Lords Sitting of 10 June 1964

Preamble
The House met at half past two of the clock, The LORD CHANCELLOR on the Woolsack.
Prayers—Read by the Lord Bishop of Lichfield

TRIBUTES TO THE LATE LORD BEAVERBROOK
2.35 p.m.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR (LORD DILHORNE): My Lords, I should like, if your Lordships will allow me, to pay a tribute to the distinguished Member of your Lordships' House whose death occurred yesterday. For most of my life he occupied a prominent position in the public affairs of this country. Always a controversial figure and always ready to engage in controversy, it was to be expected that in the course of his activities he would arouse some enmity and opposition. However that may be, no one can doubt the great value to this country of the part he played as Minister of Aircraft Production in the critical days of 1940. Even then, he was a controversial figure. Lethargy and Lord Beaverbrook did not go together. Wherever he was and whatever he did, some turbulence was to be expected.
Many of your Lordships knew him far better than I did, and it is many years since I last spoke to him. But in the 1940s, after I had become a Member of another place, I met him on a number of occasions. I do not think that anyone who got to know him at all could fail to be impressed by his great personal charm and his friendliness to those younger than himself. He had a tremendous zest for life and a great sense of fun—some might even say of mischief. He was indeed a colourful character, and in these days such characters are rare.
I am glad, and I am sure that your Lordships are, that he was able to celebrate his 85th birthday, for I am sure that the presence on that occasion of so many of his friends—and he had a very great many friends—and the messages of congratulation he received, brought great pleasure and happiness to him.
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My Lords, I would wish, on your Lordships' behalf, to extend our sympathy to his family.
2.38 p.m.
EARL ALEXANDER OF HILLSBOROUGH: My Lords, I am obliged to the noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack for the manner in which he has opened this tribute to-day. He has given a clear picture of the variety of qualities, and of the fine character behind so much of them, in the life of Lord Beaverbrook. There will always be those, I expect, who will criticise the things which he did at this or that point in his career. I have memories of the strong political controversy between a former Prime Minister and Lord Beaverbrook at a critical stage of political events.
It is unfortunate that I never had an opportunity of listening to Lord Beaverbrook in this House. I am certain that he must have been a valuable Member of the House during the war. According to himself, he had unfortunate experiences on a previous occasion and quite recently he said that he thought that politically he had been a failure. However, I had this experience. For nearly twenty years in the Daily Express he was a great enemy to the movement to which I had given my life—the Co-operative Movement—but when we met in the Committee of Ministers in the last week of May, 1940, after we had all given our views about what we wanted in aircraft, Lord Beaverbrook said (I am paraphrasing, of course): "Hurricanes are coming off in line production and Spitfires will soon be increasing in number. Wellingtons are coming and we have some Blenheims already. But there is one thing, it seems to me, Mr. Prime Minister, that we have to learn. We are evacuating France. Is there to be an air war, a Battle of Britain? If so, we have to change some of the things that I have found. We cannot afford to hold up planes from going to the fighting squadrons if an air battle for Britain is going to supervene. So we must make perhaps less spares for the present and avoid the delay in sending to our fighting squadrons the planes as they appear. For every aircraft shot down in the Battle of Britain we must have a new one to go up in its place."

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Lord Beaverbrook was greatly criticised in some quarters for the policy he put into operation, but in my view he was right when he said, "Spares will not save us in the Battle of Britain; only new planes". We owe him a great debt for that. I sent him a note across the table—I had never met him in all our years of controversy—saying, "Thank you for what you have said. Perhaps we might bury the hatchet for the period of the war, and perhaps after the war we might not be able to find it". And we had been friends ever since.
His contribution to building up the kind of organisation needed for the defence of Britain afterwards was not at all difficult to trace, for in conversations at Cherkley one could always expect to find Harry Hopkins or Averell Harriman or others who could give us the direct tendencies of the United States, and those of us who had a part in building up the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation know that many of the views originated by the genius of Lord Beaverbrook were proved by events to be true. Do not let us think at this time of the things with which we did not agree in earlier years. Mark Antony said:
"The evil that men do lives after them,
The good is oft interred with their bones."
From my personal experience of Lord Beaverbrook, after twenty years, I have a great tribute to pay to him, to his devotion to this nation and especially to his native land, Canada. I have great sympathy with his family.
2.42 p.m.
LORD REA: My Lords, by the death of Lord Beaverbrook in the fullness of his years both Britain and Canada are deprived of a colourful and prominent personality whose vitality and enterprise have earned for him a secure place in contemporary history. Many of us, as the noble Earl has just said, have at times disagreed with his views and his objectives. But nobody, as the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor said, will underrate his very high value as a powerful and effective lieutenant to our great war-time leader, Sir Winston Churchill. We all regret that we did not see him more in your Lordships' House; but he had a very full life in
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other spheres, and we sincerely hope that this may be some solace to his wife and family, to whom we offer our deep sympathy in their present sorrow.
2.44 p.m.
LORD BALFOUR OF INCHRYE: My Lords, I trust that your Lordships will allow for a few moments one to speak from these Benches who was for many years a personal friend of Lord Beaverbrook and also a colleague during the war. In 1940, the noble Viscount, Lord Thurso, then Sir Archibald Sinclair, and myself were at the Air Ministry, and the Ministry of Aircraft Production was born, with some resentment. But Lord Beaverbrook's basic drive and ruthless determination to achieve his purpose, which was a purpose of a matter of a few weeks only, justified all the policies and actions which he pursued, unconventional and unusual as some of them may have been.
I then saw Lord Beaverbrook at work in the Moscow Mission in October, 1941, with Mr. Averell Harriman and Lord Ismay. You get to know a man well when you go to Moscow and the Germans are almost at the gates of the city. On the way out, on the cruiser, Lord Beaverbrook said to us: "Will you play the hand my way?". We naturally said, "Yes". The first thing I remember he said was: "Never stay in a place more than one week or you lose your influence." At the end of six days we were about to leave, having failed to come to an agreement. On the seventh day an agreement was come to which was pleasing both to the Russians and to ourselves, in so far as we were aiming to help Russia at that time.
Friendship once given by Lord Beaverbrook was given in full measure; and his generosity was great, though often hidden from the outside world. I have thought how he would wish those who were his friends to remember him. I think he would like us to remember him, first, as a defiant man: he defied customs, authorities, men and events. Next, I believe he would like us to remember him as a determined man: storms or calm, he never deserted his purposes. Finally, I believe he would wish us to remember him as a Canadian —one who gave back to his land of birth and upbringing all that he took, and more.

PROPOSED RAIL CLOSURE AND CONNEL FERRY BRIDGE
2.46 p.m.
THE EARL OF DUNDONALD: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
[The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government in connection with the proposal of British Railways to withdraw Passenger Services between Oban—Connel Ferry and Ballachulish:—

(a) What profits have been made by British Railways from the collection of tolls on Connel Ferry Bridge from road users during the years 1961, 1962 and 1963.

(b) Whether these figures have been taken into account in calculating the profitability or otherwise of the operation of the rail passenger services that it is proposed should be withdrawn.

(c) In the event of these passenger services being withdrawn, what plans British Railways have made to reduce the time vehicles have to wait to cross this bridge (which in the summer months can exceed one hour), bearing in mind that everyone will then have to cross by road, including school children travelling to and from Oban, who at present do this journey by train from Benderloch and stations to the North.]

THE PARLIAMENTARY SECRETARY, MINISTRY OF TRANSPORT (LORD CHESHAM): My Lords, as my noble friend Lord Ferrers explained in reply to a Question by the noble Lord, Lord Stonham, on 28th January, this bridge is owned by the British Railways Board, and my right honourable friend does not feel justified in asking them to provide details of the operation and results of particular facilities of this sort unless they are directly relevant to the exercise of any of my right honourable friend's functions. As the road bridge will remain, whether or not the rail passenger service is withdrawn, these figures are not relevant to the only proposal with which my right honourable friend is likely to be concerned.
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For the same reason, the income from road tolls, the cost of collection and the cost of maintaining the roadway have not, I understand, been taken into account by the Railways Board in calculating the economic effect of the withdrawal of the passenger service. So far as delays at the bridge are concerned, if all rail services, including freight services, were withdrawn the whole width of the bridge would be come available for road traffic. An improvement in the traffic flow could then be expected.
THE EARL OF DUNDONALD: My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for the information he has given. I am naturally disappointed that we are unable to know what are the actual figures in the way of profits from the toll. Could I ask him to bear in mind in the deliberations which may take place that, although I am not informed as to the division of track costs as between passenger services and goods services, for some time the passenger services have been operated with 1,500 h.p. locomotives pulling two coaches? If this is borne in mind in any figures which are arrived at it will be seen that it is very uneconomic.
LORD CHESHAM: My Lords, I have listened to what my noble friend has said, and I will certainly do as he asks, although I find it has a somewhat tenuous connection with the subject of his original Question.
VISCOUNT MASSEREENE AND FERRARD: My Lords, may I ask the Minister whether he is aware of the extremely bad motor road between Ballachulish and Connel? If the school children who come from Ballachulish, from Appin and from Benderloch every day to high school in Oban, and return every evening, have to come by bus, owing to the withdrawal of the rail passenger services, I think it unlikely that they will arrive in time for school. The queues at the bridge will be far greater if the passenger services are withdrawn. If the passenger and freight services are withdrawn at the same time, I quite agree that the capacity of the bridge then available will be larger and can take more traffic. If both services are not withdrawn at the same time there will be a great build-up of traffic either side of the bridge.
LORD CHESHAM: My Lords, the question of the traffic capacity of the road is one of those matters that my right honourable friend, in consultation with my right honourable friend the Secretary of State, will have in mind for consideration, when in due course the proposal reaches him.
Arising from what my noble friend said, if in the transport of the school children an element of hardship was found to be involved, that point would come out as a result of the T.U.C.C's consideration, when it takes place.
THE EARL OF DUNDONALD: My Lords, arising out of the question of my noble friend Lord Massereene and Ferrard, may I ask whether the Minister is aware that the road distance from South Connel to North Connel, by any alternative route other than crossing the bridge is over 100 miles?
LORD CHESHAM: My Lords, it may well arise from the question of my noble friend Lord Massereene and Ferrard, but I am not quite sure whether it arises from my noble friend's original Question. But I can at least stretch a point and say: Yes, my Lords, we did know that.
LORD STONHAM: My Lords, is it not the case that that is a consideration which will have to be taken into account by the right honourable gentleman, the Minister of Transport? Would the noble Lord confirm that all the financial questions must be taken into account before his right honourable friend arrives at his decision and, therefore, the earnings from this bridge, although they cannot now be disclosed, are indeed relevant to this matter?—because, surely, it is not possible for the line to be closed if his right honourable friend is aware that overall it is showing a profit.
LORD CHESHAM: My Lords, I am sorry to say that the only thing I can confirm is that I did not grasp the point of the noble Lord's question. I did not quite follow what he was getting at.
LORD STONHAM: I must apologise, my Lords. I have a bit of a cold, and I will try to make my question a little more clear. It has three points. First, the fact that the distance is 100 miles by road if you do not cross the bridge is a matter which must be taken into consideration by Mr. Marples before arriving
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at a decision. Secondly, since the only justification for closing this line is that it is losing money, Mr. Marples must take into consideration the earnings from this toll bridge in arriving at a decision and, therefore, the earnings are indeed relevant although for obvious reasons they cannot now be disclosed.
LORD CHESHAM: My Lords, as I thought I had just said, such considerations as the 100 miles alternative distance are exactly the kind of relevant factor that my right honourable friends (in the plural in this case) would take into consideration in coming to a decision. But I still do not see quite how to relate the earnings of the toll bridge to the costs of the passenger service at the present time, although I would say that the anticipated future revenue from the toll bridge might well be a factor that they will have to take into consideration if there is any question of assessing alternative methods of transport.

LIVE CATTLE AND BEEF EXPORTS
2.55 p.m.
LORD STONHAM: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the first Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
[The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government to state, for the latest 12-month period for which figures are available, the exports of live cattle and of beef from the United Kingdom and the percentage increase or decrease of such exports, compared with the year 1960.]
THE JOINT PARLIAMENTARY SECRETARY, MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE, FISHERIES AND FOOD (LORD ST. OSWALD): My Lords, in the period from May, 1963, to April, 1964, nearly 214,000 head of cattle were exported from the United Kingdom, compared with nearly 58,000 in 1960. This represents an increase of about 270 per cent. of live cattle on the 1960 figure. As to carcase meat, I regret that separate figures for exports of beef and veal did not become available until 1963.
LORD STONHAM: My Lords, is the noble Lord aware that in the first four months of this year exports of meat

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in various forms to Europe were four times that for the similar period last year, and in the case of France ten times as much? Can he say why his right honourable friend, in the face of a certain impending world shortage of beef, chose to occupy his time in trying to agree import controls instead of trying to ensure an increase in supplies? And can he justify the present free market in exports of British cattle and beef against the background of the subsidies which are being paid, directly and indirectly, and the high and increasing prices in the shops?
LORD ST. OSWALD: My Lords, I think the short answer—it could be a very long answer indeed—to both questions is one that the Government have given before; that is to say, that we regard this as a short-term shortage of meat. It is a world shortage, as the noble Lord has pointed out, but it has short-term causes, and to take long term measures would be entirely against the interests of this country as an exporting nation. The noble Lord asked me, by implication, whether I did not consider that it would be right to prevent exports. He asked me, in fact, if we could justify the continuation of exports, and I would say "Yes". We are an exporting country and any suggestion, at this stage at any rate, that we should ban exports would be wrong.
LORD STONHAM: My Lords, I am most grateful for that very short answer. But is the noble Lord aware that both France and Belgium have halved the import duties against British meat, and that it is obvious, therefore, that they are taking short-term measures to improve their position at our expense and at the expense of the British consumer? That being so, is it not advisable for us even to consider measures of that kind?
LORD ST. OSWALD: My Lords, the noble Lord is entirely mistaken in thinking that it is at our expense. In what way is it at our expense? The fact is that there is a world meat shortage—I understood the noble Lord to acknowledge that fact. Therefore, if, by our action, our meat is prevented from going to the Continent those countries will draw their supplies from other parts, other meat-producing countries. This indeed
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would be at our expense, and that is why I said that in present circumstances we are unwilling to take such action.

WORK FOR MENTALLY HANDICAPPED
2.59 p.m.
LORD STONHAM: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the second Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
[The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government whether, for the purposes of the Disabled Persons Employment Acts, they will include mentally retarded persons in Section 2 of the Disabled Persons Register, and whether they will undertake research with the object of deter mining the types of employment which the mentally handicapped can perform as ably as normal persons.]
THE MINISTER OF STATE, HOME OFFICE (LORD DERWENT): My Lords, mentally retarded persons are eligible for registration as disabled persons tinder the Disabled Persons (Employment) Act, 1944, if they satisfy the usual conditions. Those who are unemployed are included in Section I or Section II of the register of unemployed disabled persons, according to whether they are considered to be suitable for ordinary employment or unlikely, because of the severity of their handicap, to obtain employment except under sheltered conditions. Much is already known about the types of occupations which are suitable for the mentally subnormal. Different types of work are being tried out in local health authority adult training centres and in hospitals for the subnormal, and a number of studies of services for the subnormal are expected to provide further relevant information.
LORD STONHAM: My Lords, while thanking the noble Lord for that reply, may I ask whether he would be kind enough, since so much apparently is known, to publish in the OFFICIAL REPORT the types of occupation which are considered most suitable for the mentally retarded? Also, is the noble Lord aware that new experimental workshops recently set up have proved that most of the 200,000 severely retarded people can be trained to undertake useful occupations and do them quite well, even in open industry? Does he not agree,

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therefore, that this matter should be looked into with the Ministry of Labour to see whether the present facilities can be improved?
LORD DERWENT: My Lords, I think, without putting it into the OFFICIAL REPORT, that I can quite briefly give the answer that the noble Lord wants. A great number of the mentally retarded are in ordinary occupations and prefer to be in them. That, I think, really answers the noble Lord's main Question. As he knows, local authority training centres are provided for those mentally subnormal people who arc able to live outside hospital but are outside the employment field. The work done in these centres is now moving away from the traditional occupations, such as rug and basket making, towards newer trades, such as concrete work, plastic-welding and electrical component assembly; and we hope that it will be found possible for these people to carry on these more normal occupations and to be trained in them on a larger scale. But, of course, we are now waiting for further information on the experiments that are going on.
LORD STONHAM: My Lords, the whole purport of my Question was directed, as I believe the noble Lord now understands, to the certainty of being able to employ far more mentally retarded people in open as compared with sheltered industry.
THE EARL OF ARRAN: My Lords, in supporting the noble Lord, and at the risk of committing tautology, may I ask whether Her Majesty's Government will not agree that, in view of the considerable success achieved inside mental hospitals for making employable the seemingly unemployable, the research suggested by the noble Lord is of high importance, inasmuch as it will enable the mentally handicapped outside the mental hospitals —and, of course, the great majority are outside the mental hospitals—to find jobs and, at the same time, a new self-respect?
LORD DERWENT: My Lords, the noble Earl is not quite right; there are quite a number of mentally retarded people in hospital who are allowed out
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to work, and they are to be encouraged, in so far as possible, to do so.
THE EARL OF ARRAN: My Lords, I think the noble Lord did not quite understand me. I was saying that inside the mental hospitals the position is highly satisfactory. I was speaking about the people outside, those who are not actually in the hospitals, and I think the noble Lord, Lord Stonham will agree with me there.
LORD DERWENT: My Lords, I am sorry, but I still do not understand the noble Earl's question.
BARONESS SUMMERSKILL: My Lords, may I ask the noble Lord whether he receives annual reports from enlightened employers who have factories and workshops in the vicinity of mental hospitals and who do employ mentally retarded people?
LORD DERWENT: My Lords, I do not know what sort of annual report the noble Lady is talking about.
BARONESS SUMMERSKILL: My Lords, the Question asked for information; and as there is already a great amount of material which could be collated by his Department, and as in the vicinity of large mental hospitals there are enlightened employers who say to a supervisor: "We are prepared to give suitably qualified people work"—and there is so much of that being done now—I wondered whether his Department ask these employers for a report, so that the Department may know precisely how these people are doing, whether they are doing well or are failing to come up to scratch?
LORD DERWENT: My Lords, I see the point and, if I may, as this is not my own Department, I will find out about that and let the noble Lady know.
LORD STONHAM: My Lords, will the noble Lord also look into the point that while only some 50,000 of the mentally retarded people are in institutional care, 200,000 are hidden away in their homes; and it is the 200,000 about whom I am concerned and for whom I wish to have training and employment provided?

SOUTHERN RHODESIAN PRIME MINISTER AND COMMONWEALTH CONFERENCE
3.5 p.m.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
[The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government whether they make a statement concerning the question of the issue of an invitation to the Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia to attend the forthcoming Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference; and to ask them, further, whether they will give details of the communication that they have sent to the Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia.]
THE MINISTER OF STATE FOR COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS AND FOR THE COLONIES (THE DUKE OF DEVONSHIRE): My Lords, as my right honourable friend the Prime Minister replied to an almost identical Question in another place yesterday I hope the House will forgive me if I answer my noble friend in similar terms to the Prime Minister's.
The process of consultation with other Commonwealth Governments on the question whether the Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia should be invited to attend the meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers has now been completed. Mr. Smith has been informed that the consensus of opinion is conclusive that in view of the size of the modern Commonwealth the meetings of Prime Ministers should in future be confined to the representatives of fully independent States. In addition my right honourable friend the Prime Minister has told Mr. Smith that he would welcome a general talk with him in London either before or after the Commonwealth Conference. Mr. Smith has thanked my right honourable friend for this invitation but has asked that it should be left over pending further correspondence.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: My Lords, I should like to thank the noble Duke for the Answer he has given. In view of the fact that, as he has said, an almost identical Question was put in
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another place yesterday, perhaps I ought to explain that I put down this Question to-day mainly because it seemed wrong that there should be no statement in your Lordships' House on this important development.
But I also put it down because I wanted to ask two supplementary questions which I think are still relevant after the reply, the first of which is this. Do Her Majesty's Government agree that it has always been the basic principle of the British Commonwealth that we do not interfere in each others internal affairs? If so, how do we reconcile with that principle their action in the present instance when they seem deliberately to have invited other members of the Commonwealth to give what they must have known beforehand would be a hostile vote on Southern Rhodesia's attendance at this Conference of Prime Ministers purely on the grounds of her internal policy?—because that is what it is, whatever excuse is given.
The second question I should like to ask is this. Her attendance having been refused, will Her Majesty's Government give an undertaking that the subject of Southern Rhodesia will not be discussed at any official meetings of the Conference in her absence? I quite understand what the Prime Minister said, that you cannot prevent people talking unofficially in corridors—nobody thinks you can. My third supplementary question is: If any member of the Conference continues to press strongly in favour of the inclusion of the subject of Southern Rhodesia on the official agenda of the Conference, on the very far-fetched grounds that she is a danger to inter, national peace, will Her Majesty's Government make it clear that that would involve also the inclusion of Cyprus, where the danger to peace is both more immediate and more acute?
THE DUKE OF DEVONSHIRE: My Lords, my noble friend said he would have two supplementaries and ended up with three. The answer to the first part of his first supplementary is "Yes". The answer to the second part of his first supplementary is that it is the view of Her Majesty's Government that no non-fully-independent member of the Commonwealth should be invited to attend the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference without the

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general agreement of all members of the Commonwealth. I must make it perfectly clear that as the Prime Ministers' Conference is held in London, our Prime Minister is Chairman of the Conference; but we are only one of the Commonwealth and it is not for us to dictate to our fellow members what we wish to be done. The decision not to invite Mr. Smith to attend is one taken by the whole Commonwealth and not by us, and I should like to put very great emphasis on that.
In reply to my noble friend's third supplementary, I should like to draw his attention to the Prime Minister's reply in another place yesterday, column 241 of the OFFICIAL REPORT. So far as an undertaking about Cyprus is concerned, it would not be fitting for me, as a Junior Minister, to give any undertaking about what the Prime Ministers choose to discuss.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend, and I would ask just one further question. If, as I think is apparent, the majority of the Commonwealth will be against Southern Rhodesia, in present circumstances, ever obtaining full independence, does that mean that in such circumstances she can never expect to attend future Commonwealth Conferences as she has done for a great many years in the past?
THE DUKE OF DEVONSHIRE: My Lords, in view of what I said I think it would be reasonable to say that it would be highly unlikely that Southern Rhodesia would attend a Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference until she had attained full independence.
THE EARL OF LISTOWEL: My Lords, in view of the fact that I think your Lordships will agree with the noble Marquess that this was a most important statement that was made yesterday by the Prime Minister about Southern Rhodesia, may I ask the noble Duke why it was that a simultaneous statement was not made in this House? Because, as I am sure the noble Duke will agree, it is the usual practice for statements of this importance to be made simultaneously in both Houses. Will the Government at any rate give us the assurance that any decision of policy about Southern Rhodesia which may be reached before
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the Recess will be announced in this House at the same time as in another place?
THE DUKE OF DEVONSHIRE: My Lords, with regard to the noble Earl's second question, I am sure that that will be done. With regard to his first question, I understand the position to be that Statements made on behalf of the Government in another place are repeated in this House under three conditions: first of all, when they are Statements as such; secondly, when they are given in answer to Private Notice Questions, and thirdly, if the Question to which the Statement relates is of such importance that it is last in the list of Prime Minister's Questions. This Question on the invitation to Mr. Smith to attend the Prime Ministers' Conference was No. 8 of nine Questions in the Prime Minister's list yesterday.
LORD OGMORE: My Lords, is it not right that this decision was a correct one; that it would be a most undesirable precedent to do otherwise, in view of the fact that a number of other countries which are shortly to become independent would have to be invited? For this reason, are not the Government and the other members of the Commonwealth perfectly correct in laying down this rule now? Secondly, from Mr. Smith's point of view, is it not extremely fortunate that they made this rule; because might he not otherwise be in an extremely embarrassing position if he had been invited to attend and the affairs of Southern Rhodesia were debated at the Conference?
THE DUKE OF DEVONSHIRE: My Lords, the answer to the noble Lord's first question is, Yes. With regard to the second question, I think I should prefer, if I may be forgiven, not to depart into the realms of conjecture.
EARL ALEXANDER OF HILLSBOROUGH: My Lords, if any question concerning the independence of Southern Rhodesia is raised at the coming Conference, will Mr. Smith be invited to remain in London so that there can be consultation with him?
THE DUKE OF DEVONSHIRE: My Lords, as I understand it (and I hoped I had made it clear in my original Answer), the Prime Minister has invited

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Mr. Smith to come to London either before or after the Conference, and so far Mr. Smith has preferred to delay any positive reply: he has said that he feels he should not come until there has been further correspondence. Therefore, at the moment there is no question of his being in London before the Conference opens, and therefore no question of extending his visit. Should he come before the Conference—and the evidence at the moment is that he will
not—this will be a matter for discussion between our Prime Minister and the other Prime Ministers attending the Conference.
THE EARL OF SWINTON: My Lords, in view of the supplementary put by the noble Earl the Leader of the Opposition, which I gather rather suggested that the question of the grant of independence to Southern Rhodesia might be discussed at the Commonwealth Conference, may I ask for an assurance, first of all, that it is for the Government of this country to decide whether, when and on what terms independence—Dominion status, as we used to call it—should be given to Southern Rhodesia or any other country? I think it is very important that that should be re-established, because that has always been the accepted rule of every Government. I agree that, having given independence— Dominion status —to a country, whether that country should become a full member of the Club is a matter for the whole Club. I hope that we may have a reaffirmation of that constitutional position.
Secondly, may we have an assurance that if people at the Conference try to discuss, within the Conference and as part of the proceedings of the Conference, the position of Southern Rhodesia, that will be definitely ruled out? Because, although we are only one of a number of people, the Prime Minister, after all, is in the Chair, and there must be some rules of order, and we must stick to what have always been the rules that have guided us.
THE DUKE OF DEVONSHIRE: My Lords, I am extremely grateful to my noble friend for drawing attention to what is a very important constitutional concept. This question of when a country achieves full total sovereign independence is entirely a matter between that country's Government and
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the British Government, and, as I say, I am very grateful to my noble friend for drawing attention to that important matter. On the second question, I can only repeat what I said to my noble friend Lord Salisbury: the Prime Minister dealt with that point in another place yesterday, and it appears at column 241 of the OFFICIAL REPORT.
EARL ALEXANDER OF HILLSBOROUGH: My Lords, may I take it that it is not likely that the independence of Southern Rhodesia will be discussed at the Conference?
THE DUKE OF DEVONSHIRE: My Lords, as the Prime Minister said in another place yesterday, as well as formal discussions, there are many informal discussions, and I should not wish to intimate that there will not be discussion informally of this matter of very great concern to the whole Commonwealth.

BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE
EARL ST. ALDWYN: My Lords, I should like to inform your Lordships that at a suitable moment after 3.30 p.m. my noble friend Lord Chesham will be making a statement on urban traffic.
BEDFORD CORPORATION BILL
Read 2a, and committed to the Committee on Unopposed Bills.

"THE SECOND NUCLEAR POWER PROGRAMME"
3.15 p.m.
LORD COLERAINErose, to call attention to the White Paper entitled The Second Nuclear Power Programme (Cmnd. 2335); and to move for Papers. The noble Lord said: My Lords, nearly a year ago, to be exact eleven months ago to the day, I opened a debate on nuclear power at I am afraid inordinate length. I hope this afternoon that I shall not trespass upon your Lordships' patience and kindness as I did on that occasion, and certainly I have no intention whatever of traversing again the ground I covered then. So far as I am concerned, all of that is water over the dam.
Your Lordships may remember, however, that the two noble Lords who wound up the debate for the Government

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successively made great play with a mysterious body called the Powell Committee, of which the membership was hidden, of which the terms of reference were secret, but which was to dispel, when it reported to the Government, all the doubts which that afternoon troubled your Lordships. The Committee has now reported to the Government and the conclusions of the Committee, or at any rate the Government's view of those conclusions, have been released in the White Paper, The Second Nuclear Power Programme. The Powell Committee deliberated for something upwards of three years, and I cannot help feeling that so monstrous a gestation can rarely have produced so very insignificant and puny an infant as this. Unfortunately the infant may grow in size to become a very dangerous adult.
In the debate to which I have referred my right honourable friend (as he now is), the Lord President of the Council, explained that while he could not give the terms of reference of the Powell Committee he could explain why it had been set up; and he told us that it had been set up, broadly speaking, to reconcile differences—that is differences between two nationalised authorities, the United Kingdom Atomic Energy and the Central Electricity Generating Board—on the economics of nuclear power in general, and in particular on the economics of different reactor systems. I am afraid that the purposes which the Lord President had in mind have not been realised, because the White Paper does nothing to reconcile those differences; it only re-states them.
I do not this afternoon want to go into the whole field of the gulf, which has been wide and deep, between the Atomic Energy Authority, on the one hand, and the Generating Board, on the other. I want just to concentrate on this question of the type of reactor which is to succeed the existing Magnox reactor, which is embodied in the nine nuclear power stations now either in operation or in course of erection. As your Lordships probably know, the Atomic Energy Authority strongly favoured its own Advanced Gas-Cooled Reactor—commonly known as the "A.G.R.". The Generating Board wanted to import under licence an American design of
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water-moderated reactor. The White Paper has something to say for both. It says that the A.G.R. is a most promising development; it says that perhaps the water-moderated reactor is promising, too; and it comes to the conclusion that the Generating Board should be allowed to shop around for both. That may sound like a judgment of Solomon. It is not a judgment of Solomon; it is the judgment of Tom Fool, because nothing could create more uncertainty, cause more delay, add more Greatly to the confusion which already exists in the nuclear industry than the proposals outlined in the White Paper.
I would ask your Lordships to refer just for a moment to paragraph 6 of the White Paper which deals particularly with this matter. Paragraph 6 tells us that
"The Central Electricity Generating Board will issue an inquiry for tenders for an Advanced Gas-Cooled Reactor station. They will also be ready to consider tenders from British industry for water-moderated reactor systems of proved design."
I should like your Lordships to notice the words "water-moderated reactor systems of approved design", because that means of American design or, it might be, Canadian design. It cannot mean of British design, because there is no water-moderated reactor that I know of proved design in this country. The implications of that seem to me to be immensely serious, and if your Lordships will allow me I will develop them a little later. However, the Board is to receive tenders for both systems. Then, the final line of paragraph 6 says:
"They will ensure that these tenders are judged on a comparable basis."
That is a far more difficult point than it seems on the surface. On the surface, it seems perfectly reasonable: if you are to compare the merits of one system with another, then obviously they must be judged on a comparable basis. What worries me—and it worries me deeply—is that, as things are going, I do not believe that they will be judged on a comparable basis. I do not believe that they can be judged on a comparable basis. I think that the Generating Board, perhaps for technical reasons which seem good to it but which are certainly not good and sufficient, is already "loading the dice" against the British A.G.R. and in favour of the American water reactor.

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The Generating Board either has issued or has declared its intention to issue an inquiry for an A.G.R. with a net output of around 460 megawatts. The designed output of the American water-moderated reactor, the reactor of proved design, is of 600 megawatts. So unless the Government take some action, we are going to be faced with the position in which somebody will have to compare the merits of a station with an output of 460 megawatts with one with an output of 600 megawatts. In this field as we all know, efficiency and economy are so much a function of science. The higher the output, the more efficient and the more economic; the lower the output, the less efficient and the less economic. So that if comparison is to be made between an A.G.R. of 460 megawatts output and an American reactor of 600 megawatts output, the American reactor is almost bound to win.
I should like to ask my noble friend who is going to reply for the Government, this question: can he give the House an assurance that, when this comparison between the two types of reactor is made, it will he between two reactors having the same output? Unless he can give that assurance, the undertaking in the White Paper is meaningless and, I think, quite definitely misleading.
It seems to me that there arc two questions which we ought to ask ourselves arising out of the proposal to import an American design. The first question is this: why has the Generating Board been pressing so strongly for an American design rather than a British design? I suppose that the answer is, and can only be, that the American design is considered to be more economic. It is difficult to prove, because so far no big nuclear power station is in operation in the United States. But there is a strong presumption (to put it at its lowest) that American types of water reactors are far more economic than any Magnox reactor which has been proved in practice in this country. That presumption is based on the fact that American electricity supply undertakings are ordering nuclear power stations in quite considerable quantities. The nuclear programme there is now about comparable in size to ours here—and not on any highfalutin grounds of national purpose, but simply on cold calculations of profit and loss: in other words, in the United
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States nuclear power is already competitive with conventional power. It is not so competitive here.
That brings me to the second question which I think we should ask ourselves. Ten years ago—even five years ago—we had a commanding lead in this field. Now we have lost it to the United States, and lost it handsomely. What is the difference? What is it that has produced these great economies of scale, this greater degree of efficiency, in the nuclear industry in the United States, compared with that in this country? I do not believe that it is the fault of the manufacturer in this country, nor do I believe it is the fault of our nuclear physicists. I believe that the fault lies in the organisation of the nuclear programme, which is far less efficiently organised in this country than it is in the United States.
Let me explain what I mean. In this country the design of a nuclear power station is virtually dictated by the Generating Board. In the United States the design is left to the manufacturer so that he can make the best use of his own plant, his own skills and techniques to get the most economical methods of production. What I mean can be most vividly expressed by an example of the differences in the method of tendering. When the Central Jersey Light and Power Company issued an inquiry for a nuclear power station at Oyster Creek, New Jersey, the inquiry was contained in three sheets of notepaper. When the Generating Board issues an inquiry it is contained in five volumes, each of them an inch thick. That shows pretty concisely the difference between the two methods of approaching the problem.
There is another difference. There has been no dramatic breakthrough in nuclear technology in the United States. The water-moderated reactor is substantially the same animal as it was ten years ago; it is bigger in size, just as Wylfa is bigger than Bradwell in size, but it is essentially the same animal. What the Americans have done is to use the design they have got to the full and to repeat station after station to the same design. The result of that, of course, is that they get the economies of scale-production, almost, one might say, mass production, and costs come down.

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Not only do costs come down, but with experience the design becomes more efficient. That has not happened in this country. In this country every new power station has been a one-off job, because the Generating Board has insisted that each new power station must represent a technical advance on its predecessor and must be a new design. Each power station carries an enormous load of research and development charges, which again add greatly to the cost.
There is still another reason for the difference in the United States. In the United States private industry has made a vast capital investment in the development of new plant simply to get more economical production of reactors and more efficient reactors. I know of one company which invested more than 10 million dollars simply to fabricate a larger pressure vessel than had been fabricated hitherto. The American company can do that because they know that if they get the price right, if they guarantee the required output and if they satisfy the Atomic Energy Commission on safety requirements, they will get the order. In this country no firm knows that. The price can be right, the output can be right, the Atomic Energy Authority may be satisfied with safety regulations; but because somebody or other somewhere or other dislikes the look of the design the firm does not get the order. If any British firms invested in nuclear power on the same kind of scale as firms do in the United States it would go bankrupt and the directors would go to jail or, more probably, to a lunatic asylum.
I have referred to the implications of ordering an American reactor system. There has been a lot of talk—most of it idle, foolish talk—in the last few days about the wickedness of the Chrysler Corporation taking an interest in Rootes. I do not myself think that it was wicked. I feel that it was entirely sensible. But even if it was wicked, it was a very minor wickedness. It was only an American firm getting a minority shareholding in one element in the motor industry. This proposal is different indeed. It means that American technology will in fact control the whole of the nuclear industry in this country. It means that we are in effect opting out of the nuclear industry, and I cannot believe that that
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is a good thing to do. It is not even as if British firms here, which will have to manufacture under licence from American firms, were going to operate under licences from the United States Government or the Atomic Energy Commission in the United States. That would be one thing and might be tolerable, but that is not what is going to happen. They will have to operate under licences granted by commercial firms in the United States, firms which are fiercely competitive with British industry in every part of the world.
I should like to ask my noble friend this question. If these licences are granted by American firms, will they cover export markets as well as the United Kingdom market? I very much doubt if they will. Even if they did cover the United Kingdom export markets, I would very much doubt whether American firms would go far out of their way to help British industry to compete with them in the export markets of the world. No doubt, if this proposal goes through, we shall he taught how to make the American type of reactor, but it will be only the existing type of reactor, which is already obsolescent. American industry is already feeling ahead to the next type, and I would think it is far too much to believe that American commercial firms, in competition with firms in this country, are going to let us into the secrets of the future. For my own part, I just do not believe it. If, therefore, this proposal is carried through and we import American designs, at best the British nuclear industry will be a kind of Chinese copyist and will for ever be a lap behind the Americans.
My Lords, in spite of the smooth words at the beginning of the White Paper, I think we are bound to admit that the nuclear programme in this country has failed. If it has not failed, how can there be any question whatever of importing American designs in preference to British designs? As I say, I do not believe that that failure is to be laid at the door of the heavy engineering industry in this country, or at the door of British science. It is simply a matter of organisation, and I suggest to the Government that we must take a good hard look at the organisation of the nuclear programme as it has been till now, and, in particular, take a good

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hard look at the position of the Generating Board in all this.
Why is it that the Generating Board has been pressing for a policy which so clearly seems to run counter to British interests, which is bound to weaken the nuclear industry here, and which is bound to destroy our export potential? —an export potential which in ten years' or even five years' time may be very great indeed. I think the answer is that there is inside the Generating Board a conflict that cannot be reconciled. I do not mean a conflict of views or a conflict of personalities; I mean a conflict of function. It is the function of the Generating Board to provide the consumer in this country with adequate suppliers of cheap electricity, and it seems to me that that function cannot conceivably be combined with pioneering a new, a highly expensive and a highly complex industry. I think it just cannot be done.
Let us look for a moment at the area of this conflict. The development of any new reactor system entails an immense expenditure on research and development. That is inevitable and it is not something to be afraid of, because unless you make that expenditure you are not going to make any progress whatsoever. But as things are now, that expenditure is paid for by the consumer of electricity, and, therefore, the Board as an entity is divided between safeguarding the interests of the consumer of electricity and promoting this new and very expensive development. That is why the Chairman of the Generating Board, in his evidence to the Select Committee, suggested that the taxpayer should subsidise the Board because of this added expense. That, I should have thought, was an entirely valid suggestion, although it carries with it the corollary that if the Board no longer pays the piper, it is no longer entitled to call the tune.
Then there is the question of export markets to which I have already referred. The Generating Board has no concern with the export markets. Its concern is cheap electricity in this country, and in furtherance of that purpose it wants to use American designs of reactors, even if that destroys any hope we have of developing a worthwhile export trade in this heavy
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engineering field. From the constitutional point of view the Generating Board is absolutely right. That is its job—to get cheap electricity. But from the national point of view it must surely be very wrong indeed.
Then there is the question of the Generating Board and the effect of its activities on industry, and particularly on the heavy engineering industry. In ten years' or five years' time I think it is as certain as anything can be that we shall not be able to meet the electricity demand in this country without a massive development of the nuclear programme. But in ten years' or five years' time what is going to happen to the nuclear industry, when we are ready to call on it and when we must call on it? I do not see how a healthy nuclear industry can conceivably survive simply on the basis of copying designs. I do not see how, on that basis, you are going to hold together the very brilliant teams that the consortia now have. We talk about the "brain drain". If there is one way of stimulating the "brain drain", I suggest that the proposals in the White Paper are that.
It seems to me, my Lords, that there is this conflict within the Board; a kind of schizophrenia for which it is not responsible. It seems to me there is only one escape from the dilemma, and that is that all responsibility for the pioneering of commercial reactor systems should be taken away from the Generating Board. Unless you do this, I do not see how you are going to avoid this conflict and escape the dilemma which I have tried to describe.
When the nuclear programme was first started ten years ago, the idea was that the Atomic Energy Authority should develop the new system and the Generating Board should own and operate it. Unfortunately, nobody ever defined where development ended and where ordinary commercial operation began; and that has been one of the great difficulties. But because that has been the pattern, we have, all of us, tended to assume—I think unnecessarily—that the Generating Board must operate all and every generating station, whether nuclear or conventional, that supplies power to the consumer. But there is no reason why this should be so. There is no reason why the Generating

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Board should not buy electricity from somewhere else and sell it to the consumer. Indeed, that is what it does now. It buys electricity from the Atomic Energy Authority, from their pilot plants, and in the aggregate it must be a considerable amount of electricity. It buys electricity, I think, from France at peak hours. There is no difficulty, constitutional or practical, or of any other sort, in the Board's buying some electricity instead of generating it.
I should like to make a suggestion to your Lordships and to the Government, and I hope that the Government may consider it seriously, though I cannot imagine that my noble friend will be able to give me a considered reply. The suggestion is this. Why do we not in this country adopt the system which is used in Canada? In Canada the Government build the first commercial type of a new series of reactors. The Government operate it until it is proved, and then the Government sell it to the undertaker, not at an economic price but at the same price that the supply undertaking would have to pay for a conventional power station, allowing for the lesser running costs of a nuclear power station. Is there any reason, my Lords, why we should not adopt the same system here? Let us have the Atomic Energy Authority carry on development until the first commercial station is in operation and is proved; then it can sell it to the Generating Board at a price which would meet the subsidy for which the Chairman of the Generating Board asked. The Generating Board could then repeat the same design, with all the consequent economies, until the next new power system came along.
I cannot see why that system should not operate here; and if it were to operate here, it would have immense advantages. In the first place, it would end this feud, which really has bedevilled the nuclear programme, between these two nationalised Authorities. In the second place, it would fix responsibility firmly upon one pair of shoulders. As things are now, if the Magnox station has not fulfilled everyone's hopes it is possible for the Board to say, "That is because the original conception was wrong", and for the Authority to say, "That is because the execution of the programme was mismanaged", Under my proposal, on the other hand, respon-
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sibility would be definitely fixed on one pair of shoulders, and that, I think, would be a tremendous advantage. This is the only way that I can see whereby we can escape from the dilemma, presented by the Generating Board as it is to-day, of their carrying these two functions of generating cheap power and developing new and highly expensive pioneer systems of power generation. It is the only way I can see in which we can escape from that dilemma.
My Lords, I do not think I have exaggerated the dangers of this proposal to import American designs. It is surely folly and defeatism, after all the millions of pounds of public money—and, indeed, the millions of private money—that have been poured into research and development here, to accept the position that we are incapable of original work ourselves and can only follow the American lead. I would ask the Government most earnestly to think again about this proposal, to think afresh about the whole organisation of the nuclear programme, and to see whether we cannot make a greater success of the second nuclear power programme than we have of the first. My Lords, I beg to move for Papers.

MOTOR VEHICLE DESIGN AND TRAFFIC RESTRAINT
3.55 p.m.
LORD CHESHAM: My Lords, I hope it will now be convenient for me to make a Statement, in the words of my right honourable friend the Minister of Transport in another place:
"In Traffic in Towns, Professor Buchanan drew attention to the tremendous impact of the motor vehicle on our way of life. I wish to announce two further developments.
"First, the future of the motor vehicle. We all accept that it has come to stay, but, just as the towns of the future must be rebuilt to come to terms with the motor vehicle, so the vehicle must be designed to come to terms with those towns. For example, can we not design vehicles whose size, power and manœuvrability make them more suitable for town use? And can we not reduce such things as noise and fumes?

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"After consultation with the Society of Motor Manufacturers and Traders, I am arranging for a study to be made of future trends in design. The study will follow the same pattern as that of Traffic in Towns, and the bulk of the work will be done by a Working Group which will include engineers from the motor industry and the Ministry and representatives from research organisations. They will work under the general direction of a high-level Steering Group with Sir Harold Roxbee Cox as Chairman. I will circulate in the OFFICIAL REPORT the names of the other members and its terms of reference.
"Second, Buchanan and Crowther demonstrated that, no matter on what scale we rebuild, our largest cities cannot physically accommodate all the traffic that will want to use them. In the shorter term comprehensive and effective parking policies will ease our problem. But in the longer run, as Buchanan and Crowther showed, wider measures of restraint of traffic may be unavoidable. No country has yet solved this problem. It is more difficult for us than for most, because we are a small, densely populated country.
"As one step we commissioned an independent study on the technical feasibility of road pricing. The report of the panel under the chairmanship of Dr. Smeed, of the Road Research Laboratory, will be on sale to the public to-morrow, and advance copies are now available in the Printed Paper Office. I am grateful to the panel for their work, which shows that a system under which road users pay directly for the use they make of congested roads is technically feasible. But no one can yet say whether such a system would be desirable. We need to know a good deal more about the much more important social, town planning, economic and administrative issues. We are now examining the need for further studies of these wide-ranging problems."
That, my Lords, is the statement.
Following are the details referred to:
Terms of reference of the Steering Group:
"To advise the Minister of Transport on future trends in the design of power driven road vehicles, with
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particular reference to their use in towns."
Membership:

Sir Harold Roxbee Cox (Chairman)

Sir Geoffrey Crowther

Mr. A. C. Durie

Professor Hugh Ford, D.Sc.

Mr. G. W. Harriman, C.B.E.

Sir Patrick Hennessy

Sir William Lyons

Mr. K. C. Turner

The Secretary of the Steering Group and of the Working Group is Mr. J. W. Furness of the Ministry of Transport.
LORD SILKIN: My Lords, we are very grateful to the noble Lord for that Statement, and it is gratifying to learn that the Government are doing some fundamental thinking into what is one of the greatest of our physical problems of the age. It is difficult to comment, off the cuff, on the Statement, but first of all I must say (I hope the gentleman in question will forgive me) that I am afraid I have never heard of Sir Harold Roxbee Cox. Perhaps the noble Lord could tell us a little about the proposed Chairman of this Inquiry. Then, on the long-term Inquiry that is being made, it will, I presume, apply not only to the ordinary motor car but to lorries, buses and other heavy vehicles, as well as to motor-cycles—of course, the greatest offenders as regards noise. It would be gratifying if we could hear that something was to be done, even in advance of the findings of this Committee, to deal with the noise of motor-cycles.
I see that the Report on what is popularly known as "road pricing" is now available. Of course, we have not had an opportunity of seeing it, and I suppose one ought to read it before one makes any final comments on it; but, in a preliminary way, I think the noble Lord himself indicated that there might be social difficulties about road pricing. One of them that occurs to me straight away is that it is pricing by the purse—that is, it is the poor man, the small man, who will suffer very much more as a result of road pricing than the big man. To plutocrats such as we have in this House, it does not matter very much whether they have to pay for the use of a vehicle, but to the small men, the small traders—delivery vans, and so on—it may be a very serious factor. However, I do not want to comment more

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on that. I presume that we shall have the opportunity of considering the Smeed Report, and possibly of discussing it in this House at some time. But all this is going to take a long time before we can get any results, and, as to the short term, we should like to have a much clearer indication of what the Government propose.
It seems to me that two things could be done. One is that we could provide far more parking facilities. The parking problem is a nightmare and, as every noble Lord knows who tries to do a bit of shopping, or who stops outside his office to collect a document, before he reaches his room a policeman is there to tell him to go away. Generally, one cannot conduct one's affairs in that way. The motor car is a necessity in business, and if one is being harassed all the time about where one is going to leave a car, then it makes life impossible. One would like to be assured that the Government are seriously considering the problem of providing far more parking facilities within easy reach than they are at the present time. I know that this is a difficult problem, and I realise that it may not necessarily be an economic proposition, but I think, in the interests of the life of the community as a whole, we may have to face the possibility of this being a subsidised service.
Secondly, we ought to have far more inspectors examining cars which are liable to be a cause of danger and a general nuisance than we have at the present time. That, it seems to me, is a very urgent problem and is one that could be dealt with pretty shortly. The men could be made available and I think an increase in the inspectorate would greatly help at the present time.
THE EARL OF GOSFORD: My Lords, may I join the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, in thanking my noble friend for his Statement, which at least shows that the Buchanan Report, far from being shelved, is, I hope, going to be followed up. I should also like to join the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, in asking that thought should not go towards restrictions on motorists until such time as all possible parking facilities have been provided. By that, in particular, I mean parking facilities at stations and bus termini, and at entrances to towns and cities where
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motorists can be persuaded—in fact, invited—to park their cars and then to use public transport to the town. At the moment it is the hardest thing in the world to park a car at a railway station, at an underground station or at a bus terminus and to take public transport into town. The railway lines are there and there is in fact, empty land over which garages could be built at the least possible cost. If this were done, it would go a long way to stopping a large percentage of the cars that come into our towns and cities to-day, carrying only people coming to work who park their cars all day.
LORD WAKEFIELD OF KENDAL: My Lords, in view of the Statement made by my noble friend, could he say, as far as London is concerned, whether the Government are yet in a position to announce plans for the extension of the Underground service, having regard to the fact that this would undoubtedly help to relieve the roads? Also, in view of the fact that all over the world there is great activity in developing Underground services in many great cities, would not this be one way of helping to solve this difficult problem so far as London is concerned?
LORD CHESHAM: My Lords, I think I must try to give the answers for which I have been asked, as briefly as I may. I should like to tell the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, that Sir Harold Roxbee Cox is chairman of the Metal Box Company; he was the chief scientist of the Ministry of Fuel and Power from 1948 to 1954, has been associated with a wide range of scientific developments and is, indeed, present Chairman of the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research. I think that will give the noble Lord the information he wanted. It is the intention that this Study of Cars for Cities, as no doubt it will be known, will extend to all forms of vehicles and not just to private cars. As to where the emphasis may come we can only wait and see what the Group concerned find: but there is certainly no inhibition on it and it is intended to cover them all.
I agree with the noble Lord in what he says about the social impact of such a measure if ever it came to pass, and, indeed, that was why I said in the Statement that there were many important factors yet to consider, including the

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social ones. The noble Lord ended, as did my noble friend Lord Gosford, by switching from the long term, to which the Statement just made applies, back to the short term. Tempting as it may be, I do not think I ought to extend this into a debate on present conditions. I will sum up, if I may, by saying that the Statement read:
"In the shorter term comprehensive and effective parking policies will ease our problem."
My Lords, that is true, and to that extent agree with both noble Lords in what they say; but really we are talking of the time that Buchanan and Crowther foresaw, when much parking has been provided and cities have been redeveloped yet would still be unable to cope with the flood of traffic that we can anticipate in the slightly more distant future. It is in those terms that this Statement was made. I am grateful to noble Lords for the way in which they have received it.
THE EARL OF SANDWICH: My Lords, may I ask my noble friend, whether this study of pricing in relation to road space should not be done on a dynamic rather than on a static basis, so that the young man travelling at 100 m.p.h. in a sports car pays as much as or more than an Archbishop in an old car moving at hardly any speed at all?
LORD CHESHAM: My Lords, this is a most interesting concept which perhaps I shall leave for comment at some more suitable stage, perhaps from the Episcopal Benches on my left. But I would say to the noble Earl that this Study was in connection with congested urban conditions and did not attempt to take in the rarer philosophies of road space.
EARL ALEXANDER OF HILLSBOROUGH: My Lords, I think we can be much obliged to the noble Lord for his answers; but we are, as my noble friend Lord Silkin said, keen on trying to get from the Government something more urgent in the short period. After all, off-street paring in garages has been with us in part—and is growing—for over thirty years, whereas there is now a development—more in the provincial cities than here—in garages which cost very little in administration
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once they are built. You can have them of many storeys but with only one exit at which there is simply a machine for inserting the coin required for payment. One cannot get out until the coin is in and the barrier raised. A great deal of progress can be made in that way with off-street parking in garages. I think the same thing applies to the suggestion of the noble Earl, Lord Gosford. If there were garages of that type as well as parking space available, so that it would cost very little in administrative staff to work it, you would, in the end, do very well for the railways and for their wider use by people in the country, who have difficulty in going by car the whole way and have difficulty in parking at stations.
LORD CONESFORD: My Lords, may I ask my noble friend to clear up one matter? I hope that when he states his general agreement with the observations that have been expressed, that does not mean that he is saying that the provision of garages in cities ought to be subsidised. Is he aware that many of those who have thought most deeply on this question have come to the conclusion that it is vitally important that an economic price should be paid by those who garage in towns?
LORD CHESHAM: My Lords, I do not think that anything I said, either in my statement or in answer to supplementaries, can possibly be construed as meaning anything of the kind. I expressed a broad measure of agreement, as I still do, with what the noble Earl said, that a comprehensive and effective parking policy will help us in the short run. My statement was about the longer run. Perhaps the noble Earl thinks that we should have a debate on this subject in due course, and he will act, if he so wishes; but, with great respect, I do not think that we ought to go into it at length now.
LORD MERR1VALE: My Lords, may I ask one or two questions? Am I right in assuming that the terms of reference of this Study Group will include the study of the size of vehicles for towns, of giving off less fumes or making less noise, of traffic flow and of the question of the parking of vehicles? In other words, could my noble friend develop a little the terms of reference of the Study Group?
LORD CHESHAM: My Lords, I had hoped to save a few minutes of your Lordships' time by not reading out the terms of reference of the study group, but I think I had better do so. The terms of reference are:
"To advise the Minister of Transport on future trends in the design of power-driven road vehicles with particular reference to their use in towns".

"THE SECOND NUCLEAR POWER PROGRAMME"
4.13 p.m.
Debate resumed.
LORD CHAMPION: My Lords, we are extremely grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Coleraine, for having put down this Motion, which enables us to discuss this highly important White Paper on The Second Nuclear Power Programme. He has, in his usual masterly fashion, drawn our attention to certain aspects of this matter. He has asked us, for example, to consider the benefits and advantages of the advanced gas-cooled reactor as against the water-moderated reactor, Britain versus the United States, and the difficulties that exist between the Atomic Energy Authority and the Central Electricity Generating Board. But I think that his Motion goes much wider than that. I think that his Motion is really asking us to say whether we think that this programme is for too much nuclear power capacity, for too little, or whether it is just about right. It seems to me that it is to this question that we have to apply our minds this evening, using, of course, as the tools of our thoughts such information as is available to us. And I must say that I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Coleraine, that we have not got all the information that ought to be available to us, when considering a matter of this immensity and importance.
For myself, I admit that I find it by no means easy to decide on these matters, for there are so many exceedingly difficult and complex factors that enter into their consideration. Perhaps the most difficult factor to assess in all this, or to guess at, because that is what we have to do, is that of the rapidity of technical change in this field. A decision to go ahead with an advanced gas-cooled reactor project might well find such a project completely out-dated by a subsequent discovery in harnessing nuclear
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fission, or even by some major advance in conventional station technique. In addition to technical considerations of that nature, we have to consider the effect on our economy of the vast capital expenditures involved in the building 9f nuclear power stations as against the conventional stations. What is clear in all this, at any rate, to me, is that the Generating Board have to make provision for a consumption of electricity and a sufficient potential to meet the sort of winter demand we had last year and that they can do this only by vast capital expenditure.
Whichever type of plant is decided upon, the cost in money, material and manpower will have to be met by the nation. I understand that the total investment of the electricity industry in 1962 was some £406 million, equalling some 8·8 per cent. of the gross fixed capital formation. That is a pretty big share for any single industry. My guess is that it will be no less for 1964, and I am sure that for the years ahead it will be very much more. This capital expenditure is being made at a time when, if I read the N.E.D.C. Report, The Growth of the Economy, aright, capacity is pretty well stretched to the limit. The spare capacity is negligible, and is likely to be negligible for many years to come. In these circumstances, the Government, in consultation with the Central Electricity Generating Board and the Atomic Energy Authority, have to decide whether the country can better afford the high capital expenditure on nuclear stations now, in the hope of lowered generating costs in the years from 1970 onwards, or the lower immediate capital cost of conventional stations now and higher generating costs in future.
In this connection, the White Paper does not give us all the information we ought to have to enable us to form a judgment. All we are told in the White Paper is that the conventional stations planned in 1960 will cost about £37 per kilowatt and that the cost at the Wylfa nuclear power station is estimated to he some £100 per kilowatt. As to the advantages to be gained from one type, as against the other, all the White Paper says is:
"Against the relatively high capital cost of nuclear power must be set running costs which are substantially below those for conventional stations."

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I am bound to say that in my view this is not sufficient information to give this House, and the country generally, as to the costs and as to the decisions of the Government that have to be taken and supported. The White Paper goes on to tell us that a number of types of reactor are under consideration, but that we shall not know the capital costs of the various types under consideration until the tenders for an advanced gas-cooled reactor station, and possibly tenders from British industry for the American water-moderated reactor system station are received.
The noble Lord, Lord Coleraine, has described this seeking of tenders for such a station as "a tom-fool decision"—at least I understood him to say that. I must say that I cannot agree. I believe it is right that we should know, and that the Government should know, what are likely to he the costs of one form of energy as against another. In connection with the American water-moderated reactor system, I have seen somewhere that the capital cast of the American Oyster Creek Station was as low as £40 per kilowatt, which figure brings it very near to the £37 per kilowatt of the conventional station as given to us in the White Paper. The American system, I learn, has the disadvantage of higher running costs than the British A.G.R. But we are not told in this White Paper, or anywhere else, how much higher they are. What is the difference in the running costs of the one as against the other?
I must say that when, as I hope, despite anything which the noble Lord, Lord Coleraine, has said, tenders are received, the Government will not be frightened off the American system by the prestige factor or the dollar import cost. In the latter connection, I see that the Chairman of the Generating Board, Sir Christopher Hinton, said at a Press conference that the "hardware" import from the United States of America for the water-moderated system would not exceed 15 per cent. of the capital cost. So that, clearly, if a decision were taken to use this system, 85 per cent. of the money spent would be spent with the construction and manufacturing industry in this country. A decision to buy the American system would, of course, be a considerable blow to our national prestige. But, my Lords,
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our attempt in this country to keep one move ahead of any possible rival, in both the aircraft and atomic energy fields, has been a very expensive business indeed, costing us many hundreds of millions of pounds, which certainly has not paid off in any straight calculation of profit and loss. Other countries have in the past profited from our research, and if it proves that the American system happens to be better than ours, I see no reason why in this country we should not profit from their research. The research in this field is largely an international matter, and I feel that we must be prepared to benefit from research wherever it is conducted. We must do what we can in this field, of course, and spend vast sums; but do not let it blind us to the fact that we have to go on living in a difficult sort of world.
So far as exporting our nuclear production is concerned—and the noble Lord, Lord Coleraine, rightly made a great point of this—national pride will not help us in the export market if the American product is cheaper when the factors of capital and running costs are taken into consideration. If I were a country seeking to buy nuclear power, I should look for it in the market that could supply it most cheaply, both on capital costs and on running costs afterwards; and I am sure that the whole world would look at it in this way. Of course, if we can, by some tremendous advance, get a world market, we shall be very happy to do so. But I do not think we shall necessarily ensure a market abroad by seeking perhaps some form of nuclear energy and power which has been outstripped by somebody else.
In the consideration of cost (and this is part of the whole problem) as between conventional and nuclear power, I believe that some thought must be given to the possible effect on our indigenous coal industry and the social consequences of a decreased consumption of coal. I know that this is likely to be only marginal—or I should think it would be. But what is marginal when looked at from the national point of view, and taking a wide aspect of it, is of tremendous importance to the village that is built around the top of a pit—around that little hole which goes down

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in to the ground from which the coal comes and upon which the whole of the community depends.
Leaving that point, I should like to ask the Minister whether, in the figure of £37 per kilowatt for conventional stations, which we are told in the programme is the figure, account has been taken of the 500-megawatt generating sets, of which the Minister of Power is quoted as saying:
"The industry and the contracting firms are making a notable and, indeed, daring jump in technology, so as to win large economies in both capital and operating costs."
Has this leap ahead in this field been taken into consideration by the Minister; and is it shown to us in the figure of £37 in the White Paper? If the £37 per kilowatt does not take into account these large capital economies, what sort of capital cost figure can we expect; and what will be the effect on operating costs of these 500-megawatt generating sets? May I take it that Sir Christopher Hinton had those economies in mind when he told a Press Conference:
"In terms of trading money values, the estimates suggest that by 1975 nuclear power costs should be round about 0·4d. to 0·45d. per unit, and this would compare with conventional power figures of round about 0·5d. to 0·52d."?
I cannot pretend to be sufficiently knowledgeable of all the technical considerations to judge of the lifetime of nuclear stations. Clearly, this is important in the balance of costs and advantages against the conventional form of power. I must admit that I was tremendously impressed by the statement and the calculations of the noble Lord, Lord Aldington, in the debate last year. But on balance it seems to me, a natural conservative (with a small "c" in such matters), that the Generating Board are right in the circumstances to use the 20 years as against the noble Lord's figure of 25 to 30 years. Certainly I believe it is right to do this until such time as further operating experience has been gained. Perhaps I am wrong about the way I look at all these problems, but I cannot imagine that the Generating Board is prejudiced in favour of conventional as against nuclear power. After all, the job of the Generating Board is, as the
916
noble Lord has reminded us, to provide electricity as cheaply as possible, and not to take undue risks with consumers' money—and inevitably sums of great magnitude are involved in their decisions.
I should have thought, too, that if a major breakthrough in nuclear fission research took place within the next few years—and an article I read in last Sunday's Observer, headed, "There is a Smell of Success in the Lab." seems to point that way—conventional stations, with their lower capital cost and high running cost, could be more cheaply scrapped than the high capital cost nuclear stations immediately projected. This, I think, is a pretty important consideration, especially if the promise that is held out to us is realised. It would be much better to scrap a low-cost article than a high-cost article if something does come along.
Having said many things which would apear to favour the building of conventional stations rather than nuclear type stations, I certainly would not support a proposal which dropped the nuclear programme, merely waiting for something to turn up. I think this would be a great mistake. Nuclear manufacturers must be kept in being as a nucleus about which it would be possible to build if the necessity arises. Certainly further experience must be sought and gained in this whole field. There ought to be a number of firms in existence with the construction know-how. This can be done in the sort of programme which appears to me to be set out in the White Paper, and, of course, the only way to keep them in being is to keep them employed. I should have thought that to sink too much of our precious capital in nuclear stations at this time would be a serious mistake.
There is another question which I should like to put to the Minister. The Select Committee on the Nationalised Industries recommended that consideration should be given to
"how the additional cost of making power by nuclear means under the present programme should be apportioned between the taxpayer and the electricity consumer".
It is an additional cost to the consumer which Sir Christopher Hinton put at some £20 million a year. Last year the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, in replying

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to the debate on this subject [OFFICIAL REPORT, Vol. 251, col. 1446] told us that
"… Ministers will of course give most careful consideration to the views of the Select Committee."
That assurance was given just about a year ago, but there is nothing in the White Paper about it. I think that to-day, more than a year after the publication of the Report of the Select Committee on Nationalised Industries, we ought to have been given the result of the Government's consideration on this point as to the allocation of cost between the consumer and the taxpayer in this field.
The Select Committee also recommended that the Cabinet Committee
"should consider as a matter of urgency, the extent to which the Board and the Authority should bear the responsibility for research and development of civilian types of reactors and the legislation which should be introduced to amend the Authority's Statute."
I believe that this problem is still unresolved, but I am sure the House would like to hear from the noble Lord, Lord Derwent, on this matter when he replies.
In this whole matter of research I believe that the remarks and criticisms of the noble Lord, Lord Coleraine, were entirely relevant. I believe, too, that we ought to consider very carefully his suggestion as to the Canadian system. His remarks in this field ought to carry tremendous weight, especially as they clearly back up that part of the recommendation of the Select Committee on Nationalised Industries. I hope that the noble Lord will have some reply to make to-night on this extremely important point.
I believe that in (his House, and elsewhere, we must accept the challenge of this Motion and say what we think about the Second Nuclear Power Programme. I came to a consideration of it with a fairly fresh mind, unimpeded by any past statements on the subject, and I am bound to say that it looks to me as though this programme is just about right. The keynote of it is flexibility, which runs through it all—flexibility in which there will be ordered a sufficient number of nuclear-powered stations to keep the home industry in being, in which advantage may be taken as between the A.G.R. and the water-moderated reactors, whichever appears
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on tender to have the balance of advantage, and in which we are not so deeply committed that we could not later benefit from the new discoveries which appear likely in this field.
I must admit that, as a member of the Opposition, I rather dislike saying all this, because it is supporting the Government White Paper. We have been told in the past that it is the job of the Opposition to oppose, and in general I subscribe to that. But I think it is absolute madness for the Opposition to oppose when it happens, by chance, to think that the Government are right, and particularly in the sort of circumstances where we may find a change of side after the next Election and some of the words which may be said from this Box may be quoted against somebody then sitting on that side. But I am bound to say that I find this exercise of looking at this matter extremely interesting, and I end where I began, by thanking the noble Lord, Lord Coleraine, for having forced me to look at it.
4.38 p.m.
VISCOUNT CALDECOTE: My Lords, in accordance with our usual custom, I must declare an interest in the subject of this debate to-day. But I would emphasise that I speak only for myself and, I hope, in the national interest. 1 listened with great interest and attention to the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Coleraine, and I must admit that I felt he had painted a picture in colours a little too contrasting, and that the general impression to me was a rather gloomy picture. I shall show, perhaps, later in my speech why I think he was rather more pessimistic than he need have been.
This is a very difficult subject, and one of the main issues behind the problem which we are discussing to-day is common to all nationalised corporations, who are monopoly buyers from industry. This is a particular case, but we have a similar situation where the Air Corporations buy from the aircraft industry, and where British Railways buy from the traction industry. I would entirely agree with the noble Lord, Lord Coleraine, that, on the whole, over the years since the first nuclear programme was initiated engineering has been better than administration. This is very important for, as I say, this is a difficult industry with

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a very advanced and fast-moving technology, and a good organisational structure behind it is, therefore, of the utmost importance.
I do not want to spend too much time looking back. We could spend a great deal of time if we chose, but there is little value in that, except to reap the benefit of past experience for the future. But I think we should bear in mind the very rapid technical advance in this field. It is less than ten years since the programme was initiated and the industry was formed. Within those ten years five new nuclear power stations will be in being, supplying power to the grid. Very large research and development teams have been built up in industry and in Government establishments. Industry has developed the size of nuclear reactors from 100 megawatts per unit up to nearly 600 megawatts per unit, and has reduced the cost from £180 per kilowatt to £100 per kilowatt. I do not believe it is really fair to say to the industry or to the Government and those who have been concerned in this enterprise that that is a failure, as I think the noble Lord, Lord Coleraine, suggested.
In spite of those achievements, there is no doubt at all that profits in industry have been low and often negative. It is doubtful, too, whether the types of contract which were put out to industry were really suitable during the period of such rapid advance, when both customers and suppliers, both industry and Government, were feeling their way and learning fast. It is doubtful, too, whether the technical resources have been as well used as they could have been, and it is sadly clear that the responsibilities between industry, the A.E.A. and the C.E.G.B. have not always been shared in the best way.
Finally, looking at the past, we must ask why, after ten years and expenditure running into many hundreds of millions of pounds, serious consideration is now being given to the use of American designs for our next round of reactors and atomic power stations—consideration being given, in my view. absolutely rightly, for the reasons that the noble Lord, Lord Champion, gave in his speech. But the question that we must also ask is: are all the relevant factors being taken into account in deciding
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this question? These questions are, of course, as the noble Lord, Lord Coleraine, said, the central issue of to-clay's debate.
In deciding our future policy I suggest that there are certain basic objectives which should be isolated. First of all, there is the broad one, that scarce national technical resources must be employed to the best advantage. Secondly, electric power must be supplied as economically as possible. In the short term, this requires correct choice of systems and efficient methods of placing contracts and of controlling them. In the long term, it requires an active research and development programme. I do not believe that these are mutually exclusive, as one article I read in a journal recently suggested. Thirdly, an efficient industry must be allowed to make reasonable profits on its capital employed. If it is not, the whole economics of the programme are unrealistic and are distorted, and the competitive power of industry is seriously reduced.
If I may, I should like to spend a few minutes on those objectives. First, the proper use of national resources requires a stable policy. It requires that there should be no more rapid expansion and contraction from four groups to five groups to three groups; and, who knows, perhaps it will be necessary to come down to two groups. I think that that lesson has been learned and it is not for me to say any more. Also, it requires that there should be no duplication between industry, the A.E.A. and the C.E.G.B. There has to be a much better delineation of responsibility. There should be a sensible administrative set-up in the Government to control all these parties; to control the C.E.G.B., the A.E.A., the research development and production work it does and the share of the work which is done in industry. There is a strong impression—perhaps it is more than that; others know more about it than I do—that the C.E.G.B. and the A.E.A. have not got on too well together; that their policies have been unco-ordinated; even in opposition. The C.E.G.B. appears to be setting up quite substantial development teams, apparently somewhat unco-ordinated with the

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industrial effort. This may be right, but is it part of an overall policy?
In the Trend Report, which we discussed in another debate, it seems to be expected by Her Majesty's Government that the A.E.A. should be left under the Ministry of Science, on what seem to me to be the extraordinary grounds that the Authority has production, as distinct from research and development responsibility. That seems to me a particularly unconvincing reason. Surely, we should leave the research functions of the A.E.A. under the Ministry of Science, and surely it is wise to review their responsibility for the development and collaboration with industry in their field; and I should think we ought to look carefully at whether they should not be much more closelys associated with, perhaps under the control of, the Ministry of Fuel and Power.
The second objective is the provision of economical power. The current issue seems to be the choice between a United Kingdom-developed system and an American-developed system. I would entirely agree with the noble Lord, Lord Champion, that if one system is clearly and obviously more economic than another we cannot simply turn it down because it has been designed in America and not here. This would mean, if we did adopt that policy, that we should have to start developing that better system here when the information could be obtained by taking a licence.
But we must, in making this choice, beware of misleading comparisons and false conclusions. the U.S.A. a very great deal of development has been financed, as in so many fields, from the defence programme, and I think, with respect, that this was a point which the noble Lord, Lord Coleraine, did not mention in his speech. I believe it to be important, because the programme for nuclear submarines has put a very great deal of knowledge in the hands of American industry and has helped very much with their development programme. I believe that they have in America built uneconomic power stations with direct subsidies. I believe it is true that the cost of fuel supplied is subsidised. Development contracts are placed direct with industry in the same kind of way that we place development contracts in the defence field in this
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country. All these things put American industry on a different footing in this field from our own industry, which has accepted fixed-price contracts for the manufacture and commissioning of atomic power stations, including the cost, at their own risk, of doing all the development work required.
In America, too, there are two principal groups, Westinghouse and the General Electric Company. On the whole, they have concentrated on one system each and they are now in a position to make several stations from one design, as the noble Lord has already pointed out. We are not yet ready to do this in the United Kingdom, and I think it was perfectly right during the period when we were searching for a system, for a type of station that would be economic and comparable economically with conventional stations, to seek to improve the technical performance of each station as it was ordered.
But there are two reasons why we are behind America in this respect. I have already mentioned them. First, there is defence expenditure; and, second, the concentration in two large groups of the available effort has been an important factor. It is all too clear that in these very difficult, highly technological, very rapidly advancing fields, it is very easy to have too much competition. To give noble Lords one simple example: if you have five groups tendering for one station, they will each spend £100,000, perhaps £200,000 or more in preparing the tender, which runs to many inches of paper. Is this really economic? I very much doubt it, because each team is using a large number of very highly qualified and scarce engineering effort.
All this development has to be paid for. Because you get a fixed-price contract for the construction of nuclear power stations you do not get the development free: the development content is in the price. I wonder whether it would not have been better to concentrate the development effort more in those early days. I do not think the A.E.A. are to blame; their job is basic research effort and the production of basic information. Industry itself must do the development of an economic system, but it has to be clone within the proper organisational framework.
Another very important factor—on which I will not dwell because the noble

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Lord, Lord Coleraine, covered it so well—is this business of the C.E.G.B. specifying their requirements in such very great detail. Whereas in America the company, the contractor, the industry, is left very largely to settle in its own way how it will meet the required performance, in this country all too often the specification includes such words as "to the satisfaction of the Board's engineer". In a situation where there is not a monopoly buyer, this is relatively unimportant because there are different buyers arranging specifications in different ways. But where there is a monopoly buyer, as we have here, this is a very important factor indeed. It also means that if the monopoly buyer, the monopoly authority, is wrong there is just one big mistake, and no counter-balancing opinion in the other direction to put it right.
I believe, for instance, that in the 1955 White Paper (I was not able to obtain a copy of it at the time) it was suggested that the probable type of reactor in 1965 would be a liquid-cooled reactor. This was in fact investigated but subsequently turned down, apparently to our detriment to-day. In the United States, as the noble Lord said, the contractor is given a free rein. He has a much better opportunity in this way of optimising the design and getting the right balance between cost and performance, the right balance between different parts of the system to give the most economic operation. I have heard it estimated that in this way savings of the order of 20 to 30 per cent. in capital cost can be achieved.
Other differences have been mentioned. One is depreciation practice. We depreciate over 20 years; I believe the United States depreciate over 30 years. Have all these factors been taken into account? Will all these factors, and many others I have omitted, be taken into account when comparison is made between the British and American systems?
Another most important point that must be considered is the effect on the British industry, on the British consortia, of a decision to go to America. Again, with great respect to the noble Lord, Lord Coleraine, I think he slightly overstated the position here. I do not believe that if you take a licence from another country you necessarily destroy your own industry. Did America destroy their aircraft Indus-
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try by taking a licence to build the Canberra bomber when they had no jet aeroplane? They bought time by buying the licence from this country. Then they improved on it and went ahead from there. Provided that we plan on that kind of basis, if it is wise for other reasons to take a licence, surely there is no harm in taking it.
However, there is a very important question to be asked at that stage. Supposing it is decided in the end to take an American licence, how shall we keep up with the technology in this country? Because what is absolutely certain is that no company can afford to pay for a licence and all the technical effort in supporting that licence and to pay for research and development on the kind of scale that is being paid for now. So what is the policy of the Government in this respect? Do they intend in these circumstances to place straight development contracts in industry to keep technology alive and ahead of the world, as we have been in the past, or do they intend, perhaps, to encourage one group to take a licence and another group to have contracts from the C.E.G.B., the A.E.A. for a British-designed reactor or in some way like that?
Finally, on these points, the present industry, as the White Paper says, is being asked to tender for two different types of reactor, for the American type and for the British type. This is an interesting exercise for the C.E.G.B. It enables them to get some idea of what the relative prices would be in production. But it is a very expensive operation for the industry if it is paying for the additional tenders, as I pointed out before. Again, I wonder whether sufficient thought has been given to whether all this competitive duplication of tendering is really the best way of using our national resources. Perhaps if the A.E.A. and the C.E.G.B. had been closer together over the years many of the problems industry is now being asked to settle by competitive tendering would have been nearer solution.
There is just one other point. As I have said already, the cost of development work is extremely high. For instance, I believe it is costing the consortia at the moment—all the consortia in this country—something of the order

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of £10 million a year to support their research and development teams. Somehow this has to be recovered, and it is rather sad to see in the first commissioning programme of atomic power stations, for 1962–69, 5,000 megawatts was to be installed, which is about 15 per cent. of the total. It is now shown in the White Paper, for planning purposes, to keep the situation flexible, that 5,000 megawatts is going to be installed in the period 1970–75. This is only 13 per cent. of the total planned commissioned power. I wonder whether it is wise that in this period there should be a smaller proportion of nuclear power stations, whether it would not be better to take advantage of the point mentioned by several speakers, to manufacture more stations from a given design.
I have referred to some of the problems and difficulties and criticisms of what is going on at the moment. I have done it because, surely, this is the way to improvement. But there is also much good to record. There has been successful design, development and operation of huge and complex systems in an entirely new field. The industry has developed comprehensive technical and manufacturing facilties in a relatively short space of time, and these difficult programmes have been pressed forward with commendable energy and initiative and enthusiasm, to the great benefit of the nation. I do not believe we have anything to be ashamed of—nothing at all, except possibly some mistakes in organisation. But certainly the engineers in this field in this country have nothing whatever to be ashamed of.
But if past investment in this new industry is to be worth while, if exports are to be obtained, if the future supply of electricity is to be provided at economic prices and, last but by no means least, if Britain is to retain the initiative and independence in this important field, we have got to do better in the future.
In conclusion, may I summarise how in my view we might go some way to achieve this? First of all, there needs to be a reappraisal of the functions and responsibilities of the A.E.A., C.E.G.B., and of industry to avoid overlapping, "empire building" or competition between them, and to ensure the best use of our resources. There has got to
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be much closer relations between A.E.A. and C.E.G.B., particularly in applied research and development work. There should be much greater freedom to industry to meet a performance specification and to produce designs which provide the best value for money. The best value for money in these commercial affairs is what matters, not the most super technical performance. Fourthly, there must be a reappraisal of the optimum number of groups to ensure greater concentration of effort on new types of system. There must be an increase in the number of stations produced from one design, perhaps by an increase in the nuclear proportion in the overall power station programme.
There should be a full investigation of all factors which may appear to make reactors based on American designs more economic. There should be a realistic appraisal of the long-term effect of choosing an American design for the British nuclear power industry, and a decision taken as to what is going to be done to keep us in the forefront of this important industry. I believe that, if action is taken along these kind of lines and the problems are studied realistically and without preconceived ideas, there is a great future before this industry; but if the issues are shirked, or if the voice of sound judgment cannot be heard above the noise of the grinding of axes, then certainly disaster will follow.
5.1 p.m.
LORD STONHAM: My Lords, I would join with my noble friend Lord Champion in extending our thanks to the noble Lord, Lord Coleraine, for having given us, twice within twelve months, the opportunity to consider this extremely important subject. The noble Lord did not on this occasion go over any of the ground which he covered on the first occasion, when, as I recall, he spoke for some seventy minutes without a note. But I think he would agree with me in recollecting that it took the combined and most persuasive effeorts of his noble friends Lord Carrington and Lord Hails-sham (as he then was) to persuade him finally to withdraw his Motion calling for "an independent inquiry into the present position". I believe that had he then had the vision to look eleven months forward, at the White Paper which we

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are now considering, and which presumably partly arises from the advice of the Powell Committee, which he was assured was the equivalent of the Committee of Inquiry for which he was then asking, he would not then have withdrawn his Motion, but would have allowed the House to decide on the events.
I find myself, as often one does in a debate of this kind, in partial agreement with much that has been said by everyone, particularly my noble friend Lord Champion in his highly admirable speech. But again—and this also applies to my noble friend Lord Champion—I am in some disagreement. I think that all of us, so far as possible, should divest ourselves of any kind of prejudice, not merely as between one form of nuclear reactor and another but between one form of producing power, the nuclear form, and the conventional form. But (and my noble friend Lord Champion made this point quite clearly) in the White Paper we are not given the information on which to make a proper assessment of relative work and relative value. It is not so important that we in this House are not given the information: the point is that the industry is not given the information. I would submit that the only fair way of comparison is to compare like with like—by which I mean attempting to arrive at the cost per unit, allowing for the capital cost of the different types, their amortisation, and, of course, the production costs. It is no earthly use telling us that it costs £104 a kilowatt for the Wylfa station and some £37 of capital cost for conventional methods, and that it will cost much less in production per unit with the nuclear method and much more by the conventional method. We want comparative figures, and I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Derwent, will be able to give some information on this point by way of reply.
The noble Lord, Lord Coleraine, made the point—this is a paraphrase of his words—that in his view the C.E.G.B. were pursuing a policy which runs counter to British interests and is bound to destroy our chances of exporting. He also expressed the opinion that the purchase of the American B.W.R. means that Britain would be opting out of the nuclear power plant industry.
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Again, these are not his precise words, but I think they are the purport of what he had in mind. With this the noble Viscount, Lord Caldecote, completely disagreed; and I would support him in expressing the view that, other things being equal, we should not turn our faces against the American appliance merely because it is American. That would be the height of absurdity, and also entirely contrary to the whole concept on which British industry is founded. But I do not accept what the noble Viscount said, that the British nuclear power industry can continue intact if after 1969 we take the American method alone. I believe that if we accept his assumption that the British industry is to continue with its design teams and the chance of continuing research, then it must be on the assumption that, alongside the American water-moderated reactor system, we should be proceeding with the British Advanced Gas-Cooled Reactor as well.
VISCOUNT CALDECOTE: My Lords, I am sure that I did not make clear that that is what I was trying to say. That if we took a licence from America it was essential to proceed with British development in parallel, to have our own ideas, and to improve upon the ideas and knowledge that we got from America. I agree that that is entirely essential, and I think that the noble Lord will see that I said something close to that.
LORD STONHAM: My Lords, I am most grateful to the noble Viscount. He and I are now in entire agreement. I did not want to interrupt him at the time, but I determined to make this point in my remarks. That was the impression that I got. He did not make his point clear. Therefore, I am now wholly in agreement with him.
But one essential point that I think has not been brought out in this debate is the extent to which this industry has been "messed about" and deceived, through the variations, the "go" and "stop", and the vacillations of Government policy, of which in my opinion this White Paper is just another example. We are all aware—the point has been made—that this is a tremendously expensive business. There is an enormous investment of capital. The

929
point was made by the noble Lord, Lord Coleraine, and not denied, that every nuclear power station in this country so far has been a prototype—a prototype because it was ordered as such—and therefore naturally it must cost much more. But when we look at the position as a whole over the last nine years it would appear almost as if we had deliberately set about making it impossible for our own nuclear power industry to develop and to compete successfully. If, for example, we go back to the 1955 White Paper, we find these statements. First of all:
"It is intended that the electricity authorities and private industry should obtain as quickly as possible the practical experience in designing and building nuclear power stations that will be the necessary foundation for a big expansion in the later stages of the programme."
It went on to say:
"The main burden of building and designing commercial nuclear power stations will fall upon industry who sill have to see that the necessary staff are trained. These are some of the many things that must be started soon if we are not to waste precious years in building up this new and unfamiliar industry."
It was only nine years ago—and nine years is not long in the development of nuclear power stations—when in the same White Paper we were told that the total nuclear power station capacity installed by 1975 would be of the order of 10,000 to 15,000 megawatts. That was the task to which the industry was then urged to gear itself. Indeed, the Government said in the White Paper:
"This formidable task must be tackled with vigour and imagination. The stakes are high but the final reward wilt be immeasurable."
That forecast, that the final reward would be immeasurable, is the only accurate one so far that the Government have made, because there have been no rewards to measure: they have all been losses. The noble Viscount, Lord Caldccote, said that the profits have been small, but in fact there have not been any profits at all.
After 1955 there were for some years continual urgings by Ministers in both Houses. For example, in March, 1957, the noble Viscount, Lord Mills, then Minister of Power, said this [OFFICIAL REPORT, Vol. 202, col. 185]:
"The Government have accordingly decided, with the full agreement of the Electricity Authorities and the Atomic Energy Authority, to adopt … a range of 5,000 to 6,000
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megawatts of nuclear capacity in operation by the end of 1965."
Then, later, he said [col. 192]:
"I have delayed putting forward this statement because I wished to satisfy myself that we had got a practical programme which we could follow …"
That statement is unequivocal enough. In the same year Mr. Maudling referred in another place to the fact that the construction of the nineteen nuclear power stations would not result in the cancellation of any contracts relating to the preexisting development programmes. In the same month he said [OFFICIAL REPORT, Commons, Vol. 569, col. 35]:
"… in our energy policy our outlook must be bold and one in which we are prepared to take risks … our policy should be to err on the side of boldness."
In the same debate Mr. George, his Parliamentary Secretary said [col. 106]:
"While I thankfully salute the scientist, I think that the Committee should salute the engineering firms who have taken up the building of these atomic power stations. … It is right to say that these firms did not face the task in a selfish way. It is right to say that they put prestige before profit. … This was private enterprise at its very best. We should give these firms our thanks."
The kind of thanks they received was to he told, in 1958, that there were not going to be nineteen nuclear power stations but that the programme could be fulfilled with fourteen—although they were still assured in 1958 that it was intended to complete between 5,000 and 6,000 megawatts by the end of 1965.
In 1959 Lord Mills somewhat rhetorically asked this question [OFFICIAL REPORT, Vol. 213, col. 696]:
"Should we abandon the maximum advantages to be gained from this great achievement"—
the development of nuclear power—
"because we have had to stock a relatively small percentage of coal …?"
And he added [col. 697]:
"If one started to chop and change, one would soon have the industry ragged and unable to co-operate in the way one would wish it to co-operate."
The consortia nobly and expensively responded to the request from the Government to net on with this vital job, and this nuclear work put heavy demands on the scientific personnel of the consortia and firms concerned. Technical teams of scientists and engineers were built up, which, if dispersed, could

931
not be replaced. Throughout this time these speeches were made. For four years the Government encouraged immense outlay in overheads. Then in June, 1950, the blow fell, with the White Paper. We were told on June 20 that all seven nuclear power stations (the number had dropped over the years from nineteen to seven) should be in operation by 1966, with a total output capacity of approximately, not from 5,000 to 6,000, but 3,000 megawatts. The same White Paper said:
"What was not then foreseen was the extent of the fall which has also taken place in the costs of conventional power from new stations."
My Lords, those are extracts, in chronological order, from the White Papers: the build-up; the exhortation to the firms to get on with the job, to use their skill, to spend their money, to do this vital job for Britain. And then not merely were they let down, but the programme was cut to half-size. It meant that the tremendous costs and overheads had to be spread over half the programme they were expecting, which meant that, relatively, they were doubled. In the current White Paper, the industry is virtually told, "You are relatively expensive"—I say that against this background of "go" and "stop" on the part of the Government.
The industry, once bitten, looks askance at this new and, in my view, sketchy White Paper, with its remarkable lack of solid information. Not one essential question is answered, although I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Derwent, when he comes to reply, will be able to answer some of the questions which have been put to him in the debate, The industry, the potential manufacturers and consortia, are, not surprisingly, confused by the implication in the White Paper that the estimated lower capital costs and higher running costs of water reactors are a development of recent origin. These facts were known years ago. They were known virtually when we started. They were well known at the inception of the first nuclear power programme. Moreover—and I think this is even more damaging—it seems to me that there is an implication in the White Paper that the Magnox system is becoming obsolete. Perhaps Lord Derwent may say a word about that, and, indeed,
932
refute what I say if he thinks there is not that implication, because if it is so, and I think that it is, it can be misleading and damaging to the industry's export prospects.
With regard to the choice of reactors, it is acknowledged that the choice can be made only in the light of the full supporting information. It is the case that the Government can make an assessment only following an analysis of different tenders. But—and I believe that this point has not been made previously—the Government have had the benefit of technical and economic assessments which, so far, have been denied to the industry, which has borne the lion's share of the burden of financing civil nuclear power in this country. So I ask, why does not the Government agree to help the industry by bringing them into partnership in this matter and making the facts known to the firms concerned? Why ask them to indulge in a costly guessing game? Why cannot the Government let them know the information that is in their possession?
Surely, in the light of all the history of the development of nuclear power in this country, the Government must treat industry as partners in this enterprise and share with them the facts on which this second programme has been based. What can possibly be gained by keeping them in the dark? Indeed, without these facts the nuclear industry will be unable, because of the lack of essential background information, to make any judgment on which to base their future plans. This whole question has enormous significance to the export drive to which the nuclear power industry as a whole is already making an important contribution.
My noble friend Lord Champion stated—and no one could contradict this—that only 15 per cent. of the total price, as it were, of the American reactor system, if built in this country, would have to be imported, and therefore if eventually it produced a cheaper unit of electricity than other methods it was the system which we most certainly should adopt. I do not want to disagree with that thesis in principle, but I do say that that is not the whole story when we are considering whether or not we should buy the American system. There are so many ancillary questions attached to it, so many other ways in which our exports

933
could be affected. If the use of the American system means the break up of design teams, an interruption in research, then, in my submission, that would be too big a price to pay for a possible saving—I know my noble friend did not say for certain that it was so—in money. Because it is increasingly evident that it is on the field of services and know-how and technology that Britain must rely for our major increases in exports, if we are going to sustain the necessary high rate of growth. I think, therefore, that we must stay in the nuclear field if we are to remain as expert as we need to be.
My noble friend thought that the programme was just about right. He and I will both remember the story that used to be told with delightful effect by our late noble friend Lord Dalton, when they used to say that about the beer—that it was just about right. "If it had been any better, we shouldn't have had any, and if it had been any worse it wouldn't have been fit to drink." That was the impression I got about this programme being just about right. My feeling is that it is a major defect in the programme that it should be put at a level of 5,000 megawatts, because I do not think it will be enough to maintain the industry in a healthy state, particularly if more than one reactor type is included in the programme with the consequent increased costs of parallel development. I say to my noble friend: if you have an American one and ours as well, then you make ours more expensive by reason of the fact that overheads have to be concentrated in a narrower, smaller field. That is another factor which ought to be taken into consideration.
Then my noble friend said that he was delighted to see that the programme was to be flexible. Of course, flexibility works both ways. One could imagine that it means that the programme could be expanded, and the flexibility would then show an increase. But the industry so far has seen the flexibility—which was such a feature of the first White Paper—working to cut down from 19 stations to 7 stations, and from an assumed 5,000 to 6,000 megawatts in 1966 to 3,000 megawatts. That kind of flexibility is what the industry is afraid of, because it has had this cutting done to it after it has spread out its plant,
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put out its plans and spent its money. That kind of flexibility is an utter disaster, not only to the nuclear power industry but to any major industry, where if you are going to be efficient, if you are going to succeed, you must have a plan, you must stick to the plan and you must have continuity. You just cannot succeed with "Stop and Go", because if there is another reduction in the scale of the programme it means that once again manufacturers' plans will be disrupted and they will be involved in further losses.
In fact, I would say—this is only to make a bit of a balance with my noble friend—that in my opinion the Government, in this White Paper, appear to have designed this second nuclear power programme on the basis of "Heads we win, and tails the industry loses". They could scarcely have been more successful if they had expressly set out with the intention of ensuring that after 1969 there would be no British nuclear power programme. They should make up their minds whether they really want one or not, and if the answer is, "Yes", then they should create conditions which will make it possible. In my submission, this White Paper, while denying us a number of essential facts that we and the industry must have, does not do anything but, nominally at least, say that the industry can stagger along for a bit longer.
In my own view, and I think this is borne out by the latest figures, the electricity industry, on average, has doubled its demand every ten years. I think last year the increase was 12 per cent., so it would seem that its demands are increasing even more rapidly than hitherto. Last winter we had a mild winter and therefore no black-outs, or almost none. But I think it is common knowledge that our power plant production programme cannot catch up with the anticipated largely increased demand until something like 1968. My personal opinion is that on the present basis it will be found, unless we have a business recession, not to have caught up then. Therefore I feel that the nuclear power part of the programme has a necessary and essential contribution to make. We should continue it on a scale sufficient to enable the necessary major economies to be achieved, and on a settled, fixed, assured

935
programme, which would enable the industry to do its best and to compete successfully with other countries in this field.
5.27 p.m.
LORD WOLVERTON: My Lords, I am sure we are all very grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Coleraine, for introducing the debate on this White Paper, because this matter is one of immense importance. I will try to show the House in the next few moments why I think that the Government's plan for the second nuclear programme is about right. I, for one, think that we did a most marvellous job, being pioneers in the world, in starting the first programme of nuclear power stations in this country. But I think it is quite true that pioneers must be very careful not to be left behind.
We have only just got a few figures of the performances of the first two stations at Berkeley in Gloucestershire and Bradwell in Essex. Berkeley in Gloucestershire is a station of 332,000 kilowatts. It has four sets of 83,000 kilowatts or 83 megawatts—I prefer to call them kilowatts, because I am old fashioned. The thermal efficiency of that station is 19·8 per cent., against the average efficiency of the 235 stations of the Generating Authority of 27·48 per cent. Bradwell, which is also running now, is a slightly larger station and its efficiency is much higher. That is the very important thing. The station is of 312,000 kilowatts, with six sets of 52,000 kilowatts each, and its thermal efficiency has gone up from 19 per cent. to 26·5 per cent. Of course, compared with the modern conventional stations, both of these power stations are of low steam pressure. Bradwell is 755 lb. per square inch and Berkeley is 595 lb. to 620 lb. per square inch.
I want just to compare that with two conventional stations, one of which I have had the pleasure of seeing. I must admit to your Lordships that I really have not yet seen an atomic power station. I was to be taken over one last summer, but it was not finished, and I hope I am going to be taken over Bradwell this summer. But I have seen Kincardine in Scotland, and this is a very fine station. It is a station of
936
760,000 kilowatts with three sets of 120,000 kilowatts and two sets of 200,000 kilowatts, and its thermal efficiency, which is all important, is 34·69 per cent. Its steam pressure is running now at the enormous figure of 1,600 lb. per square inch. That is where the great advance has been made in technology, in the greater rise in the steam pressure. When I was a director of a power company some years ago, before nationalisation, it was running at 800 to 900 lb. per square inch: it has now gone up to 1,600 lb. per square inch. Take Belvedere, in Kent, another very modern station, which has a capacity of 240,000 kilowatts it has two sets, each of 120,000. The thermal efficiency there is 34·8 per cent., which is a very high efficiency.
Therefore, I think Her Majesty's Government are right in not going on with too big a programme in the second phase until further advances can be made in these reactors, so that they are able to run much higher steam pressures. I am told that it is a metallurgical problem, a problem of metals, to try to get these reactors to go up to higher steam pressures. Unless we can get them to go up to higher steam pressures, we shall not of course get a higher thermal efficiency, and the price figure naturally depends entirely on the thermal efficiency of the station. I think a lot more research must be done. I should like to ask Her Majesty's Government this: what is happening about the Dounreay station as an experimental station on 'which so many hopes were put and which was designed on a fast-breeder reactor system? A lot of hopes were based on that, and it is running now as an experimental station. All these stations which are running—or, rather, the two or three that are running now and the others which are nearly completed—were based on Calder Hall, on the Magnox reactor system.
Sizewell, Suffolk, I understand, is coming into operation next summer. That is a much bigger station. It is 650,000 kilowatts, and they have only two sets there, each of 325,000 kilowatts, coming into operation. I do not know what the steam pressure of that station is going to be, but with these very large sets, I think it will be much more economic. At the same time, we cannot get away from the fact that in the steam

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stations, the conventional stations, on the whole, tremendous advance has been made. The Statistical Digest for 1963, just issued by the Electricity Council, says:
"Western Europe's largest generating unit, a 550,000 kilowatt cross-compound turbo-alternator steamed from a single boiler, was commissioned at the Thorpe Marsh power station, near Doncaster".
That is a huge set of 550,000 kilowatts. Therefore, like other noble Lords, I feel that a lot more basic research must be done before we embark on another very big programme, bigger than that Her Majesty's Government have announced, because we may Lind—and the White Paper says this—that, though the technical engineering is extremely well done, the technical results are a little disappointing. On page 2 of the Report, towards the bottom of the page, it says:
"Although the stations will produce power at a higher cost than was originally expected …".
That is the point, that it is at a cost higher than was originally expected.
I feel that, although we have done a wonderful job in the past in bringing these stations into commercial operation, a great deal more research will have to be done. The point is, who is going to bear the cost of this very expensive programme of research? I would have thought that the Atomic Energy Authority, backed by funds from the central Government, would be the people who could do the research, once they have got the research right on different, new types of reactors and experimental stations. They built the original station at Calder Hall, on whose pattern the commercial stations are built, and they also built the Dounreay station, with the fast-breeder reactor. I feel they ought to be the people to put up another experimental station on this new basis. I am not against getting material from America, if it is an absolute necessity, under licence, as my, noble friend Lord Caldecote said, but I would rather that we produced it ourselves as the pioneers.
We must go on with our own ideas on the other system of advanced gas-cooled reactors, and perhaps we may have, under licence, to take the American boiling water reactor. Nevertheless, research must be done so that there is competition with the conventional stations, which in the last few years have made tremendous
938
advances—I can assure your Lordships of that, and you know that well yourselves. For a conventional station the capital cost in 1948 was, I believe, £70 per kilowatt; it has now come down to between £45 and £50, and we are told in the White Paper that for the stations to come into operation in the future it may come down to £37. With those few words, my Lords, I should like again to thank my noble friend Lord Coleraine for introducing this most important subject. It involves vast capital expenditure, and it is a subject that this House ought to discuss very carefully before committing itself to this White Paper.
5.36 p.m.
Loan HOBSON: My Lords, I feel that I ought to begin by repeating what has already been said by every noble Lord who has spoken: that we owe a deep debt of gratitude to the noble Lord, Lord Coleraine, for introducing this very important debate. The amount of capital involved in an investment programme such as this is tremendous, and I certainly think it demands the most careful consideration not only by your Lordships' House but also by the other place. I found myself mostly in agreement with what the noble Lord, Lord Coleraine, said, and I certainly think the concluding part of his speech, with reference to the Canadian method of development and of payment for a complete station, is well worth the consideration of Her Majesty's Government, whatever its political complexion. I thought that was a most valuable contribution to this debate. I agreed, too, with the noble Viscount, Lord Caldecote, in his fears (which, in my submission, are also real) of the overlapping of the Central Electricity Generating Board, the Atomic Energy Authority and also, in some respects, at very great expense, the consortia of industrial firms that are connected with the industry.
I should like to make a few observations on the speech of my noble friend Lord Stonham. I think it is quite untrue to say that all the atomic power stations are prototypes: that just is not true. The one prototype was Calder Hall. Calder Hall was developed by the Atomic Energy Authority, and then handed over, for the purposes of operation, quite rightly, to the proper authority, the Central Electricity Generating

939
Board. I also think that any criticism of any Government, saying that they have cut down the programme from nineteen to seven (although I suppose it is eight, because we have eight atomic power stations in the process of being constructed), is due to all sorts of causes which are not the responsibility of the industry. There is the question of the amount of capital that is available for investment in this very important industry, electrical generation. But I do not think one can really criticise them for cutting down the number.
LORD ALDINGTON: My Lords, would the noble Lord excuse me just one minute? I did not realise he was passing so quickly from his noble friend's point about prototypes. It may have been a slight misuse of the word "prototype", but the point the noble Lord, Lord Stonham, was making is, I think, a valid one. Each station has been of a substantially different design from the one which came before, and, therefore, there has been this tremendous extra cost. I think that was the point he was making, and that was valid.
LORD HOBSON: Yes. I can even concede that point and still maintain my previous position —and I will tell the noble Lord why in answer to a very fair interjection. After all, is anybody going to say that conventional power stations are all standardised; that they have got to conform to certain designs and desires of the Central Electricity Generating Board? Indeed, they have to be vastly different in many cases because of the actual site on which the power station is going to be built. Therefore, it is not true to say that there is any great difference on the point which the noble Lord, Lord Aldington, made.
But, to revert to the question of cutting down the number of atomic power stations from nineteen to eight, in an era of shortage of electrical power—and we must face this fact—it is important that conventional power stations can be built considerably more quickly than atomic power stations. Now let us stop to analyse the effect on the people employed in the industry. First of all, the whole of the actual generating plant in an atomic power station and in a conventional power station is precisely and identically of the same type, whether it
940
be turbines or alternators. The same type of labour is involved; the same consortia and the same companies make the equipment. On the question of boiler plants, I admit that this is an entirely different matter; but the same type of labour is employed and the same firms have their capital employed and give employment to that labour. Therefore there are no really difficult consequences to the consortia, because, whether we like it or not (there is no alternative), the people who build conventional power stations and plant are the same people who build atomic power stations.
I think we must agree that much has been achieved since Calder Hall, and we must realise and appreciate that the first nuclear power programme of eight stations has proved both efficient and reliable. The cost per kilowatt out has been reduced from £180 to £92, which I believe is the present price estimated for the Wylfa atomic power station in Anglesey. So there has been a tremendous saving in capital costs; there has been a halving. To that extent I say that it is a tribute to British industry, to the consortia and to all those engaged in the research associated with the industry. But they are all looking forward to the day when atomic power stations will be fully competitive with conventional coal and oil fuelled power stations. The position to-day, as has already been stated by many noble Lords, is that atomic power stations are cheaper to run but dearer to construct. When they achieve the figure of, say, from between £40 to £50 per kilowatt out they will be not only competitive but considerably cheaper than any conventional power station. I do not think it is foolish or indulging in crystal-gazing to anticipate that situation within a decade, for the reason I have given: that the industry and the consortia (and we must give credit where it is due) have reduced the kilowatt out costs from £180 to just over £90.
My Lords, I am rather surprised that no noble Lord has mentioned this (although I realise that it may be difficult for those people who are associated with the industry), but I think some reference ought to be made in your Lordships' House to the losses incurred by the consortia in constructing these stations. The average man in the street assumes that

941
those losses have been borne by the taxpayer: the general impression is that the Government are subsidising all this. It is, in fact, the three consortia, or their shareholders, who have lost this money. And the reason for this is not due to professional incompetence; it is due simply to the fad that the consortia, the engineers and the scientists are dealing and have been dealing with the unknown, and there has been no previous experience on which to call.
On the question of large-scale new developments let us effect a comparison. There was no real prototype, as such, the expense of which was borne by the Government, in the construction of atomic power stations. Let us compare that situation with the millions of pounds that have been spent by the Government in constructing prototypes in the aircraft industry. I will not go through the whole list, but we have had the Brabazon, and at the present moment we are engaged in developing the Concorde. All this has cost millions of pounds of money. But in the case of atomic power stations, the consortia have not received millions of pounds in order to help them develop what is a new industry and in regard to which there was no real previous experience to go on. It is true also, of course, in the field of the development of missiles. The position in 1957—and this is when the real programme really got under way—was that this country was faced with a shortage of fuel oil and coal. This was a real shortage, and there was an urgent need for an alternative source of fuel to be used as a prime mover.
That was the position in 1957. Now, is any noble Lord courageous enough to get up and say, "We are not going to have that sort of situation again"? I am not thinking in terms of troubled political situations at all, but of the nature of the demand that is being made on our fuel resources. As has already been said, the electricity demand has been doubling itself every ten years; and this is not only true of Britain but of the whole of industrial Europe and of the United States of America. Let us face the fact that there is also a demand for an increase in coal and in oil. Here we must remember that both coal and oil are wasting assets and therefore we have to anticipate the future. We expect
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to export more coal, providing it is of the right type and quality. Therefore the nuclear power industry, as such, must be got into a healthy state, with work to do, in order to secure the future. The Central Electricity Generating Board realises that and the Government must realise it too.
Now, my Lords, I want to deal with the first nuclear programme. I think this is important in the light of what I shall say shortly. In the first programme we used natural uranium. What enriched uranium we possessed was needed, of course, for military purposes. The United States of America have always been in the fortunate position of having adequate supplies of enriched uranium available, both for military and civil requirements. But, what is the purport of such a statement? Why is it important? It is important for the simple reason that, as has been said, enriched uranium gives us lower capital costs in the construction of atomic power stations. But at the present time—and I must enter that caveat—it gives higher running costs. If we get lower capital costs then we are competitive with conventional stations; but the higher running cost is comparable only with such atomic power stations as are using natural uranium and those stations that will be constructed should a different type of reactor be chosen such as the advanced gas-cooled reactor or the pressurised water reactor. In other words, one must compare like with like.
In my submission, we should arrive at a situation very shortly, with the development of that type of reactor and with the use of enriched uranium, wherein not only capital costs will be lower but also running costs. If that situation arrives, as I believe it will, there is a 100 per cent. case for a very much larger atomic programme.
VISCOUNT GOSCHEN: My Lords, would the noble Lord feel that this is a convenient moment to break off for the Royal Commission? If so, I beg to move the House do now adjourn during pleasure.
Moved accordingly and, on Question, Motion agreed to.
House adjourned during pleasure.
House resumed.

ROYAL COMMISSION
The following Bills and Measure received the Royal Assent:

Elections (Welsh Forms),

National Health Service (Hospital Boards),

Burgh Police (Amendment) (Scotland),

Criminal Procedure (Right of Reply),

Pharmacy and Poisons (Amendment),

Dangerous Drugs,

Income Tax Management,

Emergency Powers,

Protection of Animals (Anaesthetics), Harbours,

Succession (Scotland),

Administration of Justice,

Criminal Appeal,

Nurses,

Road Traffic,

Malawi Independence,

Merchant Shipping,

Police,

Macduff Harbour Order Confirmation,

Chichester Rural District Council,

Life Association of Scotland Limited,

Chapel Street Congregational Church (Southport) Burial Ground,

Harwich Harbour,

Cheshire Brine Pumping (Compensation for Subsidence),

Newcastle-under-Lyme Corporation,

Stafford Corporation,

Saint John's Church, Smith Square,

Barry Corporation,

Elim Church Moor Lane Bolton Burial Ground,

British Railways,

Tees Conservancy,

Preston Corporation,

Clergy (Ordination and Miscellaneous Provisions) Measure.

House adjourned during pleasure.
House resumed.

"THE SECOND NUCLEAR POWER PROGRAMME"
6.20 p.m.
Debate resumed.
LORD HOBSON: My Lords, as I was saying before the Royal Commission, if we get lower capital costs for nuclear stations they will be comparable with conventional stations. If we compare the running costs between stations which are running on ordinary uranium and those running on enriched uranium (as I think is the intention in the White Paper, particularly paragraph 11), if we obtain a successful reactor working on enriched uranium it will certainly be cheaper than the conventional stations in every regard. That is the point I was making.
What is the position to date with regard to enriched uranium that is available in quantities from Copenhurst? They are running down, but there is an adequate supply of enriched uranium for any foreseeable military requirements. Plutonium, of course, is also available from the existing atomic power stations and can be used for the purposes of enrichment and is equivalent to uranium 235. I think this is a very important asset which has come the way of the industry.
What follows from this? After all, this Paper is looking ahead. We are now in a position where we have a choice between natural uranium and enriched uranium and, as the Statement says in paragraph 11, the position is flexible. We can have water reactors, which are run entirely on enriched uranium, and we can also have the Advanced Gas-Cooled Reactors which, as the name indicates, are in advance of the Magnox, which does not use enriched uranium. This is the problem that faces the technicians and the scientists and about which quite a lot of controversy was raised by the noble Lord, Lord Coleraine, when he introduced this debate.
Which reactor will the Central Electricity Generating Board go for, the Advanced Gas-Cooled Reactor, the Boiling Water Reactor or the pressurised water reactor? So far as the last two are concerned, I do not intend to say too much, because noble Lords have already made contributions with regard to them. I believe that about 15 per cent. of them

945
are American. But what the Central Electricity Generating Board must do is to decide which is going to be the best and the most economic reactor. This is obviously what Sir Christopher Hinton is particularly interested in finding out, because it is his duty under the Act to provide Britain with the cheapest possible electric power, and, frankly, I think he has done a first-class job. This is precisely what the document says and I do not think the Government could have gone any further.
At the present time we do not know which is the best reactor, whether it is the Advanced Gas-Cooled Reactor, the Boiling Water Reactor or the pressurised water reactor. But not only are the three consortia free to tender for the reactor; they are free to tender for an actual site, and this is very important because of the difference in cost that can accrue owing to the terrain. It is impossible from a theoretical assessment to judge exactly the merits of the three different types of reactor, and I believe that is not only the view of Sir Christopher Hinton, but is actually the view of the Atomic Forum, and they should know something about it. I think the Government, the Central Electricity Generating Board and, in this case, the Ministry of Fuel and Power are perfectly right to ask for different types of tender for a particular site.
What is the rôle of the Atomic Energy Authority? What are they doing? I think it is necessary to make a few passing remarks about that. First of all, we have Winfrith Heath, which is collaborating with the three consortia in what is now known as the S.G.H.W. reactor (the Steam Generating Heavy Water Reactor), so at least the Atomic Energy Authority are now developing the pressurised water reactor. I am not going to criticise the Atomic Energy Authority for not having done this before. The reason why they could not do so was that, for the reasons given, the enriched uranium was not available; but at least they have made a start at Winfrith Heath.
Before I sit down I should like to ask the Minister a few questions. The Government are asking for tenders for 500 megawatt atomic reactors. When they ask for tenders for conventional stations they usually ask for tenders for
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2,000 megawatt stations. This is rather important because comparisons of capital cost per kilowatt should, I think, be made on the basis of stations of similar size and capacity, because obviously if you are going to tender for a small capacity station your capital costs are going to be higher in ratio than they would be for a higher capacity station. I think this is rather unfair and I should like to know what is the intention of the Minister in this regard.
Reference has been made, I believe by the noble Viscount Lord Caldecote, to the question of cost of tenders. The cost of tendering for these atomic power stations runs into tens of thousands of pounds and is a very costly business. Obviously when there are three consortia only one is going to get the job, but I am not so sure that we have not arrived at the stage when, in fairness, because of the tremendous cost of research involved in putting in these tenders for these atomic power stations, there should not be some grant from the Government. I believe this is fair and just. I do not believe it is fair to ask British industry to have to bear that cost, and if we compare their record when they are dealing with prototypes of missiles or aircraft, we find, of course, that the full cost is met. I should like that to be gone into.
My Lords, I do not particularly want to stress a political point in a discussion of this nature, but paragraph 2 does raise the whole question of interest rates. What are the Government's intentions in this regard? Presumably, from this, they are just going to let the market work. I do not think this is good enough. I believe, as I have argued in your Lordships' House and elsewhere, that a case has been made out for low interest rates for public utilities. I think that something ought to be done about that, particularly in view of the cost of atomic power stations. I see nothing wrong and see no conflict of ideology in having low interest rates for public utility capital expenditure.
The other point I should like to ask the Minister is this and if he cannot give this information I shall fully understand because it cannot be easy to ascertain. Why are the Government taking into account lower credits for

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the plutonium surplus? If this information is not readily available now I should appreciate it if the noble Lord would let me know in writing. I do not think there is any ground, from a secrecy point of view, for not giving this information.
I now come to my final question, and it deals with the Atomic Energy Authority's monopoly in uranium fuel. In the United States there are five firms making fuel elements. I do not mind the Atomic Energy Authority having this monopoly but I should like to ask the Government (I am not sure if we can get the information, and probably it is not fair to ask; but I think it is right to do so) to inquire and satisfy themselves that the cost paid by the Central Electricity Generating Board for fuel elements is fair and that the profit is reasonable. We do not want any question of off-setting the losses for certain of their exercises—I will not refer to the Belgonucleaire Vulcain reactor as my noble Leader is here and he may intervene— but I should like to know whether the Government are sure that the profit is fair and reasonable.
Finally, this has been a very interesting debate and I share the sentiments of every speaker; I think we can take great pride in British industry and their achievements, whether it be in the private or the public sector, in putting us (and do not let us underestimate it: we still are) in the forefront of atomic power station construction in the numbers on the grid and in production capacity. If we remember the grave capital shortages which this country has had to face as the result of the war, and the fact that we have not the same natural mineral resources as the United States, I think that when we look at the real achievement —eight stations— we can say, with true British pride, that we have done a good job. I wish the industry well.
6.30 p.m.
LORD DERWENT: My Lords, after listening to your Lordships, I feel that this is an entirely suitable debate for a Home Office Minister to reply to. There is no denying either the importance or the difficulty of the issues raised in considering the future development of nuclear power in this country. For this reason it is of great value to hear the views of one with such great knowledge as my
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noble friend Lord Coleraine, and indeed of the other speakers to-day. I am not replying to this debate; I am giving the Government's view of it. I shall, I think, in what I am going to say cover most of the questions that have been raised by noble Lords; I hope to do so. And, of course, there are certain specific questions which have been addressed to the Government which, unfortunately, I cannot expect my noble friend to reply to. I think it is fair to say that, generally, informed comment outside the House, and indeed to-day inside the House, on the whole has been favourable to the Government's decision. Some delay is inevitable if we are to obtain the firm data required to settle the lines of the second nuclear power programme, but the Government will ensure that it is kept to the minimum.
I should like to refer first of all to some newspaper comments in which the issues have been dramatised into a conflict of personalities, but this is to misunderstand completely the nature of the differences of opinion. It would be absurd to pretend that in some important respects there are not differences of approach in looking at future lines of development. The Atomic Energy Authority and the Central Electricity Generating Board have a common objective in the successful and economic development of nuclear power, but with their different functions they naturally approach this objective from different points of view. It is inevitable that this should be reflected in different assessments now of the outcome of work still some way from completion. There is nothing wrong in this; indeed, such differences are healthy, and, so far as Her Majesty's Government are concerned, welcome, for they assist in the discovery of the best line of action.
The issues are important because, as the White Paper shows, nuclear power is likely to have an economic place in the British electricity system by the early 1970s; and the Paper suggests that thereafter it will become cheaper than conventional power for base-load generation. Nuclear power is therefore likely to play a growing part in our energy supplies; and with demands for electricity (I think it was the noble Lord, Lord Stonham, who gave this figure) doubling every ten years or less, it will become of major importance to our economy in quite a short space of years.

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In this venture in such a new and, indeed, exciting technology it is essential that we should do everything possible to safeguard the position which has been established by the British manufacturing firms. The issues are also very difficult —I admit that—because, as the White Paper said, the choice open to us now is so much wider than in the earlier days of nuclear power in this country. Then we had one system developed in this country, the Magnox reactor, using natural uranium as fuel and carbon dioxide as coolant—which for our purposes was then in advance of all others. Moreover the shortage of conventional fuels at that time (which was a problem foreseen for Western Europe as a whole) made it desirable to undertake a rapid expansion of the scope for using this new source of power. Our present nuclear power programme running up to 1969 has provided for the building of nine stations with a total nuclear capacity in the country of about 5,000 megawatts.
A number of new reactor systems have been developed, and with the advances in conventional generation and the plentiful supplies of conventional fuels we have the opportunity to consider very carefully the direction of the new nuclear power programme. It is indeed a measure of the success of nuclear power that alternative types of reactors likely to generate power economically are available; and the aim of the Government must be to ensure that the best choice is made for the second programme.
The White Paper is thus an interim report and it leaves important questions to he answered when further investigations have been completed. Because the supply industry and the contracting firms need to have some guide about the scale of future development, the Government thought it right to announce in this interim White Paper that for planning purposes a figure of 5,000 megawatts for England and Wales had been agreed with the authorities concerned. But the programme is flexible (I say that in spite of the fact that the noble Lord, Lord Stonham, does not like the word) and it will be reviewed at regular intervals. The policy outlined in the White Paper was agreed with both the Generating Board and the Atomic Energy Authority, and both have made absolutely clear that they support it.
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It is right that tribute should be paid to the very distinguished men who lead these organisations. The country is fortunate in having at the Generating Board Sir Christopher Hinton, who has done so much, in spite of certain criticisms, to advance nuclear technology in this country; and at the Atomic Energy Authority Sir William Penney now, and before him Sir Roger Makins.
The present programme in this country consists of Magnox reactors, which use natural unenriched uranium as fuel and carbon dioxide as coolant. As a result of the assessment made by the Atomic Energy Authority and the Central Electricity Generating Board, they concluded, and the Government have accepted, that in the circumstances now prevailing in the United Kingdom further development of the Magnox is likely to show smaller advantages in this country than those offered by other systems. It must be remembered that these assessments do not apply everywhere. The Magnox system may still show advantages in some other countries.
LORD STONHAM: My Lords, may I interrupt the noble Lord. This is most important. I did raise this point. Does the last sentence mean that he and the Government are still of opinion that the Magnox system has a future with regard to our export programme?
LORD DERWENT: That is still possible; that is so.
Of the other systems that I mentioned one of the most promising is the Advanced Gas-Cooled Reactor, called A.G.R., under development by the Atomic Energy Authority. This is a direct successor to the Magnox system and by working at a temperature some 200 degrees Centigrade higher than the Magnox stations this reactor achieves a better thermal efficiency—what my noble friend was talking about—and, unlike Magnox, can make use of standard modern generating sets as used in conventional stations. A pilot plant at Wind-scale has operated reliably and well since early 1963 and is now on a long proving run. The 30,000 fuel elements in the reactor have already achieved about a quarter of the irradiation expected of them, and not one failure has been detected. The Authority (if I may abbreviate, because it is quicker) consider that

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with more advanced types of fuel element, and with reactors of large size, the long-term development prospects of A.G.R. are good.
Some people think, and indeed have said, that because the United Kingdom Authority has developed the A.G.R. and believe it to be the most promising design available at present, we should base our programme on it straight away. But to rule out of consideration all others would benefit neither the supply industry nor the A.G.R. Information received suggests that other systems developed, in particular in the United States, may produce power more cheaply at this point in time. It is right, in the view of Her Majesty's Government, that these and other claims should be examined, and in view of the different circumstances in which the systems have been developed it is necessary to do this with the aid of firm tenders for plants to be built on a particular site. This was a point greatly stressed by the noble Lord, Lord Hobson.
The Generating Board has invited tenders for an A.G.R. to be built at Dungeness alongside the Magnox station there which is nearing completion, and will also be ready to consider tenders from British industry for water-moderated reactor systems of proved design. I am sure that, as several noble Lords have said, we ought not to take too insular a view about this sort of development. A number of countries are working in the field of nuclear power, and it is wrong to rule out of consideration other people's ideas simply because they come from another country. Even if one American system were to play a part in our programme, the amount of dollar cost would, it is estimated, be only about 15 per cent. The remainder of the cost— namely, the great bulk of the hardware—would be spent here; and it is quite likely that the greater part of the work would be done by British firms. Only part of the "know-how" and certain special equipment would be likely to come from overseas.
In the course of recent investigations a good number of studies were undertaken for the Government, both by the Generating Board and by the Authority,
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of various systems on different assumptions. A good deal has been said about the different ground rules, as they are called, on which such calculations are made; and this is certainly one of the difficulties in presenting firm estimates of relative costs, and in comparing nuclear with conventional generators. At this stage of nuclear development, when the long-term performance of all types of reactor has still to be established, it is not surprising that there should be different views about such matters as the life of reactors, their load factor over the years, and how long nuclear fuel will last. It is not simply a matter of comparing one type of station in isolation with another, since these are going to be added (this is important) to the interconnected system of stations in this country, this being the largest in the world. It is necessary to allow for the effect of the working of the new station on the whole system.
These assessments are most complicated. We should do well to remember that this is a most uncertain world, and in settling the lines of future developments, both nuclear and conventional, we are concerned with large sums of what the City calls "risk capital". The tenders will be received next year, and, as the White Paper says, full supporting evidence will be required for the water systems, and the Generating Board will ensure that the tenders are judged on a comparable basis. This was a point raised by my noble friend who moved this Motion.
The noble Lord suggested—I do not know that I can go so far as to say that he claimed —that there is no comparable basis for judging the tenders for Dungeness. It is true that the plants are likely to be of different sizes. For the A.G.R. it is the intention that the reactor should be coupled with, and match, one of the standard Generating Board 500-megawatt sets. Allowing for electricity used in the process, the net output will be about 460 megawatts. On the other side, the Generating Board do not think it necessary to restrict tenders for the boiling-water systems. They cannot use the standard 500-megawatt sets— that is to say, to the same size—because the steam is generated at lower temperatures and pressures, and they have asked that designs should be

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similar to those of plants now on order in America. They felt it better to go for a design which is already in being. They consider that the larger size will not affect the efficiency significantly, but it is bound to make for lower capital cost per kilowatt. The Board are well aware of this, as indeed are the Government, and aim in comparing the tenders to bring both to a comparable basis. They will obtain the information about the effect of size which will enable them to do this; so that this diversity will not bias the results. We are not just looking to the cheaper station in terms of capital cost per kilowatt, but aim to find which of all these systems, taking everything together, such as capital cost, operating costs, fuel supplies and development potential, is the best—or it may be which systems are best—for the British nuclear power programme and the electricity supply system as well.
Finally, the results of this inquiry will be reviewed by the Government, by the Authority and by the supply industry—that is, the Electricity Council and the Generating Board, in order to decide the type or types of reactor to be built. When this is done, it will be possible to consider not only the straight cost comparisons but also to take into account such matters as the supply of fuel and the scope for improving and developing the system or systems
adopted. When the investigation is complete and a decision has been reached, the Government will see that as much information as possible is published. Our present White Paper, as I said earlier, is by way of being an interim statement, and the full statement will be made when further investigations are completed.
LORD STONHAM: Next year?
LORD DERWENT: When further investigations are completed.
There have been some criticisms of our not giving more information with the present White Paper, but in view of all the uncertainties we feel that it would be both undesirable and, perhaps more important, misleading to do so. It would be undesirable to do so because in the investigations a good deal of confidential information was provided from a number of sources; and it would be misleading because a full and fair comparison can-
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not be made until firm tenders are received. We must not allow ourselves to be swayed by sales talk unsubstantiated by firm offers; and indeed, in answering the comments about the reasons why the Americans can offer reactors at a lower price, I think it fair to suggest that we wait to see what comes out of the inquiry. There will be, as is customary, the most careful examination of the overall advantages of the different tenders. The undertaking of these investigations involves much work in collaboration, and I would stress how extensive is the collaboration between these two bodies. The building and commissioning of the present stations has involved a great partnership between the two, together with the consortia and the many contracting firms and the Inspectorate of Nuclear Installations.
The Select Committee on Nationalised Industries, in their Report on the electricity supply industry, drew attention to differences of view about reactor developments, and I have already suggested the reasons for this. The Government are satisfied that there is effective collaboration between the Central Electricity Generating Board and the Atomic Energy Authority. In considering the direction and size of our new nuclear programme we have the supply industry and the Authority brought together with Government Departments to report to the Government. I am sure that all concerned fully appreciate the importance of this collaborative effort and are doing their best to make it work fully and effectively. Of course, the consortia and the various firms in the contracting industry also have their part to play. There is, and always has been, close liaison between these great organisations and the Generating Board as well as the Authority.
A good deal has been said about tendering and contracting procedures. These are essentially matters to be worked out by those directly concerned; that is, the Generating Board and plant manufacturers. But the Government are aware of the difficulties presented by the present arrangements, and to-day I do not want to say more than that. Standardisation is clearly not the whole answer at this stage of development of such a new technology. Development must continue and we must try to maintain a careful balance between development and repetition if we are to maintain a leading position in nuclear power. It is up to both the plant

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manufacturers and the Generating Board to consider and adapt their organisations and arrangements to achieve the most efficient practices, in the best interests of the whole country.
My noble friend Lord Coleraine has contrasted rather dramatically the position of nuclear power developments here and in the United States. But I wonder whether in fact there is not some inconsistency between his earlier suggestion that electricity supply undertakings over there purchased nuclear power stations in considerable quantities from hard calculations of profit and loss, and the later one that in this country nuclear development should be in the hands of the Atomic Energy Authority or of some body specially set up to look after it.
My noble friend made an interesting suggestion about adopting a similar arrangement to that used in Canada for developing nuclear power. This point was also mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Hobson. I am certain that they are both right that this merits careful consideration, but my preliminary reaction is that what he suggests would not enable the Generating Board to discharge what is, and must remain, its prime responsibility for the operation of nuclear plant in this country. As my noble friend has said, the Board purchase electricity from plant designed and operated by the Authority, and indeed with the A.E.A. prototype steam generating reactor of 100 megawatts which is now under construction at Winfrith Heath they are building quite large reactors. Noble Lords will also be aware that the Authority are considering the building of a prototype fast reactor to follow the successful experimental plant at Dounreay; but they are not yet ready to put proposals to the Government. I shall have something further to say about Dounreay in a moment.
The programme adopted for planning purposes is for the commissioning of 5,000 megawatts in the period 1970–75. If the first commercial station of, say, 1,000 megawatts were to be built and operated by the Authority and it was necessary to wait till the results were available before deciding on the next stage, it would not be till the late 1970's that similar plants could he commissioned by the Generating Board. One of the brightest features of the new programme
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is that now nuclear power is expected to have a fully economic place in the supply system by the early 1970's; the new programme is not simply a development programme. All the Generating Board power stations for public supply —and this is an important point—are run as constituents of a single, integrated system. It is the largest in the world, with connections to Scotland and France. Commercial stations should therefore be operated by the supply industry, who will see that they are designed and work as constituents of the system— which, of course, also comprises conventional coal and oil stations as well as nuclear ones. If the nuclear stations are economic they will fit into the supply system; if they are not, then in my view no change in responsibility will alter the fact. But in the hands of the Generating Board it will be possible to assess their capital and operating costs as well as their technical performance.
I would remind the House that the policy statement in this White Paper really is an agreed one: agreed between the Government, the supply industry and the Authority. My noble friend said that the British nuclear programme has failed, and the noble Lord, Lord Stonham, in a not very helpful and in some respects slightly inaccurate speech, also thought the Government had failed. Bradwell and Berkeley are running well and made a valuable contribution to electricity supplies in the 1962–63 winter, and the experience with the Magnox system provides the essential base for other developments. The Advanced Gas-Cooler Reactor at Windscale is running successfully and is recognised as one of the most promising types. The Authority are developing other systems and this country has a considerable lead in development of fast reactors like the one at Dounreay. We are now in a position when we can confidently expect nuclear power to be economic in Britain by the early 1970's. I refuse to accept that these achievements can be written off as a failure of our programme.
I should like to say a word about Dounreay. The Dounreay fast reactor achieved its full design power of 60 megawatts of heat in June-July, 1963, and ran fairly continuously up to March 30 when it was shut down for refuelling and experimental purposes. Up to that date, it had produced 34 million units of

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electricity; 23 million of those were exported to the national grid, making the North of Scotland Hydro-Electric Board the first utility to use power commercially from a fast reactor. It has now started a further long run at high power. I hope that gives the noble Lord the present position at Dounreay.
At this point I should like to answer a question put by the noble Lord, Lord Champion, about the apportionment of the additional cost of nuclear power under the present programme. The Select Committee recommended that this should be reconsidered. The Government, as well as the supply industry, do not agree that at this late stage of the present nuclear programme, which has been taken into account in the plans and financial estimates of the Electricity supply industry, there should be any general re-allocation of costs between the electricity consumer and the tax-paper. The programme was agreed by the Generating Board at the time and a proposal to re-allocate its costs on the basis of some other hypothetical programme which, in the light of events, might have been considered more appropriate, could not now be justified. This was the answer given by my right honourable friend to the Select Committee, which I think they accepted; that is to say, at this moment in time it was an unwise move to re-allocate.
In conclusion, may I say that this has been a helpful debate, and help is rather what we wanted as this is an interim White Paper. I will undertake to see that the various points which have been made by all noble Lords are brought to the notice of my right honourable friends who are concerned with the different aspects of the programme. I should like to assure your Lordships that the Government are determined that the decision about the next reactor, or reactors, should be reached as soon as possible, that is, as soon as possible after the tenders. I can assure your Lordships that, once that has been done and a decision made—there are many calculations to be made, and it will take some time—there will not be any delay in pushing the new programme forward as fast as we possibly can.
7.0 p.m.
LORD COLERAINE: My Lords, I must express my sincere thanks to those of your Lordships who have contributed
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to this debate and made it such an interesting one. I should ill requite you if I were to inflict upon you another speech, but perhaps I may be allowed to make one or two very brief comments upon what has passed this afternoon. Many of your Lordships fastened on my suspicion and dislike of this American licence. I think the noble Lord, Lord Champion, was under the impression that I resented the American licence because it was an affront to our national prestige. I can assure him that he is wrong. I am not in the least concerned with our national prestige. We do not live by prestige; we live by skill and work. My objection to the American licence is because of its effect on the nuclear manufacturing industry in this country in five or ten years' time, when we need a manufacturing industry and may not have one.
The noble Viscount, Lord Caldecote, said, "Oh, that does not matter. You can accept a licence from a foreign firm and still develop your own industry." That is true of some things, but I doubt if it is true of all. I can accept a licence to build an American motor car, the noble Viscount can go on building his own motor cars, and that is all right. But if I accept a licence to build an American nuclear power station I doubt if I have, in fact, the resources to build my own nuclear power station without adding tremendously to the costs of my nuclear power station and making it uncompetitive, as the noble Lord, Lord Stonham, said.
My Lords, I am most grateful to my noble friend for his reply, and certainly I am in no position to argue with him. But there are just two points that I should like to put to him. As I understood him, he replied to the point I raised in my speech about the disparity between the 460 megawatt set and the 600 megawatt set by saying that there would be a weightage factor allowed in the final assessment, to take account of that. I do not know whether or not that is possible, and, if he will not think me offensive, I doubt if he knows either.
LORD DERWENT: My Lords, I am sorry to interrupt my noble friend. He is right that I do not know, but it was a point that I raised myself. I am told there are formulas agreed between the Authority and the Ministry and the Generating Board by which they say

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they can do it. It is far too mathematical for me, because I had a classical education.
LORD COLERAINE: My Lords, I am delighted to hear there are formulæwhich I should have thought his education would have evoked instead of "formulas"—but would it not really be simpler, instead of having a 500 megawatt set calling forth this elaborate mathematical formula, to specify a 600 megawatt set, as the South of Scotland Electricity Board has apparently specified in its new order for a conventional power station? But that is by the way, and I should like my noble friend to reflect on that.
The only other point I would take him up on is when he accused me of inconsistency in saying that I praised the Americans for working on calculations of profit and loss and objected to the Generating Board's working on calculations of profit and loss. That is not my position at all. I should not mind the Generating Board's working on calculations of profit and loss—I wish it would; then we should have a more sensible system of tendering. I wish it would go in for repeat orders instead of insisting that every new design must be a one-off job. The trouble with the Generating Board is not that it works on calculations of profit and loss, but that it attempts to combine calculations of profit and loss on pioneering technical and scientific advancement, with the nuclear power programme; and I still believe, in spite of what the noble Lord said, that you cannot ride those two horses at once. However, my Lords, I am most grateful to my noble friend and to your Lordships, and I would ask your Lordships' leave to withdraw the Motion.
Motion for Papers, by leave, withdrawn.

EJECTOR SEATS IN V-BOMBERS
7.5 p.m.
THE EARL OF KINNOULL THE EARL OF KINNOULL rose to ask Her Majesty's Government whether, in view of the increasing number of Royal Air Force personnel killed in V-Bomber accidents, they will reconsider the decision to supply only the pilot and co-pilot with ejector seats.
The noble Earl said: My Lords, before I begin I feel that I should declare to your Lordships' House an interest which I have in this Question. In my professional capacity I act for a company who are makers of ejector seats. However, it is only in a capacity to do with land management of their airfields that I act on their behalf, and I am not in any way connected with the manufacturing side of the company.
I put down this Unstarred Question as a result of the recent report of a tragic accident that occurred near Andover on May 11 of this year, when a Vulcan bomber crashed while approaching to land. The three rear members of the crew—that is to say, the navigator, the bomb aimer and the engineer—were all killed, and the two pilots, having ejected from a very low level, survived. This accident triggered off yet again a feeling among many people concerned with these aircraft as to the question: is it morally right to continue to send up air crews in V-Bombers, knowing full well that if the aircraft gets into difficulties at low level the crew have next to no chance of baling out? Does not the benefit of hindsight prove to-day how utterly wrong was the decision taken four years ago not to adapt the V-Bombers with ejector seats?
From inquiries I have made, my Lords, the history of the V-Bombers and ejector seats started some fifteen years ago when the V-Bomber was being finalised on design. At that time it was said that, technically, it was not feasible to provide ejector seats for the three rear members as well as for the two pilots. One of the reasons for this is that the rear crew members sit with their backs to the pilots, and there was a technical problem of spinning them on ejection. However, much thought and expense was given to the problem of the safety of the crew in time of emergency, and I understand that designs were developed whereby the nose of the aircraft could, in emergency, be jettisoned from the main body of the aircraft, and landed by means of parachutes with all five members enclosed. This design was eventually abandoned, and I should like to ask the noble Lord to tell us, when he replies, what was the cost of the development involved. At that time, with the V-Bomber designed to operate at high

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altitudes and with the fact that, technically, it was not possible to fit ejector seats for the rear crew, I do not think one could disagree with the decision to fit seats only for the pilots.
I believe that the first recorded accident in which ejector seats were involved was on January 12, 1952, when a Valiant prototype bomber got into difficulties, due to a structural failure, and the three rear crew members baled out successfully. One pilot ejected safely and the other pilot was killed when he struck the fin of the aircraft. This accident, your Lordships may say, proved the original decision to be correct. However, it must be added that in this instance the order to abandon the aircraft was given at sufficient height to allow the crew to bale out successfully. Matters came to a head in 1956, when your Lordships may recall, there was a particularly, not famous, but noted accident, at London Airport on October 1. The then Chief of Bomber Command, Sir Harry Broadhurst, was, I believe, returning from Australia in a Vulcan B.1 and was coming in to land at London Airport. He was flying as second pilot. The plane struck the ground on approaching to land, and with control lost the two pilots ejected at a height believed to be 100 to 200 feet, and the other four members were killed.
By now, my Lords (this was in 1956) the ejector seat design had made rapid strides and it was considered that adapting the bomber was technically feasible. I understand that for the next few years the most careful consideration and thought were given to the problem, but the final decision resulted in no action being taken. I believe that the reasons for this were a combination of cost and the time lost, both in withdrawing the aircraft from service and because of the work on adaption. This reconstruction work was, I believe, estimated at that time to take between six and nine months per aircraft. It is at this point that I feel, even without the benefit of hindsight, that the decision was utterly wrong and morally indefensible. If one scans the recorded accidents since 1959, one sees that there have been six accidents involving 24 personnel, 17 of whom were killed. Out of the 17, only
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two were pilots, and both, it is believed, stayed with their aircraft in an attempt to save their crew.
I do not claim that all those killed in the V-Bomber accidents would be alive to-day if the seat had been available. However, I must record that such is the reputation of the British ejector seat that they are supplied not only to the R.A.F. and the Fleet Air Arm but also to other Allied Air Forces, including the American, French, German and Indian Air Forces. To date, I believe, over 824 lives have been saved by the British ejector seat. I should like to quote one accident to illustrate the lifesaving capacity of these seats. The accident happened at Yeovilton last year, when a test pilot who became in difficulties while approaching to land ejected safely from 150 feet. It was estimated that at the time of his ejection he had only 1½ seconds to live.
My Lords, I believe that when reaching a decision whether to refit these V-Bombers the questions which should be asked are: What is the cost? How long will it take? And what is the operational life of the aircraft? From inquiries I have made, I have endeavoured to answer these questions. The cost, I would suggest, is between £20,000 and £50,000 per aircraft. The Victor Bomber, I understand, would be less costly to adapt than the Vulcan Bomber. The Valiant Bomber I have not considered because it is already destined to become a tanker aircraft. The length of time necessary to refit all the bombers would be, I believe, between three and four years, allowing one year to perfect the adaption and two to three years to carry out the work. I would add here that I believe that the aircraft industry would, in its present state, welcome the work, and the estimated time might be even shorter. As to the operational life of the aircraft, this, I agree, is perhaps the most important question of all, but it must be agreed that conventional bombers are required for conventional wars—and Shackletons are proving this to-day, in Aden. I would suggest that the operational life of these bombers is far in excess of 1970, which is the date that has been given.
I am aware that all that can be done is being done, except actually fitting ejector seats, to assist the rear crew

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in times of emergency. The swivel seat and the inflatable cushion are being fitted at present, although I should like the noble Lord to tell us, when he comes to reply, why there are no plans to fit these modifications to the centre rear seat of the Vulcan. Nevertheless, I do not believe that these modifications would have much effect in an emergency. They will assist only in stage one of the baling out drill—that is to say, getting to the exit door. Stage two, the jumping clear of the plane, and stage three, the landing by parachute, are equally important to ensure survival.
I shall be disappointed if, when the noble Lord replies, he tries to persuade the House that these modifications are anything more than a demonstration that the Ministry are conscious of the plight of the crew. I am not aware if there is any Member of your Lordships' House who has actually had practical experience of an ejector seat, and 1 do not claim myself to have any special knowledge or experience. However, I recently visited Boscombe Down to see over the Vulcan and the Victor. Anyone who has done this will appreciate the very cramped conditions and the difficulty of a quick escape, even in controlled conditions. I am told of a survey that was recently made which showed that it took eight seconds for each member of the rear crew to bale out. An aircraft in difficulties may lose between 400 and 1,000 feet per second. If one takes the example of an aircraft losing 500 feet per second, it means that, in order to have a successful bale-out of the three-man crew, the first man must bale out at 12,000 feet. I am also told that 700 feet is the minimum height at which a man may bale out in safety.
As I have previously said, my Lords, I have raised this matter because I think there is a strong case for the Minister to revise the policy that was decided on some four years ago. The case, I feel, rests on four points. First, it is technically feasible to adapt these aircraft, as it was four years ago, but matters have now changed as the V-Bomber is due to fly as a low-level tactical aircraft, and ejector seats will therefore be even more necessary. Secondly, I believe that it can be done
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at a reasonable cost and in a reasonable time, with the co-operation of the manufacturers. Thirdly, I believe there is sufficient operational life in these aircraft to justify the cost of adaption. Fourthly, and perhaps most important of all, there is the moral question, which I think is unanswerable. Why should there be discrimination of escape equipment between the pilots and the rear crew? Why should the pilot have the extra burden, in a crisis, of deciding whether to eject or not? The old saying, "See you later, navigator!" has a bitter taste to it. What is required to-day, I feel, is for the Minister responsible to say, "I will not endure this situation any longer, where valuable crew have so little chance to escape." I am sure that, with this frame of mind, the matter could be resolved within three years. I believe that the Royal Air Force and the manufacturers support this view.
When the noble Lord comes to reply I should be grateful if he would answer these three questions. First, does he think that the rear crew stand any real chance of survival without ejector seats when the aircraft is flying at low level and gets into difficulties? And this, I would point out, is what will be happening in the future. Secondly, does he think it right that the crew should not have an equal chance of escape with the pilot? Thirdly, does he accept that conditions have changed since the decision taken four years ago not to adapt the aircraft?
7.18 p.m.
LORD SHACKLETON: My Lords, I should like to congratulate the noble Earl for raising a subject of great importance, and for doing so with great moderation but also with great firmness. I should like to support him only briefly, because the case he has put has already been very strongly deployed. Perhaps I may take this opportunity of apologising to the Parliamentary Secretary and to the noble Earl for the fact that, owing to the lateness of the hour, I may have to leave before the end of this debate, which is something I have never done, having spoken in a debate, since I entered this House.
There is only one possible answer to the case presented by the noble Earl, and that is that it is impossible to do that which he suggests should be done. It is very understandable that the Air

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Ministry and those who are responsible in this field have to weigh a number of factors, and I would not suggest for one moment that, in putting this forward, the Government or the Air Ministry are in any way being indifferent, or are gambling with men's lives without worrying about it. I am quite sure that the matter was considered very carefully and with a great deal of anxiety, although there is some suggestion that a little more thought might have been given to it—and I will refer to this in a moment.
As the noble Earl said, the present situation is really an almost impossible one. We have already example after example of a pilot being saved and the rear crew losing their lives or, alternatively, of the pilot going voluntarily to his death along with the rear crew. There is one case of which I am aware, and of which no doubt the noble Lord who is to reply is equally aware, of a Valiant which had a complete electrical failure at 1,000 feet and it was quite impossible to get the aircraft under control. The second pilot ejected and the pilot remained with his aircraft and went to his death.
There was a time, at the beginning of the 1914–18 war, when aircrew were not supplied with parachutes, on the ground that this might be bad for their morale and that there was a dancer that they might jump when they should not. Well, that idea was very quickly disposed of, and there is no doubt that the morale of the aircrew is very high, and their sense of duty so strong that they will do whatever they are asked to do and will accept that those who are in the more hazardous position in the event of the need to bale out will do this. But because they are prepared to accept it, we ought not to minimise the effect on morale, though it may be unconscious. There is an extra strain involved. While we do not want to make too heavy weather of the morale issue, none the less I think the noble Earl was quite right to point out that there is a morale issue involved.
In considering the case that has been put, I hope that the Government will realise that we are not just asking for a straight balance of operational advantage—and I am sure they would not seek to do that—but that they must take into account that men's lives are
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involved and we all have a very special responsibility for trying to save them. We know the ejector seats work extremely well in the established position in the aircraft, and I am advised that it is possible to provide satisfactory ejectors for the rest of the crew. What cost is involved we do not know; but we now know that the V-bombers are going to have a low-level rôle and the chances of survival in those circumstances (where there is a particularly increased danger of the need to bale out) for those without ejector seats will be relatively low—and I could use stronger language than that. I would suggest that there is some evidence that the Government or the Ministry have not weighed certain suggestions that have been made for dealing with this matter quite as seriously as they might. This is the sort of matter, like so many others in Government, which gets caught up in policy decisions and where the administrators, however noble-minded they may be, inevitably get driven along certain paths. What the noble Earl is trying to do, and what those who are supporting him are trying to do, is to suggest that, whatever logic there may be in their thinking, this is a special case.
I hope that, when the Parliamentary Secretary comes to reply to some of these frankly difficult questions the noble Earl has asked, he will not just say that it cannot be done; because we are likely to press him further on that. What we hope will happen, however strong may be the present view of the impossibility of dealing with this, is that the Parliamentary Secretary—who I know always listens very carefully to the debates in this House—will get some indication that there is strong feeling on this; and we should like the Air Ministry to look again.
I agree with the noble Earl that the V-Bomber in one form or another will go on for a long time. It is a fact that the R.A.F. are still flying Ansons which were regarded as obsolescent in 1940; and even the obsolescent Shackleton is still going on. I should have thought that the Vulcans are likely to go on for a long while yet, even though it is likely to be in a conventional rôle; so I think the noble Earl has done a service by bringing this question forward, and by

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bringing it forward moderately. We hope very much that the Parliamentary Secretary will be able not only to show sympathy, which I am sure he will, but to give some indication that the Government will think again about this matter.
7.26 p.m.
LORD AMULREE: My Lords, I should like just to say a very few words in support of the point which the noble Earl has put to the House. It is a point that is worth while considering because, from all points of view, as the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, said, one does not want to think that there is any sort of discrimination between the safety of one member of the crew of a V-Bomber and that of another. There is a very big humanitarian point of view here which must affect the decision taken by Her Majesty's Government, or the Air Ministry, when they make up their minds on what is the right reply.
One can see the difficulty where a bomber is out of control and coming down fairly quickly, and the members of the crew have to get out by means of an exit which may be difficult to reach. In a case like that the question of exit may be complicated. The second thing is that after the aircraft is out of control, when the crew try to bale out they may get entangled in the various parts of the aeroplane; their parachutes may get caught and this will certainly lead to their deaths.
The figures the noble Lord quoted show that, roughly speaking three-quarters of people using an ejector seat come down safely; but of those having to bale out the fraction is about one-quarter. Those figures are, I feel, very significant and important.
The final point I should like to raise is that which was mentioned by both the noble Earl and the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton: the enormous strain on the pilot of the bomber when things begin to go wrong and he has to make up his mind on the right thing to do; whether to eject himself and the co-pilot while realising that the members of the crew probably—though that may be too strong a term; perhaps I should say "possibly" —are not going to survive. One can get the case that we have had before now of a pilot flying on and killing himself because he did not want to leave his
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crew too early. These are the points which must be considered and to which I trust the Parliamentary Secretary will be able to give some type of reply; because I think they are the cause of quite a lot of worry to various people in this country who have been brought up against these tragedies which occur.
7.29 p.m.
LORD ST. OSWALD: My Lords, for one who has been persuaded to eject himself voluntarily, under no mechanical compulsion whatever, from a number of perfectly stable and undamaged aircraft, this is for me an unfamiliar medium of debate; but it is an important subject for debate and my right honourable friends in the Ministries of Defence and Aviation, as much as the personnel of the Royal Air Force, will be grateful to my noble friend for raising this matter in your Lordships' House. The noble Earl asked me to answer three particular questions and I hope, in the course of what I say in a short speech, I shall be able to do that to his satisfaction.
My noble friend's statistics regarding accidents since 1959 are not quite correct, if I heard him properly. Since 1959, 13 R.A.F. V-Bomber pilots have been killed in eight accidents. At the same time, two pilots have been killed in three crashes of Ministry of Aviation V-Bombers.
THE EARL OF KINNOULL: My Lords, may I interrupt my noble friend? I think that the figures are since ejector seats were evolved, and probably the two deaths he mentioned were due to the fact that ejector seats were not involved and the pilots had no chance of escape.
LORD ST. OSWALD: My Lords, I am not trying to raise any pedantic disagreement with my noble friend, but these are the figures which I have, and they disagree with those given by my noble friend.
I must emphasise that the decision to supply only the pilot and co-pilot of our V-Bombers with ejector seats takes into most careful account the considerations of flight safety and the wellbeing of our air crews. I must also stress that the low-level operation of the V-Force over the last year or two has not resulted in any increase in the fatal accident rate.
THE EARL OF KINNOULL: My Lords, I am sorry to interrupt again, but my

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noble friend has just said there has been no increase in the accidents in low-level flying. This was announced only in February.
LORD ST. OSWALD: My Lords, my enunciation must have been at fault. I said that low-level operation of the V-Force over the last year or two has not resulted in any increase in the fatal accident rate, and this point I make in answer to the third question which my noble friend put to me as regards the changes in conditions in which these aircraft are now engaged. The two fatal accidents to a Vulcan and a Valiant bomber which occurred last month, distressing as they are, were the first which had happened for a year. Neither of these aircraft was engaged in low-level flying practice, and I would point out that the accident rate for V-Bombers has shown no tendency to increase in recent years.
The problem of fitting ejector seats for the rear crew members of our V-Bombers is that the work of doing so involves technically a complete redesigning of the whole rear crew compartments. Extensive structural alterations would be necessary and the whole programme would take several years to complete. In fact, it would be completed only a year or two before the V-Bombers are due to phase out, around 1970. I appreciate that my noble friend and the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, whose late intervention in the debate caused me no surprise, doubted that they would in fact be phased out as expected by the Government. I cannot really go much further than my right honourable friends have gone in saying that the V-Bomber Force will be phased out by 1970 and that the Polaris Force will be then in service and will take over from the V-Bomber Force.
There is another point of interest in regard to my noble friend's argument —that is, that low-level operation takes a lot out of an aircraft, apart from other broader questions of policy, and it seems most unlikely that the fatigue life of V-Bombers will last beyond 1970. What does stand out and what I must stress is that the references to the possible extension of life of the V-Bomber in a conventional rôle, fair though they may be, are of doubtful validity as an argument. My noble friend does not take account of the importance of keep-
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ing the V-Bomber Force at strength in its nuclear rôle until 1970. If the additional ejector seats were to be fitted, individual aircraft would have to be on the factory floor for a minimum of four months at a time—my noble friend mentioned six to eight months—and if the work were to go ahead there would be a serious depletion of our front-line V-Bomber strength during the period when they were required in their present rôle.
These are the reasons why we have decided against fitting ejector seats. There have been suggestions—I think there was a suggestion from my noble friend to-day—that the work was decided against because of expense. I am pleased to say—and I know that my noble friend will be pleased to hear it —that this is totally unfounded. Cost has never entered into the question. The ejector cabin which my noble friend mentioned was not turned down on grounds of costs but because it did not prove feasible to develop it in anything like the necessary time to fit it into operation in aircraft entering service. It was turned down on technical, and not on cost, grounds. There was no question whatever of costs affecting the issue.
THE EARL OF KINNOULL: My Lords, could I interrupt here for one moment? If the manufacturers of the aircraft and of the seat agree that they could do better than the figures he has given in time, would he reconsider the question?
LORD ST. OSWALD: My Lords, the fact is that these figures have been very carefully gone into, and what my noble friend is putting to me is what I must regard as a purely hypothetical question and, as he knows, from the Despatch Box hypothetical questions are not answered. I have to regard it in that light.
Steps are being taken, however, to see what else can be done to meet the problem. Noble Lords will have been interested to know of improvements which are being made in the speed with which rear crew members can use their escape hatches. These improvements result from the installation of swivel seats, which, used in combination with a pneumatic cushion and a modified parachute and harness, can enable the rear crew to reach the escape hatch in less than half the time previously taken. The time, in fact,

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has been reduced from one minute to about 30 seconds.
The crews of Bomber Command regularly practise on the ground the escape procedures and it is clear that the introduction of these swivel seats should greatly reduce the risk of fatality in accidents. This development, in fact, gives confidence of survival for rear crew members as well as pilots from an aircraft abandonment as low as 250 feet above the ground. My noble friend said that the minimum was 700 feet. There is the additional safeguard that, if a defect occurs at low-level, there is normally a good chance of taking the aircraft up to 2,000 feet or above, facilitating still further the escape of rear crew members. Although my noble friend said that he saw practically no chance of rear crew escaping if a fault developed while flying at low level, even if a fault suddenly developed at 250 feet, it is considered that their chance of escape is good, and we must also take into account that the pilot should be able to gain height and give them a still better chance.
Work began on installing these new seats in the Valiant aircraft in the middle of last year, and this is now almost complete. Work on the Victors which are being modified should be complete by the end of the year. The Vulcan presents structurally a rather more difficult problem, but a trial installation has now been successfully completed and work will be started on the aircraft very shortly. I am happy to tell my noble friend that he is wrong in thinking that swivel seats will not be installed in Vulcan bombers. They can and will be installed.
THE EARL OF KINNOULL: In all three seats?
LORD ST. OSWALD: Yes, my Lords, in all three seats. Everything that can be done has been done to get this work under way, and some of the modification kits which are necessary for the job are even being made by hand in order to speed up the work. All the Vulcans should be fully modified by the end of next year. Taking the V-Force as a whole, about 25 per cent. has so far been modified; nearly 50 per cent. will have been modified by the end of this year, and the work will continue progressively until it is fully completed at the end of 1965.
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Finally, I should like to assure your Lordships that there is no question of this lack of ejector seats for rear crews constituting a morale problem among the crews of the V-Force. Understandably, this question—that is, the weight of responsibility on the pilot in not getting out himself until he is quite certain that the crew are out—was raised by the noble Lord, Lord Amulree, by my noble friend himself and by the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton. This is a question which occurred to me, and I asked my technical advisers about it. They assured me that both through the "intercom" and through the co-pilot's window the pilot can be informed of when the rear crew are clear of the aircraft; they can get out immediately afterwards; and the time taken is negligible.
As noble Lords know, the entire crew of a V-Bomber now consists of officers. They fully understand the problems involved, tied as they are to the readiness and effectiveness of the R.A.F. This, I think, is the main question put to me by my noble friend. He asked if I would tell him whether ejector seats could be provided, and would I assure him that it would be done. The fact is that it can technically be done, but not while maintaining the readiness and effectiveness of the R.A.F. It is quite clear that all that can reasonably be done in this matter is, in fact, being done with the utmost expedition.
7.52 p.m.
EARL ALEXANDER OF HILLSBOROUGH: My Lords, if I may be allowed to intervene at this late stage, I must say that I think the case put by the noble Earl, Lord Kinnoull has not been as effectively answered as I hoped it would be by the noble Lord, Lord St. Oswald The noble Lord is always fair to the House, and I think he has put over the case given to him by the Department with complete frankness. But I must say, having listened to the two speeches made by the noble Earl, Lord Kinnoull, and my noble friend Lord Shackleton, that the Department have not provided the noble Lord with a really effective answer.
In the first place, I would say that the time of the effectiveness of the V-Bomber force is said to be ending in 1970. I should understand from the way in which

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the noble Lord put it that it is quite certain at this moment that the Vulcan bombers will not be used for bombing after 1970. I have grave doubts about that. I know something about the development of the machinery required in the nuclear submarines of the future to deliver Polaris, and judging by the present rate of progress I should say that certainly all the projected programme of nuclear submarines will not be concluded by 1970. I am sure that if the emphasis which has been laid by the Prime Minister himself upon the great value of keeping the existing nuclear weapon to be delivered by the conventional means—that is, the bombing conventional means—is right, then it is quite likely that the ultimate period of effectiveness may be extended beyond 1970, and so the time ought to be taken into consideration on a more generous basis than has yet been admitted.
I do not doubt for one moment that there have been a number of technical problems which the Air Ministry experts have examined, but I must say from the statistics—and I shall want to check in Hansard to-morrow the statistics quoted by the noble Earl, Lord Kinnoull, and by the Minister—it seems to me quite extraordinary that in existing circumstances the rate of fatality among the pilots is lower than among the crew. The crew are obviously not as adequately provided with means of escape as the pilots. As to the urgency with which this matter is being treated, I am not reassured about the kind of change being made in the seats for the rear crew and by the various arguments as to the height at which the new seats will act with the parachute at low level. But I am told by the Minister that it may be the end of next year before the Vulcan rear seats are even put upon this, in my view, inadequate provision, compared to an effective alteration which could be made in the planes to make the ejector seat effective for the rear crew.
As regards costs, it is impossible to deal with this, because I have listened to this debate quite de novo, and I have not gone into the matter in detail. But I must say this. I wonder if the Minister could have calculated the cost of producing a pilot. And could he have calculated at the same time what is the cost of producing the crew?
LORD ST. OSWALD: My Lords, I am sure the noble Earl will recall in all fairness that I stressed that cost did not enter into this matter. This is true. There was negligible cost in assessing the validity or desirability of this change.
EARL ALEXANDER OF HILLSBOROUGH: But I would go into the cost from another point of view. I only want to say that if any further discussions arise—as I daresay they will—and more information can be obtained, then we must take into account that a good and experienced pilot, after long and varied training, will certainly not cost less than £50,000. What do the crew cost each? These things have to be taken into account, quite apart from the basis of the proper humanitarian feeling, which I am sure all the Ministry officials, as well as members of all Parties, are concerned with on exactly the same basis. But it ought to enter into the argument.
There is one other point. When the noble Lord says that the period of operational value of the Vulcan and the other units of the V-Bomber Force will expire in 1970, will that be the end of the use of this aircraft? I listened to my noble friend Lord Shackleton, who said that the Anson, which goes a long way back into my defence experience, is still in use. For what is it in use? For reconnaissance or transport'? The Shackleton is almost in the same position as the Anson. If you want extra provision for securing the safety of rear crews in the V-Bombers, surely you have to take into consideration the fact that you may be continuing the use of these V-Bomber planes for other purposes; and you would still have the great value of having the alternative means of escape if they were employed on ordinary conventional pursuits, such as the Anson and the Shackleton, very old-established planes, are employed on at the present moment.
On the question of saving the lives of our men, who are all so brave, and whose morale, I agree with the noble Lord, is not likely to be affected to any great extent by it, I would point out that it is not only the men themselves who are concerned. Their families also are concerned, and I think that every possible effort should be made to meet that situation. On the question of providing these different types of seats and the possibility of using, even at lower

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levels, the parachutes that will be connected with those swivel seats, surely there ought to be a date of completion earlier than the end of next year. So I hope the Minister will have another talk with his Department to see what further information can be given to the noble Earl before the matter is entirely dropped.
LORD ST. OSWALD: My Lords, I do not know whether the noble Earl would like me to reply briefly to what he has said. I can do so only with the leave of the House, and if I have that leave I shall be extremely brief. I think the noble Earl covered a certain amount of the ground that I hoped I had covered. What I must ask him to do—he is in a better position of experience than I am to do this—is to balance the importance of the readiness and effectiveness of the V-Bomber Force against the advantages of this additional safeguard which might be represented by providing ejector seats for the three rear crew members. I think I should point out—and this is not, I hope, too pedantic a point—that the noble Earl said that the pilots were safer than the crew. In fact, of course, they are all crew. They regard themselves as being a group of people in charge of this aeroplane, dependent upon each other. I am sure the noble Earl would not have wished to indicate, or to give the impression, that there was any difference between them.
EARL ALEXANDER OF HILLSBOROUGH: There is no difference at all, except the fact of the provision of escape methods.
LORD ST. OSWALD: This must be measured, as I say, against the readiness and effectiveness of the V-Bomber Force during its present nuclear rôle. This again I stressed rather earlier in my main speech. If it is to be depleted during this rôle, there is nothing to replace it. Later on, of course, there will be a difference. The noble Earl believes, and some of his noble friends believe, that the V-Bombers will continue either in a conventional rôle or in some other rôle. He seems to base that on information which we do not have or recognise, and I cannot, of course, accept it. As I understand it, he bases it, for one thing, on the belief that the nuclear submarines will not be ready by 1970. That, I feel, is basing his beliefs on the likelihood of a Labour Government, and I would not advise him to do that.
EARL ALEXANDER OF HILLSBOROUGH: It depends entirely on the progress being made with the Naval reactors.
House adjourned at six minutes before eight o'clock.