HL Deb 12 March 1964 vol 256 cc612-4

7.49 p.m.

Bill read 3a (according to Order).

Clause 4 [Divorce for non-consummation or intolerable conduct]: (2) In determining whether a defender has been guilty of intolerable conduct the court shall have regard to all the circumstances of the case, and except in any case where it is satisfied that the conduct complained of arose from the insanity of the defender shall not grant decree of divorce unless it appears to the court that the conduct complained of was inexcusable.

VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS moved, in subsection (2), to leave out "the conduct complained of was inexcusable", and to insert: there was no reasonable excuse for the conduct complained of.

The noble Viscount said: My Lords, this is really no more than a drafting Amendment, and I apologise for inflicting it upon your Lordships on Third Reading. However, it may be within the recollection of the House that the noble Lord, Lord Hughes, was concerned when the House was in Committee on this Bill with the juxtaposition of the word "intolerable" in the description of the intolerable conduct about which Clause 4(1)(b) is concerned, and the word "inexcusable" at the end of subsection (2) of that clause. He thought it was a pity to use the word "intolerable", which was defined with some care, and then finish up with the rather similar word "inexcusable" which was in no way defined. My noble and learned friend Lord Reid gave the House a fair indication of how he thought the courts would interpret this sort of wording when it came before them, and I did my best to explain to the House the sort of concept I had in mind in wording the clause in the way I had.

On the other hand, I see the point that the noble Lord, Lord Hughes, made, and I have thought of all the possible ways of which I was capable of thinking to put it right. I do not believe it is either necessary, desirable or possible to define the concept that is behind the word "inexcusable" in the Bill as it now stands, but I should like, if I can, to simplify the phraseology and to use a more ordinary form of words than this rather unusual epithet. I do not think there is any difference in the sense of the clause or the way in which it will be interpreted or used by the courts; but, nevertheless, I think it is right that this Amendment should be made. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 2, line 29, leave out from ("that") to end of line 30, and insert the said new words.—(Viscount Colville of Culross.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Bill passed, and sent to the Commons.