Lords Sitting of 16 April 1964

Preamble
The House met at three of the clock, The LORD CHANCELLOR on the Woolsack.
Prayers—Read by the Lord Bishop of Newcastle

UNIVERSITY OF RHODESIA AND NYASALAND
3.6 p.m.
THE EARL OF LISTOWEL: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
[The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government what proposals were made by the British Government at the conference on the University of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, why the conference was adjourned, and when it will be resumed.]
THE MINISTER OF STATE FOR COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS AND FOR THE COLONIES (THE DUKE OF DEVONSHIRE): My Lords, the noble Earl will no doubt have read the text of the communiqué which was issued in Salisbury on April 14. The British and Southern Rhodesia Governments require more time to consider the financial problems between themselves. However, a further statement will be issued as soon as the inter-governmental consultations have been completed. If a satisfactory conclusion is reached between the Governments, as I hope it will be, no resumption of the conference will be necessary.
THE EARL OF LISTOWEL: But, my Lords, are the Government aware that the text of the statement that was made after the conference contained absolutely nothing about the Government's proposals at the conference—absolutely nothing at all? Are the Government further aware that the University of Rhodesia and Nyasaland is running down, that its funds will be used up by the end of next year, and that, unless something is done soon, the staff will leave to take up appointments elsewhere? Are the Government also aware
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that this University is essential to Central Africa, if these Central African countries are to have the administrative and professional personnel they will need in the critical months and years immediately after independence?
THE DUKE OF DEVONSHIRE: My Lords, the Government are acutely aware of all the three points raised by the noble Earl.
LORD OGMORE: My Lords, may I strongly reinforce what the noble Earl has said? Is it not a fact that, if this University is not continued in full spate, there will be a disastrous situation in Central Africa? Will the noble Duke use every effort to try to persuade not only the Government of Southern Rhodesia, but also the Governments of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, to take a considerable interest in the continuation of this University?
THE DUKE OF DEVONSHIRE: My Lords, much as I should like to be able to give a reassuring answer to the noble Lord on the latter part of his question, I think we must face the fact that, at any rate for the time being, there is no possibility of further co-operation in the University by Northern Rhodesia or Nyasaland. I regret it, but there it is, and I should be misleading the noble Lord if I said that I thought there was any hope at the present stage. Therefore, these negotiations have had to be conducted between the Southern Rhodesian Government, the University authorities and ourselves. I do not wish to add to what I have already said, but I would reassure the noble Earl and the noble Lord that we are aware of the urgency of the problem.
THE EARL OF SWINTON: My Lords, having had a good deal to do with the establishment of this University—which I agree with the noble Lords who have spoken is quite unique and absolutely essential to Central Africa—may I say this? While I appreciate that there must be time for further discussion, what would be perfectly, absolutely fatal would be that there should be a rundown of the University while conversations are going on. As this question is quite unique, and cannot in any way create a precedent, will the Government not give an undertaking that they will

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give a financial assurance that the University will be able to carry on efficiently and effectively while the necessary negotiations are taking place?
THE DUKE OF DEVONSHIRE: I think, my Lords, that, in essence, this is a financial problem; there are very considerable sums of money involved. At the risk of gross repetition, I can only say that I, and indeed the Government, are acutely aware of all the points raised by my noble friend and by other noble Lords, and that we expect and believe that we shall be able to make a further statement in the very near future.
LORD ALPORT: My Lords, may I ask my noble friend whether it is not true that a certain sum of money left over from original funds was available—I think £400,000—and that that is in fact sufficient to enable this University to carry on at its present level of activity, at any rate until the financial negotiations are completed?
THE DUKE OF DEVONSHIRE: My Lords, I think it fair to say that there are sufficient funds for the University to continue, at any rate until the end of this scholastic year. At the same time, I am aware of the point made by noble Lords opposite, that there is the danger of a run-down of the staff. This is an urgent problem and I can only repeat that it is being treated in an urgent manner.
THE EARL OF LISTOWEL: My Lords, when the noble Duke talks of "the very near future", does he mean that agreement will be reached between the Governments before the Summer Recess; and, if so, will the Government be prepared to make a further statement in the House?
THE DUKE OF DEVONSHIRE: My Lords, I very much hope that agreement will be reached, and a decision one way or the other will certainly come very much before the Summer Recess. I sincerely hope that there will be agreement, and this is a matter to which the Government are giving urgent consideration. A decision one way or the other will come very much sooner than the Summer Recess.
LORD HAWKE: My Lords, is my noble friend aware that there are some dozen Fairbridge scholars from this country studying in the University at the moment? They will naturally be in some state of anxiety as to whether they will be able to complete their University courses. Furthermore, there are a considerable number of applicants for next year's scholarships, and, unless they are given some reply as to the future of the University, they will perhaps be in two boats as to whether or not they can get into an English University.
THE DUKE OF DEVONSHIRE: My Lords, I had hoped I had made it clear that I was acutely conscious of the anxiety that the future of this University is giving. I am aware of the twelve Fairbridge scholars. They, too, are worried. Everybody is worried about this matter, not least Her Majesty's Government.

PENAL REFORM
EARL ST. ALDWYN: My Lords, I should like to inform the House that at a suitable moment after 3.30 p.m. my noble friend Lord Blakenham will be making a statement on Penal Reform.
ELECTIONS (WELSH FORMS) BILL
Read 3a (according to Order), and passed.
NATIONAL HEALTH SERVICE (HOSPITAL BOARDS) BILL
Read 3a (according to Order), and passed.

BURGH POLICE (AMENDMENT) (SCOTLAND) BILL
House in Committee (according to Order).
House resumed.
Bill reported without amendment. Report received.

FILMS (AMENDMENT) BILL [H.L.]
3.15 p.m.
Order of the Day for the House to be put into Committee read.
Moved, That the House do now resolve itself into Committee.—(Lord Shepherd.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.
House in Committee accordingly.
[The LORD MERTHYR in the Chair.]
Clause 1: [Amendment of s.39(3)(b) of Films Act 1960]:
LORD SHEPHERD LORD SHEPHERD moved, at the beginning of Clause 1, to insert:
"(1) Section 39 of the Films Act 1960 (which provides for the registration of newsreels under Part II of that Act) shall be amended, in relation to applications for registration made after the end of September 1964 and to films registered in pursuance of such applications, in accordance with the following provisions of this section."
The noble Lord said: The Committee may remember that in moving the Second Reading of this short Bill I recommended it to your Lordships' House as a useful Bill, saying that it would make a considerable difference for the film producers of newsreels and would give more opportunity to the cinema-goer to see newsreels of events taken outside the United Kingdom and Commonwealth. This is a Bill that received support from the producers, from the trade unions and from the Government, and when I moved the Second Reading I did not anticipate any difficulty. I therefore feel I must apologise for having to place twelve Amendments before the Committee this afternoon, but this is due to the drafting requirements of the Minister. May I thank the Minister very much indeed for the assistance that he has given in this matter?
Amendment No. 1, which I now move, is intended to take account of the fact that the undertakings which the producers have to give when making applications for the registration of newsreels relate to the newsreels registered in a quarterly period. Section 39(4) of the Films Act, 1960, provides for the cancellation of any registration if any of the obligations in Section 39 are not
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fulfilled. We feel—and we agree with the Government here—that in view of Section 39(4) of the Films Act, 1960, it is necessary to put into this Bill a date from which the Bill will come into operation and films can be registered. This and the other Amendments can, I think, be taken as drafting. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 1, line 5, at the beginning insert the said subsection.—(Lord Shepherd.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
LORD SHEPHERD: This Amendment is consequential. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 1, line 5, leave out from ("(3)") to ("the") in line 6.—(Lord Shepherd.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
LORD SHEPHERD: This is a drafting Amendment. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 1, line 7, leave out from ("than") to ("comprised") in line 8 and insert ("three-quarters of the total of the photographs.)."—(Lord Shepherd.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
LORD SHEPHERD: This Amendment is to correct a printing error. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 1, line 8, leave out ("newsreel") and insert ("newsreels").—(Lord Shepherd.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
LORD SHEPHERD: This is another drafting Amendment. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 1, line 10, after ("taken") insert ("as follows, that is to say—

(i) at least one-half of that total").—(Lord Shepherd.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.
LORD SHEPHERD: This is a further drafting Amendment. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 1, line 12, leave out from ("Ireland") to ("by") in line 14, and insert ("(ii) the remainder (if any).").—(Lord Shepherd.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
LORD SHEPHERD: I beg to move the next Amendment.
Amendment moved—
Page 1, line 16, leave out from ("was") to end of line 18 and insert ("employed by the maker of the newsreels as a regular member of his staff in the United Kingdom.")—(Lord Shepherd.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
LORD SHEPHERD: This also is a drafting Amendment. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 1, line 18, at end insert—
("(3) At the end of the section the following shall be added:—
Section 50(1) of this Act shall have effect in relation to a newsreel as if in the definition of 'maker' the word 'editing' were substituted for the word 'making'.").—(Lord Shepherd.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Clause 1, as amended, agreed to.
Clause 2 [Definition of "Maker"]:
LORD SHEPHERD: This is a drafting Amendment. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Leave out Clause 2.—(Lord Shepherd.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
LORD SHEPHERD: This, too, is a drafting Amendment. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Leave out Clause 3.—(Lord Shepherd.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Clause 4 [Citation]:
LORD SHEPHERD: This is a further drafting Amendment. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 2, line 4, leave out ("(Amendment)").—(Lord Shepherd.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
LORD SHEPHERD: This Amendment is to exclude Northern Ireland from the provisions of the Bill. May I apologise once again to the Committee and to you, my Lord Chairman? I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 2, line 4, at end insert ("and this Act and the Films Act 1960 may be cited together as the Films Acts 1960 and 1964.
(2) This Act does not extend to Northern Ireland.").—(Lord Shepherd.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Remaining clause, as amended, agreed to.
House resumed: Bill reported, with Amendments.

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (RIGHT OF REPLY) BILL
House in Committee (according to Order).
House resumed: Bill reported without amendment; Report received.

HARBOURS BILL
3.24 p.m.
Order of the Day for the House to be again in Committee read.
Moved, That the House do now resolve itself into Committee.—(Lord Chesham.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.
House in Committee accordingly.
[The LORD MERTHYR in the Chair.]
Clause 19:
Orders for establishing schemes for control of movement of ships in harbours
19.—
(4) The provisions of a control of movement order having effect by virtue of subsection (3)(i) above shall not be so framed as to permit

(b) on conviction on indictment of a person of such an offence or of the master of a ship by reason of such a failure or contravention, of the infliction on him of imprisonment (whether in addition to, or in substitution for, a fine) for a term exceeding six months.

LORD TEYNHAM LORD TEYNHAM had given Notice of two Amendments to the clause, the first being, in subsection (3)(d), after "empowering" to insert: "subject to the next following subsection". The noble Lord said: With the agreement of the Committee Amendments Nos. 41 and 42 might be taken together. As the clause is drawn, the control authority could prohibit—
THE EARL OF SWINTON: May I interrupt my noble friend on a point of order? It seems to me that all the Amendments which follow are really dealing with the same situation as to what the penalties would be.
SEVERAL NOBLE LORDS: No.
LORD TEYNHAM: As the clause is drawn the control authority could in fact—
THE PARLIAMENTARY SECRETARY, MINISTRY of TRANSPORT (LORD CHESHAM): May I interrupt my noble friend? My understanding of this matter is that Amendments Nos. 41 and 42 in point of fact deal with quite different points.
LORD TEYNHAM: I do not think so. If the Committee agree that we should debate them together I will proceed to do so. Perhaps the Committee will see when we have debated this clause that the two, in fact, hang together. As the clause is drawn, the control authority could prohibit a ship from entering a harbour on the ground that it was not fitted with the specified equipment. I maintain that this provision raises an important principle. A control of movement order, in effect, could require the compulsory fitting of equipment. For instance, there is no international agreement to fit very-high-frequency radiotelephone equipment for harbour control, which I think is proposed under the Bill. I suggest that a provision which amounts to a unilateral requirement to fit special equipment to a ship might result in unfortunate repercussions to British ships in foreign harbours. If we were to impose requirements to fit equipment in a ship irrespective of its flag, foreign countries would be encouraged to do the same; and this might well be unacceptable to us.
I suggest that it would be wrong, on the grounds both of safety and of the possibility of international repercussions, to make a ship, stay outside a harbour, perhaps in bad weather, because she was not fitted with the equipment laid down by the control of movement order. Once the ship is inside the harbour there is no reason why she should not be directed to a designated anchorage in the interests of safety. I suggest that this clause is yet another instance of the tidy mind in drafting Bills which takes no account at all of practical facts. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 22, line 5, after ("empowering") insert ("(subject to the next following subsection)").—(Lord Teynham)
LORD HOBSON: This matter was raised by Opposition Members on
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Second Reading in the other place and I endorse, broadly, the statement and arguments put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Teynham. The real points to bear in mind are that we in Britain are the most advanced of any nation in the world, so far as navigational aids are concerned, whether it be very-high-frequency radiotelephone or radar. We are in the very exceptional position of having around our coast radio beacons (I will not mention the name, as that could be construed as advertising), and parts of the coast near Ushant, and parts of the Eastern seaboard of America are also so equipped. But if we are to insist on laying down that ships entering our ports must be equipped with the latest equipment, it seems to me to be very unfair that penalties should be provided in respect of the entry by other ships not so equipped. Because, as the noble Lord, Lord Teynham, said, there will be retaliations which will be harmful to British shipping entering ports in other countries. There is no need for me to mention the names, but some nations might be very awkward if our ships did not comply with standards which they laid down. As the clause stands, it invites retaliation; and this Amendment is moved with the sole object of making it possible that, whatever standards are laid down by the Ministry of Transport and the Ministry's advisers, they are agreed to internationally.
In another place, the Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Transport said that this was a wrecking Amendment. I have read the clause two or three times and I still fail to see how this Amendment can be described as a wrecking Amendment. We are not against having ships equipped with safety devices in our ports at all. It is absolutely ridiculous to suggest that we are. All we are doing is saying that the advanced standards of modern British ships shall not of necessity be the international standard. That can come in time, but so long as we are in advance of the normal international standard it seems to us unfair, particularly because of the dire consequences of retaliation that could ensue. I hope that after the noble Lord's serious consideration of this matter, which f am sure he has given, he will see fit to accept this Amendment.
LORD CHESHAM: At the moment, although we are speaking to two Amendments, I will take the first in isolation, if I may, because although it may have been the intention of my noble friend Lord Teynham that they should hang together, the effect is to produce a separate point and I think that I must first explain that point before continuing to deal with what has been said about the other Amendment. Amendment No. 41 has the effect of making directions under sub-paragraph (3)(d) of Clause 19 subject to the provisions of sub-paragraph (4) of that clause. I am merely going to say that this Amendment is unnecessary because of the provisions of sub-paragraph (3)(i).
LORD SHACKLETON: Surely it is subsection (3), paragraph (i). I think this is why the misunderstanding may have arisen. My view is the same as that of the noble Lord, Lord Teynham.
LORD CHESHAM: I am trying to get it right but the noble Lord keeps interrupting me. If the noble Lord would allow me to continue for a moment, perhaps I could make it clear. I refer to Clause 19. I thought the correct term was "sub-paragraphs" and that "subsections" was a term that applied after the Bill became an Act. But never mind. Subsection (3) is divided into a number of paragraphs, one of which is paragraph (i). That is further sub-divided into (i) and (ii), and I refer to sub-paragraph (ii), which is at the top of page 23. That provides what the noble Lord wants done. It has precisely the effect of the Amendment that he has on the Marshalled List. To this extent I have dealt with Amendment No. 41 before we deal with No. 42, and perhaps it may be convenient if I stop for a moment at this stage.
LORD DOUGLAS OF BARLOCH: Surely this is a misunderstanding of the effect of the Amendments which stand upon the Marshalled List. There is not only No. 41, but also No. 42 for the purpose of inserting a new subsection, and it is to that new subsection to which Amendment No. 41 refers. The noble Lord's point would be correct on the assumption that Amendment No. 42 was
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not carried, but it is perfectly clear that these two Amendments are both intended to be related, and in that case the reference in the first Amendment to "the next following subsection" is obviously a reference to the new subsection provided for in Amendment No. 42, if it is agreed to.
LORD SHACKLETON: I hope the noble Lord will not think that I am trying to make the position more difficult. I was trying to help him, so that we could use the same language and the same designations which, I understand, are the practice of this House. I do not know whether the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor can clarify this, but I understand that this is precisely what the noble Lord, Lord Teynham, is trying to do, and I should think it is pointless to discuss No. 41 without No. 42, because the new subsection to which he refers is the one contained in No. 42. I understood that the small (a) and (i) to which the noble Lord was referring were called paragraphs or sub-paragraphs, but perhaps the noble Lord the Chairman of Committees can help us on this.
LORD CHESHAM: I do not want to confuse this issue—
LORD SHACKLETON: They have told the noble Lord wrong.
LORD CHESHAM: Unless my Marshalled List is misprinted, Amendment No. 41 begins
"Page 22, line 5, …"
and then refers to "the next following subsection"—I now see what the noble Lord means. We are in a little bit of a procedural difficulty, because I think that whether it should be there or not is dependent on the insertion of the new subsection. But this Amendment in isolation does not make sense.
LORD SHACKLETON: That is why the noble Lord wants to take them together.
LORD CHESHAM: It is perfectly in order in this House to discuss two Amendments together, but they cannot be moved together. Therefore, what are we to do?
THE EARL OF SWINTON: May I ask the noble Lord this point? Suppose this first Amendment is withdrawn, shall we be in any way prejudiced in discussing any of the Amendments which follow? If that is so, is not the sensible thing to do to withdraw this Amendment and then take the substantive Amendment, and if the Bill is amended, then whatever is necessary can be put in on Report.
LORD CHESHAM: Perhaps it might be easier to do it one way or the other. The better way might be to discuss them together. I am anxious to be clear about this.
THE CHAIRMAN OF COMMITTEES (LORD MERTHYR): I would only say that, of course, it would not be proper for me to say anything at all about the merits of this Amendment, but in reading the Marshalled List it seems to me to be clear that, first of all, the only Amendment before the Committee at the moment is No. 41. On the other hand, it seems to be clear that No. 42 stands or falls by No. 41. If No. 41 is carried, your Lordships will probably wish to carry No. 42, and, on the contrary, if No. 41 is rejected, probably No. 42 will be entirely unnecessary.
LORD MORRISON OF LAMBETH: We are obliged to the noble Lord the Chairman of Committees for putting the matter so very clearly. I agree with the Parliamentary Secretary that we are in a procedural difficulty, but the only man who has made the procedural difficulty is the Parliamentary Secretary. I have paid him compliments twice in the last week, saying that he is a very good Parliamentary Secretary, which he is; but to-day he is off-colour. It is perfectly clear that this first Amendment, No. 41, leads into the second Amendment. It says "subject to the next following subsection", and the new subsection appears in Amendment No. 42. It is perfectly clear that these two Amendments hang together. I entirely agree that the Chair must put the Amendments separately; but if No. 41 is lost, then, by inference, and logically, No. 42 is lost also, and if No. 41 is carried, then No. 42 is carried. Surely the matter would be simpler if the Parliamentary Secretary would be good enough to address himself in his speech to the merits or demerits of both Amendments, and then
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let the Committee vote on No. 41 and, if necessary, on No. 42. Is not that the simple way out of such difficulty as may or may not exist?
LORD CHESHAM: Yes. I am most grateful to the noble Lord for having pointed out to me what I have just said. I suggest that at this point we can start again, the position being that the carrying or otherwise of Amendment No. 41 rests on the merits of No. 42, to which I shall now address myself.
It seemed to me that the arguments put forward from both sides of the Committee stemmed from the support of an Amendment in identical terms put down during the passage of the Bill in another place. That was aimed at what was the original draft of the Bill, which was in a shape that would have caused worry such as noble Lords have expressed to a much greater extent than the form in which the Bill now is. Because shipowners feared, as we have been told, that other countries might follow the lead and specify certain equipment, to the detriment of shipowners, and might proceed in the way that we have had described to us to-day, an Amendment was moved on Report in another place and is now embodied in the Bill. Strictly speaking, incidentally, the Amendment we are now discussing, to he complete, ought to provide also for the deletion of paragraph (d) of Clause 19(3). But that is by the way, and I hope it will not mean anything of the kind.
I think it was acknowledged by those who supported the Amendment in another place—though, frankly, that has not been the case to-day—that the Government Amendment in another place went a considerable way to meet the fears and objections that had been expressed. The Government Amendment, not going quite so far as was suggested, provided that the equipment must be of a kind agreed or recommended internationally. That will allow the existing V.H.F. system of radio-telephony to be specified because marine V.H.F. conforms to the provisions of the International Telecommunications Union Radio Regulations, 1959. It would also allow radar, as we now have it, to be used, because the Safety of Life at Sea Convention, 1960, made recommendations about the standards of marine radar.

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What is suggested to-day is that there shall be no prohibition on the ground that a ship is not fitted with particular equipment unless that equipment has been the subject of an international convention accepted by Her Majesty's Government.
Now I must come to the reason why my colleague in another place described this as a wrecking Amendment, which, quite frankly, is the way I would describe it. I am certain that neither my noble friend nor the noble Lord, Lord Hobson, have the slightest intention that it should be such: I entirely absolve them from any such idea. But it does have that effect. The reason is that it may well be years before we have an international agreement signed, sealed, delivered, ratified and accepted, which would be necessary under this Amendment, and therefore it would be years before the schemes could be brought in to be effective; and there is every reason to suppose that in some places such schemes for traffic control are required now.
It seems a great pity to waste the lead and the expertise which has been developed in this country to which the noble Lord, Lord Hobson, referred a little earlier, and to which the noble Lord, Lord Lindgren, referred, I believe, on Second Reading, and not to put it to good use. I should have thought that accepting the Bill as it is would be entirely to the benefit of shipowners, because the equipment which is now available for use, which they could not otherwise use, can bring their ships safely into harbour through fog and in adverse circumstances. If that equipment is to be debarred from use, which would be the effect of this Amendment, the only alternative will be that it must stay outside. I do not believe that is what noble Lords want.
I think this Amendment is wrong. I think, having gone so far as we have to safeguard the position by specifying only equipment which is recommended or agreed internationally, and with no discrimination against anyone else's ships, that is as far as it is necessary to go, and the position is safeguarded so far as any other country is concerned. To accept this Amendment would be likely to defeat the whole purpose of
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this part of the Bill, and I hope your Lordships will not wish to do so.
VISCOUNT RUNCIMAN OF DOXFORD: May I ask the noble Lord one question? He said that the effect of this Amendment would be to debar ships from entering under certain conditions. Surely the whole nature of the case is to lay down the conditions under which they can enter. It is permissive, not mandatory. The control authority is not obliged to exclude ships if they do not comply. It may say that they must not come if they do not, but that is not the same position as binding its hands not to allow them to come if they do not.
LORD CHESHAM: If the control scheme is to be brought in and someone is to be empowered to specify circumstances in which a ship shall not enter unless it has certain equipment, if, as will now be the case, a ship is required to have equipment which it is practically impossible for it to obtain and it may be years before it is possible to do so, I should regard that requirement as knocking the heart out of this part of the Bill.
VISCOUNT RUNCIMAN OF DOXFORD: Surely the clause says "empowering such person to prohibit". It is purely empowering and not compelling.
LORD CHESHAM: To carry on with the clause, it says:
"… unless the ship is fitted with such equipment as may be so specified."
The noble Viscount must not overlook the fact that we are endeavouring to create a situation based on considerations of safety. We have nowadays large ships carrying large and valuable cargoes, some of which may be dangerous to some extent; and we also have very fine control systems based on radar. I think that we should not debar ourselves from using these in harbours. I think it is not unreasonable to expect, if you have a traffic control scheme, that in the interests of both safety and efficiency you should be able to use the equipment which goes with it.
LORD HOBSON: I think the main point here is that we are afraid that the noble Lord and the Ministry are putting too high a standard on safety requirements with regard to V.H.F. and

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radar too early. That is really the point. The argument here advanced would be a sound one if it applied only to British ships. The fact is that not only British ships enter our ports. I agree that it might take a long time to get international standards with regard to navigational aids. I would say en passant that Her Majesty's present advisers have taken a long time to agree to the international standards of safety at sea, which they have just ratified.
The main point is that, where we have foreign trade carried out by British ships, particularly the British tramp fleet, if we are to have standards which are of such modern requirements and such advanced scientific design, there is a great danger because other countries which are ill-disposed to this nation could introduce retaliatory measures. That is what we are frightened of. We think it would be inimical to the interests of British shipping. It is not that we are against safety at sea but, as I said, that the standard is being placed too high, too early.
LORD CHESHAM: I knew that that was what the noble Lord was frightened of: he made it perfectly clear. To meet that fear I said that we had selected something which had been agreed or recommended internationally as the standard. That was done to avoid setting an impossibly high standard, and also to produce a standard from which anybody else would find difficulty in departing in the case of retaliation. That was done to meet those very points, and, I submit, meet them it does. After all, as the noble Viscount, Lord Runciman of Doxford, said, this is only an empowering measure. Also, it does not make the fitting of such equipment compulsory. No ship, either British or foreign, is compelled to fit anything of the kind. It merely means that where these highly desirable and, I would say, essential, schemes are brought into effect, in the case of fog, for instance, a ship, instead of having to apply to go in, will have to lie outside. That is all; there is no compulsion about it. But if there are these schemes, they must be properly equipped and properly run.
THE EARL OF SWINTON: Is it clear that where a regulation is passed and is being enforced by a harbour authority,
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that regulation will apply equally to any foreign ship as to any British ship? That seems to me to be vital. If that is so, then I dare say the matter is not open to such objection.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR (LORD DILHORNE): I think clearly the answer to that question is, "Yes." I would also, if I might intervene for one moment in the troubled waters in this particular harbour, say this. This is a Bill which we hope will be enacted and will last for a considerable time. We are here considering the scope of the movement control orders that can be made under the Bill. The noble Lord, Lord Hobson, was worried that too high a standard may be imposed at the outset. I appreciate his anxiety, and my noble friend has dealt with that.
But, of course, the real time to consider that is when the movement control order is formulated; and there is under Schedule 5 ample power for lodging objections to any particular proposal. That will be the time to consider whether too high a standard is being imposed. I do not think it arises now, because if this Bill is going to last as an Act, as we hope, for some time, it must have the frame for the picture and contain the right empowering provisions. I should have thought that, in the light of what my noble friend has said, the case for the provisions of the kind that are now in the Bill is very strong. But I would stress that, when a movement control order is made, Schedule 5 gives ample power for considering the particular terms of the movement control order and lodging objections, if need be.
LORD TEYNHAM: Having listened carefully to the explanation given by the noble Lord, I cannot say that I am very happy or clear about it. He said that the Amendment moved and accepted in another place has allayed the fears of the shipping interests. I am advised quite differently. I should like to see in Hansard the report of what the Minister has said, and to reserve matters until the Report stage, when we might deal with it again. On that basis, I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
THE CHAIRMAN OF COMMITTEES: Does the noble Lord, Lord Hobson, not move Amendment No. 42?
LORD HOBSON: We are under this procedural difficulty. I understand that I really moved it.
THE CHAIRMAN OF COMMITTEES: The position is that I cannot call more than one Amendment at the same time, and so far I have called only No. 41. When the noble Lord, Lord Hobson, got up, I supposed that he was supporting the noble Lord, Lord Teynham, on Amendment No. 41. Does the noble Lord wish to move Amendment No. 42?
LORD HOBSON: No, my Lord Chairman.
LORD GARDINER LORD GARDINER had given notice of an Amendment in subsection 4(b), to leave out "imprisonment (whether in addition to, or in substitution for, a fine) for a term exceeding six months" and insert
"a penalty other than a fine or of the infliction on him of a fine exceeding £300".
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: Amendments Nos. 43, 44 and 45 cover precisely the same points, and I should have thought it would be for the convenience of the Committee to discuss these three Amendments together. I do not know whether my noble friend Lord Teynham, as well as discussing Nos. 44 and 45, could move No. 43 in place of the noble Lord, Lord Gardiner.
LORD SHACKLETON: Why?
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: So that we can discuss all three together.
3.58 p.m.
LORD HOBSON: I beg to move Amendment No. 43. This Amendment deals with the question of making the maximum penalty a fine not exceeding £300. Already harbour masters in practically all, if not all, ports in the United Kingdom have power to regulate navigation by giving directions to ships. The elaborate movement control orders which are envisaged in Clause 19 will not extend the existing orders which harbour masters already possess. It seems that the introduction of high penalties is something which is to be deplored. I believe that under the present Act, when dealing with the subject of navigation, there is a fine of £20, and in the Port of London a fine of £50. Therefore, what we seek to do here
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is to limit the fine that can be inflicted for the infringement of a movement order to the sum of £300. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 24, line 1, leave out from beginning to end of line 2 and insert ("a penalty other than a fine or of the infliction on him of a fine exceeding £300").—(Lord Hobson.)
LORD TEYNHAM: In supporting this Amendment, I go so far as to say that Clause 19(4) is the most unpleasant and uncalled for clause in any Bill that I have found it necessary to debate in your Lordships' House after 25 years' service here. As a captain in Her Majesty's Navy, it is repugnant to me to know that my brother officers who are masters of ships in the Merchant Navy can render themselves liable to six months' imprisonment for disobeying a movement order in a British ship. It is all very well for the Minister in charge of the Bill to say that it is only an enabling power, as he did on Second Reading. That is not the point. This Bill enables a port authority to make by-laws whereby offences against the port scheme can be dealt with either summarily or upon indictment, with the maximum penalty of six months' imprisonment.
At the present time there are really four offences for which a master of a ship is liable for imprisonment. The first is misconduct, such as wilful breach of duty or drunkenness endangering life or ships; second, the wilful destroying or mutilation of an official log book, or making false or fraudulent entries in it; third, infringement of the Collision Regulations by wilful default; fourth, knowingly taking a ship to sea in an unseaworthy condition. I should like to ask Her Majesty's Government what justification they have for enabling a further offence of this nature to be added. Can they state any specific cases that have occurred in the past warranting this drastic clause in the Bill? In any case, I would say that it is most improper that this matter should be dealt with under the Bill which is now before your Lordships' House.
I suggest that it would be most unfortunate if this imprisonment provision were copied abroad. It would mean that the masters of British ships might he sent to gaol for not complying with the order of a foreign harbour master.

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It may well be that a master's professional judgment led him to believe that to do so would involve risk to his ship. I should like to remind your Lordships that the professional judgment of three people may be involved in the navigation of a ship entering harbour: namely, the master, the pilot and the harbour master. Why should the master of a ship be singled out for imprisonment?
This clause is placing the master of a ship, who must have high professional competence, in the same category as the driver of a Ford van. I should like to point out that the possible imposition of sentences of imprisonment under this Bill has caused deep resentment among master mariners, and my Amendment which is now before the Committee will limit the penalty for failing to comply with a control of movement order to a fine not exceeding £500. Lord Hobson's Amendment says £300, and I am perfectly prepared to accept that.
3.53 p.m.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: It may be for the convenience of the Committee if I now answer the speeches that have been made in support of Amendment No. 43, which we are discussing with Amendments Nos. 44 and 45. The question at issue is whether there should be any liability to imprisonment for a breach of a movement control order. I am sorry that this particular provision is repugnant to my noble friend and that he regards it as most improper. I feel that that language is not justified and that it is right for the Bill to remain in its present form.
My noble friend said a few moments ago that this Bill is concerned with safety, and in these days, when so many big ships carry explosives and highly inflammable cargoes, it is essential for the safety not only of those on the water, but also of those who live on the land in the neighbourhood, that there should be power to control the movement of vessels into and out of a port. I am not suggesting for one moment that the masters of these ships carrying such cargoes do not and will not exercise the greatest possible care, but the failure by others to comply with the requirements of a movement control order may place the masters of such ships in great difficulties and, indeed, lead to a situation of extreme danger. I hope that I carry
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the Committee with me in saying that it is clearly right to include in this Bill provisions for making a control of movement order.
Schedule 5, to which I drew attention a moment or two ago, deals with the procedure for making an order, and under that procedure anyone who objects to a provision in the proposed order will have ample opportunity for making known his objection. If one accepts that there must and should be a control of movement order in relation to certain ports, it surely follows that there must be some provision for dealing with those who do not comply with the requirements of such an order. I hope that so far I have been able to carry the noble Lord, Lord Teynham, and the Committee with me.
The question comes to this: what should be the maximum penalty for disobedience to a provision of the order? It is suggested that it should be a fine of £300 or £500. I would say, in passing, that it is not usual, when fining in respect of cases where the conviction is upon indictment, to prescribe an upper limit to the power of the courts. It is normally left to the discretion of the courts. Here, I think, the real issue is whether there should be any power to impose a sentence of imprisonment, and the Bill itself puts a maximum of six months. Amendment No. 45 suggests a maximum of three months, and perhaps I might deal with that Amendment straight away. I would say, first, that I cannot recollect any case where, by Statute, provision is made for trial on indictment (that is to say, before assizes or quarter sessions), with power to send to prison, in which the maximum sentence of imprisonment is limited to three months. Such a penalty is well within the jurisdiction of the magistrates' courts, and it would be highly unusual to find an indictable offence with such a limit of sentence.
But the real issue, as I say, is: should there be any power, for any breach of movement control order, to impose sentences of imprisonment limited, as the Bill suggests, to six months? Breaches of these orders must vary greatly. We are not considering here the terms of any particular order because, as my noble friend behind me remarked just now, this is only an empowering or enabling provision. The orders will be

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considered under the machinery in Schedule 5. At one end of the scale, of course, the breaches may be extremely trivial and minor: they may be wholly inadvertent, due to incompetence, ignorance or carelessness. No one would suggest that if there were a breach of that character there should be a trial of the master of the ship, or of any other person, on indictment. What I would ask the Committee to consider is the kind of breach which comes at the other end of the scale—because we are here considering, not the minor breaches, but what would be the proper limit to a criminal sanction for a really serious breach.
What about the breaches at the other end of the scale: the case where the breach is deliberate, or is due to gross recklessness or gross carelessness; or where the result of the breach is to create a serious danger and a serious risk of loss of lives and damage to property? Such cases may not occur—one hopes they will not. But the question we have to consider is what should be the maximum penalty that may be imposed by the courts on conviction, should an extreme case of that kind in fact take place. The point I want to stress is that a deliberate or reckless disregard of a movement control order may lead to a serious situation. If that happens, if there is a flagrant, wilful disregard of instructions clearly given, is it right that the maximum penalty should be limited to a fine which might, after all, be paid not by the person responsible for the breach but by the owner of the ship?
My noble friend referred to the Collision Regulations. They, too, like these movement control orders, are designed to secure safety at sea, and if an infringement of those Collision Regulations is caused by the wilful default of the master or owner of the ship, the master or owner is guilty of a misdemeanour for which he may be prosecuted and, on conviction, sentenced to imprisonment for from six months to two years. This was enacted by the Merchant Shipping Act, 1894, and the maximum then was two years with or without hard labour. We are proposing for this offence, which is analogous to that in the Collision Regulations, a maximum imprisonment of only six months, which
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obviously would be imposed—indeed, any sentence of imprisonment would be imposed—only for a gross case, a really bad case indeed.
I cannot discuss the terms of the movement control orders, but one would certainly not expect any movement control order, which may create a number of penalties for breaches of the provisions, to impose a liability of this sort to imprisonment except when the breach was of the character I have described.
As I have already said, when one gets a draft movement control order Schedule 5 gives ample opportunity for objecting and going into that matter. I must confess that I cannot see in the light of the provisions in the Collision Regulations and the provisions of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1894, that there is anything very novel, very unusual, improper, or repugnant in providing to secure compliance with a control of movement order that the most serious breaches to it may be punished on conviction and indictment by imprisonment for not more than six months.
My noble friend Lord Runciman of Doxford in the course of his speech on Second Reading said it was an entirely novel and wholly undesirable suggestion that a master mariner can render himself liable to six months' imprisonment for disobeying a movement order in port. I have already shown it is not novel. Nor do I think it is undesirable that there should be this liability. As I have said, such a liability to imprisonment exists for wilful breach of the Collision Regulations, and the Collision Regulations would not suffice in the absence of these provisions; it would not suffice simply to rely upon the Collision Regulations.
It might be argued that a collision even under control would involve breaches of the international Collision Regulations and so any penalties for such breaches set out in the Merchant Shipping Act would be applicable. That, in fact, need not necessarily follow, because the master could be observing the Collision Regulations and yet because of non-observance of directions made under a movement control order interfere seriously with the efficient working of the control system. Perhaps that might even lead to a collision. If I might give an example, he could

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anchor his ship in defiance of a direction to proceed; this would not be a breach of the Collision Regulations but would be a source of interference and could well be dangerous in an area of control. Alternatively, the master could keep his ship moving, observing the Collision Regulations, when directed to proceed to anchorage; this again could be dangerous. In a way this power we are seeking to take here, designed to secure safety, is complementary to, amplifies and brings up to date this particular part of the Collision Regulations.
My noble friend drew attention, too, to the fact that there is liability to imprisonment on conviction for other offences under the Merchant Shipping Act. The noble Viscount, Lord Runciman of Doxford, did make this point, which I think my noble friend Lord Teynham rather hinted at to-day. The noble Viscount, Lord Runciman of Doxford suggested on Second Reading that a master might risk imprisonment for not taking his vessel to sea when ordered to do so because he might fear that the port authority would not accept a defence that in his view the vessel was not in a fit condition to proceed to sea. I would point out that the determination of the guilt or innocence of the master will not rest with the port authority. If it is decided to prosecute, either summarily or on indictment, it will be for the courts to decide whether or not guilt is established. I would draw your Lordships attention to the provisions of Clause 23, which we shall be discussing later. In the event of a prosecution being instituted it will, as your Lordships will see from that clause, be a defence for the person charged to prove—and I am reading the words—
"that he had reasonable ground for supposing that compliance with the direction, provision or prohibition in question, would be likely to imperil the ship or to prove that in the circumstances compliance with the direction, provision or prohibition in question was impracticable."
I would just like to add this: that we ordinarily leave, and rightly leave, to the courts a wide discretion as to the sentence imposed. I myself do not believe for one moment that the courts would impose any sentence of imprisonment for breach of a movement control order unless it was clearly established that the breach was deliberate, inexcus-
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able and was fraught with very serious consequences. It is because a very serious breach may warrant a sentence of imprisonment that I suggest to your Lordships that it is right not to exclude power to include in a movement control order a penalty of up to six months imprisonment. As I have said, Schedule 5 provides machinery for objecting to the contents of the movement control order, and it is the order itself which will prescribe the penalties for its breach.
I really cannot accept the statement made by the right reverend Prelate the Lord Bishop of Chester on Second Reading that there would not be "a real element of criminal impropriety". I think there would if there were deliberate, inexcusable flouting of a movement control order seriously endangering lives and property. It is just to meet this extreme case, which one hopes will not in fact occur; it is because of the necessity of seeing so far as one can that these movement control orders, designed to secure safety, are not flouted, that I suggest to your Lordships, giving full weight, as I have, to the argument advanced on Second Reading and again by my noble friend to-day, that it is both right and wise to retain the Bill in its present form.
LORD SHACKLETON: The noble and learned Lord has, of course, deployed a very powerful case, but those of us who criticise this particular provision do so on the grounds that in this matter the Government are using a quite inappropriate instrument to deal with the situation for which there are already very strong sanctions. The noble and learned Lord referred to the Merchant Shipping Act, where there are provisions in certain sections—Section 200, Section 220 and Section 419, to which he referred—under which it is possible to inflict prison sentences. I should have thought that there was a strong case, in regard to this particular type of offence, to limit the penalty to a fine, and to leave the Merchant Shipping Act to take care of any grave or wilful breach of duty.
The noble and learned Lord several times used strong language about the more serious offences which. I should have thought, were adequately covered by Section 220 of the Merchant Shipping Act. The life and career of a master of a ship is dependent on much more than

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the threat of imprisonment; if he behaves in any way improperly and hazards his ship and there is a collision, he is likely to be ruined anyway. We are critical of this clause because we believe the Government are applying an old-fashioned approach to a situation which is quite different from that which applied when originally the Merchant Shipping Act was introduced. We are doing so now in a situation when there are many nations who, on occasions, have treated our masters in a way which has aroused indignation in this country. There have been instances recently where our seamen, and certainly our masters, have been treated in this way.
This, again, is an example of a unilateral act; it has not been the subject of international negotiations. I would argue that it is really not necessary for the purposes of this particular Bill to take powers to inflict a prison sentence, and that it is undesirable in view of the possibility of international repercussions. I urge the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor to look at it in that light. Clearly, in legal terms his case was impeccable and powerful. Our complaint is that this is inappropriate for the sort of situation which is likely to arise under this particular clause; and if there is such a wilful act, such wilful breach of duty, then I suggest that the existing provisions of the Merchant Shipping Act, and in particular of Section 220, would be the way to deal with it.
4.23 p.m.
THE EARL OF SWINTON: As we should expect, the Lord Chancellor has put the case most fairly, and the issue lies in a quite narrow compass. It is as to whether there should be a power to send to prison, and, if so, how that should be defined. I will come to the point of how it should be defined, because I think it is extremely important. My memory goes back to the Great Convention of 1928, when I was President of the Board of Trade, when nearly all the safety regulations were agreed by nearly all the nations, and in regard to which some Members of the Committee will still remember the most remarkable speech—I think the only speech he ever made here—that was made by Admiral Lord Jellicoe in support of the Convention. My recollection—the Lord Chan-
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cellor will correct me if I am wrong—is that the Convention and the Act which I introduced to give effect to that Convention covered an enormous field of safety regulations and the like. There was no penalty of imprisonment. There were the general penalties under the Merchant Shipping Act, as the noble Lord opposite has said, which I think were regarded as adequate.
There is a new Convention bringing that old Convention up to date, which is, I think, now enshrined in legislation which is coming before us in this Parliament. I should like to know whether, in that Convention legislation, there is any provision for imprisonment for breach of these internationally agreed rules and regulations. I should doubt it. I would agree, on the whole, with the noble and learned Lord, the Lord Chancellor—though I should have thought that the Merchant Shipping Act already provided for it—that where there was wilful, what we should commonly call criminal, default by a master risking his ship, or any ship, and the lives of the people on the ship, like a breach of the Collision Regulations (by wilful default or wilful misconduct, whichever the words are) that is so grave that there should be a power to send to prison.
I would have thought that provision was in the Merchant Shipping Act. If it is to exist, I think it ought to exist in specific legislation which lays down in precise terms what is the criminal offence for which a man may be sent to prison. It seems to me to be quite unsatisfactory just to leave it for inclusion in any one of a whole series of orders which are going to be made for every port and for every harbour regulating authority throughout the country. It is apparently going to be put in as a general penalty.
I would trust the High Court, certainly in this country, not to send a man to prison unless he had committed a serious offence. But that really is not the point here. The point here is that you are going to include in these harbour regulations a power to prosecute and power for the High Court to send to prison if a prosecution takes place. The noble Lord opposite said that it is a bit old-fashioned. It is rather like the old Army Act which used to read,
"Death, or such less penalty as this Act provides."

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That seems to me to he unsatisfactory. I would beg the Lord Chancellor to consider this matter. Let him lay down in a specific provision in the Bill what is the offence for which a master may be sent to prison; and let it be said that the harbour regulations may, under this Bill, contain that provision, but shall not contain any other provision making a man liable to go to prison. That seems to me much more consistent with what we always do in English legislation—namely, lay down specifically what the crime is for which a man may be indicted.
I have one other reason for asking that this general provision shall not be here in these terms. We have led the world in safety regulations; we have led the world in shipping practice; and countries all over the world, particularly in the Commonwealth, have copied our legislation and our provisions. To-day, many of these countries are self-governing, and it may well be that they may say, "Here, in the British Act, there is a power to imprison a master for a breach of harbour regulations. Let us include that in our domestic legislation in this country."
Then one might conceive the case (and I will take an imaginary place) in which the harbour master in Bunga Bunga has a row with the captain of a ship, and it might well be that the master of the ship would be much more likely to be right in knowing what it was safe to do than that particular harbour master. Yet if that general provision is there, then not only might the ship be impounded and the man be fined, but the master might be sent to prison. I beg the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor to consider whether, if he wants this provision for imprisonment and thinks that something is necessary in addition to the Merchant Shipping Act, he should put down a clause prescribing the offence for which imprisonment would be an appropriate penalty and that the regulations should include only that.
4.32 p.m.
LORD GARDINER,: I feel that I can speak only with the indulgence of the Committee, apologising for the fact that, through no fault of my own, I was unable to be here when this Amendment was moved, and also asking for the indulgence of the Committee if I say any-
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thing which has been said before. I particularly regret, of course, that I did not hear what the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor said. Therefore, I can tell the Committee only what was in my mind when I put down this Amendment. In the first place, this is not a subject on which it can be said that I have any prejudices, because I am not a sailor; I am a landlubber, and I am no more prejudiced in favour of masters of ships than is anybody who has been to sea. Nor have I received any letter from any interested party.
What was in my mind was this. We have 30,000 people in prison, and 8,000 sleeping three to a cell. Our forces of law and order are having some difficulty in controlling the situation, and it seemed to me that we ought, perhaps, to think before we constitute a new criminal offence which is punishable by imprisonment. No doubt it is right that harbour authorities should be able to make control of movement orders, but some of them are really navigational orders and there should be only one person who is in charge of a ship. I had in mind not only that the official who gives the order may be a quite junior official and himself a landlubber, but also the possible difficulties of the master of ships, faced, on the one hand, with his duty to his owner and, on the other, with a risk of being sent to prison. A fine, even a large fine, is perhaps, in a sense, a different matter; because if the owner thinks that the master has done the right thing I suppose that the owner may pay the fine.
I also had much in mind that the Merchant Shipping Act is, in effect, a code of nautical discipline. Discipline is, of course, necessary for masters, officers and crew, but the Act constitutes a complete code, with the various courts of inquiry and survey, naval courts, and with the Court of Admiralty being able, on the face of it, to take care of almost anything which a master of a ship might do that was wrong. I particularly had in mind the fact that Parliament has thought fit to provide that on nearly all these tribunals set up under the Merchant Shipping Act there are members who have considerable nautical experience (this does not apply to the Court of Admiralty, I know, but they have the assistance of the Elder Brethren of Trinity

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House), whereas under this provision of the present Bill, the master of a ship will find himself before justices, either in petty sessions or in quarter sessions, Moreover, I was not at all clear that anything necessary was not already covered by the Merchant Shipping Act,
I then found, to my surprise, that there did not seem to have been the usual measure of consultation with interested persons which one would have anticipated. The Merchant Navy and Airline Officers' Association had not been consulted, and they oppose this clause; the Chamber of Shipping also oppose it, so far as it provides for imprisonment. I began to wonder who it was, apart from some gentlemen in a Government Department, who wanted it. Presumably the harbour authorities. But then it was said in another place, without contradiction, that the Docks and Harbours Association did not want it at all. One still begins to wonder who did want it. If I may say so (I hope without giving offence), it may be, of course, that in what I might call a June situation there was not the time for consultation which there is now, in what I might call an October situation. Apparently the only people who wanted it were the Government, and I could not understand why. When the Parliamentary Secretary—himself, of course, a very distinguished sailor—was asked in Standing Committee in another place, on February 4, about this provision he said (col. 476):
"I can say at once that we certainly do not regard this Amendment as one that would wreck the clause, and if it is the wish of the Committee that the lesser penalty should be accepted, we will bow to the will of the Committee."
So apparently it is not even the Government who are committed to it; it is only the gentlemen in the office, and nobody else.
I apologise if, in attempting to put the matter as shortly as possible, I have repeated arguments which were made in my absence. But I suggest that this Committee would be properly fulfilling its advisory function if it said that, no interested persons having been consulted in the usual way, and this provision being opposed by all the people who understand these matters, and since the Government have said that it is
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not a matter about which they care but is a matter entirely for the Committee, the case for creating a new criminal offence, punishable by imprisonment, so far as masters are concerned, if being in difficulties they think that the movement which some "landlubbing bloke" has told them to make is not a proper one, ought to be removed and the Amendment accordingly allowed.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I am sorry that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Gardiner, was unable to be here when the Amendment was called, and I am sorry too that he was unable to hear the speech which I made in support of the Bill in its present form. I do not want to repeat what I said, but I would ask the Committee to allow me to say to the noble Lord that the case we are considering here is what is the appropriate penalty to provide as a maximum for what one might call the most serious and deliberate flouting of a control of movement order, which may seriously endanger a large number of lives and property. I recognise full well that in considering what should be the maximum penalty for such an offence there can be a wide variety of views. My approach to this problem is not in any way affected by questions of June or October or the views of civil servants, as the noble Lord suggested, but is to see whether we can get the right answer to this question.
I start with this. If, of course, the existing provisions of the Merchant Shipping Act sufficed to cover this situation, we should not have any provision of this sort in this Bill at all. The provisions of that Act impose liability not just to six months' imprisonment but to two years' imprisonment and make provision, as the noble Lord, Lord Gardiner, knows, for trial before justices as well as trial on indictment. Of course, we could in this Bill have attracted the control of movement order to the Merchant Shipping Act, 1894, in much the same way as the Collision Regulations are brought within the scope of that Act, and a prosecution for a breach of the Collision Regulations may lead to a sentence of imprisonment being imposed. And, of course, as I indicated before, that can happen only where the breach of the Collision Regulations is due to the wilful default of the master or owner of the ship.

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One of the difficulties which I am in—and my noble friend Lord Swinton drew attention to it—is the fact that in this Clause 19 this is drawn as a general empowering provision. I think a number of my noble friends are worried lest there might be some sort of overall provision in the movement control order imposing this as a kind of maximum liability irrespective of the quality of the breach. I myself, as I said before, cannot believe that any movement control order would do any such thing, because if it did it would have no possible chance of being approved by either House of Parliament. Although I say "approved", I would go further than that. The movement control orders have to be laid before Parliament, and under Clause 52 they are all subject to the Negative Resolution. I do not know what is in the mind of my right honourable friend the Minister of Transport with regard to this, but I myself would apprehend that he would certainly not do anything to assist in the presentation of a movement control order which imposed liability for imprisonment, except in the cases of the most wilful default on the part of the person responsible.
We are, in fact, being asked now by those who support this Amendment to say that, in no circumstances, however grave the breach of the movement control order may be, however much lives or property may be endangered by the breach—and it may be a breach by a small vessel which puts big vessels in danger and difficulties—would it be right for that breach to be met, if the guilt is established, by a sentence of imprisonment. I say quite frankly that I find it difficult to accept that. While I share with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Gardiner, a reluctance to add to the population in our prisons, at the same time we normally entrust a wide discretion to our courts. And I am approaching this not at all in a Party spirit, or on account of the Election date being June or October or whenever it may be, but to try to get the right answer.
I believe myself, bearing in mind the provisions of the Merchant Shipping Act which are far more draconian with their two years' imprisonment, and bearing in mind that it is the fact—I could
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amplify it at great length if the Committee wished it—that really the Merchant Shipping Act will not cover this field, that it is a reasonable provision to insert. Again, one should also bear in mind the fact that, before any provision in a movement control order defining an offence and imposing a liability to imprisonment for any term can really take effect, Parliament will have an opportunity of saying that it does not approve and of condemning it. All these are subject to the Negative Resolution.
I should be much more sympathetic to this Amendment if I felt there was not that Parliamentary control, because when we see what are the terms of the movement control order, then we can see—and I hope we shall see—this power to impose imprisonment limited by definition to offences which all of us would agree would be serious offences. At the present moment all that we are seeking to do in this Bill is to take power to secure that for some offences such a penalty can be prescribed. I myself do not think that unreasonable. I do not think that this is really an issue of Party politics. It is something which we should all approach very seriously, because, as I said a few moments ago, we are in this Bill trying to do something which will lead to greater safety, and to produce an Act which will work satisfactorily for many years.
I am, of course, perfectly prepared to consider any further suggestions which are made, and any views of noble Lords opposite and my noble friends. But I must say that I feel that it would be unwise, by accepting this Amendment, to prohibit the possibility of the imposition of a prison sentence of up to six months for the most serious breach of the requirements of a movement control order.
THE EARL OF SWINTON: Before the noble and learned Lord ends his reply, would he deal with the specific point which I put to him: that he should put into this Bill a precise definition of the offences for which the High Court is to be able to send a man to prison? Then we should know what we were making a criminal offence, and should know what it was that would go

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into every harbour regulation that was made. I cannot see any objection to that when, obviously, this is the kind of thing Parliament wants to do. I cannot see why we cannot do it now.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I am certainly very attracted to that suggestion. I was just going to say this to the noble Earl.
THE EARL OF SWINTON: I am so sorry to have intervened.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I cannot, with my present state of knowledge of what it is intended to put into movement control orders, say that I could contemplate what the particular offences will be. But Collision Regulations are attracted to the Merchant Shipping Act by these words in Section 419(2), which reads as follows:
"If an infringement of the Collision Regulations is caused"—
and, of course, it does not follow that there must be a collision—
"… by the wilful default of the Master or owner of the ship, that Master or owner shall in respect of each offence be guilty of a misdemeanour."
That carries two years' imprisonment.
I should like to consider whether one could not do something on those lines, but possibly even a little narrower. That is where I am in a little difficulty about saying, Yes, to my noble friend's suggestion. If it would meet the Committee, I think I can give an undertaking (I have not consulted my right honourable friend) that I will try, before the Report stage, to re-draft this provision to make sure that the penalty of imprisonment could not be imposed under any movement control order, except in cases of wilful default on the part of the owner or master; or, to put the other side—a side with which noble Lords are familiar in cases of manslaughter and so on—something that is equivalent to gross recklessness.
If I could carry the Committee with me to the extent that if the imprisonment penalty were limited in that way, they would be satisfied, then I should feel that this has been a very useful discussion. I should certainly like to consider whether we can find a form of words to do that. That would mean—and, indeed, it is completely in line with
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what I said originally in dealing with this Amendment—that this liability to imprisonment would be kept for only the grossest, most serious breaches; and it might well be—I hope it would be—the case that this power would never have to be used. But if it is the wish of the Committee that I should give further thought to that possibility, I shall be glad to do so. I do not think this is a Party issue. It is something of very great importance. There are masters of all kinds, but we do want to be able to cover the most serious breaches of these orders quite as well as the minor ones, which are of no very great importance.
LORD HOBSON: In view of the assurance which the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor has given in his closing remarks, I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 19 agreed to.
EARL ST. ALDWYN: I think this might be a convenient moment to have the statement. I beg to move that the House do now resume.
Moved accordingly, and, on Question, Motion agreed to: House resumed accordingly.

PENAL REFORM
4.50 p.m.
THE CHANCELLOR OF THE DUCHY OF LANCASTER (VISCOUNT BLAKENHAM): My Lords, with your Lordships' permission, I wish to make a statement on penal policy which my right honourable friend the Prime Minister has just made in another place. It will be convenient, I think, if I use his exact words. They are:
"In 1959 the Government published a White Paper, Penal Practice in a Changing Society, which discussed the greatly increased volume of post-war crime and the measures taken to deal with it, and forecast developments in the penal system and building programme over the next few years. It emphasised the need to intensify research into crime and its causes, and into the effectiveness of methods of treatment. It acknowledged that existing penal practice had developed piecemeal and empirically over a

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long period in response to experience and the pressure of current problems; and it looked forward to a time when, with growing knowledge, it would be possible to conduct a fundamental review of penal methods and of the philosophy on which they are based.
"The Government is to-day publishing a White Paper, The War Against Crime in England and Wales which is a survey of the progress made in this field since 1959. Copies of the White Paper will be in the Vote Office at 4 o'clock. In the light of that progress, the Government has decided that the time has now come for the fundamental review foreshadowed in 1959, and that its importance is such that it should be carried out by a Royal Commission. I have therefore recommended to The Queen, and Her Majesty has been pleased to approve, the setting up of a Royal Commission with the following terms of reference:
'in the light of modern knowledge of crime and its causes and of modern penal practice here and abroad, to re-examine the concepts and purposes which should underlie the punishment and treatment of offenders in England and Wales; to report how far they are realised by the penalties and methods of treatment available to the courts, and whether any changes in these, or in the arrangements and responsibility for selecting the sentences to be imposed on particular offenders, are desirable: to review the work of the services and institutions dealing with offenders and the responsibility for their administration: and to make recommendations'.
"I will announce later the names of the Chairman and members.
"It is the Government's intention to ask the Royal Commission to give first priority, in its survey, to offenders under 21 and their treatment."
THE EARL, OF LONGFORD: My Lords, I am sure we are all much obliged to the noble Viscount for his statement. The House will be aware, after many debates in this place, that noble Lords on this side of the House will always extend a welcome to far-reaching proposals of penal research; but I am bound to say that we find the timing of this particular Royal Commission highly mystifying. The Government have had many years during which to propose a Commission of this sort, and that it should come in the last months of a dying Government is,
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frankly, amazing to those of us who sit on this side of the House, and no doubt to many others. I think I need only say now that the matters with which the Royal Commission are concerned are highly urgent, and the House will realise that a future Labour Government could not possibly be retarded in the steps it might take by the fact that this Royal Commission had been set up.
LORD REA: My Lords, may I, from these Benches, add our welcome to this very interesting statement which, we agree with the noble Earl, is rather overdue? It is indeed rather mystifying that it has come at this point, but as we on these Benches do not really count very solidly on being on the Government Benches after the next General Election, we can welcome it from whatever Government it comes, and thank the noble Viscount for his statement.
THE EARL OF LISTOWEL: My Lords, may I ask my noble relative—
VISCOUNT BLAKENHAM: My Lords, before I answer my noble brother, may I answer the first of the noble Lords who, I think, have broadly welcomed this? The noble Earl, Lord Longford, said that he thought the announcement was overdue. I think, to be fair, the 1959 White Paper explained that the time was not right for an inquiry. Since then, considerable progress has been made with the prison building programme and with criminological research; and, in the Government's view, the time is right. So far as this being a late appointment—and I believe this covers the point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Rea—I do not think this is a matter on which there is any political controversy and I would point out that the Labour Government, I believe, appointed a Royal Commission within less than a year of the General Election in 1950—the Royal Commission on Capital Punishment.
THE EARL OF LISTOWEL: My Lords, may I now ask my noble relative one question? It is the first question I have asked him, and I am sure he will not mind. I happen to be associated with the organisation which does most of the after-care work in this country, and I should like to know whether after-care is included in the

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terms of reference of the Royal Commission. It has not been stated explicitly in what has been said. Also, if they are to consider after-care, does it mean that the proposals the Government now have for the reorganisation of after-care will be posponed until after the Royal Commission has reported? I think the voluntary societies would like to know where they stand, and it is most important to them that they should know.
VISCOUNT BLAKENHAM: My Lords, in answer to my noble brother, I think I can this time give him the pleasure of a very satisfactory answer on both the points he has raised. Certainly the terms of reference are quite broad enough for the Royal Commission to take in the work of the after-care associations, if they so decide. On the second point, there would certainly be no question of there being a postponement of carrying out any decision the Government may make on the evidence that is now available to them.
THE EARL OF LISTOWEL: My Lords, I am very much obliged.
LORD STONHAM: My Lords, following on the question that the noble Viscount has just answered, can he give the same assurance with regard to the inquiry into the system of preventive detention? He will be aware that a Committee was appointed in January, 1961, and reported in January, 1963, and we are still awaiting the Government's decision with regard to the recommendation of that Committee to abolish the system of preventive detention. Can the noble Viscount give an assurance that this will not be held up in any way by this appointment of the Royal Commission?
VISCOUNT BLAKENHAM: My Lords, as my noble friend, I think only two days ago, indicated in answer to the noble Lord, it is hoped the Government will be able to make a statement on this matter fairly soon. Certainly the appointment of the Royal Commission will not inhibit any decision the Government may make in this matter.

HARBOURS BILL
5.0 p.m.
House again in Committee.
Clauses 20 and 21 agreed to.
Clause 22 [Powers of inspection, etc., in connection with schemes established by control of movement orders]:
LORD CHESHAM: This is a drafting Amendment. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 26, line 6, leave out ("section 19(3)(c)") and insert ("paragraph (d) of subsection (3) of section 19").—(Lord Chesham.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
LORD CHESHAM: This, also, is a drafting Amendment. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 26, line 11, leave out ("any such order") and insert ("such provision of such an order as has or, as the case may be, had effect by virtue of that paragraph").—(Lord Chesham.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to
Clause 22, as amended, agreed to.
Clause 23:
Defence available to persons charged with offences under control of movement orders
23. In any proceedings for an offence consisting—

(a) in a failure to comply with a direction given, under a provision of a control of movement order having effect by virtue of paragraph (c) of subsection (3) of section 19 of this Act; or

(b) in a failure, in the case of a ship, to comply with a provision of such an order having effect by virtue of paragraph (b) of that subsection or a contravention in the case of a ship, of a prohibition imposed under a provision of such an order having effect by virtue of paragraph (d) of that subsection;

it shall be a defence for the person charged to prove that he had reasonable ground for supposing that compliance with the direction, provision or prohibition in question, would be likely to imperil the ship or to prove that in the circumstances compliance with the direction, provision or prohibition in question was impracticable.
LORD GARDINER LORD GARDINER moved to omit all words after the end of paragraph (b), and to substitute:
"a person charged shall not be convicted unless the prosecution proves that in the circumstances compliance with the direction, provision or prohibition in question was practicable and that the person charged had no

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reasonable ground for supposing that compliance with the direction provision or prohibition in question, would be likely to imperil the ship."
The noble and learned Lord said: This deals with another one thought out by the gentlemen in the Department! It was a Member of your Lordship's House who in a famous case described as "a golden thread which runs through the whole of our criminal law" the requirement that the onus of proof is throughout on the prosecution. There are some exceptions to that, because occasionally there is some fact that it would be virtually impossible and quite unreasonable to expect the prosecution to prove. This, I suggest, is not one of them. Here is a provision that a master is to have put upon him the burden of proving his defence. This envisages a situation in which the harbour authority—and again it may be a relatively minor official—gives a direction, and the master finds himself (assuming for the moment that imprisonment remains as a possibility) in a situation in which he feels that to comply with the direction would be hazarding his ship. Here he is, in this difficult position, torn between his duty to the owners on the one hand, and the fear that unless he can persuade lay justices on what is essentially a maritime navigational question he may be sent to prison.
I do not know whether or not it is thought that there may be many of these cases. I would have submitted that a direction should not be given by an official regarding, for example, the movement of a particular ship unless he, if necessary, was able to satisfy a court that that direction could have been complied with without the master having reasonable grounds to think that to do so would be likely to imperil the ship. I suggest that such an order ought not to be given unless the authority is in a position to satisfy a court that that is so. It is quite wrong to place upon the master the onus of proving his innocence, particularly when, after all, it is essentially a question of navigation and is being decided by justices, either in petty sessions or quarter sessions, who have not necessarily themselves—any one of them—any maritime experience. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 26, line 41, leave out from beginning to end of line 46 and insert the said new words.—(Lord Gardiner.)
5.4 p.m.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I never take any exception at all—I should like to make that clear—to any Member of your Lordships' House or anyone raising questions with regard to the onus of proof, because I think that where there is any question of putting the onus of proof on the defence the case for doing so requires to be made out. I cannot here agree with Lord Gardiner's presentation of the matter. The charge against the master or person who failed to comply with the direction—and that will be a direction of someone controlling the movements of vessels in the harbour area—will be of failure to comply with those directions. That will be a matter which will be within the power of the prosecution to establish. That is the offence: failure to comply with the direction.
Clause 23, on the other hand, produces a special matter of defence. It provides this: that even though there be failure to comply with the directions, the man accused cannot be convicted if he shows that there was reasonable ground for supposing that compliance with the direction, provision or prohibition in question would be likely to imperil the ship, or can prove that to comply with the direction, provision or prohibition in the circumstances was impracticable. It is a matter of excuse. It is not part of the ingredient of the offence. The approach in this Bill is, in my view, right; because those matters are matters particularly within the knowledge of the person on the ship.
Really, I cannot accept the view that if there is going to be any enforcement before the courts of the provisions of a movement control order—any prosecutions at all—it should be incumbent on the person in control of movements in the harbour, who is not on the ship, who does not know what is the position on the ship, to establish beyond reasonable doubt that there was no reasonable ground for supposing that compliance would have been likely to imperil the ship and no reasonable ground for considering that the direction was impracticable. That is putting the onus

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on the prosecution of proving beyond reasonable doubt two particular negatives; and the prosecution is not likely ever to be in a position to discharge that onus.
Clause 23 provides a particular defence. As the noble Lord, Lord Gardiner, knows, there are many precedents in the Statute Book of the provision of similar defences. I would remind him first of all of the Merchandise Marks Act, 1887. The Larceny Act of 1916 is another quite good example. The noble Lord will remember that under Section 28 of that Act (as amended):
"Every person who shall be found by night— … having in his possession without lawful excuse (the proof whereof shall lie on such person) … any … implement of housebreaking … shall be guilty of a misdemeanour …"
It is there for the prosecution to establish that he has in his possession an implement of housebreaking; and then, because he knows better than anyone else why he has it in his possession, it is up to him to show he has a lawful excuse for having it.
There are other Acts which provide similar provisions: the Mines and Quarries Act, the Oil in Navigable Waters Act, the Children and Young Persons (Harmful Publications) Act, the Agriculture (Safety Health and Welfare Provisions) Act and the Office, Shops and Railway Premises Act, 1963. In this case I think the provision is right and should be retained in its present form.
But we must bear this in mind, too: that the burden of proof on the defendant of establishing his defence is a very different burden of proof from the burden of proof on the prosecution of establishing guilt. To establish his defence, the defendant has only to show that on the balance of probability there was this likelihood of the ship's being imperilled or that, on the balance of probability, the direction, provision or prohibition was impracticable. I need not refer the Committee to the recent judgment of the Lord Chief Justice on what must be shown; but I think that what I have said the noble Lord, Lord Gardiner, will find is in accordance with what he said in the case of The Queen v. Patterson, decided in 1962. It is for those reasons that I cannot advise the Committee to accept this Amendment.
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The noble Lord, for some reason I was at a loss to understand, for the second time to-day suggested that this particular provision has been thought out by members of the Department. Quite what he meant by that I do not know. All I would say to him is this: Ministers are responsible for the Bills they present to Parliament. Their civil servants help them a great deal, but the Ministers are responsible. That responsibility is accepted by my right honourable friend, and we feel that the Bill is right in its present form.
The noble Lord made some reference to these matters being tried before justices who are laymen. We have two kinds of tribunals in this country. Sometimes the tribunals consist of experts and sometimes we have tribunals which listen to the evidence given by experts although they are not experts themselves. I do not believe that the justices, properly advised as they will be by their clerks, will have any more difficulty in adjudicating, should any case under this provision come before them, than they do in respect of other instances of criminal offences where the ingredients which have to be established by the prosection are clearly laid down and where also it is provided specifically that if certain matters can be shown by the defendant, then the defendant shall not be convicted. I believe that this provision is right and should remain in the Bill. If the noble Lord presses it to a Division, I would ask your Lordships to reject the Amendment.
LORD GARDINER: I have made my protest, and I would ask leave to withdraw my Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
5.11 p.m.
LORD TEYNHAM LORD TEYNHAM moved, after "imperil the ship" to insert: "or endanger the life of any person on board". The noble Lord said: I suggest that it is wrong in principle, where there is a case of dangerous illness, that the master of a ship should be faced with the alternative of either obeying the law, and possibly risking the life of his passenger, or of breaking the law and relying on the discretion of the court, as would be the case under the Bill as it is drawn. It was suggested by Her Majesty's Government in another place

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that a master might well welcome having the decision taken out of his hands. I would say that this shows a complete lack of understanding of how a normal person would react in a crisis of this nature.
This Amendment is designed to provide for the sort of case I have just mentioned. Already this afternoon we have debated whether, under the control of movement clause, a ship would be prohibited from entering a harbour if not fitted with certain equipment. I pointed out that very few yachts are provided with V.H.F. radio control instruments, which cost something like £300, at a minimum price. It is difficult to imagine the stress of mind of the master of a ship not fitted with this equipment who, for that reason, was unable to land a seriously injured member of the crew, or perhaps it might be a yachtsman, with a desperately ill wife or child, who knew that he could not land the invalid without committing an offence. I maintain that some provision ought to be made for these circumstances, and that it is not enough for Her Majesty's Government to say that, if an offence were committed under these conditions, no prosecution would arise. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 26, line 44, after ("ship") insert ("or endanger the life of any person on board").—(Lord Teynham.)
LORD CHESHAM: I do not think that anyone would wish the life of anybody on board ship to be unnecessarily in danger, and no one would wish to be other than sympathetic with the anxiety and state of mind of the master of any ship if he had serious illness on board. But it is a question of the assessment of risks. Are we to regard it as more important not to endanger one life on board a vessel or no t to endanger many lives by refusing to allow the vessel in harbour in say, conditions of bad visibility, or when its presence and movements in the harbour are unknown to the harbour authority and also, probably, to the other vessels moving in the harbour?
I think that this risk would arise only in exceptional circumstances. It could be only in harbours for which a control of movement order had been made, and I imagine that they would not be many in number. It would apply only when
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that control was enforced, which might not be all the time, but only in conditions of low visibility or bad weather. It would apply, as the noble Lord said, only to vessels that were not equipped with V.H.F. radio or some other means of communicating with the harbour authority. It all boils down to being almost a yachting matter. That being so, I think that it would be reasonable to say that in most harbours, even with a control of movement order, the likelihood would be that it would apply only to the deep-water channel, to which control would probably be limited, and there would be an area in which craft without V.H.F. and very small craft could move without committing an offence. I think that in including these words, there is a greater risk of providing a "get-out" for the unscrupulous, who are always with us in every fold. Moreover, despite my noble friend's comment that he did not think much of this argument, I think that anyone with a genuinely serious casualty, whose life was really in danger, would find that this would be taken into account as an extenuating circumstance. I do not think that we ought to make this Amendment.
LORD TEYNHAM: I appreciate what has been said by the Minister in charge of the Bill, that control might be limited to the deep-water channel and that it would be possible for yachts in harbour to keep well clear of the deep-water channel. In that case, any loss of life is likely to be in the yacht and not in the merchant ship, should there be a collision. But in view of the noble Lord's explanation that this power may be limited to the deep-water channel, I beg leave to withdraw my Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 23 agreed to.
Clause 24 agreed to.
Clause 25 [Charges of certain harbour authorities]:
5.18 p.m.
LORD CHESHAM LORD CHESHAM moved, in subsection (1), to leave out "charges" where that word first occurs, and insert "dues". The noble Lord said: As we come to a part of the Bill which deals with harbour charges, perhaps, before I ask your Lordships to consider my first

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batch of Amendments to Clause 25, I may make a few short general remarks about charges as they are dealt with in the Bill. First of all, I would distinguish between the charges which are called in the Bill, "Ship, passenger and goods dues" and other charges, such as those for loading and unloading vessels, warehousing, supply of water and for moorings. Under the Bill as it is now, harbour authorities will be at complete liberty to do what they like about ship, passenger and goods dues. They are free from all existing statutory restrictions or prohibitions on varying these charges, upwards or downwards, as they please. This freedom is subject only to the right given in Clause 29 to port users, or bodies that represent them, to object to a particular due, the objections to be heard by the National Ports Council.
Provision is also made in Clause 30 for the possibility of an overall review of charges in a particular port, which will be presented by the National Ports Council to the Minister, who can make an order, if he thinks fit. As for charges other than ship, passenger and goods dues, the Bill, as at present drafted, provides that these should be what the harbour authority think fit to charge. I would refer your Lordships to the closing words of Clause 25(2). The idea behind the Bill was to give harbour authorities the maximum practical freedom to adjust their charges as they thought right and proper in carrying out their duty in running their ports efficiently.
However, in another place there was strong criticism about the proposal that they should have this freedom in respect of charges other than ship, passenger and goods dues. It was argued that this would leave users much too much at the mercy of harbour authorities, sometimes when they would have no choice about using the services and facilities that those authorities provided, and, therefore, users would be worse off under the provisions of the Bill than they are at present. The reason why they would be worse off is that now the majority of charges, other than ship, passenger and goods dues, are either specified in local legislation, which means that they can be appealed against to the Minister, or subject to the requirement that they be reasonable, which means that the user who thinks he is being asked too much can take his case
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to the court. On thinking this over, the Government came to the conclusion that there was substance in these criticisms, and the Amendments I am about to move are designed to meet them.
I have to admit to your Lordships that the rather large number of Amendments in my name look formidable, but their purpose is quite straightforward. So far as ship, passenger and goods dues are concerned, then, the position remains unchanged as I have described it; but charges other than ship, passenger and goods dues will, in general, continue to be subject to the requirement that they must be reasonable. There are at the moment some such charges which are entirely at the discretion of the harbour authority, and it has been decided that these should continue on this basis. They are, however, comparatively few, and the great bulk of charges will be subject to the requirement of reasonableness. We think that this gives to harbour authorities a fair degree of freedom in charging, and at the same time protects the legitimate interests of the users. Basically, what we are trying to do is to restore the status quo about these charges, and although it has turned out to be a more complicated exercise than we expected—and this fact is reflected in the size and number of the Amendments—I can assure your Lordships that this is the effect which will be achieved if your Lordships accept the Amendments I shall be moving.
So I come to the first of these Amendments, No. 50, and the ten Amendments related to it, which are those up to and including No. 60. Their purpose is to introduce the necessary drafting changes to make Clause 25 apply to only ship, passenger and goods dues, instead of to other charges as well which, as I have just explained, will now be separately dealt with. They will in fact be dealt with in Amendment No. 61, which is a new clause for this purpose, and this I will move in a moment. At the moment I am dealing with Amendment No. 50 and the ten following and related Amendments. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 27, line 39, leave out ("charges") and insert ("dues").—(Lord Chesham.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Amendment moved—
Page 27, line 40, leave out ("making of a charge") and insert ("levying of a due").—(Lord Chesham.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Amendment moved—
Page 27, line 41, leave out ("charges to be made") and insert ("ship, passenger and goods dues chargeable").—(Lord Chesham.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Amendment moved—
Page 27, line 45, leave out ("charges to be made") and insert ("dues to be levied").—(Lord Chesham.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Amendment moved—
Page 27, line 46, leave out ("charges") and insert ("dues").—(Lord Chesham.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Amendment moved—
Page 28, line 3, leave out ("charges") and insert ("dues").—(Lord Chesham.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Amendment moved—
Page 28, line 4, leave out ("making of a charge") and insert ("levying of a due").—(Lord Chesham.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Amendment moved—
Page 28, line 5, leave out ("charges") and insert ("ship, passenger and goods dues").—(Lord Chesham.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Amendment moved—
Page 28, line 6, leave out from ("aforesaid") to end of line 8.—(Lord Chesham.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Amendment moved—
Page 28, line 25, leave out ("charges") and insert ("ship, passenger and goods dues").—(Lord Chesham.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Amendment moved—
Page 28, line 29, leave out ("charges") and insert ("dues").—(Lord Chesham.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Clause 25, as amended, agreed to.
LORD CHESHAM LORD CHESHAM moved, after Clause 25, to insert the following new clause:
Certain charges of certain harbour authorities to be reasonable
.—(1) In place of any limitation imposed, by a statutory provision made with respect to them in particular, on the discretion of a harbour authority as to charges (of any kind other than excepted charges) that may be made by them at a harbour which, in the exercise and performance of statutory powers and duties, they are engaged in improving, maintaining or managing (not being a limitation by way of expressly providing for freedom from charges or in any other manner prohibiting the making of a charge or by way of providing, by what form of words soever, that the charges shall be such as may be reasonable), there shall, by virtue of this subsection, be imposed the limitation that the charge shall be such as may be reasonable.
(2) For the purposes of the foregoing subsection the following shall be excepted charges, namely,—

(a) ship, passenger and goods dues;

(b) charges ascribable to the running of a ferry service in or from a harbour;

(c) contributions which, by virtue of a provision included in an order under Part IV of the Salmon and Freshwater Fisheries Act 1923 by virtue of section 38(1)(d) of that Act, fall to be assessed on several fisheries or the owners or occupiers thereof;

(d) duties on licences granted under section 61 of the said Act of 1923 to fish;

(e) charges in respect of licences under the Water Resources Act 1963 to abstract water or in respect of water authorised by such licences to be abstracted.

(3) In this section 'harbour authority' has the same meaning as in the last foregoing section.
The noble Lord said: Having removed all these charges other than those relating to ships, passengers and goods from Clause 25, we proceed to put them back again in the new clause, subject to the requirement that they shall be reasonable. I do not think there is much I need say, except that I think I ought to point out to your Lordships that subsection (3) of the clause provides that it shall not apply to the undertakings referred to in subsection (5) of Clause 25, which means broadly that it applies to the non-nationalised harbours, and the nationalised harbours are dealt with on a precisely similar basis later in the Bill under Amendment No. 80. I explained the position that the charges which have been specified or required to be reasonable would from now on all be reasonable. This new clause does exactly what I said in my explanation, so that those charges that are at present reasonable and at the discretion of the

619
authority remain so, and the status quo will thereby be preserved which I think is what is wanted. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
After Clause 25, insert the said new clause.—(Lord Chesham.)
LORD HOBSON: Are we to assume from the noble Lord's remarks that, whereas previously Clause 25 removed any restraint whatever on the authorities in regard to charges, and, indeed, gave them what was tantamount to complete carte blanche, we now have that limited by use of the word "reasonableness"? Is that the situation?
LORD CHESHAM: Slightly oversimplified, yes. Clause 25 originally did not give them complete carte blanche. It gave it subject to certain safeguards, which I described a few minutes ago, and I am sure the noble Lord does not want me to repeat the explanation.
LORD HOBSON: No.
LORD CHESHAM: The other charges, except the comparatively small number which always have been and continue to be at the discretion of the authorities, are subject to the limitation of reasonableness, which, of course, in any given case is a matter for the courts to decide.
LORD HOBSON: I want to assure the noble Lord that I am of far too generous a disposition to ask him to define "reasonableness".
LORD CHESHAM: That is why it goes to the courts.
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Clause 26 [Repeal of provisions limiting charges at certain harbours owned or managed by nationalised transport bodies]
LORD CHESHAM: This is a consequential Amendment. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 29, line 3, leave out ("charges made") and insert ("ship, passenger and merchandise dues chargeable").—(Lord Chesham.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Clause 26, as amended, agreed to.
Clause 27 agreed to.
Clause 28 [Duty of harbour authorities to make available for inspection, and to keep for sale, copies of lists of certain charges]:
LORD CHESHAM: The next five Amendments, Nos. 63 to 67, inclusive, all hang together. They are not much more than drafting, and what they do is to line up the provisions of the Bill for both nationalised and non-nationalised harbours with regard to the matter of the publication of their charges. There is a small anomaly between the Bill and the Transport Act with regard to charges, and obviously they must all be the same. These Amendments rectify this anomaly. I beg to move No. 63.
Amendment moved—
Page 29, line 35, after ("exigible") insert ("(a)").—(Lord Chesham.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Amendments moved—
Page 29, line 38, after ("managing") insert ("; or
(b) by virtue of section 43 of the Transport Act 1962 by any of the Boards at a harbour specified in Schedule 9 to that Act;")
Page 30, line 6, leave out from ("exigible") to ("are") in line 8 and insert ("as mentioned in paragraph (a) or (b) of subsection (1) above shall be levied by, as the case may be. the harbour authority or Board concerned if, at the time at which it is exigible, the authority or Board")
Page 30, line 21, at end insert ("(other than any of the Boards)")
Page 30, line 23, after ("work") insert ("or by any of the Boards at a harbour specified in Schedule 9 to the Transport Act 1962").—(Lord Chesham.)
On Question, Amendments agreed to.
Clause 28, as amended, agreed to.
Clause 29 [Right of objection to ship, passenger and goods dues]:
5.32 p.m.
LORD TEYNHAM LORD TEYNHAM moved to leave out subsections (2) to (6) and to insert instead:
"(2) Before increasing any charges or imposing a new charge to which this section applies the harbour authority shall publish in such newspapers as the Council may require a notice stating—

(a) the charge which it is proposed to impose or increase and (where applicable) the amount of the increase; and

(b) that within a period of twenty-eight days from the date of the first publication

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of the notice any person having a substantial interest or any body representative of such persons may object to the increase by giving notice to the Council accompanied by the grounds of his objection with a copy to the harbour authority.

(3) (a) If before the end of the period of twenty-eight days referred to in the last foregoing subsection notice in writing of an objection is received by the Council from any person appearing to the Council to be affected by the charge and the objection is not withdrawn, the Council shall either—

(i) cause a local inquiry to be held, or

(ii) afford to the objector and to the harbour authority an opportunity of appearing before and being heard by a person appointed by the Council for the purpose;

(b) subsections (2) to (5) of section 290 of the Local Government Act 1933 (which relates to the power of government departments to direct inquiries) shall apply to any inquiry held under this subsection as it applies to any inquiry held under that section and for the purposes of such application—

(i) for references to the department there shall be substituted references to the Council; and

(ii) in subsction (4) of that section the words 'either as a debt to the Crown or' shall be omitted.

(4) Where a charge has been objected to under this section the Council after effect has been given to subsections (2) and (3) above shall either—

(a) approve the charge but set a limit (not being later than the expiration of twelve months from the date on which they approve it) to the period during which the approval is to be of effect, and give to the authority written notice that they have approved it, stating the limit set; or

(b) give to the authority such direction with respect to the charge as would meet objection thereto (whether that is or is not the ground, or is or is not included amongst the grounds, on which the objection whose lodging gives rise to the proceedings is expressed to be made)."

The noble Lord said: The object of this Amendment is to ensure that before any alteration is made by a harbour master in the charges in respect of ship, passenger or goods dues, the proposals for alterations shall be published in a newspaper and an opportunity given for an objection by the people upon whom the charges are to be levied. It can be argued that in most cases the users of harbours will be employees of large organisations, which usually retain in the various harbours concerned agents who, of course, take care keep their organisations informed of the alterations. On the other hand, I suggest, there might be many other small users who do not
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have this service and who will not know in advance what the charges are going to be. Nor will they have an opportunity of objecting to them until they have been in force for some time. That is the position.
I would point out that Parliament has supported this principle for more than a hundred years, because it is implicit in Section 30 of the Harbours, Docks and Piers Clauses Act, 1847. I should like to point out to your Lordships the difficulty of the national authority of yachting, the Royal Yachting Association, in connection with charges at ports. Hitherto, the Royal Yachting Association and its member clubs have always received notification by advertisement of any proposals for the alteration of maximum charges in harbours, as well as an opportunity to make objections and have them ventilated at local inquiries. This opportunity has been afforded to yachting interests as, of course, to all other interests concerned. Under this Bill, no notice of such an alteration is to be given. Although objections may be raised to ship, passenger and goods dues under Clause 29, local yachting clubs still may not become aware for some time of the alteration; and, in particular, it will be difficult to safeguard, to the extent that has been possible hitherto, the interests of cruising and visiting yachtsmen, or yachtsmen living some distance from the harbour. The position would be met if the Ports Council could, and would, forward a list of such charges to the national authority, the Royal Yachting Association, when they have been produced. In those circumstances, I think the matter would be in order. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 30, line 37, leave out subsections (2), (3), (4), (5), and (6) and insert the said new subsections.—(Lord Teynham.)
LORD COTTESLOE: I am sorry to differ from my noble friend Lord Teynham on this Amendment. As he has said, it would require harbour authorities to give public notice of intended increases in charges. That is had enough, but it would also enable the appeal procedure to be set in operation and carried through before the increases could come into effect. That may sound very reasonable, but that would be (I am not speaking of yachts;

623
I am speaking of commercial vessels) disastrous to harbour authorities. If the opportunity is given to create substantial delay some months before increased charges can be brought into effect, it will naturally be taken advantage of constantly, and there will always be delay in bringing into effect increased charges, however urgent it may be that they should be brought in. In large ports the effect of the delay may be measured in very large sums of money.
In my opinion, this provision would have disastrous effects. The appeal procedure embodied in the Bill is already, I think, sufficiently effective and time-consuming. It may be that members of the Committee are not aware of the current procedure, which has worked well in the past and, no doubt, will be continued. When a port proposes to increase charges, the practice is to notify the traders, merchants and the harbour co-ordinating committee, which represents both merchants and shipowners, and also, in most cases, local chambers of commerce and others. A case is made out, objections are discussed, and in the enormous majority of cases, probably 99 per cent., the users, after discussion, will accept the position. If they do not wish to do so when the Bill becomes law, the appropriate body can always lodge an objection, under Clause 29, as soon as the new rates are brought into force; and certainly if they gave notice in any particular case of their intention to do so, the harbour authority would make great efforts to reach agreement. Indeed, it always does so now. I am bound to say that I hope very much that the Minister will not accept this Amendment.
LORD CHESHAM: On balance, I fear that I have to choose in favour of my noble friend Lord Cottesloe rather than my noble friend Lord Teynham. I should perhaps hasten to reassure my noble friend Lord Teynham that at least I have realised that Amendment 72 went with this one. In my view, frankly, the procedure he would like to introduce by this Amendment would be administratively burdensome and rather a clumsy one for harbour authorities. I shall say no more on that point, as I am more concerned with the fact that the Amendment is opposed to the funda-
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mental aim of the charging provisions of the Bill, which is to give harbour authorities the maximum freedom in charging and, therefore, in being able to vary charges quickly to fit changing circumstances with no more restriction than is necessary to preserve the legitimate interest of port users.
In fact, to be honest, the Amendment suggests a system of control which the Rochdale Committee condemned as inconsistent, incomplete and to a large degree no longer serving any useful purpose. Secondly, if accepted, it would give the port user an opportunity to object only when a new due is imposed or a due is increased subject to the necessary notice, and he would, therefore, as I see it, lose the rights he has at the present time and under the present provisions of the Bill, under which he can object at any time if he feels that a due is excessive.
I know that my noble friend Lord Teynham, again principally has yachting interests in mind, and I am not sure that there is not some misapprehension about this, because this clause deals only with ship, passenger and goods dues and does not, as I understand it, deal with charges for such things as moorings, which must be a major interest to that community. Therefore, I do not think that in any case it does entirely what the noble Lord wants it to do. But I take the point that what the noble Lord and the interests he has in mind are principally concerned with, is getting notice of what is likely to happen. I understand that this difficulty of theirs has been referred to the National Ports Council, and I am sure I am right in saying that the Council will consider sympathetically advising some means whereby the yachting interests will receive the information they want about charges in the main yachting ports. I hope, therefore, that my noble friend Lord Teynham can perhaps be content with my explanation.
LORD TEYNHAM: I appreciate what has been said by the noble Lord in charge of the Bill. He says that the National Ports Council will perhaps look at this matter in a sympathetic way. Of course, personally, I should like to see a direction to the Ports Council. I should like to look at this matter again before

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the Report stage, and in the meantime I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
5.45 p.m.
LORD HOBSON LORD HOBSON moved, after subsection (5), to insert:
"(6) If, where written objection is made to a charge under subsection (2) above, the Council are satisfied that under the circumstances then existing it is proper so to do, they may when considering the charge the subject of the objection also consider all or any of the other charges imposed by the authority to which this section applies:
Provided that the Council shall not proceed to consider any such other charges except after consultation with the authority and such other persons, or bodies representative of such other persons, appearing to the Council to have a substantial interest."
The noble Lord said: I think probably it would be an advantage if I addressed my remarks to the three Amendments which are inter-related, and certainly I think this would make my task infinitely easier. In practice, all anybody can do with regard to charges in this Bill is to raise an objection against the National Ports Council, and then, presumably, the Council considers the charges and can either eliminate them, confirm them or lower them pro rata. Our Amendment seeks to deal with the narrow but important point that the Council's order or direction is confined to the particular charge to which the objection refers.
In practice, where, say, a tariff which applies to particular goods in transit is going to be reduced, the Ports Council can effect that reduction. But there is a dilemma as the Bill now stands. Take a hypothetical case of the importation of iron ore. Let us say that a ton of iron ore is imported and the charge is 20s. One would presume that for a half ton the charge would be 10s., and for a quarter ton 5s. But at present, as the Bill stands, the Ports Council could make the charge for a half ton 11s. instead of 10., and, likewise, for a quarter ton 6s. instead of 5s. In other words, at the present moment the price may be reduced or increased for a given quantity, but when it comes to a proportion of that quantity there is nothing to prevent the Board from not effecting a pro rata reduction, and that is what we seek to deal with.
I think your Lordships will agree that the situation to which I have referred
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would be rather unfair. Therefore, there should be opportunity with regard to quantity to have pro rata reductions in the port charges. At the present time this cannot be done, and this is what these Amendments seek to provide for. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 32, line 6, at end insert the said subsection.—(Lord Hobson.)
LORD COTTESLOE: I am sorry to be opposing an Amendment brought forward by the noble Lords, but this also is an Amendment with which I find myself unable to agree. The effects of this Amendment, and, indeed, I think its object, would be that where a single objection to a rate was made the Council could extend their consideration of the appeal to any or all other rates. The result of that could be, though would not necessarily be, to produce an overall reassessment of rates by the Council under the Clause 29 procedure without any appeal to the Minister, so that the Council could in fact do under Clause 29 what the Minister is empowered to do under Clause 30.
I think it may be that the proposers of this Amendment are not really informed about the way in which rates are fixed and how the appeal procedure is likely to work. There are two cases. The first is an appeal against the whole rate schedule, and that is the case that gives rise to no particular difficulty. The second is an appeal against a single rate on the grounds that it is incorrectly related to other rates, and that is the case that is particularly involved here.
When an objection of that kind is notified, people who deal in analogous or competitive commodities will of course come along and say, "If this rate is to be brought down, this or that other rate ought to follow". In fact, the port authorities themselves, who are naturally anxious to preserve a proper relationship between their customers, may on occasion, and do on occasion, put forward proposals of that kind, and that can be done within the procedure laid down in Clause 29; it is, I believe, one of the objects of all the notices and the consultations. It seems to me that there is really no ground whatever for the Council, who will not have the detailed knowledge for the purpose, to try, off their own bat, to

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extend the scope of any rate adjustment that is asked for. I hope your Lordships will not approve this Amendment.
LORD CHESHAM: I was glad to hear from the noble Lord, Lord Hobson, what was in his mind as the object of these Amendments. Up till then, I was not quite sure what was his underlying purpose, because I could not believe that it was really what it is my duty now to explain would be the effect of these Amendments. Therefore, I was pleased to know what it really was; and it was, as I had expected, a reasonable kind of proposition. I do not think I need go ino great detail. I should have thought that the safeguards built into the Bill for objection by any port user to any due gave the necessary protection which the noble Lord seeks. After all, the right of objection to the Ports Council to a given due does not mean that the right of objection is confined to just one due. Therefore, in objecting to one you may also object to another, and there is nothing then to stop the Ports Council from considering the other dues that are charged in that port. I think that is right.
But I consider it is wrong to go further and give them the power not only to consider all the other dues in the port but to come to a decision on them, as well as any decision they may come to on the one due which has been objected to. I think it is too much, on the objection to one due, to give them the power to act on all the others. As I say, there may be cases where it is a good idea for the Council to consider other dues when they are considering the objection to one, but I equally think there will probably be a number of occasions when one objection can be considered in isolation. The effect of these Amendments would be that the Council could, without the agreement of the port authority or of the Minister, without reference to anybody, introduce any changes they wished, either upwards or downwards, in any of the dues imposed by the harbour authority, once an objection had been lodged to one due. In considering the rate for, as the noble Lord mentioned, iron ore, they could consider that and could also consider the rate for bananas and motor cars and everything else in the port, and they could change them all.
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That is not really the end of the story, because they would then be in a position, under these Amendments, to fix dues on everything, even where there has been no objection to any of them; they could change them all and fix them without any possibility of appeal. That upward or downward revision could extend over the entire range of that port's rates. That would, to say the least, create a very undesirable overlap with the powers of the Council under Clause 30 to propose to the Minister, for his approval, general revision of the dues. I do not think it would be at all consistent with the intention of the Bill to give the harbour authorities a fair measure of freedom to fix their dues. The noble Lord must also remember that if the Council used those powers in that way it would effect a freezing of dues for a period of up to one year. I think he will accept from me that it would be much better to carry out the overall revision according to the procedure in Clause 30 and not as a by-product of an objection to a single due under Clause 29. That is all I have to say, and I wait to hear whether the noble Lord thinks my argument is reasonable.
LORD HOBSON: I thank the noble Lord for that explanation, and beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 29 agreed to.
LORD TEYNHAM LORD TEYNHAM moved, after Clause 29, to insert the following new clause
Power of Minister to vary notices or directions given by Council under section 29
.—(1) Subject to the provisions of this section, where the Council, by virtue of section 29 of this Act, approve a charge imposed at a harbour and, after notice of such approval has been published by the Council in pursuance of the said section, a representation is made to the Minister that the charge so approved was imposed by the harbour authority at the instance of the Council, or by agreement between them and the authority, the Minister may give a direction requiring the Council to give to the authority such different notice or direction, within the terms of the said section, as the Minister thinks fit, and the Council shall comply with the direction.
(2) The Minister shall not give a direction under the foregoing subsection unless—

(a) the representation mentioned therein in made to him within a period of twenty-eight days from the date of publication by

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the Council of their approval of the charge which is the subject of the representation;

(b) the representation is made to him by a person or body who lodged with the Council, in pursuance of the said section 29, an objection to the charge as subsequently approved by the Council; and

(c) he is satisfied that the said charge was imposed by the harbour authority in the circumstances referred to in the foreging subsection."

The noble Lord said: This Amendment is designed to cover a case where the National Ports Council might instruct a harbour authority to impose a charge or agree with them that it should be imposed. As the Bill is drawn at present, the only appeal against such a charge would be to the National Ports Council themselves, who would thus become judge in their own case, and this Amendment would allow an appeal to be made to the Minister. At present ship, passenger, and goods dues are subject to fixed maxima and can be revised, either by application to Parliament by Private Bill or to the Minister of Transport. Under this Bill the National Ports Council would be able to apply to the Minister for a revision of charges levied by a harbour authority, but users would be excluded from doing so. Surely it is wrong that the Council should be the final arbiter in a case which has arisen possibly at the instigation of the Council itself, all the more so since the decision of the Council could be given without even an inquiry being held into the objection.
I should like to point out that owing to the rather involved nature of the clauses in this Bill dealing with harbour authorities it is difficult to draft a self-contained Amendment without tackling a very large number of consequential Amendments. I hope Her Majesty's Government will be prepared to accept the principle and will themselves set down the necessary Amendments on the Report stage of the Bill. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
After Clause 29 insert the said new clause.—(Lord Teynham.)
6.0 p.m.
LORD CHESHAM: I might as well tell my noble friend straight away that I cannot respond to his beguiling invitation to accept this clause and do all the rest of the work myself. This clause, complicated as it is and even without
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any question of the necessary consequential Amendments, unsuitable as it is in its wording, in fact cuts across what has all the way through been the clearly designed policy in the Bill: that the National Ports Council should be the final arbiter of objections made by users to ship, passenger and goods dues under Clause 29.
it is possible to conceive some circumstances in which the Council might be the objector. I confess that they do not come freely to my mind, and I do not see the Council as judge and jury in their own case. But what I do see out of this is something that has been the subject of more than one attempt (in fact, two in another place—and this I think is the third one, with a slightly different approach) to get some kind of right of appeal to the Minister.
I imagine that those who seek this right of appeal, whether by frontal attack, or—I will not call it by the back door, but by the side door, must perhaps fear that the Council, who we know will have close links, as they are supposed to have, with the port authorities, presumably may be biased against the port users in their decision. This seems to assume that the Council will not be a body responsible enough to be fully objective in their decisions on objections. Quite frankly, that is an assumption that I should be most reluctant to make. The Amendment also tends to ignore the procedure in Clause 29, for dealing with objections, with the provisions for advertisement. While what the noble Lord said is true—that the Council are not obliged to hold an inquiry—I feel that it would be most unlikely that they would not do so in any important case of objection.
I know that the Minister is involved (this is the only time that he is on these charging matters) when an overall revision plan is put to him under Clause 30. But any extension under Clause 29 is undesirable, because I believe that this should be a matter within the ports industry which, after all, it is our aim to make as fully independent and commercially-minded as we can. I do not think that there is any case for giving this right of appeal to the Minister, now that the industry has virtual freedom from statutory control, which of course it used to have in full measure when it was much more appropriate that it

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should go to the Minister. I think that the set-up will be much better, and will work better, if we leave the Bill as it is.
LORD SHACKLETON: We accept the need to avoid undue complications. What concerns me a little, in trying to think of an analogy for this particular situation is that I cannot think of one, and I am wondering whether the noble Lord can help us. In regard to other transport fields, such as the railways, bodies that deal with railway rates are not themselves directed involved in any way in management, or in exercising influence over the conduct of a particular undertaking; and I think that the noble Lord, Lord Teynham is on to a point here.
It is difficult to see how it would work out. There is clearly a possibility of conflict between the Ports Council and an individual authority, and there may be a time when, so to speak, they are the two parties to a dispute. This is liable to happen in any situation. But I am wondering whether some sort of appeal procedure, perhaps with rather more obstacles to it than are contained in this Amendment, might be appropriate. I should be grateful if the Parliamentary Secretary could indicate whether there is any parallel to this, or whether he regards the National Ports Council as merely on all fours with any other rate-fixing body, and whether there are other circumstances in which an appeal to the Minister is allowed. I think this is a special case, and one to which I should have thought it was worth giving a little more consideration than we have had.
LORD CHESHAM: I will be quite frank with the noble Lord. I cannot immediately call to mind any comparable case—though that does not mean there is not one. If, in due course, I can think of something, certainly I will let him know, if necessary by letter. But off-hand, I cannot. Perhaps I did not make myself as clear as I should have done. We took the view—and still hold to it—that the Council will be a responsible body, independent and, furthermore, able to take a quasi-judicial role in adjudicating upon this question of dues. As I said, it is our policy to do everything possible to encourage and establish full independence of the ports,
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and indeed of the Council. I think that if one is again to take this power away finally from the Council in the way that has been envisaged, and give it back to the Minister, it will detract from that conception of independence for the industry.
LORD SILKIN: There is nothing new in the conception of an appeal against the decision of a tribunal, and it certainly is not derogatory to the body making the original decision that there should be a right of appeal. After all, there is an appeal from a High Court Judge to the Court of Appeal, and from the Court of Appeal to the House of Lords; and nobody thinks any the less of the High Court Judges or of the Lords Justices of Appeal because of that fact. Moreover, the noble Lord may remember that a Committee—the Franks Committee—was set up some years ago to consider this question of appeals against decisions of tribunals. That Committee recommended strongly that wherever possible there should be a right of appeal from the decision of a body of this kind. However eminent this body may be (and I do not challenge the fact that the Government will seek to set up as eminent a body as possible), they may go wrong in their findings, and the person who is the subject of those findings ought to have an opportunity of presenting his case to the Minister.
I cannot see what the objection to the Amendment can be and I hope that the noble Lord will be prepared to consider this. He says that the wording is defective. I am quite prepared to believe that. I have never known an Amendment put down by a private Member that was in perfect order. But I think he ought to be prepared to reconsider the principle of an appeal against the decision of this Council. I hope he will.
LORD CHESHAM: When I hear that kind of argument presented to me I feel I should be rather dim-witted not to accede to it. I am certainly prepared to look at it again, provided your Lordships understand that I am undertaking no commitment as to what I may find—that I am not looking into it with a view to putting down an Amendment of some kind. I may do no more than confirm the feelings that I have to-day. If it appears to be the wish of the Committee, I will certainly undertake to look at this point again.
LORD SHACKLETON: I am sure we are all very grateful to the Minister. Would he at the same time consider how this rate fixing, so to speak, is going to be done? A great deal of this sort of thing is done by a semi-judicial tribunal. It rather looks as if at some stage there is going to be almost a semi-judicial function here, and I find it a little difficult to see, from the background of the constitution of the Council, how they are going to discharge it. If it is a matter of sending experts in and coming to a conclusion, that is straightforward, but once they act in a judicial rôle conceivably some slightly more formal procedure is necessary. Interested parties in other rate-fixing episodes are able to call counsel, and so on. I do not know whether the Ports Council will work like this.
It may all go very well, but I am sure that all Members of the Committee are with my noble friend Lord Silkin in saying that we must be alert to the possibility of oppression by tribunals. This is one of the weaker points. In the absence of the sort of appeal procedures which exist in other countries—and there is no question of an appeal to the courts in a matter of this kind, and there is no Ombudsman to refer to—I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Chesham, will look at this matter carefully. We are grateful to him. I do not ask him to say anything more, because he has come a long way to meet the point, and I congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Teynham, on raising it.
LORD CHESHAM: The noble Lord need have no fears about the methods of work of the Council, because they will have to work closely with the port in-industry in any case. The situation will be such that they will naturally proceed in the kind of manner he mentions, particularly as it is not up to them to do the original rate fixing, as the noble Lord calls it, but only to hear objections against it. On the subject of oppression by tribunals—and nobody wishes anyone to be oppressed by a tribunal—there is the fact that this matter of charges is their sole executive function. It is their sole "tooth" and they have been supplied with it simply because they seem so outstandingly able a body to do the job. Having said that, I will say no more
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pending consideration of what has been said to-day.
LORD TEYNHAM: I am sure that the noble Lord in charge of the Bill will take note of the fact that there has been a good deal of support here for a right of appeal to the Minister to be embodied in the Bill. At any rate, he has said that he will look at the matter again, and no doubt we shall be able to return to it on Report stage. On that basis, I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 30 [Power of Minister to revise ship, passenger and goods dues at harbours other than fishery harbours or marine works]:
LORD CHESHAM: This Amendment is drafting. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 34, line 45, after ("confirmed") insert ("in the form in which it is confirmed").—(Lord Chesham.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Clause 30, as amended, agreed to.
Clause 31 agreed to.
Clause 32 [Provisions supplementary to sections 29 to 31]:
LORD CHESHAM: This Amendment is also a drafting one. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 38, line 28, after ("of") insert ("the operation of").—(Lord Chesham.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
LORD CHESHAM: This, again, is drafting. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 39, line 44, leave out from ("charge") to ("shall") in line 45 and insert ("the suspension").—(Lord Chesham.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Clause 32, as amended, agreed to.
Clause 33 [Application of sections 29, 30 and 32 to local light dues]:
LORD CHESHAM: This is a drafting Amendment. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 42, line 40, after ("32(1)") insert ("and (2)").—(Lord Chesham.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
LORD CHESHAM: This, again, is drafting. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 43, leave out lines 1 to 7.—(Lord Chesham.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Clause 33, as amended, agreed to.
Clause 34 agreed to.
Clause 35 [Exclusion of certain charges from section 25]:
LORD CHESHAM: This is merely consequential on the "reasonable charges" Amendments. The clause is now redundant and can be deleted. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 43, line 21, leave out Clause 35.—(Lord Chesham.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Clause 36 [Special provisions with respect to certain aviation charges]:
LORD CHESHAM: This Amendment is consequential. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 45, line 8, at end insert ("(Certain charges of certain harbour authorities to be reasonable) and").—(Lord Chesham.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Clause 36, as amended, agreed to.
Clause 37 [Repeal of sections 30 and 47 of Harbours, Docks, and Piers Clauses Act 1847]:
LORD CHESHAM LORD CHESHAM moved to leave out Clause 37 and insert the following new clause:
Repeal of sections 30 and 47 of Harbours, Docks and Piers Clauses Act 1847 and certain other provisions as to charges.
".—(1) The following provisions shall cease to have effect, namely,—

(a) sections 30 (power to vary rates) and 47 (list of rates to be set up) of the Harbours, Docks and Piers Clauses Act 1847 (both as originally enacted and as incorporated in any Act or order);

(b) any statutory provision (other than the said section 47 or one in this Act) applying to a harbour authority in so far as (however it is expressed) it requires a list of charges imposed by the authority in the exercise of their powers as such to be published;

(c) section 17 (rates to be equally levied) of the General Pier and Harbour Act 1861 Amendment Act and any other statutory provision applying to a harbour authority in so far as (however it is expressed) it prohibits the authority from discriminating
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in the matter of charges imposed as aforesaid against any person in favour of any other person.

(2) In the foregoing subsection 'harbour authority' does not include any such person as is mentioned in section 25(5)(c) of this Act.
(3) The Shipping Dues Exemption Act 1867 (which precludes the according of certain exemptions from shipping dues and empowers the Minister to abolish dues from which an exemption exists) is hereby repealed."
The noble Lord said: I think I ought to say a word on this, since the Amendment itself is so long. The matter is reasonably simple. As at present drafted, Clause 37 provides that Sections 30 and 47 of the Harbours, Docks and Piers Clauses Act, 1847, shall cease to have effect, but certain harbour authorities do not incorporate the provisions of that Act in their local legislation but have provisions of like effect in their local legislation. Therefore, the clause needs to be revised to cover comparable provisions to those two sections. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Leave out Clause 37 and insert the said new clause.—(Lord Chesham.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Clause 38 [Amendments of Acts consequential on sections 25 to 37]:
LORD CHESHAM: This Amendment is consequential and drafting. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 45, line 25, leave out subsection (3) and insert:
("(3) For paragraph 5 of Schedule 9 to the Transport Act 1962 there shall be substituted the following paragraph:—
'5.—(1) The charges made by any of the Boards for the use of services or facilities provided in, or in connection with, a harbour specified in this Schedule (other than ship, passenger and goods dues, charges for the carriage of goods or passengers, charges for the use of a railway or charges in respect of railway wagons) shall be such as may be reasonable.
(2) In this paragraph the expression "ship, passenger and goods dues" has the meaning assigned to it by section 55(1) of the Harbours Act 1964';
and in paragraph 6(2) of that Schedule for the words 'for which the charges are regulated by' there shall be substituted the words 'specified in'.").—(Lord Chesham.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
LORD CHESHAM: This, also, is drafting. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 45, line 46, at end insert—
("(5) In section 23 of the Harbours, Piers and Ferries (Scotland) Act 1937 the words ' Part III of ' shall be omitted.").—(Lord Chesham.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Clause 38, as amended, agreed to.
LORD CHESHAM LORD CHESHAM moved, after Clause 38, to insert the following new clause:
Harbour services and facilities provided by certain harbour authorities
".—(1) A. harbour authority shall have power to make the use of services and facilities provided by them at a harbour which, in the exercise and performance of statutory powers and duties, they are engaged in improving, maintaining or managing subject to such terms and conditions as they think fit except with respect to charges as to which their discretion is limited by a statutory provision (whether by specifying, or providing for specifying, charges to be made, or fixing or providing for fixing charges, or otherwise).
(2) In this section 'harbour authority' has the same meaning as in section 25 of this Act."
The noble Lord said: This Amendment is consequential and drafting. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
After Clause 38, insert the said new clause. —(Lord Chesham.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Clauses 39 and 40 agreed to.
6.20 p.m.
LORD MERRIVALE LORD MERRIVALE moved, after Clause 40, to insert the following new clause:
Exclusion of certain harbours from application of certain provisions of Act
". In any case in which the Minister is satisfied that the interests of a particular trade or industry are being adversely affected by the application to any harbour, used wholly or mainly for the purposes of that trade or industry, of any of the provisions of this Act, he may on application being made to him, by order (made by statutory instrument which shall be subject to annulment in pursuance of a resolution of either House of Parliament) direct that such provisions or any of them shall not apply in relation to such harbour or shall apply thereto subject to such modifications as may be specified in such order."
The noble Lord said: The purpose of this Amendment is to enable the Minister, on an application being made to him, to consider the interests of a
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particular industry or trade at ports wholly or mainly used by such an industry or trade. I have particularly in mind some of the 300-odd minor ports of varying size and importance which are to be found around the coasts of this country, and which provide, in the words of the Rochdale Committee Report:
"an important service for particular industries".
Here I would stress to your Lordships, as I mentioned on Second Reading, that the small port members of the Dock and Harbour Authorities Association were never consulted by the Rochdale Committee; nor were they ever asked to submit evidence. I would mention, too, that one of the recommendations of the Committee was that:
"Minor ports should in general be maintained only if they are financially self-supporting"
Well and good, but I feel that the Minister should also have a permissive power to consider the interests of an industry or trade mainly served by a specific port. May I also remind your Lordships of paragraph 66 in the Report, which says:
"Many of the minor ports play a very important rôle in the country's coasting and short sea trade. Indeed, they sometimes offer better and cheaper facilities even to oceangoing ships than do the major ports."
Such better and cheaper facilities could —and I stress the word "could"—be impaired by certain provisions of the Bill: for instance, Clauses 9, 18(2)(e) and 30 which, again, could be to the detriment of the competitiveness of an industry or trade in the export markets of the world.
LORD SHACKLETON: May I interrupt the noble Lord? He seems to be speaking on behalf of a number of small ports, but the clause as it is drafted seems to follow very closely his earlier Amendment which he said was confined entirely to the port of Par. Would he exemplify these other ports which are used wholly or mainly for the purposes of trade or industry?
LORD MERRIVALE: I was coming to that. There are other ports which I had in mind, and although the port of Par would be included in this Amendment, I am not referring to that to-day. I was going on to say that any increase in port charges or ship and goods dues

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could limit an industry's ability to compete abroad.
I now come to the point of the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, and will consider specific industries and ports other than the Port of Par. For instance, the port of Workington in the North-West region handles mainly the traffic of adjacent iron and steel works, exporting pig iron and steel and importing iron ore. The port of Blythe in the North-Eastern region owes its existence to the coal mining of the district. Maryport is another coal exporting port. Hartlepool sends out Durham coal and imports iron ore. I would also mention Port Talbot, near Swansea, with very large local iron exports.
In moving this Amendment, I trust that I may be fortified by certain remarks which the noble Viscount, Lord Rochdale, made on Second Reading. I trust that I am entitled to quote his exact words [OFFICIAL REPORT, Vol. 256 (No. 55), col. 1180]:
"What we were trying to do was to control major development, which is, after all, the major matter that affects the port industry as a whole; and, provided that we had control to be able to say where the major development was to be, it did not really seem to us to matter what the little ports did, as long as they did not get swelled heads".
I am fairly confident that neither the industries nor the small ports to which I have referred have any swelled heads.
With regard to the steel industry, for instance, as one of the conclusions of the Report is that all terminal development should, in the main, be financed and undertaken by the industry itself, is it not right that such an industry should have the power to apply to the Minister if such a need ever arose? It may well be that such a power would not be necessary. It is only a permissive power for which I am asking your Lordships' approval. Coal is still considered an important cargo, especially for some ports. One could go on with regard to these points. I agree with your Lordships that this is purely a permissive power which may never be required, but I feel that it would benefit some industries if ever the need arose. In these circumstances, I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
After Clause 40, insert the said new clause.—(Lord Merrivale.)
VISCOUNT FALMOUTH: I should like to support this Amendment which the noble Lord, Lord Merrivale, has moved so eloquently. I must say that I am speaking as a Cornishman about the port of Par, but I know that we are not separatists in Cornwall as perhaps the noble Lord might suggest. I am interested in this port myself as chairman of companies which run clay works and export through this port. We fear that development could be frustrated by powers under this Bill, and we also fear that under Clause 20 increases in charges could be made by the authority. Our great advantage in Cornwall lies in the fact that the sea is only six miles away from the best clay formations. This is of enormous help in competing in the export markets of the world, and we fear very much any interference which means that our transport costs are increased. I would ask Her Majesty's Government to give this Amendment most careful consideration.
LORD CHESHAM: In dealing with an Amendment he moved last Monday, I said to my noble friend Lord Merrivale that he was shooting holes in one of the basic principles of the Bill, which it is of the greatest possible importance to preserve. Having accepted that I did not like his shooting holes in the basic principle, he has gone off and brought back a dirty great cannon and tried to blow the principle completely to smithereens. Whether or not the noble Lord is right in thinking that the proposed power in this Amendment is permissive, it is certainly technically permissive—but, my goodness!, you wait for the pressure that is going to build up under this permission. One successful application and the floodgates would be straining at the seams, if not actually bursting.
I think the Rochdale Committee regarded it as most important that the private ports, the one-industry ports, and so on, should remain within the scope of the Bill, because the noble Lord was perfectly right when he said that he was not talking only about Par when he moved this Amendment. He has brought in the crude oil terminals which belong to the oil companies, and he has brought in Fawley. Yes, the noble Lord has; it is no good his shaking his head.
LORD MERRIVALE: Not to-day.
LORD CHESHAM: In this Amendment.
LORD MERRIVALE: Yes.
LORD CHESHAM: He has not mentioned them to-day. I did not say he had mentioned them, but he has brought them in by means of this Amendment, and it applies to Milford Haven and Fawley. This shoots the biggest hole in the most valuable principle of the Bill. I will not go so far as to call it a wrecking Amendment, because I am sure it is not—
LORD HOBSON: It is worse.
LORD CHESHAM:—but it is really, I am afraid, totally and utterly unacceptable.
LORD MERRIVALE: I thank my noble friend for those remarks. I could not ever imagine that anything which the National Ports Council did could adversely affect the power of the petroleum industry.
LORD CHESHAM: If I may interrupt, in reply to my noble friend behind me I would say that I cannot think of anything it would do to the detriment of the port of Par, either.
LORD MERRIVALE: I thank my noble friend for his remarks in reply to this Amendment. I beg leave to withdraw it.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clauses 41 and 42 agreed to.
Clause 43 [Penalisation of furnishing false information]:
LORD CHESHAM: This Amendment is consequential. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 50, line 25, after ("section") insert ("4 or")—(Lord Chesham.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Clause 43, as amended, agreed to.
Clause 44 [Restriction on disclosing information]
LORD CHESHAM: This Amendment is consequential, and I shall say no more except to observe to your Lordships that it picks up completely the point which the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, made the other night about commercial confidence and security. If the noble Lord will have a quick look at
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Clause 44, on page 50, he will see that the point he raised is most adequately covered. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 50, line 40, after ("section") insert ("4 or").—(Lord Chesham.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Clause 44, as amended, agreed to.
Clauses 45 to 50 agreed to.
Clause 51 [Saving for telegraphic lines]:
LORD CHESHAM: This is a drafting Amendment. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 56, line 36, leave out ("exercise") and insert ("execution").—(Lord Chesham.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Clause 51, as amended, agreed to.
Clause 52:
Orders and regulations
52.—
(2) A statutory instrument containing an order under section 4, 9(1), 18(7), 19 or 58 of this Act or regulations under section 22 or 40 thereof shall be subject to annulment in pursuance of a resolution of either House of Parliament.
LORD COTTESLOE LORD COTTESLOE moved, in subsection (2), after "19" to insert "30". The noble Lord said: This Amendment is, I think, the shortest of the 108 on the Marshalled List, but it is certainly not the least important. The Amendment refers to Clause 30. Under that clause, the Minister takes power to confirm by order a scheme for the revision of ship, passenger or goods dues, overriding, on the advice of the National Ports Council, the judgment of the port authority concerned. That is a very strong power, and one that could be justified only in exceptional circumstances. After all, the port authority is responsible for the finances of the port generally, and for ensuring that it pays its way and gives a service to the public at the most economic cost. That its charges should be overridden by someone with no responsibility for its results is a very strong order. It might in some circumstances be justified, but I think very rarely.
If my understanding is correct, it is envisaged that such a power would be exercised, if it is exercised at all, not for the purpose of reducing the dues

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charged but for the purpose of increasing them, where the National Ports Council consider them to be inadequate and the Minister endorses that view. It is evident that an exceptional power of that kind ought not to be exercised without the fullest inquiry. That is provided for in the Bill, but it seems to me also that it is most desirable that such a power should be treated in the same way as the exceptional powers in other clauses of the Bill, which under Clause 52(2) are made subject to the Negative Resolution procedure. Such clauses are, among others, Clause 9(1), which gives the power by order to control harbour development; and Clause 19, with power to order control of movement. Those are very exceptional powers, and the powers in Clause 30 are also very exceptional. I hope that the Minister will be willing to accept this Amendment and agree to the inclusion of the exceptional powers given him under Clause 30 among those that are made subject to the Negative Resolution procedure. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 56, line 44, after ("19") insert ("30").—(Lord Cottesloe.)
LORD CHESHAM: I must say that I should not like to accept my noble friend's suggestion. Incidentally, I thought I understood him to say that the Minister's powers of revision in this case related only to revision upwards. That is certainly news to me.
LORD COTTESLOE: If I may correct the noble Lord, that was not, I think, what I said. What I said was that my understanding was that it was likely to be exercised in that way, rather than in the other.
LORD CHESHAM: That is a matter of guesswork. Things nowadays tend to go up more than down, I agree; but I should not like the impression to get around that revision can be only upwards; because it can, of course, be upwards or downwards. Neither do I entirely agree that this is an exceptional power. It is a power, or something very like it, which the Minister has had for some time under Section 6 of the Transport Charges, &c. (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1954, which provides that a non-nationalised harbour authority or
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port user may apply to the Minister for the revision of any of the charges which the undertaking is authorised to levy, and the Minister's power to make an order to that effect has not been subject to the Negative Resolution procedure. He had similar powers, under Section 51 of the Transport Act, 1962, in relation to the nationalised ports. And that power, too, is not subject to the Negative Resolution procedure. I know that if one wants to be strictly accurate one could say that those powers are not exactly on all fours with what is in the Bill; but they are pretty wide. They have never been subject to the Negative Resolution procedure, and I do not see the real force of the argument that they should be so now.
But I have another point. A scheme under Clause 30 could relate either to a lot of dues or to one or to very few. The factors the Minister will have to take into consideration will be matters of very considerable detail, such as the validity of financial estimates of revenue and expenditure, whether or not proper provision is made for depreciation, and the viability of proposed expenditure by the authority. I do not think the Minister is really going to get bound up with any matters of broad policy. These schemes, where the decision will usually depend on detailed judgments on sets of figures, are not really such as should be before Parliament.
I very much doubt whether any proposal under Clause 30 is likely to be other than contentious, and I consider it unlikely that the Minister will decide on the matter without a public inquiry. I think there will be every opportunity in an inquiry like that to ventilate every aspect of the case which would be subject to examination and cross-examination. The whole matter would be considered and reported on by the inspector. I think that this is a better way of dealing with such detailed matter than by throwing it back at Parliament; and I hope the Committee will agree to leave the Bill alone in that respect.
LORD COTTESLOE: I am sorry that the Minister is unable to see his way to accepting this Amendment, and I am bound to say I am not greatly surprised. In the circumstances, I beg leave to withdraw my Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
LORD CHESHAM: This is a consequential Amendment; but I ought quickly to point out that the Amendment does not actually consist of the words on the Paper. That is the reference to an Amendment earlier made, and at the moment of printing it was not known what the appropriate number would be. That will be reprinted in the draft.
Amendment moved—
Page 56, line 44, at end insert ("(Compensation for loss of office, &c. in consequence of orders and schemes)").—(Lord Chesham.)
Clause 52, as amended, agreed to.
Clauses 53 and 54 agreed to.
Clause 55 [Interpretation]:
LORD BURDEN: This Amendment and the next one have been put on the Order Paper following a discussion in the Committee stage in another place. At that time it was argued that the definition contained in the clause was too widely drawn. At that stage the Minister considered that if a form of words could be agreed upon with the Dock and Harbour Authorities' Association an Amendment could be put down at a later stage. I understand that these Amendments have been agreed to, and in the circumstances I beg to move the first.
Amendment moved—
Page 61, line 43, after ("harbour") insert ("(but not including charges in respect of any services rendered or facilities provided for them)").—(Lord Burden.)
LORD CHESHAM: These Amendments are rather more than drafting; they are for clarification. I do not know whether they have been agreed to, but I hope they will be now.
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
LORD BURDEN: I was endeavouring to get through quickly. I should have said the Amendments, according to my information, were agreed to by the Association and the Minister. That, I hope, will put me right with the Committee. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 61, line 44, leave out paragraph (c)> and insert—
("(c) charges in respect of goods brought into, taken out of, or carried through the harbour by ship (but not including charges in respect of work performed, services rendered or facilities provided in respect of goods so brought, taken or carried)").—(Lord Burden.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
LORD CHESHAM: This Amendment is consequential.
Amendment moved—
Page 62, line 29, at end insert—
("(4) Any reference in this Act (elsewhere than in the foregoing provisions of this section or in section 38) to ship, passenger and goods dues shall be construed as including a reference to charges payable by persons using a ferry which is a marine work.")—(Lord Chesham.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
On Question, Whether Clause 55, as amended, shall stand part of the Bill?
6.47 p.m.
LORD MERRIVALE: Could my noble friend define the meaning of harbour land, which in the Bill is said to mean
"land adjacent to a harbour and occupied wholly or mainly for the purposes of activities there carried on;"?
What exactly is meant by "adjacent"? And what are the activities to be carried on there? Also, as this definition seems to be widely drawn, could he say whether the National Ports Council will have any jurisdiction over firms involved in manufacturing processes on that land? In other words, would manufacturing premises come under the provisions of this Bill? Surely such manufacturing should not come within the definition of "harbour operations". It could involve some small firms or some of the poorer members of the National Association of British Manufacturers in expensive litigation which some of them could ill afford.
Secondly, with respect to the handling of goods on harbour land, which comes under the definition of harbour operations, am I right in assuming that in the event of any redundancy occurring due to a reorganisation scheme under Clause 18, men who are employed on manufacturing processes could still be employed for the handling of goods or the unloading of ships, as I understand is now the practice?
LORD CHESHAM: My noble friend has asked one of his famous multiple questions on a number of subjects. I am afraid I have not managed to follow it all in my head. But on his query over harbour land, I would say that I do not see how I can be expected to define the activities there carried on. I suspect that he has mistakenly applied the word "there" to the land and not to the harbour. If you apply it to the

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harbour, it makes the whole thing very much clearer. The second query, as I recall, was to do with firms operating in the harbour area. Of course they are not included.
LORD MERRIVALE: This is not an important point, but the Association of British Manufacturers are concerned about it. I may take it, then, that the premises of firms interested purely in manufacturing process, manufacturing firms, would not come under the jurisdiction and provisions of this Bill, or under the jurisdiction of the National Ports Council.
LORD CHESHAM: No, they would not. They would have the normal relationship with the harbour authority if they rent premises or something of that kind, but so far as what I may call private organisations and individuals in those circumstances are concerned, these provisions slip over their heads.
LORD MERRIVALE: I am very glad of that assurance.
Clause 55, as amended, agreed to.
Clauses 56 to 60 agreed to.
Clause 61 [Short title, extent, repeal and commencement]:
LORD CHESHAM: This Amendment is consequential. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 64, line 16, after ("38") insert (",(Certain charges of certain harbour authorities to be reasonable) and (Harbour services and facilities provided by certain harbour authorities)").—(Lord Chesham.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Clause 61, as amended, agreed to.
Schedule 1 agreed to.
Schedule 2 [Objects for whose achievement harbour revision orders may be made]:
LORD CHESHAM: This is a drafting Amendment. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 67, line 3, after ("them") insert ("for the purpose of its being used").—(Lord Chesham.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
LORD CHESHAM: This is a drafting Amendment. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 67, line 4, at end insert ("or for some other purpose of the harbour").—(Lord Chesham.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
LORD CHESHAM: This Amendment is consequential. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 67, line 18, at end insert—
("10A. Empowering the authority to levy at the harbour charges other than ship, passenger and goods dues or varying or abolishing charges (other than as aforesaid) levied by them at the harbour").—(Lord Chesham.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Schedule 2, as amended, agreed to.
Schedule 3 [Procedure for making harbour revision and empowerment orders]:
LORD CHESHAM: This is a drafting Amendment. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 70, line 43, after ("he") insert ("unless all persons interested consent,").—(Lord Chesham.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Schedule 3, as amended, agreed to.
Schedule 4 [Submission and confirmation of harbour reorganisation schemes]:
LORD CHESHAM: This is a drafting Amendment. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 82, line 35, leave out ("who") and insert ("that").—(Lord Chesham.)
LORD COTTESLOE: These are drafting Amendments, of course, but I think that we should all agree that "them who" in this Amendment and "they who" in the next Amendment are unsuitable. If we are going to alter them, as we should, I hope that we shall not alter them to read "them that", which is a particularly ungainly and ugly phrase. Cannot we alter the "them" to "who", which would be the correct phrase and would have exactly the same meaning?
LORD GARDINER: I was going to ask the noble Lord which language this was, because obviously it did not seem to be English.
LORD CHESHAM: I must confess to a fault here, in that, as your Lordships will not be surprised, having discovered that this was a drafting Amendment, I

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did not actually check it on a grammatical basis. I feel that I should apologise to your Lordships for that. In view of what has been said, I had better look at it again. Perhaps the Amendment can be made as it is at the present time, subject to putting down another one, if it is required.
LORD COTTESLOE: I thank the noble Lord.
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
LORD CHESHAM: This Amendment is also a drafting Amendment. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 82, line 38, leave out ("they who") and insert ("them that").—(Lord Chesham.)
LORD CONESFORD: I take it that the noble Lord's undertaking applies also to this Amendment.
LORD CHESHAM: It is intended to apply to both.
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Schedule 4, as amended, agreed to.
Schedule 5 agreed to.
Schedule 6 [Enactments repealed]:
LORD CHESHAM: This is a tidying Amendment, to repeal the provisions that no longer apply. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 87, line 3, at end insert—

("24 & l25 Vict. c. 47.

The Harbours and Passing Tolls, &c., Act 1861.

In section 2 the definition of 'differential dues.'

Sections 10, 14, 15 and 16.

25 & 26 Vict. c. 19.

The General Pier and Harbour Act 1861 Amendment Act.

Section 17.

30 & 31 Vict. c. 15.

The Shipping Dues Exemption Act 1867.

The whole Act.")

—(Lord Chesham.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
LORD CHESHAM: This Amendment is consequential. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 87, line 9, column 3, leave out line 9 and insert—("Section 12.
In Section 23, the words ' Part III of ' Section 25.")—(Lord Chesham.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
LORD CHESHAM: This Amendment is consequential. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 87, line 12, column 3, leave out line 12 and insert—
("In section 6(1), paragraphs (a) and (e), and in paragraph (c) the words 'Part III of'.")—(Lord Chesham.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
LORD CHESHAM: This Amendment is consequential. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 87, line 26, leave out from ("in") to ("and") in line 28 and insert ("subsection (2), the words from 'but shall not give preference' onwards").—(Lord Chesham.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
LORD CHESHAM: This Amendment is consequential and drafting. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 87, line 33, column 3, at end insert ("In section 50, in subsection (1), the word 'port', and subsection (3)").—(Lord Chesham.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
LORD CHESHAM: This is a drafting Amendment. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 87, line 45, after ("at") insert ("where first occurring").—(Lord Chesham.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
LORD CHESHAM: This Amendment is consequential. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 87, line 52, leave out ("5") and insert ("6(1)").—(Lord Chesham.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Schedule 6, as amended, agreed to.
House resumed: Bill reported with Amendments.
House adjourned at two minutes before seven o'clock.