Lords Sitting of 2 August 1965

Preamble
The House met at half past two of the clock, The LORD CHANCELLOR On the Woolsack.
Prayers—Read by the Lord Bishop of Bristol
The Lord Macpherson of Drumochter—Sat first in Parliament after the death of his father.

ADDITIVES IN FOOD AND DRINK
2.36 p.m.
LORD DOUGLAS OF BARLOCH: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the first Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
[The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government whether, and if so subject to what conditions, the use of cyclamates is permissible in food and drink.]
THE MINISTER WITHOUT PORTFOLIO (LORD CHAMPION): My Lords, soft drinks are the only food or drink in which cyclamates may be used at present, and except for certain special drinks, the maximum quantity which may be used is laid down. The cyclamates must comply with prescribed specifications of purity and all drinks containing them must be appropriately labelled.
LORD DOUGLAS OF BARLOCH: My Lords, I thank the noble Lord for his Answer.
LORD HAWKE: My Lords, what is a cyclamate?
LORD CHAMPION: My Lords, a cyclamate is a sweetener. Calcium cyclamate is the dehydrate of the calcium salt of cyclamic acid and contains not less than 98 per cent, and not more than 100·5 per cent. of C12H24O6N2S2Ca calculated with reference to the substance dried to constant weight at 105°C.
EARL FERRERS: My Lords, further to that fascinating answer, could the noble Lord explain how a substance can have 100·5 per cent. of any commodity?
LORD CHAMPION: Not without notice.
LORD DOUGLAS OF BARLOCH: My Lords, may I ask my noble friend whether it is not the case that these substances have no nutritive value and are therefore a falsification to the consumer?
LORD CHAMPION: Yes, my Lords, that is why they are labelled; they have no nutritive value at all. They are a sweetener and taste slightly more pleasant than saccharine.
LORD HAWKE: My Lords, in view of the enormous surplus of sugar which is building up all over the world and being grown by some of the poorest countries of the world, would Her Majesty's Government encourage manufacturers to use sugar as a sweetener rather than these extraordinary chemicals?
LORD CHAMPION: My Lords, I am afraid that we must leave this for the manufacturer to decide.
BARONESS SUMMERSKILL: Oh!
LORD CHAMPION: In fact, they are in some cases beneficial, such as in the case of people with low calorie diets.
BARONESS SUMMERSKILL: My Lords, would my noble friend not agree with me that the manufacturers who make profit out of this fluid are the last people who should be left to decide?
LORD CHAMPION: It is, of course, prescribed by the regulations which I mentioned in my previous Answer.
2.39 p.m.
LORD DOUGLAS OF BARLOCH: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the second Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
[The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government how many synthetic dyes are now permitted in articles of food, when the list was last revised, and whether it is proposed to revise it again and, if so, in what manner.]
LORD CHAMPION: My Lords, the synthetic colouring matters which may be used in food contain 30 synthetic coal tar colours and those permitted natural colourings which can be produced synthetically. The present Colouring Matter in Food Regulations were made in 1957 and were reviewed by the Food Standards Committee whose Report was published in July, 1964. In the light of the Report's recommendations and the comments received on them, Her Majesty's Government issued proposals for revised regulations on July 14. In the main, these proposals follow the recommendations of the Food Standards Committee and will, if adopted, reduce the number of colours which may be used in food.
LORD DOUGLAS OF BARLOCH: My Lords, may I ask my noble friend whether it was not the case that every one of these coal tar dyes is suspected of being cancer inducing, that many of them which were allowed to be used have been now discontinued, and that many used in this country are banned in other countries?
LORD CHAMPION: My Lords, this matter has been very carefully considered by the appropriate committees, and the Minister of Health and the Minister of Agriculture have responsibilities under the Food and Drugs Act. The Government do not feel that there is any considerable
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danger in the use of these substances. I must admit that, if I were speaking personally, I would ban the lot, but I am not.
BARONESS SUMMERSKILL. My Lords, encouraged by my noble friend's last comment, I would ask whether he could tell me why our standards regarding the adulteration of food are so much lower than those insisted on by the Food and Drugs Administration of the United States.
LORD CHAMPION: I am afraid I cannot answer for the United States. So far as we are concerned, this matter is very carefully considered by an independent body of scientists, food technologists and representatives of the general public, which has been set up to advise Ministers on this whole matter of colourings.
LORD DOUGLAS OF BARLOCH: My Lords, may I ask my noble friend whether it is not the case that when the Food Standards Committee reported on this matter they admitted that they were permitting the use of dye-stuffs on which they had little or no information?
LORD CHAMPION: My Lords, I have information on that point. But although the Committee have recommended that certain colours should be withdrawn from the permitted list, they have not suggested that this is a matter of serious or urgent importance to public health. So it has been carefully considered.
BARONESS HORSBRUGH: My Lords, can the noble Lord say which colours are to be withdrawn?
SEVERAL NOBLE LORDS: Blue.
LORD CHAMPION: My Lords, it does just happen that the colour to be withdrawn is blue. It has no political significance but a chemical and a food one.
BARONESS HORSBRUGH: My Lords, is that the only one? Because I thought that in his answer the noble Lord said "colours", in the plural.
LORD CHAMPION: My Lords, there are about six colours altogether, but blue is one of them.
BARONESS HORSBRUGH: And the others?
LORD CHAMPION: Reds, too.

GOVERNMENT ADVANCES TO NEW TOWNS
2.43 p.m.
LORD BARNBY: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
[The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government what, for each of the past two completed financial years, was the total advanced by the Treasury towards development of New Towns; also what is the amount of present commitment for the current financial year.]
THE JOINT PARLIAMENTARY SECRETARY, MINISTRY OF LAND AND NATURAL RESOURCES (LORD MITCHISON): My Lords, the total amounts advanced by the Treasury for New Town development, including advances to the Commission for the New Towns, were in 1963–64 £28·9 million and in 1964–65 £40·3 million. The total expected to be advanced for the current financial year is £51·7 million.
LORD BARNBY: My Lords, the figures indicated by the reply sound very massive. Can the noble Lord indicate whether any thought is being given to greater expenditure than the derisory amount of £200,000 a year, for spreading a better knowledge of the possibilities that exist for emigrants to the Dominions, since the Dominions which have the greatest number of British immigrants are the biggest purchasers of exports from this country?
LORD MITCHISON: My Lords, this matter is rather remote from the expenditure on New Towns, and I should require notice.
LORD BARNBY: My Lords, may I ask the noble Lord whether he would be good enough to pass on my observation to the appropriate quarter for consideration?
LORD MTTCHISON: My Lords, I am sure that the "appropriate quarter", whatever it is, reads Hansard and pays profound attention to whatever is said here. Perhaps we could leave it at that. If there is any particular question that the noble Lord would like to ask, if he could indicate it to me I would certainly do my best to find an answer about the matter.
LORD BARNBY: My Lords, I thank the noble Lord. The reason why I raised the question was that the expenditure on New Towns sounds very massive at a moment, when the aim is for economies in society.

BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, at a suitable moment after 3.30 p.m. my noble friend the Leader of the House will be making a Statement on Commonwealth Immigration. May I also draw the attention of the House to an item of Business for this afternoon—namely, the Race Relations Bill? Your Lordships will see that it is down for all stages. In view of the fact that this Bill is now likely to be amended, it is felt right that we should take the Report stage and Third Reading on Thursday.
VISCOUNT DILHORNE: My Lords, would it be the last Business on Thursday after the Rent Bill?
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, I think we might have discussions through the usual channels to find which is the most convenient way to deal with this. There are other important and interesting items of Business for that day.

EUROPEAN SPACE RESEARCH ORGANISATION (IMMUNITIES AND PRIVILEGES) ORDER 1965
2.46 p.m.
THE PARLIAMENTARY UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (LORD WALSTON)THE PARLIAMENTARY UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (LORD WALSTON) rose to move that an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty praying that the European Space Research Oganisation (Immunities and Privileges) Order 1965 be made in the form of the draft laid before this House on 14th July. The noble Lord said: My Lords, I think it might be to your Lordships' convenience if I dealt with the two Orders on the Paper at the same time; so, with your Lordships permission, I will do so. I know well that Orders of this kind dealing with privileges and immunities are never very popular with your Lordships, but they are necessary in order to enable us to give effect to various international Agreements to which we are parties.
These two Orders refer to the European Space Research Organisation and the European Launcher Development Organisation and the persons who are connected with them. Both these organisations came into being in 1964, in order to co-ordinate European efforts in the field of space research technology, and in the development of the European space vehicle launcher, and both consist primarily of a secretariat, which is concerned with administration, technical planning and establishments in the member countries engaged in the work. The headquarters of both organisations are in Paris, and they have no establishments of any kind in the United Kingdom, nor is it expected that they will have in the foreseeable future. There will, however be, and there are at the present time, occasional visits of members of the staff and experts on the staff to this country, and it is quite possible that from time to time meetings of organs of the organisations will be held here. It will be seen, therefore, that the total number of people is very small—in fact, it is probably in the neighbourhood of 50, at the maximum—and they will be here only sporadically.
The Orders are, in general, similar to previous Orders which have been placed before this House in respect of European organisations, but there are certain important modifications and limitations which have been written into these Orders, largely, I may say, in compliance with views which have been expressed from time to time by your Lordships and in another place. I shall deal with these exceptions because I think they are important. For the first time it will be possible to take proceedings, in respect of motoring offences and accidents, against employees of the organisations, with the sole exception of the heads of the organisations. It will be possible, also, to sue the organisations if one of its motor vehicles causes damage or is involved in a traffic offence. Our spokesmen at the negotiations for the Protocols were insistent on this limitation, having particular regard to the concern which has been expressed by your Lordships on other occasions. This will mean that the organisations and their employees will be subject to the jurisdiction of our courts in respect of proceedings, both civil and criminal, which arise out of motor offences
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and accidents. National representatives do not, it is true, come within the scope of this restriction; but they are most unlikely to bring their cars with them when they come here to attend conferences.
The second limitation is that the organisations will not have immunity from proceedings to enforce an arbitration order made against them. In the international agreements to which the Orders gave effect, the organisations are required to include an arbitration clause in all written contracts and may be required to submit to arbitration disputes arising out of non-contractual obligations or those in which they are otherwise involved, either directly or through the intermediary of any member of the staff whose immunity has not been waived. This is an important modification of the immunity from suit which the majority of international organisations enjoy. A third limitation is that the exemption of officials of an organisation from United Kingdom income tax is conditional on the existence of an internal tax system within the organisation. This means that the salaries of officials will always he subject to tax, but that when the organisations have their own tax system the benefit of the tax will go to the organisation and not to any one member State. Another novel feature of the Order is that the fiscal privileges of the organisations are expressly tied to their official activities, as illustrated under Articles 9 of the two Orders. Thus, under the present régime, such privileges cannot be extended to, for example, any commercial activities which ELDO may come to have when it moves beyond the present stage of developing a prototype space vehicle launcher.
The final and more general point is that in this Order, for the first time, the application of Part 4 of the Schedule to the 1950 Act, the Act under which the Orders are made, is entirely excluded. This means that the families of the officers of the organisations, the official staff of representatives and the official staff of experts will not enjoy privileges and immunities. It is, of course, perfectly right that we should always give very careful thought to any legislation which puts any individual person or any institution in a special legal position as compared with other persons and other institutions. But international organisations are created by and composed of,

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and carry out the will of, sovereign States whose position individually has always been special in the eyes of English law. The same is true of the representatives of sovereign States—namely, diplomats. As a major financial contributor to the organisations with which we are concerned to-day, and as wholehearted supporters of them at all stages of their creation, we have a particular concern to see that they function successfully and smoothly. Both are conducting collectively activities which Governments assume separately as a normal part of their Government functions. Our representatives at the negotiations of the Protocol to which the Orders give effect made a particular effort to introduce into them the new limiting features which I have indicated. Therefore I hope that your Lordships will feel that both these Orders not only fulfil our international obligations and support these two organisations with which we are closely connected and which we think have a valuable part to play, but, at the same time, do not extend unduly widely the circle of privileged people in this country. I beg to move.
Moved, That an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty praying that the European Space Research Organisation (Immunities and Privileges) Order 1965, be made in the form of the draft laid before this House on July 14.—(Lord Walston.)
2.55 p.m.
THE EARL OF BESSBOROUGH: My Lords, we are grateful to the noble Lord for having described the scope of these Orders, which we on this side of the House, of course, greatly welcome. Both these organisations are doing a most important job for the future—perhaps more important than many of your Lordships may realise. We are also glad of the fact that the Orders contain more restrictions than previous Orders of the same kind. Your Lordships will be glad to hear from the noble Lord that immunities are not given, for instance, for motor offences.
On the question of arbitration, it is laid down that the organisation, within its official duties, shall have immunity from suit and legal processes except in respect of an enforcement of an arbitration award made under Article 25 or 26 of the Protocol of the privileges and immunities
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of the organisation. This means that the organisation itself can be made to submit to arbitration on disputes arising out of contracts entered into. We also recognise the further limitation concerning the exemption of officials of the organisation from United Kingdom income tax, which is now made conditional on the existence of an internal tax system within the organisations themselves. And we are glad, too, that privileges cannot be extended to any commercial activities in which ELDO may come to engage when it gets past this period of its development.
There is one point on which I am still not very happy: it concerns Article 12 and the definitions of the staff categories referred to as "A", "B", "C" and "L". The noble Lord did not refer to it this afternoon, but the Minister of State in another place did not give, in my view, very adequate answers in regard to the kind of people included in these categories. Nor was it made clear exactly how many people would be involved. The Minister said that ELDO had 175 employees in these categories and ESRO some 500. We recognise that both these organisations have their headquarters in Paris; but it is not at all clear how many visitors from these organisations there may be to this country during a year. The noble Lord mentioned a figure similar to that given by the Minister of State in another place, as "a pure guess", of some 50 or 60 a year for short periods; and all these might come within the scope of the immunities referred to in the Orders.
The Select Committee in another place made certain criticisms which were based on the fact that these categories were not defined and also—and this is important—that they could be altered by the organisations concerned without reference to Parliament in this country. Paragraph 4 of the Foreign Secretary's reply to the Select Committee refers to this. Although the Orders were eventually approved in another place the answers given on these points were not completely satisfactory. It is true that your Lordships' own Special Orders Committee have not repeated this criticism—and I am not criticising them for that—but I think it should be mentioned in this House, and I should be grateful to the noble Lord if he could give us some further assurance on this point. It was not quite enough for the

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Minister elsewhere to say that he would look at this in the future and would write to the honourable gentleman giving a detailed answer: I should like to have that detailed answer before we approve the Orders.
Then I wonder how far the immunities and privileges of the kind defined in these Orders are likely to be extended. If they are to cover those concerned with space research and launcher development, and members of the six Committees concerned with these matters (and, of course, they may be extended to the officials and engineers, and others concerned) is there any reason why they should not also be extended to those concerned with international co-operative efforts in their technological fields—for example, the Anglo-French Concord project and those projects in which we are concerned with other countries in Europe, such as Germany? On both sides of the House we hope that such European co-operative projects will be increased. But should we then approve a further very considerable proliferation of diplomatic immunity in these cases, too? As noble Lords will know, there is considerable objection in this country to such widespread proliferation of immunities. We must be grateful that in these Orders the immunities granted are less than usual to diplomats, who are themselves numerous enough. As we know, similar Orders apply in the case of the Council of Europe, the Western European Union, the International Atomic Energy Agency, the International Development Association and the Customs Co-operation Council.
It is true that these two Orders are more restrictive than those concerned with other organisations but I am still not altogether happy about the number of people involved and the kind of people; and, in particular, the power of the Councils of either ESRO or ELDO to alter the categories without reference to Parliament. Will the immunity extend, for example, to all the engineers involved in the development and manufacture of the three stages of the rocket? Where exactly do we stop? I am very glad that, in another place, the Minister said that the Government have circulated twenty-four other Governments with a Memorandum suggesting that fresh thought should be given to the whole
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problem of privileges and immunities to such organisations and that the Committee on Legal Co-operation in the Council of Europe and the International Law Commission of the United Nations are going into this matter. I wonder whether it would not have been better to delay approval of these Orders until this fresh thought had been given to the problem.
I should be grateful to the noble Lord if he would say something further on the point. I trust that the Government will pursue their fresh look with diligence and give particular attention and special thought to Article 12 which still leaves the defining of staff categories outside the control of Parliament in the country. I think that is a serious mistake and I hope that the Minister will I look at this again.
3.2 p.m.
THE EARL OF SELKIRK: My Lords, I wish to support my noble friend. Many of us are getting very worried about the proliferation of these Orders. I remember being a member of a Consolidating Corn-mince in 1949 when I think that the phrase "international privilege" was first invented. Until then there had been nothing except diplomatic privilege. I do not think any of us had any idea of the extent to which this would be extended in due course. Can the noble Lord tell us how many organisations have privileges at this time, and how many people are concerned in those organisations? One must never forget that every privilege undermines to some degree the liberties and legal rights of other people. It may be only marginal, but it does so to some extent. I think that we should look at this matter extremely carefully.
The other day we all listened with great interest to the powerful speech made by the noble Lord, Lord Walston. What did the noble Lord say was the object of British policy? He said there were two things: liberty and the abolition of privilege. And here he is, two or three days later, solemnly coming to your Lordships' House and asking for an extension of privilege for people we do not know and whom I doubt whether the noble Lord knows. I think we ought to know just who are the people concerned.
May I say about the speech made to-day by the noble Lord that he never once told us the object of these privileges

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or why are they essential to the success of this work? All the noble Lord said was that the Foreign Office had agreed to some international Agreement. Surely we are entitled to know why the objects of both these organisations cannot properly be fulfilled unless people are given a measure of privilege in this country?
3.5 p.m.
THE EARL OF SWINTON: My Lords, I also wish to intervene to support what has been said by both my noble friends. I do so because, as noble Lords will remember, on several previous occasions when we have discussed the question of immunity I have protested against the very wide extensions which were proposed and have always been assured that "this is only a little one" or that it is the last. It seems to me, however, that this proposal strikes an entirely new line. I wonder whether we should approve this to-day. What is the difference—I should like the noble Lord to consider this rather carefully—between these two international or inter-allied conferences, standing conferences, and any other great international conference? Take, for example, the international conference on civil aviation, held in Chicago in 1944, when I had the honour to lead the British delegation. That conference was as comprehensive as it could be. Every country in the world was represented by Ministers or very high officials. The United States delegation was ministerial and diplomatic as well as including great Service chiefs. The same applied to the rest of the delegations, including those from the Commonwealth. But it never occurred to any of us, I think, that during those long international negotiations we ought to have diplomatic immunity.
Take another example, the international conference which I convened, with great results, a good many years before—the International Shipping Conference, at which every maritime country was represented and where the representation was of the most senior character. That Conference led to the Conventions, on safety, and so on, which have been the international law of the sea ever since. That Conference was held, I think, in 1926. What is the difference between conferences of that kind and this, which, as I understand it, is really an inter
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national study conference or group, and will, I suppose, consist of distinguished engineers? If we are to give diplomatic immunity to all the people engaged in that sort of work, it seems to me that whenever we have any sort of assembly, conference or consortium in which Governments are engaged, a claim for immunity will be made and, if we set this kind of precedent, will have to be given.
I do not want to make personal criticisms, and I am sure that all the people who will be engaged in these organisations will be pure and above reproach. But there are to-day a lot of very odd people in Governments. I am not including right honourable and honourable gentlemen and noble Lords opposite, but there are some very odd Governments and Government officials knocking about, people who get up to all sorts of queer tricks. If, merely because they are attending some international conference, those people are to have diplomatic immunity, we may find ourselves in extraordinary difficulties. I do not mean just that some fellow may come in and "bag" a nice hat from a hat shop: he may engage in more sinister activities. If these people have diplomatic immunity, we shall have a tremendous business in dealing with them. We should have to say that the person in question—it might be a second-class engineer—was persona non grata, and then go through the whole diplomatic business of getting rid of him. That would then invite a reprisal—because that seems to be the way these things are done, though for no justifiable reason; if somebody is got rid of from an Embassy staff, you retaliate in the same way. We do not want to have all that in this kind of consortium.
I would ask the Government—and the noble Lord, Lord Walston, is always so fair and reasonable in these matters—whether it is necessary for us to pass these Orders to-day. It is all right looking at them—and I am very glad the matter is going to be looked at; it ought to be looked at by us with our associates. But, once the Orders, which seem to me to strike new ground (or, to use a different metaphor, seem to undermine what little ground is left to us), have been confirmed, it is really too late. It is frightfully difficult to take butter out of a dog's

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mouth. If we were to come to the conclusion that we ought not to have done this, then it would be much harder to take these privileges away from these people. For these reasons I hope that these Orders may be looked at again.
THE DUKE OF ATHOLL: My Lords, I, too, should like to support all that my noble friends have said. I would also ask the noble Lord, Lord Walston, in rather more detail, whether I am right in thinking that, if these Orders are passed, the third-party liability of the people who are affected by them will be limited to motor car offences. This seems to me to raise completely new problems, and to be very unfair; because, so far as I can make out, if I am run over by one of these gentlemen and have my foot broken, I am able to sue him for damages, whereas if he drops his suitcase on my toe, I shall not be able, unless he agrees to waive his immunity under these Orders, to recover one penny from him, although the damage I sustain may be exactly the same and it may be that he was equally to blame in both cases. I should like to ask the noble Lord, Lord Walston, whether this view is correct. At the same time, I support the thesis that these people should be liable for third-party damages, although I cannot see why this is limited to motor car offences.
LORD CHORLEY: My Lords, could my noble friend give us the date of the Convention which brings this into force?
LORD HAWKE: My Lords, I, too, have frequently protested in the past about some of these Orders. One of the reasons that have been wont to be given to justify them has been that we are dealing with international organisations, and that in some parts of the world their ideas of justice, and so on, are rather more primitive than in our own. But here we are dealing with a European organisation of sophisticated countries, where the citizen is able to get justice if he goes to the courts. Surely in this case, in particular, it is quite unnecessary to give these people any immunity.
3.14 p.m.
LORD WALSTON: My Lords, your Lordships have given me many questions to answer, and, while I am grateful to the noble Earl, Lord Bessborough, for his welcome of this Order, I must confess that I am a little disappointed at the
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reception it has received, in view of the very great advances which have been made to meet the express wishes on other occasions of your Lordships in fulfilling our international obligations to these various organisations. After all, it must be remembered that these Orders which are placed before your Lordships to-day have departed a very long way from previous Orders, and do in fact give far fewer privileges than have been given in the past. I know that, in these matters, one should not expect gratitude, but I had rather hoped to hear a little more thanks for the modifications which have been incorporated in these Orders, rather than criticisms for those other elements which remain.
Let me try to deal, first of all, with the noble Duke's point about his toe and his suitcase.
THE DUKE OF ATHOLL: Not my suitcase.
LORD WALSTON: I sincerely hope that no suitcase will be dropped on his foot, and, indeed, that no motor car will run over his toe; but I would point out that the dropper of the suitcase will be exempt from a civil suit only if he drops his suitcase in the course of his official duties. Now I suppose it is possible for that to happen, but I think the noble Duke will agree that this is an unlikely event, and that it would perhaps be unreasonable to legislate for every conceivable possibility. The exception of motor car offences, which was hard fought for, was brought in because that is by far and away the most common case and the one which affects most people. So I hope the noble Duke will not press the point of the suitcase, or any other matters of that kind.
The noble Earl, Lord Selkirk, I must say, struck very close to the bone when he talked of freedom and the abolition of privilege. It is perfectly true that those are things for which we wish to strive; and, on the face of it, it is perfectly true that this Order looks as if it is going in the opposite direction. However, I would suggest to the noble Earl that we are in fact bound by international obligations in all these matters concerning international organisations, and that although it does not abolish privilege and lead to complete equality, this Order at least makes the privilege which these new organisations are to enjoy

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rather more egalitarian and rather less privileged than previous Orders have allowed to other people and other international organisations. Therefore, although our progress, as is often the case, is slow, I hope the noble Earl will agree with me that it is a progress in the right direction.
The noble Earl, Lord Swinton (I am bad at reading my own notes, I am afraid), said, I think, "We are told so often that this is only a little one, but the last." I do not for a moment suggest to your Lordships that this is the last occasion on which I or anybody else will come before your Lordships asking approval for an Order of this sort. We hope that there will not be many of them, but, undoubtedly, as international co-operation increases—and we all wish for that—there will be more international organisations, and therefore more organisations of this sort which are entitled to some form of privilege.
LORD HAWKE: May I ask the noble Lord one question? I am very puzzled as to precisely how this international obligation arises in the first place. Perhaps, at this point in his discourse, it would be convenient for him to tell us.
LORD WALSTON: I hope I will be able to find the exact justification for this, but it is an international obligation by which Her Majesty's Government, as a signatory of a Convention in the past, are bound. I hope that I shall be able to give the exact reference to that—
THE EARL OF BESSBOROUGH: Perhaps I can help the noble Lord. It is the Diplomatic Privileges Act, 1964, and the Protocol of the European Launcher Development Organisation.
LORD WALSTON: I am most grateful to the noble Earl. There was an earlier one, including the Act of 1950, which is also relevant. But it does stem from one or other of these earlier commitments into which we have entered. At this stage I should also like to point out a fact which I think perhaps several noble Lords have missed—I blame myself for not having made it clear. In general, these privileges are very severely restricted. The full diplomatic privileges of the sort to which the noble Earl, Lord Swinton, was referring are available under these two Orders only to the heads
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of the organisations. The other members of the organisations enjoy privileges 'only in so far as they are fulfilling their official duties; but, in so far as they are behaving as private individuals, they enjoy no immunities whatsoever.
LORD DERWENT: My Lords, I am sorry to interrupt the noble Lord once more, but does the head of the organisation have to claim the diplomatic privilege, as in an Embassy, for example, or is it done by the individual himself?
LORD WALSTON: My Lords, it is accorded to him, and it is something which he enjoys, without having to make any specific claim for it, when he comes to this country, which is very rarely—indeed, so far as I know, he has never been in this country.
The noble Earl brought up the question of the Concord and asked whether that also should not be included. That is entirely different. It is a matter of co-operation between two firms, and there is no Governmental or international organisation which is concerned. So there is no more reason for them to have privileges than there is where any other two firms in different countries collaborate.
THE EARL OF BESSBOROUGH: My Lords, may I say that the Anglo-French Concord may be just as important as the launcher development and the Blue Streak in its three stages?
LORD WALSTON: My Lords, it may be just as important, and if the noble Earl would like to extend privileges to them, he is at liberty to take whatever action is necessary to encourage us to do so. But there is a legal difference between them. As regards the number of people concerned, the figure of approximately 50 visitors a year was mentioned in another place, and I mentioned that figure earlier. I was asked for something rather more specific. I am afraid that I cannot give the noble Earl anything more specific than that, because I have no idea how many visits of staff there will be, either for consultation or for technical work that is going on. For example one place in the North Country is being visited now. Our best guess is that there will be approximately 50 people coming here during the course of a year. But I should not like to be held closely to that figure,

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because it is impossible to lay down any hard-and-fast figures.
The actual categories of staff referred to in Article 12 are described as Category A, staff engaged in administrative and professional work; Category B, executive technical and clerical staff; Category C, staff in minor technical or service grades and Category L, translators and interpreters. These are the categories which were established in 1957 by agreement between the Council of Europe, NATO, O.E.E.C. and Western European Union, in order to standardise grading structures and salary scales. At the same time, a standing Co-ordination Committee was established by the four organisations, to which ESRO and ELDO now also appoint members. Any proposed changes in category would be considered by this Committee and would be a matter for approval by the organisations concerned. So it is not a specific category simply for these two organisations, but a general one which embraces the main international organisations.
The noble Earl asked a more far-reaching question concerning Article 12 and both these Orders. At the risk of wearying your Lordships, as this is a very important and somewhat technical question, I think it might be worth explaining why the provisions were drafted in precisely this present form. Section 1 of the International Organisation (Immunities and Privileges) Act, 1950, which is the parent Act, and the one I had in mind when answering the noble question of the noble Lord, Lord Hawke, lays down that any Order in Council made under it shall be so framed as not to confer any immunities and privileges to a greater extent than is required by international Agreement. Each of the Agreements to which the present draft Orders are intended to give effect provides that the privileges defined in Article 12 of the Order shall be conferred on categories of staff members which the Council shall decide—A, B, C and L in this case. Subsequent to the conclusion of the Agreement, the Council of each organisation has made a decision defining the categories concerned. Therefore, the Orders as they are now drafted do no more and no less than give effect to the requirements of the Agreements as im
20
plemented by the decisions of the two Councils. A provision in comparable terms referring to all officers of grades 1 to 10 inclusive was included in the Central Treaty Organisation (Immunities and Privileges) Order of 1962. Therefore, the present provisions are not without precedent.
I hope that what I have said sufficiently answers the noble Earl's question for him to be satisfied, or at least to know not only that there are precedents, but also the Act under which we are operating and the other organisations which have been dealt with in a similar way. I accept the fact that the position is vague to the extent that some bodies over which Parliament have no control may, by their own autonomous action, alter these categories. That is a point which in the past has not been raised, so far as I know, other than when it was raised in another place fairly recently. The advice of the Law Officers of the Crown is being sought on this point, and if they consider it necessary, suitable Standing Orders can be presented for consideration by your Lordships' House. Therefore this matter can be remedied, if it is thought necessary to do so.
I was asked how many organisations enjoy privileges of some kind or another. The answer is that there are 29 of them. I will not weary your Lordships by reading out the whole list. Six have headquarters in this country; three have branches in this country, and the others are only casual visitors.
I am glad to see that there has been so much interest and such informed interest in this highly complex matter. I hope your Lordships will not follow the tentative suggestion made by the noble Earl, Lord Swinton, and refuse to accept these Orders to-day. I very much hope that your Lordships have been convinced, first, that these organisations are worthwhile, are the sort of thing we wish to support, and do a useful job; secondly, that these Orders are consistent with the normal obligations which I trust we have always accepted, and which I hope we shall continue to accept; thirdly, that the number of people involved is very small, indeed, and fourthly, and perhaps most important, that on this occasion, for the first time, I am asking your Lordships to agree to Orders which show a considerable curtailment of privileges over

21
those which have been granted by this House in the past.
THE EARL OF SWINTON: My Lords, may I assure the noble Lord that, after the explanation he has given, I shall not ask the House to divide on this Order. I would only add that I was greatly interested because the number was 29. Does the noble Lord recall a certain quotation:
"There is a great text in Galatians,
Once you trip on it entails
Twenty-nine distinct damnations;
One sure, if another fails."
On Question, Motion agreed to: the said Address to be presented to Her Majesty by the Lords with White Staves.

EUROPEAN LAUNCHER DEVELOPMENT ORGANISATION (IMMUNITIES AND PRIVILEGES) ORDER, 1965
LORD WALSTON: My Lords, I beg to move the next Motion in my name on the Order Paper.
Moved, That an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty praying that the European Launcher Development Organisation (Immunities and Privileges) Order. 1965, be made in the form of the draft laid before this House on 14th July.—(Lord Walston.)
On Question, Motion agreed to: the said Address to be presented to Her Majesty by the Lords with White Staves.

REGISTRATION OF BIRTHS, DEATHS AND MARRIAGES (SCOTLAND) BILL [H.L.]
Returned from the Commons on Friday last, agreed to, with Amendments: the said Amendments printed, under Standing Order No. 44A.
HIGHLANDS AND ISLANDS DEVELOPMENT (SCOTLAND) BILL
Returned from the Commons on Friday last, with the Amendments agreed to.

MATRIMONIAL CAUSES BILL [H.L.]
House in Committee (on Recommitment) (according to Order).
House resumed: Bill reported without further amendment: Report received.
Then, Standing Order No. 41 having been suspended (pursuant to the Resolution of July 22), Bill read 3ª, and passed, and sent to the Commons.

SUPERANNUATION BILL [H.L.]
House in Committee (on Recommitment) (according to Order).
House resumed: Bill reported without further amendment: Report received.
Then, Standing Order No. 41 having been suspended (pursuant to the Resolution of July 22):
THE LORD CHANCELLOR (LORD GARDINER): My Lords, in moving that the Bill be now read a third time, I should like to remind your Lordships that in the last two months a great deal of work has fallen on the Joint Committee on Consolidation Bills by reason of the exceptional number of Consolidation Bills. One knows the great care with which the Committee consider the subject matters put before them, and I shall, I hope, be expressing the wish of the House if I say how grateful we are to them, and how much we appreciate what they have done. I beg to move that the Bill be now read a third time.
Moved, That the Bill be now read 3ª.—(The Lord Chancellor.)
On Question. Bill read 3ª, and passed, and sent to the Commons.

MERCHANT SHIPPING BILL
House in Committee (according to Order).
House resumed: Bill reported without amendment: Report received.
Then, Standing Order No. 41 having been suspended (pursuant to the Resolution of July 22) Bill read 3ª, and passed.

IMMIGRATION FROM THE COMMONWEALTH
3.35 p.m.
THE LORD PRIVY SEAL (THE EARL OF LONGFORD): My Lords, with your Lordships' permission, I should like to make a Statement similar to that which my right honourable friend the Lord President of the Council has just made in another place about Commonwealth Immigration. If I may, I will use his own words, which are as follows:—
"The Government have had under review the whole subject of Commonwealth immigation, including the control of entry into the United Kingdom and the integration of immigrants in this country into the community. A White Paper covering both these aspects is being issued this afternoon.
"The Government have had the advantage of Lord Mounbatten's Report on his Mission to the Commonwealth countries principally concerned, and the discussions which were held with some Commonwealth Prime Ministers when they were recently in London. We recognise the very valuable contribution that workers from other parts of the Commonwealth are making to industry and the staffing of our social services; and visitors and students from other Commonwealth countries are always welcome here. But nearly everyone, both in this country and in the Commonwealth as a whole, appreciates that there is a limit to the number of immigrants that this small and overcrowded country can absorb. We have come to the conclusion that new measures are necessary if that limit is not to be exceeded.
"The Government have decided that there must be a reduction in the rate at which vouchers are issued to enable Commonwealth citizens come here for employment and, as from to-day, the rate will be reduced from 20,800 a year to 8,500 a year. Within this figure, however, a temporary allocation of 1,000 vouchers a year, to be reviewed after two years, will he made available for Maltese workers in view of our special obligations to Malta. Applications will continue to be entertained under Category B of the scheme
24
for persons with certain special qualifications or skills, though on a more restricted basis than in the past. The remainder of the vouchers will be available under Category A; that is, for workers who, whatever their qualifications, have specific jobs to come to, subject to a limitation of 15 per cent. on the share of those to be issued to any one Commonwealth country. No vouchers have been issued since September, 1964, to applicants in Catgory C, that is to say, the category for persons who wish to work here but do not qualify under Categories A or B, and it has now been decided that no further vouchers will be issued to applicants in this category.
"We propose no change in the present statutory rights of wives and children under 16 to accompany Commonwealth immigrants to, or join them in, this country; but, save in exceptional circumstances, we are withdrawing the present concessions enabling any child aged 16 but under 18 to join a parent, and any child under 16 to join a close relative other than a parent, in this country. With a view to preventing evasion, immigration officers will be instructed to apply strict tests of eligibility to dependants, and will take into account whether the would-be entrant produces on arrival an entry certificate issued in the country of origin.
"It has further been decided that in future immigrants should normally be expected to produce evidence of having undergone a medical test in their own countries.
"We shall also seek a wider power in the coming session to secure that, at the discretion of the immigration authorities, any immigrant, including dependants, may be medically examined at the port of entry and may be required as a condition of admission to report to a Medical Officer of Health with a view to medical treatment being arranged.
"In addition, we shall seek new powers to combat evasion of the control, including an extension of the Home Secretary's power to repatriate Commonwealth citizens for this purpose.
"It is a cardinal principle of the Government's policy on Commonwealth immigration that immigrants

25
have exactly the same rights and responsibilities as any other citizens.
"At the same time it is recognised that the presence in this country of a number of immigrants with differing cultural and social backgrounds, and in particular their concentration in a few areas where there is already a housing shortage and pressure on the social services, has given rise to a number of difficulties. The main problems are referred to in the White Paper under the four broad headings of housing, education, employment and health. There is no dramatic short-term solution to any of them, but we are determined to do what we can to speed up the processes whereby Commonwealth immigrants are fully accepted into our community and the present difficulties are resolved.
"We recognise that there are certain special pressures on the social services in some areas, not just because of an increase in numbers but because of differences in language and cultural background. These special difficulties can require the employment of additional staff who can, for example, speak one or more of the immigrants' languages or who can do the extra work involved in providing a link between the school and the immigrants' homes. Where the need can be shown we shall be prepared to give financial assistance to local authorities who employ such staff.
"The key to removing social tensions lies in action at the local level in which the local authority, the voluntary organisations and the immigrants themselves are all fully involved. The Government have been much impressed by the valuable contribution being made by voluntary liaison committees in certain areas. The Government hope that similar committees will now be set up in other areas where immigrants have settled but where no committees as yet exist. As evidence of our intention to encourage these committees in their work we shall be prepared, in certain circumstances, to make a grant available to voluntary liaison committees towards the salary of a trained, full-time, paid official.
"While recognising that local conditions vary, the Government consider
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that there is also a need for closer co-ordination of effort on a national basis. To this end we propose to establish a new National Committee for Commonwealth Immigrants which will be composed of individuals who are able to bring special knowledge and experience to bear on the problems arising from Commonwealth immigration. This will replace the existing National Committee. It will be the function of the new Committee to co-ordinate the work of voluntary liaison committees, to extend the range of existing information work, to organise conferences, arrange training courses, stimulate research and the examination by experts of particular problems and generally to promote and coordinate effort on a national basis.
"The Government wish to pay tribute to the valuable work of the Commonwealth Immigrants Advisory Council under the chairmanship of Lady Reading"—
in which I am sure this House joins with special heartiness—
"We have, however, decided that the advice which the Council has hitherto made available to the Government can in future be most effectively provided as part of the work of the new National Committee. We therefore intend that the functions of the Council should now be included in those of the new Committee.
"The Government are determined to ensure that Commonwealth immigrants are absorbed into our community without friction and with mutual understanding and tolerance. We believe that we shall be fully supported by public opinion and can rely on the full co-operation of all the national organisations, local authorities and voluntary organisations and of the immigrants themselves."
My Lords, that concludes the Statement.
3.42 p.m.
VISCOUNT DILHORNE: My Lords, I am sure the House will be grateful to the noble Earl for informing us of this very lengthy and important Statement made by the Lord President. So far as I can see, the Statement really falls into

27
two parts: the first dealing with the number of immigrants allowed into this country and the second dealing with the treatment of those who come here. It really is very astonishing, when one's mind goes back, as one's mind does, to the difficulties in getting a certain Act passed, to find it being said now that the Government appreciate, as indeed nearly everyone does, that there is a limit to the number of immigrants that this small, overcrowded country can absorb. Your Lordships will remember that this spring we were very concerned about the extent of evasion, and I indicated then certain action which I suggested might be taken to prevent evasion of the limits, whatever limits there might be. Are we to have details in the White Paper of what steps it is proposed to take to prevent evasion; and can the noble Earl undertake that the legislation to prevent evasion, foreshadowed in this long Statement, will be introduced early next Session?
We were told to await the results of the Mountbatten Mission. Can the noble Earl say whether the White Paper reveals to what extent these conclusions are based upon consultation with other Commonwealth countries, and to what extent other Commonwealth countries agree with them?—for, listening to the Statement, it seems to be on matters primarily within our own control, which we need not have waited since last March to accomplish.
LORD REA: My Lords, may I also thank the noble Earl the Leader of the House for this Statement? The matter is very delicate and very difficult, and I think one may say—I hope without sounding patronising—that Her Majesty's present Government have a very difficult task in trying to get this question into focus and balance. When one is in Opposition one does not know the exact position, and the present Government have had only so many hundred days, whatever number it is, in which to learn the position. I think this Statement is courageous, and I wish them well in tackling this very difficult and delicate problem.
THE EARL OF LONGFORD: My Lords, I should like to thank the noble and learned Viscount, Lord Dilhorne,
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for the restraint he has shown on this important occasion, and the noble Lord, Lord Rea, for the positive sympathy which he has revealed. I can assure him that no Minister should ever mind being patronised. There are experiences much worse than being patronised, and if he adopts the tone habitually, as he always does, we are always very grateful to him. The noble and learned Viscount, Lord Dilhorne, asked me about the measures to be taken to deal with evasion. Some of those measures are outlined in the White Paper. He will understand me it I say that it is not thought advisable to put everything down in black and white before the Bill is published. In fact, it is more prudent in some cases to wait for the Bill. As regards the Bill, I cannot give him an absolute assurance. As an old Minister, he knows it is very unwise to say exactly when a Bill is coming forward. But this one will be brought forward as soon as the Parliamentary timetable admits, and I would say a very high priority will be given to it.
The noble and learned Viscount asked me about consultation with the Commonwealth. We have, in fact, consulted the Commonwealth pretty thoroughly. We did not think it right to try to secure agreement; this was a matter in which in the last resort we had to make up our own minds. But we have made more elaborate efforts than noble Lords opposite did to consult the Commonwealth, and I thought that that was at least a most valuable exercise. If the noble and learned Viscount at the end of the day takes credit to himself and his colleagues for having been wise a little sooner in this case than in some other cases, I congratulate him. I think that Opposition would be a thankless task if one were never able to make suggestions which bore fruit, and we are very grateful to anybody in any part of the House who has collaborated in this result.
VISCOUNT DILHORNE: My Lords, I desire to press the noble Earl—I did not ask him to say at what date the Bill would be introduced—to do all he can to see that this Bill to prevent evasion is introduced as early as possible next Session. We were seriously concerned about the extent of evasion when we discussed this matter in March. The months have been going on. I know

29
that what can be done has been done to prevent it, but I have no doubt that there are many loopholes still. I do urge the noble Earl to do what he can to secure that those loopholes are stopped. When we have seen the White Paper we may want an opportunity to have a debate upon it after the Recess, but I do not propose to put any further questions to the noble Earl on this matter.
THE EARL OF LONGFORD: My Lords, I can assure the noble and learned Viscount that his desire for speedy legislation is shared by the Government.
LORD ROYLE: My Lords, I am sorry, but I cannot share the satisfaction that has been expressed in regard to the Statement which my noble friend has made this afternoon. I wonder whether he could answer one or two questions which go through my mind at this moment. First of all can the noble Earl tell us whether, as a result of this Statement, the Commonwealth immigrants will suffer disadvantages as against alien immigrants? How does this figure of 8,000 compare with the number of alien immigrants who might be admitted to this country? Is there any limitation with regard to the number of aliens? Secondly, relating to the latter part of the noble Lord's Statement, what steps do Her Majesty's Government intend to take with regard to the further education of our own people to ensure that a better spirit exists? Finally, may I reiterate the remark made by the noble Viscount, Lord Dilhorne, with regard to the opportunity for a debate on the White Paper before we get to legislation. Will this be possible?
THE EARL OF LONGFORD: My Lords, I realise that the noble Lord has taken a profound interest in this subject for a long time and I should not like him to think that the anxieties which are in his mind are being ignored. As regards a debate, of course that is for the usual channels, and I have no doubt it will be possible to arrange a debate at a time suitable to all. The noble Lord is aware that one cannot easily make a comparison between the number of aliens and the number of Commonwealth citizens who are admitted here, because the aliens ordinarily come in for a limited period in the first place. They have to register with the police and are confined to
30
employment approved by the Ministry of Labour, and they are freed from these restrictions only after four years' residence. Therefore the numbers cannot be compared. With regard to the foreign workers who settle here, I am advised that the number of aliens accepted as permanent residents of the United Kingdom is under 20,000 a year, and even with the restrictions just announced it seems likely that the total number of Commonwealth immigrants will remain larger than the number of alien immigrants, at any rate for the next few years. Doubtless when it comes to a debate the noble Lord may wish to follow up that matter further.
As to the question of education, I think that is obviously in the minds of all who will be directly concerned in this matter, and particularly the members of this Committee. I agree with the noble Lord that there is a tremendous task to be accomplished, and I do not think it is a reflection on the British people but on human nature. I think it will be the primary responsibility of the Government and of the community as a whole.
LORD DERWENT: My Lords, I am bursting with questions but I shall follow the example of my noble and learned friend and wait until I have seen the White Paper. There is, however, one question arising from the Statement which I should like to ask now. It says that as from to-day the numbers of immigrants will be reduced. I suppose that applies to the number of vouchers issued from to-day and that those who are on their way will be allowed to land.
THE EARL OF LONGFORD: My Lords, the noble Lord is quite right in that assumption.
LORD BROCKWAY: My Lords, may I ask my noble friend whether he is aware that there are others, as well as the noble Lord, Lord Royle, who will be distressed at the Statement which has been made, and we reserve until the debate the opportunity to express our views. In the meantime, I should like to ask three questions. First, how many Commonwealth Governments have agreed to the proposals which have been included in this Statement? Second, could he inform us of the number of illicit entries by immigrants from Canada, Australia and New Zealand as visitors, compared with illicit entries from other

31
Commonwealth countries? Third, in view of the need in our economy and our public services, particularly the Health Service, for more and more workers, how is it consistent to keep from this country our fellow citizens in the Commonwealth who might contribute to those essential services?
THE EARL OF LONGFORD: My Lords, I fully appreciate that the noble Lord's concern is as great as that of the noble Lord, Lord Royle. We all know his devotion to this cause over many years. I am afraid I am not at liberty to disclose the number of Commonwealth Governments which have agreed. It was not a question of trying to secure agreement; it was a question of consultation. I should not like the noble Lord to suppose that we just tried to obtain a number of agreements. We had to make up our minds after full consultation.
In regard to the number of visitors from Canada, Australia and New Zealand as compared with immigrants from other Commonwealth countries, I am afraid I should need notice of that question. Finally, the noble Lord asked possibly the widest question one could ask: how is it compatible, when we need manpower in this country, to exclude citizens of the Commonwealth? I can only say that all the economic aspects of the matter have been considered in conjunction with the social requirements, including our duty to those we do admit, and a balance has been struck in a way which seems fair to the Government; but I cannot expect the noble Lord to agree that it is in all respects ideal.
LORD ELTON: My Lords, does the noble Earl realise that there is one most important fact which was rather glazed over in the Statement and to which no noble Lord has referred? At the present moment the net inflow of dependants is running at something over 50,000 a year. In June the net inflow was 4,762. Does the noble Earl not realise that that means that, whatever may be the measures announced to-day for reducing the number of male workers entering this country as immigrants, they will have little noticeable effect on the grand totals arriving, which are still much greater than we are able to absorb?
THE EARL OF LONGFORD: My Lords, the noble Lord will not expect me to agree with his final point, which is a statement rather than a question. In effect, he asked me whether I was aware that the present large number of dependants would continue to enter this country. I would merely point out that under the proposals there is at any rate some provision for restricting the number of dependants.
LORD OGMORE: My Lords, will the noble Earl urge his colleagues, especially the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Minister of Education, to assist the Commonwealth Institute to develop its work in this country, its work being to make known to the people of this country the background of those from overseas? May I ask him, in particular, whether he will enable the Commonwealth Institute to do work in Wales, which neither the former Government nor the present Government have enabled it yet to do.
THE EARL OF LONGFORD: The noble Lord has raised a question, which he would hardly expect me to be fully prepared to answer at the moment. I am sure the work of the Commonwealth Institute in Wales ought to be promoted in every way, but offhand I cannot commit the Chancellor of the Exchequer.
LORD SOPER: My Lords, I should like to reserve a sense of disquiet about the Statement to-day to which we have just listened. I am sure it will be within the conscience and mind of this House that the principal objection to the previous Bill was this racial discrimination by which many people were debarred from what they believed to be their true Commonwealth status and privileges. If it is within the competence of the noble Leader of the House to give us the information, I should like to know whether the forthcoming Bill will include such recommendations as were excluded previously, for Irish people coming either from Eire or from Northern Ireland to this country.
THE EARL OF LONGFORD: The answer is that there will be no change in the position of the Irish. If the noble Lord expects me to differ from that conclusion, I am afraid he has asked the wrong person.

TRADE DISPUTES BILL
4.0 p.m.
Order of the Day read for the Consideration of Commons Reason for disagreeing to the Lords Amendments.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, I beg to move that the Commons Reason for disagreeing to the Lords Amendments be now considered. It may be for the convenience of the House if I move this Motion formally so that the main discussion may take place on the next Motion which I propose to move, That the House do not insist on their Amendments to which the Commons have disagreed. I think when I come to move my second Motion it would be for the convenience of the House that it should cover all the Amendments. Meanwhile I beg formally to move that the Commons Reason for disagreeing to the Lords Amendments be now considered.
Move, That the Commons Reason for disagreeing to the Lords Amendments be now considered.—(The Lord Chancellor.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

COMMONS REASONS FOR DISAGREEING TO THE LORDS AMENDMENTS
[The references are to Bill (122) as first printed for the House of Lords. The Commons Reason is printed in italics.]

LORDS AMENDMENTS
Clause 1, page 1, line 5, at beginning insert—
("() This Act shall not apply if it is shown that a threat of the character specified in the next following subsection was made to secure the termination of the employment of any person.")
Clause 1, page 1, line 5, at beginning insert ("Save as aforesaid ").
Clause 1, page 1, line 15, at beginning insert ("Where this Act applies")
The Commons disagreed to these Amendments for the following Reason:—
Because the Amendments would unreasonably limit the operation of the Bill, which is to facilitate the resolution of matters at issue as between employers and employed in industry, pending the consideration of such matters generally by tire Royal Commission on Trade Unions and Employers' Associations.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, I beg to move that the House do not insist on the Amendments to which the Commons have disagreed. We are,
34
as your Lordships know, in the field of industrial disputes, in which as a whole we have nothing to be ashamed of, losing, I believe, through strikes fewer days than other industrial countries lose, except for Sweden and West Germany, and only 10 per cent. of time lost through accidents and 1 per cent. of that lost through sickness. Nevertheless, we all agree that every strike is one too many. We are perhaps particularly vulnerable first in the field of exports where export orders may be lost if delivery dates are not kept, and what I think makes us particularly vulnerable in this country is that our Press reports nearly every small strike to an extent which is quite unknown to many of our Continental competitors. We are also particularly vulnerable in the field of public transport, perhaps partly because it is easier to put pressure on the public than on a particular employer and partly because, when one comes to public passenger transport the total receipts and expenditure are so enormous and in a strike little is saved except petrol; all the expenses go on and all the receipts stop. In this field, anything which we can do to minimise strikes by alterations in the law we should naturally wish to consider.
As a whole, I think it may be right to say that this is not a field in which lawyers have great experience. Some people talk as though our High Court Judges live a secluded life, not really knowing what is going on in the world. Nothing in fact could be less true. Judges have spent all their lives learning about other people's trades, because every case they get is different, all about real things, and whether engaged in cases relating to private contracts, commercial law, industry, criminal cases or divorce cases, there is in fact very little that goes on in our national life with which Her Majesty's judges are not familiar.
The only exception I can think of is that of industrial relations, and this is not their fault. The reason for that is, as your Lordships know, that Parliament has thought it right largely to remove the whole of this sphere from the courts. In any other case, if a man joins an organisation and agrees to pay a subscription, if he does not pay it he can he sued for it; but no trade union can sue a member for his subscription. If two organisations make a contract and

35
there is a dispute, the court is the natural place to resolve that dispute. But Parliament has provided that in agreements between trade unions the court has no jurisdiction, and the trade union Acts themselves remove large parts of this field from the consideration of the courts. In addition, we have wages boards and the Industrial Court, we have had the National Arbitration Tribunal and the Industrial Disputes Tribunal; so that both lawyers and judges are less familiar with this field than they are with other fields of our national life. But to the extent that a modern system of industrial law could help, we should all be anxious that it should do so, though the extent to which the law can help in this field is, I think, somewhat limited.
It would appear to me to be primarily a question of communication—communication between employers and employees. One cannot fail to observe that some large companies have never had a strike in their history, while some others seem to be always having strikes. The number of strikes there used to be in Ford's until they changed their industrial relations system is, I think, a matter of common knowledge, and I believe there has been practically none since. It may be that one reason why public transport is somewhat vulnerable is because when the employees are all in pairs on buses all over London, clocking in and out at different times and going to different garages, the difficulties of communication between employers and employees are obviously much greater than they are in a factory, where everyone is on the factory floor. But so far as the law can help, as your Lordships know, what the Government seek to do is, first, in effect to reverse the decision of your Lordships' House in Rookes v. Barnard for the reason that it has given rise to so much uncertainty.
As the noble Lord, Lord Conesford, pointed out when the matter was before your Lordships' House previously, there are learned articles by learned authors in the Modern Law Review, and the Quarterly Law Journal and the Cambridge Law Journal, all disagreeing with one another as to what the effect of that decision is, and in the subsequent Stratford case even the Court of Appeal themselves were divided as to what it was that Rookes v. Barnard had decided.
36
The result of all this uncertainty has been to make it virtually impossible for those in industry to know where they are, because if learned lawyers do not know what it was that Rookes v. Barnard decided it is a little hard to expect trade union officials to be able to do so. It is with that object that, by this Bill, the Government seek to reverse the decision in Rookes v. Barnard.
But apart from that, they have set up a Royal Commission and are looking to the Royal Commission to see what can be done in this field, looking at it coolly and calmly and over a period; and we hope very much that that Commission will be able, for the first time, to give us a satisfactory code of industrial law. We are all, I am sure, very much indebted to those who have agreed to serve on the Royal Commission: the noble and learned Lord, Lord Donovan, who has had particular experience in this field and was a member of the Court of Appeal in the Rookes v. Barnard case; Professor Clegg, Fellow of Nuffield College and Professor Designate of Industrial Relations at the University of Warwick; the noble Lord, Lord Collison, whose qualification we all know; Professor Kahn-Freund, who certainly knows more about industrial codes of other countries than anyone else in this country and possibly than anyone else anywhere; Sir George Pollock, the Director of the British Employers' Confederation; the noble Lord, Lord Robens of Woldingham, whom your Lordships all know; Mr. Shonfield, the Director of Studies at the Royal Institute of International Affairs and former Economic Editor of the Observer; the noble Lord, Lord Tangley, formerly Chairman of the Commission on London Government (your Lordships all know him); Mr. Thompson, Chairman of Barclays Bank; Mr. Wigham, the Labour Correspondent of The Times; Mr. George Woodcock, General Secretary of the Trades Union Congress, and Miss Greene, the Headmistress of Kidbrooke School. I feel we are extraordinarily fortunate in having the services of these experienced persons to guide us in this field. But the Government feel that meanwhile it is essential that the uncertainty of Rookes v. Barnard should be ended.
When the matter was before your Lordships' House previously, your Lordships carried an Amendment with a view,

37
I think, mainly to dealing with the closed shop, as it was called, though I think that, for the most part, your Lordships in dealing with it meant the union shop. This, of course, is not an Amendment which deals with employers who intimidate employees for not joining the union. It is intended only to cover employees, and was no doubt stimulated by the Rookes case itself. But the Rookes case itself was not one of a man who had some conscientious objection to joining a trade union; on the contrary, Mr. Rookes was a keen member of the union. Everybody liked Mr. Rookes, and he did his part to obtain for his union of draftsmen, and for a number of other unions with members working around London Airport, agreement with the British Overseas Airways Corporation and a number of other companies working there, too, that if in any section (and it was left to the employer to decide what a section was) the employer agreed that all the men working in that section were members of the same union, then the employer would not engage anybody who was not a member of that union. And when one is dealing with the union shop, one has, of course, to remember that many big industrial concerns are as much in favour of this as are the trade unions, because they believe it to be to their advantage.
Mr. Rookes was the man who used to interview applicants for the design section and he told them that they would have to join the union. The difficulty which arose was simply that when, at last, B.O.A.C. got their new building they, perhaps quite sensibly, put the design section right at the top, where it was light and airy. But the men complained that the central heating did not work well in the winter, and that on those days when we did have heat and sun it beat through the windows and the place was like a furnace. Mr. Rookes's contention was that the union ought to have threatened industrial action unless their employers built them a new building simply for the design section; whereas the union said, "We must be reasonable about this. They have only just built this building. We are pressing them hard to put in central heating, so that it works properly, and to put in a proper system of air ventilation for the summer." But Mr. Rookes, perhaps unwisely, said at the meeting that he would
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resign his post if his colleagues did not agree with him; and when only one friend voted with him, he had, in consequence, to resign. I think everybody thought that he would be back next week. His friend was. But then words passed, and ultimately, Mr. Rookes refused to return to the fold, with the result that the men lost the benefit of the 100 per cent. agreement for which they had all worked for so long.
This Amendment which was carried by your Lordships' House is not in any way restricted either to this sort of situation or to a closed-shop situation, or to a union-shop situation, or anything do with the membership of a trade union. It would apply wherever men said, "We are going on strike unless you remove so-and-so." The usual cause of such a situation is not a question of trade union membership at all. Many instances were given in another place, but perhaps the most common is where there is a foreman or supervisor whom the men do not like. In a factory of 1,000 men there may be half a dozen foremen, one of whom is a bully. The men may put up with him for a certain length of time, but then the time comes when they are not prepared to put up with him any longer.
The difficulty of the lawyers and the law, as the Royal Commission, of course, will realise, is that the points to which the lawyers have hitherto attached so much importance are not the points that matter. If the men are on seven days' notice, every lawyer says, "Well, if you tell the employers 'We are giving seven days' notice now, and we will be leaving in a week's time, but, if by that time you have removed this foreman, then we will come back', that is perfectly all right; no possible objection can be taken to that. But if you give six days' notice, instead of seven days, then that is all wrong, because that is a breach of contract." The sort of case which is also, I gather, quite common is that in which somebody is stealing from the cloakroom—though this sort of case does not interest the employers so much: it affects only the staff. But it is a difficult thing to catch somebody. Handbags are stolen and lockers are broken open; and if the man is then caught and convicted and fined, and the employer takes him back, you are apt to get trouble because the

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men say, "Every one of us has been under suspicion for this, and we are not having this man back."
Examples were also given in regard to the pits, of men marking trams as if coal had been cut by them, instead of by the men it was in fact cut by, so that they got paid for coal they had not cut. One can quite understand such actions leading to bitter industrial feelings. Another example was that of a woman supervisor who would not let any of the women under her control go to the toilet more than once in the morning and once in the afternoon, and then only for a maximum of three minutes. If a woman was not out in three minutes, she was "hoiked" out. The women grumbled, but they stood this for some time. Then, eventually, they staged a 24-hour strike; and an inquiry was held. The difficulty had been that the supervisor was a relation of the manager. However, the 24-hour strike led to a proper inquiry, and she was then removed to a mental hospital.
One cannot help feeling that the basic trouble nearly always is a failure of communication, and that that is one thing which the law cannot cover. Nor, of course, would this Amendment cover men saying, "Unless you get rid of this man, we shall work to rule", because working to rule is not a breach of contract. No lawyer could object to that. Nor would it cover men saying, "Unless you get rid of this man we shall not have any more overtime", because overtime is usually voluntary, employers relying on the additional rates of pay to produce the men for it. In fact, your Lordships may know that sometimes there is complaint against employers that they are not providing sufficient overtime. So there is that difficulty about it. Nor, as I have said, does it in any way cover employers intimidating people.
Some reference has been made to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. But, of course, whatever opposition there is with relation to that, we have not done anything so far as employers are concerned. I see that the Minister of Labour in another place cited a case which took place only a week or so ago, where a firm near Grantham sent a letter to all their members to say that the
40
National Union of General and Municipal Workers had recruited to the union workmen from the firm, and that if any worker joined the union either he would have to resign or, if not, would be given his cards and dismissed. Only if a worker refused to join the union would he be retained. The employer added that he hoped that this would be taken in the spirit in which it was intended—an observation the precise connotation of which I am not quite clear.
Then again, as the noble Lord, Lord Conesford, pointed out, it does not cover a case in which the men might say, "Unless in future you pay this man half of what he is now getting we shall all go on strike", because that is not threatening his dismissal. The noble Lord, Lord Wade, said that he thought the Amendment went too far and therefore, as an Amendment, there are these practical difficulties about the form in which it was worded. In all these circumstances, I submit for your Lordships' consideration that this is not a case in which this House ought to insist on its own Amendment.
I am not suggesting that this House is limited to drafting Amendments, though a distinction has to be drawn between that which is an Amendment of substance and a drafting Amendment. This certainly is not a case in which your Lordships have observed some point which has not been considered in another place. On the contrary, in another place the Second Reading occupied six hours, and 596 Members took part in the Division which then resulted. The Bill was considered in detail on Committee in another place for over seventeen hours in total, on, I think, seven different days, and an Amendment in substance to this effect was one of the Amendments which were moved and then negatived. On the Report stage the same Amendment was moved again, and the Report stage again took six hours. So not only has this Bill been exceptionally fully considered in another place, but so has the substance of this Amendment, both in Committee and on Report stage. Your Lordships then passed this Amendment after one hour and 50 minutes on a vote in which 7½ per cent. of Members of your Lordships' House voted in favour of the Amendment and 5½ per cent. voted against it.

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The first result was a statement by Mr. George Woodcock in which, according to the Guardian, he said:
"If this Amendment simply makes illegal the threat to strike without making illegal the strike itself, then we might be driven to advise unions not to get in contact with the employers at all and simply to advise their people to walk out without informing anyone of their intention to do so and without giving any opportunity for negotiation."
That, of course, is one of the difficulties which many of us have always felt about letting Rookes v. Barnard stand—that the main message of that case was: strike first, negotiate afterwards: if you all go on strike without explaining why, that is quite all right. What was wrong with Rookes v. Barnard was that when the branch passed a resolution saying that unless Rookes was put somewhere else than the design section they would go on strike, two of them and a trade union official, who was not an employee at all, told the management what was happening—which, one would have thought, it might have been in the interest of the management to know. Under Rookes v. Barnard there is nothing wrong with striking so long as you do not tell people beforehand what it is that you are going to do, and why.
Mr. Woodcock went on:
"This is why I call it distorting industrial relations, but if we are driven to it by the vindictiveness and stupidity of the legislators, in this case the House of Lords, we will have to do it."
I believe that all of us would want the Royal Commission to start off in its very important task under the best possible conditions. I believe that they have just issued a vast questionnaire to obtain information on all sorts of matters which only the trade unions can give. It would not seem that the Amendment is likely to assist very much to get the Commission to start work in the sort of circumstances which I am sure we would all desire. When the other place received your Lordships' Amendment, they did not say, "We have been all through this before and have made up our minds and are not going to agree to this." On the contrary, they spent more than four hours very carefully considering your Lordships' Amendment before they decided that they were unable to agree with it.
There are, of course, subjects on which I am sure many of your Lordships may
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feel that you have among your Members men with perhaps more expertise than exists in another place, though it may well be that the other place would not agree with that. We recently had a debate on Foreign Affairs at a very high level indeed, and in which the speakers included many noble Lords with a lifetime of experience in that particular field. In the field of Service matters and perhaps of scientific knowledge there are Members of your Lordships' House whose expertise and experience at least equals, if it does not excel, that of anybody in another place. But when the question arises how best to deal with disputes on a factory floor, of course the other place is full of industrialists and those who have been trade union officials and those who have worked in industry all their lives.
I hope that your Lordships will not think that I am in any way seeking to denigrate the great assets of your Lordships' House if I point out that this is perhaps not our strongest point. Those who voted in favour of this Amendment were: the noble and learned Viscount, Lord Dilhorne, a lawyer of great eminence, but I do not think that he would claim any more experience of life on the factory floor than I should myself; the noble Lord, Lord Wade, a lawyer; the noble and learned Lord, Lord McNair, a lawyer; the noble Lord, Lord Conesford, a lawyer. And the only Member of your Lordships' House who was not a lawyer and who supported the Amendment by a speech was, I think, the noble Viscount, Lord Massereene and Ferrard whose distinguished service record we know, and whose skill as a racing driver we admire. I think he allowed us to see a very charming operetta in the West End, and as a farmer he no doubt employs farm labourers, but I do not think that he himself would claim to have very much experience of industrial relations in large industries.
Therefore, your Lordships may feel, in considering whether or not to insist on our own Amendments, that one matter which it is quite proper to consider is whether this is a field in which we have particular experience which cannot be matched in another place, or whether, on the other hand, this is really a field in which they have perhaps more experience of this matter than do Members of your Lordships' House. For those reasons, I would ask your Lordships not

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to insist on your Lordships' Amendments.
Moved, That this House doth not insist on the Amendments to which the Commons have disagreed.—(The Lord Chancellor.)
4.27 p.m.
VISCOUNT DILHORNE: My Lords, I have listened with great care to what the noble and learned Lord has said and to the review of the history of the proceedings on this Bill and in particular in another place. He drew attention to the hours spent in discussing the Bill—it is an important measure—in another place, but there was one fact that he did not draw attention to, and that was the fact that when these Amendments were considered in another place they took, as he said, some hours of discussion and it was followed by a Division in which the Government's majority was three. That shows, at least, that the debate was pretty evenly balanced, whatever else it may show, but it is a significant fact which in his review I should have thought the noble and learned Lord might have brought to the attention of this House.
Then the Lord Chancellor said that the Amendments which I moved had been the subject of discussion as to their substance on more than one occasion. I will not enter into any controversy with the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor about that, but I would pray in aid the observations made by the noble Lord, Lord Citrine, during the Committee stage in this House. When referring to the Amendments I had moved, he said:
"If we look at the Amendment by the noble and learned Viscount, Lord Dilhorne, what do we find? We find that it is wider than any of the others."—[OFFICIAL REPORT. Vol. 267 (No. 91), col. 637 June 24, 1965.]
Then he said:
"It introduces a principle which, so far as I know, has not yet been contested, either in the other place or here…"
The noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor entered upon a number of matters in relation to trade unions on which I do not propose to follow him to-day. He referred, in particular, to the observations of Mr. George Woodcock, who is, of course, a member of the Trades Union Congress, to which he made some reference, and I read a report in the
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Press—I hope it is incorrect—to the effect that Mr. Woodcock was wanting to censor the evidence before submission to the Royal Commission. That is quite apart from the issues we have to decide to-day.
I disagree with the way in which the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor put one matter. He said that there was uncertainty as to what the case of Rookes v. Barnard decided, and that the decision was therefore to reverse that decision. I do not think there was any uncertainty as to what the case of Rookes v. Barnard actually decided. There has been, and is I think, uncertainty as to the implications that flow from that decision, but that is a very different matter. What Rookes v. Barnard decided was that Mr. Rookes was entitled to damages in tort against the defendants, because it was held that the defendants had been guilty of the tort of intimidation of his employer and thereby induced loss for him. I do not think anyone disputes that that is what the case decided.
But there is, and has been, uncertainty as to the—if I may use the word in common use—repercussions of that decision. I, for one, fully recognise the desirability of putting that uncertainty at rest, and the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor really cannot say with any justification, in the light of what was said in moving these Amendments and on Second Reading, that these Amendments were to deal just with the closed shop; nor can he properly say that these Amendments apply whenever men say, "We are going on strike unless you do so-and-so." My Lords, they do not; because all that these Amendments do is to preserve the decision of Rookes v. Barnard and to prevent an individual from being victimised. It is only where the strike is in breach of contract, and the threat to strike is therefore to do something which is not legal, that the use of that threat to intimidate an employer will constitute intimidation.
I make no apology to your Lordships for having moved these Amendments on the Committee stage. I did so with one object and one object alone, and that was to secure that this Bill did not make it possible for any individual to be wronged in the way that Mr. Rookes was wronged and to be without redress. I do not challenge the case for removing the uncertainty flowing from the decision of

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Rookes v. Barnard, for alleviating the anxieties of trade unionists in their day-to-day activities, and the Bill as amended makes it clear that the decision in no way restricts the freedom enjoyed by trade unionists before that decision in the conduct of their normal negotiations with employers. I do not propose to take up time to-day in reminding your Lordships of the Convention of Human Rights, but I should like to remind your Lordships of the final paragraph of the Queen's Speech. It was this:
"In all their policies My Government will be concerned to safeguard the liberties of My subjects."
It certainly cannot be said that by resisting these Amendments the Government are showing concern to safeguard the liberties of individuals, for the effect of this Bill, if it is not amended, will be to deprive individuals of any remedy if they are victimised in the way Mr. Rookes was.
I have been attacked in the Press because in the course of the Committee stage I used the word "victimised" in relation to such conduct. I did not invent the application of that term to that conduct. I used the word deliberately, because it was the word used by the Minister of Labour in the House of Commons. Why, then, are the Government insisting—and this is what it comes down to—on seeing in this Bill that trade unions have this power to victimise individuals? I had hoped that with an opportunity of reflection they might come to see that the Bill as amended achieved their objective, and that it really was not necessary to ask the Commons to reject the Amendments made by your Lordships' House. I believe the reason why the Government were not prepared to accept these Amendments is that, despite all the discussion, members of trade unions still do not realise how very limited was the decision in Rookes v. Barnard and really how very limited these Amendments are.
I am confirmed in that view when someone with the authority of the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor says that the Amendments would apply wherever men say, "We are going on strike unless you do so-and-so", when quite clearly they would not; and I am confirmed in that view by the speech made by the noble Lord, Lord Citrine,
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on the Committee stage. I am very glad to see him in his place. If I may quote from his speech, he said then:
"Any act of tyranny in the workshop which was resisted by the men to the point of the dismissal of the person concerned would bring those people within the position of being sued in an action for tort. I do not think there is any doubt about that."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, Vol. 267 (No. 91), col. 638, June 24, 1965.]
I think there is every possible doubt about that, and I hope that the noble Lord will take advice from his son, because I think that that view expressed by the noble Lord is entirely wrong. In fact, that statement completely misrepresents what was decided in Rookes v. Barnard. What is actionable—I repeat again—is to secure by intimidation the dismissal of a man from his job. If you threaten to strike in breach of contract to compel an employer to inflict loss on an employee, that is actionable.
The noble Lord went on to say that if workers joined together to try to get an employee dismissed because they believed him to be a thief or something of that sort, as the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor said, then they would be responsible if he was dismissed from his employment and would be liable in an action for tort. That just is not the case. Rookes v. Barnard did not decide that. One must have regard to what that case actually decided, and those statements, and I think some statements made by the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor somewhat misrepresent the present position. I do not propose to argue the whole matter over and over again. I do not think your Lordships would really wish it to be debated much further. I think there is a very important question of principle here, affecting the rights of an individual. But now we have to decide, not whether it was right for this House to carry those Amendments, but whether, with the other House disagreeing with them, it is right for us to insist upon them.
The noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor sought to draw some comparison between the composition of this House and another place. He did not go so far as to suggest that this House was not entitled to pass those Amendments. He did not go so far as to suggest that this House ought not to be vigilant in protecting the rights of individuals.

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whether those rights are liable to be affected by trade unions or any other body. I firmly adhere to the right—I believe it to be a valid right of this House, when it feels that something which is not of a drafting character, and which is wrong, has been inserted in a Bill—to give expression to that view and to ask the other place to give reconsideration to it. If your Lordships look back in the history of this House you find that that has been done on a great many occasions. It was done a great many times in the course of the 1945–51 Parliament, and I maintain we acted fully within our rights and with full constitutional propriety in taking that course here.
I was interested to note that when, in relation to the Murder (Abolition of Death Penalty) Bill it came to the Government Benches' wishing to reverse a decision which the House of Commons had arrived at, on a free vote, by a majority, there was no suggestion that this House would be doing anything that it ought not to do. Yet, when we moved these Amendments in the course of the Committee stage of this Bill, we were told by the noble Lord, Lord Citrine, that we were thwarting the will of the House of Commons. There was not a word of that, of course, when we were asked by the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor to disagree with provisions which had been put into the Murder Bill by a majority on a free vote.
Now we have to consider whether to insist on these Amendments. I have thought a great deal about it. I must say that in the decision at which I personally have arrived I have not been influenced by any of the observations which the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor thought fit to address to us this afternoon, but I have myself come to the conclusion that it would not be right for me—and I moved these Amendments—to invite your Lordships to insist upon them, and I should just like to explain the reasons why. The decision in Rookes v. Barnard was of a very limited character. It applied where there was a threat to strike in breach of contract, and only where there was a threat to strike in breach of contract; and it applied only where that was done with the object of inducing an employer to take action which would cause loss to a third person.
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It is a narrow issue. In my belief, there is a very important principle involved, but, in view of the kind of observations which have been made—inaccurate, I would say with great respect, as I think they were—by the noble Lord, Lord Citrine, and others, I am wondering very much whether the nature of the principle at stake would be fully appreciated throughout the country.
I would be inclined to ask your Lordships to insist on the Amendments whether or not one could make it clear to the people in the country what really was at stake were it not for the fact that a Royal Commission has been appointed, and were it not for the fact that it has now been made patently clear that it will be well within the Royal Commission's powers to reverse this provision in the Bill and to make it clear that trade unions which are seeking leave to retain these powers of victimisation should no longer enjoy them. What the Royal Commission will do, one does not know; but it is quite clear that, despite the passage of this Bill, they will not be inhibited by the contents of the Bill in any recommendations they may make. I think that is a significant factor.
I am sure the House was right to ask the Commons to consider this question again. The Commons have now considered it, they have expressed their view; and, my Lords, I believe it would be right that we should leave it at that. For once, my Lords, I agree with what was said in a leading article in The Times, of Saturday, June 26, 1965. The last two sentences of that article were:
"It would be premature to provoke a political battle and all that at this stage. The time for a battle, if there has to be one at all, is when the commission reports."
4.45 p.m.
LORD CONESFORD: My Lords, I agree with my noble and learned friend, both in regretting the rejection of our Amendments by another place and in the advice which he has given that we should not insist on these Amendments. In that, I agree also, though for very different reasons, with the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor. One of the things that I regretted, if I may say so, in the Lord Chancellor's speech was that he stated some additional facts about the plaintiff in the litigation Rookes v. Barnard which I think may

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have had the effect of suggesting to some who did not know all the facts that perhaps we ought not to have too much sympathy with him for being the subject of victimisation. On that matter, I propose later in my speech to remind your Lordships of a paragraph of the speech of the noble and learned Lord, Lord McNair, on the last occasion—a speech which very much impressed the Committee.
The Lord Chancellor said, quite rightly, that among those who spoke in favour of the Amendments which we sent to another place there were a number of lawyers, and he included me. It is true that I am a lawyer: it is also true that for some twenty years I was a Member of the House of Commons, for the greater part of which I was Member for an industrial constituency, where I perhaps became acquainted with as many trade unionists concerned with what happened on the factory floor as the Lord Chancellor himself may be acquainted with through his legal attainments and his experience at the Bar. But what makes me a little sad about the proceedings in another place is that so many of those who spoke about our Amendments appeared not to have understood either the Bill or the Amendments, if in fact they had read either.
The subject matter of the Bill is the threat to break contracts of employment, and the Bill provides that such threats cannot be made the ground of action if the threats are made "in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute." Even without the Bill such threats could very seldom be made the ground of a successful action, but the case of Rookes v. Barnard showed that they could sometimes and that the plaintiff could recover damages for the tort of intimidation.
Perhaps I might remind the House of the effect of the case, as described in one of the learned articles to which the noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack referred. This is what Mr. Hoffmann said, in his article in the Law Quarterly Review, which I quoted on the Second Reading of this Bill:
"What the case does decide is that the threat of a strike in breach of contract cannot be used to compel an employer to inflict loss upon some third party."
The special privilege created by the Bill would not, under our Amendments, be
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available if the threat was made to secure the termination of a person's employment. But in view of the great misrepresentation of the effect of the Bill and of our Amendments, perhaps I might remind the House of two things that are not done under the Bill or the Amendments.
It is quite untrue to say that the Amendments would paralyse all threats of strikes: they would do nothing of the kind. A strike is a concerted withdrawal of labour; it is not necessary for every concerted withdrawal of labour to involve a breach of contract. Strikes that do not involve breaches of contract are quite unaffected both by Rookes v. Barnard and by the Bill. Another thing that it is quite untrue to say is that as a result of Rookes v. Barnard, or of our Amendments, any liability of any sort is imposed on a trade union. That is wholly false. The trade union is absolutely immune from any liabilty for the tort of intimidation and for every other tort under Section 4 of the Trade Disputes Act 1906. It is, I think, important that the House should bear in mind that neither of those things is involved.
There are two passages in the speech of the right honourable gentleman, the Minister of Labour, in moving the rejection of our Amendments in another place, on which I should like briefly to comment. The right honourable gentleman—for whom I, a many others, entertain a high regard—assumed that the only concern of those who backed the Amendments was the position of the individual who refused to join, or to remain a member of, a trade union, and the difficulty that he might find in a closed shop or a union shop. He pointed out that what we had done by our Amendments would give only partial and inadequate protection, because they gave no protection to him at all if no contracts were broken. Of course that is true: they will not. Our Amendments deal only with the Bill before us; and the subject matter of that Bill is threats to break a contract. There are all sorts of subjects not dealt with by the Bill or by our Amendments. So that objection has no validity at all. The Minister then went on to say that trade union officials are not lawyers and cannot deal with these fine distinctions. Is that really a reason

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for permitting intimidation and victimisation?
Nevertheless, my Lords, I support the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor in advising the House not to insist on our Amendments. I give that advice because three things will have been achieved by our Amendments if we now accept the Lord Chancellor's Motion, as I suggest we should. The first is contained within the Commons' Reason for rejecting our Amendments. Perhaps I might read the passage to remind the House of it. This is the Reason they gave:
"Because the Amendments would unreasonably limit the operation of the Bill, which is to facilitate the resolution of matters at issue as between employers and employed in industry, pending the consideration of such matters generally by the Royal Commission on Trade Unions and Employers' Associations."
So, by the express terms of a document coming from the House of Commons, it is set on record that the provisions of this Bill are intended to be temporary.
Secondly, we have achieved this: that even as a temporary solution it could command a majority of only three in the present House of Commons; both the Tory and the Liberal Oppositions voted solidly against the rejection of our Amendments. Thirdly, as my noble and learned friend Lord Dilhorne pointed out, the effect of passing this Bill with our Amendments deleted will be not simply to free individuals who might have been liable from indirect effects feared as a result of Rookes v. Barnard, but to bar absolutely a man treated as Mr. Rookes was treated from having any remedy at all. And I believe that the Royal Commission will have no hesitation whatever in dismissing that proposition: that it is right that a man who suffers such victimisation should have no remedy whatsoever. There will be no temptation to ignore the issue; and, indeed, no possibility of the issue being ignored.
Now, my Lords, if I may, I will remind the House of one paragraph from the speech of the noble and learned Lord, Lord McNair, supporting my noble and learned friend's Amendments on the last occasion. He said:
"If any noble Lord will read the Opinions of the noble and learned Lords in deciding the case of Rookes v. Barnard in this House, I think he will come to the conclusion that there is only one word that describes the action
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of the trade union in question towards Mr. Rookes. That is the word that was used by the Minister of Labour on the Second Reading of this Bill in another place, and used to-day by the noble and learned Viscount, Lord Dilhorne, in his opening speech—namely, victimisation. There is no other word for it. In the hope of preventing repetition of that treatment, unless and until it should be endorsed by the Royal Commission on Trade Unions and Employers' Associations, I would urge the Committee to adopt the Amendment moved by the noble and learned Viscount. Lord Dilhorne, which w ill have the support of my noble friends on these Benches."— [OFFICIAL REPORT, Vol. 267 (No. 91), col. 651, June 24, 1965.]
If it is suggested that we should be debarred from having any sympathy by some faults in Mr. Rookes, then I ask the House to remember those words of the noble and learned Lord, Lord McNair.
There are only two other matters to which I wish to allude before sitting down. The noble and learned Lord who sits on the Woolsack mentioned the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; and I think he added a sentence, the exact terms of which I forget, but on which I should, I think, support him, about the uncertainty of the precise effect this Declaration would have on our municipal law. What I suggest that we should consider in relation to that Universal Declaration is this. Whether it puts the countries who approved that Universal Declaration under any obligation to legislate, I do not know, and of that I say nothing. But where we discover that the municipal law of the country in fact gives a remedy at law to a man who is treated in disregard of that convention. I think it a little odd that we should be so ready to sweep away that protection.
One other matter which I should mention is directly raised by this Bill with which we are now dealing for the last time, before the problem comes before the Royal Commission. It is the question of breach of contract. My Lords, I commented before on the extraordinary supposition that the most urgent thing to do in legislation on the subject of trade unions, trade unionists and industrial relations is to facilitate threats of breach of contract. So far from its being true that breaches of contract are an essential feature of all negotiations and labour relations, I trust that the Royal Commission will consider another possibility, that what may be wrong with our existing law on the subject may be that it has

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too many provisions which facilitate breaches of agreements; and that the aim in a civilised society should be that agreements, once made, should be observed.
My Lords, this Bill may be regarded as the extension of what is enacted by Section 3 of the 1906 Act. I think that the Royal Commission may come to the conclusion that Section 3 already goes too far. I hope that they will consider evidence in proof of that proposition. For the reasons which I have given, I agree with the advice given by the noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack. I agree also that this House was right to pass these Amendments and send them to another place where they were defeated by a majority of only three.
5.3 p.m.
LORD CITRINE: My Lords, I should like first to congratulate the noble and learned Viscount, Lord Dilhorne, on accepting the wise advice of the leader writer in The Times of June 26. One is tempted to follow some of the arguments raised this afternoon. Some were reiterating, in other words, what was said in earlier debates, and I must try to resist the temptation to do the same. I wish to make perfectly plain to the noble and learned Viscount, and to the Leader of the Opposition, that I have never at any time in this House disputed the constitutional right of the House of Lords to amend legislation from the House of Commons. I have said that on any matter of high principle which has been determined in the House of Commons this House has no representative capacity which entitles it to reject that principle. I repeat that now, and I believe that in time it will dawn on noble Lords that there is truth and substance in my contention.
The noble and learned Viscount, Lord Dilhorne, could not resist trying to get Party political advantage out of the reference to the Queen's Speech. He used words to the effect that the Government were not concerned with preserving the liberty of the individual. That is a distortion of a political character. It is perfectly evident that, in this practical world, if an employer has to choose between the liberty of an individual and the liberty of thousands of people who decline to work with the one, the em
54
ployer is bound to decide with the majority. That is a principle of democratic government. It may be that at some time noble Lords opposite will realise that in the trade union movement there has been a long history of sustained action on behalf of the individual in face of despotic conduct on the part of their employers. That is where has been the true protection of the liberty of the individual.
I should be very reluctant to accept an interpretation of trade union law from the noble and learned Viscount, Lord Dilhorne. Frankly, I do not think that he understands it. He probably read a snippet or two from my son's hook on trade union law, or perhaps the information was supplied to him by the research department of the Conservative Party. I am quite sure that the noble and learned Viscount never got down to the depths of trade union law in the way in which the noble Lord, Lord Conesford, has done. The noble Lord talks with knowledge. I cannot pay that compliment to the noble and learned Viscount.
I spoke about tyranny, and I am glad that the noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack also referred to it. Tyranny has gone on for too long in industry, but it has been practised from one side and from one angle—that of the employer. In reading debates on this subject I cannot remember any occasion when a representative of the Conservative Party, at least a prominent representative, ever denounced that kind of tyranny. But when something is deemed, for political reasons, to be tyranny, then, of course, we find noble Lords of the Conservative Party, and Party supporters in another place, very keen to give expression to it. Think, for example, of the perversion in the remarks attributed to Mr. George Woodcock. I do not know what newspaper was seen by the noble and learned Viscount, Lord Dilhorne, or what precise opinion was attributed to Mr. George Woodcock by that newspaper. Again, it may be that it is an interpretation of something which appeared or was attributed to Mr. George Woodcock. But when it is suggested that Mr. Woodcock has stated that he was going to censor the evidence of the trade unions before it came to the Royal Commission, I say,

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whoever may have been responsible, that it is a complete perversion.
What Mr. Woodcock has asked is what I should have asked when Secretary of the Trades Union Congress. I should have said to union representatives, "Let us see your evidence before you put it in, because there may be some point which is obscure or inaccurate and, with the help of our research department and our legal department, we may be able to help you to state it more clearly and to get the facts properly marshalled." No trade union attached to the Trades Union Congress would for a moment tolerate censorship by the Congress, and if he reflects at all, the noble and learned Viscount must realise that. The Trades Union Congress is a body which has tried to lift the standard of trade unions within the community and has tried to give the movement a measure of respectability, even of dignity, and I think it bordering on the slanderous that the Congress should be accused in that way.
We have heard on several occasions during our debate references to the Royal Commission. It occurred to me, while the noble and learned Viscount, Lord Dilhorne, was speaking, that he would make a splendid witness, were he kind enough—again perhaps with the assistance of the Conservative Party's research department—to give evidence before the Commission. I should dearly like the opportunity, through my friends on the T.U.C., to put a few questions to the noble and learned Viscount to sound the depth of his knowledge.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, I am naturally glad that your Lordships have arrived at the same conclusion as was contained in the advice which I ventured to put before your Lordships' House, if not for precisely the same reasons. But, in view of this happy unanimity, I do not think that any useful purpose would now be served by a further discussion of those different reasons. The noble and learned Viscount and the noble Lord, Lord Conesford, have suggested to the Royal Commission what they ought to do. I should be tempted to do the same, but may I limit myself to the observation that they may care to remind themselves of the judgments of Lord Justice Scrutton and the Lord Advocate in cases like Hodges v. Webb,
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in which they pointed out that the law in this field would never be sensible until Judges stopped using emotionally toned phraseology such as, "threat", "victimisation" and "intimidation", and stated in ordinary English the facts they were seeking to describe.
On Question, Motion agreed to.

RACE RELATIONS BILL
5.11 p.m.
Order of the Day for the House to be put into Committee read.
Moved, That the House do now resolve itself into Committee.—(Lord Stonham.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.
House in Committee accordingly.
[The LORD AILWYN in the Chair.]
Clause 1 agreed to.
Clause 2:
The Race Relations Board and conciliation committees
2.—
(4) The local conciliation committee shall make to the Board such periodical reports with respect to the exercise of their functions as the Board may require, and the Board, shall, at such times as the Secretary of State may direct, make annual reports to the Secretary of State with respect to the exercise of their functions; and the Secretary of State shall lay before Parliament any report made to him under this subsection.
LORD STONHAM LORD STONHAM moved, in subsection (2)(a), after "authority" to insert "in writing". The noble Lord said: I beg to move Amendment No. 2. Clause 2(2)(a) requires local conciliation committees to receive and consider any complaints of discrimination in contravention of Section 1 of the Bill, made by an aggrieved person or with the authority of that person. This Amendment would require the authority given by an aggrieved person for another to pursue a complaint on his behalf to be in writing. An Amendment to this effect was moved in the other place by Sir John Hobson, who then made the point that unless authority of this kind were given in writing, there might, at some later stage in the proceedings, be a dispute as to whether the aggrieved

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person had really authorised the complaint at all, and pressure might then be brought to bear on him to deny that he had done so. In replying, my right honourable friend the Home Secretary said that he thought there were grounds for making this change in the Bill, but that he would like to consider them further, and the Amendment was withdrawn on that assurance.
We have given further consideration to the Amendment and find that the change suggested is desirable, not only for the reasons given by Sir John Hobson, but also because it may also do something to prevent the local conciliation committees from being asked to consider a large number of ill-substantiated complaints, made on doubtful authority, by people not directly concerned. We can all imagine instances of this kind, where complaints could be made by people who saw, or thought they saw, or heard, or thought they heard, something, and then complained without referring at all to the person directly concerned, and a great deal of trouble might be caused for no purpose. Therefore, I feel that the merits of this proposal will commend the Amendment to your Lordships. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 2, line 35, after ("authority") insert ("in writing").—(Lord Stonham.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
LORD BROCKWAY LORD BROCKWAY moved, in subsection (4), after the second "functions" to insert:
"and recommendations as to any change of their functions which in their view are desirable".
The noble Lord said: I rise to ask your Lordships to accept the Amendment in my name on the Marshalled List. In doing so, may I assure your Lordships and the Minister that, in putting forward these Amendments, my intention is not to obstruct the Bill. I enthusiastically want it to be passed and I hope that my Amendments will be regarded as constructive. This Amendment suggests that, in addition to the specific places of public resort which should be considered by the Race Relations Board—I find from the Paper that this particular Amendment has been omitted; I suppose that it has been ruled out of order.
LORD STONHAM: If I can help my noble friend, it cannot be moved out of
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order. When the first Amendment was called, my noble friend was not in his place and we had to proceed to the, second Amendment. I think that the Amendment he is now moving is Amendment No. 3.
LORD BROCKWAY: I am grateful to my noble friend. The message did not reach me in another part of the House in time for me to be present for the first Amendment. The suggestion here is that, in their report, the Board should not merely review what has occurred, but also make recommendations as to changes of their functions. This is because I think that, in their experience, the Board will find many matters to which they would like to draw the attention of the Minister where they think it might be desirable to extend their functions in order that they may fulfil their duties satisfactorily. At present their functions are limited to the series of specific places of public resort which are mentioned in the Bill.
It is very likely that many of the local conciliation committees will in fact be the committees which are already functioning in connection with the inter-racial councils in the different districts. These interracial councils are finding many cases of conflict and misunderstanding between racial groups, other than those which are specifically included in the terms of reference of the conciliation committees at present. I think it might be of great value to the Minister if those conciliation committees are also able to suggest some change in their functions in order to deal with other questions of any racial conflict which may occur. That is my object in moving this Amendment. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 3, line 18, after word "functions" insert the said new words.—(Lord Brockway.)
LORD STONHAM: I am sure that no Member of your Lordships' House could have possibly imagined that in moving Amendments to this Bill my noble friend would in any way wish to obstruct. Over many years he has been working towards a Bill, if not exactly in these terms, certainly on the principle now embodied in this Bill, and we know that throughout we shall have his support, although we may object to some of the details he would like to have included in the Bill. Although my noble friend has explained

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the purpose of his Amendment, which is quite clear, I am afraid that, as it stands, it would achieve much more and place far greater restrictions and obligations on my right honourable friend and on the Government.
Clause 2(4) already requires the Race Relations Board to make an annual report to the Secretary of State, for presentation to Parliament, on the exercise of its functions. These functions are, first, setting up local conciliation committees to consider complaints of discrimination; and secondly, deciding on reports submitted to them by the committees whether, in a particular place of public resort, there has been a course of discriminatory conduct which seems likely to persist and which should, therefore, be reported to the Attorney General with a view to possible court proceedings. My noble friend asks that, in addition, the Board should be required to make recommendations as to any change in its functions which it considered to be desirable.
It would, of course, always be open to the Board in its annual report to draw attention to any difficulties which were impeding it in carrying out its statutory functions; but this is very different from entitling it to recommend a change in its functions (which could be introduced only by fresh legislation). My noble friend presumably would like the Board to be able to suggest that its functions should be widened to deal with forms of discrimination which have deliberately been omitted from the ambit of the Bill. It is thought by some that, in any case, as soon as local conciliation committees are set up they will be deluged with complaints of discrimination in these fields, although they would have no authority to entertain them. The object obviously would be—I make no complaint about this—to bring pressure to bear through the committees on the Board, and so on Parliament, to extend the whole scope of the law.
In fact if the Board and the local conciliation committees kept strictly to their statutory functions, as they should, the most they would be able to report on such matters is that large numbers of complaints have been made to them; as they would have no authority to investigate those complaints they would not
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be entitled to express any opinion on their substance; still less to go on to make any recommendations. The only matters on which they could be regarded as expert are those with which the Bill requires them to deal: outside this their opinions should not be treated as having a special authority.
It would, in the Government's view, be quite wrong to make use of local conciliation committees and the Board in this way. The effect of the Amendment, as we see it, would be to enable the Board not simply to make recommendations to the Home Secretary, but, since those recommendations would be contained in reports which the Home Secretary would be required to lay before Parliament, to appeal to Parliament over his head. If there is to be a proper relationship of trust between the Home Secretary and the Board, and if the conciliation machinery provided by the Bill is to work properly in an atmosphere free from political pressure, it is essential that the Board should be able to concentrate on its administrative and deliberative functions without being expected in any way to pronounce upon controversial matters of policy. It is difficult to believe that the Board itself would wish to be put in such a situation, or would welcome a provision the effect of which would inevitably be to encourage a flood of complaints on matters outside the Bill which, if they did no worse, would seriously embarrass the work of the local committees.
This is not, of course, to say that it may not at some later date be thought desirable to extend the scope of the legislation; but this would be for the Government and Parliament to consider, on such information and advice as had been obtained from appropriate sources. The Home Secretary would, of course, always be very ready to consider the views of individual members of the Race Relations Board, and of the local conciliation committees, based on their experience; but that is very different from requiring the Board to make recommendations for changing their statutory functions.
I have tried to think of a parallel, but I cannot think of any comparable body which has these powers or has asked for them. I submit to my noble friend that the proper course is to get the Board

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and the committees constituted and working, and for the Government in due course, if the need is clearly seen, to make any changes that may be found necessary in the light of experience, but not to bind the hands of the Government in advance in the manner suggested by the Amendment. I hope that my noble friend will not press this Amendment.
LORD BROCKWAY: The purpose of this Bill is to bring about better race relations in this country. The local conciliation committees, and, in turn, the Board, will become aware of difficulties of which many of us are ignorant now. Would it not therefore be desirable that some opportunity should be given to them to inform the Minister of those difficulties as they occur? I am not thinking only of housing and unemployment. I am thinking of other places of resort where discrimination may be practised, and indeed encouraged, because they are not specifically mentioned in the Bill. I submit those considerations to the Government. I hope that the Minister may be able to think again, and see whether there is any way of meeting this problem before we come to the Report stage. In view of the circumstances, I beg leave to withdrawn the Amendment.
LORD DERWENT: Before the noble Lord withdraws the Amendment, I hope that he does not intend to press this matter on the Report stage, because I have not the slightest doubt that if there is a gap in the Bill as regards functions the Home Secretary will quickly get to hear of it. If you are going to put functions into the annual report, you will get all the committees putting up almost new draft Bills. I submit that this would not work, and that it might in itself make difficulties. If something is not working properly, I am sure the Minister of the day and the noble Lord will find out what it is; and further legislation may be needed. I must say that I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Stonham, about this. I think it might make things much more difficult, and I have not the slightest doubt that, if there are any gaps, they will soon become apparent.
LORD BROCKWAY: I thank the noble Lord for what he has said, and for the encouragement he has given to the opportunity to give the Minister informa
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tion upon these matters. I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 3 [Proceedings for enforcement of section 1 in England and Wales]:
5.28 p.m.
LORD STONHAM LORD STONHAM moved, in subsection (1), to leave out all words after the second "and". The noble Lord said: I think it will be convenient to the Committee if, in moving Amendment No. 4, I discuss with it Amendment No. 5. The object of these Amendments is to ensure that there is an appeal on a question of fact from the decision of a county court judge in proceedings brought by the Attorney General under Clause 3 of the Bill for an injunction restraining the defendant from practising discrimination. Amendment No. 4, and the first part of Amendment No. 5, are purely drafting and transfer from subsection (1) to a new subsection (4) the provision conferring jurisdiction on the county court to entertain proceedings under Clause 3. The substantive change made by the Amendments is contained in the second half of the new subsection (4).
Under Clause 3, proceedings for the enforcement of Clause 1, which prohibits discrimination in places of public resort, may be brought only by the Attorney General by means of an action for an injunction. If the proceedings are brought in the High Court there will be a right of appeal, either on law or fact, to the Court of Appeal. But the position is different if proceedings are taken in the county court. From that court an appeal lies to the Court of Appeal under Section 108 of the County Courts Act, 1959, on any question of law and on the admission or rejection of any evidence. But Section 109 of that Act provides that, on a question of fact, an appeal lies, for present purposes, only if the action is founded on contract or tort. Although the point may not be entirely free from doubt, it seems very unlikely that proceedings under Clause 3 can be said to be founded on tort, because it is the essential characteristic of a tort that damages should be recoverable by the injured party, and Clause 1(4) of the Bill makes it clear that there is no right of action for damages at the instance of any person injured by

63
a breach of Clause 1. The second limb of the new subsection (4) therefore provides that proceedings under Clause 3 are to be included among those listed in Section 109(2) of the County Courts Act, 1959, thus conferring a right of appeal on a question of fact.
The consequences of an injunction are very serious. They restrain the defendant from the prohibited course of conduct on pain of personal detention for an indefinite period. It is right that an appeal should lie as of right in all cases from the decision of the court of first instance, whether it is the High Court or the county court. I hope I have made the point clear and that it is one that your Lordships will feel able to accept. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 3, line 34, leave out from ("and") to ("If") in line 38.—(Lord Stonham.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
LORD STONHAM: I beg to move Amendment No. 5.
LORD DERWENT: May I interrupt for one moment, because I think we are a little out of order? Owing to a misprint on the Order Paper it does not show that we are dealing with Clause 3, and we have not had the Question whether Clause 2 stand part. The last Amendment should have been in Clause 3.
THE DEPUTY CHAIRMAN OF COMMITTEES: We are still in Clause 2.
LORD DERWENT: But page 3, line 34, is in Clause 3—it is a misprint on the Order Paper. Clause 2 has not yet stood part.
THE DEPUTY CHAIRMAN OF COMMITTEES: I am much obliged to the noble Lord. The Question is that Clause 2, as amended, stand part of the Bill.
Clause 2, as amended, agreed to.
LORD STONHAM: I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 4, line 10, at end insert—
("() Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any enactment or rule of law relating to the jurisdiction of county courts, proceedings under this section may be brought in a county court; and any proceedings so brought shall be included among the proceedings men
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tioned in subsection (2) of section 109 of the County Courts Act, 1959 (appeals on questions of fact)").—(Lord Stonham.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to
Clause 3, as amended, agreed to.
Clause 4 agreed to.
Clause 5:
Discriminatory restrictions on disposal of tenancies
5.—
(3) In this section "tenancy" means a tenancy created by a lease or sublease, by an agreement for a lease or sublease or by a tenancy agreement or in pursuance of any enactment; and "disposal", in relation to premises comprised in a tenancy, includes assignment or assignation of the tenancy and subletting or parting with possession of the premises or any part of the premises.
LORD ROYLE LORD ROYLE moved, at the beginning of the clause, to insert:
"() For the avoidance of doubt it is hereby declared that any covenant, agreement or stipulation, which purports to prohibit the disposal of premises comprised in a tenancy, or the grant of a tenancy or licence to any person or persons by reference to colour, race or ethnic or national origins, shall be void, and any covenant, agreement or stipulation which purports to restrict such disposal or grant by such reference as aforesaid shall be void to the extent of such restriction."
The noble Lord said: I hope it might be convenient if the three Amendments down in my name were taken together, because they concern one argument. Perhaps I may have the opportunity of the collection of voices later on, if necessary. When my noble and learned friend the Lord Chancellor wound up on the Second Reading of this Bill, he said that many noble Lords had regarded the Bill as going too far, and others regarded it as not going far enough. I am one of the latter; I do not believe the Bill goes far enough. There was a great temptation to put down Amendments concerning all manner of things that are not covered by the Bill, but, like my noble friend Lord Brockway, I am not anxious in any way to obstruct the progress of this measure; therefore I have picked out in these Amendments something which I regard as being important because the Bill does not seem to make the position clear.
I am asking for greater clarity in this clause which deals with tenancies, because I have some doubt whether it relates the matter correctly to existing

65
law and whether the Bill achieves what it is aimed at. The Amendments are complicated as the clause is complicated and as, to my lay mind, the present law seems to be. But I will do my best to explain, with the advice which I have received. If I am a little longer than is normal in moving an Amendment, in view of the fact that I have three Amendments on the Order Paper perhaps I may be forgiven.
If my proposals were accepted, the words in the first Amendment would precede subsection (1), leaving that subsection in the Bill, but subsection (2) would go out. Subsection (3) would remain, but subsection (4) would read:
"This section applies to covenants, agreements and stipulations entered into or imposed and consents withheld, before as well as after the passing of this Act."
That is instead of "tenancies." All this is to achieve three objects: first, to operate primarily as declaring the state of the existing law, rather than enacting new law; secondly, to declare covenants which prohibit or restrict assignment or under-letting by reference to colour, race, et cetera, void; and, thirdly, to rationalise the sequence so as to deal first with covenants and then unreasonable withholding of consent under certain covenants. The "avoidance of doubt" form is put in because of advice that the present state of the Common Law is such as, very nearly at all events, to achieve the results sought by the present Clause 5, and the courts would probably act on the same basis as in subsection (1) of the clause.
But the Bill does not appear to be comprehensive, and some form of discrimination will still fall under general law—say, for example, religious discrimination. It seems to be fairly certain that withholding consent because the proposed assignee, for example, may be a Roman Catholic would be held unreasonable at present, and this may not be the case if the Bill passes in its present form, because it would then be possible to say that withholding of consent cannot have been unreasonable before. If it had been, why legislate against it?
Clause 5 reads as if it makes due provision. Similarly, with a convenant, say, against Negroes. Here the law at present seems less certain than in regard to withholding consent, but it could be
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argued that such a convenant is void. Therefore, my aim is to make Clause 5 declare the law so that the Bill should not be used to weaken the position of people not directly protected by it. My second object is also intended to settle doubt by showing that the covenants in subsection (2) are void. This subsection seems to be less stringent than the interpretation of the Common Law. Subsection (2) does not make these covenants void but deems them to be qualified covenants, not to assign without consent, and brings them within subsection (1). I am advised that this gives the landlord greater scope for discrimination than under the general law. Under general law, if a covenant is bad it is void and ineffective. Under subsection (2) of this clause it can be deemed to be qualified covenant. Thus I submit that under the general law the landlord would have to accept assignment to a Negro, for instance, unless the landlord is in occupation and sharing the premises, whereas under the clause the landlord could in any event withhold consent, say, on the grounds of inability to pay. He could not do so under the general law. If he is an occupying landlord he can withhold consent because the assignee is, say, a Negro (and this is provided for in the proviso to subsection (1)), or alternatively on financial inadequacy.
I am suggesting that the scope of the landlord is increased by the present clause and that the form proposed in these Amendments would make the covenant void. A landlord concerned on the basis of having to share part of the premises would have to take a qualified covenant against the assignee without consent in order to have any say in who the assignee is to be. Those are the purposes of my Amendment. I appreciate that what I have said probably expresses it in a most inadequate way. It is something which has caused honourable friends of mine in another place and myself to look deeply into the terms of this clause, with anxiety, as a result of which we took advice in the highest possible sphere. As a consequence of that advice we became convinced that the clause was not adequate and was not an improvement on present law. I hope my noble and learned friend the Lord Chancellor will be able to give me some satisfaction on this matter to show that the law is going

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to be improved in the way that some of us desire. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 4, line 34, at the beginning, insert the said subsection.—(Lord Royle.)
5.43 p.m.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I can well understand the motive with which my noble friend Lord Royle has moved these Amendments. They involve some complex questions of law, and I congratulate him on the clarity with which he has put forward his Amendments in this rather difficult field. However, the Government are satisfied that his Amendments would not, in fact, achieve the object which he has in mind. His object, as I understand it, is twofold; namely, first to provide for the direct avoidance of discriminatory covenants against disposal; and, secondly, to recast Clause 5 in a declaratory form so as to avoid any risk of validating by implication covenants which may at present be void.
It has been argued that covenants which discriminate by reference to race, colour, religion or national origin are void at Common Law as contrary to public policy, and that Clause 5 renders such covenants more effective than they otherwise would be, because subsection (2) converts them into valid covenants not to dispose of property without consent, and under subsection (1), and the proviso to it, the consent may be withheld on discriminatory grounds where the landlord would be obliged to share some of the accommodation with the tenant.
In the first place, the argument that discriminatory restrictions of this kind are at present void as against public policy proceeds from the doubtful premise that there is a rule of public policy affecting race or colour discrimination, but there are certainly no satisfactory authorities to that effect. There is no direct authority, but the recent case of re Lysaght, which was reported in The Times on June 5, 1965, suggests that there is no such rule. That was a case in which a gift had been left to a college on terms that excluded students of the Jewish or Roman Catholic faith, and the learned Judge, Mr. Justice Buckley, rejected the submission that the excluding condition was void for uncertainty or contrary to public policy, although he
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accepted that racial and religious discrimination was nowadays regarded as deplorable in many respects, and there was a Bill dealing with race relations at present under consideration by Parliament. So it appears that in fact there is no such strong public policy; and, indeed, there had been an earlier decision of an Irish court in 1942 which upheld a refusal to consent to an assignment founded on racial grounds.
The direct avoidance of the objectionable covenants under my noble friend's new subsection would, it is suggested, lead to unwarrantable results. In the first place, the covenant would be avoided in all cases; there would be no exception in respect of premises forming part of the covenantee's own residence. Yet the need to make such an exception, which is at present incorporated in the proviso to Clause 2(1), is generally accepted, and it was even included in the proposals put forward by the Council Against Racial Discrimination, on the ground that it only conduced to an exacerbation of bad race relations if people were compelled to live in close daily contact with those against whom they entertained strong racial prejudices.
Secondly, where a prohibition against disposal to certain racial or coloured groups is linked with a restriction on disposal to any other persons without the covenantee's consent. In practice, the prohibition would lead to the illogical result that there was no restriction on disposal to a coloured person, while disposal to anybody else required the covenantee's consent. In practice, linked covenants are probably the normal type. I understand that the only example of a discriminatory covenant brought to the attention of Government Departments has been in that form.
Thirdly, it would be difficult to justify the application of the clause to existing tenancies under subsection (4) if the relevant prohibitions were completely avoided. If, however, the application of the clause were restricted to tenancies created after the passing of the Bill, it seems highly probable that all relevant tenancies would in future contain restrictions on disposal without consent, so that the effect of the amended clause would be little different from the clause as it stands. Moreover, it would be wrong to

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enact the clause in a form which suggests that it is needed only to prevent doubts, unless there is a strong probability that under the present law relevant stipulations are already void. Then it is said that, unless the clause is re-cast in this way, it may have the effect of validating, by implication, discriminatory covenants not covered by the Bill—for example, on religious grounds—which may at present be void. But I do not think that is right. As I understand it, it is said that the courts would consider that other discriminatory covenants also have the limited validity which Clause 5 accords to the discriminatory provisions to which it applies. But there is no justification for any fears of unwarranted repercussions elsewhere, and I cannot think that any court, for example, will say that whereas it would have inclined to think that covenants based on religious discrimination would have been invalid, because religious discrimination is not referred to in this Bill it was therefore intended by Parliament that no objection should be taken to discrimination on religious grounds.
A minor alteration which would be effected by the first Amendment would be the addition of restrictions on disposal to the stipulations which are avoided by the clause, but it is not apparent what kind of restrictions are contemplated. Normally a restriction would also be a prohibition and, to that extent, be covered by the existing clause; for example, a restriction against letting to coloured persons for a term exceeding a month or at a rent below £20 a week would he a prohibition in respect of disposals for longer periods or at lower rents and to that extent be covered by the clause. The Amendment also, unlike subsection (2) of Clause 5, contains an express reference to the grant of a licence. This is otiose. A licence to occupy the premises is already covered by the definition of "disposal" in subsection (3) which includes any parting with possession.
The third Amendment is also objectionable by reason of its retrospective operation. It would apply the clause to consents already withheld and thus make it capable of altering retrospectively the rights and liabilities of the parties. Subsection (4) as it stands is not retrospective in any true sense as it affects only future dispositions. I can assure your Lord
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ships that the Government have given a great deal of consideration to this; as the noble Lord, Lord Royle, knows, they arc in substance the same Amendments as were put down in another place, although they were not then moved. It depends, I think, partly on whether certain legal advice which had been obtained was right or not. For the reasons I have given the Government are respectfully of the opinion that it is not quite accurate. For those reasons, I am unable to accept the Amendments and I hope that on considering them further my noble friend will be prepared to withdraw them.
LORD ROYLE: It is always a bone of contention when two legal opinions are being given, and it always leaves the layman in a terrible state of mind. At least my Amendments may have accomplished one thing, and that is that if any of these cases do come before the courts of law there will be some clarification because of the opinion which has been given by my noble and learned friend. While I had a great deal of confidence in the advice that I received, I always bow to the great authority of my noble and learned friend, whose opinions on these matters I value very highly indeed. I would only say one thing to him and that is in reference to the case law which he quoted. I find it very difficult to see an analogy between administration of a will and the disposal of a tenancy. It seems to me that there is nothing very close here, and I could not have accepted, had it not been said by my noble and learned friend, that this was anything that could be closely related. However, obviously I do not want to do anything in any way to hold up this Bill. I gather from a whisper behind me that, before I indicate that I desire to withdraw the Amendment, my noble friend Lord Brockway wants to say something.
LORD BROCKWAY: In putting any consideration to my noble and learned friend I feel rather like a first form boy venturing to make a suggestion to a senior in the sixth form. But nevertheless I do, and I speak as a layman wanting to understand. The object of my noble friend Lord Royle was to secure that any agreements which were entered into before the Act still had authority by the understanding of law at that time. My noble and learned friend

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has referred to a particular case which I am sure, because he mentioned it, has a relation to this subject.
However, I want to draw attention to a particular case in which I was concerned in which very high legal authority gave a different opinion. It was a case of a friend of mine who was a Commonwealth editor of a daily newspaper in London. He signed an agreement for a flat. When the terms of the agreement came to him in detail he found that one clause indicated that he would not obtain permission to sublet the flat to any coloured tenant or to anyone who employed a coloured tenant. He came to me about this and he took very strongly the view that he ought not to accept this agreement. I referred it to a colleague whom my noble and learned friend knows very well, and that legal authority advised me that any court would reject that clause as unreasonable. As I understand it, what Lord Royle is saying is that if after the passing of this Bill you particularise instances which do not include cases which might have come under covenants previous to that and which might then have been held as unreasonable, the very fact that they are not included in this Bill might mean that the law would be interpreted in future as stipulating them as reasonable. I understand that is part of the case which Lord Royle is putting forward. I am greatly reassured by the opinion expressed by my noble and learned friend, but I should like him to comment upon the actual case I have mentioned.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: This is evidently a point on which lawyers disagree. I can only say that the Government have given it considerable thought and are satisfied that the mere fact that the law is in this form instead of purporting to declare a law for the resolution of doubts will not have the effect which has been suggested.
LORD ROYLE: In view of what I have said and the assurances given to me by my noble and learned friend, I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
6.0 p.m.
LORD DERWENT LORD DERWENT moved, in subsection (3), after "enactment" to insert:
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"disposal of premises' does not include permission to use in common with any other person lavatory or kitchen accommodation".
The noble Lord said: On the Second Reading of the Bill I went into some detail as to the problem with which this Amendment tries to deal. After various noble Lords on both sides of the House had spoken to me afterwards, I knew that the majority of your Lordships understood the argument, whether they agreed with it or not; but I am afraid it was apparent from the answer of the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor when he came to reply that he had not in fact understood my argument at all—undoubtedly it was my fault—and I must therefore explain it in some detail again.
The noble and learned Lord when he came to reply kept on bringing in die question of colour and discrimination as regards colour. Let me say here and now that this problem and this Amendment have nothing on earth to do with colour as such, though they do to some extent have something to do with race. The problem is on a comparatively narrow front and it does not apply to all sorts of premises. It applies only to houses which are occupied under two or more tenancies. It would not apply to self-contained flats. It applies only to those subdivided tenancies where two or more tenants have to share a kitchen or a lavatory. It would not, I think, apply to the original tenants because they would take on the tenancies only if they knew with whom they had to share the kitchen or lavatory. But where it applies is where one or two tenancies are sublet.
This problem does not apply where the landlord is living in the house, only where there are two separate tenants. The illustration I gave last time I shall give again, because I think it is a good one. We will suppose that the original tenants of two of these flatlets (call them what you like) were orthodox Hindus, with their families. In the ordinary course of events they would not mind sharing a kitchen—although I believe that that is always difficult. But suppose that one of the Hindu families leaves and sublets to a Scotswoman. Here we have at once an obvious source of friction. The Hindu would object strongly to somebody who would cook beef in her kitchen, and doubtless the Scotswoman, who would be a sub-tenant, and who, I suppose,

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might not take the sub-tenancy, would object to the strong smell of Hindu cooking. But really the person on whom trouble is inflicted is one of the original tenants, the Hindu lady. It is not a question of colour: it might equally well be the case that the second tenant was a Pakistani.
Under the Bill the landlord (who, let us assume, is a good landlord) cannot say that he will not give a licence for the sub-tenancy unless the new sub-tenant is a Hindu. The object of this Bill is to avoid friction. Yet this is one of the things that is likely to cause friction because, if it is on grounds of race, the landlord has no choice as to who is the sub-tenant. The poor Hindu lady is going to be put, to say the least of it, in a pretty awful state about this. The same thing applies to lavatories. As we all know, if I may put it in this form, Indians and Europeans have different methods of using lavatories. Neither likes the way the other uses them, although both are perfectly all right in their own way. This is so much the case that, in factories, in the London Docks and so on, separate lavatories for Indians have had to be set up. This is the problem.
What I have tried to do in this Amendment is to say that when it comes to the landlord's licence, this clause shall not cover the sharing of kitchens and lavatories—in other words, that the landlord shall be able to say, "As I have a Hindu lady in this kitchen, I will not allow the sub-tenancy to go to anyone but another Hindu lady." It may be that those concerned are Pakistanis or people of yet another race. This is a question partly of religion—though this does not come into the Bill—and partly of race. It is a narrow point. If this Amendment is accepted I think it will do away with what may be a serious cause of friction; and, most important, it will give the good landlord an opportunity of trying to get suitable tenants to share this limited accommodation. I hope that this time I have explained the problem. Whether I have found the right solution, I do not know; but I thought it best to put it on the basis, relating it to subsection (3). I hope that what I am trying to establish is now quite clear. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 5, line 11, after ("enactment") insert the said words.—(Lord Derwent.)
6.5 p.m.
LORD STONHAM: I am quite sure that the whole Committee will agree that Lord Derwent has made his point, and also his intentions, perfectly clear, although I do not think we should agree that it is such a narrow point. At least, as I shall attempt to show, it could be widened in use to a considerable extent, and so damage, or seriously impair, one of the most important safeguards that we have in the Bill. By his Amendment Lord Derwent proposes that we should extend the exemption which is provided in Clause 5 for the landlord who occupies part of a house, to any tenancies in a dwelling-house where the lavatory or the kitchen accommodation is shared among the tenants. He has explained why, in his view, this extension is justified.
Although it is not of paramount importance, I am sorry that I must point out to the noble Lord that his Amendment is defective on two counts. The first is that, although in substance it relates to the proviso to subsection (1) of Clause 5—which is where the change should properly be made, if it is made at all—it attempts, somewhat curiously, to operate by adding to the definitions in subsection (3). Secondly, the Amendment does not make it clear what the term "lavatory accommodation" is intended to cover. Properly speaking, as I understand it a lavatory is a place where one washes, and it is a euphemism to use it to denote a water closet; but presumably, although the noble Lord did not say so, his Amendment is intended to cover both.
LORD DERWENT: I am sorry to interrupt the noble Lord. That is not so. Let us call it a water closet. I was not referring to the washing place.
LORD STONHAM: I am sure your Lordships will appreciate that I have to deal with the Amendment and not with later verbal interpolations. But I do not regard what I have just said as the paramount objection to the Amendment, although, as the noble Lord realises, if it is defective in that way, for that reason alone it could not be accepted. But the principle of the Amendment is open to considerable objection.
The noble Lord argued again, as he did on Second Reading, that it is not conducive to good race relations to compel people against their will to share

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these facilities with those of a different race. He pointed out that my noble and learned friend the Lord Chancellor was wrong when, on Second Reading, he interpreted this as meaning colour or colour prejudice. He explained, in the example which he has just given, that a Scotswoman who wanted to cook beef would be offensive to a Hindu lady if they were sharing a kitchen, not because of racial antagonisms perhaps, but largely because of religious feelings and habits of that kind. But that would indeed be a narrow case in the whole field. If we take the Amendment as it would operate as a whole, then, quite obviously, it would cover race, colour or nationality—people who are of different habits, whose habits, although perfectly proper to themselves, are objectionable to other people if they used in common such accommodation as a kitchen or a w.c.
Lord Derwent also said that if you grant the exception to sharing between a landlord and his tenants, so that a landlord is not compelled if he occupies the house to accept a tenant he does not want, it should apply equally to tenants sharing a house. But we think that this is a far from impartial statement of the case. My noble and learned friend the Lord Chancellor made it clear on Second Reading that the proviso regarding landlords is not intended to condone the sort of prejudice which would lead a person to object to sharing a kitchen, for instance, with a coloured person when he might be prepared to share it with another person. The saving is in the clause simply to recognise the principle that a landlord is entitled to some choice as to whom he would accept into his own home to share his accommodation, however misguided or irrational his choice may be thought to be. But this cannot in our view be a line which should be extended necessarily to a tenant occupying, under contract, premises which are not his own.
Apart from this, there are serious practical objections to the Amendment. Lord Derwent said that his Amendment would not apply to self-contained flats, but it would apply where there was, for example, a washroom or w.c. available for common use by the tenants even if each of the tenants also had his own. That is the position under the Amendment as it stands.
LORD DERWENT: If I may interrupt the noble Lord, I think that he has misunderstood the point. We are talking about disposal of premises. If there is a common washroom for a block of flats, the tenant is not entitled to dispose of a common room. He can dispose only of something that he shares in his particular tenancy with another tenant. If a block of flats has it, he cannot dispose of it, of course.
LORD STONHAM: I do not think I am wrong. The Amendment says:
"'disposal of premises' does not include permission to use in common with any other person lavatory or kitchen accommodation."
To take a house, whether it is in self-contained flats or not, or whether it is a house which is divided up and in which each divided part has a lavatory and a kitchen to itself, and where the whole block of flats or the whole of the house is owned by a landlord, if this Amendment were accepted it would be perfectly open to a landlord to evade the provisions of this clause simply by providing, at a small expense, a urinal or wash basin somewhere in the building which the tenants would have a common entitlement to use, even if in fact, having their own, they would rarely, if ever, wish to do so.
If it were the case that tenants of a block of flats or the tenants of a house, each had his own separate lavatory and his own kitchen, but there were provided in that total tenement one place to which they had a communal right, it would be open to the landlord, if this Amendment were accepted, to discriminate or accept one tenant but to object to another, and he would then be protected under this Bill. That is why I said that this is not a narrow issue, much as we appreciate Lord Derwent's sentiments in bringing the matter forward. If we accepted what he described as a narrow view, it could blow this Bill wide apart in relation to housing accommodation.
To put it as concisely as possible, so long as the saving in the subsection remains in its present form the opportunities for evasion will be strictly limited since it will apply only in houses where the landlord is himself resident; but as soon as it is extended to any form of accommodation shared between tenants it becomes an open invitation to abuse. Because of the two earlier defects I

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pointed out and because—very much more important—quite obviously we could not accept an Amendment which would render almost nugatory the very important safeguard in subsection (1) of Clause 5, I hope that the noble Lord will feel able to withdraw his Amendment; or, if he does not feel able to do so, I would ask your Lordships to reject it.
THE EARL OF IDDESLEIGH: May I beg Her Majesty's Government to go into the question of principle raised in this Amendment with the noble Lord, Lord Derwent, before Third Reading? If the Amendment has technical faults, then it will clearly have to be redrafted and could be moved again on Third Reading very reasonably. I do not believe that the noble Lord, Lord Stonham, has been resident for a long time in the East, and therefore he does not perhaps realise what very acute problems the sharing of lavatory or kitchen will produce. Even sharing a bathroom will produce some problems, since Europeans very commonly hang their toothbrush in a bathroom, and to an Oriental a toothbrush is an incredibly dirty and horrible object. When I was teaching school in India little boys would sometimes penetrate to my bathroom and shudder at the sight of my toothbrush.
I do not want to push things to extremes, but I do beg the noble Lord to give further consideration to this matter simply to avoid the intolerable friction which will result if a European, or for that matter a Moslem, cooks beef in the same kitchen as a Hindu, or if a Hindu cooks pork in the same kitchen as a Moslem. I feel that, whatever technical defects there may be in the Amendment, there is a great deal to be said for the noble Lord's principle, and I ask for its further consideration.
LORD DERWENT: I accept first of all that the drafting is at fault. I am not particularly interested in that at the moment because there is a Report stage of the Bill, and doubtless what Lord Stonham has said may help us to get round that. This is a serious matter, but Her Majesty's Government have not considered the matter at all, and they do not care. This is a problem which is going to affect a lot of people, particularly in the poorer districts. Just for some theory or other they are not going to help out.
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That is the position as I see it at the moment.
To take my illustration of the Hindu lady who finds herself sharing a kitchen with a Pakistani, you are going to force her out of the building because she Will not stay. This is not such a wide question. What we are dealing with here is the landlord's licence. It ought not to be beyond the wit of man to find an Amendment to the Bill enabling a landlord to do his best for his tenants. This will not include the actual rooms people live in, because he would not have the right to do anything about that. This is in regard to the kitchen and the lavatory. I do not know whether the noble Lord, Lord Stonham, wants to say anything more to me this evening on this. I see he nods his head.
LORD STONHAM: I am brought to my feet for two reasons, one good one and one not quite so pleasant. The first reason is the remarks of the noble Earl, Lord Iddesleigh. Naturally, he knows that I attach very little importance to the drafting point. We all know that it is possible to get over drafting points, and that is why I did not labour that. But we do attach the greatest importance to subsection (1) of Clause 5 of this Bill, which would prevent a landlord from refusing to grant a tenancy, unless he himself lived in the house, to a person solely on the grounds of race, nationality, ethnic considerations or colour. I thought I made it clear—certainly, I made it clear to my own satisfaction—that acceptance of the Amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Derwent, could amount to driving a coach and horses through that subsection.
I can tell the noble Earl, Lord Iddesleigh, that I have not been out to the Far East recently, but I have been continuously in touch with the near East—the East End of London. When I was a constituency Member of Parliament in the East End of London, which is not so very long ago, every Friday, and often more frequently than that, I had to meet in person just across the table people who were having precisely the difficulties that we are now discussing. I would go so far as to say that in my constituency there were at least 5,000 dwellings where a kitchen was being shared. I agree that that is one of the greatest sources

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of friction possible between two women, but they do not have to be two women of different religions or different races. They can be women of the same family, mother and daughter, if they are both married and sharing a kitchen. I do not need to be told about the contrast. In the space of fifty yards, in the same area of which I am speaking, you can see two shops. One is the Istanbul Emporium and the other is the Hellenic Wine Stores. The proprietor of one of those establishments is a Turkish Cypriot and the other a Greek Cypriot. You get all these conflicts, and they are well understood.
What I object to, which rather forced me to my feet, is the fact that the noble Lord, Lord Derwent, said that the Government have not considered this and the Government do not care. That is quite untrue and quite uncalled for. My noble friends and I, and my right honourable friends in another place, do have very considerable first-hand experience of the problems that are created, and because of that experience we have brought in this Bill and the other legislation that we have introduced on housing matters.
I now come back to the point again. It will be for the noble Lord, Lord Derwent, to reconsider the matter and bring forward at Report stage a different Amendment if he wishes to do so. But it can be acceptable to the Government, and I should have thought could be acceptable to your Lordships' House as a whole, only if it is in terms which ensure that subsection (1) of Clause 5 of the Bill is unimpaired. Very proper considerations have been put forward by the noble Earl, Lord Iddesleigh, of which we are aware and for which we have sympathy, but we cannot and will not, for that reason alone, destroy this whole provision and one of the greatest values of this Bill by so widening the possibilities for exploitation and abuse that we lose the whole value of subsection (1). I hope that that will make the Government's position perfectly clear, and it will be up to the noble Lord, Lord Derwent, to take whatever course he thinks proper.
LORD DERWENT: I am very glad that I have got under the skin of the noble Lord, because we may yet find
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a Government Amendment being drafted. I find it very disappointing that although the noble Lord, Lord Stonham, has admitted that there is a problem here, we do not know how the Government have tried to draw an Amendment to deal with it. They have the Parliamentary draftsmen with them. This is in one way a small point, and although I quite see that it can be widened, it is a question of drafting. In view of what the noble Lord, Lord Stonham, has said—I shall read it very carefully—I shall not press the matter now, on condition that the noble Lord, Lord Stonham, says that he will look at whether something can be drafted from the Government side. He can flatly say "No" now, but will he have another look at it? I should like to know that before I decide.
LORD STONHAM: I would have had another look at the matter, whether the noble Lord had asked me or not. Of course I will look, but it must be on the understanding that there can be no undertaking about this matter.
LORD DERWENT: In view of the fact that the noble Lord is going to have another look at it—and I know that when the noble Lord says that, he does in fact do it; and I hope he will ginger up the Government draftsmen—and as we still have a Report stage on this Bill, I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 5 agreed to.
Clause 6 [Incitement to racial hatred]:
6.27 p.m.
LORD DERWENT LORD DERWENT moved, in subsection (1), to leave out paragraph (b). The noble Lord said: I explained my views on this matter on the Second Reading, and they are that paragraph (b), which deals with using
"in any public place or at any public meeting words which are threatening, abusive or insulting"
is far too wide. I maintain further that these words are unnecessary, because I believe the position to be covered by the Public Order Act. In Clause 7 of this Bill, where the Government are tidying up the Public Order Act, 1936, your Lordships will see that the same sort of matter is dealt with, for paragraph (a)

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of the proposed new Section 5 of the Public Order Act includes the words:
"uses threatening, abusive or insulting words or behaviour".
The noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor did not like the illustration I gave on Second Reading of what this clause might do. I think he was shocked at the very thought that I might, even by mistake, give a penny tip to a taxi driver. But I think that, as this clause stands, it is interfering on far too wide a front with free speech.
Let us take this simple example. This provision, of course, covers any public meeting, so let us assume that there is a by-election and that one of the candidates—it does not matter which Government is in power—is a Pakistani. Let us suppose that the other candidate goes round to his meetings and says, "Do you want a Pakistani as your Member? He was not even born here. He has got ideas different from ours. Do you want that as your Member?" And as it was Election time some of his supporters, whichever side they were on, might put it in even stronger language. I believe that under this clause as it is now written that second candidate is committing an offence, and that seems to me to be going rather wide. If, on the other hand, he or one of his supporters went to nothing but Pakistani meetings and abused them, he would undoubtedly be committing an offence under the Public Order Act, because it would be likely to provoke a breach of the peace and violence might well be used.
I do not want to say much more about this point as I think it is clear. The clause as drafted is much too wide. It might interfere—and I think politically it would interfere—in certain cases with what has always been considered legitimate speech. Moreover, I believe it to be unnecessary, because if severe language is to be covered by this clause then it would equally be covered by the Public Order Act. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 5, line 24, leave out from ("insulting") to end of line 26.—(Lord Derwent.)
LORD SOPER: I hope that this Amendment will be vigorously resisted and, if it is put to the vote, overwhelmingly defeated. It seems to me that the noble Lord, Lord Derwent, impeccably des
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cribed one of the principal purposes of this Bill when he said that it was to avoid friction; and the appended description of this particular clause in the Bill has specifically to do with the incitement to racial hatred. It seems to me that there is no substantive difference between, on the one hand, the publication and distribution of written matter calculated to threaten, abuse or insult in racial terms, and, on the other hand, using in some public place words conducive to the same ends; and it seems to me that only an invidious and factitious difference can be drawn between the two. It may well be argued that the pen is mightier than the sword, but, in questions of the promotion of racial incitement and hatred, the pen is by no means mightier than the larynx.
If I may take one illustration with which I am not unacquainted, I would venture to draw your Lordships' attention to a condition which is rapidly arising in one very public place—none other than Speakers' Corner at Hyde Park. I spent some hours there yesterday in robust controversy. It might not perhaps be within the knowledge of every one of your Lordships that there has been a profound change in the personnel frequenting that public place. Yesterday, I suppose that, in that forum, which has been enlarged, as you know, in the changes which have taken place in the general set-out of the Carriage Road and that part of Hyde Park, there were as many coloured as there were European people; and there were as many inciting to racial hatred or to racial discrimination whose colour of skin was dark as there were those who were similarly inciting to racial hatred whose colour of skin was light. I am quite sure that there is an explosive situation here which would not be met if this Amendment were passed, and, though attempting no prophetic mantle, it does not seem to me likely that we shall be long spared some expression, quite obvious and perhaps dangerous, of racial violence in that time-honoured or time-dishonoured place.
I happen to be responsible for a multiracial church in Notting Hill, and I know that the flashpoint on racial hatred is the ill-considered and hasty word, often in intoxicated conditions, rather than the distribution of inflammatory pamphlets, which have a time lag which may well take off the edge of their virulence. If

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we are really genuinely concerned for the promotion of a more genial spirit as between those of different races, it seems to me completely facetious to delete from this particular Bill the kind of clause which would prohibit or would invest with serious penalties those who, by word of mouth in public places, were able so to incite their fellows, as they do now—and I have every reason to know this—to the kind of hatred which your Lordships deplore and which it is the prime purpose of this Bill to do something to alleviate. Therefore, I very much hope that this Amendment will not be pressed; but, if it is, I very much hope that it will be rejected.
LORD STONHAM: I think we would all agree that my noble friend Lord Soper speaks on the subject of addressing audiences in public places with as much authority as, if not more than, any single one of us. I am bound to point out to your Lordships that, in his Amendment, in plain terms, what the noble Lord, Lord Derwent, seeks to provide is that it should not be an offence under this. Bill to use
"… in any public place or at any public meeting words which are threatening, abusive or insulting …"
with intent to
"… stir up hatred … on grounds of colour, race, or ethnic or national origins".
That is the precise purpose of this Amendment.
This evening, Lord Derwent argued again, as he did on Second Reading, that the paragraph which he seeks to delete is too wide and that it would interfere with free speech; and he gave examples—including the one of the Pakistani and the election—additional to the ones he gave on Second Reading. He said that he thought my noble and learned friend the Lord Chancellor was shocked at the thought that Lord Derwent might possibly give a penny tip to a taxi driver. I think that, in the absence of my noble and learned friend, I can say he was in fact shocked at the thought that anyone could possibly call Lord Derwent "a bloody Jew". My noble and learned friend pointed out on that occasion that this taxi driver example was not apt. Indeed, it was no more apt than the one he quoted just now about canvassing at a political election with regard to Paki
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stanis, because in that case there would be no intent to incite hatred. That is the point. There was no intent on the part of the taxi driver to incite hatred; nor was there in the other example which he gave. Expressions of temporary irritation against a particular individual do not come within the scope of the clause unless they can be shown to have been both intended and likely to stir up hatred against a section of the public, and it is difficult to see how that could be established unless the expressions that we have just been referring to were clearly part of a systematic campaign against the section of the public concerned.
There is some substance in the argument which the noble Lord, Lord Derwent, put forward that offences under this paragraph which he proposes to delete would be likely to be caught by Section 5 of the Public Order Act 1936, and that they ought to be dealt with under that section, because it is of the essence of the offence that it occurs in a public place, and in a public place the objective and relatively simple test of the likelihood of a breach of the peace can be applied. In practice it may well be that Section 5 of the Public Order Act 1936 will continue to be the provision most frequently invoked against people who are indulging in anti-racial speeches or in displays in public places which are generally intended to provoke as well as persuade—and it should be noted that Section 5 covers written material as well as the spoken word.
Indeed, it is likely that the minor rabble-rouser will continue to be dealt with under Section 5, and that Clause 6 will be reserved for the occasional, bad case. But when the bad case does come before a court, it may not be possible properly to present the whole substance of it if the charges are limited to written matter. It might well be that, if you eliminate the spoken word as an offence, as the noble Lord, Lord Derwent, proposes to do, then the standard-bearer, the man you really want to get after—the man who gets up on a platform and so sways people that they give vent to feelings which are in fact an explosion—would be the one that would not be caught. The publication or distribution of written matter, of course, can be undertaken—it usually is—in a public place, and can be accompanied by spoken

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words, and both forms of attempt to stir up hatred should be dealt with on the same basis if at all possible.
If, in such a case, both forms were intended or were likely to provoke a breach of the peace Section 5 of the Public Order Act 1936, as re-enacted in Clause 7 of this Bill, would apply equally; and if a breach of the peace cannot be shown to be intended or likely, but the different criteria for a Clause 6 offence are justified, it is logical that both written and oral incitement should be caught. It is impossible that cases will occur where threatening, abusive or insulting words intended or likely to stir up racial hatred are spoken in a public place or at a public meeting without there being either the intention or the likelihood of provoking a breach of the peace. Indeed, it has been argued that, under the present law—that is, under the law which the noble Lord, Lord Derwent, thinks is sufficient—the only way a Jewish audience can prevent an anti-Semitic speaker at a public meeting from saying vile things about the Jews is by showing signs of being provoked into a breach of the peace. There was a general belief that this was the only way in which the law could be brought to bear against a Fascist campaign conducted in carefully chosen words and innuendoes which could lead to serious disorders and difficulties from which only the Fascists would be certain to gain. From this, in the view of the Government, it is clear that Clause 6(1)(b), which the noble Lord seeks to delete, is absolutely essential and his Amendment therefore is quite unacceptable.
LORD DERWENT: I might have been fully persuaded by the noble Lord, Lord Stonham, on this if the noble Lord, Lord Soper, had not made my case for me. As he well knows there have been difficult people and abusive people at Speakers' Corner for years. Ever since I was a boy—and perhaps more so in those days—we have had the Irish saying all kinds of things there, and people saying similar things to the Irish, and the Public Order Act and its predecessor have been perfectly adequate to keep order. It is what I said at the beginning. But there is a danger. The police understand the Public Order Act; they know what is likely to cause a breach of the peace. They normally do not run these
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people in; they move them along. The danger is that the police—particularly the young policemen—are going to be in difficulties here. I am certain of that. I leave it at that. I hope that no noble Lord gets into trouble for saying things about Yorkshiremen, for instance.
I think the noble Lord, Lord Stonham, has made an adequate case; but we shall watch it. If there is trouble under this clause because of silly arrests (I will not say "prosecutions") we shall ask for it to be changed. Meanwhile, I think the noble Lord, Lord Stonham, has made a reasonable case for keeping it. I beg leave to withdraw my Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 6 agreed to.
Clause 7 [Extension of Public Order Act 1936 s. 5 to written matter]:
On Question, Whether Clause 7 shall stand part of the Bill?
LORD BROCKWAY: Before this clause is agreed to may I put a question to the Minister? Could he inform the Committee what is the relevance of Clause 7? The Bill is a Race Relations Bill. So far as racial relations are concerned, they are covered in Clause 6. This clause is an amendment of the Public Order Act 1936, which looks to me as though it has been dragged in because of some desire to bring about such an Amendment. But it has no relevance at all to the Bill before the Committee, and in the view of some of us this particular amendment of the Public Order Act may be very dangerous in the future.
LORD STONHAM: The purpose of Clause 7 is clear and, we think, very necessary. It is to extend to written matter the provisions of the 1936 Act which at present apply only to the spoken word. In the discussion that we had on the previous Amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Derwent, I thought I made the position clear: that there were some cases which would be caught by Clause 6 and others which would be caught only by Clause 7 which is an extension of the Public Order Act.
LORD DERWENT: May I say from these Benches that we consider that probably the most important parts of the Bill (and I said this on Second Reading)

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are Clause 6(1)(a), which deals with published matter, and the tidying up of the Public Order Act, which deals with the same thing, but which was not properly covered before. I will not say that these are the only good things in the Bill; but we believe they are by far the best in both cases.
Clause 7 agreed to.
6.47 p.m.
LORD BROCKWAY LORD BROCKWAY moved, after Clause 7, to insert the following new clause.
Review of operation of this Act
". The Secretary of State shall within one year of the coming into operation of this Act present to Parliament a review of its operation and provide Parliamentary facilities for the consideration of any amendment to it."
The noble Lord said: I beg to move to insert after Clause 7 the new clause as printed on the Marshalled List. I think it is generally accepted that the purpose of this Bill is not so much to penalise persons for acts of discrimination as to seek conciliation between those elements in our society which come into conflict on racial or colour grounds. When we discussed the Bill on Second Reading a number of us indicated that in our view the Bill fell far short of that purpose and that it did not deal with many of the major causes of racial conflict at the present time. My noble friend the Minister mentioned in an earlier intervention that it does not deal with aspects of housing and of unemployment which, in the experience of many, are the most serious cases of discrimination.
It does not deal with the incitement to resentment which is caused by the columns of advertisements, particularly in suburban newspapers: "No coloureds wanted." It does not deal with many cases of discrimination which occur in places of public resort. If the intention really is to have legislation which will remove the causes of discrimination and of racial and colour feeling, I think we are entitled to ask that the Secretary of State shall, within one year of this quite new experiment in legislation, present to Parliament a review of the operation of the Act. It is only if we have that kind of review that we shall be able to judge whether the Act is effective and whether it should be extended.
I appreciate that the second part of this Amendment (where I ask that Parlia
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mentary facilities should be provided for the consideration of any amendment to the Act) is probably a precedent so far as the drafting of legislation is concerned. I am not committed to it. But I should be happy if the Minister, in considering this new clause, could give us some undertaking that within a year of the operation of the Act a report would be presented to Parliament which would enable us to review its operation. By that, I do not mean only a report of the kind which would be presented by the Conciliation Board but a report which gave a balanced view as to how far it had succeeded in meeting the hopes which we have in mind, which is to improve racial relations in this country. It would enable the Minister, on reading the report, to make recommendations to the Houses of Parliament about how far the legislation needed amending.
I think I am correct in saying that when he received a deputation on this matter the Secretary of State for Home Affairs indicated that after a year, when we had been able to look at the operation of the Act, he would consider the necessity for further legislation. It would greatly help those of us who believe that at present this Bill is inadequate if some undertaking could be given to-night that after the measure has been in operation for a year and its success or failure has been calculated, there will be an opportunity, on Government initiative, for the Houses of Parliament to introduce amendments so as to make the legislation more capable of fulfilling its purpose.
Amendment moved—
After Clause 7, insert the said new clause.—(Lord Brockway.)
6.52 p.m.
LORD STONHAM: My Lords, I feel that even as he moved his Amendment, and even as he advanced his argument, my noble friend Lord Brockway felt that what he was asking was quite impossible. He quite properly made clear that he was concerned with the provisions of the Bill dealing with discrimination. He felt that experience will show that in many spheres not covered by the Bill there will be a great deal of trouble and that fairly early on it will be found that the measure is in sufficient and does not meet the case. That may possibly be so, but even if, in principle, one were willing to admit that, it would be quite impossible to say that

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a year after the legislation came into operation the Secretary of State would be able to present to Parliament a review of its operation and provide Parliamentary facilities for the consideration of any Amendment to it.
The provisions of this Bill will come into operation a month after the Bill becomes an Act and then a number of important things have to be done. The Race Relations Board has to be appointed. In turn that will have to appoint local conciliation committees. They will receive and consider complaints of discrimination, some of which will be referred to the Race Relations Board. The Board may refer some to the Attorney General so that the possibility of taking action in the courts may be considered. How would it conceivably be possible, within a space of twelve months from the coming into operation of this legislation, for the Secretary of State to comply with the statutory obligation which my noble friend proposes should be written into the Bill, and make a report which will have any real value? My noble friend Lord Brockway is aware that he will have ample opportunity, if he so wishes, to raise matters regarding the working of the Bill when it becomes an Act, and even to create opportunities to debate its working or the extension of its scope. His Parliamentary experience is great, perhaps greater than that of almost anyone else in your Lordships' House, and I ask him to consider the consequences not only of the acceptance of his Amendment but of compliance with the request which he made to me.
First, there would clearly be an inadequate period to obtain any real experience of the working of this measure, in respect not only of a review but of amending it. Secondly, I must remind my noble friend that it is not my right honourable friend the Secretary of State who provides Parliamentary facilities, and he cannot guarantee Parliamentary time for a Government measure or Government time for a Private Member's measure. Surely it is clear that no Government could possibly agree to having their Parliamentary timetable pre-empted in a way such as is suggested by the Amendment. Regrettably enough, my noble friend has too much reason for knowing how impossible it has been until now to get a Government
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to devote time and backing to legislation on this subject.
I can give no undertaking of the kind for which my noble friend asked, but I will say that the Government have a very keen and continual interest and concern regarding this matter and for the working of this measure which will be watched closely and anxiously. If there is a need for a change which is clearly shown in the light of experience (I submit that that certainly will not be within twelve months or even two or three years, for it will take time) we shall, of course, have to consider what else it may be necessary to ask Parliament to do. Meanwhile I hope that my noble friend, having almost got this Bill on the Statute Book, will realise that we must gain reliable knowledge of its effectiveness so as to be able to take action if and when it should be proved to be necessary.
LORD BROCKWAY: In view of the crumbs of consolation handed to me in those last sentences, I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 8 agreed to.
The Schedule agreed to.
House resumed: Bill reported with Amendments.

RAIL CLOSURES: WITHDRAWAL OF ALTERNATIVE BUS SERVICES
6.58 p.m.
THE EARL OF KINNOULL THE EARL OF KINNOULL rose to ask Her Majesty's Government whether they are aware that bus services, quoted as alternatives to rail services at Transport Users Consultative Committee hearings, have in some cases been withdrawn, and whether they will consider making public passenger road services subject to T.U.C.C. closure procedure. The noble Earl said: The Question standing in my name to-night is one which I know the Government have under review and I believe that a report is soon to be published on the matter. My question relates to the withdrawal of bus services, and I think it significant that there are areas in Britain which at the moment are totally lacking in public transport services. I hope that when the noble Lord, Lord Lindgren, replies he will go

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beyond saying that the matter will be looked into, a survey made and some action taken.
I wish to draw the attention of the noble Lord to rural bus services which, following the withdrawal of local branch railway lines, became the only form of public transport. I have proof of nine bus services which have been withdrawn—there must be many more—and each was considered as an alternative transport service at the time when there were rail closures. They have subsequently been withdrawn on the grounds of economy, without any reference to the Minister of Transport or concern about public hardship. Section 56 of the 1962 Act would appear, at first glance, to indicate that it could not be possible for bus services to be withdrawn in this manner, for the Minister has a clear duty under the Act to see that an adequate alternative public transport service is available before confirming a rail closure. He may even impose conditions on this alternative service, and if it is necessary that the bus company should keep operating and it is making a loss, I understand that it can claim a subsidy from the Railways Board. The loophole to this Act appears to be that where the Minister is satisfied that there is a suitable alternative bus service but makes no condition, the service can subsequently be withdrawn without any reference to the Minister.
Of the nine bus services of which I have evidence, perhaps I may quote from a letter of the Magor and St. Mellons Rural District Council, which I think sums up the difficulties that face these areas. The letter was written to the National Council on Inland Transport in June of this year and is as follows:
"May I take the opportunity of asking for your assistance and advice on the transport problem which has arisen in my Council's area, due to the withdrawal of the Cardiff/Marshfield bus service. In 1959 the British Railways applied for the withdrawal of passenger facilities from Marshfield Station which lies approximately halfway between Newport and Cardiff. At the Transport Users Consultative Committee's inquiry it was forcibly pointed out by British Railways that an adequate bus service, operated by Newport and Cardiff Corporations, was available to residents of the area to Cardiff and Newport. The fact that this submission contributed greatly to the decision of the T.U.C.C. to support the closure has been confirmed by the Secretary to the Consultative Committee within the past three weeks. Now the Cardiff City Transport
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Department has withdrawn the service from Cardiff to Marshfield on the grounds that the annual deficit is having to be met by the Cardiff ratepayers. It is reasonable to expect a similar action by the Newport Corporation within a short time in respect of the Newport Marshfield service."
When this happens there will be no public service of transport in this area.
Of the nine examples I have with me of bus services that have been withdrawn, perhaps I may quote five of them—Crewe to Market Drayton via Nantwich, in Cheshire; Princes Risborough to Thame, in Oxfordshire; Gleneagles to Crieff, in Perthshire; Hucknall to Chesterfield, and Bristol to Pilning.
I have heard it said in your Lordships' House that in this age of prosperity the rural bus service is really hardly necessary. I take exception to this type of thinking. I believe strongly in the principle that wherever you live in Britain, you are entitled to public services. Surely people living in rural areas have the same right as people in towns to enjoy these services. I should like to end by asking the noble Lord, Lord Lindgren, this question. Does he think it right that where a bus service, considered at the time of a rail closure as the alternative service and now the only means of public transport in the area, should be withdrawn without any sanction or by-your-leave to the Minister or being submitted to any public hearing for objections? I hope that when the noble Lord replies he will say that some action is being taken to look into this matter. I am sure he is as anxious as many people are to see efficient transport services which will serve the whole country. May I suggest to him that to do this, he could do no better than to tackle the rural transport problem, as without doubt there exists a great problem at the present time in the rural areas? I hope that the noble Lord will look into the matter.
7.4 p.m.
LORD LINDGREN: My Lords, first of all, I should like to thank the noble Earl, Lord Kinnoull, for the exposition he has given to the House of the problem of safeguarding the interests of those who, where rail services have been withdrawn, have only the alternative of bus services. He also made reference to the problem of rural bus services generally, but I shall not deal with that to-night. The noble Earl will know that a Committee was set

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up by the previous Government, the Jack Committeee, and as a result of their Report certain experiments were carried out in typical rural areas over a large part of the country. We hope to make a statement in regard to those services very shortly.
I think your Lordships are familiar with the careful arrangements which my right honourable friend has made to ensure that adequate alternative services are available when a rail closure takes place. These are reached only after detailed examination by the Transport Users' Consultative Committee, in the first place, and thereafter by my right honourable friend himself. The conditions of consent laid down in my right honourable friend's letter of decision to the Railways Board list these services specifically. Not only that, but they are so framed as to provide an effective control system in the interests of displaced rail passengers, so that my right honourable friend can deal rapidly with any difficulties that unexpectedly arise afterwards.
In view of what the noble Earl has said, let me explain how this works. There are two situations. One is where extra bus services have to be put on to carry the displaced passengers; the other is where my right honourable friend decides that the existing services are enough. In the first case, the Railways Board have to arrange with the bus operators to provide the services, if necessary, as the noble Earl has said, with financial support. It is a further condition that the Board must inform my right honourable friend of any proposal to withdraw or substantially reduce the bus services listed in the consent letter. Where the Board are subsidising the provision of extra services, the initiative in any proposal to take off a service lies with the Board, because they are footing the bill. Where they are not meeting the loss on the service, they have arrangements with the operators that if any operator decides to withdraw a service required by a consent, he will first inform the Board.
The effect of these arrangements is that if the question of withdrawing such a service arises, the Board have first to seek my right honourable friend's concurrence, and that arises with both types of service. When asked to agree to the withdrawal of one of the extra services. he examines the proposal in the light of
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the use made of it. If he decides that the service is still needed, the Board must see that it is maintained. But where it is clear to him that the service is no longer justified, then he will allow its withdrawal. In such cases I should perhaps add that the public are informed of his decision by its publication in local newspapers.
I should also explain that in this type of case there is already statutory provision to bring the T.U.C.C. into the picture. If, when he receives a proposal for a withdrawal of one of the additional bus services, my right honourable friend feels that there are grounds for a special investigation by the T.U.C.C., he has power to ask them to consider the matter and make a special report. Normally, however, the issues are clear-cut. We have figures of the actual use of the bus service over a period of months and we can see what alternatives people will have, if the service is taken off. So it would be unusual for my right honourable friend to need the advice of the Transport Users' Consultative Committee. I can say, however, that if he were satisfied that there was a good case for reference to the Committee, he would not hesitate to seek their advice.
At this point, may I again remind your Lordships that no bus service, whether extra or existing, can be operated without a road service licence granted by the Traffic Commissioners? The conditions attached by the Commissioners to licences have the effect of securing that, if an operator wishes to reduce a service, he must seek their authority for the variation of his licence. Such applications are published in Notices and Proceedings of the Commissioners. Copies of these are circulated to local authorities throughout the traffic area and are on sale to the public. Local authorities may oppose applications to vary licences, and while the general public have no statutory right of representation to the Commissioners, I understand that they invariably use their discretion to consider representations from individual users. It follows therefore that there is already machinery whereby local authorities and individual users can make representations about reductions in bus services. These representations can be made to the Traffic Commissioners, who are entirely independent of the Minister.

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Because this machinery exists under the Road Traffic Acts, my right honourable friend could not agree that there is any justification for requiring the operators of bus services generally to submit all proposals to withdraw services to the Transport Users' Consultative Committees. The operation of bus services is already subject to the licensing provisions of the Road Traffic Acts. If my right honourable friend were to agree that there was a case for subjecting bus operators' proposals to withdraw services to further examination by the Consultative Committees, it would cut right across the present system of licensing bus services. He could not accept such an invasion of the statutory duties of the Traffic Commissioners.
There remains the alternative that where an existing bus service is specified as an alternative service in a consent to a closure, it should not be withdrawn without scrutiny by the Consultative Committee. This would mean that where the Minister had specified a certain bus service operating in the area as one which might be of value to displaced rail passengers, the service should become subject not only to the conditions of licences issued by the Traffic Commissioners but also to a further scrutiny by the T.U.C.C. This would be a form of discrimination, which would be open to considerable criticism and would be quite unjustified, bearing in mind the existing control machinery provided by the Road Traffic Acts. More important, however, such scrutiny would be quite unnecessary because the Minister already has power to intervene when operators withdraw essential bus services which they were already operating at the time of closure, and he can secure the restoration of any bus service which an operator decides to withdraw, if he is satisfied that the displaced rail users still need it. This is the users' safeguard.
THE EARL OF KINNOULL: My Lords, if I may interrupt the noble Lord, can he make clear whether, where the bus company is a municipal bus company, it will operate in the same way he has just described?
LORD LINDGREN: As I understand it, subject to correction, bus services of municipal undertakings are in no different category in ref and to their road ser
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vice licences than are private operators. But I can give an instance of what happens. The noble Earl referred to a case in Cardiff or Newport. Perhaps a good example is the case of an early morning bus service in Somerset. This bus service provided an essential service for up to a dozen people travelling to work regularly each day. The operators' application to withdraw the service was made to the Traffic Commissioners in the usual way, and as no objections were received, the Commissioners authorised its withdrawal. Subsequently it came to light that the local parish councils had not been advised of the withdrawal of the service by the rural district council, which had received notice of the procedure of the Traffic Commissioners, and they have made representations about the effects on the regular users. My right honourable friend has satisfied himself that the bus met essential needs formerly covered by the train service. He has therefore asked the Board to arrange for a substitute service to be provided. I hope that it will be operating very shortly.
This then is a practical example of how the Minister can step in. Experience has shown that cases where the Minister would have to intervene in this way are likely to be few and far between. Nevertheless, the Minister's power is there and, as I have shown, it is an effective power. My right honourable friend will not hesitate to use it where he is satisfied that it is justified to resolve hardship which arises in the first place from a rail closure. To sum up, therefore, the way in which the Minister gives his consent to closure ensures first of all that no extra bus service, which he requires, can be taken off without his making a proper assessment of whether or not it is needed. Secondly, so far as bus services existing at the time of closure are concerned, the Minister can and does see that if an essential service is withdrawn, a replacement is provided, if necessary with the Railways Board's financial support. I hope that this will satisfy the noble Earl.
LORD CHESHAM: My Lords, may I keep your Lordships for a moment longer? Having listened to the problem, which I think was quite fairly posed in the Question put by my noble friend Lord Kinnoull, and equally properly answered in an honest and straightforward appraisal of the present situation by the

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noble Lord, Lord Lindgren, I believe this raises one point in our minds. It emphasises one thing my noble friend said, and that is, broadly, that the evils besetting the rural bus services are akin to those that were, and to some extent are, besetting the railways; they simply are not used by enough people for them to run properly. My noble friend said that the Cardiff municipality objected to running bus services at a loss, at the expense of the ratepayers.
If the situation is to be met by a comprehensive bus service to take an insufficient number of people, whether or not they arc displaced from too many trains, so to speak, somebody somewhere has to pay for all this. I think that on investigation—and it has been going on now, as the noble Lord, Lord Lindgren, rightly said, for some time, as the difficulties have been realised which gave rise to the Jack Report and subsequent investigations—this will turn out to be a pretty expensive operation. Therefore, I think there is nothing that can sensibly be said or thought at this time, except that we shall look forward to the reports and announcements which the noble Lord told us will soon be made as to a further step forward—we hope in the right direction; and let us hope that the large problem that it is will somehow be capable of solution in due course.

MANCHESTER CORPORATION BILL
7.20 p.m.
Read 3ª (according to Order), with the Amendments.
Clause 41 [Provision of reciprocal services, etc., by Corporation and other local authorities]:
LORD DRUMALBYN LORD DRUMALBYN moved, in subsection (2), to leave out all words after "the other hand," and insert:
"for the manufacture by one party of any building or structural components of buildings for or on behalf of the other party, and for the purchase by one party of building fittings, components of buildings and other materials for or on behalf of the other party."
The noble Lord said: My Lords, I think perhaps I should start by explaining the scope of this Amendment. The rubric of Clause 41 reads:
"Provision of reciprocal services, etc., by Corporation and other local authorities."
As I understand it, the subsection, if I may interpret it, provides for agreements,
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first of all, for use by one party of the plant and equipment of another party, or for their joint use, or for the use or joint use of the services of employees. It also provides for agreements for one party which is building houses for itself, say, in the course of overspill, in the area of another authority, to put up for that other authority in that area buildings, such as houses, libraries or clinics. Thirdly, it provides for agreements for one party to do work on site preparation for another party in such circumstances; and, fourthly, for one party to carry out maintenance on behalf of another party, presumably on buildings which the first party has itself constructed. Given the existence of a direct labour force, these seem to be reasonable arangements, and no objection is taken to that. After all, neighbouring authorities are not likely to pay Manchester Corporation more for work which they can get done more cheaply elsewhere.
But it is subsection (2) where the difficulty arises. That subsection provides for the Manchester Corporation to make agreements with the councils of 4 administrative counties, 7 county boroughs, 17 boroughs, 50 urban district councils and 6 rural district councils
"for the manufacture or purchase by one party of any building, building fittings, components of buildings and other materials for or on behalf of the other party."
The Amendment that I am now moving would restrict Manchester Corporation's power to manufacture for another party to building or structural components, but leave its power to purchase, but not to manufacture, building fittings, components of buildings and other materials. The Amendment does not call in question the undoubted advantages of placing collective orders for buildings, as has been done successfully under the CLASP arrangements, and by consortia such as the North West Municipal Building Consortium. But there is no reason why one corporation should place such an order on behalf of other authorities. Authorities wishing to make such collective purchases can quite easily combine together to place orders simultaneously, and so together arrange to get the price advantage of joint purchase. Nor does the Amendment contest the power to manufacture buildings and structural components of buildings for or on behalf of other authorities.
The advantages of large-scale manufacture of industrialised houses is well recognised, and it seems sensible that if Manchester Corporation are to erect system buildings outside their own boundaries for their own overspill purposes, then they should also be able to do so for the authorities in the areas where they are putting them up for their own purposes, if those authorities accept their price. There is some reason, I understand, to question the Corporation's costings, but at the moment this has not got further, I gather, than what the witness, who is the director of the Direct Works Department, described as "a contemplated potential." I also recognise that no authority is likely to accept complete uniformity of buildings, and that neither Manchester nor any of the other authorities would like to see all the buildings they are to erect of the same type. It may well be, therefore, that for production to be on an economic scale, even for so large a Corporation as Manchester, Manchester might wish to cater for the needs of other authorities as well as their own, bearing in mind that their own demand for buildings of their own manufacture will represent only a proportion of the total requirements.
There is no question of a monopoly in the true sense, although it seems to me there is a danger of creating a monopoly within the meaning of the Monopolies Act. The director of the Corporation's Direct Works Department stated that he planned to produce at premises which had recently been acquired
"precast concrete, including lintels, units and concrete blocks."
These are plainly structural components, and there is nothing in the Amendment which would stop him from doing so, whether for himself or for the other authorities concerned in this clause. But the clause, as drafted, goes very much wider than that. It would permit the manufacture for other authorities of any
"building fittings, components of buildings and other materials."
I concede at once that learned counsel for the Corporation stated categorically that the Corporation had no intention of
"manufacturing such equipment as glass, ironmongery, plumbing or electrical fittings."
If that is so, then, surely such classes of goods should have been specifically excluded, or, better still, power should have
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been confined to production only of those goods which it was intended to produce and processess it was intended to carry out on behalf of other authorities. I say that because I think I can say with confidence that it is a generally recognised principle, as, indeed, learned counsel for the Petitioners have reminded the Select Committee in this House, that powers ought not to be conferred in excess of need—especially where they are unprecedented, as I understand this particular power is.
This subsection seems to me to offend against this rule, at least to the extent I have mentioned. I concede that the director of the Corporation's Direct Works Department wants to produce—and here again I quote what I think he said:
"bespoke joinery and other manufactured joinery and school furniture, including laboratory bench and cupboard equipment for other authorities besides his own."
But I understand he produced no evidence that there was a shortage of capacity to produce these goods, whereas evidence of the existence of adequate capacity was given by the Petitioners. All he said was that he expected he would have some unused capacity which he could usefully employ for and on behalf of other authorities.
Evidence was given that competition in the joinery trade was keen, and that the likelihood of the Corporation being able to produce joinery on a competitive basis was slight. I think evidence was given that the throughput of the whole existing unit is 187,000 feet of hardboard, ply-woods and block boards, whereas the commercial throughput is 200,000 ft. per operative. With the greatest respect to the Joint Select Committees, it hardly seems that the director made out a case for such manufacture, and I suggest that the clause should be amended: first because it goes far beyond even the stated intentions of the Corporation, and, secondly, because it is almost certainly uneconomic for the Corporation to go in for this type of manufacture. I think it unlikely that the Corporation could produce competitively goods such as the Amendment seeks to exclude. The fact remains that, despite their declared intentions, they might be tempted to try, by the fatal "surplus capacity" argument and by the desire to be self-sufficient.
In any enterprise which does not depend for its survival on ability to make a profit there is an inherent danger of empire-building. Learned counsel stated that there was no intention on the part of the Corporation of making a profit out of other authorities—either, it appears, on what the Corporation itself manufactured or on what they purchased. I am bound to say that I do not understand this. If you do not make a profit you probably make a loss. Breaking even is a somewhat difficult operation, whether you tender for a contract or whether you negotiate a price.
In conclusion, there may be something to he said for allowing a large local authority to purchase building components and to use them in building construction done by its own direct labour force, even though statistics of the Ministry of Public Building and Works for last year show that the productivity on contractors' sites was 42 per cent. higher, overall, than on direct-labour force sites. There may even be something to be said for allowing a large local authority to experiment in the manufacture of industrialised buildings—that is to say, including their structural components, and erecting them on behalf of other authorities—but there seems to be nothing to be said for their attempting to manufacture fittings and non-structural components without regard to existing capacity elsewhere. They have not the expertise to do so.
I find it difficult to see any argument to substantiate the applicant's claim that public benefit will accrue from powers which they themselves say will remain largely unused. If the Amendment is accepted, the house-building programme will not be prejudiced in any way whatsoever, either in Manchester or elsewhere. What acceptance will do is to remove a temptation to venture into fields where it is exceedingly unlikely that the Corporation can operate economically—namely, the manufacture of building fittings and components. At the very least the Corporation should undertake to amend the clause so as to restrict manufacture to those items, if any, that they can make for themselves more conveniently and more economically than they can purchase them elsewhere. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 30, line 23, leave out from ("hard") to end of line 26, and insert the said new words.—(Lord Drumalbyn.)
7.34 p.m.
LORD ERROLL OF HALE: My Lords, I rise to support the Amendment so ably moved by my noble friend, but before I go further I should like to declare a contingent interest, in that I am a director of a company which manufactures building materials; and although in the course of the evidence it was made quite clear that Manchester Corporation do not intend to manufacture any of the products which my company manufactures, they are nevertheless taking powers to do so, and I therefore thought that, in accordance with custom, I should declare a contingent interest.
I have also had brought to my notice the fact that it is somewhat unusual for an Amendment to be moved at such a late stage to a Private Bill which has been through all the stages in the other place and has been through a Select Committee of your Lordships' House. I should like, however, to put this point to my noble friend, Lord Molson. If the matter had been debated at an earlier stage, it would have taken up the time of your Lordships. It might well have been put right in Committee in earlier debate, and thus this debate would have been unnecessary. I would enter a plea for time for consideration on the Floor of the House of matters of great import and principle which are dealt with by the Bill and which have not been dealt with in the earlier stages of its passage.
I believe it to be an important principle that manufacture is the job of competitive private enterprise and not of local authorities, and it is on that principle that I wish to make my observations. I accept that, in this field of industrialised building, where a public authority already has a direct works or building department a marginal case can be made out in favour of local authorities' manufacturing industrialised buildings, but I cannot see any justification for the manufacture of building fittings and components such as doorlocks, cisterns, taps, basins, lavatories, items of built-in furniture and the like. It is quite clear from what my noble friend has said that Manchester Corporation are seeking powers which are much wider than they

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require, and in the course of the evidence given by Mr. Wilson, the director of the direct works department of the Corporation, it was made clear that they intended only to make about six types of product, two of which were not related to domestic building at all but were school furniture and laboratory desks and the like, in connection with educational schemes.
It was particularly interesting, looking at the proceedings of the Select Committee of your Lordships, to see that no attempt was made by learned counsel for the Promoters of the Bill to answer the detailed and admirable case put forward by the Petitioners. Counsel's winding up, if I may quote briefly, begins on page 21 of the fourth day of the proceedings. He said:
"My Lord, I would wish, therefore, to deal with the matter on rather broad lines.…Surely it does not matter whether in the view of one expert Manchester has chosen the wrong block-making machine…surely it does not matter whether that particular block-making machine is going to cost x thousand pounds or y thousand pounds."
My Lords, I think this sort of thing matters very much indeed. He made no attempt to answer the case put forward by the Petitioners but preferred to rely on a much broader concept. He said:
"The real issue is this, …are these powers sought likely in their exercise to achieve an improvement of production in a field which is beset, as is so often said, with social problems, namely housing, but I would prefer to use the word 'human'?"
So learned counsel made his appeal on broad human grounds, and made no attempt to answer the case which had been put.
I believe that one can be efficient and competitive and human, and that the best interests of Manchester certainly will not be served by inefficiency and a creation of losses which have to be borne by the ratepayers, the very simple practical argument being that if they were efficient they would be able to build more houses, or with the same amount raised by the rates, achieve more. So there is everything to be said for a public authority, if it is going into this field, being efficient and competitive, and there is nothing in the evidence so far to show that that is what Manchester is going to be.
Before the Select Committee of another place, Mr. Wilson claimed that his
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department was always given work by the Corporation as a result of successful tenders against open competition, but in actual fact under cross-examination he had to admit that in the course of five years his final costs of work carried out by his department had been checked on only two occasions. So there is considerable doubt about the cost-effectiveness and efficiency of this department. The record so far gives no grounds for confidence in the future. Indeed, if Manchester Corporation are to achieve more efficiency, I would, with respect, submit that the direct works department of the City Corporation should become a separate trading entity and immediately be reconstructed as such by this I mean an organisation which has to produce its own accounts and which will be open to public audits, examination and inspection, and will carry the proper overheads of its separate trading organisation, just as those engaged in private building industry have to do.
Manchester Corporation should have no difficulty in bringing about this change, because they already have separate trading entities in their transport department and their markets department, and I understand that they are intending to have a separate entity for their present airports committee. I hope, therefore, if this Amendment cannot be accepted, that the Corporation will listen to what I have said and so spare the ratepayers one more burden with which they are going to be unnecessarily saddled.
Finally, I think that our having this short debate at this late stage will serve as a useful warning to those other Socialist local authorities who may be tempted to follow Manchester's example in the coming Session. We shall be watching local authority legislation very closely in the coming Session—I have done it before, as the noble Lord knows from his experience in another place—and I do not for one moment think that a Bill incorporating similar provisions will have such an easy passage in the next Session as this Bill has had so far in this.
7.43 p.m.
LORD ILFORD: My Lords, I hope that your Lordships will not be disposed to accede to this Amendment. It comes rather late in the day. But the only comment which I desire to make about

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that aspect of the matter is that Amendments which are moved at this late stage of a Bill's progress through Parliament ought to be confined to matters which can be regarded as of general public importance or perhaps national importance. Such Amendments ought not to be used for the defence of individual or commercial interests which may be thought to be threatened. I have no desire to reflect upon commercial interests; it is our duty in this House to safeguard commercial interests. But the appropriate time for that to be done is during the passage of a Bill through a Select Committee in your Lordships' House or through Standing Committee in another place.
The Manchester Corporation and the local authorities adjacent to Manchester who arc enumerated in the Second Schedule to the Bill are confronted with a task of slum clearance and urban redevelopment of immense magnitude. I take the estimate of their task from the survey of the North-West Region which appeared at the end of last week. It is estimated that in this region there are 440,000 houses which are either slums today or will become slums before 1981. If the standard of amenity in these houses is raised by only a modest amount, it is estimated that the total number of unfit houses will rise to something like half a million, or over a quarter of the total number of houses available in this area. This area is, of course, as your Lordships who know it will recall, the oldest industrial area in this country. Many of the buildings, particularly the cottage buildings, were erected something like 200 years ago. The bulk of them are now worn out and fall far below the standards which are expected to-day.
Many of the local authorities in this area are relatively small. A problem of this immensity cannot be undertaken upon conventional building lines. If this area is to be rebuilt, as the local authorities are concerned to see that it is rebuilt, it will be necessary to have recourse to all the modern techniques of standardised building and industrialised construction of parts.
These processes cannot be undertaken by authorities that are too small, except in conjunction with other authorities possessed of greater resources than themselves. It is in order to obtain the powers
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that are necessary to carry out the reconstruction of this area in that manner that this Bill has been promoted. The Manchester Corporation are seeking these powers to enable these modern methods of construction to which I have referred to be adopted, not only by the Corporation but by the other authorities which will be associated with them. The adoption of these standardised methods will have to be undertaken throughout the whole of this great area. The Manchester Corporation already have facilities for manufacturing building fittings. They manufacture standardised windows and doors and articles of that sort. I am told that articles such as lavatories or bathrooms are manufactured as single units and are placed in houses without the separate parts being individually fitted. All these methods will be necessary if this great task of reconstruction is to be carried out.
I have found it a little difficult to understand what the purpose of this Amendment really is. As my noble friend pointed out, the clause envisages an agreement between the various local authorities concerned, of which the Manchester Corporation will normally be one, but will not necessarily be one. The clause asks for powers for the manufacture or purchase by one party of any building, building fittings, components of buildings, and so forth. The Amendment proposes to leave out the power to purchase and leave the authorities with power for the manufacture by one party of any building and so forth on behalf of the other. I have found it difficult to understand what the purpose of that is. Unless there is power for somebody to purchase the building, for the authority for whom it is intended to purchase the building when it has been erected, or to purchase component parts which are to be manufactured, what is going to happen to it? Are the Manchester Corporation or one of these authorities going to manufacture buildings or component parts and give them away to the other authorities? It is surely inherent in the whole purpose of the clause that one party should be in a position to pay for the work which is done by the other party.
I would submit to your Lordships that by omitting any power to purchase the whole purpose of the clause is really defeated. The Manchester Corporation

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are certainly not going to manufacture things to give them away. My noble friends would have something to say if they were to do that. It is an inherent feature of the whole system that somebody should be able to purchase these things.
The other alteration which the Amendment seeks to make is in the latter part of the clause, where it deals with:
"building fittings, components of buildings and other materials for or on behalf of the other party."
There again the Corporation are seeking power to manufacture and to purchase. In this case the Amendment would omit power to manufacture, and only the power to purchase would remain. It is possible, of course, that the Manchester Corporation may purchase these articles in bulk and re-sell them to the other authorities, but it is not the intention of the Corporation that they should act as wholesale builders' merchants. What they are asking for is power to manufacture these articles as well as to purchase them. I should have thought that without the power to manufacture them the clause really loses its force altogether. That, I submit, is the real purpose of the Amendment, to defeat the whole idea of the Manchester Corporation and these other authorities taking part in this comprehensive scheme.
LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, would my noble friend forgive me for interrupting him? I can assure him that that is not the purpose at all. I explained the purpose in my speech. It is a small purpose, and I think he is going much too far in dealing with this question of purchase. It is perfectly possible, as I said, for the various authorities to make their purchases collectively. But that is no reason why one person should purchase on behalf of everybody and then retail to the other authorities.
LORD ILFORD: My Lords, I am glad to have my noble friend's assurance. I confess that his explanation of the Amendment does not enlighten me. I am no wiser now that I was before, and I hope that my noble friend will not take it amiss if I continue to say that the purpose of this Amendment is really to prevent the authorities from taking part in this comprehensive scheme altogether.
I can assure my noble friends that the supply of material and the manufacturing
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capacity both of the local authorities and of the business enterprises engaged in this task will be required to the full in carrying it out. The Corporation will not have to compete with commercial traders. Both will be required. This is not a case of what used to be called municipal trading. It is really quite a different proposal. My noble friend Lord Erroll of Hale passed some strictures on the Manchester Corporation Works Department. He read, from the transcript of the evidence given to the Select Committee, passages which he claimed showed that the conduct of the Works Department was not efficient. What he did not tell your Lordships is this: that the Manchester Corporation, through their Works Department, are building houses. Before the Ministry of Housing and Local Government will approve of the tender of the Works Department they will require tenders to be obtained from private builders as well, and comparison is made between the estimates of the Works Department and the tenders obtained from private builders. That I think should be a sufficient safeguard. The Works Department of the Corporation has been in existence for more than 40 years (I think it was established in 1920) and has proved its efficiency. It will be able to undertake as the central component of this group of local authorities the immense task that they will be called upon to perform in reconstructing this obsolete area.
In conclusion may I say this: neither in the City Council nor in the Standing Committee in another place, nor in the Select Committee in your Lordships' House, has this matter been treated as a political or an ideological question. When it was before the Manchester Corporation it was accepted unanimously. I understand that the Standing Committee in another place was unanimous, and I am informed that the Select Committee in your Lordships' House was also unanimous. This is not a political question. It is not an ideological question. It is a question of urgent practical administration, and I hope that in those circumstances your Lordships will not be disposed to accept this Amendment.
7.56 p.m.
LORD MOLSON: My Lords, I find myself in complete agreement with everything that has fallen from my noble

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friend Lord Ilford. I take a certain interest in this matter, because in Schedule 2 a number of local authorities which are likely to benefit from the passage of this Bill are local authorities which I represented during 22 happy years in another place, and I have not ceased to take an affectionate interest in them, even though I have come to your Lordships' House. Therefore, I am most anxious that this measure should be passed.
However, if I may say so, with great respect, I think that your Lordships would be well advised to reject this Amendment for an entirely different reason. I believe that it is important to maintain the distinction between public legislation and private legislation. A special procedure has been set up by which Private Bills are dealt with by Committees upstairs, where it is possible for evidence to be advanced and for cross-examination to take place. The matter has been dealt with not only by a Select Committee in another place, but by a Committee in your Lordships' House, carefully chosen, and in whom I think we ought to have complete confidence. The fact that that Committee have approved this Bill unanimously should, I think, unless there is some important matter of principle, be conclusive for us.
The very fact that my noble friends on the Front Bench have been quoting evidence given in Select Committees which it is now impossible to prove or to test by cross-examination, and which was deal with upstairs in a forensic atmosphere, shows that this is hardly the kind of matter which can with advantage be dealt with upon the Floor of the House. There may well he occasions when a matter of great principle arises, where it is entirely proper for your Lordships' House to decide that a matter is of too great importance to be dealt with by Committee. I well remember the occasion when the late Lord Birkett persuaded your Lordships to reject a Bill advanced by the same Corporation and dealing with important matters of amenity in the Lake District. That, I am sure, was a right thing to do. But that was dealt with on Second Reading. It was not raised on Third Reading, after the whole matter had been carefully investigated by a
Select Committee of this House in whom your Lordships have,
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or certainly should have, complete confidence. So, apart from the merits of the case, which have been so admirably put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Ilford, it is important to maintain the distinction between private and public legislation, and I do not think this is an appropriate way of dealing with this matter. I hope therefore that your Lordships will reject this Amendment.
8.0 p.m.
THE CHAIRMAN OF COMMITTEES:(THE EARL OF LISTOWEL): My Lords, your Lordships will appreciate that I cannot follow the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, who proposed this Amendment, or the noble Lord, Lord Ilford, who supported the Bill, in discussing the merits of the Amendment. Nevertheless, with your Lordships' permission, I should like to say a few words about procedure, in the hope that it may assist noble Lords who have attended this debate to form a judgment about the procedural aspect of the issue now before the House.
Clause 41, which the noble Lord seeks to amend, was argued for the best part of three days before the Select Committee to which your Lordships referred the Bill. That Committee, after hearing counsel and witnesses for the Petitioners and the Promotors, decided to accept this clause, including subsection (2), which the noble Lord wishes to alter, and which had been inserted after equally thorough consideration by a Select Committee in another place. The whole Bill, therefore, including this clause, and subsection (2) of the clause, have already been considered with the utmost care by the Select Committee of the House. While your Lordships are fully entitled to amend or reject a Private Bill at any stage, the House has taken the view in the past that Amendments of substance on Third Reading are undesirable. In fact, no such Amendments have been made.
There are only three precedents in the present century for the moving of substantial Amendments, or the moving of the rejection of a Private Bill, on Third Reading. These were the Kent Water Board Bill, in 1955; the Adelphi Estate Bill, in 1933, and the London County Council (Spitalfields Market) Bill, in 1900. In all three cases your Lordships decided not to accept any Amendment of substance and to support the views of the Select Committee as to the merits

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of the Bill. The procedure which the House has adopted for dealing with Private Bills has proved its value because it ensures absolute fairness to Promoters and Petitioners. I am bound to point out to your Lordships that if we start amending Private Bills on the Floor of the House, where we cannot hear counsel and evidence on behalf of the parties, public confidence in our fairness would be impaired.
THE JOINT PARLIAMENTARY SECRETARY, MINISTRY OF LAND AND NATURAL RESOURCES (LORD MITCHISON): My Lords, I hope that I shall not take too long. I rise not to discuss the merits of this matter, but to state what my right honourable friend the Minister of Housing and Local Government thinks is right in this kind of case. I think that most of what I shall say has in fact already been said, but I repeat it not merely with reference to this clause and this Amendment, but to the Bill as a whole—and I hope for future reference. In this case, as the noble Earl, Lord Listowel, has just stated, there were full hearings in Committee of both Houses. In these cases Ministers who have a public interest to safeguard are required to present reports. The reports, I understand, are usually read to the Committees. They are available to anybody who asks for them from the moment they have been issued, and they are therefore public documents. My right honourable friend, being called upon to do so, made a report in this case, and it so happened that he took no objection to this clause. He confirmed that opinion when the clause was amended.
There was, however, another clause in the Bill to which he did object: that clause is still there. But that is not the point. The point is that the Minister is there to fulfil a particular function: to represent the public interest in the matter being considered. The decision must, however, rest with Parliament. Parliament for this purpose uses Committees in both Houses, and I know that both the two noble Lords sitting on the Front Bench opposite have sat in another place time and again and heard Members seeking to move instructions on Second Reading—not on Third Reading—and being told, "This is a matter for evi
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dence, and it therefore ought to go to the Committee".
This obviously was a matter of evidence. It went to the Committee, it was considered by the Committee, and what is happening now is that two noble Lords, who of course have every right to do so—I am not for a moment disputing that—are seeking to reverse the verdict of the Committee. This verdict was arrived at on evidence heard, on cross-examination, on statistics provided; all we have to go on here is what we are told by one party or another. I am not for a moment impugning the accuracy of what we have been told, but can anybody really suppose that an hour or two hours or so, either in this House or the other House, without evidence being heard, with no more than that, can properly take the place of hearings which lasted on this particular clause for three days before a Select Committee of this House?
My right honourable friend most certainly does not take that view upon a point of this kind, which depends on evidence and which, notwithstanding anything we were told by noble Lords opposite, seems to me at any rate not to raise any Party issue at all or indeed any important political issue of any kind; it is simply a question of rivalry and competence and efficiency as between private contractors and the Manchester Corporation as a body—a question of fact if ever there was one. Are we really being asked to decide the matter in this way? That is the substantial objection, and my right honourable friend does not agree to dealing with this kind of point by instructions on Second Reading, far less on Third Reading.
The difference is that the noble Lords who raise this point on Third Reading are raising a point which has already been lost before the Committee, and invite us to act as some sort of court of appeal on a question of fact (I am bound to say that my legal self might shudder a bit on this one), and to do it without even hearing any evidence at all. I suggest that it cannot be the right thing to do. I hone I have been courteous to the two noble Lords who have raised it. They had, of course, every right to take this course and, if they do not think it impertinent of me to say so, I thought

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that they did it extremely well, because it was a rather difficult case. I think, however, that this is a wrong procedure in cases of this kind. May I make one other point? I mentioned the report made by my right honourable friend. As a matter of fact, in this case there were six reports from five different Ministers. There are public interests affected in these cases. That is why these reports are called for under the procedure of both Houses and used as public documents.
I notice that no objection was taken to, indeed no mention was made of, the report in this case. It does not seem that a type of matter which does not call for any comment, favourable or unfavourable, in Ministerial reports, can have an overwhelming public importance. Obviously, on that last point opinions opposite differ. I do not think that it is a political point and I trust, as does my right honourable friend, that we shall not be led into the practice of reviewing what are, after all, rather minor questions of fact, questions of balance, questions of efficiency, questions of cost and so on, without evidence before the House, that cannot give an enormous amount of time to them and has no material whatever before it to arrive at a conclusion on those questions.
LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, I express gratitude to the noble Lords opposite for the exposition which they have given of the procedural aspect of this matter. I am bound to say that it did not occur to me at the time that this was in any way a minor matter when powers are being sought in regard to building materials and components for an area which, if one tots up the figures of the four counties concerned, one sees contains something like 10 million inhabitants. I am not certain that they are all covered by the Second Schedule, but this is what it amounts to. It cannot be
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considered a minor matter. So I think there is a real question of principle involved here, which my noble friend stated very clearly.
If I may, I should just like to say this to my noble friend Lord Ilford. He is entitled to say what he thinks is the effect of an Amendment, but I really do not think he is entitled to insist on what was my purpose in putting it down. I can assure him that my purpose was not in any way to try to disrupt the way in which Manchester Corporation are trying to meet the human needs of their own people in collaboration with others of a wider area. This, certainly, was not my purpose, and I made specific reference to the CLASP procedure, and so forth.
LORD ILFORD: My Lords, I am very grateful to my noble friend and I much appreciate his assurance. I hope that nothing I said reflected in any way upon the manner in which he moved this Amendment. It was not intended to do so.
LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, I am greatly obliged to my noble friend and I am sure that is so. I do not think I need detain your Lordships any longer. I felt it right, and my noble friend felt it right, to bring what we believed was a matter of importance before your Lordships. Having done so, I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Bill passed and returned to the Commons.

SEVERN BRIDGE TOLLS BILL
Reported, without amendment, and recommitted to a Committee of the Whole House.
House adjourned at twelve minutes past eight o'clock.