Lords Sitting of 6 July 1964

Preamble
The House met at half past two of the clock (Prayers having been read earlier at the Judicial Silting by the Lord Bishop of Exeter), The CHAIRMAN OF COMMITTEES on the Woolsack.

WIDOWS' PENSIONS AND EARNINGS RULE
LORD GRENFELL: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
[The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government how much of the weekly National Insurance Benefit now paid to a widowed mother can be kept by her, irrespective of earnings, and how this compares with the position in 1951.]
THE MINISTER OF STATE, BOARD OF TRADE (LORD DRUMALBYN): My Lords, at present 63s. 6d. of a widowed mother's National Insurance benefit is not affected by her earnings if she has one child, and 93s. if she has two children. In October, 1951, the corresponding amounts were 10s. and 12s. 6d.
LORD GRENFELL: My Lords, while thanking my noble friend for his most welcome Answer, I should like to ask him whether, if a widowed mother has to pay someone to look after her children while she is at work, this expenditure is taken into account in the operation of the earnings rule?
LORD DRUMALBYN: Yes, my Lords.
BARONESS SUMMERSKILL: My Lords, is the noble Lord aware that he is talking about sums given thirteen years ago? Has he taken into account the change in the value of the pound? So that we can see these figures in a proper perspective, may I also ask whether he is aware that the average wage of a single man to-day is £16 a week?
LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, yes, I am aware of that; but the comparison itself is rather striking. If I may call
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attention once again to this fact, at present it is 63s. 6d. of the widowed mother's National Insurance benefit which is not affected by her earnings, as against 10s., if she has one child; and, if she has two children, 93s., against 12s. 6d. As to the second part of the question, dealing with the amounts that are currently earned, I think that the House would like to know that a widowed mother whose benefit is payable at the minimum rate must have net earnings of at least £9 12s. 0d. a week, so that her total income, taking into account the amount she receives as National Insurance benefit, would then be £12 15s. 6d.
BARONESS SUMMERSKILL: My Lords, I should still like to ask the noble Lord to bear in mind what I have just said—this pinpoints my question—that these widows have all sorts of responsibilities, and the single man gets £16 a week. Can the noble Lord also explain to the House why it is that this woman, who works outside the house, has her earnings taken into account, while the wealthy widow who has her pension supplemented by, let us say, dividends, has not any earnings rule applied to her?
LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, to deal with the second part of the question, this is of course in line with the 1946 Act, which was carried into effect by the Party opposite and has remained ever since.
BARONESS SUMMERSKILL: May I ask the noble Lord to recall that in 1946, which is nearly twenty years ago, the principles of the Insurance Act were laid down because it was anticipated that there would be more unemployment than eventuated, and therefore it was felt that those whose pensions were supplemented should be penalised in a small way. Now, of course, it has been proved that there is virtually no unemployment; in fact, last week we were told that there is full employment. Therefore, the principle on which this provision was based in 1946 just does not apply to-day.
LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, I do not quite see the relevance of that observation to this particular Question. The noble Lady raised the question of the average wage, and mentioned what is paid to the single man. It is, of course, paid to the married man who is earning the average wage. But we all

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know that a great many people are earning less than that. and if a widow who is receiving only the minimum and is subject to the earnings rule receives £12 15s 6d., she is in fact receiving more in some cases than her husband received when he was alive.
LORD ALPORT: My Lords, would my noble friend draw attention to the noble Baroness's tribute to the Conservative Party that there is no unemployment at the present time, and her confession that when she was a Minister in 1946 it was anticipated that under the Labour Government there would be large-scale unemployment?
EARL ALEXANDER OF HILLSBOROUGH: My Lords, would not the Minister agree that that was because the Labour Government from 1945 to 1951 adopted something which entirely avoided the enormous unemployment created by the neglectful Tory Government in 1918?
LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, what my noble friend drew attention to was the fact that the Labour Party did not know that they were going to do that in 1946, and based their calculations on the supposition that they would not.

THE NATIONAL DEBT AND SERVICING COST
2.36 p.m.
LORD WILLIAMS OF BARNBURGH: My Lord, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
[The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government whether they will state the size of the National Debt on the date of the outbreak of war in 1939, on the cessation of war in 1945. on the date of the Budget in 1951 and on the date of the Budget in 1964; and the cost of servicing the debt at each of the dates mentioned.]
THE CHANCELLOR OF THE DUCHY OF LANCASTER (VISCOUNT BLAKENHAM): My Lords, the figures in this Answer are for the National Debt at 31st March in each year. Figures for the precise dates in the noble Lord's Question are not available.
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In 1939 the National Debt was £7,130 million, and it cost £229 million to service. In 1945 the Debt was £21,366 million, which cost £475 million to service. In 1951 the Debt was £25,922 million, and it cost £561 million to service: and in 1964 (these are provisional figures) the Debt was £30,224 million. The servicing cost is estimated at £1,085 million. These figures are gross figures; the Debt total for 1964 includes about £10,000 million borrowed for advances to the nationalised industries and other public bodies, on which the Exchequer receives £425 million in interest, reducing the Debt servicing cost to £660 million.
LORD WILLIAMS OF BARNBURGH: My Lords, may we have an assurance from the noble Lord that the Prime Minister will be warned against making the mistake during his electioneering campaign of blaming the Leader of the Opposition in another place for this increase in the National Debt?
VISCOUNT BLAKENHAM: Well, my Lords, I am sure my right honourable friend the Prime Minister is well able to depict the facts as they are and not enlarge them in the way the noble Lord suggests.
LORD WILLIAMS OF BARNBURGH: But is it not true that he has a lot of most doubtful advisers round him?
VISCOUNT BLAKENHAM: My Lords, speaking as one who is somewhat prejudiced, I would not agree with the noble Lord. I think it is important to point out that advances to nationalised industries are some £8,500 million more than they were in 1951, and this accounts for quite a large portion of the large increase in the cost of servicing which is necessary.
LORD WILLIAMS OF BARNBURGH: But the noble Viscount will be aware that the Government's policy, which has been their policy for a very long time indeed, seems to be based on the belief that it is good, statesmanlike financing to pay off some of their debts by borrowing at a higher rate of interest.
VISCOUNT BLAKENHAM: My Lords, I have too high an affection for the noble Lord to start a great argument on this subject. Perhaps he might like to debate it, but I should not like to agree with what he has said.
EARL ALEXANDER OF HILLSBOROUGH: My Lords, would not the Leader of the Conservative Party Headquarters in the country agree that this financial record of the Government would only go to show that if there is anybody who is dangerous it is not the Socialists but the present Government, whose thirteen years' record of finance makes it most dangerous to let them be the Government again?
VISCOUNT BLAKENHAM: My Lords, all I would say about the record of this Government is that production has never been higher, and our national economy is far stronger than it has ever been. And long may it continue to be so!
EARL ALEXANDER OF HILLSBOROUGH: My Lords, is it not a fact that we handed over to the Government a Budget of just over £4,000 million in 1951, and that the Budget this year is £7,000 million, with only half the defence forces that we handed over?
VISCOUNT BLAKENHAM: My Lords, I can tell the noble Earl what he knows perfectly well, that the Labour Government handed over a financial crisis to the present Government in 1951, which it has taken us a long time to get out of.
BARONESS HORSBRUGH: My Lords, would the noble Viscount agree that some of the Budget is taken up in paying these higher pensions for widows?
VISCOUNT BLAKENHAM: My Lords, that is quite true.
THE EARL OF SANDWICH: My Lords, can my noble friend ascribe any reason for the fact that the Labour Party shows the most violent reactionary views on high finance? Is it not the case that the only burden to the nation in the National Debt is the cost of the salaries to those who administer it?
VISCOUNT BLAKENHAM: My Lords, I should tell my noble friend that I always prefer the Labour Party to make explanations of that sort for itself.
LORD STONHAM: My Lords, would not the £1,000 million servicing of the National Debt, which I understood to be the current charge, also be a charge on the taxpayer?
VISCOUNT BLAKENHAM: This is part of our general burden.

TRANSPORT POLICY AND RAILWAY CLOSURES
2.40 p.m.
LORD STONHAM: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
[The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government whether they are aware that in September, 1962, the National Council on Inland Transport submitted proposals to the Prime Minister for improving our transport system which included:

(a) An impartial assessment of the true costs of each form of transport and a fiscal policy designed to ensure that each form bore a proper share of the costs to which it gave rise;

(b) The application by the British Railways Board of the Light Railways Act of 1896 to lightly used branch lines where such action might make the services viable;

that these policies, which were rejected by Her Majesty's Government, have now been adopted by the British Railways Board; whether this indicates a change in Government policy; and if so, whether they will suspend further action on stopping train and branch line closures until the effect on the lines proposed for closure in the Reshaping of British Railways can be fully considered.]
THE PARLIAMENTARY SECRETARY, MINISTRY OF TRANSPORT (LARD CHESHAM): My Lords, Her Majesty's Government gave a full reply on February 7,1963, to the Memorandum to which the noble Lord refers. As he undoubtedly realises, neither the recent Memorandum by the British Railways Board, to which part of his Question seems to relate, nor any plans the Board may have for action under the Light Railways Act, are expressions of Government policy. These developments therefore lend no support to the suggestions for Government action made by the noble Lord in the last part of his Question.
LORD STONHAM: My Lords, is it not the case that, if action were to be taken under the Light Railways Act, the Ministry of Transport must consent to such action? Is the noble Lord aware that the apparently inspired articles on

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this subject in The Times said that the operation of the Light Railways Act would reduce losses on the central railway lines from £176,000 to £30,000, and that proportionate savings on other lines could turn profit into loss and dispel the economic case for closure? Would it therefore not be a good thing to consider the application of the Light Railways Act to many other lines which people are desperately anxious to save?
LORD CHESHAM: My Lords, the noble Lord really must understand that there is nothing new in this situation, in that both economies and different kinds and sizes of train have always been open to the Railways Board on these matters, either with or without the operation of the Light Railways Act. At times it may be useful or appropriate to use it; at times it may not; but these are the kinds of considerations which are taken into account in every case of a closure proposal.
LORD STONHAM: My Lords, is the noble Lord aware that my Question points out that there is nothing new in this proposal? What is new, according to The Times, and unless the noble Lord says that this is a complete fabrication, is that his right honourable friend the Minister is now considering this project in connection with a particular line. Will the noble Lord say whether this is so, and, if so, whether it marks a change in policy?
LORD CHESHAM: I thought that 1 had just pointed out—apparently I did not do so very clearly—on the aspect of the noble Lord's Question which I thought referred to something new, when he referred to a change in policy, that in fact there is no change of policy.
LORD STONHAM: On the other aspect of my Question, will the noble Lord say whether he is aware that, according to Dr. Beeching, the cost per ton by rail is one-third of a penny and by road four-fifths of a penny per mile; that lorries are paying less than half their true costs; and that a proper balance of road and railways will not emerge unless each bears a proper share? Does he agree with this sentiment, and if so, can he say what the Government are going to do about it.
LORD CHESHAM: The noble Lord will of course already be aware that this is a Memorandum which has been produced by the British Railways Board on their own responsibility. I will go as far as I can with the noble Lord and say that I think it would be useful to know more about the situation; and that is why we in my right honourable friend's Department are carrying out a study of these very matters. The Railways Board's Memorandum we regard, I think in common with the Railways Board, as a useful addition to research and thinking on this important subject.
LORD STONHAM: While expressing my grateful thanks to the noble Lord for that second reply, may I ask him whether the decisions which will be reached by his right honourable friend and himself, after these deliberations, will be made available to the House?
LORD CHESHAM: It has already been announced—and if the information has not yet reached the noble Lord, I am delighted to confirm it—that the results will he submitted to the Geddes Committee, which is sitting on road licensing, and made public.

THE NEW FOREIGN OFFICE BUILDING
2.45 p.m.
LORD BOSSOM: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
[The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty Government whether they will make arrangements for the sketch drawings of the design which they are considering for approval for the new Foreign Office building in Whitehall to be exhibited in the building of Parliament before any final decision is reached, so that Members and others who hold strong views on this subject may have the opportunity of giving the Government the benefit of their knowledge before an irreparable decision is made.]
THE MINISTER OF DEFENCE FOR THE ROYAL NAVY (EARL JELLICOE): Yes, my Lords. When the drawings of the new Foreign Office are available my right honourable friend will make

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arrangements for them to be exhibited in this building before the scheme goes ahead.
LORD BOSSOM: My Lords, may I thank my noble friend exceedingly for that answer? I am sure it will be appreciated throughout the entire world.

FURNITURE INDUSTRY DEVELOP MENT COUNCIL (AMENDMENT No.2) ORDER, 1964
2.46 p.m.
LORD DRUMALBYN: I beg to move that the draft Furniture Industry Development Council (Amendment No. 2) Order, 1964, which was laid before Parliament on Tuesday, June 23, be approved. Naturally, if any noble Lords would like a fuller explanation of this I should be glad to give it. The Order is subject to Affirmative Resolutions of both Houses of Parliament, and is made under the authority of the Industrial Organisation and Development Act, 1947. It amends for the second time the Furniture Industry Development Council Order, 1948, which set up a Development Council for the furniture industry.
To enable the Development Council to meet its expenses, Article 6 of the 1948 Order, as amended by the Furniture Industry Development Council (Amendment) Order, 1958, give the Council authority, with the approval of the Board of Trade, to impose levies on persons carrying on the designated activities, and paragraph (3) of Article 6 provides that any such charge shall be computed so as to yield not more than £30.000 in each year. The purpose of the Furniture Industry Development Council (Amendment No. 2) Order, 1964, is to increase the maximum amount of the levy which may be imposed by the Furniture Development Council on the industry to £75,000 per annum. Any such levy will continue to be subject to Board of Trade approval.
The research activities of the Furniture Development Council were taken over by the Furniture Industry Research Association on its establishment in 1961. The Research Association receives most of its industrial income through the Council
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from the levy. Apart from its report from research and technical information, the Council itself continues to do much useful work and provides many services to the industry. These include method study and costing, statistical and economic services, educational promotional activity, including study tours abroad and the study of design and marketing. Many of these activities are self-supporting, so that the Council has been able to make available to the Research Association the greater part of the levy collected for each of the past three years, although this has meant drawing on its reserves.
The purpose of the proposed increase is to provide additional funds to enable the Furniture Industry Research Association to expand and maintain its programme of research. Revolutionary changes both in the utilisation of new materials and in new manufacturing techniques in the furniture industry have led to rapid expansion in the Research Association's work. The Association, together with the Furniture Development Council, have moved to new and larger premises at Stevenage. There is still a sizeable sum outstanding on the building, and with the new equipment and staff required expenses have risen sharply. After receiving a request from the Furniture Development Council to seek Parliamentary approval for an increase of the levy to a maximum of £75,000, the Board of Trade, in compliance with subsection (3) of Section 1 of the Industrial Organisation and Development Act, 1947, consulted the organisations representative of the manufacturers and of the trade unions in the industry. The British Furniture Manufacturers Federated Associations and the National Federation of Furniture Trade Unions support the proposed increase of the levy ceiling to £75,000. Accordingly, I ask your Lordships to approve the Order.
Moved, That the Draft Furniture Industry Development Council (Amendment No. 2) Order, 1964, laid before the House on the 23rd of June, be approved.—(Lord Drumalbyn.)
2.50 p.m.
LORD STONHAM: My Lords, I am very grateful to the noble Lord for his careful and interesting explanation of the reason for this Order, but I should be glad if he would allow me to put one

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or two points to him. First, I must declare an interest, as I am one of the contributors originally to the £30,000, and in future to the £75,000 which is proposed. I would say at once that I am wholeheartedly in favour of the principle of the Development Council and all it stands for, and in another place many years ago, and under another Government, I was a party to the Bill which enabled this Council to be formed.
I should like to ask the noble Lord whether there is any real evidence that the efforts of this Council, and the research in which it engages, have been translated into benefit for the industry in terms either of increased efficiency or, still more, of increased trade. I ask this because of the Council's publications given to me. Of course, I study them and I have yet to find one which has been of really firm, practical interest. They seem to me of a rather esoteric character. I have a very great admiration for the efforts of the present Director of the Council, who is now about to retire, but it does seem to me that their inquiries and efforts have not been sufficiently informed in a practical way. I am, of course, aware that the reason for this Order is approved both by the B.F.M. and by N.F.F.T.U., the trade union. But I am still not satisfied, and I was not satisfied some ten years ago when I made a similar point, and was thereafter asked to inspect the premises and saw some of the research that was then going on.
Finally, may I ask the noble Lord whether he could say if this £75,000 is, as it were, a "once-off job", in order to clear up the payment for the new premises, or whether when the new premises have been paid for there will still be demanded an annual contribution of some £75,000? It is the case that employment in the industry over the years has been steadily declining. Numbers employed in the industry over the past ten years have dropped by far more than one-third, and turnover in real terms has also declined, and still continues to decline. Therefore, I am putting the valid point to the noble Lord whether it is right to add 150 per cent. to the current charges to an industry which is in decline, and when, so far as I was able to hear, the noble Lord was not able to say that the
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industry was receiving any real value for money.
2.53 p.m.
LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, I think the noble Lord has asked me two main questions. First of all, dealing with the increase of the amount that can be raised—it will not necessarily be £75,000; this is to be the maximum—of course, the amount is a very small proportion, indeed of the turnover of the industry. At the present time, expressed as a percentage of the turnover of roughly £130 million a year, it amounts to 0·023 per cent., or a little more than one-fiftieth of 1 per cent. of the turnover; and the increased levy will amount to a little more than one-twentieth of 1 per cent. of the turnover of the industry.
The noble Lord asked me whether there was any evidence that research had been translated into action and into increased trade. On the general point, I should have thought, considering the close links between the Research Association and the industry, and the representation of the industry on it, that it would not have been likely that the industry would agree to a further amount unless it had been satisfied that the research was of value to the industry. I am told that in recent years projects of much value to the industry have been undertaken, and have included, for example, research into the uses and properties of particle board, and a structural analysis of cabinet furniture which has resulted in stiffer and stronger furniture.
EARL ALEXANDER OF HILLSBOROUGH: My Lords, may I ask whether this research organisation has paid any attention to research with regard to increasing the export of furniture?
LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, as I said, I think this is more a matter for the Furniture Development Council itself, rather than for the Research Association. But I mentioned in the remarks I made the activities of the Furniture Research Association, including, for example, study tours abroad and the study of design and marketing.
On Question, Motion agreed to.

HIRE-PURCHASE (No. 2) BILL [H.L.]
2.55 p.m.
Order of the Day read for the consideration of Commons Amendments.
LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, I beg to move that the Commons Amendments be now considered.
Moved, That the Commons Amendments be now considered.—(Lord Drumalbyn.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.
COMMONS AMENDMENT
[The references are to Bill [81] as first printed for the House of Commons]
In the Title, line 3, leave out from ("make") to ("let") in line 5, and insert ("provision with respect to dispositions of motor vehicles which have been").
LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, I think it will be for the convenience of your Lordships if I deal with the Amendments in a series of groups with special reference to those which are of some particular interest and importance to your Lordships. The first Amendment makes an alteration in the Title of the Bill to take account of a complete change which Amendments Nos. 77 to 83 propose to make in Part III of the Bill. With the agreement of your Lordships, therefore, I think it would be convenient to discuss with Amendment No. 1 Amendments Nos. 77 to 83, and two consequential Amendments, Nos. 85 and 87. These Amendments propose the insertion of three new clauses and the deletion of the existing Clauses 23 to 27.
Part III of the Bill is concerned with protecting the man who buys a car in good faith and later finds that, because it was the subject of a hire-purchase agreement, he has no title to it. The existing provisions of Part III proposed to protect him by means of a system of licensing cards issued to hirers of cars the log books being held by the finance houses. This scheme was criticised, particularly by finance house interests, who anticipated inconvenience and expense to themselves, and possible abuse. There was also the possibility of some confusion in the period in which current hire-purchase transactions ran their course. The House will recall that the noble Lord, Lord Shepherd, voiced these
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objections and proposed an alternative scheme, and I undertook to consider this. I made it clear, and so did my right honourable friend in another place, that the Government were determined to deal with the matter in this Bill but were prepared to consider alternative ways of doing so. We made the important proviso, that any alternative scheme, to be acceptable to us, must offer the innocent buyer as good protection as was given by the scheme in the Bill as it stood.
During the Committee stage in another place, a new clause was moved from the Opposition Front Bench embodying a scheme which did, in principle, meet this requirement. This scheme was, in essence, very simple. Where a car on hire-purchase was sold by the hirer to a person who bought it in good faith, not knowing it was on hire-purchase, the purchaser would get a good title. We were informed that this scheme was acceptable to the Finance Houses' Association, whose members conduct the greater part of hire-purchase business in cars. This was, of course, a vital point in considering a scheme which would debar them from recovering their cars after fraudulent disposals. This scheme offered a simpler way of dealing with the problem and, given that it was acceptable generally in finance house circles, the Government accepted the principle, and at the Report stage in another place introduced the three new clauses contained in Amendments Nos. 77, 78 and 79 to give effect to it. Since the new clauses are necessarily somewhat complicated, it may be helpful to the House if I explain how they will work.
The first two subsections of the new clause in Amendment No. 77 contain what is really the basic provision: that where the hirer sells the car to a person who buys it in good faith and without notice of the hire-purchase agreement, that person gets a good title, or, to be strictly accurate, as good a title as was possessed by the finance house who had let the car to the fraudulent hirer. The scheme is for the protection of the public, and, quite reasonably, the finance houses did not think that motor dealers or finance houses should be so protected, since they can and should be on their guard against buying cars which are on hire-purchase. The first two subsections,

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therefore, apply only where the fraudulent hirer sells to a private purchaser—and that, to anticipate the definition in subsection (2) of the third new clause, means someone who is neither a motor dealer nor a finance house.
Subsection (3) of the first new clause deals with the case where the fraudulent hirer sells to a trade or finance purchaser—that is to say, a motor dealer or finance house. The clause does not protect such a purchaser, who remains, as now, liable to the true owner for detinue or conversion. The same applies to another trade or finance purchaser to whom he resells the car. But the first private purchaser will again get a good title, provided he buys in good faith and without notice of the hire-purchase agreement. In either case, whether the private purchaser has bought the car from the fraudulent hirer or from a trade or finance purchaser, the title he gets can then be passed on like any other title. The result is that the innocent buyer, or anyone claiming under him, is protected, but that a motor dealer or finance house who buys from the hirer is not. The only other provision of this clause to which I think I need draw attention is subsection (6), which makes it quite clear that the criminal and civil liabilities of the hirer who fraudulently disposes of a car and a trade or finance purchaser who takes it from him are not affected.
I turn now to the new clause which is Amendment No. 78. In practice, an innocent purchaser, just because he is innocent, may very likely not be able to trace back the channel through which the car came to him. To make the provisions work as intended, certain presumptions are necessary. Let me take a situation which is quite likely to arise. A man who has bought a car is approached by a finance house, who tell him that the car is theirs and was let on hire-purchase. He may have bought it following a newspaper advertisement, and may well not be able to produce the person who sold the car to him. The first presumption contained in subsection (2),therefore, is that that person was the hirer. This presumption operates equally where the roan who has actually got the car relies for his title on claiming under an earlier private person who
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bought in good faith and without notice of the hire-purchase agreement.
The next presumptions deal with the case where it is proved that the man who has got the car—or, where appropriate, such a previous purchaser—bought the car from someone other than the hirer. Under subsection (3) it is presumed that the hirer sold to a private purchaser, who bought in good faith and without notice of the hire-purchase agreement, and that his title has been transmitted. Subsection (4) deals similarly with the case where it is proved that the hirer sold the car to a motor dealer or finance house, and makes similar presumptions regarding the first sale to a private prchaser. The new clause in Amendment No. 79 is concerned with interpretation, and contains the definitions and other provisions necessary for the new Part III. Amendment No. 85 introduces the necessary transitional provisions.
My Lords, fraudulent sales of cars on hire-purchase have caused real hardship to the victims. We are glad that it has been possible to introduce these provisions to protect such people in a reasonably simple way. We feel confident that they will be generally welcomed. I beg to move that this House doth agree with the Commons in the first Amendment.
Moved, That this House doth agree with the Commons in the said Amendment.—(Lord Drumalbyn.)
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, I am sure the House is grateful for the introduction that the Minister has made to this first group of Amendments; and may I also say that we agree with his suggestion to consider this considerable number of Amendments by groups, and in subjects. Those who have taken an interest in this Hire-Purchase Bill will, I am sure, welcome it back rather as an old friend, although, unlike the old friend, when we take into account the Commons Amendments we may not be able to recognise the Bill, because (as I see the noble Lord, who is smiling, agrees) there is a major change in the Bill from what it was when it left us some months ago. I was indeed pleased that the Minister himself recognised the part that my right honourable and honourable friends played when the Bill was in another place. A great many of these important

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changes and important improvements stem from their work. Their approach was not on a Party basis, but was designed to improve what they felt was a Bill that should be useful to the public but which, in view of the rush of the Government in introducing it, failed to meet many of the major points that we wanted to see and which we now see in this Bill.
My Lords, with regard to these Amendments I am glad to see that Part III of the Bill has been removed. I used a phrase previously which I would use again now: that the Government were taking a very large sledgehammer to crack a very small pea. It was a very cumbersome and expensive method that the Government then proposed, and I think they would also agree that it would have raised many difficulties, in particular as to the status of the log book. I think that in accepting the proposals made by my honourable friends in another place the Government have made a considerable advance. It will be much easier for the hire-purchase companies and also much easier for the hirer; and, of course, it will relieve the hirer of many of the fears which he had before, in view of the fact that he may have bought a car under a hire-purchase agreement without knowledge of it. We on this side of the House accept this group of Amendments and thank the Government for their acceptance of this principle.
On Question, Motion agreed to.

COMMONS AMENDMENTS
Clause 1, page 1, line 10, after ("apply") insert ("as amended by subsection (5) of this section").
Page 2, line 6, at end insert—
("(5) In section 4(1) of the principal Act there shall be inserted the words' Provided that if the Court is satisfied in any action that a sum less than the amount by which one-half of the hire-purchase price exceeds the total of the sums paid and the sums due in respect of the hire-purchase price immediately before the termination would be equal to the loss sustained by the owner in consequence of the termination of the agreement by the hirer, the court may make an order for the payment of that sum in lieu of that amount.'")
LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, Amendment No. 2 is a paving Amendment for Amendment No. 3, and also for Nos. 62, 123, 124, 133, 134, 139 and 145, which go together. In another place
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there was a great deal of discussion, as there had been in your Lordships' House, of what the hirer's liability should be if the agreement were terminated before it had run its full length. As in your Lordships' House, the Government maintained that the existing provisions of Sections 4 and 5 of the 1938 Act were a practical measure of consumer protection which we were not prepared to diminish, and in this respect the Bill has not been amended. There was, however, one aspect of this matter to which several of your Lordships drew attention. This was the possibility of an anomaly under the 1938 Act as it stands. A hirer who recognises in the early stages of his hire that he cannot go through with the agreement becomes liable to make his payments up to one-half of the hire-purchase price if he terminates the agreement in accordance with Section 4(1). The argument is that he might get off more cheaply if, instead of terminating, he defaulted and left the initiative to the finance house.
In Committee in another place an Amendment was passed which, with the subsequent drafting changes, is now Amendment No. 3. It adds a proviso to Section 4(1) of the 1938 Act, empowering the court, in a case where the hirer has terminated the agreement in the early stages, nevertheless to assess his liability at less than the amount necessary to make his payments up to one-half of the hire-purchase price. This provides the hirer in the position I have mentioned with a remedy. I am bound to say that we do not think that it is a provision likely to be often invoked; but it is an added measure of consumer protection and, as it were, a long-stop for the hirer. Amendments Nos. 62, 123, 124, 133 and 134 incorporate this new provision in the Act of 1938 as it is extended to Scotland. Amendment No. 139 makes a consequential Amendment to Section 5(c) of the 1938 Act and Amendment No. 145 amends the Schedule to the Act to take account of Clause 1(5). I beg to move that this House doth agree with the Commons in the said Amendments.
Moved, That this House doth agree with the Commons in the said Amendments.—(Lord Drumalbyn.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

COMMONS AMENDMENT
Clause 2, page 2, line 8, after ("by") insert ("or on behalf of").
LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, this is a drafting Amendment. I beg to move that this House doth agree with the Commons in the said Amendment.
Moved, That this House doth agree with the Commons in the said Amendment.—(Lord Drumalbyn.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

COMMONS AMENDMENTS
Clause 3, page 2, line 36, leave out ("immediately before or")
Clause 3, page 2, line 39, at end insert ("the agreement having been signed by or on behalf of all other parties before it is signed by the hirer, that copy is delivered to him immediately after he signs the agreement, or")
Clause 3, page 2, line 15, leave out ("immediately before or")
Clause 3, page 2, line 18, at end insert ("the agreement having been signed by or on behalf of all other parties before it is signed by the buyer, that copy is delivered to him immediately after he signs the agreement, or").
LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, may I take Amendments Nos. 5, 6, 7 and 8 together?—and with them go Amendments Nos. 110, 111, 117 and 119. These are drafting Amendments. I beg to move that this House doth agree with the Commons in the said Amendments.
Moved, That this House doth agree with the Commons in the said Amendments.—(Lord Drumalbyn.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

COMMONS AMENDMENT
Page 3, line 35, leave out from ("which") to first ("the") in line 38 and insert ("on being signed as mentioned in section 2(2)(a) or section 3(2)(a) of the principal Act,—

(a) constitutes a hire-purchase agreement to which that Act applies, or

(b) constitutes a credit-sale agreement to which that Act applies under which the total purchase price exceeds £30,").

3.14 p.m.
LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, this Amendment raises two issues. First, there is a drafting point, which arises also on Amendments Nos. 104, 108, 109, 112, 121 and 122. Clause 3(4) empowers the Board of Trade to make regulations about the space in which the hirer's or buyer's signature is to be inserted in a hire-purchase or credit-sale Agreement. Amendment No. 9 will ensure that the regulations will apply
826
in the case where the document, at the time it is signed by the hirer or buyer, is only an offer to enter into an agreement and not yet an actual agreement. The six consequential Amendments make the same provision in relation to Scotland.
The second issue raised by Amendment No. 9 also arises on Amendments Nos. 12, 13, 54, 55, 58, 72, 107, 115, 116, 120, 125, 118 and 140. It concerns the figure of £30 which appears in the last line of Amendment No. 9. When your Lordships considered the Bill the figure of £20 appeared, in relation to credit-sale agreements, in two contexts. First, there are the existing provisions of the 1938 Act, concerning documentation and so on, which apply, in the case of credit-sale Agreements if the total purchase price exceeds £5. The Bill provided for the raising of this figure to £20, to take some account of the change in the value of money since 1938.
Secondly, there were the "cooling-off" provisions. Here, in accordance with the recommendation of the Molony Committee, the Bill provided that the provisions should apply to credit-sale agreements where the total purchase price exceeded £20 When the Bill was in Committee in another place, a proposal to raise the figure from £20 to £30 was made and fully debated. Any monetary limit of this kind is, in the nature of things, arbitrary, and a matter of judgment. On the one hand, there is the need to protect the consumer from sharp practice; on the other hand, excessive interference with the normal trade practice is to the advantage of neither the trader nor the customer. The Government spokesman advised the rention of the figure of £20, but the higher figure of £30 was supported from both sides and, on a vote, was accepted. The Government felt that in a matter of this kind they should abide by the view expressed by the majority, and accordingly these Amendments change the figure of £20 to £30 in each place where it occurs. I beg to move that this House doth agree with the Commons in Amendment No. 9.
Moved, That this House both agree with the Commons in the said Amendment.—(Lord Drumalbyn.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

COMMONS AMENDMENT
Clause 3, page 3, line 42, leave out from beginning to first ("in") in line 43 and insert (" location of those words")
Clause 3, page 3, line 44 at end insert "and may prescribe such other requirements (whether as to type, size, colour or disposition of lettering or otherwise) as the Board may consider appropriate for securing that the words come to the attention of the hirer or buyer at the time when he is about to sign the document.")
LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, Amendments Nos. 10 and 11 go together with Amendments Nos. 20, 23, 57, 74, 105, 106, 113, and 114. The substantive Amendment is No. 57. Your Lordships will recall that the noble and learned Lord, Lord McNair, raised the question of how to ensure that hire-purchase agreements are not printed in such a way that nobody can read them. I undertook that we would deal with this matter, and the new clause introduced by Amendment No. 57 does so. The Amendment deals with the new subsection (1), which gives the Board of Trade power to make regulations for this purpose; the power covers not only the kind and size of lettering but extends also to other matters which affect legibility, such as the colour of the print and the paper, the length of the line, and the distance between the lines. The other subsections of the clause deal with subsidiary matters; for example, subsection (2) recites the documents regarding which regulations may be made, and subsection (3) provides that where a document does not comply with the regulations the effect is the same as if it had not been sent or delivered. The introduction of this new clause necessitates minor Amendments in Clauses 3 and 5, and consequential Amendments in Clause 22 and Schedule 2. I beg to move that this House doth agree with the Commons in Amendments Nos. 10 and 11.
Moved, That this House doth agree with the Commons in the said Amendments.—(Lord Drumalbyn.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

COMMONS AMENDMENT
Clause 3, page 4, line 18, leave out ("£20") and insert ("£30").
THE CHAIRMAN OF COMMITTEES: My Lords, Amendment No. 12 has already been mentioned.
LORD DRUMALBYN: I beg to move that this House doth agree with the Commons in the said Amendment.
Moved, That this House doth agree with the Commons in the said Amendments.—(Lord Drumalbyn.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

COMMONS AMENDMENT
Clause 4, page 4, line 29, leave out ("£20") and insert ("£30").
LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, Amendment No. 13 is consequential. I beg to move that this House doth agree with the Commons in the said Amendment.
Moved, That this House doth agree with the Commons in the said Amendment.—(Lord Drumalbyn.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

COMMONS AMENDMENT
Clause 4, page 4, line 37, leave out ("requisite") and insert ("second statutory").
LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, Amendment No. 14 is consequential on the need for first and second statutory copies and has been taken with a number of others. I beg to move that this House doth agree with the Commons in the said Amendment.
Moved, That this House doth agree with the Commons in the said Amendment.—(Lord Drumalbyn.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

COMMONS AMENDMENT
Clause 4, page 4, line 46, leave out ("clearly").
LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, Amendment No. 15 is a drafting Amendment. I beg to move that this House doth agree with the Commons in the said Amendment.
Moved, That this House doth agree with the Commons in the said Amendment.—(Lord Drumalbyn.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

COMMONS AMENDMENTS
Clause 4, page 5, line 19, leave out ("requisite") and insert ("second statutory")
Clause 4, page 5, line 20. leave out from ("means") to first ("of") in line 28 and insert ("the copy of that document (in the form in which the document is after it has been signed by the prospective hirer or buyer and by or on behalf of the other party or parties thereto) which is sent by post to the prospective hirer or buyer after the document has been so signed and is the copy referred

829
to in paragraph (d) of section 2(2) of the principal Act as modified by the next following section, or in paragraph (c)")
Clause 5, page 6, line 23, leave out ("the copy of the agreement") and insert ("each copy referred to in paragraph (d) or paragraph (e) of this subsection which is delivered or")
Clause 5, page 6, line 28, leave out from ("Trade") to ("and") in line 30.
LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, Amendments Nos. 16 to 19 inclusive are consequential on Amendment No. 14. I beg to move that this House doth agree with the Commons in the said Amendments.
Moved, That this House doth agree with the Commons in the said Amendments.—(Lord Drumalbyn.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

COMMONS AMENDMENT
Clause 5, page 6, line 32, leave out from beginning to ("as") and insert ("complies with such other requirements (whether as to type, size, colour or disposition of lettering or otherwise) ").
LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, Amendment No. 20 has been dealt with and is therefore consequential. I beg to move that this House doth agree with the Commons in the said Amendment.
Moved, That this House doth agree with the Commons in the said Amendment.—(Lord Drumalbyn.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

COMMONS AMENDMENTS
Clause 5, page 6, line 38, leave out ("the copy of the agreement") and insert ("each copy referred to in paragraph (c) or paragraph (d) of this subsection which is delivered or")
Clause 5, page 6, line 43, leave out from ("Trade") to ("and") in line 45.
Clause 5, page 6, line 47, leave out from beginning to ("as") and insert ("complies with such other requirements (whether as to type, size, colour or disposition of lettering or otherwise)")
Clause 5, page 6, line 48, at end insert—
("(5) Any statement which, in accordance with regulations made under section 2(2) or section 3(2) of the principal Act as modified by this section, is contained either in the first statutory copy or in the second statutory copy of a document shall specify the name of a person to whom, and an address to which, notice of cancellation may be sent; and (without prejudice to any other respect in which, in accordance with section 31(3) of this Act, the regulations may make different provision as between the first statutory copy and the second statutory copy of a document, or as between copies delivered and copies seal) different names and addresses may he so specified in the first statutory copy and the second statutory copy of the same document.")
page 7, line 13, at end insert—
("(6) In this and the next following section "the first statutory copy" in relation to a document, means the copy thereof (in the form in which it is at the material time) which is either delivered as mentioned in subparagraph (ii), or sent as mentioned in subparagraph (iii), of section 2(2)(e) or section 3(2)(d) of the principal Act.")
Clause 6, page 7, line 17, leave out from ("is") to ("sent")
Clause 6, page 7, line 18, leave out ("in the requisite copy") and insert ("either in the first statutory copy or in the second statutory copy of the relevant document")
Clause 6, page 7, line 20, leave out first ("addressed") and insert ("sent") leave out ("the letter")
Clause 6, page 7, line 24, leave out ("that letter") and insert ("it")
Clause 6, page 7, line 33, leave out ("the letter containing")
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, I wonder whether I can help here. I have been through all these Amendments, and if the House is agreeable I suggest that we should take together all Amendments up to Amendment No. 31A, which I think is the next Amendment of some substance.
THE CHAIRMAN OF COMMITTEES: My Lords, if I may express an opinion, it would be quite proper and in order to take Amendments together, but only, of course, those which are consecutive.
LORD DRUMALBYN: Except for drafting Amendment No. 26 and drafting Amendments Nos. 28 to 31 the remainder are consecutive up to and including 31. I beg to move that this House doth agree with the Commons in the said Amendments.
Moved, That this House doth agree with the Commons in the said Amendments.—(Lord Drumalbyn.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

COMMONS AMENDMENTS
After Clause 6, insert the following new clause:
Re-delivery and interim care of goods comprised in notice of cancellation
(".—(1) The provisions of this section shall have effect where a notice of cancellation is served, and at any time, whether before or after the service of that notice, any of the goods to which the relevant document relates are in the possession of the prospective hirer or buyer, having come into his possession in consequence, or in anticipation, of his signing that document.
(2) The prospective hirer or buyer shall not be under any obligation (whether arising by contract or otherwise) to deliver the goods except at his own premises and in pursuance of a request in writing, signed by or on behalf of the person entitled to possession of the goods and served on the prospective hirer or buyer either before, or at the time when, the goods are collected from his premises; and any such obligation shall be subject to any lien, or other right to retain the goods, which he may have under section 7(4) or section 8(3) of this Act.
(3) If the prospective hirer or buyer—

(a) delivers the goods (whether at his own premises or elsewhere) to an authorised person, or to a person designated for the purpose by an authorised person, or

(b) sends the goods at his own expense to an authorised person,

he shall be taken to have done so with the consent of that authorised person and (if that person is not for the time being entitled to possession of the goods) with the consent of the person who is so entitled, and shall be discharged from any obligation (whether arising by contract or otherwise) to retain the goods or to deliver them to any person so entitled.
(4) Until the occurrence of whichever of the following events first occurs, that is to say—

(a) the prospective hirer or buyer delivers or sends the goods as mentioned in paragraph (a) or paragraph (b) of the last preceding subsection, or

(b) the period of twenty-one days beginning with the date of service of the notice of cancellation expires without his having received such a request as is mentioned in subsection (2) of this section and unreasonably refused or unreasonably failed to comply with it,

the prospective hirer or buyer shall be under an obligation to take reasonable care of the goods; and if he sends them to an authorised person as mentioned in paragraph (b) of the last preceding subsection, he shall be under an obligation to take reasonable care to see that they are received by that person and are not damaged in transit to him.
(5) Any obligation under the last preceding subsection shall he owed to the person for the time being entitled to possession of the goods, and any breach of that obligation shall be actionable, at the suit of that person, as a breach of statutory duty.
(6) Except as provided by subsections (4) and (5) of this section, the prospective hirer or buyer shall not be under any obligation (whether arising by contract or otherwise) to take care of the goods by reason of their having come into his possession as mentioned in subsection (1) of this section.
(7) In this section "authorised person" means a person falling within any one or more of the following descriptions, that is to say—

(a) the person who conducted any antecedent negotiations in pursuance of which the prospective hirer or buyer signed the relevant document;

832

(b) the person for the time being entitled to possession of the goods;

(c) the owner or seller;

(d) any person who is specified, as mentioned in section 6(1)(a) of this Act, as a person to whom a notice of cancellation may be sent,

and any reference to the premises of the prospective hirer or buyer is a reference to the premises which in the relevant document are specified as his address.")
Clause 7, page 7, line 37, leave out subsections (1) and (2).
Clause 7, page 8, line 33, leave out from ("has") to end of line 35 and insert ("in pursuance of any antecedent negotiations been paid to, or for the benefit of, the owner or seller, or has in pursuance of any such negotiations be paid to, or for the benefit of, any person (other than the owner or seller) who conducted those negotiations").
LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, during the Report stage of the Bill in your Lordships' House there was a good deal of discussion about the return of goods if an agreement was cancelled by the prospective hirer or buyer under the "cooling-off" provisions. This Amendment, 31A, and Nos. 32, 33 and 35 go together. I do not think there was any real divergence of view about what we wanted, and I think your Lordships will find that the new clause contained in Amendment No. 31A introduces the necessary improvements and clarifications. It provides, in subsection (2), that the hirer who cancels the agreement shall only be under an obligation to deliver the goods at his own premises in pursuance of a written request signed by or on behalf of the person entitled to possession of the goods. And even then he has a lien on the goods if there is any sum due to him; for example, if his deposit has not been returned. This subsection covers what will be the normal case where the hirer retains the goods until they are collected from this house.
But the hirer may well wish to get rid of the goods and decide to take or send them back to an "authorised person". Or he may hand them to such a person who collects them at his own premises without producing a written request. These would, in the circumstances, be reasonable things for him to do. Subsection (3) therefore provides that the hirer shall be taken to have discharged his obligation to retain the goods or deliver them if he delivers the goods at his own premises or elsewhere to an authorised person or sends the

833
goods back to such a person at his own expense.
Subsection (7), if I may anticipate, defines the "authorised person" to whom the hirer may deliver or send the goods in wide terms which will cover all the possibilities. Subsection (4) imposes the obligation on the hirer to take reasonable care of the goods. Discussion in your Lordships' House brought out that, while this was reasonable initially, the obligation should not continue indefinitely, since if it did an unscrupulous trader might exploit the position.
This point was put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Shepherd. To meet this, subsection (4) sets a time limit on the hirer's obligation to take reasonable care of the goods; this is to be 21 days from the service of the notice of cancellation. There is the necessary qualification the. the hirer's obligation would continue if, within the 21 days, he had received a written request to deliver the goods at his own premises, as prescribed in subsection (2), and had unreasonably refused or unreasonably failed to comply with it. Subsection (4) also provides that if the hirer, rather than await collection, chooses to send the goods at his own expense to an authorised person, he must take reasonable care to see that they are received and are not damaged in transit. If the hirer fails to carry out his obligation, sub-section (5) provides that he is liable for breach of statutory duty (that is, a civil action) to the person entitled to possession of the goods, whoever that may be.
Subsection (6) provides that the hirer is to be under no other obligation to take care of the goods. His obligation therefore lapses if the goods are not collected within the 21 days, unless he has failed unreasonably to comply with a request to hand them over at his own premises.
The introduction of the new clause makes certain consequential amendments necessary in Clause 7. Subsections (1) and (2) and (6) and (7) are superseded, and Amendments Nos. 32 and 35 propose their deletion. I beg to move that this House doth agree with the Commons in the said Amendments.
Moved, that this House doth agree with the Commons in the said Amendments.—(Lord Drumalbyn.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

COMMONS AMENDMENT
Clause 7, page 8, line 45, at end insert ("() Any sum recoverable under subsection (4) of this section shall be recoverable as a simple contract debt in any court of competent jurisdiction.")
LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, I beg to move that this House doth agree with the Commons in the said Amendment.
Moved, that this House doth agree with the Commons in the said Amendment.—(Lord Drumalbyn.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

COMMONS AMENDMENT
Clause 7, page 9, line 1, leave out subsections (6) and (7).
LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, I beg to move that this House doth agree with the Commons in the said Amendment.
Moved that this House doth agree with the Commons in the said Amendment.—(Lord Drumalbyn.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

COMMONS AMENDMENT
Clause 8, page 9, line 36, at end insert—.
("(4) Any sum recoverable under subsection (2) of this section shall be recoverable as a simple contract debt in any court of competent jurisdiction.")
LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, this Amendment is consequential. I beg to move that this House doth agree with the Commons in the said Amendment.
Moved, that this House doth agree with the Commons in the said Amendment.—(Lord Drumalbyn.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

COMMONS AMENDMENT
Clause 8, page 9, line 36, at end insert—
("() Where the prospective hirer or buyer recovers from the dealer a sum equal to the part-exchange allowance, then, if the title of the prospective hirer or buyer to the goods agreed to be taken in part-exchange has not vested in the dealer, that title shall so vest on the recovery of that sum.")
LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, this is a technical Amendment. I beg to move that this House doth agree with the Commons in the said Amendment.
Moved, that this House doth agree with the Commons in the said Amendment.— (Lord Drumalbyn.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

COMMONS AMENDMENT
Clause 8, page 10, line 4, at end insert ("or, if no such sum was agreed, the part-exchange allowance shall be taken to be such sum as in all the circumstances it would have been reasonable to allow in respect of those goods if no notice of cancellation had been served.")
LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, this is another technical Amendment. I beg to move that this House doth agree with the Commons in the said Amendment.
Moved, that this House doth agree with the Commons in the said Amendment.—(Lord Drumalbyn.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

COMMONS AMENDMENT
Clause 9, page 10, line 17, at end insert—
("(3) In this section "representations" includes any statement or undertaking, whether constituting a condition or a warranty or not, and references to making representations shall be construed accordingly.")
LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, this Amendment, which goes with Nos. 60 and 67, is also a technical Amendment. I beg to move that this House doth agree with the Commons in the said Amendment.
Moved, that this House doth agree with the Commons in the said Amendment.—(Lord Drumalbyn.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

COMMONS AMENDMENT
Clause 11, page 11, line 20, at end insert—
("(2) The following subsection shall be substituted for section 8(2) of the principal Act (whereby a condition is implied where the hirer makes known the particular purpose for which the goods are required):—
"(2) Where the hirer, whether expressly or by implication,—

(a) has made known to the owner, or to a servant or agent of the owner, the particular purpose for which the goods are required, or

(b)in the course of any antecedent negotiations has made that purpose known to any other person by whom those negotiations were conducted, or to a servant or agent of such a person,

there shall be an implied condition that the goods shall be reasonably fit for that purpose.
Section 20(2) of the Hire-Purchase Act 1964 shall apply for the purposes of this subsection as it applies for the purposes of Part I of that Act".")
LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, I beg to move that this House doth agree with the Commons in this Amendment.
Moved, that this House doth agree with the Commons in the said Amendment.—(Lord Drumalbyn.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

COMMONS AMENDMENT
After Clause 12, insert the following new clause:
Jurisdiction of county court
(".—(1) Where goods have been let under a hire-purchase agreement to which the principal Act applies, and the owner brings an action to enforce a right to recover possession of any of the goods from the hirer before one-third of the hire-purchase price has been paid or tendered as mentioned in section 11(1) of that Act, the action shall be brought in the county court for the district in which the hirer resides or carries on business, or resided or carried on business at the date on which he last made a payment under the hire-purchase agreement.
(2) If in any such action the owner claims any sum due under the hire-purchase agreement, or under any contract of guarantee relating thereto, the county court shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine the action as well in relation to that claim as in relation to the claim to enforce such a right as is mentioned in the preceding subsection, if apart from this section the county court would not have jurisdiction to do so.")
LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, during the Report stage of the Bill, I said that the Government would be bringing, forward proposals with regard to the jurisdiction of county courts. The new clause contained in Amendment No. 41 is the result. There are consequential Amendments in Schedules 2, 4 and 6. These are Amendments Nos. 101, 127, 141, 143, 144, 148 and 150. At present, all actions to enforce a right to recover possession of goods under hire-purchase agreements to which the principal Act applies where one-third of the hire-purchase price has been paid must be brought in the appropriate county court. In addition, any claim for any sum payable under the agreement, or under a guarantee, must be brought in the same action. When the Bill becomes law, this jurisdiction of the courts will automatically be extended to actions for the recovery of goods under hire-purchase agreements not exceeding £2,000, or such larger sums as may be substituted by Order in Council under Clause 1(3). Since the owner will be compelled to bring his action in the county court when one-third of the purchase price has been paid, that court will have jurisdiction.

837
There are, however, actions in connection with hire-purchase agreements which the 1938 Act does not require to be brought in the county court and to which therefore the ordinary county court limit of £400 will apply. These are, first, actions for the recovery of goods before one-third has been paid (with or without a money claim) where the value of the goods or the value plus the money claim exceeds £400; secondly, a money claim exceeding £400 for payment under the agreement or damages where no action for the recovery of the goods is brought; thirdly, claims for damages exceeding £400 for breach of warranty; and, fourthly, claims exceeding £400 when the owner has recovered possession of the goods in contravention of Section 11(1) of the Act.
The new clause introduced by Amendment No. 41 deals with actions in the first category. Subsection (1) provides that if the owner wishes to sue for the recovery of the goods where less than one-third of the hire-purchase price has been paid, he must bring his action in the hirer's local county court. Subsection (2) enables the county court, in such an action, to entertain any claim by the owner for a sum due under the agreement or any related contract of guarantee.
In not giving the county court the power to entertain a money claim alone where it exceeds £400, we are following the pattern of the 1938 Act, which did not give the county court any special power to entertain a money claim alone. Such a claim might be for damages for breach of warranties or conditions. The county court has no particular expertise in dealing with claims of this kind and there seems no reason why it should be given power to entertain an action which may be far beyond its ordinary monetary jurisdiction. In the case of credit-sale agreements the ordinary limits of the county court jurisdiction will apply, since there is nothing in the 1938 Act which compels a seller to bring his action on the county court. In the case of such agreements there is, of course, no question of the recovery of the goods. I beg to move that this House doth agree with the Commons in the said Amendment.
Moved, That this House doth agree with the Commons in the said Amendment.—(Lord Drumalbyn.)
LORD MORRISON OF LAMBETH: My Lords, I am sure that we are all much obliged to the Minister of State for his explanations. I only want to raise a point with the House on procedure, on which the Lord Chairman of Committees has been good enough to advise us, and we always treat his advice with the greatest respect because it is meant to be helpful. My difficulty is that, though listening to the Minister of State very carefully, I do not understand a word of it. That is not his fault. It may be my fault. But how many noble Lords understand a word of what he has been saying in his somewhat comprehensive observations? I gather that nobody in the House intends to quarrel with the Commons on these Amendments. For myself, I am prepared to take the word of my noble friend Lord Shepherd, who has been through them very thoroughly and thinks that there are no objections to them.
I wish we could find a procedure to help. Of course, if any noble Lord has any objection to any Amendment, he should be heard, but I should like to avoid this rigmarole—and do not let the Minister of State take that as objectionable, because I do not mean it in that way. But these are lengthy explanations, which noble Lords really do not understand. I wonder whether the Committee on Procedure could consider a procedure whereby any noble Lord who wishes to raise a point could give notice and otherwise the Amendments could be put pro forma from the Woolsack. I raise this point only for the convenience of the House, because it seems as if we shall be sitting here for a while dealing with these Amendments in a way which I think could be avoided and which is a bit farcical from the point of view of Parliamentary procedure.
LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, I should like to comment on what the noble Lord said. I very much appreciate the spirit in which he has raised this matter. The real point is that I undertook on Third Reading to look at certain points and it was known then that they would come back to the House. If I may say so with respect to the noble Lord, a good

839
many noble Lords who sat through long hours discussing this Bill—and especially those who have been following the Bill in another place—will probably know what I am talking about and will understand the changes that have been made. I am entirely in your Lordships' hands, but I thought I owed it to the House to give this explanation.
3.20 p.m.
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, I appreciate the intervention of my noble friend Lord Morrison of Lambeth, and also the point of view of the Minister. I was one—and looking round I see a number of other noble Lords—who did sit long hours on this Bill, and we are now very pleased to see some of the fruits of our labours. I suggest that if we could have an explanation of Amendment No. 42 and those that go with it (because I think this represents a major break-through in hire-purchase agreements and consumer protection), the rest of the Amendments might be taken en bloc. Most of them are of a drafting and consequential nature. There are some dealing with Scotland, but I do not think there are any Scottish Peers present who took part in the hire-purchase debates. Perhaps the Minister and the noble Lord who sits on the Woolsack might care to consider that suggestion.
LORD SILKIN: My Lords, I think it would be a good idea if this matter could go to the Procedure Committee. My noble friend's statement applies not only to this Bill but to a great many other Bills that come back from another place, where we have a long series of Amendments which are of no particular interest to anybody in this House, on which we could save a good deal of time. There was one Bill in which every Amendment was read out to the House before it was put. It was quite unnecessary even to read out the Amendments; they could have been taken en bloc.
On the other hand, there is an obligation on the Government to explain to this House Amendments of a material character which have been made in another place. I think this is due to us. In the busy life that we lead, we may miss some of them, and it is right that our attention should be drawn to these Amendments, although not necessarily at great length. I hope my noble friend
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will not mind my saying this: he did not understand a word of the explanations, but I did because they happened to be of a quasi-legal character, and I have followed the Bill. I thought the explanations were very clear. But that does not affect the question that my noble friend has raised. We could save a good deal of time if we confined discussion to those Amendments in which this House is interested. I suggest—I am sure the noble Lord who is in the Chair will take notice of this—that we should consider whether it is worthwhile taking this matter to the Procedure Committee.
VISCOUNT GOSCHEN: My Lords, I think we all agree with what has been said about taking these Amendments en bloc. I think the best thing would be to take Amendment No. 42, as the noble Lord, Lord Shepherd, said, and then take the remaining Amendments en bloc. But we can take together only consecutive Amendments; we cannot dodge about all over the place in the list. Later, through the normal channels, we can discuss whether this whole matter should go before the Procedure Committee.
On Question, Motion agreed to.

COMMONS AMENDMENT
After Clause 12, insert the following new clause:
Notice of hirer's default
(".—(1)The provisions of this section shall have effect where goods are let under a hire-purchase agreement to which the principal Act applies, and that agreement, or any other agreement, contains a provision (however expressed, and whether limited to defaults in payment or not) whereby, apart from this section, on the occurrence of, or at a time to be ascertained by reference to, a default in the payment of one or more instalments or other sums payable by the hirer, such of the consequences mentioned in the next following subsection as are specified in that provision (in this section referred to as 'the specified consequences') would follow.
(2) The consequences referred to in the preceding subsection are that the hire-purchase agreement, or the bailment of the goods, shall terminate, or shall be terminable, or that the owner shall have a right to recover possession of the goods.
(3) If default is made in the payment of one or more sums to which that provision (in this subsection referred to as the relevant provision') applies, the specified consequences shall not follow by reason of that default unless the owner serves on the hirer, by post or otherwise, a notice (in this section referred to as a notice of default') stating the amount which has become due, but remains unpaid, in respect of sums to which the relevant provision

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applies, and requiring the amount so stated to be paid within such period (not being less than seven days beginning with date of service of the notice) as may be specified in the notice.
(4) Where a notice of default is served, the specified consequences shall not follow before the end of the period specified in the notice by reason of any default to which the notice relates; and, if before the end of that period the amount specified in the notice is paid or tendered by or on behalf of the hirer or any guarantor, the specified consequences shall not follow thereafter by reason of any such default.
(5) In a case where the specified consequences are that the hire-purchase agreement, or the bailment of the goods, may be terminated by notice given by the owner, a notice of default may include a notice terminating the hire-purchase agreement or the bailment at or after the end of the period specified therein in accordance with subsection (3) of this section, subject to a condition that the termination is not to take effect if before the end of that period the amount specified in the notice of default is paid or tendered as mentioned in the last preceding subsection.
(6) Without prejudice to the service of a notice of default in any way in which such a notice could be served apart from this subsection. a notice of default shall be deemed to be saved on the hirer under a hire-purchase agreement if—

(a) is addressed to the person last known to the owner as the hirer under the agreement, and is delivered at, or sent by post to, the last known address of that person, or

(b) in a case where that person has died, the notice,(if not served in accordance with the preceding paragraph) is addressed to that person's Personal representative (whether by that or any similar description, and whether for the time being there is any personal representative of his or not) and is delivered at, or sent by post to, the address which was the last known address of the deceased person.

(7) Where the person who, immediately before his death, was the hirer under a hire-purchase agreement has died, and his rights under the agreement have not yet passed to a personal representative,—

(a) section 9 of the Administration of Estates Act 1925 (vesting of estate of intestate between death and grant of administration) shall not be construed as enabling a notice of default to be served on the Probate Judge (as defined by that Act) as being the hirer under that agreement, and

(b) subsections (1) to (5) of this section shall have effect as if the deceased person had not died, and any reference in those subsections to default in the payment of a sum payable by the hirer shall be construed accordingly.

(8) At any time after the service of a notice of default and before the amount specified in the notice is paid or tendered as mentioned in subsection (4) of this section or the period specified in the notice expires (whichever first occurs) the goods to which
842
the hire-purchase agreement relates shall not be treated—

(a) for the purposes of section 4 of the Law of Distress Amendment Act 1908, as goods comprised in a hire-purchase agreement made by the hirer, or

(b) for the purposes of that section or of section 38 of the Bankruptcy Act 1914, as goods which are by the consent and permission of the owner in the possession, order or disposition of the hirer.")

LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, perhaps I may trespass a little longer on your Lordships' patience. During the debate on the Report stage in your Lordships' House I undertook that the Government would introduce a new safeguard for a hirer who fails to pay an instalment when it is due. The present Amendment goes with Nos. 66, 68, 69, 90, 147, 149, 152 and 155. The noble Lord, Lord Shepherd, argued that a hirer might suffer hardship if he failed, either through an oversight or because of circumstances beyond his control, to pay an instalment on the date due; or a hirer might die and his family might not realise that an instalment was due. The noble Lord suggested that before the owner could repossess goods let on hire-purchase he should be required to send a notice warning the hirer of his default and giving him a week in which to pay. It was generally agreed that most finance houses and traders, in practice, do this and more, but it was felt that for the minority of cases a statutory pro-vision was desirable. This would be particularly useful where the hirer had not yet paid one-third of the hire-purchase price and so was not protected by Section 11 of the 1938 Act.
This new clause makes the provision which we undertook to introduce. It applies where the hirer defaults on an obligation to pay a sum of money clue under the agreement and the agreement gives the owner the right to terminate the agreement or to terminate the bailment of goods or to regain possession of the goods. Under the new clause the owner cannot exercise those rights on the ground of such a default unless he has served on the hirer a notice of default stating the amount due and requiring the hirer to pay it within a period of not less than seven days from the service of notice. If the hirer pays within seven days, the owner cannot exercise his rights. The owner may include in the notice of default a post-dated cancellation of the

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agreement, which naturally will be effective if the hirer does not pay up, and ineffective if he does.
I need not trouble your Lordships with the details of the clause, but will only point out that we have taken particular care to cover the case where the hirer has died and there may be no personal representative, or the owner does not know what the situation is. The clause ensures, on the one hand, that the owner will in all cases be required to serve the notice of hirer's default; on the other hand, it also ensures that there is in all cases somebody upon whom the owner can legally serve the notice. The other Amendments are consequential upon the insertion of the new clause. I beg to move that the House doth agree with the Commons in the said Amendment.
Moved, That the House doth agree with the Commons in the said Amendment.—(Lord Drumalbyn.)
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, this was a moment of satisfaction that I was not going to let my noble friend Lord Morrison of Lambeth prevent me from enjoying. I think this is one of the biggest break-throughs we have had in this Bill. For the first time, any hirer under a hire-purchase agreement is protected against the few of the hire-purchase companies that have brought disrepute to the name of the industry by seizing goods on the mere default of one payment. I think we must express our appreciation to the Government, and also to my honourable friends in another place who have pressed this point. I am pleased that the Government have gone even further to protect the interests of the family of a hirer who has died. This is again something that gives us great satisfaction, and we thank the Government and all those who have played their part in this break-through.
On Question, Motion agreed to.

COMMONS AMENDMENTS
Clause 13, page 12, line 25, leave out from ("of") to ("agreement") in line 30 and insert (" subsection (2) or (as the case may be) subsection (3) of this section shall have effect where goods are let under a hire-purchase agreement to which the principal Act applies, and that agreement or any other agreement, provides that, on the occurrence of, or at a time to be ascertained by reference to, one or more events referred to in the provision in question,—
(a) the hire-purchase")
Clause 13, page 12, line 33, after ("the") insert ("hire-purchase")
Clause 13, page 12, line 37, after ("hirer") insert ("under the hire-purchase agreement").
LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, I beg to move that the House doth agree with the Commons in these Amendments.
Moved, That the House doth agree with the Commons in the said Amendments.—(Lord Drumalbyn.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

COMMONS AMENDMENT
Clause 13, page 13, line 4, at end insert—
("(4) Without prejudice to the preceding provisions of this section, where goods are let under a hire-purchase agreement to which the principal Act applies, and that agreement, or any other agreement, contains any provision (whether expressed as a provision that the hire-purchase agreement shall be personal to the hirer or otherwise) which, if the hire-purchase agreement is in force immediately before the death of the hirer, would apart from this subsection have the effect of terminating the hire-purchase agreement on the death of the hirer or otherwise preventing the benefit of the hire-purchase agreement from being transmitted on his death, that provision shall be void in so far as it would have that effect.")
LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, I beg to move that the House doth agree with the Commons in this Amendment.
Moved, That the House doth agree with the Commons in the said Amendment.—(Lord Drumalbyn.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.
LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, if there are no noble Lords who wish to raise points on any of the remaining Amendments, Nos. 47 to 156 inclusive, I will move them en bloc.
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, we on this side of the, House agree to that suggestion.

COMMONS AMENDMENTS
Clause 14, page 14, line 13, leave out ("re-Cover, or to")
Clause 14, page 14, line 16, leave out ("recover, or to")
Clause 14, page 14, line 17, at end insert ("and, in relation to any action to enforce a right to recover possession of the goods from the person in possession, section 10 of the principal Act shall apply as if any reference in that section to the hirer were a reference to the person in possession")
Clause 14, page 14, line 38, leave out ("recover, or to")
page 15, line 15, at end insert—
("(9) The preceding provisions of this section shall have effect in relation to sections

845
11(1) and 12(1) of the principal Act as modified by section 15 of that Act (which relates to successive hire-purchase agreements between the same parties) as those provisions have effect in relation to the said sections 11(1) and 12(1) apart from the said section 15.")
Clause 15, page 15, line 19, after ("action") insert ("to enforce a right")
Clause 16, page 16, line 39, after ("action") insert ("to enforce a right")
Clause 17, page 17, line 39, leave out ("£20") and insert ("£30")
Clause 17, page 18, line 31, leave out ("£20") and insert ("£30")
Clause 18, page 19, line 25, after ("by") insert ("or on belle if of")
After Clause 18, insert the following new clause:
Legibility of documents
(".—(l) The Board of Trade may make regulations prescribing such requirements (whether as to type, size, colour or disposition of lettering, quality or colour of paper, or otherwise) as the Board may consider appropriate for securing that documents to which this section applies are easily legible.
(2) Subject to the provisions of subsection (4) of this section, the documents to which this section applies are documents of any of the following descriptions, that is to say—

(a) any hire-purchase agreement to which the principal Act applies, and any such copy as is mentioned in paragraph (d) or paragraph (e) of section 2(2) of that Act;

(b) any credit-sale agreement to which the principal Act applies under which the total purchase price exceeds £30 and any such copy as is mentioned in paragraph (c) or paragraph (d)of section 3(2) of that Act;

(c) any copy supplied to a hirer or buyer in pursuance of a request made by him under section 6 of the principal Act;

(d) any note or memorandum of a contract of guarantee relating to such a hire-purchase agreement or credit-sale agreement as is mentioned in paragraph (a) or paragraph (b) of this subsection and any such copy as is mentioned in paragraph (a) or paragraph (b) of section 17(1) of this Act;

(e) any such copy as is mentioned in paragraph (a) or paragraph (b) of subsection (4) of section 17 of this Act which is supplied to a guarantor in pursuance of a request made by him under subsection (3) of that section.

(3) A hire-purchase agreement, credit-sale agreement or contract of guarantee shall not be invalid by reason only that any regulations made under this section are not complied with; but where the requirements of any such regulations relating to a document are not complied with—

(a) if the document falls within paragraph (a) or paragraph (b) of the last preceding subsection. section 2(2) or section 3(2) of the principal Act shall apply as if those requirements were included among the
846
requirements specified in paragraph (b) to (e) of the said section 2(2) or paragraphs(b) to (d) of the said section 3(2), as the case may be;

(b) if the document is a copy falling within paragraph (c) or paragraph (e) of the last preceding subsection, section 6(2) of the principal Act, or section 17(5) of this Act, shall apply as if that copy had not been supplied to the hirer or buyer, or the guarantor, as the case may be;

(c) if the document falls within paragraph (d) of the last preceding subsection, subsections (1) and (2) of section 17 of this Act shall apply as if the requirements of the regulations relating to that document were included among the requirements imposed by subsection (1) of that section.

(4) Without prejudice to the operation of section 31(3) of this Act in relation to any regulations made under this section, any such regulations—

(a) may specify which parts of the contents of a document to which the regulations apply are permitted to consist of handwriting or a reproduction of handwriting, and may prescribe requirements in relation to so much of the contents of such a document as is permitted to consist, and consists, of handwriting or a reproduction of handwriting and in relation to the remainder of the contents of such a document; and

(b) may except from any of the requirements of the regulations any marginal note or other subsidiary parts of a document.

(5) In relation to so much of any document falling within paragraph (a) or paragraph (b) of subsection (2) of this section as consists of—

(a) words or other matters prescribed by regulations made under section 3(4) of this Act, or

(b) a statement required to be contained therein as prescribed by regulations made under section 2(2) or section 3(2) of the principal Act as modified by section 5 of this Act,

any regulations made under this section shall have effect subject to the provisions of the regulations referred to in paragraph (a) or paragraph (b) of this subsection, as the case may be.")
Clause 19, page 20, line 34, leave out ("£20") and insert ("£30".)
Clause 20, page 21, line 27, leave out ("section 5(1), sections 6") and insert ("sections 5")
Clause 20, page 21, line 36, at end insert ("In this subsection 'representations' has the same meaning as in section 9 of this Act, and references to making representations shall be construed accordingly ")
Clause 21, page 22, line 14, leave out from beginning to ("the") in line 18.
Clause 21, page 22, line 19, leave out ("and (2)") and insert ("(2) and (5)")
Clause 21, page 22, line 30, at end insert("(3) The following enactments shall cease to have effect, that is to say, sections 1 to 5 and 8 and 9 of the Hire Purchase and Small

847
Debt (Scotland) Act 1932, the Hire-Purchase Act 1954 (in so far as it applies to Scotland) and the Credit-Sale Agreements (Scotland) Act 1961.")
Clause 21, page 22, line 31, leave out subsection (3) and insert—
("(4) The following provisions of this subsection shall have effect for the purpose of the construction of any reference (however expressed) in any enactment passed before this Act to a contract to which the Hire Purchase and Small Debt (Scotland) Act 1932 applied or would in certain circumstances have applied:—

(a) if the reference is a reference to a contract to which paragraph (a) of section 1 of that Act applied or would have applied, it shall be construed as a reference to a hire-purchase agreement within the meaning assigned to that expression by section 21(1) of the Act of 1938;

(b) if the reference is a reference to a contract to which paragraph (b) of the said section 1 applied or would have applied, it shall be construed as a reference to a conditional sale agreement within the meaning assigned to that expression by section 18(5) of this Act;

(c) if the context of the reference requires that it shall be construed as a reference only to a contract relating to an article within the limitation as to value specified in the said paragraph (a) or, as the case may be, the said paragraph (b) it shall be construed as a reference to a hire-purchase agreement (within the meaning assigned as aforesaid) under which the hire-purchase price does not exceed the limitation for the time being specified in section 1(1) of the Act of 1938 or, as the case may be, a conditional sale agreement (within the meaning assigned as aforesaid) under which the total purchase price does not exceed the limitation specified or referred to in section 18(2) of this Act;

(d) for the removal of doubt it is hereby declared that except as required by the last preceding paragraph no account is to be taken of section 1 of the Act of 1938, or section 2 or the proviso to section 18(2) of this Act, in construing any such reference;

(e) in relation to any such reference, expressions to which meanings are assigned by section 21(1) of the Act of 1938 shall in any enactment passed before this Act have the meanings so assigned to them respectively, unless the context otherwise requires; and any words defining the expressions 'purchaser' or 'instalment' for the purposes of any such reference shall be disregarded.")

Clause 22, page 23, line 2, leave out from ("Scotland") to end of line 6, and insert ("the provisions of this Act set out in the following Table shall extend to Scotland subject to the modifications specified in the next following subsection.

TABLE
Section 2.
Sections 4 to 10 and section (Re-delivery, and interim care of, goods comprised in notice of cancellation).
Section 12.
Section (Notice of hirer's default).
Sections 13 to 17.
Section 18(2) to (5).
Section (Legibility of documents).
Section 19.
Section 20 (in so far as it relates to the provisions mentioned in this Table).
Schedule 1.
(2) The modifications referred to in the preceding subsection are as follows:—")
Clause 21, page 22, line 17, at end insert—
("(d) for any reference to a personal representative there shall be substituted a reference to an executor.")
at end insert—
("()in section 9(3), for any reference to a condition or warranty there shall be substituted a reference to a stipulation.")
Clause 21, page 22, line 20, at end insert—
("()in section (Notice of hirer's default), subsection (8) and paragraph (a) of subsection (7) shall be omitted.")
Clause 21, page 22, leave out lines 22 and 23.
Clause 21, page 22, line 31, at end insert—
("(v)in subsection (4), the words from "and in relation to" to the end of the subsection shall be omitted.")
page 24, line 11, leave out ("Act of 1938") and insert ("Hire-Purchase Act 1938 as extended to Scotland.")
Clause 21, page 22, line 14, leave out ("£20") and insert ("£30".)
Clause 21, page 22, line 18, after ("signed") insert ("before two witnesses")
Clause 21, page 22, line 26, at end insert—
("()in section (Legibility of Documents)—

(i) in subsection (2)(d), the words "note or memorandum of a" and the words "paragraph (a) or paragraph (b) of", where those words second occur, shall be omitted; and

(ii) in subsection (5)(a), for the words "section 3(4) of this Act" there shall be substituted the words "section 2(3) or 3(3) of the Hire-Purchase Act 1938 as extended to Scotland".")

Clause 21, page 22, line 30, at end insert—
("(iii) in paragraph 6(2), for any reference to an assignment there shall be substituted a reference to an assignation.")
Clause 21, page 22, line 34, at end insert—
("(iv) paragraph 8A shall be omitted.")
page 24, line 38, leave out Clause 23 and insert the following new Clause—
Protection of purchasers of motor vehicles
(".—(1) The provisions of this section shall have effect where a motor vehicle has been let under a hire-purchase agreement, or has been agreed to be sold under a conditional sale agreement, and, at a time before the property in the vehicle has become vested in the hirer or buyer, he disposes of the vehicle to another person.
(2) Where the disposition referred to in the preceding subsection is to a private purchaser, and he is a purchaser of the motor vehicle in good faith and without notice of the hire-purchase agreement or conditional sale agreement, that disposition shall have effect as if the title of the owner or seller to the vehicle had been vested in the hirer or buyer immediately before that disposition.
(3) Where the person to whom the disposition referred to in subsection (1) of this section is made (in this subsection referred to as 'the original purchaser') is a trade or finance purchaser, then if the person who is the first private purchaser of the motor vehicle after that disposition (in this section referred to as 'the first private purchaser') is a purchaser of the vehicle in good faith and without notice of the hire-purchase agreement or conditional sale agreement, the disposition of the vehicle to the first private purchaser shall have effect as if the title of the owner or seller to the vehicle had been vested in the hirer or buyer immediately before he disposed of it to the original purchaser.
(4) Where, in a case falling within the last preceding subsection,—

(a) the disposition whereby the first private purchaser becomes a purchaser of the motor vehicle in good faith and without notice of the hire-purchase agreement or conditional sale agreement is itself a letting under a hire-purchase agreement, and

(b) the person who is the owner in relation to that agreement disposes of the vehicle to the first private purchaser or a person claiming under him, by way of transferring to him the property in the vehicle in pursuance of a provision in the agreement in that behalf,

the disposition referred to in paragraph (b) of this subsection (whether the person to whom it is made is then a purchaser in good faith and without notice of the original hire-purchase agreement or conditional sale agreement or not) shall, as well as the disposition referred to in paragraph (a) of this subsection, have effect as mentioned in the last preceding subsection.
(5) The preceding provisions of this section shall have effect—

(a) notwithstanding anything in section 21 of the Sale of Goods Act 1893 (which relates to the sale of goods by a person who is not the owner), but

(b) without prejudice to the provisions of the Factors Acts (as defined by section 62(1) of the said Act of 1893) or of any other enactment enabling the apparent owner of goods to dispose of them as if he were the true owner of the goods.

(6) Nothing in this section shall exonerate the hirer or buyer from any liability (whether criminal or civil) to which he would be subject apart from this section; and, in a case where the hirer or buyer disposes of the motor vehicle to a trade or finance purchaser, nothing in this section shall exonerate—

(a) that trade or finance purchaser, or

(b) any other trade or finance purchaser who becomes a purchaser of the vehicle and
850
is not a person claiming under the first private purchaser,

from any liability (whether criminal or civil) to which he would be subject apart from this section.")
After Clause 23, insert the following new clause:
Presumptions relating to dealings with motor vehicles
(" .—(1) Where in any proceedings (whether criminal or civil) relating to a motor vehicle it is proved—

(a) that the vehicle was let under a hire-purchase agreement, or was agreed to be sold under a conditional sale agreement, and

(b) that a person (whether a party to the proceedings or not) became a private purchaser of the vehicle in good faith and without notice of the hire-purchase agreement or conditional sale agreement,

the following provisions of this section shall have effect for the purposes of the operation of section (Protection of purchasers of motor vehicles) of this Act in relation to those proceedings.
(2) It shall be presumed for those purposes, unless the contrary is proved, that the disposition of the vehicle to the person referred to in paragraph (b) of the preceding subsection (in this section referred to as 'the relevant purchaser') was made by the hirer or buyer.
(3) If it is proved that that disposition was not made by the hirer or buyer, then it shall be presumed for those purposes, unless the contrary is proved—

(a) that the hirer or buyer disposed of the vehicle to a private purchaser who was a purchaser of the vehicle in good faith and without notice of the hire-purchase agreement or conditional sale agreement, and

(b) that the relevant purchaser is or was a person claiming under the person to whom the hirer or buyer so disposed of the vehicle.

(4) If it is provided that the disposition of the vehicle to the relevant purchaser was not made by the hirer or buyer, and that the person to whom the hirer or buyer disposed of the vehicle (in this subsection referred to as 'the original purchaser') was a trade or finance purchaser, then it shall be presumed for those purposes, unless the contrary is proved,—

(a) that the person who, afer the disposition of the vehicle to the original purchaser, first became a private purchaser of the vehicle was a purchaser in good faith and without notice of the hire-purchase agreement or conditional sale agreement, and

(b) that the relevant purchaser is or was a person claiming under the original purchaser.

(5) Without prejudice to any other mode of proof, where in any proceedings a party thereto admits a fact, that fact shall, for the purposes of this section, be taken as against him to be proved in relation to those proceedings.")
After Clause 23, insert the following new Clause:
Interpretation of Part III
(" .—(1) In this Part of this Act—
'conditional sale agreement' and 'seller' have the meanings assigned to them by section 18(5) of, and paragraph 6 of Schedule 1 to, this Act;
'disposition' means any sale or contract of sale (including a conditional sale agreement), any letting under a hire-purchase agreement and any transfer of the property in goods in pursuance of a provision in that behalf contained in a hire-purchase agreement, and includes any transaction purporting to be a disposition (as so defined), and 'disposed of' shall be construed accordingly;
'hire-purchase agreement' and 'owner' have the meanings assigned to them by section 21(1) of the Hire-Purchase Act 1938;
'motor vehicle' means a mechanically propelled vehicle intended or adapted for use on roads to which the public has access.
(2) In this Part of this Act 'trade or finance purchaser' means a purchaser who, at the time of the disposition made to him, carries on a business which consists, wholly or partly,—

(a) of purchasing motor vehicles for the purpose of offering or exposing them for sale, or

(b) of providing finance by purchasing motor vehicles for the purpose of letting them under hire-purchase agreements or agreeing to sell them under conditional sale agreements,

and 'private purchaser' means a purchaser who, at the time of the disposition made to him, does not carry on any such business.
(3) For the purposes of this Part of this Act a person becomes a purchaser of a motor vehicle if, and at the time when, a disposition of the vehicle is made to him; and a person shall be taken to be a purchaser of a motor vehicle without notice of a hire-purchase agreement or conditional sale agreement if, at the time of the disposition made to him, he has not actual notice that the vehicle is or was the subject of any hire-purchase agreement or conditional sale agreement.
(4) In this Part of this Act 'the hirer or buyer'—

(a) in relation to a motor vehicle which has been let under a hire-purchase agreement, means the person who at the material time (whether the agreement has before that time been terminated or not) is the hirer in relation to that agreement for the purposes of the Hire-Purchase Act 1938, including a person who at that time is, by virtue of section 13(1) of that Act, deemed to be a bailee of the vehicle as therein mentioned;

(b) in relation to a motor vehicle which has been agreed to be sold under a conditional sale agreement, means the person who at the material time (whether the agreement has before that time been terminated or not) is in relation to that agreement the buyer (as defined by para-
852
graph 6 of Schedule 1 to this Act), including a person who at that time is, by virtue of section 13(1) of the Hire-Purchase Act 1938 (as modified by paragraph 4 of that Schedule), deemed to be in possession of the vehicle as therein mentioned.

(5) In this Part of this Act any reference to the title of the owner or seller to a motor vehicle which has been let under a hire-purchase agreement, or agreed to be sold under a conditional sale agreement, and is disposed of by the hirer or buyer, is a reference to such title (if any) to the vehicle as, immediately before that disposition, was vested in the person who then was the owner in relation to the hire-purchase agreement, or the seller in relation to the conditional sale agreement, as the case may be.
(6) In the application to Scotland of subsection (4) of this section, for the word 'bailee' there shall be substituted the word 'custodier'.")
Leave out Clause 24.
Leave out Clause 25.
Leave out Clause 26.
Leave out Clause 27.
Clause 32, page 31, line 41, at end insert—
("(3) For the removal of doubt it is hereby declared that no account is to be taken of section 1 of the principal Act, or of section 2 of this Act, for the purpose of construing any enactment whereby (however the enactment is expressed) it is provided that in the enactment (or, if the enactment extends to Scotland, in the enactment in its application to England and Wales) 'hire-purchase agreement', or any similar expression, has the same meaning as 'hire-purchase agreement' has in the principal Act or the definition of 'hire-purchase agreement' in the principal Act is otherwise applied for the purposes of the enactment:
Provided that this subsection shall not affect the construction of—

(a) any enactment (not contained in this Act) which expressly refers to hire-purchase agreements 'to which the Hire-Purchase Act 1938 applies', or

(b) any reference in this Act to hire-purchase agreements to which the principal Act applies.")

Clause 33, page 32, line 12, at end insert—
("(3) The provisions of Part III of this Act—

(a) shall have effect in relation to hire-purchase agreements and conditional sale agreements made before, as well as in relation to such agreements made after, the commencement of this Act, but

(b) shall not have effect where the disposition by the hirer or buyer which is referred to in subsection (1) of section (Protection of purchasers of motor vehicles) of this Act was made before the commencement of this Act.")

After Clause 33, insert the following new clause:
Commencement
(" .—(1) Subject to the following provisions of this section, this Act shall come into operation on 1st January 1965.
(2) This section, any provisions of this Act which confer any power to make regulations (including any provision conferring such a power by way of amendment of another Act) and any provisions of this Act relating to the exercise of any such power shall come into operation on the passing of this Act; but no regulations shall be made in pursuance of any such provisions so as to come into operation before 1st January 1965.
(3) Any reference in this Act, and (notwithstanding anything in section 36 of the Interpretation Act 1889) any reference in any Act passed after the passing of this Act, to the commencement of this Act shall be construed as a reference to 1st January 1965.
(4) The preceding provisions of this section shall have effect without prejudice to the generality of section 37 of the Interpretation Act 1889 (which relates to the exercise of statutory powers between the passing and the commencement of an Act).")
Clause 34, page 32, line 23, leave out subsection (4)
Clause 34, page 32,line 31, leave out subsection (7).
Schedule 1, page 33, line 23, at end insert—
("(2) In accordance with the preceding subparagraph {and without prejudice to the generality thereof) in section 4(1) of this Act the reference to a document which, if executed by or on behalf of another person as owner of the goods to which it relates, would constitute a hire-purchase agreement to which the principal Act applies shall be construed as including a reference to a document which, if executed by or on behalf of another person as seller of the goods to which it relates, would constitute such a conditional sale agreement as is mentioned in section 18(3) of this Act.")
Schedule 1, page 33,line 25, after ("bailment") insert ("and in section (Notice of hirer's default) of this Act the words 'or the bailment of the goods' in subsections (2) and (5) and the words 'or the bailment' in the second place where they occur in subsection (5)")
Schedule 1, page 33,line 35, leave out from ("Where") to end of line 40 and insert ("goods have been sold under a conditional sale agreement and the property in the goods, having become vested in the buyer, is transferred to a person who does not become the buyer under the agreement, the buyer shall no longer be entitled to determine the agreement under section 4 of the principal Act.
(2) Subject to the preceding sub-paragraph, where a buyer under a conditional sale agreement determines the agreement under section 4 of the principal Act after the property in the goods has become vested in him, the property in the goods shall thereupon vest in the person (in this sub-paragraph referred to as 'the previous owner') in whom it was vested immediately before it became vested in the buyer")
Schedule 1, page 33, line 46, at end insert—
(" 6.—(1) The definitions of 'buyer' and 'seller' in section 21(1) of the principal Act shall not apply to conditional sale agreements.
(2) In this Part of this Schedule—
(a) 'buyer', in relation to a conditional sale agreement means the person who agrees to purchase goods under the agreement and includes a person to whom the rights or liabilities of that person under the agreement have passed by assignment or by operation of law;
'seller', in relation to a conditional sale agreement, means the person who agrees to sell goods under the agreement and includes a person (other than the buyer) to whom that person's property in the goods or any of that person's rights or liabilities under the agreement has passed by assignment or by operation of law.")
Schedule 1, page 34, line 4, leave out from ("means") to third ("of") in line 5 and insert ("a conditional sale agreement, as defined by subsection (5) of section 18 of this Act, in relation to which the provisions of Part I of this Act have effect in accordance with subsection (3)")
Schedule 1, page 34, line 6, at end insert ("and 'buyer' and 'seller' have the meanings assigned to them by paragraph 6 of this Schedule")
Schedule 1, page 34, line 13, at end insert—
("8A.—(1) Section 11(1)(c) of the Sale of Goods Act 1893 (whereby in certain circumstances a breach of a condition in a contract of sale is to be treated only as a breach of warranty) shall not apply to a conditional sale agreement.
(2) A breach of a condition (whether express or implied) to be fulfilled by the seller under a conditional sale agreement shall be treated as a breach of warranty, and not as grounds for rejecting the goods and treating the agreement as repudiated, if (but only if) it would have fallen to be so treated had the condition been contained or implied in a corresponding hire-purchase agreement as a condition to be fulfilled by the owner.
(3) In this paragraph 'corresponding hire-purchase agreement' means a hire-purchase agreement relating to the same goods as the conditional sale agreement and made between the same parties and at the same time and in the same circumstances and, as nearly as may be, in the same terms as the conditional sale agreement.")
Schedule 1, page 34, line 21, at end insert ("as well as a reference to payments in respect of two or more conditional sale agreements")
Schedule 1, page 34, line 29, at end insert ("or both are conditional sale agreements")
Schedule 2, page 35, line 8, after ("1938") insert—
("(a)")
Schedule 2, page 35, line 10, leave out ("and") and insert—
("(b) at the end of subsection (1) there shall be added the words:—
'Provided that nothing in this subsection shall be taken to confer on an owner any

855
right to recover, otherwise than by action, possession of any goods let under a hire-purchase agreement where one-third of the hire-purchase price has not been paid or tendered as aforesaid'; and
(c)")
Schedule 2, page 35, line 12, leave out from ("1938") to ("for") in line 14, and insert—
("(a) for subsection (1) there shall be substituted the following subsections—
'(1) The following provisions of this section shall apply, in a case to which the last foregoing section applies, where the owner commences an action to enforce a right to recover possession of any of the goods from the hirer after one-third of the hire-purchase price has been paid or tendered as aforesaid.
(1A) After such an action has been commenced the owner shall not take any steps to enforce payment of any sum due under the hire-purchase agreement or under any contract of guarantee relating thereto, except by claiming the said sum in the said action'; and
(b).")
Schedule 2, page 35, line 23, after ("Act") insert ("and the words 'and in subsection (1) of section (Jurisdiction of County Court) of the Hire-Purchase Act 1964'")
Schedule 2, page 35, line 26, leave out from beginning to ("which") in line 28 and insert—
("19A.—(1) Subject to the following provisions of this section, where goods have been let under a hire-purchase agreement to which this Act applies and the owner brings or institutes an action to enforce a right to recover possession of any of the goods from the hirer, the action shall be brought or instituted in the sheriff court for the district in which the hirer resides or carries on business or resided or carried on business at the date on which he last made a payment under the hire-purchase agreement.
(2) No cause, action or proceeding on or arising out of any hire-purchase agreement to which this Act applies or credit-sale agreement to which this Act applies.")
Schedule 2, page 36, line 4, at end insert—
("13. In the Schedule to the Act of 1938—

(a) in the second paragraph 1, the words from the beginning to 'has been paid, then]' shall be omitted; and

(b) in the second paragraph 2, after the word 'If', in the first place where it occurs, there shall be inserted the words '*[after (here insert an amount calculated in accordance with the provisions of sections 11 and 19 of this Act) has been paid]'; and after the word 'court', in the second place where it occurs, there shall be inserted the words '(under powers conferred by the Hire-Purchase (Scotland) Acts 1938 to 1964)'.")

Schedule 2, page 35, line 25, after ("which") insert ("on being signed as mentioned in subsection (2)(a) of this section")
Schedule 2, page 35,line 30, leave out from first ("the") to first ("in") in line 31 and insert ("location of those words")
Schedule 2, page 35,line 32, at end insert ("and may prescribe such other requirements (whether as to type, size, colour or disposition of lettering or otherwise) as the Board may consider appropriate for securing that the words come to the attention of the hirer at the time when he is about to sign the document")
Schedule 2, page 35,line 44, leave out ("£20") and insert ("£30")
Schedule 2, page 35, line 47, after ("reference") insert ("to paragraph (a) or")
Schedule 2, page 35, line 48, after ("reference") insert ("to paragraph (a) or, as the case may be,")
Schedule page 39, line 28, leave out ("immediately before or")
Schedule 2, line 31, at end insert ("the agreement having been signed by or on behalf of all other parties before it is signed by the hirer, that copy is delivered to him immediately after he signs the agreement, or")
Schedule 2, page 40, line 2, after ("which") insert ("on being signed as mentioned in subsection (2)(a) of this section")
Schedule 2, page 35, line 6, leave out from ("the") to ("in") in line 7 and insert ("location of those words")
Schedule 2, page 35, line 8, at end insert ("and may prescribe such other requirements (whether as to type, size, colour or disposition of lettering or otherwise) as the Board may consider appropriate for securing that the words come to the attention of the hirer at the time when he is about to sign the document")
Schedule 2, page 35, line 17, leave out ("£20") and insert ("£30")
Schedule 2, page 35, line 33, leave out ("£20") and insert ("£30")
Schedule 2, page 41, line 10, leave out ("immediately before or")
Schedule 2, page 35, line 11, leave out ("a") and insert ("the")
Schedule 2, page 35, line 13, at end insert ("the agreement having been signed by or on behalf of all other parties before it is signed by the buyer, that copy is delivered to him immediately after he signs the agreement, or")
Schedule 2, page 35, line 35, leave out ("£20") and insert ("£30")
Schedule 2, page 35, line 38, after ("reference") insert ("to paragraph (a) or")
Schedule 2, page 35, line 39, after ("reference") insert ("to paragraph (a) or, as the case may be,")
Schedule 2, page 35, line 51, at end insert—
("Provided that, if the court is satisfied in any action that a sum less than the amount by which one-half of the hire-purchase price exceeds the total of the sums paid and the sums due in respect of the hire-purchase price immediately before the termination would be equal to the loss sustained by the owner in consequence of the termination of the agreement by the hirer, the court may make an order for the payment of that sum in lieu of that amount.")
Schedule 2, page 42, line 27, leave out from ("is") to ("or") in line 30 and insert ("(apart from any liability which has accrued before the termination) subject to a liability to pay an amount which exceeds whichever is the lesser of the two following amounts, that is to say, the amount first mentioned in section 4(1) of this Act and an amount equal to the loss sustained by the owner in consequence of the termination of the agreement,")
Schedule 2, page 43, line 1, leave out ("£20") and insert ("£30")
Schedule 2, page 44, leave out lines 9 to 12 and insert:—
("(2) Where the hirer, whether expressly or by implication,—

(a) has made known to the owner, or to a servant or agent of the owner, the particular purpose for which the goods are required, or

(b) in the course of any antecedent negotiations has made that purpose known to any other person by whom those negotiations were conducted, or to a servant or agent of such a person,

there shall be an implied stipulation that the goods shall be reasonably fit for that purpose.
Section 20(2) of the Hire-Purchase Act 1964 shall apply for the purposes of this subsection as it applies for the purposes of Part I of that Act.")
Schedule 2, page 45, line 18, after ("of") insert ("any of")
Schedule 2, page 45, line 19, at end insert ("Provided that nothing in this subsection shall be taken to confer on an owner any right to recover, otherwise than by action, possession of any goods let under a hire-purchase agreement where one-third of the hire-purchase price has not been paid or tendered as aforesaid.")
Schedule 2, page 45, leave out lines 33 to 44 and insert—
("12.—(1) The following provisions of this section shall apply, in a case to which the last foregoing section applies, where the owner commences an action to enforce a right to recover possession of any of the goods from the hirer after one-third of the hire-purchase price has been paid or tendered as aforesaid.
(1A) After such an action has been commenced the owner shall not take any steps to enforce payment of any sum due under the hire-purchase agreement, or under any contract of guarantee relating thereto, except by claiming the said sum in the said action.")
Schedule 2, page 49, line 9, leave out ("comprising those goods") and insert ("relating to the whole or any part of those goods (with or without other goods)")
Schedule 2, page 49, line 11, leave out ("from the commencement thereof") and insert ("if in section 11(1) of this Act the words from 'and one-third' to 'any guarantor' and in section 12(1) of this Act the words 'after one-third of the hire-purchase price has been paid or tendered as aforesaid', were omitted")
Schedule 2, page 49, line 32, leave out from beginning to ("which") in line 33 and insert—
858
("19A.—(1) Subject to the following provisions of this section, where goods have been let under a hire-purchase agreement to which this Act applies and the owner brings or institutes an action to enforce a right to recover possession of any of the goods from the hirer, the action shall be brought or instituted in the sheriff court for the district in which the hirer resides or carries on business or resided or carried on business at the date on which he last made a payment under the hire-purchase agreement.
(2) No cause, action or proceeding on or arising out of any hire-purchase agreement to which this Act applies or credit-sale agreement to which this Act applies.")
Schedule 2, page 51, line 29, after ("Act") insert ("apart from the proviso to subsection (1) of section 4")
at end insert ("unless the court determines that a smaller sum would be equal to the owner's loss.")
Schedule 2, page 51, line 29, leave out lines 39 and 40.
Schedule 2, page 52, line 1, after ("If") insert ("*[after (here insert an amount calculated in accordance with the provisions of sections 11 and 19 of this Act) has been paid]")
Schedule 2, page 52, line 2, after first ("court") insert ("(under powers conferred by the Hire-Purchase (Scotland) Acts 1938 to 1964)")
Schedule 4, page 53, line 21, leave out ("twenty") and insert ("thirty")
Schedule 4, page 52, line 32, at end insert—
("In section 5, in paragraph (c) for the words from 'subject to a liability' to the end of the paragraph there shall be substituted the words '(apart from any liability which has accrued before the termination) subject to a liability to pay an amount which exceeds whichever is the lesser of the two following amounts, that is to say, the amount first mentioned in section 4(1) of this Act and an amount equal to the loss sustained by the owner in consequence of the termination of the agreement or bailment'.")
Schedule 2, page 52, line 40, leave out ("twenty") and insert ("thirty")
Schedule 2, page 52, line 46, at end insert ("In section 11(1), after the words 'possession of' there shall be inserted the words 'any of'")
Schedule 2, page 52, line 46, at end insert—
("in section 15, for the words 'comprising those goods' there shall be substituted the words 'relating to the whole or any part of those goods (with or without other goods)', and for the words 'as from the commencement thereof' there shall be substituted the words 'as if in section 11(1) of this Act the words from "and one-third" to "any guarantor", and in section 12(1) of this Act the words "after one-third of the hire-purchase price has been paid or tendered as aforesaid", were omitted'.")
Schedule 2, page 52, line 50, at end insert ("after the words 'section twelve of this Act' there shall be inserted the words 'or section

859
(Jurisdiction of County Court) of the Hire-Purchase Act 1964', and after the words 'the said section' there shall be inserted the words 'twelve or section (Jurisdiction of County Court),as the case may be'")
Schedule 2, page 52, line 52, at end insert— ("In section 19(1), after the words 'this Act', in the third place where they occur, there shall be inserted the words 'and in subsection (1) of section (Jurisdiction of County Court) of the Hire-Purchase Act 1964'.")
Schedule 2, page 54, line 13, at end insert—
("In the Schedule, in the first paragraph 2, after the word 'Act', there shall be inserted the words 'apart from the proviso to subsection (1) of section four', and at the end there shall be added the words 'unless the court determines that a smaller sum would be equal to the owner's loss'.")
Schedule 2, page 54, line 13,leave out lines 19 to 26
Schedule 6, Page 56, line 23, at end insert—
("(a) Section (Notice of hirer's default) except in relation to a default committed before the commencement of this Act")
Schedule 6, Page 56, line 26, after ("16") insert ("and section (Jurisdiction of County Court)")
Schedule 6, Page 56, line 42, leave out from ("the") to end of line and insert ("coming into operation of that Order.
(2) In relation to any such agreement as is mentioned in the preceding sub-paragraph, whether made before, on or after the date on which the Order comes into operation,—
(a) section (Notice of hirer's default) of this Act shall apply, except in the case of a default committed before that date.")
Schedule 6, Page 56, line 45, after ("16") insert ("and section (Jurisdiction of County Court)")
Schedule 7, page 58, line 1, leave out ("and 15") and insert ("15 and 19A(1)")
Schedule 7, page 58, line 5, at end insert ("(e) Section (Notice of hirer's default) of this Act except in relation to a default committed before the commencement of this Act")
Schedule 7, page 58, line 11, after first ("Act") insert ("section 21(4) of this Act,")
Schedule 7, page 58, line 31, leave out ("and 15") and insert ("15 and 19A(1)")
Schedule 7, page 58, line 35, at end insert ("(e) section (Notice of hirer's default) of this Act, except in relation to a default committed before the date on which that order comes into operation")
line 41, at end, insert—
("(2) The preceding sub-paragraph shall apply to any such agreement as is therein mentioned, whether the agreement was made before, on or after the date on which the Order comes into operation.")
LORD DRUMALBYN: My Lords, I beg to move that the House doth agree with the Commons in the said Amendments.
Moved, That the House doth agree with the Commons in the said Amendments.—(Lord Drumalbyn.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

MALICIOUS DAMAGE BILL
Brought from the Commons; read 1a, and to be printed.
FINANCE BILL
Brought from the Commons; read 1a, and to be printed.
REFRESHMENT HOUSES BILL
Brought from the Commons; read 1a, and to be printed.

PHARMACY BILL
3.41 p.m.
Order of the Day for the House to be put into Committee read.
Moved, That the House do now resolve itself into Committee.—(Lord Grenfell.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.
House in Committee accordingly.
[The LORD MERTHYR in the Chair.]
THE CHAIRMAN OF COMMITTEES: May I point out to the Committee that if Amendment No. 1 is agreed to, Amendment No. 2 could not be called, and Amendment No. 3 might need an alteration before it could be put.
Clause 1:
Amendment of section 14 of Pharmacy Act 1954. 2 & 3 Eliz, 2. c. 61.
1. Section 14 of the Pharmacy Act 1954 (which provides that every registered pharmaceutical chemist shall, by virtue of registration, be a member of the Pharmaceutical Society of Great Britain) shall be amended by the insertion at the end thereof of the following proviso:
"Provided that any person who satifies the registrar—

(a) that he has a conscientious objection to being a member of the Society, and

(b) that his conscientious objection is based upon religious beliefs which he shares with others,

shall not by virtue of registration become a member of the Society or, if he is a member of the Society, shall cease to be a member thereof".
VISCOUNT HANWORTHmoved to leave out all words after "Britain)" and insert "is hereby repealed." The noble Viscount said: The effect of this Amendment makes it possible to register and practise without being a Member of the Pharmaceutical Society. This Amendment has been called a wrecking Amendment, but I did not put it down with that end primarily in view, though I would say now that I feel most strongly that this Bill should not pass. I should like to consider that aspect of the question a little before actually speaking on the details of this Amendment.
I abstained from voting in the Division recently, but I have reconsidered the matter and feel, for a number of reasons, that it would be most unwise to pass this Bill. In the first place, I do not think it is an issue of discrimination against a religious society, because it is they who are discriminating against our society. In these circumstances, I think we are entitled to take in to account their merits as citizens and their importance as a minority. But there is an even more important reason why I think this Bill should not stand as it is at present. It is really the thin end of a wedge. The associate membership of many societies —and I quote in particular that of accountants—is required in a number of jobs. In other words, one has little prospect of obtaining certain posts and appointments unless one can say that one has the associate membership of one or two of these professional bodies. That applies to engineers as well.
I think there are a number of other religious societies who for a long time have been labouring under minor disadvantages, none of which they felt it right to raise. If we pass this Bill, I see no logical reason why it should stop short of the Pharmaceutical Society associate membership or the equivalent membership required in the other learned bodies. I feel that many other of the smaller religious sects would feel that they, in turn, could rightly ask for a similar type of help. Mr. Stanley, leader of the Exclusive Brethren, in a letter of June 30 said:
"With one exception, every one of my fellow Christians who owned a chemist's business has either sold the business or converted it into a non-pharmaceutical business if he has not been able to sell it."
It is not a case of 26 Exclusive Brethren who cannot dispense poisons; and until
862
Mr. Taylor recently came from America there was no difficulty on this question. He stirred things up, and I think it might be profitable to make inquiries as to what his motives were, and possibly as to his general character.
If we pass this Bill, I feel that we are not only leaning over backwards to help a small religious minority; I should say we were falling over backwards to do so. An argument has been put forward that if we do not do so the Exclusive Brethren may feel that they are martyrs. Personally, I think it would be much better that they should have this feeling rather than that they should be heroes and champions. I might also say what the position was when this matter came up in another place. In 1963 no Conservative M.P. would sponsor the Bill. One Labour M.P. did so ultimately, but decided not to move the Second Reading.
Now I should like to speak on the actual effect of this Amendment and why I put it down. I think it is wrong in principle to require the membership of a society. Article 20 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, issued by the United Nations, says:
"No one may be compelled to belong to an association."
There are plenty of other alternatives: one is, the payment of a registration fee, plus a yearly practising fee. This, I feel, is much more equitable. It distinguishes between money required to administer the profession and that required by the society as such. One of the arguments put forward on this point is that the whole matter was looked at carefully in 1930. I suspect that the present arrangement was agreed as a matter of administrative convenience. But the fact that this was done in 1930 makes me feel that it should be looked at again very carefully. Apart from the Pharmaceutical Society, I think the Veterinary Society and the Law Inns, there is, to the best of my knowledge, no other society or institution which manages its affairs in this way. I feel that on principle this matter should be looked at, and unless we press this Amendment to a Division it is very unlikely that it will receive the consideration which it ought to have.
I should like to deal for a moment or two with one or two of the objections

863
put forward by the Pharmaceutical Society. They say, first of all:
"This separation is contrary to the findings of the Departmental Committee which inquired into the workings of the Pharmacy Act and reported in 1930 in favour of the identification of membership and registration."
I have already said that the fact that this was in 1930 makes me feel that it should seriously be reconsidered. They say:
"This identification has been a source of great strength to pharmacy. There is no demand among members of the Society for an alteration."
Probably there are few members who would in fact leave the Society now, and the threat of a decreasing membership is probably not a real one. Even if it were, I suggest the alternative of a yearly practising fee. They state also:
"The organisation of pharmacy in Great Britain is based upon this identification and to do away with it would mean a complete recasting of the Society's constitution. The change would involve a major recasting of Pharmacy Acts."
This may be so, but, as your Lordships will see a little later, I do not think the whole matter has been considered in any great detail.
They then said that the change would represent the abandonment of a new statutory principle adopted for the Pharmacy Act, 1933, and subsequently followed for veterinary surgery, and that it may well be a pattern which should be developed for other professions, rather than curtailed. This is precisely the point I am making. On a matter of principle, I think that this should not be allowed to continue if it can be altered without any serious harm being done. They then said:
"The effect of this change would be so fundamental that it deserves that no Amendment with such an effect should be contemplated until there has been a full examination of the many implications."
My reason for pressing this Amendment is precisely that these various factors should receive full consideration. Unless we pass this Amendment I am reasonably certain that there is very little chance of that ever being so. I beg to move.
Amendment moved.
Page 1, line 8, leave out from ("Britain)") to end of line 17 and insert ("is hereby repealed.")—(Viscount Hanworth.)
3.52 p.m.
BARONESS SUMMERSKILL: I have considered this Amendment very carefully and I agree with very much of what the noble Viscount has said. Having listened to the Second Reading of the debate of this Bill we all appreciate that. I think an important fact is that the Pharmaceutical Society is not blameless in this matter. They have behaved in a most inefficient way; and their officials have behaved in a way which astonishes me because they slipped this Bill through another place without its being revealed at any one stage—Second Reading, Committee stage or Third Reading—that the people with whom we were dealing were this tiny little sect of 26 people called the Exclusive Brethren.
LORD GRENFELL: May I interrupt the noble Lady? I am very sorry, but I may say that the Pharmaceutical Society did not slip this Bill through the House. It was put through on behalf of the Exclusive Brethren. The Pharmaceutical Society have been perfectly neutral the whole time about the Bill. I had to put that right.
BARONESS SUMMERSKILL: The noble Lord is being very kind. The Pharmaceutical Society have, of course, circularised us all and said in the first sentence of the circular that they were neutral. People who are neutral do not immediately circularise every Member of this House and ask them to take certain action. That is surely not the action of a neutral body. I would point out to noble Lords that the Secretary of the Pharmaceutical Society is a Member of the other place, and he sat there throughout the debate but was remarkably quiet. Only when the Bill came to this House and was analysed and they did not get their way did the Pharmaceutical Society move from a neutral position—and they moved very fast. They had a remarkable amount of literature printed in a very short time and have directed us how to act. That, in my opinion, is a remarkable way for a neutral body to behave.
I fully appreciate the point that is being put in this Amendment and I had to think very carefully what my attitude would be. But may I point out to noble Lords that this Bill in the first place was presented for a certain purpose; and should we, therefore, take action so that we destroy the constitution of the Pharmaceutical Society through an Amendment?

865
If it could be proved that some dictator, some rather stupid official in the Pharmaceutical Society—I have now discovered that there are just under 30,000 members —had said to all the members that in future registration and membership should be identical, that he or a small committee had behaved in an arbitrary fashion and had imposed this on the membership, I should immediately support this Amendment.
But what are the facts. The facts are that in 1930 a very powerful Departmental Committee was set up which inquired into the working of the Pharmacy Act and then, after a long time, reported in 1930 in favour of the identification of membership and registration. Are we to-day entirely to dismiss the findings of that Committee? I have been told since the Second Reading that the other
organisation which regards registration as identical to membership is the Veterinary Society. I am not in a position to say, because we really have not had time to make inquiries to find out, why these two powerful and reputable organisations should feel that this is the right approach. I must confess this afternoon that I am a little diffident, because I feel as aggrieved as many noble Lords here about the way in which this Bill was conducted in the other place. I feel that we should be a little irresponsible if we said in an Amendment that we reject the findings of the Departmental Committee which decided that this was the best way to conduct the business of the Pharmaceutical Society. Therefore I am afraid that I will oppose the Amendment, but I will support the next two Amendments.
When I made a remark about things being slipped through, I certainly did not apply it to the noble Lord, Lord Grenfell, who interrupted, because when he rose in this House he made it quite clear that he was dealing with this sect, and did not attempt to deceive us. It was then that we realised that we were being asked to pass a Bill in favour of a tiny sect who were demanding privileged treatment. But, in view of the fact that the constitution of the Pharmaceutical Society was
recommended by such a powerful and responsible body. I cannot, just in this rather arbitrary fashion, dismiss it.
3.58 p.m.
LORD SILKIN: I am sorry to find myself in disagreement with my noble friend on this Amendment, although I supported her on the Second Reading when we sought to reject the Bill. Nor do I find myself in agreement with her remarks about the Pharmaceutical Society. I think they were neutral until they found this Amendment was on the Paper, and they quite properly circularised noble Lords to inform them, as they were entitled to do, that they did not approve of this Amendment and of what would be the consequence of our passing it. I have carefully read their memorandum and I am prepared myself to face the consequence of passing this Amendment, and I think it is right that we should.
What are we asking the Committee to say? Here is a professional body, the Pharmaceutical Society, which, with possibly one excepttion (I do not know about the Veterinary Society), is unique in insisting that those who pass the examinations and become registered also become members of the professional body. The difficulty arises because a few people object to being members of the professional body. How it has come about I do not know, because this has been law for a very long time and, so far as I know, nobody has ever disagreed about it. But I think it is time the law was changed. My noble friend referred to a Committee in 1930. It may be that they were fully justified in the findings that they made in 1930, but we are now in 1964. Circumstances may well have changed. I think the time has come when people who are registered as pharmacists should be free to choose for themselves whether they want to become members of the Society or not. After all, that is the spirit of this Bill. This Bill wants to give certain people freedom to opt out of membership of the Society. I want to give everybody freedom to opt out if they so desire.
What would be the consequences of it I do not know. The Pharmaceutical Society must face up to freedom of membership just as all other organisations do. The Law Society, of which I am a member, does not insist on solicitors being members. They manage to get along quite well by giving their

867
people complete freedom to join or not to join. Whether you are a member or not, you are still subject to the jurisdiction of the Law Society, and presumably pharmacists will still be subject to the jurisdiction of the Pharmaceutical Society for disciplinary purposes. Nobody wants to take that away. But the object of this Amendment is to give everybody complete freedom to be a member or not, whether on religious grounds, conscientious grounds or other grounds. I hope this is a principle which will appeal to noble Lords in this House.
4.2 p.m.
LORD SPENS: So far as I can make out, this is the first time in either House of Parliament that the question of compulsory membership of a body on registration has ever been discussed. I have taken the trouble to go into the history both of the 1933 Act and of the 1954 Act; and although the 1933 Act was in fact founded on the Departmental Committee's report, it was introduced into this House by the then Lord Lucan. He drew attention to the two important provisions: that registration and membership of the Society were to go together, and that there was to be a disciplinary committee. But nobody else discussed either of those points. And when the Bill went to another place it was introduced somewhere about 12.55 a.m. one day, by the then Home Secretary, I think it was, and except for a very spirited protest by the late Mr. Michael Bowman not a soul spoke on the Bill. The 1954 Bill was a consolidation measure, and therefore there was little or no discussion in either House. And so we get the principle of Section 14 of the 1954 Act being discussed for the first time in this House. It is, of course, really a unique society that compels everyone to belong who desires to practise that particular profession. In the case of my profession we do it rather the other way round: we introduce them as students and they go forward and have to qualify under our examination for call to the Bar and practice. As regards other societies, this is the only one of which I am aware with a rule that a member of the profession must join the professional association.
My difficulty, quite frankly, about this matter is that at the time the 1933 Act
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went through I had only just got into the other place. If I felt myself free to discuss the compulsory registration of membership of a professional body I should certainly vote against it, for the first time. But I still feel that all who know anything about it have very great respect for this particular Society. They have run their profession for the last 31 years and have undoubtedly improved the standards in every kind of way. Therefore, I personally should be very sorry to see us, with, after all, what has been comparatively little time and consideration, put that Society into the position it undoubtedly would be in if we passed this particular Amendment. It is for that reason I personally propose to vote against this Amendment in hopes that the Committee will consider favourably the next Amendment. Because—and let there be no mistake about it—I most strongly object to the only exception to a general law for the land being given to one or more bodies, based on religious, sectarian views.
LORD TAYLOR: I greatly sympathise, and agree almost entirely, with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Spens. If we carry this Amendment we shall, in fact, wreck the Bill, and I feel certain that the sponsors of the Bill would wish to withdraw it. So we should achieve absolutely nothing. We should not in fact liberalise the Pharmaceutical Society in any way, nor should we make it possible for people to object on the grounds of conscience to belonging to it. Therefore I hope we shall not carry this Amendment, though I must say that I can see a case for wrecking the Bill if one dislikes the Exclusive Brethren strongly enough. My feeling is that here is a chance to do a little good, and that the little good is worth doing; that is, to make it possible for people to opt out of membership of the Pharmaceutical Society on grounds of conscience, provided that they are still required to pay the subscription in the same way as every other pharmacist does. This would be a worthwhile advance towards non-compulsory membership of a body, and this would be a fruitful product of this small Bill.
LORD CONESFORD: I think this is a difficult question, and I should like to say that I propose, as at present advised, to vote for this Amendment, though my

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name is associated with the next. As I see it, it is a very striking fact that the Amendments that have been put down have been put down by those who supported the Second. Reading, those who opposed and even by one who abstained. What was common to all was the thought that the Bill as it stands was intolerable. The Bill as it stands has no principle whatsoever that has ever been approved by Parliament, so far as I know, at any time. In order to introduce a tolerable principle into the Bill we can do one of two things, and they are embodied in the first two Amendments. Instead of adding a proviso to Section 14 of the Pharmacy Act, 1954, we can repeal it. That is one way of introducing principle into the Bill. The second is to allow a principle of conscientious objection which, unlike that at present in the Bill, has some parallel in our law.
Might I correct one point made by my noble and learned friend Lord Spens? I think there are two other Statutes which contain a similar provision to that which this Amendment proposes to repeal. They are the Legal Aid and Solicitors (Scotland) Act, 1949, which so treats the Law Society of Scotland, and the Veterinary Surgeons Act, 1948, Section 1 of which has a similar effect to that of the Section 14 which this Amendment proposes to repeal. Those are the only exceptions to the rule that it is not automatic that you become a member of a Society on becoming a registered practitioner in a profession. I think that that will be borne out by my noble friend who will give the Government view. The principle is almost unparalleled.
I think it is worth seeing what was the argument of the Committee that proposed that this should be incorporated in the law. It will be found in the second paragraph of Paragraph 20 of the Report of the Departmental Committee. Perhaps I might read it:
"Under the Society's present constitution members are elected on their application, by the Council from among those who are registered as 'pharmaceutical chemists,' and 'Chemists and Druggists.' At present, it appears that there are only 12,500 members out of 20,000 eligible for membership. This is, in our opinion, an element of weakness both to the Society and the profession of pharmacy, which it would be well to remove. It is now proposed that registered persons
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should, by virtue of registration, become members of the Society."
That is the only reason given, so far as I know, in the Report—that it was in the interests of easy membership of the Society. The question is: is that good enough? In common with all other noble Lords who have spoken, I feel some sympathy with the Pharmaceutical Society in this matter because, whether they ought or ought not to have realised the danger of being neutral about this Bill, it is quite clear that they were not alive to all the implications. But if we introduce the principle of this Amendment into this Bill, that will not be the final and last word. It will still be for this House or for another place to say whether, this Amendment having been incorporated in the Bill, they want the Bill or not.
It is not for me to say what either House is likely to do, but I think it is so essential to introduce some principle into this Bill that we must carry one or other of these two Amendments; and as this will be the first to be voted on I propose to vote on it, though I shall certainly, if it fails, speak and vote on the second. As the second cannot arise if we succeed in the Division on the first, I should like just to say one word about the second Amendment by way of anticipation. I have been unable to discover any Statute—and we have had Statutes that recognise conscientious objection—that has ever thought it necessary to mention religion in this connection. Still less am I able to grasp exactly what is the principle of having a conscientious objection based on religious grounds, but having to show that there are others who agree with you. That I say merely by way of anticipation.
What I say is that either this Amendment or the next introduces an arguable principle into this measure. At present it has none. I propose, therefore, to vote for each of these Amendments—this one because it is the first one that gives me the chance of introducing a principle. If it fails, I shall speak and vote on the second. But in reply to both the noble Baroness and my noble and learned friend Lord Spens, I think it is worth reminding the Committee that, if we pass this Amendment, neither House will have yet disposed of the Bill; it will still be for Parliament to say

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whether they desire this Bill to continue with this Amendment.
4.16 p.m.
LORD WILLIAMS OF BARNBURGH: It seems to me that the Committee is in a peculiar position this afternoon. The noble Lord who has just addressed your Lordships tells us that there are only two examples dealing with the Pharmacy Act, 1954, one being the Veterinary Surgeons Act, 1948, the responsibility for negotiating which through another place was mine. I do not recall that through, out the subsequent sixteen years there has been any complaint against the Act as it has existed from 1948 down to to-day. If that is the case, then clearly there must be a strong case for repealing the Pharmacy Act, either to-day or at any other time.
The noble Lord who has just spoken told your Lordships that he is willing to support the first Amendment, which abolishes the principle in the Pharmacy Act that is embodied in the Veterinary Surgeons Act, 1948; but that if he cannot abolish this principle, then he is willing to go forward to the next Amendment and support that because it simply leaves the Act as it exists at the moment, plus the fact that there is a conscience clause. Is there a conscience clause in any other similar Act dealing with a profession? If not, then clearly we must have some strong arguments in favour of embodying for the first time in an Bill of this description, a conscience clause. Usually I agree with my noble friend the Deputy Leader of my Party, but I am afraid that I utterly disagree with him on this point. It may be that in 1948 we were all wrong over the Veterinary Surgeons Act. But Parliament approved it. The veterinary surgeons have never been stronger than they are to-day, and I do not think they have ever been more useful to the animal kingdom than they are to-day, because of their new prestige.
I am all against the complete freedom for everybody that my noble friend Lord Silkin suggested that he wanted to support. There is such a thing as licence, as well as liberty, and as well as freedom. I started my working life at eleven years of age, and, as a trade unionist, paid my first sixpence out of my first week's wages. I remained in the trade union until I came to your Lordships' House. I am still an
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honorary member—though I have no "bobs" to pay, for which I am grateful. It was my lot, with many of my colleagues, to support the union, because in those days our power to negotiate with the employers was so weak, that, unless we had a strong trade union to help us, we had not a chance in life.
LORD CONESFORD: May I put one point? I am grateful to the noble Lord for allowing this intervention. As I understand him, he has indicated that he is opposed to both these Amendments. May I therefore ask him what his attitude would be to a Bill that proposed to amend the Veterinary Surgeons Act in exactly the same way as this Bill proposes to amend the Pharmacy Act?
LORD WILLIAMS OF BARNBURGH: I should oppose it, of course. Any attempt to abolish or repeal the Veterinary Surgeons Act, 1948, which has been so useful, I should quite obviously oppose. The noble Lord is quite right when he suggests that I am opposed to both of these Amendments. I would leave the Pharmacy Act as it is. Unless there is something happening that ought not to happen, which is weakening either the profession or the members of the profession, or weakening the morality or stability or sensible approach of your Lordships' House, and that of another place, I do not see any reason for either of these two Amendments. Consequently, I should vote against both. If I were driven to support any one—
LORD SPENS: Does not the noble Lord propose to vote against the Third Reading, if the Bill goes through in its present form?
LORD WILLIAMS OF BARNBURGH: Possibly that would be my attitude. I am not going to prophesy at the moment, because I do not know whether either of these Amendments is going to be carried. I am suggesting that, unless there is a strong case for doing something about the existing Pharmacy Act, we ought not to do it. If a strong case can be put up, on the lines suggested by my noble friend Lord Silkin that he wants to give more freedom to people, either to become a member of a society or to refrain from becoming a member of a society, there may be something in that; although I must say that my trade union experience tells me that there is not much.

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Remembering all the years that we relied upon combination to get the miserable, shocking, slave-like wages we then got, I am willing for combination, at least in most cases, for the purpose of preserving a lot of good sense in the country. I do not think that the country has lost because the trade unions have become stronger. The situation has completely changed; the workers now have more freedom and liberty in the economic field, as well as more political freedom. It has been said by the ex-Prime Minister that we have "never had it so good". Whether he is right or wrong, I do not know, but I feel that there is no justification for the first Amendment on the Order Paper and little justification for the second, at least, until a substantial case can be put up—and so far that has not been done.
LORD MORRISON OF LAMBETH: My noble friend Lord Williams of Barnburgh has said that he feels great regret at disagreeing with my noble friend Lord Silkin. So should I;but on this occasion I agree with my noble friend Lord Silkin. I have equal regret because I disagree with my noble friend Lord Williams of Barnburgh, with whom I usually agree. I am sorry that this should be so. Trade unionism has really nothing to do with this Bill. It is true that in the trade union field the "closed shop" is often enforced by industrial action of the unions, or by agreement with the employers. There are controversies about it, but that is not an issue which is before the House. What has never been proposed by the trade union movement, so far as I can recall, is that the "closed shop", compulsory trade unionism, should be enforced by Act of Parliament—never!
LORD WILLIAMS OF BARNBURGH: No; but the noble Lord knows full well that there is no trade union in this country that allows its members to have a conscientious objection to paying its share of trade union fees.
LORD MORRISON OF LAMBETH: The noble Lord can raise that point on the appropriate Amendment: it will then be relevant. But at the moment it is not. The point I am raising is that, whatever is the practice of the individual union —and the practice varies—there is no
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proposal from any responsible trade union quarter, nor, so far as I know, from any irresponsible trade union quarter (if there be such), to propose that membership of a trade union shall he made compulsory by Act of Parliament; and that is the principle which is embodied in the Pharmacy Act, 1954. It is perfectly reasonable for Parliament to require that, in professions of this kind, people should be registered and, if appropriate, should be required to go through an examination before registration to be certain that they are fit and competent to carry on the procedure of the business they are proposing to enter. That is legitimate; indeed, I should think that in this case it is probably in the public interest that that should be so. But I do not think that an Act of Parliament has a right (and I shall come in a moment to the Veterinary Act, which I admit is an awkward one) to say, "We require you to belong to a certain society or organisation." That is where the mischief began, and that is where the difficulty with these troublesome Exclusive Brethren began.
My noble friend has a point in regard to the Veterinary Act, and there is also a rather less important one that has been mentioned. I was a member of that Government—and so was my noble friend, Lord Silkin—in 1948; but Members who are experienced in Governments will know that, even though you disagree, if you remain in a Government you have to put up with it. And sometimes matters of relatively less importance than the primary ones, especially when skilfully pioneered by my noble friend Lord Williams of Barnburgh, may get through without a certain point being considered. Anyway, I still object to the principle of compelling a person to belong to a particular society.
I do not think that the Pharmaceutical society will suffer. Probably it will make less than 5 per cent. difference to its membership—indeed it may be materially less than that. But that is where the trouble began, and that is where the scruples of the Exclusive Brethren began. Not that I think much of their scruples, because I think they are a nasty bit of work and, in some respects, rather sadistic in their conduct towards fellow human beings—and even, from what I can hear of it, towards their own families. So

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there is no defence for them. Nevertheless, I think that this Amendment is right. If the Amendment is carried, it is true that the promoters of the Bill (I do not know whether they require consent) can withdraw it. I have no doubt that that can be done. I am advised that it cannot be withdrawn here, because it is a Commons Bill, and as it has passed through the Commons there might be difficulty there as well.
LORD GRENFELL: May I interrupt the noble Lord? The Bill cannot be withdrawn, but I, personally, can refuse to proceed with the Bill. Any other noble Lord in the House can then take up the Bill, if he wishes, but I would not proceed with it. That, I understand, is the correct solution to the problem as put by the noble Lord.
LORD MORRISON OF LAMBETH: I do not know about "the correct solution", because now this has degenerated into a bit of a threat.
SEVERAL NOBLE LORDS: Oh!
LORD MORRISON OF LAMBETH: Excuse me, but it has. The threat is that if we pass this Amendment, the noble Lord will not proceed with the Bill —although it is not his Bill; it is a Bill which belongs to another place. I think that is questionable, very questionable indeed, and I do not think the House should bow down to threats of that kind.
In all the circumstances the question is, what will happen if the Amendment is carried? If the Bill is not killed, all right; it will continue with that Amendment. If it were killed, or if the noble Lord "committed suicide" with it, then the law would remain as it is, and the Exclusive Brethren would have to put up with what is happening to them, which I should not mind. But I still object to the principle of compulsion on the individual, not by trade agreement but by law, to belong to a particular society. I think it is an improper interference with the liberty of the subject, and that when Parliament does it Parliament is overstepping the limits of its legitimate functions in the light of civil liberty.
SEVERAL NOBLE LORDS: Hear, hear!
THE EARL OF SANDWICH: I allowed my noble friend to put my name to
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this Amendment on a muttered word of agreement during Second Reading debate, and because I knew that it would be the proper way in which to bring up this subject for discussion. I have listened to what your Lordships have said with great appreciation of the strongly held opinions from different points of view, and in the course of the debate I have slowly come to the conclusion that the only thing to do is to throw out this Bill altogether. If we allow this individual group to contract out of the need to join the Pharmaceutical Society, it is in logic necessary that we should widen the provision to include any other group which wants to do the same; and, indeed, the Amendment of my noble friend Lord Spens does allow individuals to contract out of their own volition, without any explanation except that of conscience. That might indeed wreck the Society in the same way that, to pass this particular Amendment which we are now discussing would, they claim, wreck the Society. In fact, I think that in the documents they have addressed to us they take as much exception to the Amendment to be moved by my noble friend Lord Spens as to the one moved by my noble friend in front of me.
In these circumstances, what ought this House to do at a late stage in the Summer when the Bill has already passed the Commons, and when the Commons have to consider any Amendment made by your Lordships' House in the next two or three weeks? The arguments adduced by the Pharmaceutical Society are not very strong, and I think that is what influenced the noble Lady and others who spoke when they said, "Let us, for goodness sake, pass this Amendment and bring about a change in the principle." On the other hand, there may be—and perhaps we shall hear from my noble friend the sponsor of the Bill in a minute —much more weighty considerations that the Pharmaceutical Society possess in detail, as to what would happen to their life and livelihood if your Lordships did pass this Amendment. I think it is extremely difficult at this stage in the legislative programme, without any prospect of another learned committee sitting on this whole principle as sat on it in 1933, one understands—
LORD CONESFORD: It was 1930.
THE EARL OF SANDWICH: —to take it upon ourselves to use such a sledgehammer on a Society of great worth and usefulness to our country. In spite of my having put my name on this Amendment, as a result of what I have heard and the thinking I have been able to do while sitting here listening to your Lordships I would urge you not to pass this Amendment, but to wait for the appropriate stage of the Bill and throw it out altogether.
BARONESS SUMMERSKILL: Hear, hear! I have never said "Hear, hear!" to the noble Earl before.
4.33 p.m.
LORD DENHAM: I think it would be convenient if I now put the views of Her Majesty's Government. When I spoke on Second Reading, I told your Lordships that Her Majesty's Government took a neutral position on this Bill as it stood then. I am afraid I must say that Her Majesty's Government will not be neutral on this first Amendment, and will in fact advise your Lordships to reject it for three reasons which have already been mentioned by various noble Lords. First, they consider it would be wrong at this stage in a Private Member's Bill to revert to the position before the Pharmacy and Poisons Act, 1933. I think your Lordships should remember that, before that Act was passed, only 60 per cent. of pharmacists were members of the Pharmaceutical Society. That was what prompted the Departmental Committee on the Pharmacy and Poisons Acts, in their Report to the Lord President of the Council, to suggest that registration should carry with it automatic membership of the Society.
Secondly, Her Majesty's Government understand that removing the membership provision would create an element of doubt in the position of the Society. In the first place, they would have to petition for an amendment of their Royal Charter. Secondly, at the moment the election of members is, by Statute, automatic, and they would have to work out some new system of how members would be elected. A third reason, which I think the noble Lord, Lord Williams of Barnburgh, expressed so well, is that this provision has worked very well since 1933, and Her Majesty's Government know of no members of the Pharma-
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ceutical Society who object to being compelled to become members in this way. They have never had a complaint. The debate on these small—
LORD SILKIN: Is that not equally an argument for giving registered people freedom to join or not to join?
LORD DENHAM: Is the noble Lord suggesting that, if nobody has protested about not having freedom in this way, that should be an argument for giving them the freedom? Members of the Society seem to be quite happy with the position. The debate has covered a great deal of ground, and it has also covered very much wider ground than this small detail; it has covered the principle of whether one should be compelled by law to be a member of the society of your profession. There are, as your Lordships have heard, three Societies where this applied—the Pharmaceutical Society, the veterinary society and the society of the solicitors in Scotland. Also, I am sure the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, will be interested to know that under Section 75 of the Solicitors Act, 1957, membership of the Law Society can be made compulsory for practising solicitors on a day appointed by the Lord Chancellor, after a poll of practising solicitors in which two-thirds indicate their approval of the measure. So that is a fourth society that could have similar provisions. It has not got them at the moment, but it could do.
I think this debate has gone so wide that we are in danger of losing sight of the point of the original Bill. This Amendment is risking the right of a small number who suffer hardship under the existing law for the sake of extending the right to all members of the Society, very few of whom seem to want it in any event. I should also like to point out to your Lordships that any right given to avoid membership of this Society would confer no advantage on any pharmacist but, if anything, a disadvantage. A pharmacist who opted out of the Society on religious grounds would still have to pay, would still be subject to all the disciplines, would have no right of saying how the money was to be spent, would have no right of election to the council of the Pharmaceutical Society, and would have none of the other advantages that members enjoy. In fact, somebody who opts out on religious grounds

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is going to have to pay for membership of the club without having any of the advantages to which membership entitles him.
I feel that we have been apt in this debate to confuse two issues. The first is whether your Lordships' House approve of the doings of the Exclusive Brethren. As I said on Second Reading, it would not be right for me to follow your Lordships into any mention of the rights and wrongs of a religious minority. The second issue is this small question of religious hardship. My noble friend Lord Hanworth, in moving this Amendment, said that we should take into account the merits of citizens and their importance as a minority. I think your Lordships might possibly consider it a dangerous principle, in a democracy which prides itself on religious freedom, to take into account the amount one approves of a religious minority in deciding whether or not you give them relief from some disadvantage.
4.39 p.m.
LORD GRENFELL: I think I might describe myself to-day, if I were a good deal younger, as a rather "mixed-up kid." But perhaps that would hardly suit my age and my dignity. But prior to speaking to the first Amendment moved by my noble friend Lord Hanworth, I should like, with your Lordships' permission, to say a few words on the first two Amendments in general. These Amendments change the whole concept of the Bill, which was, as the Committee will remember, to give a small minority the right to practise pharmacy though opting out of the Pharmaceutical Society by reason of conscientious objections on religious grounds. The Bill, if amended, would still allow this minority to practise pharmacy but would cut out the religious aspect, and in doing so would, in my opinion, gravely damage the Pharmaceutical Society.
The Committee will remember that no mention was made in another place of the Exclusive Brethren, and I believe that if they had been mentioned the Bill would not have had such a smooth passage through that House. Since the Second Reading in this House I have had a number of letters, none of them condemnatory of myself but all sincere
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and very moving. They disclose infinitely sad stories of broken homes in the name of religion, with hate taking the place of love. Whatever the noble Lady may say, the Pharmaceutical Society has been neutral up to the present regarding this Bill, but since these Amendments were put down they have had, very naturally, to come forward to protect their own interests. For these reasons, I treat these two Amendments as wrecking Amendments. I do not see why the Pharmaceutical Society should he severely damaged just to assist a very small minority of people who, although they call themselves Christians, do not act up to the Christianity which I understand. I must be very frank with the Committee and inform Members that, as is my right, if both these Amendments are carried, or if one of them is, I shall feel it my duty not to proceed with the Bill.
I now turn to the first Amendment, moved by my noble friend. This Amendment seeks to separate statutory registration from membership of the Society. As has already been said in all parts of the Committee, it is contrary to the findings of the Departmental Committee which inquired and reported in 1930 in favour of the identification of membership with registration. There is no demand whatsoever among members, except this small number of Exclusive Brethren, for any alteration in this fact. The change would probably involve a major recasting of the Pharmacy Acts and a probable granting of a new charter, together with an abandonment of a statutory principle adopted for pharmacy in 1933.
This, I think, is an exceedingly important part of my few words: the effects of this change would be so fundamental that no Amendment with such effects should be contemplated until there has been a full examination of the main implications. Here, in answer to my noble friend Lord Sandwich, I would say that the Pharmaceutical Society do not really know the full implications of this Bill, should it be amended. They cannot tell. It would need to have a great deal of thought, and to my mind there does not seem to have been time to do this in the short period since these Amendments were put down. For that reason alone, I think we would be mistaken if we passed

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these Amendments. Hence, I must ask the Committee to resist this Amendment moved by my noble friend Lord Hanworth.
VISCOUNT HANWORTH: I have listened with great interest to the speeches on this Amendment. There is a lot to be said on both sides, but
4.55 p.m.
LORD SPENS LORD SPENS moved, in the proviso, to leave out "and", at the end of paragraph (a), and the whole paragraph (b). The noble Lord said: I shall certainly be brief in moving this Amendment, as I spoke on the last Amendment and said then most of what I wanted to say regarding this clause. But I would ask the Committee to study for a moment paragraph (b) of the proviso. Your Lordships will realise that it does not refer to a conscientious objection based on an individual's own belief: it is a conscientious objection "based upon religious beliefs which he shares with others". That is an exception the like of which we have never seen in our law before, an exception in favour of a man saying that he has a conscientious objection because he belongs to a certain religious sect. I would suggest that this is a proviso which we do not want introduced for the first time into our law.
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I do not feel, in the circumstances, that I can withdraw it.
4.45 p.m.
On Question, Whether the said Amendment shall be agreed to?
Their Lordships divided: Contents, 25; Not-Contents, 45.

CONTENTS

Addison, V.

Hobson, L. [Teller.]

Milverton, L.

Alexander of Hillsborough, E.

Horsbrugh, B.

Morrison of Lambeth, L.

Amwell, L.

Iddesleigh, E.

Shepherd, L.

Archibald, L.

Lambert, V.

Silkin, L.

Brentford, V.

Latham, L.

Sinha, L.

Burden, L.

Lindgren, L.

Williams, L.

Colwyn, L.

Long, V.

Williams of Barnburgh, L.

Conesford, L.

Meston, L.

Wise, L.

Hanworth, V. [Teller.]

NOT-CONTENTS

Aberdare, L.

Grenfell, L. [Teller.]

Samuel, V.

Ampthill, L.

Hastings, L.

Sandwich, E.

Attlee, E.

Hawke, L.

Selkirk, E.

Auckland, L.

Hurcomb, L.

Spens, L.

Bessborough, E.

Ilford, L.

Strang, L.

Bossom, L.

Inglewood, L.

Stuart of Findhorn, V.

Cawley, L.

Kinnoull, E.

Suffield, L.

Champion, L.

Lawson, L.

Summerskill, B.

Coleraine, L.

Luke, L.

Taylor, L.

Craigmyle, L.

McCorquodale of Newton, L.

Teynham, L.

Denham, L.

Margesson, V.

Thurlow, L.

Ebbisham, L.

Merrivale, L.

Twining, L.

Ferrers, E.

Merthyr, L.

Wakefield of Kendal, L. [Teller.]

Forster of Harraby, L.

Rea, L.

Glentanar, L.

St. Davids, V.

Westwood, L.

Greenway, L.

Resolved in the negative, and Amendment disagreed to accordingly.

Therefore, my Amendment seeks to leave out paragraph (b) altogether, so leaving the matter as one of individual conscientious objection. That appears to me to be in conformity with other provisions in our law as regards conscientious objection.
The Pharmaceutical Society have made one point that I think has some substance. They say that if the Amendment is carried it will throw a great burden on the Registrar who will have to decide whether or not a man has a genuinely personal conscientious objection. To that I would say that there is still a later stage of this Bill where we can either substitute some tribunal other than the Registrar himself or make some provision for appeal from his decision. For the time being, I ask the Committee not to accept this exception as it is worded in this clause and to reduce it to that of individual conscientious objection, of a kind which we have elsewhere in our legislation, and which has generally worked well for the

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purposes for which it has been inserted. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 1, line 12, leave out from ("Society,") to end of line 14.—(Lord Spens.)
BARONESS HORSBRUGH: I should like just for a moment to draw the attention of the Committee to the practical difficulties in this proviso. As my noble friend Lord Spens has already said, the Pharmaceutical Society have said that this Amendment would place an almost impossible burden on the Registrar. If I might ask the Committee to look at this proviso, I think it will be agreed that whether paragraph (b) is in the Bill or not, the Registrar will still have to decide, under paragraph (a), before he goes on to paragraph (b), whether a person has a conscientious objection. There are two parts to the proviso. One part is not an alternative to the other; nor is it a proviso to the other; they are both joined by the word "and". Therefore, whatever happens, the Registrar is first going to have the difficulty of deciding whether this man has a conscientious objection to being a member of the Society. It seems to me that, since he must then decide the point contained in paragraph (b), he is going to be placed in a much more difficult situation. His burden, if it was impossible before, is going to be even more impossible under paragraph (b).
The Registrar has, we will say, already decided whether a particular person has a conscientious objection; so decision number one is made. Now for decision number two: he must decide whether that objection is based on a religious belief which the man shares with others. How does he do this? The applicant who wishes to opt out may, perhaps, produce two friends; and he may say: "These two people have the same religious beliefs as I have." They do not have to belong to the same sect or to the same organisation. The Bill simply says, "with others", so I take the minimum of two—it would be even worse for the unfortunate Registrar if there were more. The duty is laid on him to discover whether their religious beliefs are the same. How is he going to do it? How does he start to work? Does he have some sort of examination into their religious beliefs? Does he question them? Does he try to find out from them, one
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after the other, whether their ideas and beliefs coincide? This seems to me to be an impossible proposition.
I think it is impossible for anybody, after reading this provision and considering it carefully, not to agree that this is not only absurd but unworkable. I supported this Bill on Second Reading, and my support will continue, because I am in favour of allowing people conscientious objection. They have a perfect right to object. I may disagree with this sect or the next sect—that has nothing to do with it: they have the right to make a conscientious objection and I support that. But I do not support this extraordinary idea that the Registrar has to find out whether man's conscientious objection is based on the fact that he can provide two others and is able to say that their religious beliefs are the same.
LORD FORSTER OF HARRABY: I shall vote against this Amendment, because I believe that it is quite impracticable to carry it out. How is the Registrar to satisfy himself that a man has a conscientious objection? It seems, as the Amendment stands, that it is sufficient for a man to stand up and say that he has a conscientious objection, without defining what his conscientious objection is. And if he starts to attempt to define it, how is he to satisfy the Registrar?
BARONESS SUMMERSKILL: I think that this Amendment provides a logical approach to the whole question, because if we are asked to give 26 members of this sect special provision on the ground of religious conscience, why not give it to all those who have conscientious objection on some other grounds? The Pharmaceutical Society say: "It would be difficult to establish the bona fides of the applicant". This is very naive of the Pharmaceutical Society. I should have thought that there was no difficulty about the bona fides of members of this curious sect, the Exclusive Brethren. May I draw this fact to the attention of the Pharmaceutical Society? The latest pronouncement on religion was made on Saturday, when the President of the Methodist Conference said:
"Much of the religious thinking is quite wrong and unintelligible to scholars."
Despite that pronouncement, the Pharmaceutical Society feel that they are quite capable of deciding, when these recruits to the Exclusive Brethren come along,

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whether what they subscribe to in the way of religious beliefs is genuine. They are very clever people to be able to do that. I think that what we are asking them to do is much more simple.
There are all kinds of conscientious objections. The test I would apply is to examine the life of the man or woman and see how he or she has lived. If these people have been members of the Pharmaceutical Society for many years, as many of them have, there will be little difficulty in doing that. I hope that your Lordships will take no notice of the objection that the Pharmaceutical Society has circularised—namely, that if this Amendment is accepted, the difficulty would be one which the Registrar could not face.
5.7 p.m.
LORD CONESFORD: This part of the Bill deals with conscientious objection. The idea of excluding a person from liability on the ground of conscientious objection is not new in our law. Both in the National Service (Armed Forces) Act, 1939, and in the National Service Act, 1948, provision was made for conscientious objection. The first was introduced by a Conservative Government, and the relevant section is Section 5. The second was introduced by a Socialist Government, and the relevant section is Section 17. Both the great Parties of the State came roughly to the same conclusion about how to provide for conscientious objection, if we are to provide for it. If I may remind your Lordships, Section 17 of the 1948 Act starts like this:
"If any person subject to registration claims that he conscientiously objects—

(a) to being registered in the Military Service Register, or

(b) to performing military service, or

(c) to performing combatant duties,

he may, on furnishing particulars about himself, apply in the prescribed manner …"
Then Parliament set up a tribunal to consider his objection.
What I want to bring emphatically to the attention of the Committee is that every great Party in the State, when providing for exclusion on the ground of conscientious objection, has made the exclusion dependent on establishing a conscientious objection and has not thought it necessary to mention religion at all. To mention religion is something wholly novel in this connec-
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tion. Do we really wish in this little Bill to bring in a wholly novel scheme?
But my noble friends who put their names with mine to this Amendment have pointed out the further absurdity. It is not sufficient to prove your own conscientious objection. You have to prove that it is shared with others. I have no doubt why this rigmarole has been put in. It is in order to make it extraordinarily simple for the registrar. The argument that determined the promoters of this Bill is that the Exclusive Brethren was not a body to which anybody would claim to belong unless he in fact did and, therefore, it would be fairly simple for the registrar to accept the bona fides of a claim, and after two or three cases, in which it had been established that this queer body objected to its members being members of the Pharmaceutical Society, it would be a comparatively simple task. But suppose the claim of the Pharmaceutical Society is sound and that this Amendment, if carried, which on principle it is bound to be, would make it a very difficult task for the registrar. Then, as my noble friend pointed out, no doubt on Report stage we can provide for some more suitable body than the registrar to decide the matter. What we cannot do is, in the interests of easy machinery, to adopt an intolerable principle.
I do not believe that there is any section of this Committee which really wants to say that a conscientious objection to be valid must be shared with others, and that it must be based on religion, when we have worked for a great number of years under Statutes introduced by different Governments that allowed the principle of conscientious objection not based on religious beliefs at all. But suppose you were going to mention religion; and suppose it were true that there is only one body claiming to be a religious body that desires the passage of this Bill. Then ought we not to look into the merits of that body? Ought we to do a wholly novel thing in our law in the interests of one particular religious body, on the idea that some people seem to have that anything that uses the name "religion" is bound to have some merit? I wonder if anybody seriously maintains that. There have been some

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sincere religions that believed in human sacrifice. I gather that such a religion would not be one to which we should wish to give privileges under our law for the first time. I ask the Committee to consider what is the principle in this Bill, unless the Amendment which I am now supporting is carried.
When I made some remarks about this measure in the debate on Second Reading I was wholly ignorant of the nature of the Exclusive Brethren. Since that Second Reading, I, in common, I take it, with other noble Lords in all quarters of the Committee, have received the most moving letters from people who are suffering from quite intolerable conditions at the hands of these people. In the Second Reading debate there were two right reverend Prelates who divided against the Bill, because, I think, they had some knowledge of the activities of these people. I am sorry that neither of them is here to-day to describe what each of them knows from his own experience. If there is a word of truth in some of these letters I have seen, then I am reminded of the great passage in Lucretius, in which, after describing the sacrifice of Iphigenia in order to produce a favourable wind for the fleet on the voyage to Troy, he concludes with this great line:
"tantum religio potuit suadere malorum"— "so great the evils to which religion could prompt".
Whatever our attitude on anything else in the Bill, I beg the Committee to pass this Amendment in order to introduce a principle which is known to our law, instead of a principle that has never been tried under our law, the only objection to which that has been put forward is on the ground that it would be unworkable. If the Committee still desire the Bill hereafter, and they think it unworkable, then we can have consequential Amendments setting up conscientious objectors' tribunals to make it workable. But the difficulty of machinery is no argument whatever for adopting an intolerable principle.
LORD SALTOUN: I do not wish to detain your Lordships for more than a minute. I will support this Amendment. But as a good deal has been said already in this Committee about the Close Brethren, I should like to say that, in
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my personal relations and as I have known them personally, I have found them conscientious and upright and fair dealing people. At the same time, I acknowledge what has been said about the effects of their religious intolerance. In my own experience, religious intolerance may have an extraordinary number of facets and an extraordinary number of quite unexpected results. I certainly distrust religious intolerance in pharmacy.
LORD GRENFELL: The effect of this Amendment, as we all know, would be to entrust to the registrar the determination of the question whether any person has real conscientious objection to being a member of the Society. I would put the point to my noble friend Lord Conesford that it is much easier in the case of conscientious objection to carrying arms, because that is quite a definite objection, and it usually carries with it, as was the case with so many people during the war, that they do wonderful work in other ways; but it also carries with it the knowledge by the person who is judging the conscientious objection that probably that person would not be of great value in the firing line in any war. I consider that this is quite different. It is a question of opting out of a society. Perhaps, if a person opts out of a society, he would not be much good as a member of the society. Still, the registrar will have a very difficult decision to make if the religious side is cut out. I firmly believe that. He will have no guidance in his decision, and must rely on his personal assessment of the applicant, in the knowledge that refusal may rebound on him. In other words, he might really just toss a coin.
LORD McCORQUODALE OF NEWTON: May I interrupt the noble Lord for one moment, as one of those who during the war was in charge of the conduct of conscientious objectors courts? No such question was ever asked in the courts as to whether they would be good marksmen in the firing line or not. The objection was based on the conscientious ground.
LORD GRENFELL: I thank the noble Lord for putting me right on that point. The requirement that the applicant must share his conscientious objection with others seems to me—and it is very much in the minds of the Pharmaceutical Society—a condition which it is right

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to impose. I know that this is not an easy one to argue, but I stand firm now on the fact that I consider that it would be wrong to weaken the Pharmaceutical Society, which for many years now has done a wonderful job, just to give extra power to the Exclusive Brethren, who, in the minds of us all, are not doing a good job. For those reasons, I would ask your Lordships to resist this Amendment.
LORD TAYLOR: I very much hope that your Lordships will carry this Amendment and that the Government will advise your Lordships that they are neutral. I do not know which way they will come down. It seems to me that, whereas the Government could object to the last Amendment, in that it would wreck the structure of the 1954 Bill, this Amendment will not wreck the structure of the 1954 Bill at all. It leaves the 1954 Act as it is, and I personally think it should be left as it is. It simply and solely alters one small thing, which we were not asking to do. Many of us voted against the Bill. The noble Lord, Lord Grenfell, the proponent of the Bill, asked us to accept the double qualification of conscience—namely, this mixture of conscientious objection to belonging to a society, and conscientious objection to belonging to a society on religious grounds, linked with another person. When we had this Bill first before us, it seemed to me quite crazy to have religious objections to belonging to a pharmaceutical body. This seemed to me not to make logical sense, and to mean that we were here in danger of making legislative asses of ourselves.
I still feel that this is a great big legislative nonsense, and that the only hope of making any sense of it is to knock out the second of these provisions—to accept the Amendment—even though this means wrecking the Bill. I would much sooner have no Bill at all, and the noble Lord, Lord Grenfell, perfectly rightly and perfectly reasonably, has said that he will not go on with the Bill if we carry this Amendment. I say, "Right-ho! Carry the Amendment". I think that will be the best thing for the Pharmaceutical Society and Parliament, and the only losers will be the Exclusive Brethren, which I do not think will be a very bad thing. I hope we shall accept this Amendment, whatever the consequences.
THE EARL OF SWINTON: May I say one word?—because I took a little part on the Second Reading, on what, to me, was the vital question of whether, if these people were allowed to opt out of the Society—as I would put it—they would still be subject to exactly the same discipline as the people who are in the Society. We had a complete assurance from the Government that that was so, because the Act lays down that every chemist is subject to that discipline. On that assurance, I did not myself vote against the Bill on Second Reading. But I did not mean to give any adherence to what, to me, is a very wrong principle: that conscience is not a matter of individual conscience, as it has always been whenever we have had to deal with conscience as an objection. We are asked to exempt these people because they are members of a religious society. Having taken that stand on the Bill, but not voted against it, I would only say that I could not possibly do anything except vote for this Amendment, in order to maintain what has been the fundamental principle of English law on all religions in the past.
LORD WILLIAMS OF BARNBURGH: I made one or two observations earlier to the effect that noble Lords were in a hot spot this afternoon with a most peculiar Bill and with the Amendments on the Order Paper. To avoid any misrepresentation or misunderstanding outside, I want to make it perfectly clear that I voted for the last Amendment in order to kill the Bill. I think I am going to vote for this Amendment, because I think this might kill the Bill, too. In any case, I will be consistent and vote against the Third Reading as well, if the Bill reaches that stage.
There is one other reason, which I feel is a substantial one, why I feel justified in voting for this Amendment —and this again is an explanation to avoid misrepresentation outside. As I said earlier on, I know of no complaint having reached either the Ministry of Agriculture or anywhere else against the relevant section in the Veterinary Surgeons Act, 1948. I know of no objections against the Pharmacy and Poisons Act, which was passed in 1933. If we make a break-through here by approving this Amendment, it simply means that we are opening the door to

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any discontented vet. in any part of the country—and in all sections of the community there are one or two curious fellows. If we accept this Amendment which allows conscientious objection to being a member of a Society, then we give the other awkward customer the right to come forward and say, "Well, you did it in the Pharmacy Act; why should you not do it with vets? Why discriminate in this fashion? What sort of legislators are you?" It seems to me to be strictly consistent, as I said earlier on. The only thing I can do is to help kill the Bill, and I hope to kill it either by supporting an Amendment with which I do not agree, or by voting against the Bill on Third Reading.
LORD MORRISON OF LAMBETH: Are we to hear anything from the Government on this? I think it is reasonable that the Minister should say what the Government's view is. It is quite likely that I shall disagree with it, but I should like to know what it is.
LORD DENHAM: As your Lordships know, it is not customary for Her Majesty's Government to speak on a Private Member's Bill, except where they think it is necessary for their own views to be heard. Her Majesty's Government have no objection on principle to this Amendment, but they feel that the advice they have had so far is that the Amendment would make it more difficult for the Registrar. So in practice Her Majesty's Government advice is against this Amendment. On principle, they have no advice to offer to your Lordships.
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
5.32 p.m.
LORD TAYLORmoved, in the proviso at the end of paragraph (b), to insert:
"and
(c) that he will regularly pay such dues to the Society as are paid by members of the Society."
The noble Lord said: I am not really sure whether this Amendment is necessary: first, because it is doubtful whether the measure will progress much further; and secondly because, in fact, subscriptions have to be paid every year as a condition of remaining on the register of the Pharmaceutical Society. Our Amendment was intended to remove any
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doubt and ensure that nobody who opted out on conscientious grounds would be let off paying his subscription. In other words, we were determined that there should be no cash benefit to those who exercised this conscientious objection to being a member of the Pharmaceutical Society. I think it fair to say—and here I speak to the noble Lord, Lord Grenfell —that they cannot remain on the register unless they do pay their subscription to the Society. If that be so, this Amendment is not necessary. But I will move it, in order that it may be discussed. I beg to move,
Amendment moved—
Page 1, line 14, at end insert the said words.—(Lord Taylor.)
LORD GRENFELL: As the noble Lord, Lord Taylor, says, in order to remain on the register pharmacists have to pay their dues. So, as I am advised by the Pharmaceutical Society and by everybody, this Amendment is unnecessary.
BARONESS SUMMERSKILL: May I put another point, for clarification? The word which is put in the Amendment is "dues". I feel that "dues" is a rather generic term which might cover all kinds of contributions. In a society, very often, not only is there a statutory contribution, related to registration, but the members are sometimes asked for other sums for all kinds of reasons. May I remind noble Lords that last week, or the week before, it was announced that the chemists of this country are to have £5 million or £6 million added to their remuneration. This came about, of course, as a result of some pressure from the Pharmaceutical Society. May I ask the noble Lord whether there are any dues which might go under all kinds of names but, nevertheless, are paid in order to help the Pharmaceutical Society to act as a trade union?
LORD GRENFELL: The noble Lady gives me a "stiff one" to answer. As I understand it—and I shall have to give this answer subject to checking the position—the only dues that would be obligatory on registration would be the actual subscription to the Pharmaceutical Society. That is as far as I know. But I will raise that question, and if I am wrong in any way I will

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immediately write to the noble Lady and inform her. But I am pretty certain that I am right on that.
LORD DENHAM: Perhaps I can help the noble Lady on this point. My information is that pharmacists pay a registration fee of five guineas, and that thereafter each registered pharmacist pays a similar amount annually by way of retention fee. Premises are also on the register kept by the Pharmaceutical Society, and authorised sellers of poisons pay a registration fee of £3 and a similar amount annually by way of retention fee. But under the provision of the Pharmacy and Poisons (Amendment) Act, 1964, the society are enabled to increase the registration fee, and I understand that they shortly intend to do so. But no other membership fee is required from members.
LORD TAYLOR: I thank the noble Lord, Lord Grenfell, and the Minister for their explanations. Their understanding was as mine, and I beg leave to withdraw this Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
On Question, Whether Clause 1, as amended, shall stand part of the Bill?
LORD WILLIAMS OF BARNBURGH: The noble Lord said earlier on that if one or other of these Amendments were carried he was afraid that he could not proceed further with the Bill. I wonder whether he still feels that way, because it seems to me that a very simple method of disposing of this Bill is to object, on the Question, That Clause 1 stand part. If the noble Lord agrees, I will gladly support him.
LORD GRENFELL: I had proposed to make a very short speech on the Question, That the House do now resume; but as it is convenient to the House I will make it now. First, may I say that I make no apology for bringing this Bill to your Lordships' House. I think, if I may say so, that it has shown your Lordships' House at its best in its vigilance on legislation. We can all have our conscientious objections; I have mine, and I agree that it is not a religious matter. But my objection is that by amending the Bill, which was intended to give a right to a very small minority, we have done a great deal to the detriment, to my mind, of the
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Pharmaceutical Society. I do not consider we are right in doing that. For this reason I personally am not going to proceed with this Bill. I understand that anybody else can proceed. But I must say that I for one, fascinating as its time has been, shall have no sleepless nights over not proceeding with this Bill.
THE EARL OF SANDWICH: I do not know whether at this stage any of your Lordships would be prepared to say that he is prepared to carry on the Bill to its further stages. If so, it will, of course, help very much if he would rise and say for what reasons he would like to take it on; otherwise it might be convenient to kill the Bill this afternoon, clause by clause; having nothing further to do with it, in the knowledge that this terrific principle of whether the Society should he established by law and its membership equated to the number of registered practitioners should continue.
I myself believe, as I said earlier, that some Committee will have to be charged with the investigation of this very complex subject. The Pharmaceutical Society have said, in a memorandum, that they like the principle here, and think that it should be further extended. That means, presumably, that someone may have to go into the question of whether the Royal College of Surgeons, the Royal Society, the Royal Academy, the Royal College of Physicians, the Royal College of Organists and a great many other learned societies and public bodies should be subjected to legislation which requires compulsory membership. Alternatively perhaps we should go back on what has been done, and get rid of this principle in the Pharmaceutical Society itself, for the Scottish solicitors and for the English barristers. It seems to me that, clearly, at some stage a Committee will have to sit on the subject. My own inclination is to vote against the Question, That this clause, and the subsequent clause, shall stand part and kill the Bill altogether. I should not do so only if I were persuaded by some noble Lord or noble Lady who desires the Bill to continue.
LORD MORRISON OF LAMBETH: I will try to persuade the noble Earl. I am not sure I am the right one to do it; but having taken the Bill sufficiently

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seriously to discuss one Amendment, which was lost, and another which was carried, I do not think it would be proper Parliamentary procedure then to proceed to strike out Clause 1 and Clause 2, and so on.
LORD WILLIAMS OF BARNBURGH: Why not?
LORD MORRISON OF LAMBETH: As my noble friend behind me says, I think it would be a rather childish thing to do; and it is unnecessary. The noble Earl is quite right in saying that it would kill the Bill. It looks as if the Bill will not proceed unless some other noble Lord takes on the task the noble Lord, Lord Grenfell, so ably started. In any case the House is still master of the situation. It would be pointless to go through this procedure of voting against the clauses. If the Bill does proceed, there will have to be a Report stage and a Third Reading. It would be better, if the House wishes to kill the Bill, to kill it in a proper parliamentary form. I suggest that the procedure suggested by the noble Earl, Lord Sandwich—I have no doubt from the best of motives—would not be wise. Therefore, I think we should leave the situation as it is.
Clause 1, as amended, agreed to.
Remaining clause agreed to.
House resumed: Bill reported with an Amendment.

LOCAL GOVERNMENT (PECUNIARY INTERESTS) BILL
5.45 p.m.
Order of the Day for the Second Reading read.
LORD AUCKLAND: My Lords, I beg to move that this Bill be now read a second time. It is, as described in another place by my friend the honourable Member for Chelmsford, a modest measure. Indeed I suppose most Private Member's Bills can be described as modest measures. I myself have never served on a local authority or been a candidate in local government; so I approach this Bill from a dispassionate angle. It has been questioned whether a Bill of this kind is necessary. I think there is one justification for it: that is, that there are some people who are
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rather tentative about going into local government, whether as councillors or as servants of a council, in case they break some small regulation by failing to declare a very small interest, under the terms of the Local Government Act, 1933. This Bill is primarily to amend Sections 76 and 123 of the Local Government Act, 1933 and Sections 52 and 90 of the London Government Act, 1939.
Subsection (1) of Clause 1 of the Bill is the most important. This removes from members of a local authority with a very remote interest in a subject which is being debated the duty of declaring that interest. There are a number of things which could be said to give meaning to this point; for example, if a councillor wants to plant trees in a suburban street, or if his house is going to be overlooked by a row of trees and he serves on, say, the allotments committee, there seems to be little reason why he should have to declare his interest. But as against that it is important to remember that a man or woman who serves on a local council and who is himself or herself a council house tenant can take part in a debate on a differential rent scheme only if he or she obtains permission from the Ministry of Housing and Local Government. That is a provision of the 1933 Act and it is not repealed by the present Bill.
The other important subsection of this Bill is subsection (4) of Clause 1, which increases the penalty under the 1933 Act from £50 to £200 for failing to disclose an interest in a matter which is not considered to be remote. This may seem a very complicated provision, and indeed it is perhaps one of the difficulties of local government. My interpretation of it is that a person who offers himself or herself for service with local government is of sufficient intelligence and integrity to be able reasonably to tell whether his or her interest is remote or otherwise. It is obvious, for example, that if a person has a six-figure interest in some property scheme it is not a remote interest, and he or she would therefore have to declare his or her interest if they wished to speak on a council matter relative to this point. By increasing the penalty to a maximum of £200, it brings it into line with other modern legislation which is making penalties more commensurate with present-day

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finance. Therefore, the yardstick by which this Bill can be measured is, I think, as to whether a councillor or a local government officer knowingly goes beyond the reasonable bounds by which legislation faults him in this Bill.
There is one other point which could be mentioned in regard to the question of rating relief. A councillor who claims relief under the Rating (Interim Relief) Act would have to seek permission from the Minister before taking part in a debate of that nature. Clause 2 of the Bill applies to local government officers —town clerks and others practising in local government, and the penalties here are the same as in Clause 1. Clause 3 deals with repeals under the London Government Act, 1939, and when the London Government Act comes into force in April of next year new legislation will be brought in.
This Bill went through all its stages in another place without a Division. I think it is a useful measure. It will help to encourage people to go in for local government. I think it will be agreed on all sides that local government needs more young people, and more people who are at present, as I said earlier, under the 1933 Act, diffident about going into local government in case they infringe what are rather stringent proposals. I am not for one moment suggesting that declaring an interest should be brought to an end—far from it, because here and in another place if one has a financial interest, in hospitals or in anything else, one has to declare In actual fact, this Bill gives dispensation only to those who have marginal interests. One can think of quite a number of such people. I hope that in my brief explanation of this Bill I have given at least some reasons why, in a small measure, it is useful, and I ask your Lordships to give it a Second Reading.
Moved, That the Bill be now read 2a. —(Lord Auckland.)
5.54 p.m.
LORD HOBSON: My Lords, I should like first of all to congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Auckland, upon the clear way in which he has explained the Bill. While it is quite true that it passed through all stages in the other place without opposition, I think there may well be some doubts in many noble Lords'
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minds as to whether it should be opposed here. So far as we officially are concerned we regard this purely as a private measure. As the noble Lord has said, the Bill amends Section 76 and Section 123 of the Local Government Act, 1933; and on balance I myself think it is useful —and I speak with considerable local government experience. Evidently, it has the Government's blessing, or it would not have got so far. It did not start off in propitious circumstances; it received its Second Reading on Friday, the 13th, but it seems to have arrived safely here without Amendment.
Frankly, I doubt whether this Bill is really necessary, for two good reasons: first, because the Government are most conscious of the difficulties that arise in the definition of "pecuniary interests" as that phrase affects councillors and aldermen. They have set up a Committee, under Sir John Maude, to examine the whole question, and I think it is fair to assume that, whatever Party is in power, legislation will follow from that inquiry. The second reason is that there has been a Working Party dealing with this matter. I think it was the sponsor of the Bill in another place who said that he had not seen the findings of that Committee. I do not know whether the noble Lord, Lord Hastings, when he comes to speak, will mention what were their findings. It will be most interesting to know what they were. But in this Bill we are dealing piecemeal with a most important question affecting members of a local authority. I think it is rather unfortunate at this late stage of a Parliamentary Session—indeed, almost on the eve of a General Election —to have time given for a Private Member's Bill like this. I am afraid that I am rather cynical and take the view that it is because it cannot be deemed to be very effective.
The whole of this question deals with what are pecuniary interests. It deals, first of all, with a most important matter that I think we all ought to have in our minds when we are in local government, or, indeed, are Members of another place or of this House—namely, whether a person should abstain from voting on a matter in regard to which he has a pecuniary interest. The difficulty, of course, is to define what is a pecuniary interest. The noble Lord has endeavoured

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to point out some of the difficulties, and I want to suggest that we ought to be exceedingly careful about eroding any part of this most important principle. We should be most careful about tampering with it, or making it easier for people who could be deemed to have a pecuniary interest to vote.
I personally should deplore any attempt to limit the moral obligation to disclose an interest to local authorities, however remote that interest may be. In practice, members of a local authority do not discount the views of a person who says that he has a pecuniary interest in a matter. Indeed, often they pay considerable attention to it; and at least they are in a position, in the light of the fact that they know he has a pecuniary interest, to assess the real value of what he is saying. That is a position which I think is most valuable in British local government. The whole of British local government has been singularly free from abuse of this character. I think we can say with modesty that we are the envy of the world in the conduct of our local affairs, so far as they affect one's personal interest. We are often told, as the noble Lord, Lord Auckland has reminded us, that because of the rigidity of the 1933 Act we are keeping able people out of local government. In my experience that is not so. I sat on a large local authority in the London area for many years. We had most able people. I do not think it is possible to argue that able people are kept off local authorities because of this question of a pecuniary involvement; I think it is purely that they have not the time.
Nevertheless, we must look at the other side of the coin. If we are going to make it easy for people not to declare their pecuniary interests and to proceed with a lot of amendments to the 1933 Act, we are going to make private and public duty, and indeed interest, almost synonymous. Therefore, we must proceed on this matter most carefully. Two rather important subjects in this regard are, first, the question of planning by a local authority; secondly, the question of contracting in public works. Therefore, we must be careful indeed about any amendment of existing legislation.
The Bill attempts to deal with the question of automatic dispensation in
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certain previously undefined cases. This may be welcome. For instance, my reading of the Bill is that it clears for all time any doubt that a person working for an electricity board or for a generating authority would be perfectly free to vote without any dispensation whatsoever from Lord Hastings' Department—for example, if the question should arise whether heating in blocks of council flats should be by gas or electricity. He would be free to do that. Likewise, I assume that a person working for British Railways, in whatever capacity, will be perfectly free to express his views on matters affecting British Railways. I think that is the intention of the Bill. Whereas before, if the town clerk was in doubt, the town clerk would adopt the journalist's maxim, "When in doubt, leave out" and would apply to the Ministry to see whether dispensation would be granted. I remember a branch line being closed down in my constituency, and the railwaymen were precluded from voting until inquiries were made as to a dispensation. I think the town clerk was quite right to do that. Now, as a result of Clause 1 of this Bill, there will no longer be any difficulty in regard to that.
I want to raise two points on which I have doubts. What is the position of the man who works in a motor factory? This was raised in another place, but no clear answer was given. Suppose a person is working in a large motor manufacturers and the council want to buy a car for the mayor or vehicles for the public services from the firm in which the person is working. Will that person be entitled to vote? One might answer, "Well, if he is only a fitter or semiskilled, yes"; but what is the position if he holds a post of higher responsibility? These are matters which must be cleared up.
Furthermore, what is the position of council house tenants? At present they cannot vote on any matters affecting council housing, except where such prohibition would affect a majority of the council, and each case for exemption for disqualification has to be submitted to, and agreed by, the Ministry of Housing. I want to know whether, as a result of this somewhat nebulous phrase in the Bill, it is proposed that there should be

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any alteration. The phrase in Clause 1 is
"having a pecuniary interest which is so remote or insignificant that it cannot reasonably be regarded as likely to influence him in the consideration or discussion of, or in voting on, any question with respect to that contract or matter."
We should like to know whether, assuming the Bill passes, the status quo ante would prevail. This is an important point.
Then there is the question of investment. I informed the noble Lord that I was going to raise this point. The question of unit trusts is an important one, for I feel that it is a more important consideration than giving exemption to people who are members of co-operative societies, which has already been dealt with in previous legislation. Considerable investments are held in unit trusts, which usually cover what are commonly known as "blue chips". "Blue chips" automatically include electric combines, insurance companies, banks and so on. The lists of investments held by unit trusts are made known on the dividend slip and on advertisements which are put out asking for new capital. What is to be the position in a large local authority when the question of insurance arises as between two different companies, for every local authority does not insure with the Municipal Mutual Insurance Company? A person could have considerable holdings in a unit trust—and in these matters one always has to deal with human nature as it is —and he may know full well that the unit trust in which he is interested has investments in one insurance company as opposed to another one, when companies are put up for consideration in relation to investments by the local authority.
These are rather important points which must be dealt with, and presumably they will be dealt with, if a satisfactory answer cannot be given to the points I have raised, when the Working Party which is to be set up considers the whole question. I should like to know the precise effect of Clause 1(b). I feel that it is important we should have a statement on that. From my own experience and from talking with colleagues, many of whom have had many years' experience in local government—indeed, I have had a word
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with my noble friend Lord Morrison of Lambeth, who unfortunately has had to go away—I think that all are agreed that it is almost impossible to lay down in precise terms what pecuniary interest counts for dispensation. The more one tries to find words to make certain exceptions the more difficult the position becomes. As I have said, both Houses of Parliament have to be exceedingly careful in agreeing to amending legislation in order to deal with this important and vital point.
In regard to raising the fine from £50 to £200, one would argue that if we are going to make it easier for people with pecuniary interests to vote, then, when they do offend, the penalty ought to be higher. I think this automatically follows. This also applies to the provisions relating to officers. This puts them on parity with members of the local authority, the only difference being that the good local officer should often be seen and not heard when questions of this sort are being discussed, and we leave it to him. It is a very small Bill, and I do not want to be thought to be damning it with faint praise. At the present time I believe it is harmless, and to that extent I would not consider voting against it. I do not know what the views of my colleagues are on this matter, but I urge on your Lordships' House that we must be extremely careful indeed jealously to guard the integrity of our government, both local and national.
6.9 p.m.
THE JOINT PARLIAMENTARY SECRETARY, MINISTRY OF HOUSING AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT (LORD HASTINGS): My Lords, may I put in just a word on behalf of Her Majesty's Government to say what we feel about this Bill? I am pleased indeed to welcome it on behalf of my right honourable friend, and to congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Auckland, on introducing it to your Lordships' House. It is, of course, not the first time the noble Lord has put us in his debt in this way. I remember well a year ago he was responsible for another measure which, if I may say so without frivolity, was also concerned to remove unnecessary obstructions: I refer to the Public Lavatories (Turnstiles) Act, 1963.
In the time that I have been Joint Parliamentary Secretary at the Ministry

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of Housing and Local Government I have seen at close quarters a good deal of the work of local authorities. I have had the opportunity to form views about the way in which this work is done and about the people who do it. The work is often time-consuming and exhausting. Indeed, the extraordinary fact emerges from a recent study published by the Acton Society Trust that heavy drinkers are the only people who spend as much time away from their families as councillors do. Of course, I hasten to add that there is no connection at all between the two. The first category is a matter of indulgence and the second is a matter of sacrifice in the public interest.
This work is by its nature quite often of a kind which many people regard as rather thankless. Yet it is done, in general, with reasonable efficiency and despatch: and, what is much more important, it is done impartially, honestly and without fear or favour. This is, in itself, a tribute to the character and quality of the people who do the work. These people are fairly closely bound in their activities by the law; and the law of local government is at once a reflection and a component of the high reputation for honesty, incorruptibility and public confidence which local government in this country enjoys. I think we can say, without immodesty or chauvinism, that this reputation is second to none in the world.
One of the principles of local government law is that there shall be a clear and visible separation between the public duties of the member and his private and personal interests, as the noble Lord, Lord Hobson, has insisted upon. This principle is reflected in those provisions of the Acts of 1933 and 1939 which this Bill seeks to amend. I think it is generally agreed that we should not lightly do anything which might erode either the principle itself or the effect of these provisions. However, as my noble friend has explained, there is evidence that the provisions as they stand can cause unnecessary nervousness and inhibition for councillors whose work in local government is of such great value; and it is right that we should try to mitigate that.
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The noble Lord, Lord Hobson, asked me about the Working Party which was set up to investigate this matter—I think it started its work in 1959. The report was actually an informal document not intended for publication, but, certainly, there is no objection at all to telling the noble Lord that the Bill substantially reflects the Working Party's views. So this is the main purpose of the present Bill, and I hope very much that it will achieve its purpose. It will also make the penalties for real abuse more realistic in to-day's terms, and will make possible some very welcome simplifying of the administration of these provisions, both for the Department which I represent and for local authorities; and that touches upon the point which the noble Lord, Lord Hobson, put as to administrative changes. It will save quite a lot of work in the Department and on the part of the local authorities.
If I may, I will turn to one or two points which the noble Lord put, as I think that, although this is a Private Member's Bill which is being sponsored by the noble Lord, Lord Auckland, it will not be out of place for some explanation of these points to be given by the Government's spokesman, without exceeding his authority in doing so. Of course, the noble Lord is quite right about public bodies, about the employees of the Central Electricity Generating Board and of British Railways. It is quite clear that there is no objection to their discussing, or voting on, matters affecting those interests. When it comes to the employee of a motor manufacturer, this is in fact an example of what might be considered a remote or insignificant interest. Under the Bill such a councillor will be free to vote; it is only an interest of a general nature and not a specific one.
The question of councillor-tenants is, of course, a very important matter, and the position of the councillor-tenant under this Bill is exactly as before, except that if this Bill becomes law he may now be given a dispensation for longer than three months—which is the present practice based on the Minister's legal advice. Such a member could be given dispensation indefinitely under this Bill. He could, of course, give general notice now of an interest arising from his employment, but he will be able to give it, also,

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in respect of his interest as a council tenant under Clause 1(3) of this Bill. So, really, the position of the councilor-tenant is hardly changed—certainly, not changed in principle—by this Bill.
Then I turn to the matter of holdings in unit trusts. That again, I think, is clearly a remote interest. Of course, if the holder of such a trust is ignorant of the subsidiary holdings of the unit trust, he is naturally not to blame; but there is a limiting factor in any case, and that is the holding of up to £500 worth of stocks or shares in a company, provided that it is not over one-hundredth of the nominal share capital. A member would not in any case have to declare that interest if it did not exceed those limits, and the holding in a unit trust would certainly come under the provision of a remote or insignificant interest. I do not feel that we are, in fact, relaxing the standards too much, and I hope that your Lordships will feel that it is possible to give this Bill a Second Reading. I commend it to your Lordships as a useful Bill which will go some way to making the onerous duties of local councillors somewhat less nerve-wracking, without in any way reducing the standards of integrity and honesty to which they are accustomed.
6.18 p.m.
LORD AUCKLAND: My Lords, by leave of the House I should like to thank the noble Lord, Lord Hobson, for a very fair speech. Of course, he has had a distinguished record in Parliament and in local government, and in that respect he has a slight advantage over me in that he knows the working of the machine. I think he made a very fair speech and made some cogent points. I think the report of the Working Party may well answer a number of the questions which he has quite rightly raised. I would certainly agree with him when he says that our local government is the envy of the world. I think that is quite apparent, even through the eyes of one who has not served in local government but who, nevertheless, has a great interest in local government. I think, too, that we should be careful not to make Bills of this kind too easy-going, although I believe the provisions of this Bill will be stringent enough to discourage the small minority of local authorities who might try to "pull a fast one". I should like to thank my
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noble friend Lord Hastings for his help in this Bill, and for his clear explanation of some of the points raised. With those few comments, I ask your Lordships to give this Bill a Second Reading.
On Question, Bill read 2a, and committed to a Committee of the Whole House.

BETTING, GAMING AND LOTTERIES (AMUSEMENTS WITH PRIZES) BILL
6.20 p.m.
Order of the Day for the Second Reading read.
THE EARL OF KINNOULL: My Lords, this Private Member's Bill was introduced in another place by my right honourable friend the Member for the Division of Pentlands, Edinburgh, who, but for the limit of time following the recent honour bestowed on him, would have had the opportunity and honour of himself introducing and explaining this Bill to your Lordships' House as well. This would have created, I am sure, a unique precedent.
The Bill is short but important, and its purpose is to amend the Betting, Gaming and Lotteries Act, 1963, as to the provision in that Act of amusements with prizes—the expression used to describe a minor form of gaming in which a small sum not exceeding 1s. in cash may be paid and a small prize of money not exceeding 1s. may be offered. Under the 1963 Act, two safeguards were laid down to prevent abuse as to the provision of amusements with prizes. First, with the exception of travelling fairs, such amusements could be carried out only under a permit issued by the local authority; and, secondly, conditions under Section 49, subsection (3), of the Act were laid down to prevent the element of gaming becoming anything but small. Both these two safeguards have, in practice, I fear, been outflanked. The local authorities have found that, due to the wording of Section 49, subsection (1), paragraph (a), of the Act, and also due to the interpretation by the Courts, they have been obliged to issue permits to premises such as public houses and cafés, which were never intended, either

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by Parliament or by the local authorities, to be eligible.
Furthermore, a serious abuse of the value of prizes has arisen. The 1963 Act, although limiting the value of money prizes to 1s., did not put a limit on the value of prizes in kind. It has been found that very substantial prizes in kind have been offered to induce the public to use these amusement machines. To-day, machines offering tokens that can be exchanged for valuable prizes have proved more numerous than machines that offer only small money prizes. The result of the outflanking of or the loophole in the two safeguards in the 1963 Act is that machines offering considerable prizes in kind, and thus forming an element of gaming, have been established in premises not considered suitable by those who drafted the 1963 Act, or by the local authorities.
To turn briefly to the provisions of the Bill, Clause 1 applies both to "amusement places" as defined in the Bill under Section 2, subsection (5), and to other premises, such as public houses. This clause endorses the conditions laid down under Section 49, subsection (3), as regards the limit of prizes that may be offered and won, and adds the important condition as regards prizes in kind. The limit of such a prize must not exceed the value of 5s. for any single stake or game. Subsection (3) of this clause further ensures that there can be no lawful arrangement by any proprietor to evade the limits on prizes in kind. The clause reaffirms that the maximum value of a money prize for any one stake is to remain at 1s.
The purpose of Clause 2, subsection (1), is to strengthen the original intention of Parliament. This was to give the local authorities clear power, if they so wished, to refuse a permit for any premises which they considered undesirable for amusements with prizes—such premises as public houses and cafés. This subsection does not apply to such premises defined as "amusement places". Any of the three following reasons for refusing a permit is valid: first, the purposes for which the premises may be used; secondly, the circumstances for which the premises may be used; and, lastly, the persons who may use the premises. The effect of this, as has been said, will be that in future
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local authorities may refuse—I emphasise the word "may"—new applications for permits or the renewal of an existing permit when the period of the current permit has expired. It must be pointed out that local authorities are only having their discretion of refusal strengthened, and that they may still grant permits for such premises as cafés if they deem them socially desirable. Also, there is still the right, under Schedule VI to the 1963 Act, to appeal to quarter sessions.
Clause 2, subsection (2), gives the local authority the important power to impose certain conditions when granting a new permit, or renewing an existing one, to any premises except "amusement places". Recently, a High Court Judge, in the case of Hewison v. Skegness Urban District Council, ruled that such a power did not exist under present legislation. These conditions include limiting the amusement to machines as described in Clause 1, and specifying the number of such machines to be allowed in any one set of premises. Under paragraph (b) of this subsection a right of appeal is granted against conditions attached to a permit, which the Court may revoke completely or vary. However, any breach of condition will attract the same penalties as a breach of the conditions set out in Section 49, subsection (3), of the 1963 Act. Clause 2, subsection (3), provides that the Court, on convicting the holder of a permit of an offence under Section 49, subsection (2), of the Act, may order the forfeiture of the permit. This order will not take effect until after the appeal has been heard or after the period during which the appeal may have been lodged has expired. This procedure is governed by Section 2, subsections (2) and (3), of the 1963 Act. I shall have to check that later. Clause 2, subsection (4), is designed to allow only to premises defined as "amusement places" the protection of paragraph 3 of Schedule 6 of the 1963 Act. This will mean, in practice, that amusement arcades and funfairs can be refused a renewal of a permit only on the grounds laid down by Schedule 6, paragraph 3, to the 1963 Act. Clause 2, subsection (5), defines the term "amusement place" as used in this Bill, and I feel it needs no explaining.
Clause 3, subsection (3), proposes that Clause 1 of the Bill shall not come into

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effect until October 31, 1965. The purpose of this is to avoid financial hardship to owners and hirers of existing machines. It is felt that the effect of limiting the value of prizes in kind will reduce the incentive to use the machines. The time limit under the Bill grants a further summer season to allow
such owners to recoup some of their investment. It must be remembered that these expensive machines can cost between £400 and £500, and have been installed to give high-value prizes in kind on a perfectly legitimate basis as the law now stands. Finally, my Lords, I should like to add that this Bill has the support both of the local authorities and of Her Majesty's Government, and I trust it will also have the support of this House. I beg to move that this Bill be now read a second time.
Moved, That the Bill be now read 2a.—(The Earl of Kinnoull.)
6.30 p.m.
LORD CHAMPION: My Lords, I am sure the whole House is grateful to the noble Earl for the clarity of his explanation of this small but somewhat difficult Bill. It is not an easy Bill to follow—one has to relate it, of course, to the previous Act of 1963—but the noble Earl has I think covered adequately all the points that arise from this Bill which he has presented to the House. Of course, I expected this from him. I remember his excellent speech on ejector seats, in which he received tremendous support from the House, and the excellence of his exposition of that.
I agree with the noble Earl about the importance of this Bill. The Act of 1960, as codified and, to some extent, consolidated in the Act of 1963, has been found not to express clearly the intention of Parliament at that time. This has been revealed, as the noble Earl has told us, by decisions in the Courts which have had the effect of making the control of the placing of these machines by local authorities very difficult indeed. As I understand the noble Earl, this Bill will put that right; and, of course, we welcome the fact that it will give the local authority the control which clearly was the intention of Parliament both in 1960 and in 1963.
The previous Act has also proved to be deficient in its attempt to limit the prizes which can be won from these machines in amusement arcades and the
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other places to which the public has free access. I think the noble Earl told us that this will not apply to the clubs and to those places where the membership is limited, but only to places to which the public has free access; and the limitation is the limitation that was clearly intended by the Act of 1963. But, of course, clever operators have found a way round the Act of 1963.
There are always clever operators where money is concerned and particularly where gambling is concerned. If I read the newspapers rightly, last week some clever operators might have got away with £10 million, but they did not. But there is always somebody seeking to find a way round; and it is Parliament's job from time to time to stop up these little gaps in legislation as they arc found. Indeed, we do this annually in the Finance Bill. As the clever operators in respect of tax avoidance find the little holes, so it is Parliament's job to stop them up. On this occasion, we are closing one of the little gaps that clever operators have found in the previous Act, and it is right that we should do so. I am not sure that this will be the end of it; we might need to have another Bill to stop another hole. But if Parliament is to carry out what the 1963 Act intended, we must be very vigilant, and we must thank and support those who will be prepared to take Private Members' time for this purpose. I am sure that we, on this side, support this Bill.
6.34 p.m.
EARL FERRERS: My Lords, the question of the Government's attitude to this Bill is not, I think, a matter on which I need detain your Lordships very long. I would at the outset congratulate my noble friend on the manner in which he introduced the Bill. This, I think, is the first occasion on which he has introduced a Bill in your Lordships' House. The careful and lucid exposition he gave of the purpose and objects of the Bill will leave your Lordships with little doubt that it commends itself to the Government. Your Lordships may find it helpful, however, if I say a word or two more in amplification of that brief welcome to the Bill.
The existing statutory provisions are based on the recommendations of the Royal Commission on Betting, Lotteries and Gaming 1949–1951. The object of

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the recommendations was to provide for a licensing control over the installation of these amusements, and to ensure that the element of gaming in these amusements should remain trivial. In fact, as your Lordships have heard both from my noble friend and the noble Lord, Lord Champion, provisions have in some cases not worked very well; and this has given rise to difficulties for local authorities and others concerned in their operation. It has transpired that because of doubts and difficulties which have arisen over the interpretation of the provisions, the local authorities' discretion in the grant of permits has been unduly restricted; and because of a particular defect in the Act the limit on the value of prizes has been open to evasion. To the extent that the Bill seeks to remedy these shortcomings your Lordships will realise that it has the Government's support.
The other main object of the Bill arises from comments by Mr. Justice Salmon in his judgment in the case of Hewison v. Skegness Urban District Council. In that judgment the criticism was made that it seemed unsatisfactory that a local authority had no power to attach to a permit conditions as to the number and type of amusement machines which may be provided on the premises. It seems reasonable and desirable that the local authority should have this kind of discretion, and for their part the Government readily approve the inclusion in the Bill of the particular provision.
Since the Bill was first introduced as a Private Members' measure in another place, the Government have been closely connected with it and have examined its detailed provisions, and I can say that the Government are satisfied that the provisions of the Bill are suitable to achieve its objects. In short, therefore, the Government are well content that this Bill, which they regard as a worthy and opportune measure, should reach the Statute Book; and accordingly I trust it will have the approval of the House.
THE EARL OF KINNOULL: My Lords, I should like to thank briefly both the noble Lord, Lord Champion, for the warm words and the points he made,
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and my noble friend who speaks on behalf of the Government, for their support of the Bill. As I have said, this is an important amendment to the 1963 Act.
On Question, Bill read 2a, and committed to a Committee of the Whole House.

ANIMALS (RESTRICTION OF IMPORTATION) BILL
6.37 p.m.
Order of the Day for the Second Reading read.
VISCOUNT HANWORTH: My Lords, I beg to move that this Bill be now read a second time. The object of the Bill is to restrict the importation of rare animals into this country except under licence. This will help to curb traffic when it is illegal in the animals' country of origin and lead to more humane treatment generally. The Bill is in line with a resolution passed at the Seventh General Assembly of the International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources, the Survival Service Commission and the Fauna Preservation Society at Cracow on June 24, 1950. The resolution was as follows:
"Believing that a major threat to the existence of some rare animals is their illegal exportation from the country of origin, followed by their legal importation to other countries … warmly approves the action of those countries which have restricted the importation of such animals, … now resolves that the International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources should urge all Governments who do not yet restrict the importation of rare animals in harmony with the export laws of the countries of origin, to do so now and thereby support the efforts of those countries to preserve the animals in danger of extinction."
This resolution was passed unanimously by over 30 countries, including the United Kingdom.
To-day, my Lords, there are many species of animals in danger of extinction, and one of the major factors contributing to the future decline is the speculative trade. Very seldom is the animal regarded as anything more than a money-making proposition; and with orang-outangs it is estimated that there is a wastage of nine animals for every one that reaches this country alive. There are two distinct methods of capture used

913
in the illicit trade. The female may be shot and the young taken; or, alternatively, the animal may be located in a tree, in which case the surrounding trees are felled and the animal is isolated. When it is finally dying of thirst, it descends the tree and is captured. The latest reports suggest that there are 60 such animals, which have been captured purely on a speculative basis and are "in the pipeline" in the Singapore area.
Although the importation of rare animals for properly run zoos may be quite justifiable, it would be wrong to imagine that this can provide an important contribution in preserving the species. Not many animals breed well in captivity, and they will certainly ultimately produce a degenerate species, having few of the natural instincts and characteristics of the wild animal. The present wastage in obtaining such animals through anything except the official channels is appalling and far outweighs any possible gain by breeding in close captivity. There is, moreover, the question of the known cruelty to the animals. The speculative trade is at best concerned only to keep the animals alive until the money they represent changes hands. It is interesting to note that the United States of America have a strict code relating to imports of both animals and birds. In 1961, India, prohibited the import of rhinoceros trophies from Nepal, and since April, 1962, Hong Kong has refused permits for the importation of orang-outangs.
The provisions of the Bill itself are simple. Clause 1 states that the animals specified in the Schedule may be imported only under licence. The licence may be general or specific, and is revocable at any time. The clause also defines penalties, which are in addition to any which are incurred under the Customs and Excise Act, 1952. It also provides for the forfeiture of any scheduled animal found in the possession of a person who cannot furnish proof that it was imported under licence.
Clause 2 enables the Secretary of State, after consulting the Advisory Committee, which is to be established under Clause 3 of the Bill, to vary the list of animals scheduled. Clause 3 establishes an Advisory Committee. The Schedule lists families of animals. The first three families include well over 100 species, including various monkeys.
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In general, the Customs are prepared to operate the Bill only on the basis of complete families. Where a commonly imported animal is included, it will be necessary to obtain a licence, but since this must be on a general basis, no great inconvenience should be caused.
The Bill was very thoroughly debated in another place, in all, for something over four hours, and received general approval. It is a very useful measure, not only in helping to preserve rare species but also, indirectly, in discouraging inhumane and cruel treatment. It does nothing, of course, to prevent the importation of skins or the ravages caused to animal populations when they are used for food or other purposes. This is another question. It would seem to be a pity to risk the passage of this Bill into the Statute Book by any attempt to increase its scope. Nor do I think it would be wise to create difficulties of enforcement by seeking to exempt certain species—such as, for example, the common imported tortoise —from the families listed in the Schedule.
These can be covered by a general licence and the whole position, if necessary, could be re-examined in the light of experience under the provisions of Clause 2 of the Bill. I beg to move that the Bill be now read a second time.
Moved, That the Bill be now read 2a.— (Viscount Hanworth.)
6.45 p.m.
LORD SHACKLETON: My Lords, in the absence of my noble friend, Lord Wise, who has studied this subject in much greater detail, I should like to welcome this Bill. It is the sort of small measure which is most appropriate for a Private Member's Bill and which, I am sure, the Government would like to see passed into law. The noble Viscount said that the Bill was debated at considerable length in another place. There it gave rise to a good deal of merriment. I think that the difficulty was that honourable Members who spoke did not know what the Schedule meant. We are accustomed now to having schedules in French, but it is unusual to have a schedule which is as unintelligible as this one is. Everybody knows that pongidae means monkeys of some kind, because we know what

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"pongos" were during the war. They were Army officers named after an ape with a particularly small brain. That is a useful clue, based on previous experience in another Service.
I am sure that the Customs, the Government and the supporters of the Bill are right to extend the general control over families, rather than over species. It is extremely important that there should be an international measure of control in the case of certain animals. The present great interest in the World Wild Life Fund is encouraging. It is making considerable impact, and may even preserve such animals as the oryx, which has been so heavily hunted in Persia, and other species. Perhaps the noble Viscount, or the Minister, may be prepared to say something about two species of animals from a part of the world in which my noble friend Lord Shepherd and I are both interested—the orang-outang and the turtle. Perhaps noble Lords read the article in the Sunday Times, written by an old friend of mine, Mr. Tom Harrison, in which he told the remarkable story of the turtle. We still do not know the full life circle of the turtle, but whereas it is one of the most efficient producers of eggs, there is still a danger that, if not controlled, it will become extinct. I doubt whether this Bill will be effective in this matter. I doubt whether it is really directed to the problem of the turtle and the Lord Mayor's Mansion House dinner. Nevertheless, it is a small step in the direction of saving wild life.
I should be interested to know, either from the noble Viscount or from the noble Earl, Lord Bessborough, how far other countries are going to apply similar provisions. I am thinking particularly of the emerging African countries, where the problem is not one of restricting import but one of restricting export. It is obviously necessary that there should be a two-way stop. This is a matter directly beyond our control, but one has only to talk to a game warden from East Africa, or to anyone concerned with the preservation of wild life, to know the great anxiety that is felt.
Certain difficulties are likely to arise. It is not clear whether the Bill will apply to animals in transit. Nor am I clear whether it will enable action to be taken,
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either by the Customs or by some other authority, where it is found that a large number of animals are travelling under difficult conditions. Anyway, they would probably be animals the importation of which was permitted under general licence. The Bill is primarily directed to preserving certain rare species which belong to these particular families mentioned. It may be that there are other species. What are sphenodontidae?
THE JOINT PARLIAMENTARY UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EDUCATION AND SCIENCE (THE EARL OF BESSBOROUGH): They are South American monkeys.
LORD SHACKLETON: They are a different kind of pongidae. It was suggested that one of these species was an extinct hominid. But presumably this is not so: these are all names of animals that exist, and not references to our extinct ancestors.
At any rate, we wish the Bill well, and we hope that it works. This is a responsibility which the Government appear to be content to shoulder. I take it that the Customs authorities are satisfied with this; because, as the noble Viscount said, it must be workable, and we must not seek the perfect situation. If we are not going to be able to achieve that, then I think we should be content to have this small but useful measure, which is very much in accordance with present-day thinking in this matter.
6.52 p.m.
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, I should like to ask a question of the Minister, because I think it is one which only the Government, and not the noble Viscount who introduced the Bill, can answer. As I see it, these animals will not be allowed to be imported into the country unless a licence has been granted. We know of the difficulties under the Commonwealth Immigrants Act, where persons have entered this country who have not a permit to come and are therefore returned. I am being serious. I know that there have been difficulties where animals have been brought to this country by air or by sea when there has been no licence for them. Somebody has taken a risk, hoping that, having brought the animal over, the Customs will be more lenient in the granting of a licence. I hope that the Board of Trade will consult

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with the shipping owners and airlines to ensure that they do not carry, either in ships or in aircraft, any animal that is subject to a licence unless a licence number has been produced.
My noble friend Lord Shackleton mentioned the orang-outang. Your Lord-ships may have seen a report on the efforts that have had to be made by the wife of one of the forestry officers in Borneo for the training of the orang-outang to go back to its natural life. They have been in capitivity for a relatively short period, and because of that it would be inhumane to send them hack into the jungle without this period of training and acclimatisation. I hope that the Minister, when he replies, will be able to give an assurance that the Board of Trade will consult with the shipping companies and airlines, in order to ensure that they do not bring any of these animals into this country unless a valid licence is available. If that can be done, a great deal of hardship may be prevented.
6.54 p.m.
THE EARL OF BESSBOROUGH: My Lords, I am sure we should all like to congratulate my noble friend Lord Hanworth for bringing before the House this Private Member's Bill from another place, because it is quite clear that its objects command general support. I think I might make one comment on his speech, and it is that the Conference at Cracow took place in June, 1960, and not in 1950, as he said. However, this is not his fault, because it is a misprint in Hansard of another place. As my noble friend has made clear, some species of animals are now becoming so rare as to stand in real danger of extinction, not by any process of natural selection or even response to climatic change in their own habitat, but, I regret to say, from man-made causes and the result of the exploitation by man.
As the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, suggested, the first line of protection lies in the countries of origin. But those countries do not always have the administrative apparatus to enforce protective legislation along the whole length of their frontiers. And so long as there is an uncontrolled market in importing countries, such as our own, there will always be an incentive to speculative hunting and trapping, even if certain legal pro
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hibitions do already exist. The Government therefore welcome this Bill as a useful and necessary underpinning of efforts at conservation made by other countries.
The noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, asked me the extent to which similar legislation was being initiated in other countries. Since the Cracow resolution —and I think some 30 countries endorsed that resolution—I regret to say that there has not been much legislation, except in the United States. The Government therefore felt strongly that we should set a good example and follow the lead of, and endorse, the Cracow resolution.
LORD SHACKLETON: My Lords, what does the noble Earl mean by saying "the Government" think that we ought to set a good example? I thought this was a Private Member's Bill.
THE EARL OF BESSBOROUGH: The Government endorse the view of the private Member that this country should set a good example.
The object of the Bill, as the noble Viscount has told us, is to stop the import of rare animals into this country, except for genuine educational and scientific purposes. In form, the Bill will bring in control, by import licensing, many species which are not at all rare, as noble Lords will see, including a few which are sometimes kept as pets. Licences will, of course, be readily granted for common species, and such licences under Clause 1(2) of the Bill may be to any degree general or specific. It has been asked: why include common species within the scope of the Bill at all? This is a question of practical operation of the control. It is no use legislating if you cannot enforce. Customs officers are not zoologists: they can learn to recognise animals belonging to the families of, say, apes, monkeys or lemurs; they cannot be expected to distinguished between rare and common species of those families—the more so as their "rarity" may depend on their place of origin. As time goes on, a species which is now rare may cease to need special protection, or, on the other hand, the population of another species may decline to the danger level and may need protection under the Bill. The only way, therefore, it seems, to provide effective protection for those which need

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it is to require a licence for all members of the families of animals concerned, so that the job of the Customs officer is merely to check the existence of a corresponding licence.
As my noble friend pointed out, the Bill provides for the setting up of an Advisory Committee. It will be among the functions of this Committee to keep the Schedule under review and advise when additions or deletions may be made under Clause 2. It will also advise the licensing authority which species within the Schedule from given countries of origin can be freely licensed, and which not, having regard to the need for conservation of that particular species. This Committee will, of course, include fully qualified persons to advise on these matters.
The noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, also asked me about animals in transit. The answer to his question is that this Bill would cover animals landed temporarily in this country which are in transit to other destinations. The Bill will also enable Customs and Excise to confiscate unlicensed rare animals included in such consignments. This could be done, and would be done in particular instances, if the Customs had been previously alerted to any undesirable traffic of this kind. It is not, however, the practice of the Customs to exercise the same close supervision of consignments in transit as of imports into this country, unless there is some compelling reason of health or safety to do so, both for reasons of manpower and of our relations with other countries. I am quite sure that we should not attempt to police the world in this matter. We should hope rather that the countries of ultimate destination, such as our own, in so far as they have not already done so, would themselves legislate to control the importation of rare animals.
There was a reference to the names in the Schedule, and I think the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, agreed with me that it
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is necessary to include the names as set out. I have been asked whether it would not be possible to include the English translation as well, but the trouble is that the English names are not scientific names, and they vary in different parts of the world. So I think it is preferable that the names should stay as they are, although if any noble Lord would like a list with the translation of Cebidae, Cercopithecidae, and Dasyuridae, or any of the others, I should be glad to hand him a copy of that list. I do not know whether there was any other point, except perhaps I should add that turtles are not included, although tortoises are. As I have said, I am sure we have a useful measure here which deserves the support of this House, and I commend it accordingly and hope that your Lordships will give the Bill a Second Reading.
VISCOUNT HAYWORTH: My Lords, I think the Minister has answered all the points which were raised by noble Lords, and it only remains for me to thank them for giving the warm reception they have given to this Bill.
On Question, Bill read 2a, and committed to a Committee of the Whole House.

PORT OF LONDON BILL
The CHAIRMAN OF COMMITTEESinformed the House that the opposition to the Bill was withdrawn: the Order made on June 23 last discharged, and Bill committed to the Committee on Unopposed Bills.

ISLE OF WIGHT RIVER AND WATER AUTHORITY BILL
Returned from the Commons, with the Amendments agreed to.
House adjourned at three minutes past seven o'clock.