§ 2.51 p.m.
§ THE FIRST LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY (EARL JELLICOE) rose to move to resolve, That this House approves the Statement on Defence, 1964 (Cmnd. 2270). The noble Earl said: My Lords, we are this afternoon starting once again our annual debate on Defence. Perhaps the regularity of this occasion induces a certain artificiality. Our policy towards other nations, the threats against us, and our interests and the ways in which, when it comes to 718 the crunch, we meet them with armed force, vary, of course, but little year by year. As your Lordships know, paragraph 4 of the Defence White Paper rehearses once again the basic objectives of our policy. I do not think that any reasonable Lord can dissent from these objectives. Indeed, I find it very hard to believe that any reasonable man will disagree with what is said in the next paragraph of the White Paper, that the keystone of our policy is the prevention of war and that until true disarmament becomes a reality—and we are determined, as my right honourable friend the Foreign Secretary showed last month at Geneva, to do all we can to make disarmament a reality—it is the power of nuclear weapons and the fact that no country is willing to risk suicide that keeps the peace.
§ Like other members of my generation—like many of your Lordships indeed—I have seen something of war. And I did not like what I saw. But I know that what I saw in terms of human misery and human degradation and sheer material destruction was as nothing compared with what nuclear war would mean. The imagination boggles at the thought of nuclear war. And I suspect that part of every man's conscience instinctively cries out: "We must contract out of this business. We must have nothing to do with the bomb". I can understand—we can all understand and respect—that view and those who in sincerity hold it. But, this cannot be my view, or that of the Government, or indeed, as I conceive it, that of either of the official Oppositions. This brings me to the heart of the first part of the noble Earl's Amendment. In it he speaks of his lack of confidence in our Defence policy to provide effectively for the defence of this country, and, of course, we shall listen with interest to his explanation for this lack of confidence.
§ Meanwhile, my Lords, I would say this—and it brings me to our rôle as a nuclear power. In the past we could rely for the defence of these Islands upon conventional arms and natural obstacles. We could rest our defences on the White Cliffs of Dover—as in Napoleon's time—or on the Rhine. We could shelter behind our "walls of oak" or Dreadnoughts. But those days are dead. Nowadays, against a would-be aggressor armed 719 with nuclear warheads and missiles our only sure and certain defence is in fact the deterrent—the certain knowledge on the part of that aggressor that should he strike us he would, in so doing, automatically and inevitably draw upon his own head and upon his cities and his population damage and destruction on a scale to which no rational ruler could possibly expose his people.
§ As I see it, it is that ultimate defence of this country—the ultimate independent control of our own deterrent—which some members of the Party opposite are now inviting us to surrender. I hope that we shall not walk this primrose path, since I cannot see how such a renunciation by us could possibly make it easier for us effectively to defend this country. Indeed, to go down this path would involve tremendous risks.
§ Let me make it quite clear that we accept the primacy of collective defence with our Allies. That is why, subject only to the supreme national interest, we have already assigned our V-bomber force to NATO and will so assign our Polaris submarine force as it comes into being. Whatever the Party opposite may say, I cannot see myself how we could withdraw our contribution from the Allied deterrent without at the same time greatly reducing our influence both within the Alliance and more generally in the world as a whole. But, by acting in this way, we should not only be making it impossible for us to contribute to the Western deterrent as a whole; we should also be stripping ourselves of our present ability to demonstrate to a potential aggressor that in the ultimate resort Britain alone can levy unacceptable retribution.
§ The Government's unwillingness to renounce this ultimate—I stress the word "ultimate"—independent option implies no distrust of our Allies. It simply recognises that, beyond situations in which, for example, we know with absolute certainty that the great forces of the United States would operate, there is an unknown region of formidable risk to our national survival against which no sane Government could fail to guard if it was within their power to do so. In this vital context, what responsible Government would claim to read aright, and into the far distance, the future of 720 our uncertain world, or to rule out the possibility, however, remote, that a potential aggressor might attempt to coerce Britain in the belief that she could be attacked in isolation? To discard any measure of national defence which we actually possess and can maintain would be, I suggest, sheer folly.
§ My Lords, I want to put our case for the retention of this ultimate independent nuclear option as moderately and as objectively as I can. I do not wish now to claim that it would necessarily be right for this country to wish to retain this option for all time. There might—it is not inconceivable, in my view—come a time when the organic structure of the Western Alliance was sufficiently strong for us to be able with entire confidence to place our nuclear armoury irrevocably in a common pool. But this is not the position now, and it is now or in the near future that we are being asked to abdicate our final control over our final means of defence.
§ LORD OGMOREMy Lords, may I interrupt the noble Earl? This is a very important statement he is making. It is the first time the Government have ever made this statement. Would he like to tell us in what conditions they would be prepared to abandon the independent deterrent? What position would the other Powers have to be in, in order to enable us to abandon it?
EARL JELLICOEMy Lords, I should not wish, if the noble Lord would excuse me, to be drawn too far into detail here; but, broadly speaking, my answer is: when we could do it with entire confidence that we were doing so without prejudice to the defence of this country. But we are being asked to renounce this independent option now, when we should in return have no assurance of thereby gaining greater control over the Allied deterrent as a whole, or indeed greater influence in the councils of the Allies. It is now, at an uncertain and entirely unpredictable moment of the world's history; and it is now, when so far as I know this renunciation would not produce any similar renunciation by any other country in the world. And if it is now, or in the near future, it is for all time. If we now make a bonfire of our bombers; or chop our Polaris submarines in two, as Mr. Wilson and Mr. Healey have suggested that we might 721 do; if we disperse all our crews and scientists and engineering know-how, I do not think we should kid ourselves—
§ EARL ALEXANDER OF HILLSBOROUGHMy Lords, I should like the quotation of Mr. Wilson, when he said he would chop them in half.
§ LORD SHEPHERDOr burn the V-bombers.
EARL JELLICOEMy Lords, if I have misquoted the Leader of the Opposition I will gladly withdraw. I thought that he had said that. I can remember the official spokesman of the Opposition in another place, Mr. Healey, specifically saying so. If I have misquoted the Leader of the Opposition, I will gladly withdraw my remark.
§ LORD SHACKLETONMy Lords, would the noble Earl also give us the quotation of Mr. Healey? Although the noble Earl may study these speeches closely, so do some of us, and I have no recollection of any such speech.
EARL JELLICOEI would merely draw the noble Lord's attention to the remarks of Mr. Healey in the Defence Debate in another place.
§ LORD SHACKLETONWhich remarks?
§ LORD KENNETMy Lords, if the noble Earl will permit one further intervention, would he accept that what Mr. Healey said in another place was that, if necessary, we would consider converting the Polaris submarines to hunter-killer submarines; and that he said nothing, either then or at any other time, about burning the bombers? Would the noble Earl accept that?
EARL JELLICOEI will of course accept that. But when the noble Lord comes to read Hansard to-morrow he will see that I was not suggesting that Mr. Healey had suggested we should burn our bombers. I was merely referring to taking the central portion out of the Polaris submarine.
§ LORD MORRISON OF LAMBETHMy Lords, I am sorry to interrupt again, but it is a pity that the noble Earl has 722 not the text of the quotation in front of him. These statements are made and, as he might have anticipated, it is desirable to check them up. As he has not got them with him—that cannot be helped—will he kindly arrange for the Leader of the House to give us the text of the quotations in winding up the debate?
EARL JELLICOEMy Lords, I cannot speak for my noble Leader. I will certainly accept the correction which the noble Lord, Lord Kennet, places upon my remarks about confusion over the Polaris submarines, if that is helpful. That I will certainly do.
§ LORD KENNETAnd about the bombers, and what the noble Earl attributed to Mr. Healey?
EARL JELLICOEI was not saying that Mr. Healey was suggesting that. This is a question of punctuation. All am suggesting is that if we made this decision it would be irrevocable, probably for all time. Given all this, given the uncertainty of the world to-day and given the finality of this decision, I would suggest to your Lordships that this is neither the right moment, nor probably the right decade, for us to make this supreme act of national renunciation. That is why I am glad that the Government have firmly decided to retain our nuclear capacity, for the time being, with the V-bombers and thereafter with a British force of five Polaris submarines.
Since we spend less than one-tenth of our Defence budget on the nuclear deterrent, it is rather odd how our debates on Defence policy at times tend to be monopolised by this nuclear issue. I hope that we may, to some extent at least, redress this balance in our debate this afternoon, and I, for my part, propose to pay at least equal attention to our need to maintain well-equipped, suitably deployed, mobile, highly trained and sufficient conventional Forces.
§ EARL ALEXANDER OF HILLSBOROUGHMy Lords, am Ito understand from the figure of 10 per cent. that we spend only £200 million a year on nuclear weapons, including all the provisions which have been made for Polaris?
EARL JELLICOEYes; in fact, it is rather under 10 per cent., and will continue so, as was made clear by my right honourable friend in another place in the Defence debate there.
I should like, first of all, to deal with equipment, and I trust that your Lordships will not feel that this old bottle is not properly imbued with the new spirit of Service interdependence if I concentrate in the main here on the Royal Navy. So far as equipment is concerned, the Army, as I think we all recognise, has in the past, at least sometimes, been rather the odd man out. Those of us who were platoon commanders in 1939 and 1940 have only too vivid memories of the sort of symbols with which we used to represent our missing anti-tank rifles. I will not delve into the inventory of new equipment coming into the Army to-day—I do not think it would be appropriate in this sort of debate; but I should like to suggest that the flow of this equipment can be measured by the rise in expenditure on the Army's new fighting equipment. Two years ago we were spending at the rate of £70 million a year on new equipment for the Army. Last year we were spending at the rate of £80 million a year. This year's expenditure will be £100 million, and the increase will continue.
Next, the Royal Air Force. I think by common consent the R.A.F. to-day is not only a superbly trained but also a well-equipped arm. The major operational aircraft now being developed for the R.A.F. are the TSR 2 and the P1154. Your Lordships have all heard a lot about the TSR 2, and I am therefore not going into a great deal of detail about it. All I am going to do is to confirm that good progress is being made with the project. The first flights of this aircraft will take place shortly, and I have no doubt that when the TSR 2 starts to replace the Canberras in the tactical strike and reconnaissance rôles in about three years' time, the R.A.F. will possess in that aircraft one of the most formidable weapons systems of the present time.
§ EARL ALEXANDER OF HILLSBOROUGHMy Lords, can the noble Earl give me the actual time when the design of the TSR 2 first came off the drawing board?
EARL JELLICOEMy Lords. I am afraid I cannot; but the development order was placed about four years ago, and for an aircraft of this complexity to be where it is now is not in the space of four years doing too badly. The P1154 comes, of course, a little later in the time scale.
I should like to say that it is disappointing—and I would be the first to admit it—that a common aircraft for the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force to replace both the Sea Vixen and the Hunter did not prove a practicable proposition. But let me make one thing quite clear here. This was not a case of Service rivalry and pig-headedness. Both the Air Ministry and the Admiralty would have welcomed the successful development of the common aircraft, and both Services were prepared, in order to secure this, greatly to compromise their requirements. We are now, in any event, embarking on the full development of the P1154 for the R.A.F., designed to replace the Hunter at the end of this decade. Its primary rôle, as the Hunter replacement, will be that of Army ground support. With its S.T.O.L. capability and the ability to go right forward in the battlefield, it will be quite invaluable in that rôle.
Next, the Royal Navy. I have touched on the Polaris force in my opening remarks. Your Lordships, as we were reminded the other day, admire tradition, especially naval tradition. I am sure, therefore, that you will be glad that these vessels, the most powerful warships this country has ever possessed, will bear the honoured names of "Resolution", "Renown", "Repulse", and "Revenge". On the Polaris force I would in addition say this. The Navy is proud to discharge the responsibility which has been placed on it of being the chief custodian of our national deterrent in the 1970's. The Navy will discharge that responsibility with its habitual efficiency. Nevertheless, I should like to make it equally clear to your Lordships that we are equally determined to maintain the strength and quality of our conventional naval forces.
I would suggest that our present plans demonstrate this. Take, for example, the field of naval aviation. 725 There the construction of the new aircraft carrier, on which the necessary design and development work is being pushed ahead with all possible speed, the return to service of the completely modernised H.M.S. "Eagle", and the choice of the Phantom aircraft as the Sea Vixen replacement, are all proof of the very substantial effort which we are devoting to this vital part of the Fleet. I know there has been some criticism of the decision which my right honourable friend recently announced to buy this American aircraft, the Phantom, subject, of course, to final technical evaluation and to satisfactory contract arrangements. Like other noble Lords, other things being equal, or almost equal, I prefer to buy British. But our responsibility, my Lords, is to see that the pilots of the Fleet Air Arm have the best possible equipment available to them. The Phantom, by all accounts, is the best all-weather fighter in the world to-day. The performance of the version to be developed for the Royal Navy, with its twin Rolls-Royce Spey engines, will be some 20 per cent. better across the board. I believe that this Anglo-American version of the Phantom will give the Royal Navy an all-weather fighter probably without equal in the next decade, certainly in the early part of the next decade.
§ LORD SHACKLETONMy Lords, the Noble Earl said that it would be 20 per cent. better across the hoard. Did I mishear him? Could he say precisely in what way it will be better.
EARL JELLICOEI did not want to go into specific details, but, generally speaking, better in its performance.
My Lords, during the past months, since I took over from my noble friend the Leader of the House, I have done my best to see as much as possible of the Fleet, and I, for one, have been tremendously struck by the new ships coming into service. I have seen the Oberons, the Counties, the Leanders and the Tribals; and I believe that these new ships of the conventional Navy are, ship for ship, and class for class, as good as, or better than, the equivalent ships in any other navy in the world to-day. Finally, dealing with naval equipment, I would make it clear that we have made good progress with our long- 726 term plan for replacing the older escorts by modern frigates. Since January, 1960, 24 escorts of post-war design have either joined the Fleet already or will have done so by the end of 1964. In addition, nine Leanders are either under construction or have been ordered. And we intend to keep up the momentum of the programme for modernising and keeping modern the escort Fleet. This is the backbone of the Navy, as the noble Earl the Leader of the Opposition knows, and underpins the Fleet in every part of the world.
The best equipment and the best Forces are useless unless we can get them where we want them when we want them. It is for that reason that mobility is so important. The tactical mobility of our Forces will be greatly improved when the Army takes delivery of the light helicopters, the order for which my right honourable friend recently announced. The tactical mobility conferred by Transport Command has recently been greatly enhanced, and it will be further enhanced when we take delivery of the new HS681 tactical freighter which the Government have decided to develop. The strategic transport capacity of the R.A.F. will be immensely strengthened in the next two or three years when the Belfasts and the VC10s arrive on the scene. They will supplement the present fleet of Britannias and Comets and will in fact, when in service, double the strategic capacity of Transport Command.
§ LORD SHACKLETONMy Lords, can the noble Earl say when the HS681, to which he attaches so much importance, as we do, is going to come into service?
§ LORD SHACKLETON1970.
EARL JELLICOEThe latter end of the 1960's. I think recent events have shown the ability and the efficiency with which Transport Command have met all the simultaneous commitments which they have had to discharge.
§ EARL ALEXANDER OF HILLSBOROUGHMy Lords, before the noble Lord leaves helicopters, could I ask whether the whole of these new helicopters are to be British made?
EARL JELLICOEI think the intention is that the initial buy will be "off the peg" from abroad, and then the subsequent buy will be from a British firm.
§ EARL ALEXANDER OF HILLSBOROUGHYou will buy American as required, and then later on have copies made of the American design and replacements from British industry. Is that it?
EARL JELLICOEI think I gave the noble Earl a very clear reply to his question. He can place what interpretation he wishes on my reply.
As recent events have shown the ability of Transport Command to discharge their obligations, I think they have also demonstrated how maritime power can be used to exert the right influence in the right place at the right time. That is why I, for one, am so glad that our programme of reviving our amphibious capability is going forward so well. There is the modernised "Bulwark", which I saw set sail for the Far East the other day; there are the two new assault ships of high speed; and then there are the six new landing ships logistic (as they are called) which the Army are about to commission. This means that by 1966 we shall have a fast and flexible amphibious force able to lift the fighting arms of at least a brigade group and capable of intervening quickly and decisively anywhere within the reach of sea power. No less important, to plan and prepare for the use of this force a new command is being set up, that of the Commodore Amphibious Forces. All those of us who remember the amphibious improvisations of 1939 and 1940 will know how important it is to keep this vital military art, amphibious warfare, fully alive and kicking.
So much for material. Given the progress recorded in the White Paper and given the decisions recently announced by my right honourable friend, I believe that, broadly speaking, this side of the Armed Forces is now, or shortly will be, catered for. I might add that it is also catered for within the financial discipline—7 per cent. or so of the gross national product—which we have imposed upon ourselves.
At the present time manpower, not material, ranks as perhaps the most chal- 728 lenging problem facing the Armed Forces. I would summarise the present position in broad terms as follows. So far as the R.A.F. is concerned, recruitment is good. So far as the Royal Navy is concerned, it is reasonable. So far as the Army is concerned, it is, as yet, only fair. But, my Lords, the Army's recruiting position is improving. After the bumper crop of 1962, 1963 was, of course, a very disappointing year indeed for Army recruiting, but there have recently been encouraging signs of an improvement, and on February 1 of this year other ranks strength had risen to 152,260. While this, of course, represents a shortfall of some 8,000 from our total other ranks requirement of some 160,000 men, I would suggest that a shortfall of this order does not call for any departure from our policy of all-Regular volunteer forces. It does, however, call for all the determination, energy and imagination which we can command, in order to stimulate recruitment and to foster re-engagement.
§ EARL ALEXANDER OF HILLSBOROUGHI agree, but I should like to ask a question—
§ EARL ALEXANDER OF HILLSBOROUGHI beg your pardon? I want clarification of the figures just given. We have been dealing before, not with other ranks strength specifically, but dealing with the overall strength. There was supposed to be an overall strength of 165,000, and then it went up to 185,000. Some people then argued it should be 200,000. Will the noble Earl tell us what the present overall strength actually is?
EARL JELLICOEI think it is 172,000-plus, which again is a shortfall of about 8,000. I should like to say that to this end of stimulating recruitment and fostering re-engagement we should welcome all the assistance which I am sure many noble Lords can give; and, equally, my right honourable friend and myself will gladly examine any proposals to this end which your Lordships may proffer during this debate.
There are many other aspects of this manpower situation on which I should have liked to have touched but with which I will not deal to-day. There is 729 the question of living standards; there are all the side-effects of early marriage and, with them, the need for Service housing. There is, above all, the need for recruiting quality as well as quantity; and, in the educational field and the field of training, the need for keeping up with the Newsoms and the Robbinses. All these are vastly important areas, and I think they are, in their way, worth a separate debate of their own; because manpower is the essence of the problem of the Armed Forces at the present time. I should like to suggest, if your Lordships could afford the time, that we could very profitably have a separate debate on manpower and all the associated subjects which go with it.
My Lords, I realise that I am open to the reproach that much of what I have been saying about our conventional Armed Forces may sound rather theoretical. I have been looking to the future, to the new equipment which the Forces will be receiving, to their enhanced mobility and so on; and I would be the first to agree that an ounce of practical demonstration is worth a ton of theoretical disquisition. But, my Lords, if that is so, then I would claim that our Armed Forces have in recent months amply demonstrated, by their performance, that they are fully adequate to the tasks which they have been called upon to discharge. If our conventional forces were in fact as ill-equipped, immobile and as thin on the ground as the Opposition have sometimes tended to suggest, then it is hard to see how they could have responded as they have responded to the simultaneous emergencies with which they have been confronted, in Eastern Malaysia, in East Africa and in Cyprus.
I think I am entitled to take for the Government that meed of credit, but in so doing I do not propose for one instant to take the credit away from those to whom it really belongs—to our Armed Forces themselves. We have all, I think, been impressed by the smoothness and efficiency with which Transport Command have discharged their recent tasks; we have been struck by the quietly ubiquitous response of the Royal Navy to these recent operations. And may I add that I, for one, find it fitting that, in their Tercentenary Year, four out 730 of five of the Royal Marine Commandos should be deployed East of Suez.
But if any one arm of our Forces has borne the brunt of these operations, it has, I think, been the Army. We can all, wherever we sit in the House, take pride from the recent performances of the Regular units of our modern Army. The modern British soldier has given an astonishingly fine account of himself, whether in confronting the problems, both of climate and of terrain, in Eastern Malaysia; in acclimatising himself to the problems, part military, part diplomatic, of East Africa; or, most difficult of all, in dealing with communal strife in Cyprus. There, our troops have not been fighting people: they have been tackling the very much harder task of people fighting each other; and there is no military task—and I am sure that here your Lordshps will agree with me—which tests discipline and training more than this. I myself do not find it altogether fanciful to suppose that the recent and healthy improvement in recruiting for the Army may not be unconnected with the image which our modern Army has put before us recently—that of a tough, well-disciplined, well-equipped, well-trained and, above all, restrained and very humane force.
My Lords, it is, of course, important for us to have the right forces, but it is equally important for us to have the right policy. Perhaps, since we are approaching the witching month of June, or October, or whichever month it may be, it is not unexpected that from time to time our Defence policy should be somewhat guyed by some members of the Opposition as being, somehow, chauvinistic, or a throwback to an earlier age of outworn jingoism. It is true that in certain respects we still live in an age of nation States; and because of this, and because the forms of regional and international organisations are still developing, we believe it right to retain, in the last analysis, an independent option, as I mentioned earlier on. Yet, we do not delude ourselves—and this I would wish to underline—into thinking that this is the rule rather than the exception. The whole logic of our contemporary world is towards interdependence, and in that increasingly interdependent world our real security must increasingly lie in the Alliances to which we are pledged and 731 in the groupings of which we are members. That, of course, is the reason for our active membership of the three great regional Pacts—NATO, CENTO and SEATO.
But, my Lords, our military interdependence is not governed only by these formal Alliances. We also make a major contribution to peace-keeping within the framework of the Commonwealth in a whole number of ways. As we have recently seen, this business of helping our Commonwealth friends to make their peaceful way in the world is by no means an easy one. How long this Commonwealth military rôle (if I may so term it) will continue, I should hesitate to say, but I think that all the signs are that we shall have an indispensable part to play here for many years to come. At one extreme we shall continue, as at present in Malaysia, to protect our friends against those who, professing to abhor imperialism, seek to impose their own and, at the other, our political and military experience, and our ability to help train the forces of nascent nations, will remain at the disposal of those who are resolved to establish independent and good government on a foundation of reliable and well-trained defence forces.
My Lords, I would go further, if I may, for the benefit of those who misrepresent our policy as cast in a jingoistic mould. I would not wish at this stage to enter into any discussion over the precise relationship of the Royal Navy to the United Nations; nor would I wish to cross swords with those who, like Mr. Wigg, feel that we should have no Navy at all. But I should like to take the opportunity of reaffirming that it is the policy of Her Majesty's Government fully to support the efforts of the United Nations in the preservation or restoration of peace throughout the world. Time and again, as in Cyprus to-day, Britain has been called upon to fill a dangerous vacuum. But this does not mean that we have been acting against the common interest. Indeed, it is we, and we alone, who have made the United Nations' political and military presence in Cyprus possible.
732 I should like to quote two sentences from the important speech by my right honourable friend the Foreign Secretary at Geneva last month. He said that:
It is in my view essential to build up the peace-keeping rôle and capabilities of the United Nations.He then went on to say:We are very ready to discuss these ideas or others designed for the same end, with all those who are interested.This will remain our steady aim.My Lords, in conclusion I would say that it is no very easy task to introduce a Defence debate in this Chamber, because, of all the problems that beset the modern world, those in the field of defence are possibly the most stubborn and intractable. In this setting it would be almost incredible if, over the years, we had not made mistakes and committed errors of judgment. Of course we have: and I do not doubt that we—or our successors—shall make more in the future. And yet, by any fair, practical, criterion, our Defence policy has been successful. Our stated overriding aim has been the avoidance of major war. There has been no major war. We have set ourselves the task of providing mobile, highly professional, compact forces to deal with trouble spots, or potential trouble spots, all over the world. In 1964 these forces have surmounted the rigours of simultaneous testing in three different continents. We have aimed to arm our men with first-rate equipment. In great measure I believe that we have succeeded. The new generations of tanks, aircraft and warships can hold their own with any. All this has had to be done without overstraining a delicately balanced economy. And I would remind noble Lords that the man in the street pays less for national Defence to-day that he does for drink and tobacco. Above all—and this is a truly national achievement—the men themselves, as has been demonstrated by the events of recent months, have done and are doing a job of which we can all be proud. My Lords, I beg to move.
§ Moved to resolve, That this House approves the Statement on Defence, 1964 (Cmnd. 2270).—(Earl Jellicoe.)