SOUTH AFRICA: ARMS EMBARGO (Hansard, 17 November 1964)

§ THE EARL OF LONGFORD
My Lords, with your Lordships' permission I should like to intervene to repeat a Statement which is being made by my right honourable friend the Prime Minister in another place on arms for South Africa. The Statement is as follows:
"The Government have decided to impose an embargo on the export of arms to South Africa.
"Since the Government took office no licences for the export of arms to South Africa have been issued. It has now been decided that all outstanding licences should be revoked, except where these are known to relate to current contracts with the South African Government. The contract to supply 16 Buccaneer aircraft is still under review.
"Outstanding commitments by the Ministry of Defence will be fulfilled, but as from to-day no new contracts will be accepted for the supply of military equipment. The Ministry of Defence will proceed with manufacturing agreements that have already been concluded but not yet executed.
"Licences for the export of sporting weapons and ammunition will be revoked and shipment will be stopped forthwith. In other cases when licences are revoked, fresh licences will be issued to the extent necessary to permit the execution of current contracts.
524 "These decisions bring the Government's policy into line with United Nations resolutions on this question, the latest of which was the Security Council resolution of June 18."

§ LORD CARRINGTON
My Lords, it is hardly necessary for me to say that this is a very serious Statement indeed. The consequences will undoubtedly be very far-reaching, and I very much doubt whether any of us here this afternoon can foresee what these consequences will be and how far all this will go. It is very difficult, just on the spur of the moment, to see exactly what the Statement means. In one part the Statement talks of revoking licences, but it goes on to say that existing licences will be fulfilled. Could the noble Earl the Leader of the House let us know exactly what amount is involved, and what weapons are involved, in this revocation? It may be that we shall have to have a debate on this subject in the very near future. It probably would be better to arrange this through the usual channels.
I should like to ask the noble Earl this question. Have the Government really weighed up the consequences of what they have done? It may he, for instance, that the Simonstown Agreement will be revoked. This means that the Royal Navy will be deprived of refuelling and other facilities at Simonstown, and that the world-wide communications of the Royal Navy may be disrupted. Do the Government view that possibility with equanimity?—the noble Lord shakes his head. There is an important wireless station at Simonstown.

§ THE EARL OF LONGFORD
I did not shake my head.

§ LORD CARRINGTON
No; the noble Lord on the noble Earl's right shook his head. But I was asking: do the Government view with equanimity the possibility that the Royal Navy will lose facilities at Simonstown? It seems quite likely that the noble Earl may reply that this will happen only if the sixteen Buccaneers are cancelled. May I ask him when we are likely to have a statement about these Buccaneers? The longer this issue is in doubt, the more difficult our relations with South Africa may become. It may be that over-flying rights which we now have, in conjunction with the South African Government, 525 by courtesy of the South African Government, may be denied to us. This means that in certain instances we shall find it more difficult to reinforce our troops in South-East Asia and the Far East. Are the Government prepared to put all this at risk in order to deny South Africa arms—arms which are to be used for their defence, and not for purposes of enforcing apartheid?
Recently the Government have not hesitated to stress the gravity of the balance-of-payment; situation. Is it not rather unhelpful flat they should, by this action, prejudice our very large ex port trade to South Africa? If the Buccaneers are cancelled, an order worth something like £80 million will be lost to the export trade of this country. I hope that the noble Earl will be able to answer some of these questions this afternoon, but it may be that we shall have to have a debate in the near future; because, I say again, this is one of the gravest Statements we have heard in this Parliament.

LORD REA
My Lords——

§ THE EARL OF LONGFORD
Perhaps I might answer the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, at once, and then defer to the noble Lord, Lord Rea. I quite agree that this is a serious Statement, and I am sure that the Government would not wish to minimise it in any way. I think the noble Lord will do the Government the justice of believing that they would not have made this Statement without very careful thought. I must ask him to accept that, as I hope he will.
There was one point he raised which I cannot answer precisely, but I feel that I should attempt to say something about it. He asked me, if I understood him rightly, what would be the value of arms shipments to South Africa. I gather that it is not the practice of the Government, as the noble Lord, from his ministerial experience, is aware, to disclose details of arms supplies to overseas Governments. But the value of our arms shipments to South Africa is very small in relation to our total export trade. I am afraid that I cannot answer that point precisely.
But, to deal with the more general issues which were raised by the noble Lord (and if he chooses to initiate a debate on this, it is entirely for him and his colleagues), I should like to make it 526 plain that this, for us, is a moral issue. There is, in the first place, the question of whether the decision is right, and then there is the question of whether it will do this country much immediate damage. There are two questions there which go together. It is perhaps worth observing that, according to my information, our very distinguished representative, Sir Patrick Dean, voted in the United Nations, on the instruction of the former Tory Government, for the resolution prohibiting the export of arms to South Africa.

§ LORD CARRINGTON
But he made a specific reservation, as I think the noble Earl knows—and I know he does not wish to be unfair: that we should continue to supply South Africa with arms for purposes of her defence, not for purposes of supporting apartheid.

§ THE EARL OF LONGFORD
As the noble Lord is well aware, it is extremely difficult to draw the line. There is the moral question. It is not a question on which one can speak with absolute freedom, because all of us in this House, in different ways and in different degrees, perhaps, strongly disapprove of very much that is going on in South Africa. It becomes a question of how far one carries that disapproval. If we wish to be loyal to the United Nations, we have to carry it a considerable way. But there is also the question of the immediate damage. One cannot calculate the long-term balance of gain and loss, but there is the question of immediate damage.
The noble Lord, Lord Carrington, raised certain points. He asked about the Simonstown Agreement. I am advised that that Agreement is certainly a considerable convenience, both to us and to South Africa. It is not essential to our national defence. I am entitled to say that on behalf of the Government. The noble Lord has had many years at the Admiralty—I have had only a few months, but I have been First Lord of the Admiralty. Therefore I do not make that sort of remark on advice without any kind of consideration of the issues at all. Our advice is that it is not essential, but it is a very considerable convenience.
Let us assume that it would be a loss, though I hope that would not arise. There is no reason to suppose that it 527 would arise, but, if it did arise, and if this were really a moral issue, we should have to face it. I am afraid that I must put it in that way. In our view, the losses can be undertaken, if they must be. This is a clear moral issue and, in our view, we should be betraying the United Nations and its ideals—I must state the view of the Government—if we failed to carry out this resolution.

§ LORD CARRINGTON
The noble Earl did not answer one of my questions. Perhaps he cannot answer it this afternoon, but I should like him to try, because I think it is of the greatest importance. When will the Government be in a position to make a statement about the 16 Buccaneers which are ordered by the South African Government? I think I am right in saying that they have an option on a further 20 Buccaneers. The whole of the Simonstown Agreement, and possibly our over-flying rights, may, for all I know, revolve on this question of the Buccaneers and not on the Statement which has been made. I think this is rather unlikely, but I am sure it is very important that this matter should be cleared up. When will the noble Earl be in a position to make a statement?

§ THE EARL OF LONGFORD
My Lords, I agree with the noble Lord that this is an important issue and a difficult issue, at any rate in the light of our approach to these problems. I can only assure the noble Lord that we will inform the House as soon as possible, and I should hope to inform the noble Lord even earlier. I should hope that the very first moment we knew anything definite, we would inform the noble Lord.

LORD REA
My Lords, in view of the general opinion in this country that the South African Government is what The Times has called an "evil Government", I am a little surprised that even members of the Conservative Party do not see that this moral gesture has a great deal behind it. The point is not how much we are going to lose—and that matter is still nebulous in the Statement which the noble Earl has just made: the contract for Buccaneer aircraft is still under review. But is it not a fact that aircraft delivered for defence purposes could be turned to exactly the sort of 528 purposes which we do not want to encourage?

§ THE EARL OF LONGFORD
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord for what seems a general attitude of support, and for, at any rate, an understanding of our own attempt at a moral approach. I think the Buccaneers raise a difficult question, because a contract is involved there. One may, therefore, have to pit good against good or, if the noble Lord puts it the other way, evil against evil. This is a very difficult issue and I quite agree with the noble Lord.

§ THE EARL OF SWINTON
My Lords, may I ask the noble Earl two questions? First of all, have the Government had any consultation or discussion with the Government of the Republic of South Africa before coming to these very serious conclusions? The second question, which perhaps I may put as my noble and gallant friend Lord Alexander of Tunis and I negotiated the Simonstown Agreement, is this. Is it not a fact that the Simonstown Agreement not only covers the use of Simonstown by the British Navy, but also puts at the disposal of ourselves and our Allies what is far more important—that is, all the ports of South Africa in the event of war? Have the Government considered what would be the effect of losing that agreement and all that it entails in the event of an aggressive war taking place?

§ THE EARL OF LONGFORD
My Lords, the answer to the first question of the noble Earl is that I have no advice about the consultations, or otherwise, with the South African Government. My impression is that they were not consulted, but I do not know. I understand that they have been informed, but my impression is that they were not consulted, because, in a sense, in the case of a decision of this kind, you either do it or do not do it. I am afraid you cannot expect——

§ THE EARL OF SWINTON
Is that the way in which we are going to treat all our Allies?

§ THE EARL OF LONGFORD
My Lords, I am afraid, to be quite frank, that a number of decisions have been taken in the last few weeks which the noble Earl may or may not like, but which, on the whole, have been approved by the country. In fact, consultation with many countries 529 affected by the 15 per cent. surcharge was impossible. So that if the noble Earl wishes to ask, "Were they consulted?", my impression is that they were not consulted, but certainly, to the best of my belief, they were informed.

§ EARL ALEXANDER OF HILLSBOROUGH
My Lords, my noble friend may take it from me that many of us with long experience in Ministerial control of defence policy would certainly not regard Simonstown as not being of any great strategic importance. I could not say, after my experience in the last war and in charge of the Admiralty right through it, that I could support that belief. In the event of warfare breaking out, it is extremely difficult to forecast in which particular area the demands upon your defence departments will appear to be greatest at any given time. The then existing agreements were most valuable to us in the last war. Of course, what goes with Simonstown is that, in the event of conflict, we should have equally free use of Durban as we had in the last great conflict. If we were not in a sufficiently friendly relationship at the time, we should find the length of voyages, especially for troop transportation and matters of that sort, much more difficult, if we had always to go right round to other places.
I do not know enough about the decisions which the Government have taken to understand them fully yet. But I do beg—and all of us on this side of the House entirely support our Prime Minister, when he said last night at Mansion House that he was concerned always for the defence of this country and its people—that these things should not be taken in any sense lightheartedly. Simonstown is of great value to us for naval use. I say that after, perhaps, having charge of defence department is for a longer continuous, consecutive time than any of my colleagues in the House on either side, and at a particular period. I suggest that we should not be quite so lighthearted about Simonstown, or about any other part of that great strategic area which was absolutely essential to us when, for various reasons, not excluding air power, the Middle East was denied to us.

§ THE EARL OF LONGFORD
My Lords, may I answer the noble Earl? Of course, anything that is said by the noble Earl, 530 Lord Alexander of Hillsborough, has special claims not only on the attention of all of us who have followed him so long and so devotedly here, but on the attention and respect of the whole House. His experience, indeed, is unique. I should be sorry—but one never knows what impression one creates—if anything I said suggested that I took this matter lightheartedly. I really cannot imagine how any words of mine—one can never be sure of one's manner—can have given any such impression.
I said at once that this is an important matter, to which the Government have been giving very careful thought. The words I used, on advice, were that these facilities, which we certainly have not lost yet, by any means, are not essential. That is not the same thing as saying that they are not important. In other words, they would not jeopardise the essential defences of the country about which the Prime Minister spoke last night. That must be absolutely clear. But, going beyond that, I want to repeat to noble Lords that if we think this is right, as the noble Lord, Lord Rea, says, we may have to face a certain element of sacrifice. I am not saying there is no loss involved. If a thing is right there may have to be some sacrifice. I do not want to give noble Lords the impression that we can always be sure of having it both ways; that we can do the right thing without any loss to ourselves. I should be very sorry indeed if anybody in the House, particularly the noble Earl, were to get the impression that we took this matter lightheartedly.

§ VISCOUNT ECCLES
My Lords, may I ask the Leader of the House whether it is not a fact, in experience, that economic embargoes are worse than useless unless they are complete and watertight? In this case it is as certain as anything can be that the South Africans will be able to obtain from some other source 90 per cent. of the arms which we refuse them. If that happens, then I feel sure that we shall be weakening the citizens of South Africa of British descent in their attempt to bring pressure on their Government to change the policy which we all deplore; and I very much regret to see an embargo imposed, for the sake of salving consciences here, which is going to make it more difficult and not more easy to change the policy of that Government.

§ THE EARL OF LONGFORD
My Lords, I am rather sorry to hear the noble Viscount pouring a certain scorn on the idea of salving one's conscience. I should have thought it was one's duty to act according to one's conscience. The noble Viscount shakes his head, but I am afraid I cannot give way to his view of morals there. If this is in accordance with our conscience, we must do it. But it is not a trade embargo. The noble Viscount may or may not be aware of the proposals—there has not been much time to study them—but it is not a trade embargo in the sense he seems to have in mind.

§ LORD MILVERTON
My Lords, the issues involved in this are of such deep value, and the moral issues have been quoted so much to-day, that I think that one voice, at least, might be permitted from the Back Benches, and that we should not leave moral issues to be a matter solely for Front Bench decision. They are matters on which we claim an equal right to have views. When I say that I have listened with horrified distaste to this Statement this afternoon, that is putting it very mildly. If ever there was an instance of intolerant prejudice finding expression in intemperate action, this is it. Has nobody considered what are the true interests of the people of South Africa? Are they likely to be furthered by this kind of interference from outside? And, my Lords, since when have decisions of the United Nations had the force of Holy Writ? Since when—and we know how some of those decisions are arrived at—have we decided that we will have our foreign policy dictated to us by decisions at the United Nations?
I shall have the opportunity of saying much more when the debate on this matter, which I hope will come, takes place, but I feel that it would have been a mistake if a strong protest (I almost said a violent protest) had not been made from the Back Benches of this House to show that at least there is a very strong opinion which protests at this kind of attempt to bully another country by external interference with its internal policies. If ever there was a threat to the peace of mankind, my Lords, this is the kind of thing that is.

§ THE EARL OF LONGFORD
My Lords, I entirely agree with the noble Lord (I do not think it was really in dispute) that someone who sits on the Back Benches is as much entitled to express his conscience as anybody who sits on the Front Benches. On that, certainly, there is no argument. But I think it ought to be quite plain that the United Nations, and not just this country, have adopted this policy.
The Security Council, in the resolution I mentioned, called upon the Government of South Africa to abandon the policies of apartheid and discrimination, and to liberate all persons imprisoned, interned or subjected to other restrictions for having opposed the policy of apartheid; they solemnly called upon all States to cease forthwith the sale and shipment of arms, ammunition of all types and military vehicles to South Africa; and requested the Secretary-General to keep the situation under observation and report back. That is the attitude of the Security Council, and it is, broadly speaking, the attitude of the Free World. So I hope that the noble Lord will not assume that it is just some peculiar idiosyncracy of Her Majesty's Government. It is an expression of the opinion of the Free World.

§ LORD CONESFORD
My Lords, the noble Earl said that the South African Government had not been consulted. Can he say, in view of the immense importance of this decision to the whole of the Free World, whether the Dominions of Australia and New Zealand were consulted?

§ THE EARL OF LONGFORD
My Lords, I have not that information by me. Of course, as the noble Lord is aware, a number of States, including the United States, have already put this policy into operation; but I cannot inform the noble Lord, offhand, which countries within the Commonwealth, if any, have been consulted.

§ LORD CONESFORD
My Lords, may I ask one more question on the moral issue, because I want to clear my mind, so far as possible? I gather that this resolution of the United Nations has very great importance in the view of Her Majesty's Government. Do I understand that the equally strong resolutions on the subject of Hungary, which are still 533 being disobeyed by the Communist world, have no moral importance and involve Her Majesty's Government in no consequential duties?

§ THE EARL OF LONGFORD
My Lords, the noble Lord is taking us rather far afield in asking us to share some responsibility for the conduct of the Communist world. If the noble Lord will tell us how to put right the situation in Hungary, no one will be more grateful than I shall be.

§ VISCOUNT MONSELL
My Lords, will the Government study the results of the last time the Government put sanctions on a foreign country due to Left Wing prejudice and pressure? It was a total fiasco in 1935, when we put sanctions on Italy. It resulted in Mussolini being thrown into the arms of Hitler, and made the last world war possible.

§ THE EARL OF LONGFORD
My Lords, I might be tempted to make too hot a reply to that suggestion, but I think there are many of us who regard the betrayal of collective security at that time as one of the main events leading up to the war; so I am not exactly with the noble Viscount in his line of thought. But I think that to call this Left Wing prejudice, if I may say so with great respect to the noble Viscount, would be somewhat fantastic. This is the opinion of the United Nations; and the United States, which is hardly a country of Left Wing intellectuals, has in fact already taken these steps.

§ LORD COLYTON
My Lords, may I ask the noble Earl the Leader of the House whether he i aware how bitterly this decision will be resented by the workers in the shipbuilding, aircraft, armaments and engineering industries, who have already had a taste of the Government's medicine over contracts for Spain and Portugal? May I ask him, also, whether he is aware that already all over the country engineering firms are reporting a falling off of orders as a result of animosity engendered by the Government's attitude, not only towards South Africa, Spain and Portugal, but also towards the Scandinavian Powers?

THE LORD ARCHBISHOP OF CANTERBURY
My Lords, are the Government aware that, irrespective, perhaps, of 534 some of the details of the Statement that has been made to-day, the Statement made will greatly hearten many people in this country as a resolute attempt to carry out the intention, not only of themselves but of their predecessors, not to export to South Africa arms which may be used for the enforcement of the policy of apartheid?

§ THE EARL OF LONGFORD
My Lords, I must not attempt to evaluate the respective weight of the opinions of noble Lords, but if there is one noble Lord whose opinion brings moral sustenance it is the most reverend Primate the Lord Archbishop of Canterbury. May I just answer the noble Lord, Lord Colyton? Whether this is going to be popular with aircraft workers I have no means of knowing.

§ THE EARL OF LONGFORD
I have no means of knowing; but if noble Lords think they are so successful in an election, then they must do better next time than they did last time. But, at any rate, that is not quite the footing on which we are approaching this question. This is not a search for popularity: this is an attempt to do right, and I am very glad to think that noble Lords who come to this matter somewhat dispassionately—the noble Lord the Leader of the Liberal Party and the most reverend Primate—have supported our policy in outline very strongly.

§ LORD CARRINGTON
My Lords, I am sorry to intervene again, but I feel that I should do so, in view of something which the noble Lord the Leader of the Liberal Party said. I do not know whether he meant to imply it, but he seemed to me to imply that those of us who sit on these Benches condoned a Government which supported a policy of apartheid. We have made it perfectly clear that we do not. We have adopted exactly the policy on which the most reverend Primate has just congratulated the Government. This was exactly our policy and not the policy of noble Lords opposite. We have said that we would not export to South Africa arms which could be used for the purposes of enforcing the policy of apartheid. That is where we stood, and that is how we voted in the United Nations. I am very glad to hear the most reverend Primate 535 agrees that this was the right policy. What I am saying, however, is that we do not believe that it is sensible to base your trade policy on a policy of trading only with those with whom you agree. If the Government go on like this, there may be many people in the world who are not prepared to trade with the Government of noble Lords opposite.

§ THE EARL OF LONGFORD
My Lords, if I may answer the noble Lord, this is not a trade embargo: the noble Lord the Leader of the Opposition was going outside the proposal in suggesting that it was. He argued that the most reverend Primate, if he had really understood the issues, would have supported the late Government instead of us. I am afraid that I must leave that to the most reverend Primate to decide. He has, in fact, issued very encouraging words in our favour this afternoon. I can hardly believe that he would have done so if he had not understood what he was saying.