who had attempted murder, had later been released from prison, and had then committed a murder. I am sorry to say that, without notice, I cannot answer that question. But within my knowledge

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there are two cases within this century—and fortunately only two—of men who had murdered and were released and who then committed a second murder. And in one of these two cases, that might not have happened, if the Home Secretary had been able to exercise his powers.
VISCOUNT DILHORNE: My Lords, were not both those cases where men had been released by the Home Secretary on licence?
LORD STONHAM: Certainly these are the only circumstances under which a murderer could be released. Although it is not clear from the noble and learned Viscount's Amendment as worded, he has indicated that it means that he wants a prisoner to stay in prison for at least five years, as distinct from five years less remission. But I do not want to pursue the technicalities of the Amendment and discuss whether it can be said to have that meaning, because, as the noble and learned Viscount indicated, if Amendment No. 2 is accepted by your Lordships, there will be no necessity for the Amendment we are now discussing.
In introducing the Amendment, the noble and learned Viscount raised the much wider and important question of whether some system of discriminatory release on licence, similar to that which has been used with some success with murderers serving a life sentence, could be extended to prisoners serving long sentences for other offences. That question, of course, is outside the scope of the present Bill and would be a matter for further legislation. Your Lordships will be aware that before coming to the Home Office I took a particular interest in prisoners serving long sentences, especially those in preventive detention. The noble and learned Viscount will realise that I am sorely tempted to follow the lead he has given. All I can say to-day is that the Home Secretary is studying the question of new and more flexible forms of treatment for medium-term and long-term prisoners, and that, as a Minister, I personally have spent more time working on these plans than on any other subject. But since they have not yet reached their final form, I cannot reveal any details. I can, however, say that we warmly welcome the views of the noble and learned Viscount
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and if, as I hope, your Lordships support them, we shall not find ourselves far apart.
With regard to the other point raised by the noble and learned Viscount, I am in a somewhat similar difficulty. In dealing with the licensing of medium-term and long-term prisoners, he suggested that there should be a Parole Board to advise the Home Secretary about releases on licence in individual cases. Again thinking aloud, I would say that our past experience of nearly equivalent bodies does not encourage me to support that suggestion. Your Lordships will remember that a former Home Secretary, the right honourable Mr. Henry Brooke, abolished the preventive detention advisory boards in 1963. They used to recommend whether a preventive detainee should be given the hostel system and released after serving two-thirds instead of five-sixths of his sentence. These boards included prison visitors, senior probation officers and, in some cases, psychiatrists, as well as representatives of the Prison Commission. But, as was pointed out in the Report on preventive detention by the Advisory Council on the Treatment of Offenders, these boards and their decisions were a cause of bitterness, unrest and misunderstanding to prisoners, who found it difficult to understand or accept the boards' decisions and, in the judgment of their own Chairman, they were not successful in forming reliable opinions about the potentialities of individual prisoners.
It might also be thought that if legislative provisions for the licensing of medium-term and long-term prisoners were to be introduced, either at present or in the near future, it would be wise to keep them as simple as possible, until the Royal Commission on the Penal System has examined the whole complex of problems relating to sentencing and reported. If implemented, however, the noble and learned Viscount's suggestion and this Bill, in the form in which I hope finally to see it, will help towards the achievement of the penal system which the Government have in mind—namely, a system which will serve the public interest by awarding severe punishments when they are necessary, but which never loses sight of the possibility of the reclamation of offenders.
3.18 p.m.
LORD REA: My Lords, I think that the intention of this Amendment is extremely good, but there is one point which is not quite clear. Perhaps the noble and learned Viscount would explain it to us. It would seem from the first paragraph of the Amendment that anybody serving imprisonment for murder cannot possibly be released until four or five years have elapsed. What I have in mind is the occasional case which is sometimes called a "mercy killing" when perhaps a mother puts an end to the suffering of an imbecile or a painfully ill son. It would seem to some of us that in such a case, provided that the motive of mercy was proved, such a murderer should not serve even a five-year sentence, but might be released after six, or even four, months. I put this forward as a tentative suggestion, and I wonder whether the noble and learned Viscount can explain this to us.
LORD AIREDALE: My Lords, may I draw attention to what seems to me to be a drafting defect in the Amendment? Surely the last three words of subsection (1) should not be "five years imprisonment" but "five years of that term of imprisonment". Surely the correct meaning of this subsection, as now printed, would be that if a man had ever served five years' imprisonment, for any offence what ever, and was then sentenced to imprisonment for murder, he could be released on licence, could he not, by the Home Secretary on the day after he was sentenced, because he had in his life served a term of imprisonment of five years? I do not think that could possibly be what is intended, but that, I think, would be the result of adopting these words.
VISCOUNT DILHORNE: My Lords, I do not think it is the result of the clause as now drawn, reading the subsection as a whole; but I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Airedale, that it might be made clear beyond a doubt if the last part of the clause were altered as he suggests. This was drafted in the hope that it would make quite clear what one had in mind. One could not set out in this new clause exactly how it would apply in relation to the present system of licensing. But I did say in moving the Amendment that this clause was intended to enlarge the
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Home Secretary's powers, and would be superimposed on the present system; that is to say, if the man was sentenced to a term of imprisonment two-thirds of which was not in excess of five years, he could be let out under the present system when he had served two-thirds of that sentence. That would still happen. This provision in no way restricts the release on licence of persons sentenced to short terms of imprisonment, but it is intended to enlarge the power so that, no matter what sentence he has been given, once he has spent five years of that sentence in prison the Home Secretary should then have power to release on licence. I hope I have cleared up the point for the noble Lord.
LORD REA: My Lords, I am afraid it is not altogether clear to me. The noble and learned Viscount seems to assume, quite rightly, I think—it would usually happen—that in the case of a difficult mercy killing the Judge would take the humane view and probably inflict a very short sentence. But what I have in mind is where a sentence of ten or fifteen years is given, where there seems to be no possibility of the prisoner being released after five years.
VISCOUNT DILHORNE: My Lords, in the case the noble Lord has mentioned I do not think there would be any chance of the original sentence being anything like as long as that. If it was the sort of case that he has put forward, one would assume that it would be five years or less, in which case the ordinary two-thirds rule would apply.
LORD PARKER OF WADDINGTON: My Lords, may I take this opportunity of associating myself with all that the noble and learned Viscount, Lord Dilhorne, has said about the need for reviewing long sentences, whether they be for murder or for any other type of offence. I am sure that this is an urgent necessity. I should also like to support the noble Lord in the hope that this review may be done by means of a Parole Board, who would clearly have all the available information from prison officers, medical experts and the like. I should hope that the Government, knowing the feeling of so many of us, would invite the Royal Commission on Penal Reform to study this question and make an Interim Report so that legislation could be introduced.
3.24 p.m.
BARONESS WOOTTON OF ABINGER: My Lords, as the Member of your Lordships' House who introduced this Bill, I should like to say how much I appreciate, as many of my colleagues do, the large concessions which have been made by the noble and learned Viscount, Lord Dilhorne, in his present Amendment, in comparison with the Amendments that he moved in Committee and the attitude he took at earlier stages of the Bill. I find myself to-day in the extremely happy situation—and I might say a little unexpectedly happy situation—of being in agreement with at least three-quarters of what the noble and learned Viscount has said. I should like to assure him that both on what has been called the "hot air" side of this House, and, equally, what I understand has been called the "cold feet" side of this House, there is a strong sentiment in favour of some system of review of long-term determinate sentences. Maybe if the noble and learned Viscount, Lord Dilhorne, feels strongly about this, and if he is not satisfied with the measures which may come in due course from the Government Benches, he will avail himself of the opportunity to introduce a Private Member's Bill dealing with the topic.
But in view of the trend in your Lordships' House, I think that perhaps we ought to remind ourselves at this stage that this is not a Bill on sentencing policy; it is a Bill primarily to abolish the death penalty. While the noble and learned Viscount may have great sympathy with the rather radical changes in sentencing policy, particularly on the flexibility of determinate sentences that he has suggested, we must, I think, ask ourselves whether it is wise to make these radical changes through what is, after all, the most serious offence of all—namely, the offence of murder. Would it not be much better to reserve this topic, and to review it in the context of parole boards, determinate sentences and flexibility of sentences all together, and to have in mind at the present juncture only the question of the appropriate sentence for those who have committed the gravest crime of all?
I think, in view of later Amendments on the Marshalled List which stand in the name of the Lord Chief Justice, that the primary object of the Amendment which is now before your Lord
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ships' House might be achieved, though in a slightly different form, in the context of those Amendments. I wonder whether the noble and learned Viscount, Lord Dilhorne, might be willing to withhold his Amendment at this stage, in order that your Lordships may have an opportunity of possibly expressing your general sympathy with the concept of flexibility by your approval of the Amendments which appear later on the Marshalled List.
VISCOUNT DILHORNE: My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Wootton of Abinger, for what she has said, and for the fact that for once she finds herself so much in agreement with what I said. I hope that this will be repeated, and I shall be glad of the opportunity to give her the lead on future occasions. The only matter on which rather differ from her in was what she said is as to my having made concessions. I am not aware that I have conceded anything. In fact I put this forward in the course of my Second Reading speech. and I think I have been entirely consistent about it. Indeed, I urged this years before this Bill ever saw the light of day.
BARONESS WOOTTON OF ABINGER: My Lords, I should be sorry to be thought to be misinterpreting the noble and learned Viscount. I had in mind that a good deal of play was made by him and other noble Lords about a mythical figure of nine years earlier in the debates, and I notice that the figure of five years is in the Amendment. I had in mind that perhaps this was a concession.
VISCOUNT DILHORNE: I am glad that the noble Baroness has explained that. I was not particularly wedded to the figure of five years, but I thought that would give the Home Secretary ample power to act properly; and if I put in too high a figure, again it would suffer from the arbitrary line like such as exists with the two-thirds rule.
I am grateful to the House for the way in which it has received this proposal, and to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Parker of Waddington, for speaking in support of it. I am also grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Stonham, for what he said, in which he held out, if I understood his words correctly, real hope that a change may be made and that this could

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be made to apply throughout the whole field in the near future. I hope that it will not be delayed. I should be sorry (I do not know how long it will take the Royal Commission to report, but one knows that Royal Commissions take a considerable time to report) if this change had to be held back until the final Report of the Royal Commission. I hope that the noble Lord will be able to adopt the suggestion made by the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chief Justice, and see whether he can encourage the Royal Commission to make an Interim Report on this matter, in which event it may be possible to introduce some change on these lines before the Final Report is received.
LORD STONHAM: My Lords, may I be allowed to deal with this extremely important point? I made it clear in my speech that we thought, before adopting a very complex solution, that we should await the Report which we hope to receive from the Royal Commission on the whole subject of sentences. With regard to the point put to me by the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chief Justice, the position is that we expect the Report of the Royal Commission to deal with this subject. It is for the Royal Commission itself to order its business, but naturally we will see that this suggestion is put before it; and, indeed, a member of the Royal Commission, my noble friend Lady Wootton of Abinger, is immediately behind me. Finally, I should like to say, in reply to the noble and learned Viscount, Lord Dilhorne, that it is the Government's intention to go ahead in due course with the plans we have in mind.
VISCOUNT DILHORNE: My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord for that last statement. I am not quite sure how I interpret it, but I hope I interpret it aright as meaning that action will be taken pretty promptly. That being so, I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Wootton of Abinger, that it would be much more desirable to have a provision of this sort in general legislation, and not to seek out one category of offence for this change. If I had not got this pretty clear (not entirely clear) promise, I should have thought that perhaps there was something to be said for putting it in this Bill and making it certain that it was done in another Bill.
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I do not think it is necessary for me to deal with these criticisms of drafting. If it was necessary for me to do so, I would rebut these charges that it is badly drafted. In the light of what has been said, I would ask your Lordships' leave to withdraw this Amendment. One can see what will happen to the later Amendments, and then, if need be—I do not think it will be likely—we can put something of this sort down on Third Reading. I would ask leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 1:
Abolition of death penalty for murder
1.—(1) No person shall suffer death for murder, and a person convicted of murder shall, subject to subsection (4) below, be liable at the discretion of the court to imprisonment for life.
3.32 p.m.
LORD PARKER OF WADDINGTON LORD PARKER OF WADDINGTON moved, in subsection (1), to leave out "liable at the discretion of the Court" and insert "sentenced". The noble and learned Lord said: My Lords, if I may, I will deal with Amendment No. 3 together with this Amendment. Your Lordships will remember that at the Committee stage I introduced an Amendment which would enable the trial judge to give a sentence, not merely of life imprisonment but, in suitable cases, of a fixed determinate sentence, the idea being that in a suitable case a long sentence might be given which would act as a deterrent. That Amendment was carried in your Lordships' House, albeit by a small majority. I still think that it is right in principle and indeed, logical. But, as it was carried, I did not have the opportunity of moving an alternative Amendment which would, I think, meet many of the criticisms of those who were against the Amendment which was carried.
As my noble and learned friend Lord Stonham has said, there were really three criticisms, or fears. One was that murder was still a unique offence and should be marked by a unique penalty, in this case life imprisonment. Secondly, there was a fear, I think exaggerated, that judges might give what some people thought were inordinately long sentences, and that there is at the moment no machinery for review. Thirdly—and I think this was the point which largely influenced

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those who voted against the Amendment—that there might be cases in which the Home Secretary would have to release a prisoner who had served the determinate sentence, less his remission, even though he might feel that it was unsafe to do so. I now beg to move the alternative Amendment, which means restoring subsection (1) of Clause 1 as it was originally, and adding Amendment No. 3. I think that this will meet the criticisms raised.
Murder will still be the only offence which carries a fixed statutory sentence, the life sentence. The Home Secretary will continue to exercise his power to release on licence, and to detain if it is felt that a man is unsafe to be let loose. All that the judge can do is to recommend—not fix—a minimum period, and that, I think, leaves the Home Secretary completely unhampered. At the same time, it preserves the right, for which I have been striving so long, of the trial judge to mark the gravity of the offence, the revulsion of public feeling, in a proper case by giving what appears to be a very long sentence, which it is hoped will deter others and afford some protection to the police, in particular. This alternative Amendment is a compromise, and I venture to think that it is a compromise to which no reasonable person can object.
On February 26, 1962, I received a letter from my noble and learned friend the Lord Chancellor, then Mr. Gerald Gardiner, Q.C., in which, if I may quote, there is this passage:
"Suggested solution. I am wondering whether any reasonable person would object to the following proposal as a compromise to meet all views: namely, that if capital punishment for murder is abolished, the alternative should be (a) a sentence of imprisonment for life; (b) subject to the Home Secretary's power of release whenever he thinks it both right and safe to do so and, (c) but not before such term of years as the trial judge may fix."
Your Lordships will notice that the noble and learned Lord went a little further in saying that the trial judge should fix the minimum. I do not propose to suggest anything quite so drastic—merely that he should "recommend."
What argument can there be against this? I conceive only two possible arguments. The one may be that a prisoner who is not let out by the Home Secretary after he has served the minimum period recommended by the judge should feel
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in some way aggrieved. Why he should feel aggrieved I do not know—it is a minimum period. Anyhow, are we to throw away a reasonable compromise merely because we think that some prisoner, some day, somewhere, may, unjustifiably, feel that he is aggrieved? Secondly, there is the possible argument that the Home Office—or, rather, the right honourable gentleman the Home Secretary—might feel in some way inhibited by receiving a recommendation from the judge. I think it is quite clear that no Home Secretary would desist from acting on clear, definite information before him merely because a trial judge. perhaps ten years before, had marked the severity of the offence by giving a long minimum period. But if it causes the Executive to pause, to think again, and to look at the case again, then, I venture to think, so much the better. After all, it is not dissimilar to a restrictive order which a judge can impose in making a hospital order under the Mental Health Act. The Home Secretary can allow the patient out at any time, but the presence of the restrictive period means that the Executive must take a second look at it. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 1, line 7, leave out ("liable at the discretion of the Court") and insert ("sentenced").—(Lord Parker of Waddington.)
LORD STONHAM: My Lords, if these Amendments are accepted, as I hope they will be, Clause 1, with one important exception, will be restored to the condition in which it came to us on Second Reading. Her Majesty's Government and, I have no doubt, the sponsors of the Bill wish unreservedly to accept and welcome them. I acknowledge also with most grateful thanks the exceptional efforts of my noble and learned friend Lord Parker of Waddington and the high degree of co-operation which he and others have shown in making this happy solution possible. Personally, I was delighted to hear the Lord Chief Justice refer to me as his noble and learned friend. "Friend", I shall delightedly retain; "learned" I must, unfortunately, disclaim. I can only think that something of the aura of the Home Office has rubbed off on to my most unlearned person.
I entirely agree with my noble and learned friend that this is the right solution. There will still be a mandatory

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sentence, the life sentence, for murder. The Home Secretary, or the Secretary of State for Scotland, in the exercise of his primary duty to protect the public, will retain complete discretion to release a murderer after a short or long period, or not at all, but will at all stages be able to avail themselves of the advice of the Judiciary. In making a recommendation as to the minimum period for which a murderer should be detained, the Court will be expressing the view it has formed, both of the relative seriousness of the particular crime and of the degree of public danger inherent in the convicted person. As I understand it, the Committee could recommend anything from a very short sentence to a very long one. Recommendations, as the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chief Justice said, will make an impression on the public mind if they are for a long term, and I think that they will make an impression, too, on the type of criminal who has figured frequently in our discussions on this Bill.
Secretaries of State will not be bound by a recommendation but they will take very careful account of it from the start. They will also retain full discretion with regard to release, but under Clause 2 they will have the great advantage of pre-release consultation with the Lord Chief Justice or the Lord Justice General, and with the trial judge, if he is available. In my view, these consultations will be of particular value to the Secretaries of State in those cases where it seems to them, on the basis of the facts then known, that the public interest demands that a prisoner should not be released at the expiry of the recommended minimum, or alternatively that he should be released before the minimum period has expired. Prisoners sentenced to life imprisonment, if released, will, of course, always be subject to recall.
Finally, on behalf of the Government, and, I trust, with the explicit agreement of the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chief Justice, I must make it clear that the recommended minimum period will not necessarily mean the maximum period. There will certainly be understandable pressure on the Secretaries of State by the prisoner, his representatives, and others interested in his case to release him on the expiry of the recommended minimum period. Nothing will prevent pressure of that kind from arising, but on behalf of the Government I take
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this opportunity of declaring that when a person has been sentenced to life imprisonment for murder and the Court has recommended a minimum period which he should serve, there should be no automatic expectation that a prisoner will be released on the expiry of that minimum period.
My Lords, it would be unfortunate if, on this, as I regard it, happy occasion I were to end on that grim note. Therefore, I prefer to remind your Lordships of a comment in the Daily Telegraph leader on July 20, under the heading of "Lords and Gallows", in which we were reminded of Chesterton. It was suggested in that leader that we might have had
"a superlative chance for vindicating Chesterton's maxim that being born is a universal experience and that those who owe political power to nothing else are by definition more representative than those who earn it by submitting to an elaborate process of election."
The Daily Telegraph expressed the hope that we should not succumb to that temptation: and we did not.
I do not know whether it was because of that quotation, but certainly on Second Reading I ventured to suggest that we might agree the Bill without Division. On that occasion some people thought that was over-optimistic, but I hope no-one will think I am being over-optimistic now if I express the view that on Third Reading this Bill will not be opposed.
LORD MESTON: My Lords, I am unhappy in my mind about one question: what exactly is meant by "a very long sentence"? I hope I am not given a very long sentence for saying so, but I think that anything in excess of twenty years is nearly as terrifying as the horrible practice we are now abolishing.
VISCOUNT DILHORNE: My Lords, I will not seek to define "a very long sentence" but I am sure we can agree that anything over twenty years comes within that description.
I listened with the greatest interest to what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Parker of Waddington, said in moving this Amendment. Of course, he had this Amendment on the Order Paper in the Committee stage. He brought on two runners in the race then and was only prepared to run one, and, if I may say so, he put back the horse that he thought was the better of the two. A lot of us followed his lead. That horse ran very

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well. I think it got round the course the first time and might indeed have got round a second time in another place. But, however that may be, the noble and learned Lord has now obviously come to the conclusion that the second horse is the better of the two, and he has suggested that no reasonable person could possibly object to that second horse.
My Lords, I hope I am still a reasonable person. I must say I slightly prefer the first horse. I do not think there is all that much in it, but I believe that if a judge could pass a determinate sentence it would be likely to have a slightly more deterrent effect than just to say, "The minimum I think you will serve will be …"—whatever it may be. However, this is marginal and if the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chief Justice is content with this Amendment, which I think improves the Bill, if now he believes that this horse is a better runner than the one he backed, and we backed, following his lead last time, I certainly shall not oppose this Amendment. I am certain that this Amendment, if carried into the Bill, would make a desirable improvement, although I should be willing to support him if he still wanted to risk some money on the horse he backed earlier.
3.46 p.m.
BARONESS WOOTTON OF ABINGER: My Lords, I do not feel equal to maintaining the racing metaphors which have been started by the noble and learned Viscount Lord Dilhorne, but I sometimes think that your Lordships' House presents a model of democracy which might well be copied—shall I say?—in other places We now have the spectacle of the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chief Justice, having carried the Amendment of his first choice, forgoing the sweets of victory and substituting the Amendment of his second choice in order to meet some criticisms which were made on the part of those who, on an earlier occasion, voted against him. As one of those who so voted I should feel it very ungracious not to acknowledge that democratic gesture. I would assure your Lordships that this Amendment meets with our approval, though perhaps I still have a little hankering and preference for the Bill without it.
LORD MESTON: My Lords, may I have a straight answer to the question which I have asked? Can a sentence of more than twenty years be given? If so, it is wicked.
BARONESS WOOTTON OF ABINGER:
My Lords, I think the noble Lord is perhaps going back to the earlier Amendment. There is now no question of a determinate sentence. Under the present Amendment there will always be a life sentence and complete discretion.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, as an ordinary Member of your Lordships' House with a special interest in this subject, may I say, as the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chief Justice has said, that some two or three years ago I had some correspondence with him and the then Home Secretary to see whether I could achieve some accord between them as to what the consequence should be if capital punishment were abolished. I venture to hope in regard to these Amendments—and although, strictly speaking, only Amendment No. 2 is before your Lordships, No. 3 goes with it—that your Lordships will be able to accept them. Strictly speaking, even now there is nothing to prevent a judge from expressing an opinion of this kind when passing sentence. Judges have not done so in the past, and it would be proper that, if there is to be a change, it should be one embodied in a Statute. I should have thought that no one who is anxious to see capital punishment abolished, as I am, could find any reasonable cause to object to these Amendments, and I would venture to hope that my right honourable and honourable friends in another place might also give favourable consideration to them.
LORD PARKER OF WADDINGTON: My Lords, I have nothing to add. It is sometimes the second string that wins. and I hope that it does on this occasion.
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
LORD PARKER OF WADDINGTON: My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 3.
Amendment moved—
Page 1, line 7, at end insert—
("() On sentencing any person convicted of murder to imprisonment for life the Court may at the same time declare the period which it recommends to the Secretary of State as

425
the minimum period which in its view should elapse before the Secretary of State orders the release of that person on licence under Section 27 of the Prison Act 1952, or Section 21 of the Prisons (Scotland) Act 1952.")—(Lord Parker of Waddington.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
House adjourned during pleasure.
House resumed.

ROYAL COMMISSION
4.0 p.m.
The following Bills and Measure received the Royal Assent:

Appropriation,

Severn Bridge Tolls,

Finance,

Criminal Justice,

Lost Property (Scotland),

Justices of the Peace,

Solicitors (Scotland),

Highways (Amendment),

Solicitors,

Administration of Estates (Small Payments),

Control of Office and Industrial Development,

British Nationality,

Shops (Early Closing Days),

Gas,

Carriage of Goods by Road,

Overseas Development and Service,

Criminal Procedure (Scotland),

Housing (Amendment) (Scotland),

Local Government (Scotland) Act 1947 (Amendment),

Public Health (Notification of Births),

Statutory Orders (Special Procedure),

Firearms,

Backing of Warrants (Republic of Ireland),

Highlands and Islands Development (Scotland),

Merchant Shipping,

Trade Disputes,

Registration of Births, Deaths and Marriages (Scotland),

Monopolies and Mergers,

National Insurance,

National Insurance (Industrial Injuries),

Family Allowances,

426

National Health Service Contributions,

Statute Law Revision (Consequential Repeals),

Compulsory Purchase,

Nuclear Installations,

Ministerial Salaries Consolidation,

New Towns,

Gas (Borrowing Powers),

Judges' Remuneration,

Redundancy Payments,

Public Works Loans,

Commons Registration,

International Monetary Fund,

Hire-Purchase,

Hire-Purchase (Scotland),

Salmon and Freshwater Fisheries,

Criminal Procedure (Attendance of Witnesses),

Coatbridge Burgh Extension Order Confirmation,

Writers to the Signet Widows' Fund Order Confirmation,

Royal Four Towns Fishing Order Confirmation,

British Waterways Order Confirmation,

Welsh Office Provisional Order Confirmation (Llanelly),

Ministry of Housing and Local Government Provisional Order Confirmation (Melton Mowbray),

Ministry of Housing and Local Government Provisional Order Confirmation (Newton-le-Willows),

Ministry of Housing and Local Government Provisional Order Confirmation (Rotherham),

University of Leeds,

Greater London Council (General Powers),

British Railways,

Birmingham Corporation,

British Waterways,

Gulf Oil Refining,

Greater London Council (Money),

Aberdare Markets and Town Hall,

Flintshire County Council (Higher Ferry Saltney Footbridge),

Crude Oil Terminals (Humber),

Devon County Council,

Poole Corporation,

Saint Laurence, Catford,

Huddersfield Corporation,

Rochester Bridge,

Brighton Skydeck,

Conway Corporation,

Pembrokeshire County Council,

Rochdale Canal,

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Birkenhead Corporation (Mersey Tunnel Approaches),

City of London (Various Powers),

Mersey Tunnel (Liverpool/Wallasey) &c.,

London Transport,

Manchester Corporation.

Prayer Book (Miscellaneous Provisions) Measure.

House adjourned during pleasure.
House resumed.

RENT BILL
4.25 p.m.
Report of Amendments received (according to Order).
Clause 3:
Limit on contractual rent.
3.—
(3) Where no rent for the dwelling-house is registered under this Act (whether or not Part II of this Act is in operation in the area in which the dwelling-house is situated) the said limit shall, subject to any adjustment under section 4 of this Act, be—
(a) if not more than three years before the regulated tenancy began the dwelling-house was the subject of another regulated tenancy, the rent payable under that other tenancy (or, if there was more than one, the last of them) for the last rental period thereof;
LORD HASTINGS LORD HASTINGS moved, in subsection (3)(a), to leave out "three" and insert "two". The noble Lord said: My Lords, this Amendment is slightly different from the one I moved on the previous occasion, which was taken by the noble Lord, Lord Champion, and instead of inserting "one year", as I did on that occasion, I have inserted "two years". Noble Lords may remember that there was a difference of interpretation on this important clause, and with the permission of the House and of the noble Lord, Lord Champion, who has given it, I should like to read out part of a letter which he has sent to me, because I think it is useful to have the meaning of this clause cleared up once and for all.
The noble Lord wrote as follows:
"In Clause 3, then, we are dealing with rent payable whilst a tenancy agreement still governs the relationship of landlord and tenant, and what the clause does is to prescribe a limit on the rent that can be recovered; in other words, it establishes the rent freeze so far as that tenancy is concerned. The rent freeze will he 'thawed', of course, as soon as a fair rent is registered for a dwelling; there is no ques-
428
tion of the landlord having to wait three years before applying for a fair rent—he can do this as soon as Part I is brought into operation."
It will be seen, therefore, that the interpretation which I and the noble Lord, Lord Lloyd of Hampstead, set upon this clause is the correct one, and this does deal with the initial phase and the rent freeze. It is precisely because of the last sentence in that paragraph of the letter, that there is no question of the landlord's having to wait three years before applying for a fair rent—
"he can do this as soon as Part I is brought into operation"—
that I put down originally "one year" and now "two years" as the right period. Perhaps one year would be a little close, as the rent officers may not be operating much before that time in all areas, and therefore it seemed to me very reasonable that two years should be inserted instead. That is the purpose of this Amendment, and I hope the noble Lord will find it acceptable.
There was another interesting matter arising out of this clause, and, if I may, will read a little more of the letter from the noble Lord, Lord Champion. He wrote:
"This clause, of course, applies not only in the initial stages of the working of this legislation; it will apply, given the right conditions, at any time in the future. Suppose, for example, I want to let a house two years hence; in considering the rent I can charge, I must ask myself: is there a registered rent? … If there isn't, I next have to ask: has there been a regulated tenancy within the last three years—that is to say, a tenancy for which a rent could have been registered. but in fact wasn't? If there has been such a tenancy I cannot charge more than I charged in the case of that earlier tenancy."
What occurs to one immediately after that is that if the period of three years had elapsed, the landlord and tenant would apparently be free to agree upon a new rent. But if that were the case, and the tenant subsequently regretted his agreement and took the matter to the rent officer, and was successful in getting a lower rent registered than that agreed, would the tenant then be able to recover the excess rent which he had been paying, perhaps for as much as a year? It seemed to me that the answer depended on whether or not that tenancy was a statutory tenancy.
I was under the impression that any second tenancy is a statutory tenancy

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under Clause 5, and that therefore the tenant would be able to recover that excess rent. But apparently I am wrong and not all second tenancies are statutory tenancies. The enoble Lord, Lord Mitchison, to whom I wrote about this, was good enough to reply in the following terms:
"Firstly, you ask whether the second tenancy is a statutory tenancy, and the answer is No. A statutory tenancy, as I see it, comes into being only when a contractual tenancy (i.e., one created by a tenancy agreement between landlord and tenant) has been terminated by the landlord, and statute law (i.e., the Rent Acts) provides the legal basis for continued occupation of the dwelling by the former contractual tenant. By definition, if I agree to let my house afresh, the tenant and I will start off with a tenancy agreement and he will therefore be a contractual tenant, not a statutory one, though he will in all probability be a regulated contractual tenant."
I apologise for reading all that to your Lordships, but it makes absolutely clear the intent of this clause, which I think is extremely obscure, and it is very desirable that landlords and tenants should know what they are able to do by agreement and what the effects of that will be. Now that it can be read in the OFFICIAL REPORT there should be no doubt in the future, and I beg to move this Amendment which, for the reasons I stated in the beginning, I hope will prove acceptable.
Amendment moved—
Page 3, line 20, leave out ("three") and insert ("two").—(Lord Hastings.)
4.31 p.m.
LORD MITCHISON: My Lords, I had read Lord Champion's letter previously, but may I apologise to the noble Lord for having been a minute or two late and missing only, I hope, little more than the beginning of the letter? May I try putting this in my own way, not because I differ in any way from my noble friend Lord Champion, but because one prefers to do it in one's own fashion? If the Minister has not brought Part II of the Bill into operation in the relevant area, paragraph 3(b) is going to operate in a normal case where the tenancy begins before (as I call it) the rent freeze—that is, the period when that Part is not in operation—and if it is continued right through the rent freeze. That is not this case. But suppose that during the period of rent freeze a tenancy ends because, say, the tenant leaves the house and the landlord relets Then paragraph 3(a)
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comes into operation and the final rent payable for the first tenancy is the limit of the rent recoverable by the landlord under the second tenancy until a fair rent is fixed, and that will have to be done, if it is to be fixed otherwise than by agreement, under the Part II machinery when it comes into force. So far as this Amendment relates to that period at all, the only point to make clear, I think, is that everyone will be sadly disappointed and surprised if the period of freeze lasts for three years or anything like it.
Now suppose Part II has come into operation. The parties are bound to their contractual rent unless the tenant—or the landlord, for that matter—refers the agreement to the rent-fixing authorities and some other rent is fixed. But suppose the tenancy comes to an end and the landlord relets. The tenant is entitled to the protection of a maximum rent, if one is readily available, even though he has not yet referred his agreement to the rent officer. In these circumstances, paragraph (a) does this—and, as I see it, only this: it says that if the dwelling-house has been let in the last three years on a regulated tenancy and no rent is registered (we are now, of course, assuming Part II has come into operation) then the assumption is that the landlord was satisfied with the rent he was getting and the tenant was satisfied, and that that figure should be the limit of rent recoverable until a fair rent is registered. But once Part II is in operation, the landlord can at any time ask for a fair rent to be fixed. He is not bound for any period to the limit set by Clause 3.
In those circumstances, the only question is whether three years is a reasonable period to allow a fair rent fixed by the rent-fixing machinery to last; and whether, if the landlord tacitly accepts a rent as a fair rent, it is also a fair period. This is really a matter of judgment—how long, after a rent fixed either by the rent-fixing machinery or by express or tacit agreement, ought to be allowed before anyone reopens the bargain in these circumstances? Our conclusion has always been—and, agree, this is considerably a matter of judgment—that three years was right. The matter has been debated previously on an Amendment proposing one year, but we remain of the same opinion. I wonder whether the noble Lord would feel that, in a matter of this kind—

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and I repeat it is really a matter of judgment—it is not unreasonable to accept the experience one generally attributes to the Ministry of Housing or the people whom the Ministry of Housing no doubt consult in the matter, and that we should leave it at three years.
On Question, Amendment negatived.
Clause 11:
Power to convert existing controlled tenancies into regulated tenancies
11.—
(6) A notice of increase served under section 7 of this Act in respect of an existing controlled tenancy which by virtue of an order under this section is treated as a regulated tenancy shall only he valid if the rent specified in it does not exceed by more than fifteen per cent. of the controlled rent the rent payable for the rental period beginning twelve months before the notice takes effect, except so far as the increase relates to such part of the rent registered under this Act as may in pursuance of the order be distinguished in the register as attributable to the provision of additional or improved services or furniture or the carrying out of an improvement; and in ascertaining for the purposes of this subsection the amount of the rent payable for any rental period, any amount payable in respect of rates borne by the landlord or a superior landlord shall be disregarded.
4.37 p.m.
THE DUKE OF ATHOLL THE DUKE OF ATHOLL moved, in subsection (6), to leave out "fifteen per cent. of the controlled rent" and insert "the specified figure". The noble Duke said: My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 2 which stands in my name on the Order Paper; and, with your Lordships' permission, I should also like to speak to Amendment No. 3, as Amendment No. 2 is just a paving Amendment for Amendment No. 3, which contains the bones of the matter. On the Committee stage of this Bill I moved an Amendment which would have had the effect of allowing the controlled rent to rise by 7s. 6d. per week each year until it had reached the so-called fair rent. The noble Lord, Lord Hughes, who replied on behalf of the Government, opposed this for, as far as I can make out, three main reasons. The first was that it would hit hardest, percentage-wise, those who occupied the worst houses—the theory being that, on the whole, the worst houses have the lowest rent, which I think is a fair enough theory. Secondly, he did not like it because, he
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said, it might double, or even in some cases treble, some rents, and he felt that these increases would be much too steep. Thirdly, he did not like it because the only rent increase which had been permitted during the course of the last fifteen years or so was the 1957 one of 25 per cent., and this Amendment would enable rents to rise far faster than appears to have been envisaged over the last fifteen years.
I might, in parenthesis, say that if I speak largely about Scotland so far as these Amendments are concerned, it is not because I do not realise that they apply to England but because, on the whole, the rents in England are so much fairer and so much more realistic that my new figures would have only a very marginal effect so far as the average rents in England are concerned, either because the fair rent and the controlled rent are not all that much different or because the 15 per cent. increase, of which the Government approve, would in many cases come to more than six shillings, anyway.
I have tabled a new Amendment this time to try to get over the three difficulties which the noble Lord, Lord Hughes, pointed out on the Committee stage. May I take them in the reverse order to that in which he put them? The third of his difficulties—namely, that my 7s. 6d. would have allowed a far greater increase than had been envisaged at any time since the war—is not, I submit, really a difficulty. I have, incidentally, reduced the 7s. 6d. to 6s. for this Amendment, because, on thinking it over, I am inclined to agree that in some cases 7s. 6d. is probably a little high and 6s. would be a better figure. I think that nearly everyone agrees that controlled rents in Scotland, at any rate, have not kept pace with the fall in the value of money and have not even done so sufficiently to allow the landlords to do the essential repairs unless they are prepared to dip substantially into their own pockets.
After all, the average rent of controlled houses in Scotland has risen by only 33 per cent. since 1914, whereas a joiner's jobbing rate has gone up from 1s. 0½d. to 11s. 8d. an hour, which is a rise of approximately 1,125 per cent. And this is only an average rent; in some places the actual rents of houses are worse in

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money terms than they were in 1914. In other places, such as Lanarkshire, they are about equal to the 1914 figure. I am sure that noble Lords would agree that this makes it almost impossible for the landlord to do the essential repairs which we consider so desirable in these controlled houses.
The second of Lord Hughes's objections I have tried to meet by putting a limit of 50 per cent. on the amount by which the rent can be increased. Thus, if the weekly rent is less than 12s., the 6s. will not apply, but the landlord will be allowed to increase the weekly rent by only 50 per cent. of the present controlled rent. It is in regard to the first of the noble Lord's objections that our attitudes are fundamentally different. Many tenants pay such a small rent weekly (I gave some examples on Committee stage and I should be delighted to give further examples now if it would not weary your Lordships), that a 15 per cent. increase would amount to less than 1s. 6d. a week, which, in my opinion, is absolutely ridiculous.
I will give just one example to your Lordships: a house of three bedrooms, a kitchen and a bath room in Dundee is rented now at 9s. 4d. a week (incidentally, it was 6s. 8d. a week in 1914) and as the Bill now stands the rent would be increased by less than 1s. 5d. a week until the new fair rent was reached. I should like to point out in this connection that 6s. a week represents about one-and-a-quarter hours' work to even the lowest-paid worker in this country; but to many people in these heavily subsidised houses (and when I say "subsidised" I do not mean subsidised by the council, but subsidised by the private landlord) the 6s. represents just about three-quarters of an hour's work. This does not seem an unreasonable weekly increase.
The crux of this problem is the relation between the controlled rent and the gross annual value. In a survey conducted in 1963 by the Scottish Development Department and the National Federation of Property Owners in Scotland, the average rent of 56,740 controlled houses was £15 15s. 5d. per annum, and the gross annual value of the same houses averaged £27 16s. 7d. If the 15 per cent. increase remains the limit, it will take rover five years for the rent to reach the
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present gross annual value. During those five years there is bound to be another quinquennial revaluation, which will once again, in all probability, increase the gross annual value quite substantially; so it will probably be eight or even nine years before the rent gets anywhere near the gross annual value.
That is the average; in many cases the position is considerably worse. Thus, in Ayrshire, 998 controlled rents averaged £12 6s. 6d. per annum while the gross annual value of the same houses was £26 6s. 3d. The 15 per cent. increase allowed would represent £1 17s. per annum or 8½d. a week, and it would be the eighth year before the rent reached the present gross annual value. This is surely much too slow a rate of progress and will not enable the landlord to do the repairs and to put these houses in good order, which is the whole object of this Bill. Under my suggestions I think it would be in the third year that the rent would reach the gross annual value in that particular example; and as a general average it would reach it in the second year.
Lastly, I should like to read a short extract from the Daily Mail which appeared two days after we had the Committee stage of this Bill. It reads as follows:
"Rent rises of up to £1 3s. 0d. a week for council tenants in the London constituencies of two Government Ministers have led to a demand for the resignation of the local Labour Party chairmen. The tenants are in Bermond sey, Southwark and Camberwell, now merged in one Greater London Council borough."
This borough, I believe, has a Labour council. I shall leave out the next paragraph, which is not relevant. The article goes on:
"The rent scheme, due to be announced on Wednesday, will affect 16,000 people and the average rise will be 8s. 6d. a week,"—
which is considerably more than the rise I have suggested in my Amendment—
"but some families will get a rebate."
I feel very strongly about this Amendment. I think almost the only hope of improving the standard of the controlled houses in Scotland is that the landlords should be allowed to make a reasonable increase as soon as possible in their rents. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 8, line 27, leave out ("fifteen per cent. of the controlled rent") and insert ("the specified figure").—(The Duke of Atholl.)
LORD HAWKE: My Lords, I am not a landlord and I am only a quarter Scots. I support the concept in this Bill of a fair rent: but, pari passu with that, I think to make for fairness and common sense one should have a more or less uniform rate of advance from the present rent to the fair rent. As the Bill stands at the moment, as my noble friend pointed out, there is arithmetical nonsense in it. You cannot equate the present rents and the fair rents on the same scale or percentage where in some cases they will have to rise by a quarter or a half and in other cases fourfold or fivefold. I think the Government would be wise to accept some Amendment of this nature; because, as I say, their Bill in this respect is arithmetical nonsense without it.
4.48 p.m.
LORD MITCHISON: My Lords, I do not think the case could have been put more fairly than it was put by the noble Duke who moved the Amendment, but I am afraid that I still have to resist it; and I will tell him why. There fell from his lips, in the course of moving the Amendment, a sentence with which I entirely disagree. The object of this Bill is not to enable landlords who have not repaired houses to repair them now: it is to give security to tenants; and the rent arrangements really follow on that. One of these arrangements is that, in certain circumstances, the landlord can apply to have a fair rent fixed, instead of the controlled rent which used to exist under the 1957 Act. The feature of this Bill is the way it departs from the principle of every previous Rent Act, which has tried to control rents on the basis of some arithmetical arrangement dependent usually upon the rateable value. That was the case in the 1957 Act. I was interested to hear the noble Lord, Lord Hawke, still clinging to it, but I am not quite certain that he would have applied it to other points than the immediate one.
My Lords, the substantial point here is that if a fair rent is found to be higher than the present controlled rent, then a landlord will, in due course, be allowed to get his fair rent. That is the whole fabric and basis of the Bill. It was because of this arrangement towards substituting a fair rent for the previous controlled rent—not uniformly I agree, but as the basis of the matter—that the Bill
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was, very rightly, welcomed in this House as a courageous Bill; and one does not want to get away from that in any sense. The principal point is that it does not follow that in every case every landlord will get a higher rent. It depends on whether the original controlled rent was or was not unfair to him. If it was unfair, then to the extent that it was unfair, he will be allowed to increase it. In some cases, the increases may be quite considerable in relation to the rent itself, and the result, as the Bill was originally brought forward in another place, would have been that a tenant might have been compelled to pay a rent increased by a very large proportion of his former rent in one jump—if I may so put it. Subsection (6) of Clause 11 was introduced as an Amendment to meet that difficulty. It is intended to apply particularly to tenants who are rather badly off and, on the whole, are paying small rents.
I entirely accept from the noble Duke, the Duke of Atholl, that there are a great many low rents in Scotland. But low rents are not confined entirely to Scotland, and this clause would bite on rents which are a great deal higher than the ones which the noble Duke gave as an instance. If I have done by arithmetic properly, paragraph (a) applies to rents of 12s. and lower, and paragraph (b) applies to rents between 12s. and 40s. We are therefore getting out of the region of the minimal rents which seem to exist in some parts of Scotland, and which were found by the survey to which the noble Duke referred. The Amendments are therefore of fairly wide application, and the whole object is to enable landlords to get increases more quickly. The reason given is that the landlord could not otherwise afford to do his repairs, or, putting it on another basis, that he ought to be put into a position to do his repairs out of the rent as increased. That is another question. I do not think I can accept it in that form, and I want to look at the matter from the point of view of the tenant.
When we are dealing with these small rents, an increase of 6s. may mean an increase of very nearly 100 per cent.—as in some cases which were given—or certainly 75 per cent. I think that that is too much to put on people suddenly; the right way to do it is to take a proportion of the rent. I do not think that we should be doing the right thing

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if we made the tenant of a small house with a low rent bear such an increase.
THE DUKE OF ATHOLL: My Lords, my Amendment limits the increase to 50 per cent. The noble Lord, Lord Mitchison, has talked about 100 per cent. or 75 per cent. throughout the range.
LORD MITCHISON: I do not think that we are quite at one about this. I was talking of what would happen if there were no provision in the Bill at all. That was the reason why subsection (6) was introduced in another place. Without it we should have had increases of that order. It was thought that a 15 per cent. increase at a time was reasonable. One could go on doing sums about how long it would take a landlord to get his full increase, but against that we have to weigh the fact that the tenant has to pay. In the case of a smallish house with a low rent, it does not seem to be right to have an increase of the order contemplated in the noble Duke's Amendment. Like so much else in this Bill, it is a matter of judgment. I appreciate the point of view of the landlord but I do not think that it would weigh very much in my mind—perhaps I am too prejudiced—against the hardship that a jump of the order contemplated in the present Amendment would impose on a tenant who is paying a low rent and usually is living in a small house. On that one ground, therefore, I would resist the Amendment.
In another place an Amendment was made to meet the case of two sudden jumps, and I think that the case has been met. It was in the nature of a compromise, and to extend it beyond what has been given would mean an interference in respect of the small tenant. If he is a Scots tenant I see the point made by the noble Duke, but I can only tell the noble Duke that this clause will apply all over the country. It is a balance, and when making a balance of this kind we do perhaps come down on the side of the more human factor, which in this case is the hardship that might be caused to the tenant. I cannot think it right to allow a 50 per cent. increase at the bottom, and to lower the increase in the higher range. I would not say that I would do it the other way round—that would be almost perverse; but I think that the percentage range is the right one, and
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that an attempt to put a maximum figure, however qualified, is bound to impair the fairness of the arrangement. I hope that the noble Duke will accept that I, and I think I may speak for my honourable and right honourable friends also, have looked at this carefully and feel, on the grounds that I have tried to give, that we must stick to the percentage arrangement.
On question, Amendment negatived.
4.59 p.m.
LORD NEWTON LORD NEWTON moved, after Clause 14, to insert a new clause 10. The noble Lord said: My Lords, I should point out that there is a printing error in the first word of the proposed new clause which is printed as "When"; it should be, "Where", but I do not think that makes very much difference. This Amendment is yet another attempt to meet the case of the man who obtains a house with vacant possession intending to live in it when he retires. During the Committee stage we had quite a good argument on the merits of treating this sort of man exceptionally. It seemed to me that there was general agreement about the desirability of doing so if a good way to do it could be found. The noble Lord, Lord Mitchison, was sympathetic about the purpose, just as were Ministers in another place, and it seems to me that there was no divergence of opinion between the two sides of the House on the merits of the objection. It was merely a question of how it could be done without opening the door too wide.
That, in fact, was the objection made by the noble Lord, Lord Mitchison, to my noble friend Lord St. Helens, who moved a somewhat similar new clause during the Committee stage—namely that it went too wide. This Amendment is much narrower in two respects. The first is that my Amendment would bite only if the house is to be occupied by the owner or his widow. My noble friend's Amendment made it possible for the house to be occupied by members of the owner-occupier's family. The second is that the owner must apply to the court within five years of the date on which he rented the house, so there could be no question under this Amendment of turning out a tenant who had lived in a house for many years and had come to regard it as his own home.
This Amendment approaches the problem of the man about to retire in the same way as did my noble friend's Amendment. The noble Lord, Lord Mitchison, objected to this approach for various reasons. One was that to approach the problem in this way makes no mention either of retirement or of age. We fully accept the view that we cannot do it that way, and that if we tried to write retirement or age into the clause we should get into difficulty, and we have not attempted to do so. Another objection of the noble Lord was that the owner is already fully protected by the 1933 Act. We do not think that he is, and this is the reson why we keep putting down this Amendment.
The noble Lord's third objection is that the owner is given the absolute right to get his house back and this might result in hardship to the tenant. It is arguable how much hardship there would be to a tenant who agreed to live in a house, if he knew that within five years the landlord would require possession. It does not seem to me that this is a valid objection to this approach, if one accepts that it is right in principle to treat specially the man who requires a house for his retirement. I thought that there was no difference of opinion between the two sides of the House on this principle. Otherwise the noble Lord would not have said that he had tried hard to find a way to give effect to this principle. The fourth objection of the noble Lord, Lord Mitchison, was that this provision would cover cases which have nothing to do with retirement. I do not believe that my new clause, as it is drawn, would give rise to many non-retirement cases. I think that it is sufficiently narrow. In any event, this seems to me to be a risk which it is right to take in order to achieve the very desirable object of assisting those about to retire. I commend this new clause to your Lordships and hope that the noble Lord will also commend it. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
After Clause 14, to insert the following new clause:
Recovery of possession of dwelling-house for residence by owner or his widow
(".—(1) Where a person has purchased or became the owner of a dwelling-house with vacant possession and intends to occupy it within five years from the date of obtaining
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vacant possession and has let the dwelling-house on a regulated tenancy and the conditions mentioned in subsection (2) of this section are satisfied, then if—

(a) apart from the Rent Acts the landlord would he entitled to recover possession of the dwelling-house; and

(b) the court is satisfied that the dwelling-house is required as a residence for that person or his widow, and the said five years have not elapsed;

the court shall make an order for the possession of the dwelling-house, whether or not it would have power to do so under section 3 of the Act of 1933, and section 5(2) of the Act of 1920 shall not apply in relation to the order.
(2) The said conditions are—

(a) that not later than the commencement of the tenancy (or if the tenancy was created before the commencement of this Act, not later than six months after the commencement of this Act) the landlord has given notice in writing to the tenant that possession may be recovered under this section; and

(b) that the dwelling-house has not since the commencement of this Act been let by the owner-occupier on a regulated tenancy with respect to which the condition mentioned in paragraph (a) of this subsection was not satisfied.")—(Lord Newton.)

LORD MITCHISON: My Lords, the noble Lord is perfectly right in saying that both here and in another place we expressed sympathy with the man who wants to get a house to retire into and we sought to find a clause that would meet his case. The noble Lord's new clause differs in two points from the one moved by the noble Lord, Lord St. Helens. It brings in the widow and limits it to a period of five years out of occupation.
LORD NEWTON: My Lords, it does not bring in the widow; it excludes the family.
LORD MITCHISON: I stand corrected. I put it the wrong way round. It refers to the widow and does not bring in the family. Like the clause of the noble Lord, Lord St. Helens, this clause does not mention the word "retirement". When we consider the substance of the matter, there are still the points of the age at which people retire and what is retirement, and the position of, for instance, members of learned professions who have repeated "retirements". A clause in these comparatively wide terms will, as the noble Lord recognised, bring in a number of cases that are not retirement cases at all.
LORD NEWTON: My Lords, I really believe that, drawn as it is, this new clause would not bring in a very large number of non-retirement cases. If the noble Lord disagrees, would he give a few examples of the sort of cases that would arise?
LORD MITCHISON: I see no particular reason why it should not bring in a large number of cases, unless it is felt that the five-year provision makes all the difference. I doubt if it does. It would still allow a man, having bought a house with vacant possession, to let it for five years and resume possession for some purpose quite unconnected with retirement.
LORD NEWTON: My Lords, I do not want to be difficult, but I ask the noble Lord to apply his mind to this point. A large number of people will not do that unless they are going to retire.
LORD MITCHISON: I think that there are a substantial number who might, and that is as far as one can go in cases of this sort. Neither the noble Lord nor I can estimate a matter of this kind. We can only use our ordinary judgment. And I think that is what would happen. People would buy houses, intending not to occupy them until five years later, and their reason for resuming occupation might not be the intention to retire to that house. The trouble is that, under this new clause, whatever the reason for which they wish to resume occupation, if they have given the requisite notice, they will be entitled to do so. If there were no other provision for these people, I think I should feel differently about this, but there is. There is the ordinary provision of the 1933 Act, to which the noble Lord referred, subject to limitations about the date of purchase, which has been pushed on with every Rent Act that has been passed.
The difference between the two provisions is that, when you are proceeding under the 1933 Act—and all these matters could be dealt with under that Act—you have to consider what is reasonable, and you have to bear in mind the balance of hardship. I think that is right, because you would get cases (I cannot tell the noble Lord how many, and he cannot tell me) in which it might be a considerable hardship. A man who had gone into
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a house four years ahead, expecting that he would be turned out after such a period, might find that he had nowhere else to go.
I hope that we shall get out of the worst difficulties of London housing fairly soon, but there is the real possibility of hardship here to the four or five year tenant. It is not like letting accommodation for a holiday, or some short period; this is quite a substantial let. There must be people who will accept a let of this sort, with notice given, because at present they cannot get any other accommodation. It is true that one must hold them to their bargain. But there is this hardship in these cases, and under the 1933 Act you have to consider hardship, and hardship not only to the tenant but to the landlord, too.
I think, therefore, on balance—and this is a question of balance—that, in the long run, this is a better way of dealing with the matter than by putting in this additional remedy which will cover people other than people providing for their retirement. I feel that some noble Lord opposite will throw a book at me if I talk again about balance, judgment, and the rest of it, but you cannot avoid it in dealing with this type of Bill. I think the clause as now drawn is too wide. It might cover the people considering retirement; it might also cover others. It might help some cases, and it might be hard on others—and when I say "it might be hard on others", I am thinking particularly of the tenant's position in the matter. I am not saying this because of any prejudice in favour of the one or the other, but simply because of the feeling that the 1933 Act provides more suitable machinery in what I think is always bound to be a not altogether easy case.
I am sorry about this. Both I and my right honourable friend should have liked to find—I say this quite genuinely—a clause that would cover the case of "retirement people". But we gave it up. We looked at this clause hoping that it would provide an answer; but I do not think it does, and I must say to the House that I am afraid I cannot accept the Amendment.
LORD HASTINGS: My Lords, I think what is so disappointing about the noble Lord's reply is that it is so negative. For instance, he talks of the matter of

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judgment, and he thinks that it will let in a lot of people whom the Government do not want to benefit by this kind of clause. I think that is very bad judgment. In my view, it will let in remarkably few people. After all, most people who buy a house buy it for immediate occupation. Those who do not, buy it with a purpose, and usually that purpose is to retire to it. Would the noble Lord please take note that we have not even allowed for the wife to occupy such a house while her husband is still alive, but only in the event of his death? Surely this is a perfectly apt right; indeed, it is a moral duty for a man to provide for his widow. We only provide for that instance, and for no other; and that in itself makes it clear that it is a place for a person to retire to, or for his widow to retire to, but not to use while he is alive.
It seemed to us that a five-year period was reasonable. A man looks ahead to the day of his retirement at a certain age, whatever his profession may be, and he looks for and finds a house at a suitable moment and buys it for the purpose of I retiring to it. I think that is so in nine cases out of ten. But we do not tie ourselves to five years. I feel that if the noble Lord and the Government were willing, they could accept this proposal and put in three years, or even as little as two years. It would still be a step in the right direction. It would help the people who are going to retire, and diminish the extent of possible hardship, about which the noble Lord seems so anxious, on any temporary tenant in the house.
Certainly we have cut out any possibility of landlords who own a great many flats doing this with one after another of them and putting in various members of the family. I should have thought that this was strictly limited, and it seems to me to boil down to the simple question of whether the Government are seriously concerned about the position of the man who wishes to retire and make provision for his retirement by buying a house, or whether they are not. After listening to the noble Lord, both on the Committee stage and during this discussion, serious doubts enter my mind as to whether the Government are as seriously interested in this matter as they have professed to be. We have certainly shown ourselves strenuously endeavouring
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to solve this problem. I should have thought that, with a little modification of the time factor, the Government could well accept this Amendment without any fear of leaving the door open to many people to take unfair advantage of the position.
5.17 p.m.
LORD SILKIN: My Lords, I hope that my noble friend will be prepared to look at this Amendment again. He has gone some long way in the direction of accepting the principle. There are cases, as he admits, where a person buys a house without requiring to live in it at once, but foreseeing that within a certain period he will want to live in it, or that, if he happens to die, his widow will. He is limiting it only to cases of people who foresee retirement, but there are other cases equally meritorious. In my own practice, we have often had occasion to buy houses for people who are going abroad on a job, say, for three or five years, and who want to be quite certain that when they return at the end of their term of duty they will have a home to go to. That practice seems to me to be not unmeritorious, and there is nothing wrong in it or against public policy. That they should then be put in the position that they have to establish that their hardship is greater than the hardship of the person who has been in occupation seems to me to be manifestly unfair. They have bought the house for this express purpose, and at the end of their term of duty abroad, if they can satisfy the court that they genuinely want to live in the house and not just to be in a position to sell it at a profit, they ought to be able as a matter of right to live in that house.
It may be that the wording of the Amendment is not all that it should be, but I hope my noble friend will be prepared to look at it again, with a view to extending the principle, which he has already accepted, to those who have bought a house with the genuine intention of living in it at some future time.
I have mentioned a case of people who go to serve a term of duty abroad in their jobs. There are, also, of course, people in the Services. A man who knows that his duty in the Services will come to an end in three or four years' time may want to be assured of having a home to go to. He is not retiring. Such

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men are in their early forties, perhaps, men who are looking forward to carrying on activities in other fields. They ought to be considered, and they are entitled to sympathy just as the person in retirement. So I would ask my noble friend not to say "No" flat out, but to be prepared to look at it again at the last stage of the consideration of this Bill.
LORD WOLVERTON: My Lords, I should like to support this Amendment, as I supported the Amendment of the noble Lord, Lord St. Helens, on Committee stage. I feel it is important. I have seen a little of this in my experience of local government officials. A policeman may build a house and let it for two or three years, but he wants to feel certain that he has somewhere to go when he retires, and when he has to get out of the local authority house. There are teachers, living in school houses, and, as the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, said, people in the Services, going abroad, who want to make certain that when they return there is somewhere for them to live in their retirement from the Service. I cannot see why something should not be done for them. I feel strongly about this matter, and I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Mitchison, will look at it again. He said that he has sympathy with the Amendment, but that there is difficulty over the drafting. Surely, with the ingenuity of the Department and this House we could find some words which will help these people.
BARONESS BROOKE OF YSTRADFELLTE: My Lords, I want to raise a point of sympathy towards clergy widows. I make this special plea because I happen myself to be the daughter of a vicarage. I know full well that many of my father's colleagues who were in possession of a Church house used to feel very strongly that they wanted to leave security for their widows when they died. The clergy widow not only loses her husband, but she loses her home, and she has to leave her home within three months of her husband's death. If her husband has bought a cottage or a small home for her within a year or two of his death, it seems to me that, unless this clause is looked at again, it will prevent her from having a home to go to. This is the point I wish to make, and I hope that it will be looked at again with sympathy.
THE DUKE OF ATHOLL: My Lords, surely one snag of not accepting this Amendment would be that many dwellings which could house people satisfactorily for three or four years will be left empty—the people who own them knowing that in three or four years they will want possession for themselves.
LORD HAWKE: My Lords, at the last stage of the Bill I made the point about the clergy. The point about the clergy's widow has just been made. The noble Lord said that they sought to try to find an Amendment to meet this point. I think that his colleague, an eminent old Wykehamist, ought to be ashamed if the ingenuity of his upbringing cannot manage to produce a solution.
LORD MITCHISON: My Lords, if I may have the leave of the House to speak again, out of courtesy to noble Lords who have spoken since I last spoke, I would say that I doubt whether there is a question of principle here. I think we are all agreed that if we could provide for the case of a man who buys a house with a view to retiring shortly into it, we would do so. My right honourable friend certainly said it quite clearly in another place; I repeated it here, and I have repeated it again to-day. The trouble is that this clause does not do that; it does a good deal more. On balance—and I repeat that it is a question of balance—we must stay with the 1933 Act machinery. The noble Lord, Lord Hastings, did not mention the 1933 Act machinery, and it is there.
LORD NEWTON: It is not enough, as I said.
LORD MITCHISON: The noble Lord says that he thinks it is not enough. The reason why he thinks that is presumably because it takes account of hardship on both sides. That is the difference.
VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS: My Lords, not only does it do that, but you cannot take account of hardship at ail if the man bought the house after March 23, 1965.
LORD MITCHISON: That is because this is the date of the current Rent Act. I really think that this kind of privilege is a matter for some other Amendment, not for this one. In the vast majority of cases the balance of hardship will have to he considered, and what noble

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Lords are asking—and let us be quite clear about it—is that the hardship should be considered on one side, and not on the other. That does not appeal to me. I think it is right that in those circumstances we should rely on the 1933 Act. I agree there is always the case of the man who has bought a house quite recently and that comes, of course, in the application of the 1933 Act. On the whole, and on the best judgment I can take of it, I think this clause would go too far. We tried—tried desperately, I may say—to find something that would not go too far, and we could not find it.
May I, with great respect, point out one thing to my noble friend Lord Silkin? The burden of proof of hardship in these cases is not on the landlord; it is on the tenant, who has to show that an order for possession ought not to be made. That makes quite a considerable difference in the position. Broadly speaking, this question has cropped up in previous rent legislation. It has been very carefully considered, and carefully considered more than once, and Parliament has always thought it right to provide for both sides of the case to be taken into account and to strike a balance between the hardship on both sides.
LORD SILKIN: My Lords, would my noble friend consider this? This is not a case of two equal contestants for accommodation. This is a case of a person who buys a house deliberately with the intention of occupying it in a few years. It is his only purpose in buying it. He gives notice to the tenant. The tenant goes in with the full knowledge that in a certain number of years he will be required to give up possession. Where then does the question of relative hardship come in? This is a bargain which both parties enter into with their eyes open.
LORD MITCHISON: My Lords, with great respect (I do not want to conduct this argument at any great length), this is just the sort of case that the county court judge has to consider. If my noble friend is telling me that there can be no hardship on the tenant, I beg leave to disagree with him.
LORD SILKIN: I am not saying that.
LORD MITCHISON: I did not think my noble friend meant to. It is left,
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and has been left for years, to the judgment of the county court judge. I think that is the right way to do it—the burden being put on the tenant, if he wishes to resist an order for possession, to show that the greater hardship would be caused to him. As regards the question of the date, your Lordships will remember that this is a case of a house bought with vacant possession. In that case, I do not think noble Lords will find that the question of the date has anything whatever to do with it. I just mention that.
The question I have to consider, and the question the House has to consider, is not one of deep principle, concerning the form of the Amendment or anything of that sort. It is broadly the question of whether, in cases which are already dealt with by the 1933 Act—on consideration of the hardship involved to both sides—your Lordships should be (I hope you will allow me to say this) rather landlord-minded and eliminate the possibility of considering whether there is any hardship to the temporary tenant. If you ask me whether the tenant will usually succeed, I think the answer is that, in the cases your Lordships have been putting to me he will never succeed: he will always be turned out. I can think of cases—and I mentioned one or two when I was speaking—in which the tenant would suffer hardship if this clause were passed whereby the court would be precluded from considering any possible hardship on the tenant. It is a very old maxim that it is better to hear both sides, and that is what the 1933 Act provides in cases of this kind.
LORD NEWTON: I am exercising my right of reply. I must draw the noble Lord's attention to his own Clause 14 in the Bill, which deals with owner-occupied houses. There is nothing there to require the court to consider possible hardship to the tenant, and perhaps the noble Lord, Lord Mitchison, would like to consider this point.
LORD MITCHISON: I will gladly reply to that if the noble Lord wishes me to. Of course, I have noticed Clause 14, and it will cover a lot of cases. I am quite prepared to draw the distinction if the noble Lord wishes me to, but perhaps it is sufficient to consider this clause as it is.
LORD NEWTON: No, my Lords, because this is a basic principle as to whether or not powers of recovery of possession should be given without any requirement that the court should consider the possible hardship to the tenant; and the fact that Clause 14 is in the Bill appears to me completely to torpedo the argument of the noble Lord, Lord Mitchison. I think it must be quite obvious how strongly virtually every noble Lord in this Chamber this afternoon feels about the rightness of an Amendment of this kind. At any rate, there has not been a single speech in support of the noble Lord, Lord Mitchison, and I would support the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, in his suggestion that the noble Lord should think about this Amendment just once more. I know he has done it before, but I should like him to do it again.
Finally, may I try once again to get the noble Lord, Lord Mitchison, to see the inconsistency of maintaining, on the one hand, that the Government accept the principle of giving exceptional treatment to the man who is going to retire, if only they can do it, and at the same time complaining, when we try to do it, that it is unacceptable because it ignores the hardship to the tenant. As I said in moving the Amendment, if the Government accept the principle that it is desirable to treat exceptionally the man who is going to retire, then, ipso facto, they must accept that in the end they are giving him absolute power to recover possession, irrespective of the hardship to the tenant. So, with great respect, it seems to me that all the argument about the balance of hardship is completely irrelevant provided that the Government accept the principle that it is desirable, if possible, to help these people.
The only objection then left to my new clause is that it would cover cases other than retirement. I still believe that there would not be many other cases, but the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, argued persuasively that there might be equally deserving cases, such as that of the man who wants to go abroad and wants to buy a house beforehand in order that he may return and live in it. I am going to withdraw this Amendment now, because I do not feel we shall get any further, but I may have yet another shot at it on Third Reading, and I should be grateful if the
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noble Lord, Lord Mitchison, would accept the advice of his noble friend.
LORD MITCHISON: My Lords, if I may be allowed shortly to answer one point, the difference between Clause 14 and this proposed new clause is that Clause 14 deals with the owner-occupier—it is his home. The most that can be said in this case is not that the landlord has ever occupied the house but that he has bought it for some purpose or other in the future. This seems to me to make all the difference in a Bill which, after all, is founded on the right of people to stay in their homes at a fair rent. I do not expect for one moment that the noble Lord, Lord Newton, will agree with me. If he wishes I will certainly speak to my noble friend Lord Silkin, but with a view to persuading him rather than being persuaded myself.
LORD NEWTON: I really cannot accept that there is some basic distinction between a claim in respect of a house which you have already occupied and a house which you have bought in order that it may be your home in the future, but such difference as there is cannot be built up so that in the one instance it is right to ignore the hardship to the tenant and in the other instance it is wrong. However, I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 15 [Recovery of possession of dwelling-house held for occupation by minister of religion.]
LORD MITCHISON: My Lords, this is a drafting Amendment. It covers one particular case where something is done at the commencement of the tenancy. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 11, line 13, leave out ("before") and insert ("not later than").—(Lord Mitchison.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Clause 16:
Recovery of possession of dwelling-house held for occupation by a person employed in agriculture.
16.—(1) The following provisions of this section shall apply where a dwelling-house which was at any time occupied by a person under the terms of his employment as a person employed in agriculture has been let on a regulated tenancy to a person other than—

(a) a person who is or at any time was, so employed by the landlord; or

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(b) the widow of any such person as is mentioned in paragraph (a) of this subsection.

5.36 p.m.
LORD HASTINGS LORD HASTINGS moved, in subsection (1), to leave out all words after "tenancy". The noble Lord said: My Lords, this Amendment deals with the case where an agricultural landlord who lets a vacant agricultural cottage to somebody who is not his agricultural employee, and who never was, can get it back when he needs it for agricultural purposes. The effect of my Amendment would be to take out of the clause the reference to his own agricultural ex-employee or that man's widow, and I propose this for reasons of which I have informed the noble Lord, Lord Mitchison, in order to extract an answer to the question which I put three times on Committee stage to both noble Lords opposite without getting any reply, other than being asked to bring it up on another clause, when it did not arise.
What I am trying to find out is this. If the landlord lets a vacant agricultural cottage to a person who is, or at any time was, employed by him, or to that man's widow, can he and, if so, in what circumstances, reacquire possession of that cottage? It seems clear to me that, if that ex-employee or his widow stays in the cottage which was occupied by him during his employment, then the case would fall under Clause 32 because the cottage would be in the possession of the tenant who, under the former tenancy, occupied the premises under the terms of his employment. I presume that would come under Clause 32 and the courts would have to take into consideration all the matters set out in the clause. But in the more likely event of such tenants moving to another cottage because the one they were occupying was needed for an agricultural worker, possibly because of its more suitable location, then they would come outside the scope of Clause 32; but do they come within the scope of Clause 31? Clause 31 merely says that the court shall give an order for possession if the tenancy is not protected.
I have not been able to find out from looking at the Acts, which are rather involved, whether in this instance that would form a protected tenancy, because I imagine that in any circumstances they
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could not be evicted. I am trying to clarify this position both for the landlord and for this type of ex-farm employee or his widow, because if the landlord is not able to evict them on any grounds whatever, he may be rather reluctant to help them out by letting them into the cottage, although at the moment landlords normally do so under some verbal arrangement. I am anxious to get an answer to this problem so that both parties in such a case will know the best way to conduct themselves in the future.
LORD MITCHISON: My Lords, on the merits of the Amendment I will give a fairly short answer. This clause was introduced after discussion with both sides of the industry, and it was intended to hold a fair balance between them; and speaking in effect for the agricultural workers my noble friend Lord Hilton of Upton made it very clear at the Committee stage that, whilst he could not support the clause, he would not oppose it so long as the tenant, to whom the house is let or from whom the farmer can recover possession, has not previously been employed by the farmer, is not now employed by him or is not going to be employed by him in the future. That being—I do not say a compromise, because neither side agreed to it, but a fair balance sought, and I hope attained, between the two sides of the industry, it seems very inadvisable to upset it.
I am still, however, not quite certain what the noble Lord is asking. I do apologise to the noble Lord, Lord Hastings; one always feels that this is one's own fault. I can only say I am not the only person who finds it a little difficult to discover what he is really asking. He is not asking what would happen in the case of a farm worker or his widow staying on in the house after he ceases employment. He is asking about the case in which a farm worker goes into another cottage.
LORD HASTINGS: After he has finished the employment.
LORD MITCHISON: I can only say to that that he would fall under the ordinary provisions of the Bill. There would be a regulated tenancy in that case, as I understand it, and Clause 32 does not apply to regulated tenancies. When one turns to Clause 31, this is a case about the prohibition of eviction without the due

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process of the law. Is it that? Because here the occupier continues to reside in the premises. That cannot be the case of a man who has moved to new premises. I hope, therefore, I have answered the noble Lord's question. If I have not, will he make due allowance for human frailty and stupidity and tell me if I have not answered.
LORD HASTINGS: My Lords, may I have another try. Clause 31 seems to deal with tenancies which are described as not protected. Will these people whom we are talking about, who come into this vacant agricultural cottage after employment by the same landlord, have protected tenancies, or not? Because if they do, it seems to me that an order against them cannot be given in any circumstances. If they do not have protected tenancies, then of course it can. That is the point I am trying to have answered.
LORD MITCHISON: I think I answered it, with great respect to the noble Lord. They are protected tenants just as much as any other tenant is. If you look at Clause 31, it is quite true it starts off by talking about a dwelling which is "not a protected tenancy", but one of the conditions is that the occupier continues to reside in the premises, and that is not the case here. I can only assure the noble Lord I have tried to answer his question, and I think I have.
LORD HASTINGS: My Lords, I think the noble Lord has, but I am worried because it may mean that the farmer will not be so anxious to make these cottages available to these particular people.
LORD MITCHISON: If I may speak again, by leave of the House—I have no right otherwise—may I say that there is a good deal to be said on this clause by both sides, and I think it is better to treat it as what it really is: a clause intended to balance conflicting interests in the industry itself, and to leave it at that. May I make a suggestion to the noble Lord? If he would like to write to me again—he has written once—I will get the answer for him, and he can find some opportunity, by putting down a suitable Amendment, to make the answer public, if he would like the answer public.
LORD HASTINGS: I am grateful to the noble Lord. I think it is clear now. I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
5.45 p.m.
LORD HASTINGS LORD HASTINGS moved, after Clause 16, to insert the following new clause:
Recovery of possession of dwelling-house for person employed in agriculture
".—(1) The following provisions of this section shall apply where a dwelling-house which was at any time occupied by a person engaged or employed in agriculture as defined in subsections (a) and (b) of section 72 of the Local Government Act 1929 has been let on a regulated tenancy to a person not so engaged or employed.
(2) If—

(a) not later than the commencement of the tenancy (or, if tenancy was created before the commencement of this Act, not later than six months after the commencement of this Act) the tenant has been given notice in writing that possession may be recovered under this section; and

(b) apart from the Rent Acts the landlord would be entitled to recover possession of the dwelling-house; and

(c) the court is satisfied that the dwelling-house is required for occupation by a person engaged or employed or to he engaged or employed in agriculture as defined in subsection (1) of this section;

the court shall make an Order for the possession of the dwelling-house, whether or not it would have power to do so under section 3 of the Act of 1933, and section 5(2) of the Act of 1920 shall not apply in relation to the Order."
The noble Lord said: My Lords, this Amendment also deals with the position in the agricultural industry. On the previous occasion the Government moved in the one which we have just been discussing so that agricultural cottages would not be left vacant. That was really its purpose. I want this Amendment to be accepted, if possible, so that temporarily redundant farmhouses shall not be left vacant. I do not want to repeat what I said on Committee stage, but with amalgamations in farms, forming small units into large ones, farming companies, partnerships and so on, a number of farmhouses are becoming vacant and it is tempting to sell them off. I think it would he a pity if they were; they should be retained so that they can be used in the future if they are needed, as they may well be, in the agricultural industry.
In my definition of the people who, should be covered by this provision I

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have gone to the Local Government Act, 1929, Section 72, where it refers to people who are:
"(a) primarily engaged in, carrying on or directing agricultural operations on that land ".
That would, of course, be the farmer, whether he is an owner farmer or a tenant farmer; and
"(b) anyone who is employed in agricultural operations on that land in the service of the occupier thereof and is entitled whether as tenant or otherwise so to use the house only while so employed".
I put that in as well because it would cover not only the ordinary agricultural employee but the farm manager as well. It may be that these houses are suitable for farm managers or stewards or whatever they may be called, or in due course these farmhouses might be converted into agricultural cottages. I think it is desirable to keep these houses available, and if this Amendment could be accepted I think it would have that effect. It is not designed to give any peculiar advantage to agricultural landowners or farmers, but I think it is in the interests of the industry as a whole. It is for that reason that I have put it down. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
After Clause 16 insert the said new clause.—(Lord Hastings.)
LORD MITCHISON: My Lords, I agree with the noble Lord that this Amendment really covers a rather special kind of case. It is principally directed to owners of comparatively large estates, where they may have a redundant farmhouse on their hands. One has a good deal of sympathy with it. But this is a Bill on which the question of tied cottages, which is not the same question but round the corner from it, if I may put it that way, was the subject of a compromise, and I do not think, with great respect to the noble Lord, that we ought to introduce this new matter, particularly at this late stage. On the best information I can get, it is not a clause which would be likely to have any widespread effect, and I am not sure that in a way it is not more closely related to a Bill about agriculture than it is to this Bill. I quite see that it is a question of tenure and that it falls in that sense into a Rent Bill, but it really is a different question, and when we have had a good deal of difficulty settling the broad question of the tied house, between the
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two sides of industry, I feel that on balance we cannot accept this Amendment at this stage of the Bill. It is a special case; I see that it has its merits—I do not deny that. But on balance, I think it is better not to press it at this stage, and I hope that the noble Lord will feel the same way.
EARL FERRERS: My Lords, I am sorry to hear the noble Lord's remarks, after what he said at the outset of his speech, because I thought that he was going to accept this Amendment. Indeed, I think his right honourable friend in another place gave an undertaking that this particular point would be looked at. I think there is a strong argument that farmhouses, as such, should not be subjected to these particular provisions—for this reason. A farmer may quite easily amalgamate his farm with another, or he may move out of the farmhouse; and if the farmhouse is then let to somebody else not connected with the farm, it means that if the farmer should at any time wish to let that farm, or even to sell it, he will be at a grave disadvantage because the farmhouse which goes with the farm will be occupied by somebody else disconnected with it.
Here I must declare an interest. I did not know until about a week ago that I myself was in precisely this position. About two years ago I moved out of a farmhouse which is now occupied by somebody else. That is all quite satisfactory. But should the occasion arise—though I do not anticipate it will do so—when one wished to let the farm, or to sell it, it would be impossible for any farmer to take on the farm because there would be no house to go with it. Therefore, whilst a certain set of conditions arose which fully justified, and in many cases would justify, somebody being in the house although not connected with agriculture, if these provisions are kept I think that agriculture as a whole may be seriously inconvenienced, because the future letting of the farm in question will be made difficult.
LORD HASTINGS: My Lords, I am a little disappointed with what the noble Lord, Lord Mitchison, has said. As my noble friend behind me has just pointed out, this Amendment would do for farmhouses what we have just done under Clause 16 for farm cottages—that is, it would enable them to be let in between

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agricultural occupancies or tenancies. It seemed to me to be a useful provision. I rather wish the noble Lord would not keep talking about this carefully worked out balance between the farmer and farm worker, or the employer and employee, because in respect of this new clause that does not come into the picture. It is not upsetting the balance in anyway whatsoever.
I think this is a matter worthy of consideration, and perhaps the noble Lord would look at it again between now and Third Reading, and see his right honourable friend, who may feel a little differently about this. I did not put this forward in Committee in connection with Clause 16, because I did not want to confuse that clause with this, or to interfere with the rights of the agricultural employee who may have been put into a vacant cottage by his former employer. I think it is better taken separately, precisely because it does not interfere with or upset the balance worked out previously. But for the moment I will withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 20 [Tenancies ending before commencement of Act]:
5.55 p.m.
VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS moved, after subsection (1), to insert:
"() For the purposes of this section there shall be inserted in the First Schedule to the Act of 1933 as amended the following paragraph:—
'(cc) the landlord has, since the date of the order, contracted to sell or let the dwelling-house or has taken any other steps as a result of which he, or any person to whom he has contracted to sell or let the dwelling-house, would, in the opinion of the court, be seriously prejudiced if the landlord could not obtain possession.'"
The noble Viscount said: My Lords, it was at this point on the last stage of the Bill that Lord Mitchison's imagination, which I have always known to be extremely vivid, embarked upon cats getting out of the bag and highwaymen. It was on a point which was raised by my noble friend Lord Kinnoull, and I was certainly under the impression that, although there may have been something wrong with the drafting of my noble friend's Amendment, there was a point of substance in it. I know that we have many things to do to-day and I do not want
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to take too long. But I wonder whether, by going through it, I may ask the noble Lord to say whether I have the situation right.
There will be houses occupied by tenants, which until this Bill was introduced were not protected by the Rent Acts but which would come within the rateable value of this Bill. Supposing, before the Bill became law, the landlord had got an order from the court, in a perfectly proper way, that the tenant should go on the ground that his tenancy had run out, and he had insisted on staying on and was therefore a trespasser. I imagine that this is the sort of situation that we are dealing with under this transitional clause, Clause 20. I hope I am right so far. The court is given power to vary this order on the application of the tenant.
There are two things that really worry me about it, and I wonder whether the noble Lord can help. First of all, am I right in supposing that the court, in deciding whether it will rescind or vary the order, or indeed refuse to do either of those things, will have regard solely to the criteria which affect the power to give possession under the Rent Acts? In other words, will the court say, "We will rescind this because there is no alternative accommodation", or, if that does not arise, "because one or other of the provisions of Schedule 1, as amended, to the Act of 1933 has not been complied with"? I do not know whether or not this is so. Certainly, as the clause stands, the court does not appear to have any direction given to it upon what kind of criteria it is to exercise its jurisdiction. I think I am right in that as well so far.
For some reason, when we were discussing this matter before, the case was put forward where the landlord, having got the order for possession of the house, although it had not been executed, had re-let it to somebody else; and the person to whom he had re-let it—the new tenant, shall we call him?—was concerned whether or not the order to get the old tenant out should be rescinded or varied, because obviously he was interested in taking up the tenancy that he had arranged. The noble Lord said—and here he confirmed something which had been said in another place—that under Clause 20 the new tenant would not be able to be called as a witness. I think

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I have this right. Perhaps I had better check. I think that my noble friend Lord Kinnoull asked this specifically, and what my noble friend quoted was
"I confirm that the prospective tenant would not have the right of audience."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, Vol. 268 (No. 109), col. 1120, July 26, 1965.]
That was the point. He would not have a right of audience; he would not be a party, but he would be a witness. He could be called by the landlord as a witness, as I understand it.
The noble Lord objected to Lord Kinnoull's Amendment because it appeared to mix up the position of parties and witnesses. I accept that one does not want to do that, and I have attempted to put down a definition, first of all on the assumption that the criteria to be adopted by the courts are those in the 1933 Act—I do not know whether or not this is so, but I assume that it is—and secondly, because none of the criteria set out in the First Schedule to the 1933 Act would give the landlord any opportunity for calling the new tenant as a witness upon any ground which the court was entitled to consider.
Where can he possibly find any case in which the court would be interested tinder the First Schedule as to the tenant's position? It could not be because the rent has not been paid by the old tenant; that has nothing to do with it. It could not be because the old tenant has made a nuisance. It could not be because the tenant has given a notice to quit, because there has been no notice to quit; there has been an order for possession. It could not be a matter of sub-letting by the tenant. It could not be anything to do with licensed premises. It could not be anything to do with dwelling-houses being required by the landlord for somebody in his whole-time employment. And it could not be because he requires it as a dwelling-house for his own residence. Therefore, there are no conditions laid down in the Schedule to the Act whereby the landlord could possibly get the hardship of the new tenant before the court.
I have done my best to see that the landlord, in these special transitional circumstances, ought to have an extra category for the court to consider within the framework of the First Schedule to the 1933 Act—that he should have a
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specific reference, which this Amendment will give him, by which he can set out not only his own serious prejudice but also the serious prejudice of the new tenant. As I have tried to draft it, it would be by way of calling that new tenant as a witness, not by bringing him in as a party. I hope I have got over the main difficulty which the noble Lord saw. This is a transitional matter which will not last very long, but if we are really concerned with the comparisons of hardship as between landlords and tenants and other prospective tenants, I cannot understand why the noble Lord, representing the Party opposite, should wish to exclude consideration—for that is all it would be—of the position of the new tenant and refuse to allow that to be before the court. I think that that would be the effect of leaving the Bill without the Amendment I have proposed. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 14, line 34, at end insert the said subsection.—(Viscount Colville of Culross.)
LORD MITCHISON: I agree that this Amendment gets out of the confusion between parties and witnesses which clouded the previous discussion, but I do not think it is right. I should like to examine where we are at the moment. If one looks at Clause 20(1)(b) one sees we are dealing with a case where the order has been made and has not been executed. The court which is called upon to look at the matter again has to be of opinion that the order would not have been made if this Act had been in force. If it is so of opinion, it may, on the application of the person against whom it was made, either rescind it or vary it in such manner as the court thinks fit for the purpose of giving effect to this Act.
What is really happening here is something which in a sense can be called retrospecive legislation. We are trying to give to people in this halfway position the respective rights they would have had if the Act had been passed. Exactly the same thing has been done in previous Rent Acts. I have the references here, this time I hope the right ones. The references are as follows: the Rent Act 1915, the Rent Act 1920 and the Rent Act 1939. It can be put quite simply: it is to give the protection of the Acts to persons still in possession of the premises but

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whose tenancies have been brought to an end before the Act came into operation. It has been in a succession of Acts, and I do not think one ought to quarrel with the principle of it.
I turn from that to what is proposed here. I will put to the noble Lord just one case. Let us take a landlord who has tried to obtain vacant possession of dwelling-houses by seeking possession orders before the coming into operation of the Bill, and let us suppose he gets an order and then enters into contracts to sell or let the premises. He does this in order to get round the difficulties which he thinks may exist in the present Clause 20. I do not know that one is particularly concerned to help him over this. It is all very well to bring the prospective buyer in. He must have known perfectly well what was happening. At the moment the Protection from Eviction Act is in force, and therefore the occupier could not have been got out. Knowing that, and knowing also that it was introduced as a precursor of further legislation, he buys the house, reckoning on the landlord's ability to get possession. But has he really any right to reckon on the landlord's ability to get possession if the landlord's ability was not in the Bill until this House puts it there?
VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS: This, in fact, is not so; with great respect, the noble Lord has not read my Amendment. It is that he has contracted since the date of the order; I specifically made that clear. There is no question of somebody taking a gamble on buying the house and hoping that the landlord will get an order. This is where the order has been given, and the Amendment is perfectly specific on the point.
LORD MITCHISON: I may have used the wrong words and, if so, I will gladly apologise, but I thought that I made myself clear. What I am talking about is the case in the noble Lord's Amendment where an order for possession was obtained before the Act came into force and then there was a sale. That sale may have been made at any time. It is that sale which brings in the third party whose interests we are expected to look after. But at the time when that sale was made, the third party knew perfectly well that the landlord might not be able to get possession of the dwelling-house so as to pass it over to him. If you bring
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forward this kind of Amendment, it seems to me that you are simply playing into the hands of the landlords who have got possession orders before the Bill, but who could not have done anything about it but for Amendments of this kind, and who are therefore trying to get round the ordinary transitional provisions in Clause 20, which provisions seem to me to be quite sufficient.
This is the kind of thing that appeals to me as ordinary common sense as a point which the court has to take into consideration. It appeals to me as something which has always been done in other Rent Acts without Amendments of this kind. I do not see why we should be called on to vary the position in the interests of a third party who only became a third party after he must have known there was very considerable doubt whether the landlord could deliver the goods. I therefore see no sufficient reason for this Amendment, and in fact I see objections to it. I am not saying that these cases will necessarily be widespread. I am not one of those people who believe that all landlords or all tenants are good or are bad. I think that they are much like the rest of us, a mixture. But I consider there is no case for this. I do not believe there is any hardship against which anybody ought to be given special protection. I find no fault in the clause as it stands, and I find some justification for it in the fact that this is something whch has been done before and which has worked all right and not caused any trouble. Therefore, I am afraid I cannot accept the Amendment.
6.10 p.m.
LORD LLOYD OF HAMPSTEAD: My Lords, I respectfully agree with my noble friend that this Amendment seems to be quite unnecessary. The point is that the paragraph gives the court complete discretion by using the word "may". Therefore the court, in doing justice between the parties, can take into account any circumstances it likes. I see no reason whatsoever for introducing a complicated addition of this kind, which, so far as I can see, is intended only to try to fetter the discretion of the court. Even if this Amendment were introduced, this discretion would still remain under the Rent Acts, because it would still be open to the court to say whether or not it was reasonable to make an order. But quite apart from that, I should have thought

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that by saying that the court may rescind or vary, it is made quite clear in the normal form that the court has a discretion to take all the circumstances into account. I respectfully submit that there is no need to add anything at all.
VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS: My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Lloyd of Hampstead, if he is right, has, of course, completely answered my point. In fact, I did ask—though the noble Lord, Lord Mitchison, did not answer me: I entirely forgive him because I made a long speech—whether I was correct in my assumption that the only criteria the court could take into account were those in the Rent Acts—basically, those in the 1933 Act. The noble Lord, Lord Lloyd of Hampstead, says, No—
LORD MITCHISON: Does the noble Viscount want an answer? The answer is very simple. This paragraph means what it says; and that is what I said.
VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS: It seems to me that the noble Lord, Lord Lloyd of Hampstead, has said that it means one thing, and that it means that the court can take into account the position of the tenant. If that is so, I am delighted, and there is absolutely no necessity for my Amendment. The noble Lord, Lord Mitchison, seemed to think that the court cannot take this into account.
LORD MITCHISON: With respect, I did not say anything of the sort. Let us be clear about this. We are both lawyers, and this paragraph means what it says—Statutes sometimes do. Moreover, what it says is perfectly clear. It does not say anything about taking into account, or not taking into account, the position of anybody. It simply says what I spun out at some length when I was previously speaking, and the noble Viscount understands that.
VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS: I am very sorry, my Lords, but I do not understand this at all, and, with great respect, this is a matter of such importance that it must be cleared up in Parliament. In referring to the wording of Clause 20, the noble Lord, Lord Mitchison, read out subsection (1)(a):
"no order for the possession … shall be made which would not be made if this Act had come into force before the termination of the tenancy ".
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An order which could not have been made if the Rent Bill had come into force must inevitably bring in the criteria of the Rent Acts; otherwise, there is no point in referring to "this Act". What the Rent Bill does is to extend the powers to recover possession under the Rent Acts to certain types of houses which were not previously covered. I do not know whether the noble Lord, Lord Lloyd of Hampstead, agrees with my point of view. I hope that he does.
LORD LLOYD OF HAMPSTEAD: My Lords, by leave of the House, may I suggest that the noble Viscount is confusing two points: first, the original order that was made; and, secondly, the question of varying and rescinding it. It is true that the original order would presumably have been made on some ground allowed in the First Schedule to the 1933 Act, had this new Bill been in operation at the critical time. But when the matter now comes before the court, the court has to consider not the circumstances of the original order, but whether it ought to be varied or rescinded. In this respect—and it seems to me that the words are quite clear—the court is given complete discretion, because it is said that the court "may vary or rescind", which is the normal way of giving the court a discretion.
VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS: My Lords, what the noble Lord has said would have been perfectly correct if the word between paragraphs (a) and (b) had been "or" instead of "and". The court can deal with this Act only if, had this Act been in operation at the end of the tenancy, the order would not have been given. The only means by which the court can say whether or not the order would have been given is by reference to the criteria in the Rent Acts, because that is the whole point of the operation.
The noble Lord, Lord Mitchison, shakes his head, and it may be that the only way to clear this up is for me to have a conversation with him afterwards, as we do not want to waste a great deal of Parliamentary time on it. But here we have a situation (I am no expert on the Rent Acts and I am probably wrong) where the court cannot take account of the new tenant. The noble Lord, Lord Lloyd of Hampstead, says that it can. If it cart, I am perfectly content; if

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it cannot, I think it ought to be able to do so. Perhaps we need not take this matter any further to-night. We have another stage of the Bill, and I can put down another Amendment if I am not satisfied. If the noble Lord will be so good as to correspond with me on this subject, to see whether we can clear up the matter, then I shall be happy to withdraw the Amendment at this stage.
LORD MITCHISON: My Lords, that is an undertaking which I can easily and readily give. I will even talk with the noble Viscount or correspond with him, and do anything reasonable that he wishes me to do. My answer to some of his questions would have been that "it all depends". But I had better not give it now.
VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS: My Lords, I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 21 [Operation of Part II]:
LORD MITCHISON: My Lords, this is a paving Amendment for Amendment No. 12, and we may be able to discuss the two together. The object of the Amendments is simply to allow Part II of the Bill to be brought into operation as quickly as possible. The case it is intended to deal with is the case where in part of an area there is some difficulty in finding a suitable officer of some kind, probably a rent officer. This provision is intended to enable the rent regulation machinery to be set in motion in the rest of the area, without having to wait while one solves the difficult problem. This is purely a machinery Amendment. It introduces no question of principle. In Scotland it is unnecessary, because the machinery is more centralized and different. It is therefore confined only to England, and Wales. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 15, line 10, at end insert ("and, in England and Wales, for different parts of a registration area").—(Lord Mitchison.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Clause 22 [Registration areas and rent officers in England and Wales]:
LORD MITCHISON: My Lords, this Amendment, and the following Amendment, No. 11, are both consequential on
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the consolidation of the National Insurance Acts. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 16, line 7, leave out ("Acts 1946 to 1964") and insert ("Act 1965").—(Lord Mitchison.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
LORD MITCHISON: My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 11.
Amendment moved—
Page 16, line 8, leave out ("Acts 1946 to 1964") and insert ("Act 1965").—(Lord Mitchison.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
LORD MITCHISON: My Lords, this Amendment has been discussed already. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 6, line 14, at end insert—
("(7) If different days are appointed under section 21 of this Act for different parts of a registration area a scheme under this section—

(a) shall be a separate scheme for such a part if it is made to take effect before Part 11 of this Act has come into operation in all parts of the area; and

(b) may be such a separate scheme notwithstanding that it is made to take effect when the said Part II has come into operation in the whole of the area;

and the preceding provisions of this section shall have effect, in relation to a scheme made for part of a registration area, as if the references to the registration area were references to that part.").—(Lord Mitchison.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
6.20 p.m.
VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS moved, after Clause 27, to insert the following new clause:
Prohibition on making available to any person by valuation officer of returns to which s. 3 of Rating and Valuation (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1955 applies.
".—(1) If any valuation officer shall make available to any person, for the purposes of this Part of this Act, any returns to which section 3 of the Rating and Valuation (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1955 applies he shall be guilty of an offence.
(2)If any person who by virtue of the said section 3 has inspected or made extracts from any return to which that section applies shall make use, for the purposes of this Part of this Act, of any information so obtained he shall be guilty of an offence.
(3)A person guilty of an offence under this section shall be liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding ten pounds.
(4) In this section 'valuation officer' has the same meaning as in Part III of the Local Government Act 1948."
The noble Viscount said: My Lords, on the face of it, I confess that this Amendment looks immensely obscure, but it is in fact a matter that I asked about during the Committee stage of the Bill, and I do not think that, in the general discussion which took place at that time, any answer was given to me, so I thought I would raise the matter again. The noble Lord, Lord Champion—and I am afraid he has had his leg pulled to a certain degree about it ever since—says that he can always tell what the right rent is if he is sitting on a rent assessment committee. Moreover, I think he is on record as having said that he will know what the rents are in the town, or a particular part of the town, both controlled and uncontrolled.
Now, in any area there is one person who really does know what the rents of any rented property are, and he is the valuation officer. It is certainly true that he may make a remarkably wrong conclusion from the returns, if any, that he has, but, at any rate, he is given power under Section 58 of the Local Government Act 1948 to require people to send him returns which, among other things, in practice, set out the amount of rent that they pay and the terms of their tenancy. As I understand it, these forms are, normally speaking, confidential. They are for purposes of making the valuation list, and for that purpose only.
But, in 1955, in the Act to which I have referred, there was a small breach or crack in this confidentiality in that, first of all, provided that he gives adequate notice, a valuation officer, when dealing either with a proposal to change an assessment or with resisting somebody else's proposal, can himself make a reference to some of the returns that he has received under Section 58 of the 1948 Act. If he does so, then his opposite number—the person who is either making the proposal or resisting it—can also go and have a look at a specified number of similar returns, of his own choice, which the valuation officer has received. Of course, there is a certain protection given by Section 3 of the 1955 Act as to what can be done with these. It says that they can be used only as evidence in valuation proceedings. More
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over, there are certain items in these returns that cannot be used, even in those proceedings.
The case of Watney Mann, Limited v. Langley is reported in 1963(3) All England Reports, at page 967, and the reference that I should like to draw to your Lordships' attention is on page 982, where Mr. Justice Thompson refers to Parliament's intention in relaxing contidentality under Section 3. He said this:
"So far as concerns inferences as to what Parliament did intend or would have intended had the matter been raised"—
that is an indictment of your Lordships, I must say—
"I would say this. Section 3 of the Act of 1955 comes later in point of time than the provision with which I am concerned"—
which is, in fact, returns under Section 58—
"and enacts that returns made under that provision may be made available to be used in evidence in any valuation proceedings. It seems to me that to be usefully so used the contents of the return which Parliament must have had in mind were the intimate details relevant to valuation and not the mere factual details of the whereabouts of the hereditament or the name of its occupier. Section 3(4) does, as I have indicated, prohibit the use of the contents of returns in certain proceedings and the section provides also some protection against improper requests for the production of returns. I cannot, in the circumstances, infer that Parliament failed to recognise what kind of information would he contained in returns made under Section 58 of the Act of 1948, or that Parliament cannot have intended that particulars such as are asked for"
—in this particular case—
"should be able to be discovered by other persons in other rating proceedings, and that accordingly"—
I think one must construe it like this—
"I should hold that Parliament cannot have intended that particulars such as are sought by"
the section
"should be able to be included in a notice under Section 58".
Whether or not that particular case, and the questions asked there, were in point is neither here nor there. That case makes it perfectly clear that people mind very much about the confidentiality of their returns—and, indeed, about the use of information which is put in them. There is a loophole in this particular section whereby people can get hold of information in the returns. I should have thought it was quite clear that if rent

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assessment committees wish to have the best possible information, particularly to begin with, about the level of rents, the terms and so on, in the area with which they are dealing, the first person they would go to is the valuation officer.
I have put down this Amendment with one aim in mind, and one only. I do not believe that Parliament ought to sanction the use of returns made under Section 58, or any of the other sections mentioned in Section 3 of the 1955 Act, for the purposes of this Bill, because I think that, if we once start eroding the principle of the confidentiality of these returns, it will be increasingly difficult for valuation officers to get the information they require. It will be said that certain information which has been asked for, and which is very necessary to the valuation officer—and it becomes more and more difficult to obtain it—ought not to be given under these returns. It will be said: "Look what use may be made of them! They may go in front of rent assessment committees; they may be used by rent officers; all sorts of things may happen". The whole principle which is at the moment based on the confidentiality of these returns will be eroded and undermined. This is a matter of some importance. What I want to know is the answer to the simple question: will the rent assessment committees and rent officers be allowed to use these returns or not? If they will, I think that it is wrong, and that is why I have put this Amendment down. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
After Clause 27, insert the said new clause.—(Viscount Colville of Culross.)
6.28 p.m.
LORD MITCHISON: My Lords, the 1955 Act, so far as I can discover, does not in terms impose any obligation as to the confidentiality of these papers, and it depends on the general principles followed by the valuation officers for the Inland Revenue—civil servants—in these cases. Generally speaking, the Inland Revenue does not disclose information of this kind unless there is some reason for it. But the Amendment goes quite a long way beyond that. In fact there are in Section 3 quite elaborate provisions about the use of these returns in what amounts to open court proceedings. They can be used before the local valuation court, the Lands Tribunal, the
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Court of Appeal and all kinds of bodies, and, so used, of course, they become public property and anybody is entitled to take a note and to use that note. I think that, if the noble Viscount, in the light of that, looks at this Amendment, he may find that it goes a little too far.
Be that as it may, the real point, I think, is this. The information is obtained for an official purpose, and if it is used for some other purpose than that for which it is made available, then the provisions of the Official Secrets Act operate. That is the real safeguard. In trying to deal specially with this case, you would in fact be dealing with a particularly difficult matter because of the use of material in open court. There would be considerable difficulties if a person who had heard the valuation officer reciting a return in open court was allowed to refer to it but the poor valuation officer was not. I think it falls within the general principle that public servants getting information for a purpose should not disclose it for other purposes, and do not do so; and the criminal sanction lies in the rather fierce provisions of the Official Secrets Act. I thank the noble Viscount for having raised the point—and I mean that sincerely—but I think his Amendment is unnecessary, and perhaps he will withdraw it.
VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS: My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord. I have no doubt that the Amendment is unnecessary but I thought it better that the point should be cleared up. This is one aspect that I would raise. I do not know the Official Secrets Act as intimately as perhaps I ought, and I am not aware about the position of a person who has examined or made extracts from the returns under Section 3(5) of the 1933 Act, the second subsection of my Amendment.
LORD MITCHISON: It seems to me that this is the position. If someone, other than the valuation officer and someone other than the person who has made the return is, by Statute, empowered to make extracts from it, and if that is done for the purpose of proceedings before the valuation court of some other body, clearly he can refer to it there. I find no obligation of secrecy in a case of that sort. It may be somewhere in the Official Secrets Act. I am sure, however, that

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the noble Viscount would not expect me to know it off by heart, any more than he does.
VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS: My Lords, I am obliged to the noble Lord. It conjures up possibilities of very special sorts of proposals being made in order to get information. I hope that is as far-fetched as most of the noble Lord's objections to the Amendments from this side. With your Lordships permission, I beg leave to withdraw my Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
6.34 p.m.
VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS moved, after Clause 29, to insert the following new clause
Amendment of First Schedule to Act of 1933
". In paragraph (h) of the First Schedule to the Act of 1933 as amended the words '(not being a landlord who has become landlord by purchasing the dwelling-house or any interest therein after 7th November, 1956) shall cease to have effect."
The noble Viscount said: With your Lordships' permission, I should like to speak to this Amendment together with Amendment No. 21a. I think that will be the convenient course. I attach, and I think my noble friends do also, very considerable importance to getting an explanation about this matter. The situation is this. Until the Rent Act 1957, the ground which is now specified in paragraph (h), as amended, in the First Schedule to the 1933 Act, allowed the court to consider the respective hardships of a landlord and a tenant in circumstances where the landlord wished to recover possession of the house in order to live in it himself or to have any son or daughter over eighteen or his father or mother living in it. There was then put in, I think for the first time, a time-limit which, in fact, related to November 7, 1956. I imagine that was the date when the Bill was first printed in another place. If the landlord acquired the house after that date, the ground given in paragraph (h), as I understand it, is not open to him at all.
I have looked through the OFFICIAL REPORTS of both Houses. I am bound to say that I have not looked at the Standing Committee Reports of the other place on this particular Bill. There were
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a great many polemics; but I do not think anybody explained the point of putting in this date. The date, as the noble Lord, Lord Mitchison, said earlier, has now been changed, and changed to March 23 of this year, which was the date when this Bill was first printed in another place. Therefore any landlord who wishes to recover possession of a house which he bought from the 24th March, 1965, onwards will not be able to avail himself of the provision of paragraph (h) of the First Schedule to the 1933 Act. I hope I am right. That is the way I read it.
This will become increasingly important. At the moment it may not seem very significant, because we are not very far from that date; but in parts of this country regulated rents and rent control are likely to continue for some time, as one admits if one is realistic. The further one goes away from the 23rd March, 1965, the more people there will be who will have bought houses and left them and then will want to come back and live in them themselves. This is of cardinal importance when dealing with a person who wants to buy a house to go into on his retirement. It is all very well for the noble Lord, Lord Mitchison, to say that it is perfectly all right for these people, because what will happen if the Amendments moved from this side on the retirement points are not accepted is that the man can go to the court and get it dealt with on the balance of hardship as between himself and the tenant. But this is not so. It is untrue. He can do that only if he bought his house before the 23rd March, 1965.
Suppose I buy a house in order to retire to—although I hasten to say that, being a member of the profession to which the noble Lord has referred, I do not intend doing so, either now or frequently—and I let it for five years, and then at the end of that time I want it back in order to live in it. I shall not have available to me the provision in paragraph (h) of the First Schedule of the Act, and the only thing I shall be able to do and the only way in which I shall be able to get possession of that house is by providing alternative accommodation. There will be no question of weighing up the two hardships as of myself and of the tenant in the house. It will not be open to me to plead it.
I have never understood why this date was in the Bill; it serves no function in relation to the matter of comparative hardship. I do not believe that Parliament has ever been told why it was put in. I do not believe that Parliament has ever been told why the date has been changed this time, or what is the principle which underlies it. I believe that if the noble Lord comes to the end of the proceedings on this Bill without accepting anything on the retirement point that we have made from this side and that we have discussed so frequently, if he comes to the end of the Bill and does not accept this Amendment and my consequential one, then all his promises of protection for the people who are going to buy a house for their retirement, are going to be absolutely valueless, providing they have bought the house after March 23, 1965. People ought to be perfectly clear what the situation is. Unless I have misinterpreted this Bill the question of comparative hardship will not arise; people will not be able to get their retirement houses back again. I think that this date ought to be struck out and left out of all future legislation, and it certainly ought to be left out of this Bill. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
After Clause 29, insert the said new clause.—(Viscount Colville of Culross.)
LORD MITCHISON: I hope I can help the noble Viscount on one point. The reason why this particular provision was not discussed in the 1957 Rent Act was its almost hoary antiquity. Obviously, a provision referring to November 7, 1956, did not occur in the 1933 Act. I think even before that, if my memory serves me aright, some provision had been made in rent legislation, although I am not sure about that. The point is that it has been so for 32 years or thereabouts. First it was in the 1933 Act and then in the 1957 Act. The reason for it—I am charging my memory—was discussed at some length when it was first introduced. Certainly, there is hardly any provision in the Rent Act which I have heard more often discussed. It is quite a deliberate provision. Let us see what it is exactly. It does not apply to a person who buys with vacant possession. I was not sure whether the noble Viscount had that in mind when we were talking about a
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previous Amendment. It does not apply in the case where a landlord grants the tenancy; because then he does not acquire it by purchase. It applies only in the case where the house is purchased subject to an existing tenancy, as I understand it, by the landlord after a certain date. That date has always been the date of the introduction of the preceding Rent Bill.
The reasons for it are, I think, that if a man buys a tenanted house knowing that the tenant has the protection of the rent legislation—whether it is the legislation in existence at the time of legislation introduced into Parliament—and goes into the transaction with his eyes open, he cannot expect to have any special ground for getting possession from the tenant. I can assure the noble Viscount that this is no new thing, and I am of opinion that we do not want to encourage the provision of special protection for landlords who buy knowing what the legislation is and knowing that they will not get protection because of it. I do not see any reason for altering the present arrangement which has served well for many years. I do not think it ought to be amended now, and therefore I cannot accept the Amendment.
VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS: My Lords, again I am much obliged to the noble Lord. I am bound to confess that he has the edge on me if he remembers the discussions on the 1933 rent legislation—
LORD MITCHISON: No, it is the discussions on the 1957 Bill that I remember.
VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS —because I was certainly not a Member of either House of Parliament at that time. I am very interested that he should now tell us that this does not apply to someone who buys with vacant possession. If that is so, a great deal of what I have said was, I fully admit incorrect.
LORD LLOYD OF HAMPSTEAD: My Lords, if the noble Viscount will forgive my intervention, may I say that if he will look at the case of Epps v. Rothnie, which was decided in the Court of Appeal in 1945, he will discover that the court decided that if you buy premises which are unoccupied and subsequently let, this

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limitation has no operation. It only protects a sitting tenant. Therefore, I suggest that this qualification has in it none of the peril that the noble Viscount has suggested.
VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS: My Lords, it is the greatest pity that the new Rules of this House do not allow me to refer to the noble Lord, Lord Lloyd of Hampstead, as the "noble and learned Lord". His interventions are most helpful, and I am grateful to him. I should like to look at the case he mentioned. I think that the situation is probably not as I feared, and I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
6.47 p.m.
LORD MITCHISON LORD MITCHISON moved, after Clause 30, to insert the following new clause:
Restriction on re-entry without due process of law
". Where any premises are let as a dwelling on a lease which is subject to a right of re-entry or forfeiture it shall not be lawful to enforce that right otherwise than by proceedings in the court while any person is lawfully residing in the premises or part of them."
The noble Lord said: My Lords, this is a proposed new clause, and I think that I had better read out to the House the first sentence of what I have been told about it. This new clause deals with a small and technical lacuna in Clauses 30 and 31. I am perfectly prepared to explain the small but technical lacuna, but it is very dull, and I wonder whether your Lordships will accept that from me. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
After Clause 30, insert the said new clause.—(Lord Mitchison.)
LORD HASTINGS: My Lords, I think that we on this side would have no difficulty in accepting what the noble Lord, Lord Mitchison, has said. We understand that there is—may I say?—a gap in the legislation. We agree with the Amendment.
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Clause 31:
Prohibition of eviction without due process of law
31.—
(2) For the purposes of this Part of this Act a person who, under the terms of his employment, had exclusive possession of any premises otherwise than as a tenant shall be deemed to have been a tenant and the expressions "let" and "tenancy" shall be construed accordingly.
VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS moved, in subsection (2), to leave out "exclusive possession of any premises" and to insert "exclusive occupation of any premises as a residence". The noble Viscount said: My Lords, it is very unwise for the noble Lord, Lord Mitchison, to ask me to see whether I can improve on the drafting of the Bill. I think it would probably be equally unwise for me to try to accept his invitation. Nevertheless, I think it was agreed at the last stage of our discussions on the Bill that the terms of what is now Clause 31(2) are capable of construction in a way which is not intended.
I have put down two alternative versions, in Amendments Nos. 16 and 17, to see which, if either, the noble Lord would like. I believe that both have the merit of making it perfectly clear with what this subsection is intended to deal. On Committee stage, the noble Lord said that it was intended to give the protection of Part II to a person who was outwardly indistinguishable from a tenant but, because of some technicality, was not a tenant. I entirely appreciate that, and it is in that spirit that I have attempted to improve this subsection. It is a very bold thing to try.
Exclusive possession—the OFFICIAL REPORT put it as "exclusive occupation"—is not a common expression in law. The only case I can find relates to a man who bought a piece of land with a railway tunnel underneath it and electric wires running across it, and he did not know whether exclusive possession went down to the middle of the earth and included the tunnel, and up into the sky to include the electric wires. But the term "exclusive occupation" is extremely well known under rates legislation and was also widely dealt with under the old Parliamentary franchise legislation of the third quarter of the last century. If anything is a hoary old chestnut, exclusive occupation is that. What we are after is the person whose house it is—not the lodger, or the nanny, who has just the use of a bedroom. Therefore, I hope that the noble Lord can go with me and

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use the term "exclusive occupation" instead of "exclusive possession".
Then we come to the premises. I do not wish to interrupt the noble Lords in their conversation, but if I am going to explain this at all the noble Lord must listen to me. I have taken the words out of an adjacent part of the Bill. Clause 30(5) talks of occupying "premises as a residence". I do not think this gets us into any difficulty, as does the technical use of a "dwelling-house" in the Rent Acts. It seems to me that there is an occupation when the phrase is used with the words "as a residence". Amendment No. 17 uses the words "separate dwelling", which is part of the definition of dwelling-house "for the purposes of the Rent Acts, but not the dwelling-house itself, to which the noble Lord objected last time. Therefore possibly there is a value in the distinction for the purposes of trying to explain what we are getting at. I do not have any particular confidence in my own power to put the matter right, but I have suggested these Amendments and perhaps the noble Lord can say either that they are acceptable or whether he has been able to do better himself.
6.54 p.m.
LORD MITCHISON: My Lords, I do not know if the noble Viscount does any wet fly fishing, but I have always found that putting two flies on a cast works tolerably well when the water is sufficiently murky. I think that the water here is rather murky, and though I appeciate the two flies offered to me, I am afraid that I cannot rise to either of them. The short answer would be to say that this is really a matter at which the Parliamentary draftsmen are better than any of us—and leave it at that. But as I said something of the same character last time, I had better try to say a little more now.
The reason why the term "exclusive occupation" in the first Amendment is disliked is that it is the normal sort of phrase for a tenancy, and the case we are trying to cover is not a tenancy, though it is something rather like a tenancy. The matter sought to be dealt with is the question of possession, and for that reason the draftsmen prefer "exclusive possession" to "exclusive occupation". That goes for the second Amendment, too, but with this firmer
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point: that the words "as a separate dwelling" bring in all the difficulties of the Rent Acts—the sharing of kitchens and the rest of it. There is no real reason for them here, and if we put them in we might find ourselves doing something we do not intend to do. If I am too curt and abrupt I will gladly give the noble Viscount more information afterwards.
VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS: I think the noble Lord could give me it briefly now. He has dealt with "exclusive possession" and "exclusive occupation", but he did not deal with "premises as a residence". Could he say why he does not like that?
LORD MITCHISON: I took the clause as a whole and produced my objection to it. I hope that that will satisfy the noble Viscount.
VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS: I do not want to be tiresome about this matter. I appreciate that this is a matter for the Parliamentary draftsmen. But it was really the word "premises" that I was after, in the first place, because this word produces the crucial distinction between the case where you have a house as a person's home and the case where you simply have a bedroom and share the rest of the house. T wonder why the noble Lord does not like "premises as a residence".
LORD LLOYD OF HAMPSTEAD: My Lords, may I add a word that may conceivably help? As I understand it, Clause 31(2) merely extends the meaning of a tenancy. It does not deal with the question of premises. This is brought in by the words in subsection (1),
"where any premises have been let as a dwelling".
Therefore the words "as a dwelling" are in the clause in any case, and I venture to think that it is not necessary to add anything, because these words govern the whole clause. Subsection (2) deals only with the extended meaning of the notion of tenancy.
VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS: The noble Lord appears not to be going to answer my question.
LORD MITCHISON: I should have thought that one sound objection to an Amendment was sufficient. If

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there is an objection on one ground it does not very much matter whether there are objections also on other grounds. If I have the noble Viscount's point aright, he is talking about the words "as a residence" in the Amendment. The words in subsection (1) "as a dwelling" carry on into subsection (2), the draftsmen and I understand, and what is the point of saying "let as a dwelling" and then "let as a residence"? If we use "let as a dwelling", we run into Rent Act difficulties and if we used "let as a residence", then I should have thought we should run into another set of difficulties connected with the word "reside". I can only say to the noble Viscount that we have looked at his Amendments, as we would look at anything he suggests, with great respect, but we still prefer our own wording.
VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS: This puts us in a most splendid dilemma in that I now understand that "premises" is to be construed as premises "let as a dwelling" attracted from Clause 1. The objection to the Amendment is that it would attract the meaning of "dwelling" in the Rent Acts, to which the noble Lord objected. Therefore, we have a situation where the definition of "premises" imports all the difficulties about what is or what is not a "dwelling", which is precisely the reason why the noble Lord rejected my Amendment. So we have gone full circle and got back to where we started, and the noble Lord has fallen into precisely the same trap as he tried to prevent me from falling into.
LORD MITCHISON: My Lords, the noble Viscount has performed the most difficult task of all—he has succeeded in convincing himself that he is right.
VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS: My Lords, I beg leave to withdraw my Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
6.58 p.m.
VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS moved to add to the clause:
"() The Court shall, in the exercise of its jurisdiction under this Part of this Act, award costs to the successful party to the action except and insofar as it shall deem it just to do otherwise."
The noble Viscount said: My Lords, I had intended to move this Amend
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ment on Committee stage on behalf of my noble friend Lord Molson, who was unable to be present; but neither was I. What happened was this. A learned gentleman wrote a letter to The Times, which I have not been able to find, but I gather that he was not a legally learned gentleman, though he was learned in many other respects. He thought that under Part II of the Bill there was some doubt whether a successful litigant would get his costs following the event in the ordinary way. The learned gentleman's letter was never answered. The matter has never been raised in Parliament. The Times is read by a large number of people, though possibly not by all those who are going to deal with this Bill, and I thought it might be worth while asking the noble Lord whether there is any reason to suppose that the normal rule as regards costs will not apply under Part II of this Bill. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 20, line 34, at end insert the said subsection.—(Viscount Colville of Culross.)
LORD MITCHISON: My Lords, the court will, of course, have its ordinary discretion. There are some exceptions which I need not go into at length. Where an action for possession is brought against a tenant whose tenancy is controlled (this will now include regulated tenancies), the normal practice is not to give costs to the successful landlord. I see nothing here that interferes with that practice. Clause 31(6) displaces the normal rule as to costs by saying that where the court makes an order for possession but suspends its execution by virtue of the powers under that clause, the court shall not make any order for costs except in special circumstances. If the Amendment were accepted, it would conflict with that. I can assure the noble Viscount that the court has the normal discretion as applied in Rent Act cases and in this Statute.
VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS: But, in particular, it has its ordinary discretion, not in either the Rent Act cases or in the special cases under Clause 32, but in the absolutely normal (if I can so call them) Protection from Eviction Act cases in Part II of the Bill. I should have been talking about Part II of the Bill, but I have referred to Part III. I have now made a mistake—I am sorry.

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The noble Lord has satisfied me, and I hope he has satisfied my noble friend Lord Molson, that all is well under this. I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 34 [The court]:
LORD MITCHISON: My Lords, this is a consequential Amendment. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 22, line 30, leave out from ("enforce") to ("or") in line 31 and insert ("a lessor's right of re-entry or forfeiture").—(Lord Mitchison.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
LORD MITCH ISON: My Lords, this Amendment is consequential on the consolidation of the Lands Clauses Acts. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 22, line 40, leave out paragraph (d) and insert—
("(d) section 13 of the Compulsory Purchase Act 1965.")—(Lord Mitchison.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Clause 38 [Furnished houses]:
7.2 p.m.
LORD MITCHISON LORD MITCHISON moved to leave out subsection (6). The noble Lord said: My Lords, this Amendment and Amendment No. 190 were brought forward on the Committee stage. The noble and learned Viscount, Lord Dilhorne, felt that they were a partial withdrawal of a concession which had been made in Committee or on Report in another place. There is a question as to what was intended and what was understood in another place. I have been in touch with the noble and learned Viscount, as he suggested, and I think I can say that we both agree that the Amendments should be accepted for the time being, and so leave it to another place to make their own decision as to what was intended and agreed at the time. For reasons which I need not go into, I expected the Amendment, when originally moved, to go through without difficulty. I am grateful to the noble and learned Viscount, not only for having raised the point, but also for having considered it when he communicated with me, and having taken what I feel sure is the right course about it. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 25, line 13, leave out subsection (6).—(Lord Mitchison.)
LORD HASTINGS: My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord for his explanation. It is true, of course, that he and my noble and learned friend Lord Dilhorne have been in communication. My noble and learned friend apologises for his absence, and has asked me to agree to accept these Amendments, in the circumstances of confusion which arose in another place. We feel, in all the circumstances, that perhaps it is not for this House to sort out rather unnecessary confusions that were raised in another place, and that we had better leave them to argue about it, as they will have the opportunity of doing on receiving this Amendment when the Bill returns to the other place.
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
LORD MITCHISON: My Lords, this is the second of the two Amendments to which I referred. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 26, line 7, at end insert—
("() No right to occupy a house or part of a house for a holiday shall be treated for the purposes of the Act of 1946 as a right to occupy it as a residence.")—(Lord Mitchison.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Clause 46 [Interpretation]:
LORD MITCHISON: My Lords, this Amendment is intended to make clear beyond doubt the meaning of the phrase "agricultural holding", in Clause 33(1)(c). The meaning given to it is the same meaning as in the Agricultural Holdings Act 1948, and there is a certain technical sense in this. There are some tenancies of agricultural land which are not included within the definition of the 1948 Act, and we think that if no Amendment were made the expression might not be read in the sense of the Agricultural Holdings Act 1948. Certainly it is our intention that it should be so read. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 31, line 20, at end insert—
("'agricultural holding' has the same meaning as in the Agricultural Holdings Act 1948").—(Lord Mitchison.)
VISCOUNT INGLEWOOD: My Lords, I can see that the definition of "agricultural holdings" here may well be an

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improvement, and I am glad the noble Lord has referred to that particular point, because I can see that he now wants to define a farm which is let, because the term "agricultural holding" is frequently used, much more loosely, to mean any farm, owner-occupied as well as let, and the definition in the 1948 Act does refer to a holding that is let.
On the other hand, I am not sure that he has gone to the right Statute for his definition of "agriculture", because if he refers to the Agriculture Act, 1948, Section 1(1), he will find his definition; he will find the definition of "agricultural", in subsection (2); and he will find the definition of "agriculture" in the Interpretation Section, Section 94. He will remember that there are two functions of agriculture in the Act of 1948. The Agricultural Holdings Act 1948 is a consolidation Act, and therefore the definition of "agriculture" is something that is carried forward. It is rather old-fashioned drafting and laborious. In the Interpretation Section of the Agricultural Wages Act 1948 he will find a redraft, which was drawn in the early days when we were both Members of another place. It is a much clearer and shorter definition of "agriculture", and one which I should have thought could more appropriately be inserted in this Bill. I would ask the noble Lord to look into this point to see whether, by incorporating the definition of "agriculture" as contained in the Agricultural Wages Act 1948, he would not make a small improvement.
LORD MITCHISON: My Lords, the noble Lord has a special experience in this field which I am far from sharing. I am a simple soul compared with these agriculturists, and I thought that if we defined "agricultural holding" as it was defined in the Agricultural Holdings Act 1948 it must be right. I will not give an undertaking to make a change or anything of that sort, but I will look into the points which have been raised by the noble Viscount.
VISCOUNT INGLEWOOD: My Lords, I thank the noble Lord.
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Clause 52 [Short title, commencement and extent]:
LORD MITCHISON: My Lords, this Amendment is to exclude from Scotland the new Clause entitled "Restriction on re-entry without due process of law", the reason being that the Scots do it already, and have done for centuries. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 33, line 35, after ("23") insert ("(restriction on re-entry without due process of law)").—(Lord Mitchison.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Schedule 2 [Rent assessment committees]:
LORD HASTINGS LORD HASTINGS had given Notice of an Amendment to leave out ("one or"). The noble Lord said: My Lords, this is a point that we raised in Committee as to the constitution of rent assessment committees and whether they would be of a permanent or temporary nature. The noble Lord, Lord Champion, has been good enough to send me a letter, the upshot of which is that they will be of both natures. Normally the Minister intends to ask the president of the respective panel to appoint three members to any committee which can be considered of a permanent nature; but in order to deal with perhaps an overload of cases, or minor matters, and to help out generally, he should have power to constitute committees, of a temporary character, of perhaps only two members. I thought it was useful to obtain that explanation and I am grateful to the noble Lord. I therefore do not propose to move the Amendment in my name.
Schedule 3 [Registration of rents]:
7.10 p.m.
VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS moved, in paragraph 3(a), to leave out "that application" and insert the confirmation". The noble Viscount said: My Lords, this was a point which I tried unsuccessfully to explain to the noble Lord, Lord Mitchison, on the Committee stage, and which he was not at that moment willing to consider. I hope that I have now put down an Amendment which he agrees requires his consideration. The matter which raises my curiosity is this. If you apply for a change in the rent which is registered for the house in question, and if that application is made either by the landlord or by the tenant, but not by both

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of them, there is a difference in the result according to whether the change in the registered rent is made before the old rent is confirmed. If the old rent is confirmed, you can have another "go" three years or more from the date of your application to have the rent changed. If, however, the registered rent is changed, you have another "go" three years from the date of the registration.
In many cases there may not be a great deal of difference between those two times, but there is a provision by which, not only can the registration go to the rent assessment committee, which might take a certain length of time to make up its mind, but it is not until after that that the rent officer registers or confirms according to whatever the decision of the committee is. But I understood, from something one noble Lord opposite said at an earlier stage, that there was going to be some provision for an appeal on a point of law to the High Court from the decisions of rent assessment committees. That is not in the Bill. I understand that it is to be done by means of some sort of order under the Tribunals and Inquiries Act, 1958, or something of that nature. At any rate, if this is going to be done, then presumably the decision of the rent assessment committee may take a great deal of time finally to become established. If that is so, it may be a long time after the application is originally made.
I do not know whether I have adequately explained my point to the noble Lord. If the rent is confirmed you can try three years after the application; if it is changed you can try three years after the registration of the change. Why is there a distinction? I have no idea. This Amendment was put down to try to find out, and I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 37, line 47 leave out ("that application") and insert ("the confirmation").(Viscount Colville of Culross.)
LORD MITCHISON: My Lords, it looks as if the effect of this Amendment would be to defer the date of the next opportunity for going back to the rent officer to get a revised fair rent assessed. I can only say that not only must I be singularly stupid, but a large number of other people must be, too. That is what we thought about it. I wonder whether
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the noble Viscount has considered that the registration of a fair rent has effect from the date of application—that is paragraph 13 of the Schedule. It seems reasonable, in those circumstances, that you should date this particular matter from the date of application, too.
All I can say about it is that we have considered it. We have been in a little difficulty in finding out exactly what the noble Viscount had in mind. I am still not quite clear about it. I think the point is that he does not like the wording of the Bill. I wonder whether he could tell us what the difference would be if the Amendment were carried. That might help. If it is any consolation to him, I think it very unlikely that I can accept this Amendment at the moment. Perhaps he will come and tell me what it is all about—I will gladly listen—and perhaps he can bring it up on another occasion.
LORD AIREDALE: My Lords, I did not have any difficulty at all in understanding the point the noble Viscount was making in moving the Amendment. Nor did I have any difficulty in understanding the Minister who gave a very good answer to the point the noble Viscount advanced. It is a great sorrow to me that two noble Lords each do not understand the other, because I understood them both so well.
VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS: My Lords, the reason for this, if I may tell the House, is that whereas I was talking about one thing, the noble Lord, Lord Mitchison, was talking about another. Therefore, there was no reason why either of us should understand the other. The noble Lord, Lord Airedale, as he understands the whole thing, of course understood both these matters. The point I was trying to make is this. Notwithstanding paragraph 13, which says the registration shall take effect from the date of the application, you are still forbidden from going back to apply for another change within three years of the date of the registration. That is what the Bill says.
LORD MITCHISON: No, my Lords. The two of them together can go back. That is the short answer.
VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS: Exactly, if there is a dispute. This provision applies only where there is only one party to it; where it is either an application by the landlord or the tenant,

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but not by both. I started off by saying that if the rent is changed you can go back not less than three years after the registration was made. It does not make any difference that the registration took effect from the date of the application. That does not affect the fact, because you are still tied to the actual date of the registration, and it is three years from that date that has to elapse. The fact remains, as the noble Lord will see if he looks at it, that the three years runs from the application, and in the other case it runs from the date of registration. I can see no rhyme or reason for it at all. If the noble Lord likes, we will have it in both cases from the date of the application. I do not know whether I have made my point understood now. I think I will explain it to the noble Lord later. I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
LORD HASTINGS LORD HASTINGS moved, in paragraph 4, to leave out "seven" and insert "fourteen". The noble Lord said: My Lords, on Committee stage I moved no fewer than ten Amendments of this nature dealing with the time period within which landlord and tenant must take action after receiving a notice from the rent officer or the rent assessment committee, as the case may be. I wanted to alter the time period of not less than seven days, and in some cases of not less than fourteen days, to not less than twenty-one days. During that discussion the noble Lord, Lord Mitchison, for the Government moved four Amendments which he described as a concession. I replied that I did not think they were concessions and they did not affect any of my Amendments. In point of fact they did affect three of my Amendments, and I wish to apologise unreservedly to the noble Lord for having said they were not concessions when in fact they were. I am glad to accept them as such.
Now I have revised my demands upon Her Majesty's Government, and have put in five Amendments asking that the period should be not less than fourteen days instead of not less than twenty-one days. That lets out two of the remaining seven Amendments which were not affected by the Government's improvements, because they were already not less than fourteen
488
days, so we are reduced to five Amendments. On one of those, the last one, the noble Lord, Lord Mitchison, has met my request, and he himself has moved to insert "fourteen" instead of "seven". I would point out that there is already in the Bill a discretion on the part of, I think, the rent assessment committee, to extend the time, but the noble Lord has altered the figure of seven to fourteen, which I think is much more satisfactory.
So we now are reduced to four Amendments. It is rather like the ten little nigger boys. Whether one is white, one brown, one black and the other yellow, I do not know, but I hope very much that all four may receive a welcome to the bosom of the Government, because otherwise it seems to me a little illogical. We are now left with only four cases where the minimum time within which the rent officer can require action by the landlord or tenant is seven days. It seems to me that this is really too short a period. Of course it would mean eight or nine days in some cases, but it would be an inconvenience in many circumstances to both landlord and tenant.
At Committee stage the noble Lord, Lord Mitchison, said the Government did not want to inconvenience the people who have to operate this Bill, and it seems to me that, as we have made the period fourteen days in all the other cases, to say "not less than fourteen" in these four cases would be more reasonable, and especially because there is no discretion in any of those four cases for the rent officer to give an extension of time. Admittedly he could say "twenty-one days" straight off if he found that the period of eight or nine days was not working, but there is no discretion for him to say, "Come before me in nine days' time or else you lose your chance", and then to extend it to fourteen or twenty-one days if he found it better to do so. I think it would be more reasonable to make the minimum fourteen days, especially as in all these cases it is a question of consultation with the parties if they happen to turn up at the time. Therefore, I think it important they should be given sufficient time. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 38, line 13, leave out ("seven") and insert ("fourteen").—(Lord Hastings.)
LORD MITCHISON: My Lords, on Committee stage I said to the noble Lord,

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Lord Hastings, that I thought this was a question of administration (indeed, I still think so) and that I would look at the matter again. I have looked at the matter, and I asked my advisers to see what concessions they could make to the noble Lord's point of view. That is the reason why my name appears with his on one of the Amendments. I can assure him we have gone into the matter carefully.
There is not very much to be said on this question, but we tried sympathetically to do what we could. This is a case of balancing two things. If you make the machinery too slow you may really put difficulties in the way of working the Bill, but, on the other hand, you must not hustle people unduly. I am not quite certain whether the noble Lord, Lord Hastings, fully appreciates what some of these time limits involve. I hope I am being respectful—I mean to be. For instance, the first one is in Schedule 3, page 38, line 13; and if one looks at it one finds that it empowers the rent officer to require the landlord or the tenant to give to the rent officer certain information
"within such period not less than seven days from the service of the notice as may be specified in the notice ".
Therefore, it gives the rent officer power to extend the time. He is given that because it is left to the rent officer to fix the time, except that it must not be less than seven days, in order not to hustle the parties.
This "not less" proviso applies to the next Amendment, which is to line 20, and I think also to the third Amendment, to line 40. Therefore, it is not intended to hustle anybody. A reasonable discretion is left with the rent officer, coupled with a reasonable protection against his trying to hustle the parties. I would say that was right. It is quite true that in all these cases one may say, "That is a bit short" or, "That is a bit long", but in the last resort one must leave it to the people who will be working the Act. In this case, of course, it is the rent officer. As regards the time limits themselves, there is some virtue in ministerial and local authority experience in cases of this kind, and I can only assure the noble Lord that I have tried to help as far as I could, but I have also tried to make it fair and reasonable.
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Those are the cases under the registration of rents Schedule, and I think the other two cases concern the Certificates of Fair Rent Schedule, Schedule 4. I can go into this in detail if necessary, because there is quite a long argument involved here. It is, however, the same sort of point again, and perhaps the noble Lord will accept it from me that we took his suggestions very seriously. We met one of them, others he himself found sufficiently met by the provisions of the Bill, and on looking at the form of the time provisions I would regard what is left as reasonable and therefore, technically, I suppose, I cannot accept the Amendment.
LORD HASTINGS: I am grateful to the noble Lord for considering this matter carefully with his advisers, but I think that if he and they will read the OFFICIAL REPORT to-morrow they will find my argument is much the more logical of the two. However, I do not intend to press this point now, and I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Schedule 4 [Certificates of Fair Rent]:
LORD HASTINGS: My Lords, this is our joint Amendment, which I move formally.
Amendment moved—
Page 44, line 4, leave out ("seven") and insert ("fourteen")—(Lord Hastings.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Schedule 6 [Minor and Consequential Amendments]:
LORD MITCHISON: My Lords, this is an Amendment in connection with houses near aerodromes and the grants which are made for soundproofing. This raises the same sort of point as that raised in the Committee stage in relation to regulated tenancies. It is intended to make this conform with that part of the Bill. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 47, line 41, at end insert—
("9.—(1) In section 5(3) of the Rent Act 1957 after the words 'Housing Act 1949' there shall be inserted the words 'or a grant has been made in respect of the improvement under section 15 of the Airports Authority Act 1965'.
(2) In section 5(4) of the Rent Act 1957 after the words section 20' there shall be inserted

491
the words 'or under the said section 15'.")—(Lord Mitchison.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Schedule 7 [Enactments repealed]:
LORD MITCHISON: My Lords, this Amendment is to repeal subsections (3), (5) and (6) of Section 72 of the Housing Act 1964 because there are corresponding and more general provisions in Clauses 30 and 31 of this Bill. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 49, line 48, at end insert—

("1964 c. 56.

The Housing Act 1964.

In section 72, subsection (3), in subsection (4) the words 'and (3)', subsections (5) and (6); and, in paragraph (d) of subsection (7), the words '(3)', the words 'and (5)' the words from '(3)' Subject' to 'both 'and the words and (3) '")

—(Lord Mitchison.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
LORD MITCHISON: My Lords, again, this Amendment is the result of consolidation. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 50, leave out lines 42 and 43.—(Lord Mitchison.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
LORD MITCHISON: My Lords, this is a similar point. The consolidating Act is the New Towns Act, 1965, and a reference to the appropriate section there is substituted for the previous reference to the 1944 Act. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 50, line 51, at end add—

("1965 c..

The New Towns Act 1965

Section 22(4)")

—(Lord Mitchison.)
LORD HASTINGS: My Lords, I am happy to agree to this final Amendment, and I am sorry the Report stage has taken a little longer than I personally estimated. I do not think we have wasted time. I shall look forward to renewing my battle with the noble Lord opposite, I believe on the first day of the resumed Session after the Recess. I hope noble Lords will enjoy their holiday.
LORD MITCHISON: My Lords, may I be allowed to say "Thank you", and
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respectfully thank the Opposition for putting forward so many useful and constructive suggestions with hardly any of which I have agreed.
On Question, Amendment agreed to.

RACE RELATIONS BILL
7.30 p.m.
Report of Amendments received (according to Order).
Clause 1:
Discrimination in places of public resort
1.—(1) It shall be unlawful for any person, being the proprietor or manager of or employed for the purposes of any place of public resort to which this section applies, to practise discrimination on the ground of colour, race, or ethnic or national origins against persons seeking access to or facilities or services at that place.
(2) This section applies to the following places of public resort, that is to say—
(a) any hotel, and any restaurant, café, public house or other place where food or drink is supplied for consumption by the public therein;
LORD AIREDALE LORD AIREDALE moved, in subsection (2), after "say" to insert:
"() the place of any public meeting;"
The noble Lord said: My Lords, this clause seeks to prohibit discrimination on racial grounds in certain places of public resort to which the Bill applies. This is an Amendment to subsection (2), which lists those places of public resort. Perhaps I could preface my remarks by quoting the right honourable gentleman the Secretary of State for Home Affairs, who explained in Standing Committee in another place what the expression "places of public resort" in the Bill was intended to mean. The right honourable gentleman said, at col. 257 of the proceedings of the Standing Committee B on June 23 last:
"Places of public resort, in the concept which I would commend to the Committee, are places where, broadly speaking, a person goes to stay for a time to enjoy all the amenities which are provided in that place. That is the purport of the word 'resort'. Simply to use the phrase 'places of public resort' would have been to use a phrase of very indefinite import. We thought it wiser to say exactly what sort of places of public resort we had in mind, and those places are set out in subsection (2)."
I will leave out a few words, and then he goes on:
"We think that we have covered every kind of place—there may be some left out—which can be brought within the category of places which we have designated 'places of public resort'."
He gives examples, and then goes on:
"They all have the common characteristic that one goes there to stay there and to enjoy something which is provided for the public at large, and which one wishes to enjoy in common with fellow citizens whom one finds there. To be told that one cannot go to those places is particularly injurious and wounding to the feelings."
That is what the Home Secretary said in Standing Committee in the course of resisting an Amendment which would have included shops within the list of places in subsection (2).
I think I can claim that both this Amendment and the other two standing in my name all refer to places which come within this definition of "places of public resort" as stated by the right honourable gentleman the Home Secretary. This Amendment seeks to include in the list "the place of any public meeting". This Bill does deal with public meetings specifically. Clause 6(1)(b) deals with incitement to racial hatred at public meetings, and I should have thought it was only logical and common sense to include in the list in Clause 1 public meetings—that is to say, in the list of those places where discrimination shall not be practised against persons seeking access. Because it is not much comfort to a person who is denied access to a public meeting upon racial grounds to be told that he would have been protected by something in Clause 6 if he had succeeded in making his way in. The logic and common sense nature of this Amendment is so self-evident to me that I think I should be wasting the time of the House if I were to continue arguing the matter. I think the only sensible course is for me to move this Amendment and see what the Minister has to say in reply. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 1, line, 13, at end insert ("() the place of any public meeting;").—(Lord Airedale.)
LORD STONHAM: My Lords, the noble Lord has quoted what my right honourable friend the Home Secretary
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said on the subject of places of public resort, and in particular he referred to my right honourable friend as saying that they all had in common something to savour which would cause us distress if it were denied to us. That is to some extent a paraphrase of what my right honourable friend said, but I think the noble Lord, Lord Airedale, will agree it is good enough.
LORD AIREDALE: "To be told that one cannot go to those places is particularly injurious and wounding to the feelings".
LORD STONHAM: Your Lordships would expect my right honourable friend to put it more graphically than I have myself. The noble Lord also quoted in aid of his Amendment the fact that in Clause 6 and again in Clause 7 of this Bill the expression "public meeting" is used. I would point out to him, first of all, that he has inserted his Amendment in the part of the Bill dealing with discrimination and has quoted in aid those parts of the Bill which are specifically concerned with racial incitement or incitement to racial prejudice. I have to point out that the noble Lord's Amendment would apply to particular public meetings and is not therefore appropriate to the remedies in Clause 1 of the Bill, which are designed to effect a change in a course of conduct extending over a period of time. It is difficult, therefore, to envisage in those circumstances how conciliation committees could operate or how the civil law could in the last resort be particularly effective.
The noble Lord's Amendment seems to us to be based on the assumption that a public meeting is, or should be, open to all members of the public. This is not necessarily true. Often it is used to mean a meeting of a section of the public on a matter of public concern. Since there is no definition in the Bill of "public meeting", although the term is used, this would be bound to lead to uncertainty. "Public meeting" has been defined in a number of ways for different purposes. For example in the Law of Libel Amendment Act 1888, Section 4, it meant:
"any meeting, bona fide and lawfully held, for a lawful purpose, and for the furtherance of discussion of any matter of public concern, whether the admission thereto be general or restricted."

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Subsection (1) of Section 9 of the Public Order Act 1936 states that a "public meeting":
"includes any meeting in a public place and any meeting which the public or any section thereof are admitted to attend, whether on payment or otherwise",
and meeting means,
"a meeting held for the purpose of the discussion of matters of public interest or for the purpose of the expression of views on such matters".
In the Report in 1909 of the Departmental Committee of the Home Office with respect to the preservation of order and public meetings, it was stated that:
"a public meeting may properly be defined to include any lawful meeting called for the furtherance or discussion of a matter of public concern to which the public, or any particular section of the public, is invited or admitted, whether the admission thereto is general or restricted."
I quote these definitions, which have endured, to make the point that in this context it is not possible to have a sort of "blanket" definition of a public meeting which would mean that all members of the public should necessarily be admitted. But the definitions I have given would include any meeting called for any political or municipal purpose to which the public are admitted, whether by ticket or otherwise. It would also include many non-political meetings, such as bazaars, public lectures and the like, but not shareholders or committee meetings to which the public are not admitted.
In so far as the noble Lord intends his Amendment to deal with a public meeting in a public place, there is no room for discrimination, since all members of the public, irrespective of their colour, race or nationality, have the right to be present, and on this count the Amendment is unnecessary. In so far as the Amendment deals with a public meeting held in private premises, it would unwarrantably limit the right of the promoters of the meeting to invite such members of the public as they saw fit. Such a limitation would be far-reaching and totally unacceptable. Is there any reason why, for instance, Turkish Cypriots or Greek Cypriots should not be able to hold meetings confined to members of their own racial group and to exclude members of the other racial group? Or, to quote a recent actual case which no doubt noble Lords remem-
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ber, is there any reason why Asian or African members of a trade union in this country should not hold a meeting to discuss ways of removing alleged disabilities suffered in their employment? Such a public meeting would be for the purpose of discussing matters of common concern to them, and it would be an incitement to disorder if they were not able to exclude persons hostile to them on racial grounds.
In my view, the only case in which, in theory, the Amendment might serve a useful purpose is that in which there is a meeting in private premises, which is announced as being open to all members of the public but from which, in practice, certain racial groups of the public are excluded. Here, it might be argued that discrimination on grounds of race and so on should be prohibited. But the Amendment is not limited to this particular case. And in so far as there is a problem in relation to public meetings in private places it would not, as I have already indicated, be appropriate to deal with it by the procedure in Clauses 1 to 3 which relate to prohibiting a course of conduct.
To sum up, the Amendment fails in three ways. First, if "the place of any public meeting" means a public meeting in a public place, it is unnecessary because there is no room for discrimination. Secondly, if it means a public meeting confined to persons of a particular category, it would be an oppressive incitement to disorder; and, thirdly, if it means a public meeting in a private place, it is not appropriate to the section of the Bill in which it is proposed to insert it. On those grounds, therefore, I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Airedale, will see fit to withdraw the Amendment.
7.46 p.m.
LORD BROCKWAY: My Lords, I had not intended to speak on this Amendment because I have a later Amendment which not only covers this item but subsequent items which are to be moved in Amendments by the noble Lord, Lord Airedale. But the Minister will forgive me if his speech has incited me to take part in this debate. He began by saying that this Amendment was irrelevant.
LORD STONHAM: My Lords, I am quite sure it is within the recollection of your Lordships that I did not use the

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word "irrelevant" at all at any time during my speech.
LORD BROCKWAY: "Irrelevant" was my own word, and I would not suggest that the Minister used that word.
LORD AIREDALE: "Unnecessary".
LORD BROCKWAY: My Lords, I meant by the term "irrelevant" the dictionary meaning: that this particular Amendment is not related to the item of the Bill because it is unnecessary and because it is inconsistent.
My noble friend argued, first, that this Amendment was not applicable because this clause of the Bill deals with discrimination which is continuous and persistent. I submit to the Minister and to noble Lords that frequently public meetings are continuous, and are persistent in their denial of racial equality. I have had handbills in my hand of meetings which have been organised by Fascist societies which have not only announced one meeting but a series of meetings and therefore, so far as those meetings are concerned, the discrimination is persistent and continuous. And it may well be that at those public meetings discrimination is practised against members of the public attending them, on the ground that they are of a particular race or colour.
The second argument which the Minister put forward was that meetings may be called for a particular purpose by a particular community. I would submit to him that those are not public meetings, in the sense of being places of public resort as defined in this clause. It may be that Greeks or Turks from Cyprus may seek to hold a meeting of Greeks or of Turks to express their view about the problem in Cyprus. If those meetings are specifically meetings of Greeks or Turks, I submit that they are not public meetings in the sense of this clause, which speaks of "places of public resort".
A third point which was put by the Minister was that there might be public meetings to which the general public were invited, and which seemed to me to be within the term of meetings in "places of public resort", but that if at those meetings persons were excluded on the ground of race or colour there are other provisions in the law (or if the incitement took place, there is a later clause in the
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Bill) covering those conditions. I submit that that is not the case. A public meeting may easily be called, open to the general public, and when members of a particular race or particular colour desire to attend that meeting they may be either excluded from the meeting, or, when they have gained attendance, may be expelled from it. That is a public place, a public meeting. It is discrimination on the grounds of race and colour. Even if the Minister suggests that the actual wording of this Amendment goes beyond the kind of case which I have indicated, I would suggest very strongly to him that, even if he cannot accept the terms of this Amendment, it is one further argument in favour of the Amendment of a more comprehensive nature which I shall move later.
THE EARL OF IDDESLEIGH: My Lords, I wish that we were not in such a hurry over this Bill. In the present circumstances, we are not able to do the thorough job on this most important measure which I am sure everybody in your Lordships' House would wish to do. The noble Lord, Lord Stonham, has put forward points of great substance and importance which I should much like to consider. I think that the noble Lord's point about the public meeting held in a private place could probably he met by a definition of "public meeting" for the purposes of this Act. If we have time to consider the matter thoroughly, and if the noble Lord, Lord Airedale, has a chance to consult with his friends on the matter, no doubt a valuable Amendment could be put down on Third Reading—a right which the House is now being denied.
I am most disappointed that the possibility still exists that a coloured man may be excluded from a public meeting in a private place. I cannot see why exclusion from such a meeting should not come under the provisions of this clause. The exclusion is likely to take place by some act by an over-excited steward—and stewards do get rather excited—at a public meeting saying, "e don't want your sort here. There is no room for you." It would be perfectly possible to subject treatment of that kind to consideration by the conciliation committee. The organisers of the meeting could be told by the conciliation committee, "We are quite sure that you did not mean to exclude coloured persons

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from the meeting. Will you in future instruct your stewards to take a reasonable line?"
In saying all this, I am afraid I am wasting your Lordships' time, because this measure is being rushed through this House. How much better it would have been if we had decided to meet rather earlier in October and to subject this Bill to the thorough and proper examination which it deserves!
LORD AIREDALE: My Lords, I am grateful for the support I have received from noble Lords. I propose to accept the advice which has been given by the noble Earl, Lord Iddesleigh. Before I do so, I would mention that "public meeting", which is referred to specifically in Clause 6 and 7, is defined in Clause 6 as having the same meaning as in the Public Order Act 1936. I do not know whether, if that definition were to be included in Clause 1, it would make my Amendment more acceptable than it is at present. However that may be, I put down the Amendment at short notice, and it has been amply demonstrated to me that Lord Stonham has gone into the matter with great throughness, and I should not feel it right to press the matter without studying in great detail what he has said in reply. The only proper course for me at this stage is to ask leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
7.56 p.m.
LORD AIREDALE LORD AIREDALE moved, in subsection (2), after paragraph (a) to insert:
"() any museum or other place of an educational or cultural nature to which the public is normally admitted;"
The noble Lord said: My Lords, paragraph (b) of this subsection specifically lists places of public entertainment and recreation. I should have thought that it was equally important that foreign students and other serious-minded foreigners should not be liable to be excluded from museums and places of that nature which are the subject of this Amendment. I seek to include museums, et cetera, within the subsection. Among the other places to which I refer after the words "any museum", I have in mind such of Mr. Noel Coward's stately homes of England as open their doors to the members of the public, and
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places of that kind. The words "of an educational or cultural nature" in the Amendment are already enshrined in the Statute Book in the Public Libraries and Museums Act 1964. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 1, line 16, at end insert the said paragraph.—(Lord Airedale.)
LORD STONHAM: My Lords, before dealing with this Amendment, I ask your Lordships' indulgence as I suffer under two disabilities. The first is that on Report stage I cannot speak a second time without leave of the House, and for that reason I could not reply to the points made by the noble Earl, Lord Iddesleigh, or those made by my noble friend Lord Brockway. The other disability was referred to by the noble Earl when he spoke about the hurry we were in. To be fair, we have had a reasonable time between Committee and Report stage for the tabling of Amendments, and the noble Lord, Lord Airedale, was kind enough to say that I had gone thoroughly into his Amendment and had given it a considered reply. I shall certainly do so on this one too. I think that all friends of the Bill will agree with me when I say that the most important thing is to get the Bill. As I understand the time-table, it is necessary for us, after the completion of the Report stage, to have a Third Reading to-night in order that we can get the Bill. Apart from that, I am in your Lordships hands with regard to the particular Amendments we are considering.
To come now to the Amendment which has just been moved, it includes among the places of resort covered by Clause 1 of the Bill, museums and other places of an educational or cultural nature, such as libraries and art galleries, to which the public are normally admitted. In large part, in our view, the Amendment is unnecessary, because subsection (2) (d) of Clause 1 has the effect of including museums, libraries, and so on, maintained by the local authority or other public authority, and the paragraph was designed for that very purpose. Admittedly, it would not cover places of the kind maintained by a Government Department—for instance, buildings scheduled as ancient monuments by the Ministry of Public Building and Works—because the Bill does not bind the

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Crown. But this, of course, and for the same reason, would apply equally to the Amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Airedale, if it were accepted. In any case, I know your Lordships will agree that the point is of very little real significance or practical importance, because it can scarcely be suggested that the Government would itself practise discrimination or tolerate it among its employees.
But there remain museums, art galleries and similar buildings maintained by private individuals and organisations, to which the public are normally admitted. These may often be in private homes. Indeed, the noble Lord, Lord Airedale, made it clear in moving his Amendment that where it is the practice to open to the public private parks or historic or stately homes, no one member of the public should be excluded solely on grounds of colour or race. But I must say, quite frankly, that I am not aware of any case in which discrimination of this kind is practised. Many of those stately homes are in fact owned by Members of your Lordships' House, and it is quite inconceivable that anyone would dream of allowing discrimination of that kind.
In common, no doubt, with many of your Lordships, a week or two ago I saw a programme on television which illustrated some of the stately homes. Indeed, some noble Dukes who own those homes were interviewed frankly and freely on the subject, and, if I am not being unfair, it seemed to me that their greatest concern was the maximum number of half-crowns. Some, at least, took a particular pride in the fact that their homes and gardens were a source of great attraction to visitors from overseas and to people of many different races. I can assure your Lordships that. I listened carefully, but I did not hear any noble Duke suggest that anyone who visited his grounds or his house and who paid his 2s. 6d. or 3s. 6d. should be asked for a certificate of entry; and certainly no noble Duke questioned anyone about the number of dependants that the visitor had overseas. Their interest, if they had asked about the dependants, would probably have been in future business. In any case, it would be a quite unwarrantable intrusion on the freedom of the individual to require him to accept into his own home or precincts people whom he wished, however misguidedly, to exclude—
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although I am certain that those people do not exclude them, and would not dream of excluding them.
This is a principle which the Bill has throughout been at pains to safeguard—for instance, by omitting from its provisions boarding houses and private hotels, and by the special saving in Clause 5 for landlords who share accommodation with their tenants—and there is certainly no reason for abandoning it here. Put in its most plausible form, the argument may be that people who own stately homes, libraries and collections should be considered as holding them in trust for the public and should be expected to act accordingly. But the logic of that would require that all these places should be open to the public whether the owners wished it or not, and, clearly, whatever may be thought of that principle, it is still a long way from being accepted or made acceptable.
I want to make it very clear that it is not serving the cause that we all have at heart to put up theoretical cases where discrimination could possibly be exercised but where we have no knowledge that it is being exercised. Also, in this case—although, of course, I fully appreciate the reasons why the noble Lord, Lord Airedale, is moving his Amendment and am glad that he has done so, because it gives the opportunity for this discussion—we feel that in great measure, and in so far as it is necessary at all, the point he has in mind is covered by the Bill. On those two grounds, therefore, we feel that the Amendment is not necessary.
LORD AUCKLAND: My Lords, before the noble Lord replies, may I say that I have listened with great interest to these discussions? Surely, the criterion should be one of behaviour, whether the person is coloured or white, and if a person arrives at a museum or a concert hall, whether it is owned by the Government or privately-owned, in a truculent state, those who run it should have the right to refuse entry. I agree with the noble Earl, Lord Iddesleigh, that there has not really been sufficient time to discuss this Bill properly. I think that the Bill as drafted covers many of the points which the noble Lord, Lord Airedale, seeks to cover, but it is surely the criterion of behaviour and apearance which should dominate the precepts of this Bill.
LORD AIREDALE: My Lords, I am sorry to say that I was not nearly so satisfied with the Minister's answer to this Amendment as I was with his answer to the first one. What the noble Lord's argument boils down to is this: "I cannot think of any cases where discrimination would be practised in the sort of circumstances that this Amendment envisages, and therefore it is unnecessary". In my submission, that sort of argument is never a very strong one. In this particular instance it seems to me that we have really reached a quite extraordinary position. Paragraph (b) specifically lists
"sports ground, swimming pool or other place of public entertainment or recreation ".
We may have this position. A noble Duke has a stately home which he opens to the public in order primarily that serious-minded people may enjoy the treasures there. In the grounds he puts a swimming pool and roundabouts, for the public entertainment of the children of the people who come primarily to enjoy the cultural surroundings of the stately home. As I understand it, under paragraph (b) the noble Duke cannot exclude persons on racial grounds from his public entertainment facilities—his swimming pool, and so on—but, unless my Amendment is accepted, he is going to be able (I am not suggesting that any noble Duke would do it, but he would be able) to exclude people upon racial grounds from going inside the stately home and enjoying seeing the treasures. That seems to me to be a perfectly ridiculous position to allow to exist. I really do not think I can withdraw this Amendment.
LORD STONHAM: My Lords, if I may be allowed to speak again, I want to make only two points. First, I would remind the noble Lord, Lord Auckland, that, even in a place which is covered by the Bill, if a person is truculent or offensive in any way other than in regard to questions of race, ethnics, nationality or creed, then, of course, the proprietor has every right, and a continuing right, to exclude him.
On the point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Airedale, he said that a noble Duke could not exclude a person of colour from his swimming pool or roundabout but he could exclude him on those grounds
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from his home. The answer to that, my Lords, is that an Englishman, Duke or otherwise, can exclude any person from his home on any grounds. Therefore, the noble Lord's Amendment would not alter or add to that position at all. I still feel that the case I made was a complete answer to his Amendment, and that it is unnecessary.
LORD AIREDALE: My Lords, I suppose that if I say anything more I shall be in grave danger of being called out of order, but I shall chance it. I would suggest to the Minister that it is not reasonable to call those parts of a stately home of England which are not lived in but which are preserved as a museum for the enjoyment of members of the public, part of an Englishman's home. They are nothing of the kind. It is only the flat in which he lives privately which is the Englishman's home.
On Question, Amendment negatived.
8.11 p.m.
LORD AIREDALE LORD AIREDALE moved, in subsection (2), after paragraph (a) to insert.
"() any public exhibition;".
The noble Lord said: My Lords, this Amendment seeks to include in the list any public exhibition. A public exhibition is not usually a cultural place, and it is not a place of entertainment such as comes within paragraph (b)—at least, not usually. That is not to say that the Antique Dealers' Fair is not primarily a cultural occasion, or that many of the people who go to the Boat Show do not go for the purpose of entertainment. But, my Lords, public exhibitions are very much part of our national life in these days. They deal with almost all the material facets of our national life, and they draw enormous crowds. I should have thought it would undoubtedly be felt by anybody to be a serious deprivation to be excluded upon racial grounds, or upon any other ground, for that matter, from attending one of the many public exhibitions which are held in this country all the year round.
If the words of the Home Secretary (which I quoted, which the Minister paraphrased, which I then requoted and which, if I may do so, I will quote once more) mean anything, I should have thought that it was quite evident that public exhibitions ought to be in this

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list. The Home Secretary's words were:
"To be told that one cannot go to those places is particularly injurious and wounding to the feelings".
Again, I am not suggesting that this would happen, but I can imagine the feelings of somebody who, on racial grounds, might be told, "You cannot go into the Ideal Home Exhibition", or "You cannot go to the Boat Show". I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 1, line 16, at end insert: ("() any public exhibition;").—(Lord Airedale.)
LORD STONHAM: My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Airedale, quoted my right honourable friend again, and said that if you were told you could not go into one of those places it would be very wounding. I quite agree; but he did not give any indication when, if ever, anyone had been told that he could not go to those places on the grounds of race or colour, or for any of the reasons which are objected to in this Bill as a matter of discrimination.
However, to come to the particular Amendment, first of all I have to say to the noble Lord, Lord Airedale (always, of course, with the proviso that I have never regarded this as very important), that the drafting of his Amendment is at fault because its words do not necessarily convey the meaning which he has assigned to them. To include in Clause 1 of the Bill any place at a time when a public exhibition is being held there would mean, for example, that Olympia would qualify only when an exhibition was being held there. If that is what the noble Lord intends, then much the same objections apply as they did to the previous Amendment dealing with museums, art galleries and so on, when he found my answer singularly unconvincing. That is to say, it would apply except, perhaps, that the number of public exhibitions sponsored by individual organisations and undertakings is greater in proportion to the whole than the number of museums and art galleries privately maintained to those maintained by local or public authorities. In another way the consideration may also be said to differ in degree because public exhibitions, from their nature, tend more often to be held in premises specially hired for the purpose and frequently hired from public authorities.
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The fact remains that we have had no complaints of discrimination being practised in public exhibitions, nor are they the sort of occasions on which we would expect it to be. Indeed, many trade exhibitions make a point of publishing each day the number of overseas visitors and buyers who have been at the exhibition. Most trade exhibitions, at least those of a national character or on a substantial scale, go to a great deal of expense and trouble to advertise overseas to attract visitors to the exhibition. It would therefore be ludicrous to suggest that any discrimination of this kind would be practised in those circumstances.
I believe that there is general agreement that it is not in large gatherings of that kind that the abuse which we all deplore tends to show itself, but in the more intimate circumstances—the circumstances, for example, of a public house, or in places at which people are served together, as in restaurants, or where they are engaged in a common activity such as at a swimming pool or at dances. These are the places where discrimination is likely to be practiced, and not—I repeat not—in public exhibitions where, by the very nature of things, all who will come and pay for admission or are qualified to enter by reason of their trade and occupation (and some exhibitions are limited in that way) are welcome.
The purpose of this Bill, I must say once more, is to strike at likely, actual or threatened abuses and not at purely theoretical ones. I would say this. If we were to try to cover every public place or occasion where discrimination might theoretically be practised, and where there is little or no reason to believe that it ever would, and where we have no evidence that it ever has been, it would be difficult to know where to stop. What is more important—and I hope the noble Lord will accept this point—is that, however long a list we compiled, we should be bound to leave something out. The result would be to encourage people to think that discrimination was all right in any of the places or circumstances not specifically mentioned in the Bill. I believe, therefore, much as I appreciate, as I always do, the noble Lord's reasons and arguments on this occasion, that the Bill would be much

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better without his Amendment and I hope he will not press it.
LORD AIREDALE: My Lords, the arguments of the Minister on this Amendment are very much the same as his arguments on the other. He says he cannot think of any circumstances where discrimination would be practised in such places as exhibitions and therefore it is unnecessary to have exhibitions in the list. I can use that argument, too. Paragraph (b) includes sports grounds and swimming pools. I could have moved an Amendment to leave out "sports grounds and swimming pools" and, in support of that, I could have said that I cannot think of any sports ground or swimming pool where anyone is liable to be excluded on racial grounds. I could then ask the Minister whether he could give me examples of sports grounds or swimming pools where this would be so. If he could not do so, then I could say, "Let us leave those words out of the Bill." I imagine that the Minister's answer would be, "I have no specific instance in mind, but this is the sort of place which ought to be on the list."
My Lords, I think that exhibitions ought to be on the list. Not all exhibitions are enormous, or held at Olympia or Earl's Court. We have large, small and medium-size public exhibitions. If theatres, public houses, cafés, sports grounds and dance halls are to be included, I think that exhibitions ought also to be on the list, and I do not feel that I ought to withdraw the Amendment.
On Question, Amendment negatived.
8.21 p.m.
LORD BROCKWAY LORD BROCKWAY moved to add to subsection (2):
"() any other place to which the public is normally admitted."
The noble Lord said: My Lords, I think I should begin by expressing an apology to the Members of this House, because I had an Amendment down in the same terms during the Committee stage and was not in my place when it was called. This was due to the fact that I was working in the Government Peers' Room, which is in the dungeons of this House; the previous debate ended rather precipitately and I was not informed in
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time to be in my place to move the Amendment. I apologise to those who were present on that occasion; I apologise even more to those who are present now, because they are being detained at a late hour.
I am moving this Amendment not because I am opposed to the principle of the Bill but because I am enthusiastically in favour of it. I hope that I may be able to argue the case quietly and reasonably, and in such a way that I may have a response from the Government. Clause 1(2) of the Bill includes as was said by the noble Lord, Lord Airedale, a list of places of public resort where discrimination would be regarded as unlawful. They are four in character: any place where food or drink is sup-lied for consumption by the public; any place of public entertainment or recreation; any premises used for the purpose of public transport, and any other place of public resort maintained by a local authority. Those are not inclusive words; those are the principles of the four sections. Subsection (2) not only lays down those principles but lists a number of places where the provisions of this Bill should apply: hotels, restaurants, cafes, public houses, theatres, cinemas, dance halls, sports grounds, swimming pools, vehicles, vessels or aircraft used for public transport.
If the purpose of this Bill were to take into a court of law, either in civil proceedings or in criminal proceedings, any person who practised discrimination in those places, I could understand that they should be specifically and directly mentioned in the Bill. The first draft of the Bill was made with that kind of purpose; but the amended Bill has a different purpose—and I am among those who welcome that purpose. The purpose now is not to take to a court of law an individual who practises discrimination in a series of specific places: the purpose now is, where discrimination is practised in places of public resort, to make the utmost effort to settle the difference by the method of reconciliation. I submit to the members of the Government who are here that that change in the character of the Bill makes unnecessary the listing of a series of places in which discrimination may take place (which nevertheless may omit some) and makes it desirable that

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there should be a much broader definition. In my Amendment I have not suggested omitting the list, but in view of this change in the nature of the Bill, I propose that there should be added the words:
"any other place to which the public is normally admitted".
To emphasise my point, let me describe the procedure that will be followed under this Bill. First, if there is a charge of discrimination in one of these public places, a complaint will be made to the local conciliation committee. The object of that conciliation committee will be to use its best endeavours to secure a settlement of the difference. Only when it has used its utmost efforts to bring about conciliation, and has failed, will the case be reported to the Race Relations Board. Even when it is reported, it is not inevitable that the case will be taken to court. It is only if it is clear to the Race Relations Board that a contravention of this clause has taken place, and is likely to continue, that the case will be reported to the Attorney General, in England and Wales, or to the Lord Advocate, in Scotland. Even then, the case will not necessarily be taken to court: that will be a matter for the Attorney General or the Lord Advocate to decide. And even when the case has gone to court, and if the charge is proved, there will not be a sentence of imprisonment or a fine. The court can only grant an injunction to require that the offence is not continued.
What I am trying to do is to convince members of the Government, in a cooperative and constructive way, and the Members of this House, that when this Bill is aimed at conciliation, then the broadest possible definition of circumstances in which discrimination could take place should be included in the Bill, rather than the listing of possible places of discrimination which are not necessarily inclusive of all those where it occurs, and almost certainly will not be inclusive of all places where it will occur in future. This would seem to me to be ground, not for limiting an effort to settle differences in the stated places of public resort, but for giving the local conciliation committees authority to bring about conciliation in all places of public resort. I submit that argument to the Minister with all the persuasion that I
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can, because I believe it is the only principle that is consistent with the changed character of the Bill.
There is another case for accepting the Amendment that I have on the Marshalled List. Indeed, I am tremendously fortified by the concluding passage of the speech which the Minister has just delivered. He has argued against a list of places where discrimination has not at present occurred on the very grounds on which I am arguing for the acceptance of this Amendment. There is a danger in listing a number of places without including all places of public resort, because those who control those other places will take the fact that they are not made unlawful under this Bill as justifying the practice of discrimination in those places. Discrimination (and I am almost using the words used by the Minister) could be practised with impunity in public places other than those which are specifically listed in this Bill.
I want to recognise at once that discrimination may not occur beyond the places which are recorded in the Bill. Indeed, I would say to the Minister—and I have made some examination of this problem—that there are places in the list already where it would be difficult to find the practice of discrimination at this moment. My study of this problem has led me to the view that the practice of discrimination at this moment is actually decreasing. It was at its height about eighteen months ago. I think the Minister would find it difficult, in certain of the places which he has included in this Bill, to prove that any discrimination is now taking place.
But, in my view, it is dangerous to gamble that this psychological situation will be maintained. It may be that, owing to the development of unforeseen and unhappy circumstances, discrimination will grow. It may easily be that it may grow in particular places. If it does grow in that way, discrimination will occur, not only in the specific places of public resort mentioned in this Bill, but also in other places.
May I indicate what I have in mind? In America now, there are certain public corporations which are providing beauty parlours and barbers' shops of an exclusive character, from which coloured persons and those of a different race are

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excluded. Such places are not covered in this Bill. Is the Minister really suggesting that in the kind of atmosphere of business exploitation for profit which is now occurring, and particularly the epidemic (if I may so call it) of attempts to find a particular presentation of a business which will appeal to certain sections of the people, it is unlikely that a concern which is running a beauty parlour or a barber's establishment may not, if the feeling of colour and discrimination arises, apply—quite lawfully under this Bill—discrimination to its establishment?
In saying this I am not speaking without some evidence. I had a lady friend this week who went to a beauty parlour. The owner of that parlour said to her: "I am sorry that there are coloured people here. I hope that the time may come when it will be possible to run an establishment of this kind where only white women can have the services which we can provide".
The Minister cannot possibly say that the list of particular places set out in this Bill is the complete list of places of public resort where discrimination is likely to take place. I take another instance which is, I admit, on the borderline between the area of employment, which the noble Lord has already excluded from the Bill, and the area of public resort. We are now having for the first time large numbers of coloured children school-leavers. I was quite surprised to see in the White Paper on Immigration which has been distributed this week that there is very little difficulty for coloured teenagers leaving school. That is not my experience. My experience is that in town after town where there are Commonwealth immigrant communities, the Youth Employment Officers are finding the greatest difficulty in obtaining any opportunity for those children in offices in this country.
As I have said already, I recognise that that is partly a matter of employment. But it is not only a matter of employment. Those offices which are public offices, in the sense that anyone should have the opportunity to participate in the work of those offices—places of public resort in that sense—are excluding from a coloured child the opportunity to enter. The Minister has to look at
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that problem very seriously indeed in view of the school leavers whom we now have in our midst. He has to look also at the problem, if racial discrimination increases in this country, that there may be some exclusion even from shops of a particular kind, in particular areas of a particularly snobbish character.
I suggest to him, further that he has got to look at the problem of clubs which are normally open to the general public. I am not asking him to apply this Bill to clubs of a particular character—it may be clubs of a religious community, it may be some special association—but to clubs which are normally open to the whole population, where the only restriction is colour or race; they ought to be included within the terms of this Bill. The Labour Club at Smethwick was an unfortunate example of that.
I have tried to put this case reasonably. I have put it, I hope, with some conviction. I want to know what is the objection of the Government and the Minister to this wider definition, when this is a matter of conciliation and agreement and trying to end racial feeling. The criticism of this Bill is that it is inadequate, that it does not deal with the most urgent cases of discrimination. I want to ask the Minister, in these last moments of the consideration of this Bill, whether he will do something to meet this criticism by accepting the Amendment which I have put forward.
May I add just this?—and I think the Minister knows how I feel about this matter. In one sense I was a pioneer, with my noble friend Lord Sorensen, of legislation in this sphere. I am terribly proud to-night that we are reaching the stage where this Bill is likely to become law. I am pleading with him to look at the Amendment which I have moved because I believe by this Amendment we shall be able to improve race relations in this country; we shall be placing the emphasis not so much on the penalisation of those who commit offences as on seeking by conciliation to bring about agreement. I beg to move.
Amendment moved
Page 2, line 2, at end insert the said new paragraph.—(Lord Brockway.)
LORD SOMERS: My Lords, I should like to point out to the noble Lord, Lord Brockway, that the wording of his

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Amendment in fact covers both your Lordships' House and the other place. We all know, naturally, that so far as admission is concerned there is no problem there—and I am thankful there is not—but it is not impossible, although perhaps not likely, that words might be said during some debate which might be taken as being discrimination in one way or another. I think it would be a most serious thing if this Bill were to inhibit the freedom of speech of either Members of your Lordships' House or honourable Members in another place.
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, may I just say to the noble Lord that your Lordships' House and the other place are not public places. The public are in fact outside the House, so the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Somers, is not valid.
LORD SOMERS: I think that is rather a technical point.
LORD AUCKLAND: My Lords, I have listened carefully to the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Brockway, which he has made with a good deal of sincerity, but I think his Amendment is much too widely drawn. As I understand it, it would take in places like Tower Hill and Speakers' Corner, where you not only may get a white man inciting racial hatred but you may get a Zambian or some other coloured national doing the same thing. I am not suggesting that this happens on a very big scale. I used to visit Tower Hill quite a lot and also, on occasions, Speakers' Corner. I think it would be a very great pity if the carryings on there were curbed through the means of this particular Bill. I would ask the Government to consider that point.
My second point is this. We are, of course, discussing Clause 1, but if there was really discrimination on a large scale the implications would surely turn towards Clause 6, because there may well be violence ensuing, and under Clause 6 there are very wide powers to deal with any incidents, or most incidents, of the kind which the noble Lord, Lord Brockway, has mentioned.
LORD AIREDALE: My Lords, in sixty seconds I should like to support this Amendment to m the Bill compre-
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hensive, if only in order to justify the Title of the Bill which is
"An Act prohibiting discrimination on racial grounds in places of public resort."
It does not say "in certain places of public resort"; still less does it say "in a few selected places of public resort chosen upon an arbitrary basis". I should have thought that Her Majesty's Government had only two choices: either to accept the noble Lord's Amendment or else to move on the Third Reading in a few minutes' time an Amendment of their own to amend the Title so as to read, not "places of public resort", but "certain places of public resort". I think I have taken 57 seconds.
LORD STONHAM: My Lords, I regret to have to inform the noble Lord, Lord Airedale, that I shall have no difficulty in resisting the temptation to accept either of the suggestions that he put to me as the only two possible alternatives. We have listened, as we might have expected to a speech from my noble friend Lord Brockway fired with sincerity, in which at different stages he presented his case passionately, sympathetically and engagingly. It is good that at this almost last stage of this Bill I should be speaking in the presence of my noble friends Lord Brockway and Lord Sorensen, who between them have done certainly more, I would say, than any two men in Parliament to bring about the state of affairs that we have now in this Bill. But I really do not think it is appropriate that at this stage we should be asked virtually to transform this Bill completely and fundamentally.
My noble friend said that the change in the character of the Bill, meaning that we have now related it to discrimination as a course of conduct as distinct from what it was in the original draft of the Bill, renders unnecessary any restriction with regard to type of place. Again, those may not be his exact words, but certainly that is the intention.
LORD BROCKWAY: To a type of public place.
LORD STONHAM: As my noble friend knows, I did not want to misquote him. But it seems to me impossible that we could, even for a moment, consider utterly and completely changing the whole concept of the Bill in the way that he suggests. He wishes to extend the provision

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against discrimination to the generality of places to which the public are normally admitted, and of course this is a most attractive appeal. It is one which readily appeals, I should have thought, to most of us. Under his proposal, as he made clear, the Bill would cover all premises, all places to which the public is normally admitted—shops, hairdressing establishments, beauty parlours, clubs and similar places which are normally open to the public. Even when my noble friend quoted an example it was that of a hairdressing establishment, not where colour discrimination was practised, because coloured people were there, but where it was the hope of someone that it one day might be practised.
I am bound to say that in this context the Amendment itself, apart from my noble friend's exposition of it, is obscure; and we have to consider the Amendment and its effect if we accepted it. It would be at the least confusing and at the worst inflammatory, and it would also be misleading if, after setting out in the subsection that the provisions are to apply to certain specific places of public resort, we should add certain words which would mean they would apply to all. It is imperative that we should avoid imprecision in our legislation and particularly in this Bill, and that we should make the effect of the law as certain as it can be; but it would be almost impossible to put any exact limit on what may be comprised within the term "place to which the public is normally admitted", because the Amendment would provide a wide and indeterminate field within which neither the members of the immigrant communities would know whether they had rights of entry or service; nor would the proprietors or managers know whether they were entitled lawfully to exclude them or deny them service. Such a situation would inevitably cause friction and would be likely to impose intolerable difficulties on the local conciliation committees in deciding which complaints they were entitled to consider and which they were not.
The places to which Clause 1 applies have all been carefully selected and defined with as much precision as is possible. I am delighted to hear that it would be difficult in some cases to find or
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to quote examples where discrimination was being or had been exercised in such places. It has not been thought necessary to extend the Bill to shops and similar places because there is no evidence that discrimination is in fact being practised in them. I know that the noble Lord, Lord Airedale, does not accept that as a convincing argument, but I do find that it is a proper argument to use. And there is the strong practical objection to including them that discrimination is widely defined in subsection (3) of Clause 1 so as to cover not only refusal to provide access facilities or services, but also to neglect to provide them in the like manner and on like terms as to the public in general. This opens up the prospect of innumerable complaints, for example, of delays in service in shops, most of which may well prove trivial or unfounded or imagined, but which might create feeling and prove excessively burdensome to the conciliation committee.
It is no proper answer to say that the same objections could apply to restaurants which would be brought under the clause, because this would ignore the question of degree, which cannot be lightly disregarded when you come to a practical issue of this kind. Moreover, if we include shops and the other establishments which my noble friend mentioned, it will make a major inroad into the whole basis of retail trading under which the display of merchandise with a price ticket is not regarded as an offer for sale which may be accepted by any customer. There is no doubt that it would be opposed by the whole trading community. The fact that there would be opposition is not in itself a reason for not accepting my noble friend's suggestion. A reason is that the trading community would resent it because the clause would be applied in a field where in fact there is no evidence of discrimination and where they do not discriminate.
Therefore, I must ask my noble friend to accept that an Amendment in such wide and definite terms as the one which he is proposing would create difficulties, not only for suppliers but for consumers in fields where they do not at present exist. I say again that I do not think it is going to serve the cause which we both have at heart if we go on imagining possible places or avenues of discrimination that do not at present exist or where

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discrimination is not at present being exercised. If a situation should arise such as he fears might arise, then it is a matter which we could look at again. But, meanwhile, I am bound to advise my noble friend that we cannot possibly accept his Amendment, and I hope that he will withdraw it.
LORD BROCKWAY: My Lords, I will not pretend that I have been convinced by the speech which the Minister has delivered: but first, in view of his undertaking that, if conditions develop so that the Bill should be extended, that would be considered by the Government, and, second, because, like others, I am much more concerned that the Bill should be placed on the Statute Book than that one should press points about which there is difference, I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Then, Standing Order No. 41 having been suspended (pursuant to the Resolution of July 22):
LORD STONHAM: My Lords, I beg to move that the Bill be read a third time. I will detain your Lordships for only a few moments. I think despite, or perhaps even because of, what has been said to-night, the Government can reasonably claim that the machinery devised for our purpose has been well-designed to provide the greatest possible opportunities for the settlement of disputes with the least possible cause for misunderstanding or friction. Its success will depend very greatly on the efforts of the Race Relations Board which the Home Secretary is to appoint. In making these appointments it will be my right honourable friend's object to find people of ability, of wide human sympathies and of some national reputation, capable of winning the confidence of all sections of the community, whether immigrant or native born.
But success will not only depend on the ability of the Board; it will depend even more on the good sense and restraint of the communities themselves. During the passage of the Bill, we have argued about the forms of discrimination and the places of public resort to which the provisions should apply. I do not wish, in these final words, to spend further time in explaining the principles that have
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guided the Government's choice. It is sufficient to say that the aim throughout has been to find ways of easing racial tensions and not to carry principles—however excellent in themselves—to an extreme that is likely to alienate well-intentioned and moderate public opinion and so to provoke those very feelings of antagonism which we wish to allay.
The noble Lord, Lord Derwent, who informed me that he could not be here to-dad, has suggested, among others, that in some respects the Bill goes too far. I know that your Lordships felt considerable sympathy with the argument which he so clearly and ably advanced for extending to tenants who may be required to share kitchen and sanitary accommodation the protection already given to landlords under the Bill. I promised to look again at what he said, but I am bound to say that, after the most careful consideration we in the Home Office have been quite unable to find any way of effectively meeting the substance of his case without opening the provisions as a whole to wide-scale evasion and abuse. Equally, on the other side of the argument, I realise that there are others, like my noble friend Lord Brockway, who are disappointed that the Government have not felt it wise to go further and attempt to apply the provisions to a wide range of places and activities, in which it is said that discrimination has been, or may at some time in the future be, practised. This balancing of opinion, on the one side and the other, may well prove that the Government have not been so very far wrong in gauging the scone of the Bill. Clearly, however, this is not a matter capable of precise and objective assessment: it is something that time and experience can show.
My final word is this. Whether the Bill goes too far, or not far enough, I trust that all of us will give it every opportunity for the machinery to prove itself in an atmosphere free of unnecessary sectional controversy and provocation. It would, I am sure, be a tragedy if the work of the Race Relations Board and its local committees were to be impeded by well meaning but misguided people seeking to force upon their attention problems with which they will have no authority to deal. Whatever larger ends such action was intended to serve,

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it would not, I am sure, be the way to promote that goal of racial harmony to which all people of goodwill, whatever their race or national origin, are united in dedication. My Lords, I beg to move.
Moved, That the Bill be now read ª.—(Lord Stonham.)
9.2 p.m.
VISCOUNT GOSCHEN: My Lords, although, as the noble Lord, Lord Stonham, said, the Bill in some ways goes too far for some people and, on the other hand, not far enough for others, I am sure that all noble Lords will feel that this has now been thoroughly examined and gone into. I feel that the best thing we can do is to wish the Bill the very best luck it can have; and, as the noble Lord said, we shall do anything in our power to make it work well and be a success.
THE EARL OF IDDESLEIGH: My Lords, I cannot entirely agree that we could not have improved the Bill, had we had the opportunity of exercising the privilege of this House and amending it on Third Reading, and had we had longer to consider it. But I entirely agree with the words of the noble Viscount, Lord Goschen, that whatever criticisms and objections there may be in detail—and I felt that the noble Lord, Lord Derwent, had a point which deserved to be met—we greet the Bill with great satisfaction. We rely very much on the conciliation committees to enforce its provisions in a reasonable and sensible way, and we wish it full good fortune.
LORD BROCKWAY: My Lords, I am not sure that it is necessary to add anything to what has been said. I very much hope that we shall all co-operate in making the Bill successful in diminishing racial and colour feeling in this country. With the knowledge that will be obtained from the operation of this Bill, I hope that we may at a later stage be able to introduce further legislation which may deal more fully with the problem.
On Question, Bill read 3ª, with the Amendments, and passed, and returned to the Commons.