HL Deb 10 June 1964 vol 258 cc959-76

7.5 p.m.

THE EARL OF KINNOULL rose to ask Her Majesty's Government whether, in view of the increasing number of Royal Air Force personnel killed in V-Bomber accidents, they will reconsider the decision to supply only the pilot and co-pilot with ejector seats.

The noble Earl said: My Lords, before I begin I feel that I should declare to your Lordships' House an interest which I have in this Question. In my professional capacity I act for a company who are makers of ejector seats. However, it is only in a capacity to do with land management of their airfields that I act on their behalf, and I am not in any way connected with the manufacturing side of the company.

I put down this Unstarred Question as a result of the recent report of a tragic accident that occurred near Andover on May 11 of this year, when a Vulcan bomber crashed while approaching to land. The three rear members of the crew—that is to say, the navigator, the bomb aimer and the engineer—were all killed, and the two pilots, having ejected from a very low level, survived. This accident triggered off yet again a feeling among many people concerned with these aircraft as to the question: is it morally right to continue to send up air crews in V-Bombers, knowing full well that if the aircraft gets into difficulties at low level the crew have next to no chance of baling out? Does not the benefit of hindsight prove to-day how utterly wrong was the decision taken four years ago not to adapt the V-Bombers with ejector seats?

From inquiries I have made, my Lords, the history of the V-Bombers and ejector seats started some fifteen years ago when the V-Bomber was being finalised on design. At that time it was said that, technically, it was not feasible to provide ejector seats for the three rear members as well as for the two pilots. One of the reasons for this is that the rear crew members sit with their backs to the pilots, and there was a technical problem of spinning them on ejection. However, much thought and expense was given to the problem of the safety of the crew in time of emergency, and I understand that designs were developed whereby the nose of the aircraft could, in emergency, be jettisoned from the main body of the aircraft, and landed by means of parachutes with all five members enclosed. This design was eventually abandoned, and I should like to ask the noble Lord to tell us, when he replies, what was the cost of the development involved. At that time, with the V-Bomber designed to operate at high altitudes and with the fact that, technically, it was not possible to fit ejector seats for the rear crew, I do not think one could disagree with the decision to fit seats only for the pilots.

I believe that the first recorded accident in which ejector seats were involved was on January 12, 1952, when a Valiant prototype bomber got into difficulties, due to a structural failure, and the three rear crew members baled out successfully. One pilot ejected safely and the other pilot was killed when he struck the fin of the aircraft. This accident, your Lordships may say, proved the original decision to be correct. However, it must be added that in this instance the order to abandon the aircraft was given at sufficient height to allow the crew to bale out successfully. Matters came to a head in 1956, when your Lordships may recall, there was a particularly, not famous, but noted accident, at London Airport on October 1. The then Chief of Bomber Command, Sir Harry Broadhurst, was, I believe, returning from Australia in a Vulcan B.1 and was coming in to land at London Airport. He was flying as second pilot. The plane struck the ground on approaching to land, and with control lost the two pilots ejected at a height believed to be 100 to 200 feet, and the other four members were killed.

By now, my Lords (this was in 1956) the ejector seat design had made rapid strides and it was considered that adapting the bomber was technically feasible. I understand that for the next few years the most careful consideration and thought were given to the problem, but the final decision resulted in no action being taken. I believe that the reasons for this were a combination of cost and the time lost, both in withdrawing the aircraft from service and because of the work on adaption. This reconstruction work was, I believe, estimated at that time to take between six and nine months per aircraft. It is at this point that I feel, even without the benefit of hindsight, that the decision was utterly wrong and morally indefensible. If one scans the recorded accidents since 1959, one sees that there have been six accidents involving 24 personnel, 17 of whom were killed. Out of the 17, only two were pilots, and both, it is believed, stayed with their aircraft in an attempt to save their crew.

I do not claim that all those killed in the V-Bomber accidents would be alive to-day if the seat had been available. However, I must record that such is the reputation of the British ejector seat that they are supplied not only to the R.A.F. and the Fleet Air Arm but also to other Allied Air Forces, including the American, French, German and Indian Air Forces. To date, I believe, over 824 lives have been saved by the British ejector seat. I should like to quote one accident to illustrate the lifesaving capacity of these seats. The accident happened at Yeovilton last year, when a test pilot who became in difficulties while approaching to land ejected safely from 150 feet. It was estimated that at the time of his ejection he had only 1½ seconds to live.

My Lords, I believe that when reaching a decision whether to refit these V-Bombers the questions which should be asked are: What is the cost? How long will it take? And what is the operational life of the aircraft? From inquiries I have made, I have endeavoured to answer these questions. The cost, I would suggest, is between £20,000 and £50,000 per aircraft. The Victor Bomber, I understand, would be less costly to adapt than the Vulcan Bomber. The Valiant Bomber I have not considered because it is already destined to become a tanker aircraft. The length of time necessary to refit all the bombers would be, I believe, between three and four years, allowing one year to perfect the adaption and two to three years to carry out the work. I would add here that I believe that the aircraft industry would, in its present state, welcome the work, and the estimated time might be even shorter. As to the operational life of the aircraft, this, I agree, is perhaps the most important question of all, but it must be agreed that conventional bombers are required for conventional wars—and Shackletons are proving this to-day, in Aden. I would suggest that the operational life of these bombers is far in excess of 1970, which is the date that has been given.

I am aware that all that can be done is being done, except actually fitting ejector seats, to assist the rear crew in times of emergency. The swivel seat and the inflatable cushion are being fitted at present, although I should like the noble Lord to tell us, when he comes to reply, why there are no plans to fit these modifications to the centre rear seat of the Vulcan. Nevertheless, I do not believe that these modifications would have much effect in an emergency. They will assist only in stage one of the baling out drill—that is to say, getting to the exit door. Stage two, the jumping clear of the plane, and stage three, the landing by parachute, are equally important to ensure survival.

I shall be disappointed if, when the noble Lord replies, he tries to persuade the House that these modifications are anything more than a demonstration that the Ministry are conscious of the plight of the crew. I am not aware if there is any Member of your Lordships' House who has actually had practical experience of an ejector seat, and 1 do not claim myself to have any special knowledge or experience. However, I recently visited Boscombe Down to see over the Vulcan and the Victor. Anyone who has done this will appreciate the very cramped conditions and the difficulty of a quick escape, even in controlled conditions. I am told of a survey that was recently made which showed that it took eight seconds for each member of the rear crew to bale out. An aircraft in difficulties may lose between 400 and 1,000 feet per second. If one takes the example of an aircraft losing 500 feet per second, it means that, in order to have a successful bale-out of the three-man crew, the first man must bale out at 12,000 feet. I am also told that 700 feet is the minimum height at which a man may bale out in safety.

As I have previously said, my Lords, I have raised this matter because I think there is a strong case for the Minister to revise the policy that was decided on some four years ago. The case, I feel, rests on four points. First, it is technically feasible to adapt these aircraft, as it was four years ago, but matters have now changed as the V-Bomber is due to fly as a low-level tactical aircraft, and ejector seats will therefore be even more necessary. Secondly, I believe that it can be done at a reasonable cost and in a reasonable time, with the co-operation of the manufacturers. Thirdly, I believe there is sufficient operational life in these aircraft to justify the cost of adaption. Fourthly, and perhaps most important of all, there is the moral question, which I think is unanswerable. Why should there be discrimination of escape equipment between the pilots and the rear crew? Why should the pilot have the extra burden, in a crisis, of deciding whether to eject or not? The old saying, "See you later, navigator!" has a bitter taste to it. What is required to-day, I feel, is for the Minister responsible to say, "I will not endure this situation any longer, where valuable crew have so little chance to escape." I am sure that, with this frame of mind, the matter could be resolved within three years. I believe that the Royal Air Force and the manufacturers support this view.

When the noble Lord comes to reply I should be grateful if he would answer these three questions. First, does he think that the rear crew stand any real chance of survival without ejector seats when the aircraft is flying at low level and gets into difficulties? And this, I would point out, is what will be happening in the future. Secondly, does he think it right that the crew should not have an equal chance of escape with the pilot? Thirdly, does he accept that conditions have changed since the decision taken four years ago not to adapt the aircraft?

7.18 p.m.

LORD SHACKLETON

My Lords, I should like to congratulate the noble Earl for raising a subject of great importance, and for doing so with great moderation but also with great firmness. I should like to support him only briefly, because the case he has put has already been very strongly deployed. Perhaps I may take this opportunity of apologising to the Parliamentary Secretary and to the noble Earl for the fact that, owing to the lateness of the hour, I may have to leave before the end of this debate, which is something I have never done, having spoken in a debate, since I entered this House.

There is only one possible answer to the case presented by the noble Earl, and that is that it is impossible to do that which he suggests should be done. It is very understandable that the Air Ministry and those who are responsible in this field have to weigh a number of factors, and I would not suggest for one moment that, in putting this forward, the Government or the Air Ministry are in any way being indifferent, or are gambling with men's lives without worrying about it. I am quite sure that the matter was considered very carefully and with a great deal of anxiety, although there is some suggestion that a little more thought might have been given to it—and I will refer to this in a moment.

As the noble Earl said, the present situation is really an almost impossible one. We have already example after example of a pilot being saved and the rear crew losing their lives or, alternatively, of the pilot going voluntarily to his death along with the rear crew. There is one case of which I am aware, and of which no doubt the noble Lord who is to reply is equally aware, of a Valiant which had a complete electrical failure at 1,000 feet and it was quite impossible to get the aircraft under control. The second pilot ejected and the pilot remained with his aircraft and went to his death.

There was a time, at the beginning of the 1914–18 war, when aircrew were not supplied with parachutes, on the ground that this might be bad for their morale and that there was a dancer that they might jump when they should not. Well, that idea was very quickly disposed of, and there is no doubt that the morale of the aircrew is very high, and their sense of duty so strong that they will do whatever they are asked to do and will accept that those who are in the more hazardous position in the event of the need to bale out will do this. But because they are prepared to accept it, we ought not to minimise the effect on morale, though it may be unconscious. There is an extra strain involved. While we do not want to make too heavy weather of the morale issue, none the less I think the noble Earl was quite right to point out that there is a morale issue involved.

In considering the case that has been put, I hope that the Government will realise that we are not just asking for a straight balance of operational advantage—and I am sure they would not seek to do that—but that they must take into account that men's lives are involved and we all have a very special responsibility for trying to save them. We know the ejector seats work extremely well in the established position in the aircraft, and I am advised that it is possible to provide satisfactory ejectors for the rest of the crew. What cost is involved we do not know; but we now know that the V-bombers are going to have a low-level rôle and the chances of survival in those circumstances (where there is a particularly increased danger of the need to bale out) for those without ejector seats will be relatively low—and I could use stronger language than that. I would suggest that there is some evidence that the Government or the Ministry have not weighed certain suggestions that have been made for dealing with this matter quite as seriously as they might. This is the sort of matter, like so many others in Government, which gets caught up in policy decisions and where the administrators, however noble-minded they may be, inevitably get driven along certain paths. What the noble Earl is trying to do, and what those who are supporting him are trying to do, is to suggest that, whatever logic there may be in their thinking, this is a special case.

I hope that, when the Parliamentary Secretary comes to reply to some of these frankly difficult questions the noble Earl has asked, he will not just say that it cannot be done; because we are likely to press him further on that. What we hope will happen, however strong may be the present view of the impossibility of dealing with this, is that the Parliamentary Secretary—who I know always listens very carefully to the debates in this House—will get some indication that there is strong feeling on this; and we should like the Air Ministry to look again.

I agree with the noble Earl that the V-Bomber in one form or another will go on for a long time. It is a fact that the R.A.F. are still flying Ansons which were regarded as obsolescent in 1940; and even the obsolescent Shackleton is still going on. I should have thought that the Vulcans are likely to go on for a long while yet, even though it is likely to be in a conventional rôle; so I think the noble Earl has done a service by bringing this question forward, and by bringing it forward moderately. We hope very much that the Parliamentary Secretary will be able not only to show sympathy, which I am sure he will, but to give some indication that the Government will think again about this matter.

7.26 p.m.

LORD AMULREE

My Lords, I should like just to say a very few words in support of the point which the noble Earl has put to the House. It is a point that is worth while considering because, from all points of view, as the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, said, one does not want to think that there is any sort of discrimination between the safety of one member of the crew of a V-Bomber and that of another. There is a very big humanitarian point of view here which must affect the decision taken by Her Majesty's Government, or the Air Ministry, when they make up their minds on what is the right reply.

One can see the difficulty where a bomber is out of control and coming down fairly quickly, and the members of the crew have to get out by means of an exit which may be difficult to reach. In a case like that the question of exit may be complicated. The second thing is that after the aircraft is out of control, when the crew try to bale out they may get entangled in the various parts of the aeroplane; their parachutes may get caught and this will certainly lead to their deaths.

The figures the noble Lord quoted show that, roughly speaking three-quarters of people using an ejector seat come down safely; but of those having to bale out the fraction is about one-quarter. Those figures are, I feel, very significant and important.

The final point I should like to raise is that which was mentioned by both the noble Earl and the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton: the enormous strain on the pilot of the bomber when things begin to go wrong and he has to make up his mind on the right thing to do; whether to eject himself and the co-pilot while realising that the members of the crew probably—though that may be too strong a term; perhaps I should say "possibly" —are not going to survive. One can get the case that we have had before now of a pilot flying on and killing himself because he did not want to leave his crew too early. These are the points which must be considered and to which I trust the Parliamentary Secretary will be able to give some type of reply; because I think they are the cause of quite a lot of worry to various people in this country who have been brought up against these tragedies which occur.

7.29 p.m.

LORD ST. OSWALD

My Lords, for one who has been persuaded to eject himself voluntarily, under no mechanical compulsion whatever, from a number of perfectly stable and undamaged aircraft, this is for me an unfamiliar medium of debate; but it is an important subject for debate and my right honourable friends in the Ministries of Defence and Aviation, as much as the personnel of the Royal Air Force, will be grateful to my noble friend for raising this matter in your Lordships' House. The noble Earl asked me to answer three particular questions and I hope, in the course of what I say in a short speech, I shall be able to do that to his satisfaction.

My noble friend's statistics regarding accidents since 1959 are not quite correct, if I heard him properly. Since 1959, 13 R.A.F. V-Bomber pilots have been killed in eight accidents. At the same time, two pilots have been killed in three crashes of Ministry of Aviation V-Bombers.

THE EARL OF KINNOULL

My Lords, may I interrupt my noble friend? I think that the figures are since ejector seats were evolved, and probably the two deaths he mentioned were due to the fact that ejector seats were not involved and the pilots had no chance of escape.

LORD ST. OSWALD

My Lords, I am not trying to raise any pedantic disagreement with my noble friend, but these are the figures which I have, and they disagree with those given by my noble friend.

I must emphasise that the decision to supply only the pilot and co-pilot of our V-Bombers with ejector seats takes into most careful account the considerations of flight safety and the wellbeing of our air crews. I must also stress that the low-level operation of the V-Force over the last year or two has not resulted in any increase in the fatal accident rate.

THE EARL OF KINNOULL

My Lords, I am sorry to interrupt again, but my noble friend has just said there has been no increase in the accidents in low-level flying. This was announced only in February.

LORD ST. OSWALD

My Lords, my enunciation must have been at fault. I said that low-level operation of the V-Force over the last year or two has not resulted in any increase in the fatal accident rate, and this point I make in answer to the third question which my noble friend put to me as regards the changes in conditions in which these aircraft are now engaged. The two fatal accidents to a Vulcan and a Valiant bomber which occurred last month, distressing as they are, were the first which had happened for a year. Neither of these aircraft was engaged in low-level flying practice, and I would point out that the accident rate for V-Bombers has shown no tendency to increase in recent years.

The problem of fitting ejector seats for the rear crew members of our V-Bombers is that the work of doing so involves technically a complete redesigning of the whole rear crew compartments. Extensive structural alterations would be necessary and the whole programme would take several years to complete. In fact, it would be completed only a year or two before the V-Bombers are due to phase out, around 1970. I appreciate that my noble friend and the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, whose late intervention in the debate caused me no surprise, doubted that they would in fact be phased out as expected by the Government. I cannot really go much further than my right honourable friends have gone in saying that the V-Bomber Force will be phased out by 1970 and that the Polaris Force will be then in service and will take over from the V-Bomber Force.

There is another point of interest in regard to my noble friend's argument —that is, that low-level operation takes a lot out of an aircraft, apart from other broader questions of policy, and it seems most unlikely that the fatigue life of V-Bombers will last beyond 1970. What does stand out and what I must stress is that the references to the possible extension of life of the V-Bomber in a conventional rôle, fair though they may be, are of doubtful validity as an argument. My noble friend does not take account of the importance of keep- ing the V-Bomber Force at strength in its nuclear rôle until 1970. If the additional ejector seats were to be fitted, individual aircraft would have to be on the factory floor for a minimum of four months at a time—my noble friend mentioned six to eight months—and if the work were to go ahead there would be a serious depletion of our front-line V-Bomber strength during the period when they were required in their present rôle.

These are the reasons why we have decided against fitting ejector seats. There have been suggestions—I think there was a suggestion from my noble friend to-day—that the work was decided against because of expense. I am pleased to say—and I know that my noble friend will be pleased to hear it —that this is totally unfounded. Cost has never entered into the question. The ejector cabin which my noble friend mentioned was not turned down on grounds of costs but because it did not prove feasible to develop it in anything like the necessary time to fit it into operation in aircraft entering service. It was turned down on technical, and not on cost, grounds. There was no question whatever of costs affecting the issue.

THE EARL OF KINNOULL

My Lords, could I interrupt here for one moment? If the manufacturers of the aircraft and of the seat agree that they could do better than the figures he has given in time, would he reconsider the question?

LORD ST. OSWALD

My Lords, the fact is that these figures have been very carefully gone into, and what my noble friend is putting to me is what I must regard as a purely hypothetical question and, as he knows, from the Despatch Box hypothetical questions are not answered. I have to regard it in that light.

Steps are being taken, however, to see what else can be done to meet the problem. Noble Lords will have been interested to know of improvements which are being made in the speed with which rear crew members can use their escape hatches. These improvements result from the installation of swivel seats, which, used in combination with a pneumatic cushion and a modified parachute and harness, can enable the rear crew to reach the escape hatch in less than half the time previously taken. The time, in fact, has been reduced from one minute to about 30 seconds.

The crews of Bomber Command regularly practise on the ground the escape procedures and it is clear that the introduction of these swivel seats should greatly reduce the risk of fatality in accidents. This development, in fact, gives confidence of survival for rear crew members as well as pilots from an aircraft abandonment as low as 250 feet above the ground. My noble friend said that the minimum was 700 feet. There is the additional safeguard that, if a defect occurs at low-level, there is normally a good chance of taking the aircraft up to 2,000 feet or above, facilitating still further the escape of rear crew members. Although my noble friend said that he saw practically no chance of rear crew escaping if a fault developed while flying at low level, even if a fault suddenly developed at 250 feet, it is considered that their chance of escape is good, and we must also take into account that the pilot should be able to gain height and give them a still better chance.

Work began on installing these new seats in the Valiant aircraft in the middle of last year, and this is now almost complete. Work on the Victors which are being modified should be complete by the end of the year. The Vulcan presents structurally a rather more difficult problem, but a trial installation has now been successfully completed and work will be started on the aircraft very shortly. I am happy to tell my noble friend that he is wrong in thinking that swivel seats will not be installed in Vulcan bombers. They can and will be installed.

THE EARL OF KINNOULL

In all three seats?

LORD ST. OSWALD

Yes, my Lords, in all three seats. Everything that can be done has been done to get this work under way, and some of the modification kits which are necessary for the job are even being made by hand in order to speed up the work. All the Vulcans should be fully modified by the end of next year. Taking the V-Force as a whole, about 25 per cent. has so far been modified; nearly 50 per cent. will have been modified by the end of this year, and the work will continue progressively until it is fully completed at the end of 1965.

Finally, I should like to assure your Lordships that there is no question of this lack of ejector seats for rear crews constituting a morale problem among the crews of the V-Force. Understandably, this question—that is, the weight of responsibility on the pilot in not getting out himself until he is quite certain that the crew are out—was raised by the noble Lord, Lord Amulree, by my noble friend himself and by the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton. This is a question which occurred to me, and I asked my technical advisers about it. They assured me that both through the "intercom" and through the co-pilot's window the pilot can be informed of when the rear crew are clear of the aircraft; they can get out immediately afterwards; and the time taken is negligible.

As noble Lords know, the entire crew of a V-Bomber now consists of officers. They fully understand the problems involved, tied as they are to the readiness and effectiveness of the R.A.F. This, I think, is the main question put to me by my noble friend. He asked if I would tell him whether ejector seats could be provided, and would I assure him that it would be done. The fact is that it can technically be done, but not while maintaining the readiness and effectiveness of the R.A.F. It is quite clear that all that can reasonably be done in this matter is, in fact, being done with the utmost expedition.

7.52 p.m.

EARL ALEXANDER OF HILLSBOROUGH

My Lords, if I may be allowed to intervene at this late stage, I must say that I think the case put by the noble Earl, Lord Kinnoull has not been as effectively answered as I hoped it would be by the noble Lord, Lord St. Oswald The noble Lord is always fair to the House, and I think he has put over the case given to him by the Department with complete frankness. But I must say, having listened to the two speeches made by the noble Earl, Lord Kinnoull, and my noble friend Lord Shackleton, that the Department have not provided the noble Lord with a really effective answer.

In the first place, I would say that the time of the effectiveness of the V-Bomber force is said to be ending in 1970. I should understand from the way in which the noble Lord put it that it is quite certain at this moment that the Vulcan bombers will not be used for bombing after 1970. I have grave doubts about that. I know something about the development of the machinery required in the nuclear submarines of the future to deliver Polaris, and judging by the present rate of progress I should say that certainly all the projected programme of nuclear submarines will not be concluded by 1970. I am sure that if the emphasis which has been laid by the Prime Minister himself upon the great value of keeping the existing nuclear weapon to be delivered by the conventional means—that is, the bombing conventional means—is right, then it is quite likely that the ultimate period of effectiveness may be extended beyond 1970, and so the time ought to be taken into consideration on a more generous basis than has yet been admitted.

I do not doubt for one moment that there have been a number of technical problems which the Air Ministry experts have examined, but I must say from the statistics—and I shall want to check in Hansard to-morrow the statistics quoted by the noble Earl, Lord Kinnoull, and by the Minister—it seems to me quite extraordinary that in existing circumstances the rate of fatality among the pilots is lower than among the crew. The crew are obviously not as adequately provided with means of escape as the pilots. As to the urgency with which this matter is being treated, I am not reassured about the kind of change being made in the seats for the rear crew and by the various arguments as to the height at which the new seats will act with the parachute at low level. But I am told by the Minister that it may be the end of next year before the Vulcan rear seats are even put upon this, in my view, inadequate provision, compared to an effective alteration which could be made in the planes to make the ejector seat effective for the rear crew.

As regards costs, it is impossible to deal with this, because I have listened to this debate quite de novo, and I have not gone into the matter in detail. But I must say this. I wonder if the Minister could have calculated the cost of producing a pilot. And could he have calculated at the same time what is the cost of producing the crew?

LORD ST. OSWALD

My Lords, I am sure the noble Earl will recall in all fairness that I stressed that cost did not enter into this matter. This is true. There was negligible cost in assessing the validity or desirability of this change.

EARL ALEXANDER OF HILLSBOROUGH

But I would go into the cost from another point of view. I only want to say that if any further discussions arise—as I daresay they will—and more information can be obtained, then we must take into account that a good and experienced pilot, after long and varied training, will certainly not cost less than £50,000. What do the crew cost each? These things have to be taken into account, quite apart from the basis of the proper humanitarian feeling, which I am sure all the Ministry officials, as well as members of all Parties, are concerned with on exactly the same basis. But it ought to enter into the argument.

There is one other point. When the noble Lord says that the period of operational value of the Vulcan and the other units of the V-Bomber Force will expire in 1970, will that be the end of the use of this aircraft? I listened to my noble friend Lord Shackleton, who said that the Anson, which goes a long way back into my defence experience, is still in use. For what is it in use? For reconnaissance or transport'? The Shackleton is almost in the same position as the Anson. If you want extra provision for securing the safety of rear crews in the V-Bombers, surely you have to take into consideration the fact that you may be continuing the use of these V-Bomber planes for other purposes; and you would still have the great value of having the alternative means of escape if they were employed on ordinary conventional pursuits, such as the Anson and the Shackleton, very old-established planes, are employed on at the present moment.

On the question of saving the lives of our men, who are all so brave, and whose morale, I agree with the noble Lord, is not likely to be affected to any great extent by it, I would point out that it is not only the men themselves who are concerned. Their families also are concerned, and I think that every possible effort should be made to meet that situation. On the question of providing these different types of seats and the possibility of using, even at lower levels, the parachutes that will be connected with those swivel seats, surely there ought to be a date of completion earlier than the end of next year. So I hope the Minister will have another talk with his Department to see what further information can be given to the noble Earl before the matter is entirely dropped.

LORD ST. OSWALD

My Lords, I do not know whether the noble Earl would like me to reply briefly to what he has said. I can do so only with the leave of the House, and if I have that leave I shall be extremely brief. I think the noble Earl covered a certain amount of the ground that I hoped I had covered. What I must ask him to do—he is in a better position of experience than I am to do this—is to balance the importance of the readiness and effectiveness of the V-Bomber Force against the advantages of this additional safeguard which might be represented by providing ejector seats for the three rear crew members. I think I should point out—and this is not, I hope, too pedantic a point—that the noble Earl said that the pilots were safer than the crew. In fact, of course, they are all crew. They regard themselves as being a group of people in charge of this aeroplane, dependent upon each other. I am sure the noble Earl would not have wished to indicate, or to give the impression, that there was any difference between them.

EARL ALEXANDER OF HILLSBOROUGH

There is no difference at all, except the fact of the provision of escape methods.

LORD ST. OSWALD

This must be measured, as I say, against the readiness and effectiveness of the V-Bomber Force during its present nuclear rôle. This again I stressed rather earlier in my main speech. If it is to be depleted during this rôle, there is nothing to replace it. Later on, of course, there will be a difference. The noble Earl believes, and some of his noble friends believe, that the V-Bombers will continue either in a conventional rôle or in some other rôle. He seems to base that on information which we do not have or recognise, and I cannot, of course, accept it. As I understand it, he bases it, for one thing, on the belief that the nuclear submarines will not be ready by 1970. That, I feel, is basing his beliefs on the likelihood of a Labour Government, and I would not advise him to do that.

EARL ALEXANDER OF HILLSBOROUGH

It depends entirely on the progress being made with the Naval reactors.

House adjourned at six minutes before eight o'clock.