Lords Sitting of 11 July 1963

Preamble
The House met at three of the clock, The LORD CHANCELLOR on the Woolsack.
Prayers—Read by the Lord Bishop of Coventry

MEDWAY CONSERVANCY BILL
Read 3a, with the Amendments, and passed, and returned to the Commons.
WILLS BILL
Read 3a (according to Order), with the Amendments, and passed, and returned to the Commons.
OATHS AND EVIDENCE (OVERSEAS AUTHORITIES AND COUNTRIES) BILL
Read 3a (according to Order), and passed.

PEERAGE BILL
3.8 p.m.
Order of the Day for the House to be put into Committee read.
Moved, That the House do now resolve itself into Committee.—(The Lord Chancellor.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.
House in Committee accordingly.
[The LORD MERTHYR in the Chair.]
Clause 1:
Disclaimer of certain hereditary peerages.
1.—(1) Subject to the provisions of this section, any person who, after the commencement of this Act, succeeds to a peerage in the peerage of England, Scotland, Great Britain or the United Kingdom may, by an instrument of disclaimer delivered to the Lord Chancellor within the period prescribed by this Act, disclaim that peerage for his life.
(3) The foregoing provisions of this section shall apply to a person who has succeeded to a peerage before the commencement of this Act as they apply to a person who succeeds to a peerage after the commencement of this Act, but subject to the following modifications:—
(a) the period within which an instrument of disclaimer may be delivered by such a
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person shall be six months beginning with the commencement of this Act or, if he is then under twenty-one years of age, six months beginning with the day on which he attains that age; and
(4) In reckoning any period prescribed by this section for the delivery of an instrument of disclaimer by any person no account shall be taken of any time during which that person is shown to the satisfaction of the Lord Chancellor to have been subject to any infirmity of body or mind rendering him incapable of exercising or determining whether to exercise his rights under this section
LORD BOOTHBY LORD BOOTHBY moved, in subsection (1), to leave out "for his life". The noble Lord said: The subsequent Amendments standing in my name on the Marshalled List are consequential upon this Amendment and, therefore, with your Lordships' permission, it might be convenient to have the discussion upon this Amendment and, if it is not approved, I will not then move the subsequent Amendments. I think this Bill would be well entitled the "Wedgwood Benn Enabling Bill". Indeed, the Leader of the House of Commons has said that the case of Mr. Wedgwood Benn led to its introduction; that he was entitled to the full credit for it, and he would take his place in Parliamentary history. I agree. But hard cases do not necessarily make good laws and, for my part, I should have preferred to await the radical reform of your Lordships' House, which I believe to be necessary and inevitable.
That being said, I think that a Peer who disclaims and elects to be a commoner and to stand for the House of Commons, if he wishes to do so, should do it properly. He should have the full rights and privileges of a commoner, but no other rights or privileges inherent or potential. In short, he should not be able to have it both ways. The word "disclaim" is defined in the dictionary as,
"To renounce a legal claim"
and
"To disavow any claim to, or connection with."
That is clear enough. But it is not the intention of this Bill, which will allow a Peer to stand for election to the House of Commons and simultaneously hold in reserve for his heirs all the privileges and titles which pertain to him, and which will remain only temporarily in abeyance.
What we are setting out to do is to create a number of dormant Peerages; and that, on the face of it, is rather an extraordinary thing to do. Why? Because it is claimed that the disclaimer of a Peerage is the arbitrary act on the part of a single individual, who has no night to deprive his successors, who may be unborn, or may not be in a position to be consulted, of the rights and privileges of membership of the Upper House. But the acceptance of an hereditary Peerage is an equally arbitrary act on the part of a single individual, which has hitherto deprived his heirs, without their being consulted, of the rights and privileges—which are at least as great, if not greater—of membership of the House of Commons. In accepting an hereditary Peerage the late Lord Stansgate, one of the great Parliamentarians of our time, also accepted this fact. But, on the other hand, the late Mr. Leopold Amery, another great Parliamentarian with vast administrative experience, refused a Peerage on the ground that he did not wish to debar his son from the House of Commons. I think that it is extremely important to bear this point in mind. After the passage of the Life Peerages Act it would, of course, no longer have been necessary; but it was necessary in his time, and he faced up to it and accepted that fact.
In the Memorandum which he circulated to the Select Committee, the Lord President of the Council and Leader of your Lordships' House said:
"Many titles are links with a famous past and justly regarded as a part of the national heritage … and to allow the ambition or perhaps even the spite or caprice of an individual to extinguish a famous name would, I feel, not redound to the dignity of the institution …"
On that, I would only say that Sir Winston Churchill seems to me to get along quite nicely under his own name; and I cannot feel that the fame or the historical significance of, for example, the houses of Howard, Cavendish or Cecil are dependent on the titles they may from time to time hold or have held. Moreover, what is there to prevent an heir to any Peerage from entering either House in the future on his or her own merits?—absolutely nothing. The noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, said in his Memorandum that it would be intolerable for a Peer to move backwards and forwards at will, because the ridiculous-
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ness of his conduct would be passed on to Parliament. I think it not very much less ridiculous that a small number of families—because that is what it amounts to—should enjoy for generations to come the right of choosing whether to sit in this House by right or to stand for election to the House of Commons. An additional complication which arises is the question of courtesy titles. I have read all the debates in another place, and I am quite clear that no one at the present time has a clue as to what is going to be done about courtesy titles if this Bill is passed in its present form.
In conclusion, I should like to say this. I personally should like—and here I share the views of the noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury—to see an hereditary element retained in a reformed Upper House, consisting of those who wish to serve, elected by their own order; because I do not think any other kind of election would be acceptable to the House of Commons, and because I think it would keep a youthful element in this House, which is extremely important. If we now establish the right to what I think I can best describe as "mothball" hereditary Peerages—putting them aside and pulling them out again at the whim of the holder of any title—then I think we are in real danger of bringing the whole institution into ridicule and some disrepute. I do not think that this sort of "Jack-in-the-box" act will, in the long run, work. I fear that, in that case, the days of the hereditary Peerage may be numbered; and I should be sorry to see that. It is for these reasons that I thought it right to table this Amendment, in order that your Lordships might have the opportunity at least to express an opinion on the matter, and perhaps even to take a decision in the Lobby. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 1, line 11, leave out ("for his life").—(Lord Boothby.)
LORD SOMERS: I should like to oppose this Amendment very strongly, on two main grounds. I think it was during the Second Reading that the noble Earl the Leader of the Opposition spoke of the position of a Member in another place as being a grand privilege—words which I do not question in the

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least. But now the noble Lord, Lord Boothby, wants to make that grand privilege descend to his heirs and successors. What price the hereditary principle there, my Lords? It seems to me that, if one is going to disregard the hereditary principle, one must disregard it in both directions.
There is another reason, and that is that if one is to decide, not only for oneself but also for one's heirs and successors—and this may be particularly difficult, especially when they are distant relations and not one's own son—I think one will find that many fewer Members of your Lordships' House will take the advantage of disclaiming: not that I think very many are likely to, in any case. I think that with the added weight of having to decide not only for yourself but also for somebody else as to what their future is going to be, it would be extremely difficult to make any decision at all. After all, not everybody is suited to be a Member of another place. It is an extremely specialised and difficult vocation, and it is quite unlike membership of your Lordships' House, where is is comparatively easy—or so I have found it. I know very well that I should not have the ability to be a Member of another place. I think, therefore, it is quite unlikely that many people would disclaim, in view of that fact.
THE EARL OF MANSFIELD: It is greatly to be hoped that this Amendment will be rejected by your Lordships with the contumely that it merits. While fully agreeing with my noble friend Lord Somers on the points he has put, I should like to add several others. The first is that to say now that we are going to create a new kind of "mothball" Peerage is far from accurate. "Mothball" Peerages are already in existence, owing to the ridiculous system of the English, as apart from the Scottish, Peerage of a Peerage which can be held by a woman going into abeyance when there is more than the one daughter and no son of a Peer who has died. So the "mothball" argument falls at once.
Secondly, I do not see that a Peer has it both ways, because it does not mean that he can come back to your Lordships' House, and it confers no privilege on his
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progeny of being able more easily to get into another place. All it does is to make it possible for someone who would otherwise come to your Lordships' House sooner that he would like, to go to another place and do useful work there. But why that should mean that his descendants for ever after should be debarred from enjoying a Peerage which his ancestors had gained is something that passes my comprehension. I cannot see that there will be any advantage. I agree with my noble friend Lord Somers that all it will mean is that far fewer people will go to another place.
Furthermore, let it be remembered that this provision would put a premium upon spite felt by an inheritor of a title for his possible successor. Some man might well succeed to a Peerage who did not want it and who thoroughly disliked his next heir. He would hurriedly disclaim that Peerage simply for the pleasure of spiting that heir and his descendants. Altogether I cannot regard this suggested Amendment as being other than deplorable.
3.21 p.m.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR (LORD DILHORNE): I should like to thank the noble Lord, Lord Boothby, for the commendable clarity and brevity with which he moved a highly controversial Amendment. I apprehend that this was the subject of very considerable discussion by the Joint Select Committee. If I may remind your Lordships, the Joint Select Committee rejected extinction by twelve votes to six, which is a pretty substantial majority. The first point which the noble Lord, Lord Boothby, put forward was that it would be ridiculous, generation after generation, for Peers to come back, and go out, and so on. I wonder whether there is any real substance in that argument when one bears in mind that the position to-day is that someone who succeeds to a Peerage has a perfect freedom to opt whether he takes any part in your Lordships' proceedings, and, indeed, successive generations may—I do not know—decide not to take part and exercise that option. That in a sense, I suppose, could be said to create some dormant or temporarily dormant Peerages. This Bill does not alter that position. All that this Bill does is to make the difference that a Peer who chooses not to serve in your Lordships' House will be able to attempt to serve in another

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place. That is really the effect of the Bill as it stands.
The argument was also put forward by the noble Lord that when one accepts an hereditary Peerage one binds ones successors; therefore, ought not one to be free, if one succeeds to a Peerage and disclaims it, also in that case to bind ones successors? There is a fallacy in that argument, although it may sound attractive from a debating point of view, because the whole point of this Bill is that each successor should be able in his turn to choose whether or not to avail himself of his hereditary rights and to subject himself to his hereditary disabilities.
I was interested to hear the noble Lord, Lord Boothby, say that he would like to see the hereditary principle retained, because I think that when he comes to consider and reflect upon the proposal that he has been putting forward, he will see that it is really a proposal that will nibble at the hereditary principle, because what he is suggesting is that the heirs and successors of a Peer who disclaims should be penalised in a way in which no heirs or successors of other Peers would be. That is to say, to that extent he is encroaching upon the hereditary principle. I do not want to start a debate to-day—because we have a lot of Amendments to consider—on the hereditary principle. All that I am saying is that I think, if you are going to curtail the legislative rights of heirs to Peerages or to abolish Peerages, then the enactment should apply to all such heirs and not merely to those whose ancestors happened to have disclaimed under the Bill.
This is, again, one of the issues on which many people will absolutely sincerely hold different views and, as your Lordships know, this matter has been the subject of prolonged consideration by the Joint Select Committee. I make no complaint at all, naturally, of the noble Lord's having raised this issue, and having raised it and having sensed the feeling from several quarters of the House, and in the light of what I have said, I hope that he will not press it to a Division.
LORD MORRISON OF LAMBETH: I think there is liable to be a little universal assumption that the only issue involved in disclaiming is whether or not
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a person wishes to continue his membership of the House of Commons or to stand for election to the House of Commons. But that is not the only issue involved in the Amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Boothby, which I support. There may be other reasons why a person does not wish to take a title or an hereditary Peerage. It may be that his circumstances are modest and he feels that he cannot live up to it (to put it one way, and it could be put in another) and therefore he does not wish to succeed. Other reasons are that his social circumstances are such that a title would be inappropriate; that his employment might conceivably be prejudiced by his holding of a title; or he may have strong convictions against titles and hereditary Peerages. So there may be a number of reasons why a person disclaims, apart from the question of wishing to stand for, or to continue to be a Member of, the Commons House of Parliament.
I personally think this Amendment is right. I supported this line in the Joint Select Committee for two reasons. One is the "Jack-in-the-box" argument which the noble Lord, Lord Boothby, used—which I call the "bob in, bob out, and bob in again" argument. I think that that position is not dignified from the point of view of this Parliamentary institution. I think it is a bad thing, if a Peerage is disclaimed, that the next generation can come in and the one after that can come in or stay out. I do not think it adds to the dignity of the House of Lords. That is one argument.
The other argument is that I think the Lord Chancellor is in danger of making it, in a sense, too easy for a man to disclaim. I do not want it to be too easy. I think the consequences—not penalties, but consequences—of disadvantage to somebody later on should be in his mind. I do not think he should disclaim light-heartedly. Therefore, if it makes him think two, three, four or five times before he disclaims because of the consequences to his descendants, I think it is a good thing, because the decision to disclaim must be taken responsibly and after careful thought. I do not think he ought to be in the position of being able to comfort himself with the thought, "I am not going, but

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my son can". I think that is not conducive to the dignity and the status of the House of Lords as things are. I think, therefore, that if a person disclaims and does not want the Peerage then it must be binding upon his successors. Nobody can tell, of course, whether or not a man's successors will want to take advantage of reviving a Peerage. In any case, it is not such a terrible thing that they should not be able to. Therefore, I think that this is a rational thing to do.
I do not think we are called upon this afternoon to express firm opinions about the hereditary principle. In principle, I am against it. On the other hand, I think there might be political disadvantages if this House were converted into too popular a Chamber. I do not want it to be too popular a Chamber, otherwise it will strengthen its moral authority against the elected House. Therefore, I do not propose to discuss the hereditary point too much. The narrow point before us was of a Peer, who would otherwise succeed, deciding to disclaim, and I think it is logical, right and more dignified that, if so, the Peerage should be extinguished—or drowned, as we call it in rather more vulgar language. Therefore, if I am still here, which is not certain, and a Division takes place I shall vote for the Amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Boothby.
LORD SALTOUN: I did not intend to intervene in this debate, and I shall keep your Lordships only a very short time. But I would remind your Lordships that we are a House of Peers, which means that on questions in this House we are all equal. For that reason we should be particularly careful that our legislation is completely and absolutely fair as between one and another.
The reason why I shall oppose this Amendment is that it does not operate fairly as between different Members of your Lordships' House. I can quite understand, and strongly sympathise with, the present Lord Stansgate's attitude and feeling in the matter. But take, for example, my noble friend Lord Forbes. He and his predecessors have been head of the Forbes for hundreds of years. If he should wish to disclaim his Peerage
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absolutely, the whole of his family—and I mean not only his children, but everybody connected with him—would object and feel that he was doing them an injury. That reason would operate sufficiently to prevent him from making use of this Bill which is now before us. For that reason I think this Amendment should be opposed, because it does not operate fairly. I am not talking about what a man feels in himself. I am talking about the inducements that will naturally and certainly be put upon him to refrain from making use of the Bill, when it becomes an Act.
LORD SHERWOOD: I would say that this Amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Boothby, opens a new gate to blackmail. A person holding a title might easily say, "I want to return to contest such-and-such a division", where other people hope they are going to succeed in an election. In such a case he can turn to them and say, "Unless you give me so much money I will do away with my Peerage". I can think of one very strong case, the Duke of Portland. He is not here at the moment. He has no direct heir. He could easily say to the whole of the Bentinck family, "Unless you pay me one thousand pounds each I will go back to the Newark division"—where I am certain he would be successful—opening the door to real blackmail. And where did his title come from?
LORD BOOTHBY: May I interrupt my noble friend? He is at the moment accusing the whole of this House of being potential blackmailers.
LORD SHERWOOD: Lord Boothby perhaps knows more about blackmail than I do. All I said was that Lord Boothby's Amendment is opening the door to future blackmail, which I strongly deplore. As in the case of the Duke of Portland which I have just raised, he could say, "I am going back to the House of Commons. I have been in it, and not unsuccessfully, and I shall return to it": But all descendants of the present Duke, every one who has a right to succeed to the title of Duke of Portland (which brought in Protestantism instead of Roman Catholicism, which I deplore; it brought it in largely due to the lack of security by John Churchill, who became Duke of Marlborough. So he departed to the enemy; yet he became a Duke because he was a Protestant), are

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entitled to succeed to the title and not to to Mr. Bentinck, of Welbeck Abbey.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: After the speeches which we have had from the noble Lord, Lord Somers, the noble Earl. Lord Mansfield, and my noble and learned friend the Lord Chancellor, there is little I can add against this Amendment. I certainly do not intend to discuss the hereditary principle, as such, or to wander into the byways where the noble Lord, Lord Sherwood has been leading the House. But I should like to add this to what has been said. I, of course, listened with great interest, like, I suppose, everybody else in the House, to the remarks made by the noble Lord, Lord Boothby, in moving his Amendment. He pleaded his case with that great persuasive force which we should expect from him. But I very much hope—and I would say this, if I may, to the noble Lord, Lord Morrison of Lambeth, too—he will not press the Amendment to a Division. I feel that it goes far beyond the terms of reference by which the Select Committee's deliberations were governed, as they were defined to us at the beginning of our sittings. I can only express my own view, but I certainly thought it was made clear to us from the very start that we were not intended to go into all the wider issues of the composition of this House, on which, no doubt, almost all the Members, on one side and the other, had their own very strong views.
I think it is very probable that some, at any rate, of the Labour members of the Committee, possibly the majority, would have liked to abolish the hereditary principle altogether. But I think they realised, as I certainly realised, that the purpose for which this Committee was called was not to raise fundamental issues but to deal with the immediate difficulty which had been caused by Lord Stansgate and for which it was very important, from every point of view, that a solution should be found. I thought, if I may say so, that it was to their very great credit that they did not press their views too far on the Committee. They realised, as we did, that the best one could hope for, and what we must work for, was a fair compromise between widely differing opinions. We accepted that, and I understood that
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they accepted that. I think it was a pity, if I may say so, that the noble Lord, Lord Boothby, was not equally wise.
If he were to achieve success on this group of Amendments, what would happen? He would certainly have killed the Bill, because I have no doubt at all that this House would reject the Bill, with this Amendment, on Third Reading. That would be a most idiotic result after all the work we have put into this question. Surely what we ought to do now is to face the fact that we can get agreement on a way of dealing with what may be called the Stansgate difficulty. All parts of the House can get agreement. We cannot get agreement on the wider question. Let us leave that alone to a later period.
LORD MORRISON OF LAMBETH: The word "blackmail" has been mentioned. Is this a little attempt at blackmailing the House as to how it should vote in this Division?
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: I do not think it is an attempt at blackmail to say what will certainly happen. I am not threatening anybody. I am only telling the House what will happen; and everybody knows it will happen.
LORD WALSTON: May I briefly support the noble Lord, Lord Boothby, in his Amendment? It seems to me this issue, in its small aspect, as we shall look at it, is a very simple one. A hereditary Peer has certain privileges. The one at issue is the privilege of sitting in your Lordships' House. He is now being given under this Bill, quite rightly in my view, an additional privilege—the privilege of deciding whether, in fact, he will sit here or attempt to sit in another place. So the issue is what price he should pay for this additional privilege which he is being given. The price this Bill suggests is renunciation for his lifetime of the right to sit in this House again unless he is re-created a Peer. Lord Boothby's Amendment suggests that the price should be a higher one, and I feel that, in view of the very great additional privilege which is being proposed, he should pay the higher price.
LORD LUCAS OF CHILWORTH: He will not pay it: his descendants will.
LORD WALSTON: The noble Lord correctly says it is not only the Peer renouncing who will pay the price; he is making the decision on behalf of the people who come after; and it is a very difficult decision to make. But, after all, anybody who is fortunate enough to inherit anything, other than good health or good looks or good intelligence, does have, in addition to the advantages that inheritance gives him, the responsibility of deciding how he shall use those things he has inherited. He may inherit a great business; he may inherit a great estate; he may inherit simply vast wealth.
Many people (your Lordships know them well) have had to make the decision whether, in their own personal circumstances, they will continue to enjoy these privileges—or, as is often the case be overlaid by them: preserving them, to their own personal disadvantage, and often unhappiness, for the sake of their descendants, not yet born, maybe—or divest themselves of them. We can all think of friends of ours, Members of your Lordships' House—or it may have been their fathers—who have divested themselves of their ancestral estates, of their businesses, or even, on occasion of their wealth, to the detriment of people who come after them. They have done it, having thought about it carefully and decided, on balance, that it was the right thing to do for their own personal amenities: not their own pleasure, but because they feel they can make a greater contribution to their country, as their ancestors did before them, and also because they feel, often, that it is going to be better for their descendants, to put it simply, to stand on their own feet.
While I cannot say that those who have made that decision have necessarily in every case made the right decision, one respects them for having faced these facts and for having made the decision. But I do not think these people should never have to make that decision; that they should be able to feel they can divest themselves of the responsibilities which go with certain inheritances, but can do it relatively lightly, only for themselves. They must regard it—particularly those people who believe in the hereditary principle—as something in regard to which they have a personal responsibility towards the people who will come after
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them. Simply to be able to say, in what in effect is a selfish, though a public-spirited, way, "I do not wish to be burdened with the responsibility of my estate, my business, my fortune or my title. I shall get rid of them and act as if I had none of these things. But I am not going to take the responsibility of deciding for the people who come after me. So they can carry on if they so wish"—that, I think, is too light a price to pay. This is a serious decision for anybody to make, and one must make it in full recognition of the fact that one's decision is not a personal one, a selfish one, but must affect one's whole family in future generations. For these reasons, I strongly support the noble Lord, Lord Boothby.
3.43 p.m.
EARL ALEXANDER OF HILLSBOROUGH: I think we have had a most interesting discussion. We have had views from all quarters of the House. I was glad that Lord Boothby moved the Amendment. I think perhaps that the noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury, did not intend to suggest it, but it might have been interpreted as if the Amendment, when moved in the Joint Select Committee, was not really within the original terms of reference. I do not think he intended to convey that, but he may perhaps be interpreted in that way by some people who may read it in print.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: I did intend to convey that the wider issues of the composition of the House were outside the terms of reference. The noble Earl may say that I was wrong, but that is my view.
EARL ALEXANDER OF HILLSBOROUGH: That is fair enough. But we were certainly allowed to put it forward by the terms of reference of the Joint Select Committee, and we moved it there. The other matter is that the noble Marquess is quite right in being anxious that we should not do anything that we think likely to injure the future progress of this measure. That view is held on this side as strongly as anywhere else.
We not only took this view in the Joint Select Committee, but this proposal was moved in another place, and there is no reason at all why your Lordships should not be allowed the same privilege of voting upon it in this House. We made

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our position perfectly clear. There is no doubt at all that in the country at large a large section of the community—exactly how large I do not know, but large—is not in favour of the hereditary principle at all. On the other hand, we, as a Labour delegation to the Joint Select Committee, put our case and we voted on it. But I think in the interests of the further progress that we wanted to make in this direction, we signed the Report without signing a Minority Report. Since then this point has been debated and voted upon in another place, and there is no earthly reason why we should not vote upon it, too. I hope we may keep to that principle.
LORD BOOTHBY: I should like just to say a further word. I have no doubt at all about what will be the result of
this vote. But this was the only point of real substance which was discussed in another place. It was discussed exhaustively, and the Leader of another place advised the Members that it would be a good idea if a vote were recorded on this issue. Nobody doubts what the result of this vote will be. If I thought that there was any chance of my winning on this occasion I can assure your Lordships that I should withdraw my Amendment. As I do not think that that is the case, I intend to press it to a Division.
3.50 p.m.
On Question, Whether the said Amendment (No. 1) shall be agreed to?
Their Lordships divided: Contents, 25;Not-Contents, 106.

CONTENTS

Alexander of Hillsborough E,

Latham, L.

Shackleton, L.

Attlee, E.

Lindgren, L.

Shepherd, L.

Boothby, L. [Teller.]

Lucan, E.

Stamford, E.

Champion L.

Macpherson of Drumochter, L.

Summerskill, B. [Teller.]

Crook, L.

Morrison, L.

Taylor, L.

Douglas of Barloch, L.

Morrison of Lambeth, L.

Walston, L.

Henderson, L.

Ogmore, L.

Williams, L.

Henley, L.

Rusholme, L.

Wootton of Abinger, B.

NOT-CONTENTS

Ailwyn, L.

Faringdon, L.

Monsell, V.

Airedale, L.

Ferrers, E.

Montagu of Beaulieu, L.

Albemarle, E.

Ferrier, L.

Montgomery of Alamein, V.

Alexander of Tunis, E.

Forster of Harraby, L.

Mowbray and Stourton, L.

Allerton, L.

Fortescue, E.

Moyne, L.

Ampthill, L.

Fraser of Lonsdale, L.

Newton, L.

Atholl, D.

Fraser of North Cape, L.

Rea, L.

Auckland, L.

Gage, V.

Rockley, L.

Balfour of Burleigh, L.

Gosford, E.

St. Aldwyn, E. [Teller.]

Beauchamp, E.

Grenfell, L.

St. Just, L.

Boston, L.

Guest, L.

St. Oswald, L.

Brocket, L.

Haddington, E.

Salisbury, M.

Burden, L.

Hailsham, V. (L. President.)

Salter, L.

Burton of Coventry, B.

Harvey of Tasburgh, L.

Saltoun, L.

Carrington, L.

Hastings, L.

Samuel, V.

Cholmondeley, M.

Hawke, L.

Sandwich, E.

Chorley, L.

Hayter, L.

Saye and Sele L.

Clitheroe, L.

Horsbrugh, B.

Sherwood, L.

Clwyd, L.

Ilford, L.

Simonds, V.

Colyton, L.

Ironside, L.

Sinclair, L.

Conesford, L.

Jessel, L.

Sinha, L.

Coutanche, L.

Killearn, L.

Somers, L.

Cowley, E.

Lawson, L.

Soulbury, V.

Crathorne, L.

Long, V.

Stonehaven, V.

Croft, L.

Lothian, M.

Strathclyde, L.

Darwen, L.

Lucas of Chilworth, L.

Stuart of Findhorn, V.

De La Warr, E.

Mabane, L.

Swanborough, B.

Denham, L. [Teller.]

MacAndrew, L.

Swinton, E.

Derwent, L.

Mansfield, E.

Terrington, L.

Devonshire, D.

Massereene and Ferrard, V.

Teynham, L.

Dilhorne, L. (L. Chancellor.)

Mersey, V.

Twining, L.

Dudley, L.

Merthyr, L.

Uvedale of North End, L.

Eccles, L.

Meston, L.

Willingdon, M.

Effingham, E.

Milverton, L.

Wise, L.

Ellenborough, L.

Molson, L.

Wolverton, L.

Evans, L.

Resolved in the negative, and Amendment disagreed to accordingly.

THE EARL OF SWINTON THE EARL OF SWINTON moved, in subsection (3), to leave out paragraph (a). The noble Earl said: I have put down this Amendment to give effect to a proposal which I made during the Second Reading debate, a proposal which I think commanded a good deal of support in the House. To recapitulate very briefly for the benefit of those who were not here on Second Reading, the Committee will recall that the Select Committee recommended, in the case of Peers wishing to disclaim, that if a man was a sitting Member of the House of Commons he should disclaim within one month; if he were not sitting in this House already but succeeded to a Peerage, he should have twelve months in which to disclaim; but if he was a Peer already sitting in this House, he might have only six months in which to disclaim: and the Bill has been drafted in that form.
My Amendment would mean that, in the case of a Peer sitting in the House of Commons now or at any time in the future, he would have to make up his mind within one month. I feel that that is quite reasonable for the Peer himself, for his constituency, and for the House of Commons. He will, of course, know as soon as he succeeds whether or not he wishes to remain a Member of the House of Commons, and therefore the sooner he decides the better. Therefore, I proposed that we should leave that part intact.
As regards a Peer who succeeds hereafter, I propose to leave the Bill as drafted—namely, to give him twelve months. But, quite frankly—and I have talked about this matter to some of my noble friends who were on the Select Committee with me—I am not quite sure why we drew this distinction between a Peer who succeeds and a Peer who is now sitting. We felt that a Peer who succeeds ought to have plenty of time in which to make up his mind. It is a difficult and important decision and he wants to look round and consider the position. Indeed, it was suggested that in the case of a young man it might be longer, but we said that there should be a year in which to decide. As to the Peer who is already sitting in this House, it may be an equally difficult decision for him and he, too, wants time to look round and to consider the matter.
Therefore it seems to me on reconsideration, and I think your Lordships will probably agree, that there really is not, either in logic or in equity, any reason for distinguishing between the Peer now sitting in this House and the Peer who subsequently succeeds. I therefore propose that in each case, for the sitting Peer or the succeeding Peer, the time should be twelve months. That does not mean that he has to wait twelve months. If he wishes to take a decision within a month he can take it. He can take it as soon as the Bill comes into operation. But it does give them all up to twelve months if they so wish.
In a sense, I think this Amendment is rather closely connected with the Amendment standing in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, who is proposing that the Bill should come into operation on the passage of the Act, which I am bound to say is what the Select Committee expected and, I think, intended. Certainly, if that Amendment were adopted, then obviously it would add force to the argument that you ought to give the full twelve months to anybody who is to-day a Member of this House. I hope very much that the Government will accept this Amendment. It seems to me to be a common-sense, practical convenience, and I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 2, line 9, leave out paragraph (a).—(The Earl of Swinton.)
4.2 p.m.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: The noble Earl has made very clear what he wants to achieve by this particular Amendment. I must tell him that, as I see it, the Amendment as now drawn would have very much greater consequences than he suggests in the course of his speech in moving this Amendment. The omission of Clause 1(3)(a) which he proposes would have this result: that if that were omitted, Clause 1(3) would give sitting Peers twelve months from succession in which to disclaim. So that would mean that any Peer who had succeeded more than a year before the Bill came into force would be deprived of the opportunity of disclaiming the Peerage. I am perfectly certain that that is not a result that the noble Earl desires in the least, but that is what in fact this Amendment would do. On that ground I am going to ask the noble Earl not to press

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this Amendment, which in fact goes far beyond achieving the object which he put forward.
I do not know what reasons prompted the Joint Select Committee to arrive at the conclusion that, in the case of sitting Peers, the period of time should be six months. The Joint Select Committee recommended, by a majority of one, if I may remind your Lordships, that the Bill should apply to sitting Peers, and the Motion which was carried was that such Peers should be given an opportunity to disclaim within a reasonable time. I do not know—I cannot tell from reading the Report—why it was felt by the Joint Select Committee that six months was in this instance a reasonable time. There are, I think, arguments for saying that, in the case of a Peer who is not a sitting Member of this House at the time of succession, a period of longer than six months is desirable. Some time may elapse before he has been able to discover whether he has, either certainly or probably, succeeded, and while all sitting Peers are alerted to the implications of the change in the law created by the passage of this Bill, when the interest in this Bill has died down a person succeeding to a Peerage may well not know at once what his rights are, and may not perhaps start to consider his position seriously until several months have elapsed. That may be an argument not relating directly to whether the six months now in the Bill for sitting Peers should be extended or not, but it appears to me, on consideration, to be a possible explanation for the different periods recommended by the Joint Select Committee.
I will say quite frankly that I should like to have more time to consider the noble Earl's proposal, and to consider what would be the appropriate Amendment to give effect to that proposal. If the noble Earl were to put it down at a later stage I should like to hand it to him in an appropriate form, because I am sure it is not his desire to have the adverse consequences that the Amendment in this form has. It is for those reasons that I would ask the noble Earl to be good enough, if he thinks fit, to withdraw this Amendment, it being clearly understood that it will be perfectly open to him to put down
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an Amendment which would, if carried, achieve his object at a later stage.
THE EARL OF SWINTON: I am much obliged to the noble and learned Lord, the Lord Chancellor. Of course, the purpose of my Amendment, as I stated it in the language of my speech, was fairly simple. Apparently the language of my Amendment was inappropriate. I said on Second Reading that I thought it would be a very good thing if the Government would draft the Amendment, as they were better draftsmen than I was. However they did not draft the Amendment; they left it to me. I have not been successful in my purpose and now the Government will have to do my work over again. However, on the clear understanding that the Amendment should be agreed in a form which will give effect to what I have put to the House in moving it, and that that Amendment can go down either in my name or the name of the Government on Report, then I think it would be for the convenience of your Lordships if I asked leave to withdraw the present Amendment now.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I should like to make it clear that I want to have an opportunity of giving further consideration to the question, making it quite clear that I will certainly secure that the Amendment is properly drafted and will hand it to the noble Earl so that he can put it down. I want more time to consider this question, for the simple reason that I should feel very grave reluctance in deciding rather rapidly, perhaps, to depart from the recommendations of the Joint Select Committee. If it is withdrawn now I shall have that time, and in any event I can give the noble Earl the Amendment in the proper form.
EARL ALEXANDER OF HILLSBOROUGH: Before the noble Earl finally asks leave to withdraw his Amendment, I would say that I am much obliged for the statement of the noble and learned Lord, the Lord Chancellor. We shall all require to look very carefully indeed at any Amendment of this kind. I remember very well the decision in the Joint Select Committee on this point. There were a good many speeches on it and different views were expressed among the parties concerned. I hope that we shall not come to any major decision on this matter without very careful reflection,

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because it is the sort of thing that might hold us up again in another place.
THE EARL OF SWINTON: I am quite content. I did not mean to assume that the Lord Chancellor would necessarily accept the Amendment. But provided it can be drafted by the Parliamentary draftsmen in a form which will give effect to it, then I ask leave to withdraw my Amendment and I will certainly put it down again.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
4.8 p.m.
LORD SALTOUN LORD SALTOUN moved, in subsection (4), after "been" to insert "(a)". The noble Lord said: I am very sorry that I was not here for the debate on the Second Reading, and I feel that I missed a great deal, but I have done my home lessons and I have very carefully read through Iolanthe, and I came down this afternoon in the hope that the noble and learned Lord, the Lord Chancellor would say that an old Equity draftsman would be equal to the occasion. I am not so sure at the moment. But the object of Amendments Nos. 3, 4 and 5 is to ensure that in the case of the succession to any Peerage, time does not begin to run until the successor knows that he has succeeeded to a Peerage.
When I was young and many others of us were young it was possible for a man to disappear for seven years in Darkest Africa, and it would not be known whether he was dead or alive. Today it is equally possible for a man to disappear in enlightened Africa for quite a considerable time, and people are not to know whether he is dead or alive. There are other cases. I can think of people who have been prisoners, who were moved behind the Iron Curtain at the conclusion of the war, and it is not certainly known whether they are alive or dead at this moment. It therefore seems to me that the future may hold the possibility, as has the past, of a case arising where it is not known whether a Peer has died, or it is not known when he has died, and where it is therefore impossible for his sucessor to know whether or not he has succeeded to a Peerage. I have looked through the Bill and I cannot see that the point is covered in any other way,
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and it certainly has surprised me that the Bill has got as far as this without it being covered. I think it ought to be covered in some way or another, and I do not think I need waste any more words in explaining the Amendment to your Lordships. I therefore beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 2, line 9, leave out paragraph (a).—(Lord Saltoun.)
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: The noble Lord has made quite clear his object in moving this, the first of three Amendments dealing with the same particular point. His purpose, as I understand it, is to guard against the risk of a successor to a Peerage losing his option to disclaim without ever having realised that the occasion for its exercise had arisen. Now I think that in this context there are really two cases to consider. First, there is the case where the events which caused the succession are well known but the entitlement of the heir, or it may be of the previous holder, is disputed and not readily ascertainable. If I might give an example of that, there is the case of the younger brother of a Peer whose elder brother dies leaving a widow who may be pregnant. In that case, the entitlement of the heir will not be readily ascertainable at least for some time.
In that type of case I do not think there will be any difficulty, because, although a particular individual may not be sure that he is the heir to a Peerage, he can, if he wishes to stand for the House of Commons, disclaim without suffering any penalty at all. If it turns out that he is not the heir, then the disclaimer becomes a nullity and no harm is done. If, on the other hand, he has succeeded, the disclaimer takes effect at once, as soon as he has executed the necessary documents, so that he can retain his seat in the House of Commons, if he is already a Member, or stand for election to that House if he is not a Member of it. I think that there is no difficulty in relation to that type of case; and, in substance, the Bill thus carries out the recommendations contained in paragraph 6(i) of the Joint Select Committee's Report.
The other type of case that might arise is where the events giving rise to the succession may themselves be unknown

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—for instance, where the previous holder of a Peerage is a distant relative who dies abroad, it may be under a different name, so that a considerable interval of time elapses before the heir gets to know about it. I must concede straight away to the noble Lord that this type of case could, in theory, cause the heir to lose his opportunity of disclaiming. The practical position, though—and I think the noble Lord would agree with me here—is that such cases are likely to be extremely rare, and the only heirs likely to wish to disclaim (that is to say, those who are Members of Parliament or who have Parliamentary ambitions) will take good care to keep themselves informed of circumstances which may cause a Peerage to devolve upon them.
The noble Lord has said that he finds no indication in the Bill dealing with this particular point, and he might have gone on to say that he did not find in the Report of the Joint Select Committee any recommendation dealing specifically with the case of ignorance, as opposed to one of disputed succession. The Joint Select Committee rejected a suggestion for a board of appeal, with power to allow the time limits to be extended on compassionate grounds, and it is to be inferred from that, I think, that they would have rejected the noble Lord's proposal. But the Bill, as the noble Lord no doubt has noticed, does to some extent depart from the strictness of the Committee's recommendations by allowing an extension of time in cases of infirmity, and I hope that that particular proposal will meet with the noble Lord's approval and obtain his support.
There are these objections to the noble Lord's proposal. First, it is clearly right, I would suggest to him, that, so far as possible the terminus a quo of the limitation period should be certain, and any additional departure from this principle is to that extent undesirable. Secondly, I would suggest that to allow an extension of time on the grounds of ignorance would discourage the successor to a Peerage, who might be in no hurry to come to a decision, from ascertaining his true position. Indeed, I think it would be necessary, if the noble Lord's proposal were acceptable in principle, to guard against this by excluding from its benefit any successor who had not taken
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reasonable steps to find out the truth. But once an inquiry of this nature had been embarked upon, the position of the Lord Chancellor, as the adjudicating authority, would, I think, become increasingly difficult. Indeed, one would have to conduct a miniature trial, and one might find oneself in the unfortunate position of having to resolve issues which were far from clear-cut and which might, in the case of a sitting Member of Parliament, involve the Lord Chancellor in a considerable amount of political controversy.
Whilst I must concede that there is a theoretical case in support of the noble Lord's proposal, the difficulty he is trying to meet is, I suggest, unlikely to occur; and I submit to your Lordships that, on balance, the disadvantages of introducing yet another factor making for uncertainty in the length of the limitation period outweigh any possible gain. I am glad the noble Lord has raised this point; that it has not escaped his attention. I hope that he will be satisfied, at least to some extent, by the reply which I have given.
LORD SALTOUN: I have listened very carefully to the noble and learned Lord's explanation, but I am bound to say that I am not satisfied, and for this reason. Here we have a special clause which allows a gentleman with infirmity of body or mind—and mark that particularly, "of mind"—to have an option in this matter, whereas a man of vigorous mind who is at the height of his career may be debarred from continuing that career by the fact that it is completely impossible for him to know that he has succeeded to a Peerage. The noble and learned Lord pointed out that this circumstance must occur very seldom. Mercifully, great cataclysms do not occur very often; nor do great wars. But great wars do give rise to precisely this kind of circumstance, and I hesitate to suggest to your Lordships that there will be no great wars in the future. It seems to me that there is here a clear injustice being done.
I do not say that the words of my Amendment are perfect, and I would very gladly change them. As a matter of fact, I had it originally in mind to insert right at the end of this Bill a little clause saying that the time should not

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begin to run until it was known, or, in the case of a disputed succession, declared by a court, that the succession had taken place. That would be just as good from my point of view, and it would remedy an injustice. But I think the Government should hesitate before doing something manifestly unfair and manifestly unjust. I do not propose to press my Amendment this afternoon. I propose to take it ad avizandum and perhaps propose some other Amendment later. I believe it is important; and I do not think we should, without proper consideration, do something which is manifestly unjust.
LORD MOYNE: Would the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor agree to look at this matter between now and Report stage and see whether some word such as "unavoidable" might not cover the position? The noble Lord, Lord Saltoun, will be thinking about it between now and then; and if the noble and learned Lord Chancellor is also directing his thoughts to this subject which seems to have a possibility of unfairness in it, then I should feel much happier.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: If my noble friend will look at what I have said he will see that the insertion of the adjective "unavoidable" would not resolve the great difficulties that arise in this matter. I am, of course, always willing to look at something again; and I will. But I cannot do it with any commitment or really with any hope of finding a solution to this really theoretical difficulty.
LORD SALTOUN: I am afraid that I know cases where it is by no means a theoretical difficulty. But, as I said, I will take it ad avizandum and see whether I can find another Amendment for a later stage. In those circumstances, with the leave of the Committee I will withdraw my Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
On Question, Whether Clause 1 shall stand part of the Bill?
4.23 p.m.
THE DUKE OF ATHOLL: May I say a word on Clause 1? As one of the younger Members of your Lordships' House, I feel that I probably have a slightly better recollection than some noble Lords—and particularly some of
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those on the Joint Select Committee—of what one's thoughts are like at the age of 21. It worries me very much that a person who succeeds to a Peerage as a minor has to make up his mind whether he is going to disclaim it or not by the time he is 22 years old, allowing for the twelve months afterwards. The noble Lord, Lord Silkin, moved an Amendment in the Joint Select Committee that the age should be changed to 25, plus a year's grace, making it 26. This Amendment was, I think, rejected by a small majority.
I should be very interested to know the reasons why this particular Amendment was rejected; because I feel that having to make up one's mind by the time one is 22 would have one of two effects: either people will disclaim their Peerage because they think they have political ambitions and think they may wish to go to another place later in life, say at 30 or 35 years; or else they immediately waive the disclaimer because they know that they have no political ambitions. They may not even know what it entails; they may never have been inside your Lordships' House or, for that matter, inside the House of Commons at that time. So I think it would be interesting to know why Lord Silkin's Amendment was rejected on the Select Committee.
LORD SILKIN: May I offer a conjecture to the noble Duke? It is the one he himself put forward: that in the majority of cases it was a very long time since we were 21.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I cannot help my noble friend since I was not a member of the Committee.
LORD CONESFORD: May I ask my noble and learned friend why there is a distinction between two classes of minors? One has twelve months and one only six months under the Bill as it stands. I think that some of those minors will have twelve months under subsection (2); but some will have only six months under subsection (3)(a). Is it right that there should be a distinction between various classes of minors?
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I will certainly look at that point, but I do not know whether my noble friend is right about it.
Clause 1 agreed to.
Clause 2 agreed to.
Clause 3:
Effects of disclaimer
3.—(1) The disclaimer of a peerage by any person under this Act shall be irrevocable and shall operate from the date on which the instrument of disclaimer is delivered,—
(a) to divest that person (and, if he is married, his wife) of all right or interest to or in the peerage, and all titles, rights, offices, privileges and precedence attaching thereto; and
but shall not accelerate the succession to that peerage nor affect its devolution on his death.
(2) Where a peerage is disclaimed under this Act, no other hereditary peerage shall be conferred upon the person by whom it is disclaimed, and no writ in acceleration shall be issued in respect of that peerage to the person entitled thereto on his death.
4.26 p.m.
LORD SALTOUN LORD SALTOUN moved, in subsection (1)(a), to leave out "titles". The noble Lora said: I put this Amendment down as an exploratory one, and I have no particularly strong views about it. But the Committee will notice that the paragraph does not apply to Irish Peers and I do not see why there should be a difference in that respect.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: With respect, is the noble Lord on the right Amendment? As I understand it, this Amendment leaves out the word "titles".
LORD SALTOUN: Yes, that is right. My noble friend the late Lord Winterton stood as Lord Winterton; and there is nothing in this Bill to prevent anybody in a similar position from doing the same thing. I may be wrong. I am willing to be instructed. It seems to me quite reasonable to put everybody on the same footing; and so I thought I would move this Amendment and see what happened. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 3, line 34, leave out ("titles").—(Lord Saltoun.)
THE EARL OF SANDWICH: The noble Lord, Lord Saltoun has already referred to Iolanthe and it is probably permissible to introduce the name of another doggerel poet. I regret to tell the Committee that I made a mistake or Second Reading in referring to the Earl of Potamus's son
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as "Lord Lucky". It was in fact, as you would suppose, "Lord Hippo" who
"suffered fearful loss by putting money on a horse,
"which he had been told if it were pressed
"would run far faster than the rest.
"But on the morning of the race
"it only took the seventh place."
Then followed financial disaster, and finally his sire, the Earl of Potamus, sent for him and bitterly addressed him thus:
"We had intended you to be,
"the next Prime Minister but three;
"but, as it is, my language fails.
"Go out and govern New South Wales."
THE DUKE OF ATHOLL: I think my noble friend's Lord is Lord Lundy, who was easily moved to tears.
THE EARL OF SANDWICH: There is a Report stage of this Bill when I shall have the opportunity to get the situation even more muddled. My qualifications for being "next Prime Minister but three" I must judge as being very poor indeed; and I have no desire whatever to go out and govern New South Wales.
LORD CONESFORD: For Lord Hippo and the Earl of Potamus the story ended much more happily. He
"received a telegram at dinner
"to say that he had backed a winner."
THE EARL OF SANDWICH: That is what I hope will be the prospect of this Amendment. I merely seek some clarification from the Lord Chancellor as to what the phrase "all titles" means. The object of this Amendment is to make the clause read—and I will leave out a number of words:
"The disclaimer of a peerage by any person under this Act shall be irrevocable and shall operate …
(a) to divest that person … of all right or interest … in the peerage, and … all rights, offices, privileges and precedence attaching thereto …"
There is another Amendment later dealing with the omission of privileges, which is a separate question. This is a matter of leaving out the reference to "all titles", which is going to get us into some considerable state of anxiety and distress.
My noble and learned friend the Lord Chancellor, and other members of the Government in another place have told us that they cannot legislate for courtesy titles. Now it seems to me that the phrase "all titles" catches up the

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courtesy title idea, and if we are to legislate to exclude all titles from the Peerage then that includes courtesy titles as well. Only by leaving out the phrase "all titles" can we do justice to what has been said by my noble and learned friend the Lord Chancellor and by other members of the Government—that is to say, that no legislation can take place about courtesy titles.
It seems to me to be most sensible, if Peers are returned to the House of Commons or remain in the House of Commons, that they use their former names. I am going to cite a few, without any suggestion that they are intending to do one thing or the other—Lord Dunglass, the Honourable Quintin Hogg, Lord Lambton, Lord Balniel, and so on. But here there is a further danger, if this were acceptable, because a confusion might arise if a son, or even a grandson, refused to go down one (to use a colloquial expression), if it was the wish of his father to return to the other place or remain there. It would be very confusing, indeed, if there were two Lord Hartingtons, or even two Lord Burling-tons, whether in the other House or generally at large throughout the country.
My noble and learned friend the Lord Chancellor referred, at column 1007 of Hansard the other day, to persons in the entertainment world calling themselves "Lord This" or "Duke That". He said that there was no reason why these persons should not call themselves "Lord This" or "Duke That". But are we not in some danger of running up against the law as it may be when these words "all titles" are enacted? There is in another place a very admirable younger Member of Parliament entitled the Earl of Dalkeith. He may one day become the Duke of Buccleuch. He may not wish to leave another place. Is he entitled to call himself Duke Buccleuch—like Duke Ellington—without running up against the law?
I should like to ask my noble and learned friend point blank whether the title "Earl Sandwich, Esquire" or alternatively "Victor Montagu, Esquire, commonly known as the Earl of Sandwich", could be disputed at law following the enactment of Clause 3(1)(a)? There has been inconsistency, and some flippancy, in Government answers so far in both Houses, and I do
1488
not believe the Select Committee thought this matter out at all. There has been no authoritative judgment advanced either from the Government or from the authorities of this House, or from the College of Heralds, the Editor of Debrett, the Palace or whoever happens to be concerned—nothing whatever. A cat-and-mouth game is being played, and the fact that two of the mice are potential Prime Ministers renders it all the more undignified. If this word "titles" were taken out, I believe that it would at least give individuals an opportunity of basing their decision on what to call themselves in future in conformity with the law and not at variance from it.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I have listened with interest to my noble friend's speech in support of this Amendment. The first thing to get clear is precisely what the Bill does. It does not purport to take away from anyone something to which he is not in law entitled. The difference between a courtesy title and a title which is not a courtesy title is that there is in fact no legal right to a courtesy title. All we are seeking to do by Clause 3 is to secure what are the effects of a disclaimer. Clause 3(1)(a) therefore seeks
"to divest that person (and, if he is married, his wife) of all right or interest to or in the peerage, and all titles, rights, offices, privileges and precedence attaching thereto …"
It is operated only to divest him of those titles, rights, offices, privileges and precedence to which he is by law entitled. Therefore, it does not touch at all upon courtesy titles. What a Member of another House may call himself when he is inside or outside that other House is, I think, not really a matter for me. I said, in moving the Second Reading, that, provided there is no dishonesty attached to it, it is the law of this country that a person can call himself by what name he likes. All this Bill does is to make clear, so far as legal rights are concerned, what is the effect of a disclaimer. The legal right to "all titles" means, and means only, the titles to which a person is legally entitled. I think I made that perfectly clear in relation to this matter on Second Reading—at least I hope that I did. Though I dealt with it quite shortly, I endeavoured to make it clear.
LORD MOLSON: May I elucidate one point? Suppose the holder of an Earldom

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disclaimed it and thereby deprived himself of his courtesy title. Would his son still be entitled to the courtesy title? Surely he is entitled only if his father holds by law that title. Therefore, if the father has disclaimed, surely the son will be deprived of his courtesy title as well?
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: A courtesy title is a courtesy title and when the noble Lord talks about anyone being entitled to a courtesy title, it is a contradiction of terms. That is the short answer to the noble Lord. I hope I have made that quite clear. I was just going to say to the noble Lord who moved this Amendment that I was sorry to interrupt him, but the noble Lord has an Amendment down later dealing with Irish Peerages and I was a little confused by his reference to the noble Lord, Lord Turnour, whom we all know, because, of course, this particular clause deals only with the consequences of a disclaimer by a Peer. If we took out the word "titles", I do not know that it would materially alter the position, but I think that, from the point of view of drafting, it is desirable that we should have it in the clause, to make it as clear as we can what is the legal position, that we are dealing with titles to which Peers have legal right and with precedence, privileges and offices which are all matters of legal right.
LORD MOYNE: May I plead my ignorance, in order to draw further on the wisdom of the noble and learned Lord on this question? I am probably wrong, because I do not know much about this, but I have always understood that titles were in the father and that the word "courtesy" came in only as regards the courtesy of letting the son use one of his titles. I may be quite wrong about that, but I think that is what many people believe.
LORD SALTOUN: The noble and learned Lord rather knocked me off my perch, and I should like to explain my position to your Lordships in moving this Amendment. It is the case that an Irish Peer does not give up his title, if he stands for the House of Commons, and therefore Irish Peers are in a different position to other Peers in this respect. From time to time, we have heard many opinions expressed upon the
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Peerage from all quarters of the House, some of them, to my inferior intelligence, a good deal of nonsense, if I may say so. It seems to be felt by some people that elevation to a Peerage is a kind of trans-substantiation and makes you a different kind of person. That this is felt by some noble Lords when they become Peers is made fairly clear to me by some of their declarations. I have known noble Lords accept a Peerage and tell all their friends that it would make no difference: in fact, rather like Humpty Dumpty, they almost fell off the wall in their efforts to shake hands with Alice in order to show that they were not proud. I do not think that any person can be in your Lordships' House for very long and retain opinions of that kind.
If I were to take advantage of this Bill I should be ready to go back and call myself Alexander Fraser. The Alexander Frasers have done things of which I am just as proud as any that any Lord Saltoun has done. But the trouble is that as I have always gone about Scotland a great deal and am fairly well known I should find that people would always call me Lord Saltoun just the same, and I should find it impossible to divest myself of the title I bear, even if I took advantage of the Bill. I could not do it without a certain amount of bad manners. That is a point on which I think your Lordships are sensitive, because I know so many of your Lordships who are famous for your good manners. I feel I should find myself embarrassed if I had to correct everybody I talked to by telling them that I was not Lord Saltoun, but only Alexander Fraser. That was at the back of my mind when I moved the Amendment. I do not think it matters two straws, but I wanted to put it to your Lordships.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: I rise on a point of clarification. I am still not clear about this courtesy title position. Mention has been made of the Earl of Dalkeith. The Earl of Dalkeith, I understand, has no legal right to that name at all, but he is known as the Earl of Dalkeith, not only outside the House of Commons but inside the House of Commons as well, as I was known before my father died by the name which I understood he had lent to me. Suppose the noble Earl, Lord Sandwich, proposed

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to masquerade in the House of Commons under the alias of his own name, would that be all right? Not only that, but would he be referred to by Members of the House of Commons as "the noble Earl", or how would he be addressed?
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I endeavoured to anticipate that sort of question by saying that I thought this would be a matter for the other place to decide.
VISCOUNT GAGE: Arising out of that, suppose a Peer, having disclaimed, was described on election posters at an election by his present name, would that be a ground for being unseated if he should win?
THE EARL OF MANSFIELD: Surely, this is an attempt to get it both ways: that is to say, for a noble Lord to give up his seat here and go to another place but still be known by his title. If the noble Earl, Lord Sandwich, chooses to give up his seat here after this Bill becomes law, and finds a constituency to adopt him, and he is elected and goes to the other place, there is nothing to prevent him from changing his name by deed poll and calling himself the Earl of Sandwich—and whether the Sandwich in the new form would be more digestible to the House of Commons remains to be seen. I think this is an attempt to have the best of both worlds. As has been said by the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor, and by the noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury, no one is entitled to a courtesy title. The courtesy title is a subsidiary title held by the Peer himself, which at his discretion he may let his son use. In Scotland, it is sometimes not even a son. A cousin may use the courtesy title of "Master", because that in old Scottish law might mean something—
LORD SALTOUN: I beg the noble Earl's pardon, but perhaps he will allow me to interrupt. The title "Master" is not a courtesy title. It is not held by the holder of the main title. It is a real title on its own.
THE EARL OF MANSFIELD: If my noble friend had not interrupted me, I was going on to explain that that was the actual position, in which the so-called holder of the title of "Master" was, in
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the old Scottish Parliament, entitled to vote instead of his father or kinsman, as the case may be. It was applied to the next heir. That I believe to be the fact. But now we are having it brought forward that someone is to leave your Lordships' House, go to another place and still be known by the title which he used to bear here. Quite frankly, as I say, I think that is having the best of both worlds, and some way ought to be found of preventing it.
VISCOUNT STONEHAVEN: I am still in some doubt about the case of a Peer who disclaims but also happens to be a Baronet.
THE EARL OF MANSFIELD: May I draw the attention of my noble friend to Clause 3(1)(a), where it says:
"to divest that person … of all right or interest to or in the peerage, and all titles, rights, offices, privileges and precedents attaching thereto,"
The words, "attaching thereto" would, I think, cover the point.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I can confirm what my noble friend Lord Mansfield has said. I was going to draw the attention of my noble friend Lord Stonehaven to the fact that he had not read the concluding words of the paragraph.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: Does not this discussion expose the absolutely ludicrous character of the Government's proposal? Would it not be much better to allow the man to keep his title legally, as he is going to use it anyway, rather than to lay the Government open to all the absurd possibilities which have been adumbrated? It seems to me that we are going to get into the most terrible difficulties. The noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor said that it will be a matter for another place to decide. I really think it is a matter for the Government to decide.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: The noble Marquess put forward this proposal before the Joint Select Committee, and it was rejected by a majority of 15 to 4. The noble Marquess, quite rightly, at an earlier stage of our discussion today made a powerful plea to the noble Lord, Lord Boothby, with regard to his proposal, which had been discussed by

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the Joint Select Committee and was rejected by them. He then drew attention to the possibility that if the change proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Boothby, was carried into the Bill it might well have the result of the Bill being lost. I pray in aid those words of the noble Marquess in dealing with this particular Amendment. The word "blackmail" was used in relation to what the noble Marquess said. I do not wish to put pressure on any noble Lord—it would not be right for me to do so—but I think I should draw the attention of your Lordships to the possibility, to say the least, that if the decision of the Joint Select Committee on this by 15 to 4 against the noble Marquess was reversed by your Lordships' House, I do not think I should be putting it too highly to say that it would seem to me likely that this would put the Bill in peril.
Sometimes Bills are not entirely logical; and sometimes we leave these matters to people's discretion. I rather drew attention to this when I moved the Second Reading of the Bill and I pointed out that the effect of Clause 3 was to divest a Peer of all those titles, rights, offices, privileges and precedents to which he was by law entitled. I did comment on and draw attention to the courtesy titles, and I suggested then that I really thought it was quite impossible to legislate in relation to courtesy titles, but I thought it unlikely that anyone who was a Peer, and had of his own act deliberately divested himself of that Peerage, whether a Member of another place or not a Member, would wish still to pass under the title which he had and of which he had divested himself by his own voluntary act. I am afraid I do not hold out any hope of being able to find a form of words which would meet my noble friend's suggestion and which would not at the same time seriously imperil the prospects of this Bill. I must ask your Lordships to accept the position that it is right in Clause 3 to ensure that all the titles, rights, offices, privileges and precedence by law attaching to the peerage should be divested if a Peer chooses to disclaim.
I dealt then with the question about the difficulty, indeed the impossibility, of dealing by law with courtesy titles.
LORD LUCAS OF CHILWORTH: Would the Lord Chancellor clear my
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mind on one point? Is the title of Peeress a courtesy title, or a title in law?
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: If the Peeress is the wife of a Peer she has a legal right to it, and that is why you find Peeresses specifically referred to in line 33 on page 3 of the Bill.
LORD LUCAS OF CHILWORTH: When her husband disclaims, she loses her title?
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: Yes.
LORD BALFOUR OF BURLEIGH: Will the noble and learned Lord tell the Committee this? In the case of a noble Lord who has disclaimed in the circumstances he has described, and in which he is not to call himself by the title by which he always has been called, what is he to call himself?
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: That is a matter of choice for him.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: Might I say one word? The noble and learned Lord has suggested that I was behaving in an improper manner in what I have said.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: No.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: Well, I thought he did. He said that I had said at an earlier time that if noble Lords opposite and the noble Lord, Lord Boothby, pressed an Amendment which I thought upset the balance of the conclusions reached by the Select Committee, they would endanger the Bill. I hoped very much that they would accept that appeal, but they did not. They pushed it to a Division nevertheless. Does the noble and learned Lord suggest that I should behave in a different manner from what was regarded as quite legitimate for them?
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: If the noble Marquess—
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: I have not quite finished yet. I do not want to lose this Bill any more than anybody else. I think it was a difficult negotiation and a delicate balance, and if I am told that this will destroy the Bill I shall not press it. But I think it is an idiotic position for us to have reached.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I would be the last person to suggest that the noble Marquess was behaving in any way in an improper manner, and I do not think that what I said conveyed that impression. He is perfectly free to follow the example of the noble Lord, Lord Boothby, if he so wishes, and I could not possibly restrain him. All I was doing—and I thought it was fair debating—was to use his words against him in support of my answer to what he said on this occasion. I do not say it lightly, and I do not want to put pressure on. I cannot positively say what would be the reaction in another place if this Amendment were carried. But I think I am not putting it too highly in saying that it would at least create a very considerable risk of rejection of the whole measure. I do not think it would be right to put it higher than that, but that is the advice I have received, and I think it is right that I should communicate it to your Lordships.
LORD CONESFORD: I rise only because of what was said by my noble friend Lord Salisbury. He asked whether we expected him to behave quite differently from the noble Lord, Lord Boothby. The answer to that is, "Yes". The concluding words of the noble Lord, Lord Boothby, before proceeding to a Division, were almost exactly in the words of the philosopher Kant, translated, the definition of "immorality". The noble Lord advised those who agreed with him to follow him into the Division Lobby, saying that he would do nothing of the sort if he really feared that the majority of the House would take that view. Those who have studied ethics, and particularly Kant, will know that that gets very near to the definition of "immorality". Therefore, I say without the slightest hesitation to my noble friend that we expect him to behave quite differently from the noble Lord, Lord Boothby.
My noble and learned friend the Lord Chancellor has put forward what I think are conclusive reasons why the word "titles" is required in this clause. He has also pointed out, again quite rightly, the importance that the Select Committee attached to this subject. I must say that I feel some sympathy for my noble friend Lord Sandwich on a quite different ground—not because if he
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wishes to return to the House of Commons he will be deprived of the title of the Earl of Sandwich, but because he will apparently also be masquerading if he uses the title of Hinchingbrooke, which is the name by which he was known throughout the country and in the House of Commons when he sat there. Nevertheless, I think that in the House of Commons he probably appeared in the records under the name of "Montagu, generally known as Lord Hinchingbrooke". So perhaps the words of the Bill as they stand are not only right in carrying out the recommendation of the Select Committee but are not unreasonable in themselves.
LORD SALTOUN: If a title lapses for any reason, the courtesy title deriving from it must also lapse. I only rise to say that I do not propose to press this Amendment unless my noble friend Lord Sandwich wishes to do so. I raise it as an exploratory matter but, of course, if he wishes to press it, I am his man.
THE EARL OF SANDWICH: If noble Lords wish to carry on this debate and call a Division, it is up to them to do so. I hope to call a Division on a much more important topic in half an hour or so. This is so personal to me and so slender in itself that I would not dream of pressing it.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
LORD SALTOUN: I move this Amendment simply in order to ask a question. It is merely to cut out the word "precedence". Precedence depends on a great many other things besides Peerage. For example, does my friend Mackintosh take precedence over Lord Mackintosh? I do not know. He certainly does in an assembly of Mackintoshes. I have not had time to consult Garter. I should like to have an assurance of the limitation of this word. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 3, line 35, leave out ("privileges and precedence") and insert ("and privileges").—(Lord Saltoun.)
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I am glad the noble Lord has not asked me the question of who takes precedence in an assembly of Mackintoshes, because I should be quite unable to answer him.

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To what extent Peers' precedence is a matter of law is not altogether certain. Precedence of Peers among themselves in Parliament is covered by Statute. Precedence inter se of holders of Peerages in England, Scotland, Great Britain, Ireland and the United Kingdom is also dealt with by the Acts of Union of Scotland and Ireland. There does not appear to be any other statutory provision governing precedence of Peers, but the Joint Select Committee recommended that a Peer who had disclaimed should not be entitled to any precedence attached to the Peerage. Since it is at least arguable that even apart from the Act of 1539 and the Acts of Union a Peer's precedence is enjoyed as a legal right, it was thought necessary to refer expressly to precedence in the subsection.
THE EARL OF IDDESLEIGH: May I ask whether Her Majesty's Government have really faced the issue that a Peer who disclaims can walk into dinner after all his sons?
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I do not think that is a matter of law.
LORD SALTOUN: With your Lordships' permission, I ask leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
LORD SALTOUN: This Amendment is to ascertain whether or not a Peer who has disclaimed will have a vote for a Member of the House of Commons. It is not quite clear to me. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 3, line 39, after the second ("House") insert ("and disability to vote").—(Lord Saltoun.)
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I think I can give a short and positive answer to the noble Lord. The Bill as drafted, as the noble Lord will see, relieves the Peer
"of all obligations and disabilities (including any disqualification in respect of membership of the House of Commons and elections to that House)…"
The words "elections to that House" are certainly wide enough to include the disqualification from voting and, therefore, the noble Lord's Amendment is not necessary.
THE DUKE OF ATHOLL: Am I to understand from that that if this Peer who disclaims happens to live in a constituency outside that for which he is standing, he could then vote in an election for one of the candidates standing in the particular constituency in which he lives?
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: The answer is, Yes. He will have the same right of voting as a commoner once his name is on the register.
LORD SALTOUN: I moved the Amendment only because it was not clear to me that the elections did not refer to his own election to the House of Commons. But the noble and learned Lord has given me an assurance and, with your Lordships' permission, I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
LORD SALTOUN: This Amendment is rather a different one. I understand that Her Majesty the Queen has put at the disposal of Parliament her Prerogative in regard to Peerage. I do not know if that is true, but I have been told so. But this clause seems to me to go unnecessarily far in interfering with Her Majesty's Prerogative. It makes it illegal to create an hereditary Peerage in favour of somebody who has already disclaimed. It does not make it illegal to create a Life Peerage and it does not interfere with the succession, and I really do not know whether there is any special reason for this. I am asking the Government therefore whether this is going rather further than necessary in limiting the Royal Prerogative in respect of this matter. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 3, line 43, leave out subsection (2).—(Lord Saltoun.)
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: The noble Lord has moved an Amendment which deals not only with hereditary Peerages but also with writs in acceleration. He wants that left out as well. He did not mention writs in acceleration, and I therefore need not touch upon them. This particular point was raised in your Lordships' House on Second Reading, and the arguments are fairly evenly balanced so far as the point raised by the noble Lord is concerned.

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The difficulty here is that this Bill has reached your Lordships' House with this matter having been fully considered by another House and with this proposal contained in it. I think it was the noble Lord, Lord Rea, who at Second Reading commented upon this proposal as questioning the discretion of Her Majesty in the exercise of her Prerogative. I think one reason which led to this proposal being put forward was the thought that it would enable a Peer to disclaim a Peerage on terms that, after a given period of service in the Commons, he should be able to be reinstated in his former hereditary Peerage and given the same title as that which he previously disclaimed.
So far as I am aware, the view is strongly held that the exercise of any such power would be undesirable, but I am not seeking to defend this provision on the grounds of logic. Indeed, it is one of those proposals on which different views may well be held, but I do feel that it would be right to leave the Bill as it now stands and I do not really think I can say any more than I have already said to the noble Lord in relation to this particular part of the Bill. But I have listened with interest to what has been said on this particular point. I think everyone must recognise that, logically, there is very considerable force in what the noble Lord, Lord Rea, said on Second Reading and, if my memory serves me aright, also in what the noble Marquess said. I was impressed with the argument when I heard it then.
My difficulty here is that, in accepting any proposal for a change, I am nervous about what the repercussions may be on this particular matter, on which I am told opinions are strongly held. That being so, I am in difficulty—and I will be quite frank to the noble Lord—about making any promise. But I will certainly give further consideration with my colleagues to the question if that be the view of your Lordships.
LORD REA: I think that the noble and learned Lord's position and difficulty are well understood, and he has mentioned the question of the Royal Prerogative. Before we leave this matter—and I take it that the noble Lord, Lord Saltoun, will probably withdraw this Amendment—I think it should be under-
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lined that it is not merely logic, it is equity. People in favour of this Bill, and people in favour of interpreting it in a very wide way, have made great play on the fact that a Peer who disclaims his Peerage should have all the privileges of a real commoner of our country—and and these are great privileges—and that they should have every privilege that every other commoner has. This one thing in the Bill prohibits a Peer from enjoying the full privileges of a commoner, and I think that that fact ought to be recognised.
LORD AIREDALE: In particular, one of the privileges of a commoner at the present time is that if he succeeds in becoming Prime Minister, when he comes to retire from that great office he usually, by custom, has an Earldom conferred upon him. Under this subsection a young man who had disclaimed a Peerage, perhaps at the age of twenty-five, and who succeeded in becoming Prime Minister would not be able to have the customary Earldom conferred upon him when he retired from the office of Prime Minister.
LORD CLITHEROE: For a number of reasons which have already been stated, I hope that the Government will be persuaded to take out this particular subsection and, if they do not want to do so this afternoon, will do so at the next stage.
LORD SALTOUN: On the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Airedale, I think this is a case for another equity drafting to be equal to the occasion, because your Lordships will remember that in the case of Benjamin Disraeli that difficulty was rather got over. I propose to ask your Lordships' leave to withdraw the Amendment, and I do it with more pleasure because this is a real Brandenburger Tour of a clause through which you can drive a coach and horses any time you like; because you can make a man a Life Peer and, as far as a writ of acceleration is concerned, you can make his son a Life Peer, so it really does not make much difference. 'I beg leave to withdraw this Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 3 agreed to.
Clause 4 [Scottish peerages]:
5.9 p.m.
THE EARL OF SANDWICH THE EARL OF SANDWICH moved, after "Scotland" to insert "and the peerage of Ireland". The noble Earl

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said: I am afraid the large topic of the Irish Peerage will take rather longer to introduce to your Lordships than previous Amendments, but I will encompass the arguments within as brief a period as possible. I ask leave to take Amendment No. 15 at the same time as this one for purposes of discussion. The object of this Amendment is, by adding the words "and the peerage of Ireland" to Clause 4, to enable Irish Peers to come here as Irish Peers, just as Scottish Peers are enabled to come here as Scottish Peers. The Amendment does not envisage the electoral process for Ireland, nor the creation of United Kingdom Peerages for Trish Peers. Amendment No. 15 is consequential, in the sense that it strikes out the provision for allowing Irish Peers to be eligible for the other place, so as to avoid the incompatibility of double service.
I have to maintain again, as I did on Second Reading, that this is again a result of a "package deal", words to which we are now directed by the noble and learned Viscount the Leader of the House, instead of my belief that it was a sordid Party bargain, as I explained to your Lordships on the previous occasion. I have referred to the words of the noble Viscount the Lord President: he is the last person with whom I want to have a contest, but he did say a "package deal".
LORD BOOTHBY: If I may interrupt the noble Earl, he was careful to amend that. He said that it was not a "package deal"; he said it was a "package". I asked him the difference, and he was not very clear, but he said there was a difference—something about a Christmas present. He did say "package", and not "package deal".
THE EARL OF SANDWICH: The noble Viscount said that if we referred to Hansard we should find that he had said "package" and not "package deal". I referred to Hansard and found that he said "package deal". He subsequently amended it, and we must accept that. Anyway, I will call it a "package deal". The Joint Select Committee were prepared to admit 16 Scots, but no more, to your Lordships' House. I suppose the Labour Party could not resist 16 more hereditary Peers, but they felt that 70 on top of that—or 69 to be exact—was just about
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too much; and so they struck hard on another point with the authorities on this side of the House, and the package deal emerged. There is no argument in the Report in favour of the exclusion of Irish Peers. All it says—it is on page 21—is:
"Paragraph 10 is read and agreed to."
No Amendments occurred in the disputations of the Joint Select Committee—no sign of any argument; they simply brushed it aside—a feeble effort, on the whole, as I have sought to explain to your Lordships.
The history of the Irish Peerage appears in a Memorandum by Lord Dunboyne. It is a long Memorandum and I do not propose to quote extensively from it, but perhaps I may be allowed to take out a few sentences. He says:
"History alone can explain their present dilemma."
The dilemma of the Irish Peers.
From the start the Peers of Ireland, like those of England but not of Scotland, owed the loyalty of their allegiance and the creation of their peerages to English sovereignty. From the thirteenth century the House of Lords in 'Ireland and that in England developed along broadly parallel lines. Then in 1800 the Irish counterpart was abolished and Peers of Ireland were consequently deprived of their traditional right to a scat, voice and vote in the House of Lords of their Sovereign. To make amends, the Fourth Article of the Union with Ireland Act provided that twenty-eight lords temporal of Ireland, elected for life by the Peers of Ireland, shall be the number to sit and vote on the part of Ireland in the House of Lords of the United Kingdom."
Then there follows a long passage in which Lord Dunboyne deals with the rusting machinery of election in Ireland ever since 1919. He goes on:
"This year of 1962"—
that was when he wrote the Memorandum—
"is then the first year in the seven centuries of their history in which the Peers of Ireland are without representation in the House of Lords of the Crown which conferred their peerages. About seventy Peers who hold no collateral peerage entitling them to a summons to the Lords are so affected; in many a case he is the successor of a long line of illustrious ancestors who have rendered loyal service to the Crown as Peers of the Realm."
On March 28 this year in your Lordships' House the Chairman of the Joint Select Committee, the noble Earl, Lord Kilmuir, wrote off the Irish case very briefly, almost in one sentence. I have

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given him notice that I am going to criticise his utterances and I have received a charming telegram from him in reply. He said, in the first place, that some Irish Peers lived in the Republic of Ireland, as if that was a rather wicked thing to do. But I should have thought it was more relevant to consider those who live in the Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. And I make out that there are 43 Irish Peers who give their principal addresses in the United Kingdom and 19 in Eire. The rest show addresses further overseas or no address at all.
In the next half-sentence the noble Earl, Lord Kilmuir, said that some were descendants of Peers who composed the Upper House of the Irish Parliament, as if that was a fatal disability to their appearance here. But the Act of Union of 1800 abolished the Irish Parliament and created the Irish Representative Peerage in this House. So that, if anything were to be done, I should have thought we should return to the status quo ante now that the machinery is rusted and died away. In view of the fact that the Earl of Kilmorey, the last Irish Peer, died a year or so ago, I should have thought we should have restored the status quo ante and restored the Peerage of Ireland to its rightful position. Logic and justice, it seems to me, require a return to that status.
The noble Earl, Lord Kilmuir, said in the next sentence that some Peers were made Irish Peers because they themselves did not want to sit, or someone else did not want them to sit, in your Lordships' House. That may have been true. That applies presumably to those who were made Peers before 1800, since after 1800 they could have been made Representative Peers in this House. I have done a little sum, and I find that 50 Peers may or may not be in this category. Twenty were created in or after 1800, which gives an admitted majority in favour of Lord Kilmuir's argument; but it is by no means an overwhelming consideration. Moreover, the 28 Representative Peers who have sat here since 1800 invade the principle contained in the argument of the Chairman of the Joint Select Committee. Finally, the noble Earl, Lord Kilmuir, said [OFFICIAL REPORT, Vol. 248 (No. 63), col. 288]:
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"One comes to the conclusion that the Irish Peerage is such a cluster of anomalies that no guidance really comes out from the various points to show any lines on which reform can be made …"
That was just the situation which faced a certain court in Venice, when a famous advocate spoke about the "quality of mercy" and got judgment for the defendant by means of a loophole in the law—or, to be more correct, a scruple in the balance. I am sorry that Lord Kilmuir and his Committee do not seem to be interested in the slightest degree in a drop of Irish blood. I am not in this matter asking for a mercy judgment; I am asking only for a right judgment.
In the Second Reading debate the other day, in which I started my speech with a reference to this subject, Lord Morrison of Lambeth interrupted me to ask how I would get over the fact that Eire is not part of the United Kingdom. I replied that there are many Peers who derive their titles from lands and languages far removed from the United Kingdom. I was not thinking particularly about Peers of the Royal blood, or of Royal connection of German origin, nor was I thinking of ordinary Peers of Italian, Huguenot or even Norman descent—I am one of the latter myself, though somewhere in the green fields of Northamptonshire in the Middle Ages the connections went slightly awry. I am thinking of Peers—and they are in this House, or could be in this House—who do not claim, or who only partly claim, a United Kingdom hereditament or place of registration, and who live a great deal, if not the whole, of the time outside this Island altogether.
On the right side of the dividing line there are those with listed United Kingdom Peerages: Lord Twining of Tanganyika and Godalming; Lord Beaver-brook, of Beaverbrook, Canada and Cherkley; Lord Bruce of Melbourne, and Westminster Gardens; Lord Casey, of Victoria and the City of Westminster—that is not Victoria along the street, but Victoria. Australia; Lord Coutanche, of Jersey and the City of Westminster. The City of Westminster seems to be a most desirable repository for Peers' connections. Lord Talbot de Malahide, of County Dublin; Lord Templemore of County Dublin; Lord de Freyne of Sligo—they all have established and written up United Kingdom

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Peerages, and they are on the right side of the law. Then there are some Peers on the borderline whose United Kingdom status is not indicated in the books of reference. I wonder why that is. Either it does not exist, or there has been a slip up, or they may conceivably have failed to establish it, or it has not been questioned. They are Lord De Saumerez of Guernsey; the Marquess of Sligo, of County Mayo; Lord Holmpatrick of County Dublin and Lord Shaughnessy of Montreal and County Limerick.
Finally, there are two Peers in this House who live abroad in independent sovereign republics and are not English, Scottish, Irish or United Kingdom Peers and have no United Kingdom place of registration. They are Lord Sinha of Raipur, India, and Lord de Villiers of Wynberg, Cape of Good Hope. Are we to suppose that these two Peers are freaks, who cannot be cited as a precedent for the admission of other Peers? Are they believed to be worthier for attendance in this House than 43 Irishmen who live here, some of them in London, and 19 who live in Eire? The refusal to admit to this House the Earl of Bandon, K.B.E., D.S.O., Commander, Allied Land Forces, Western Europe, stands beside the right of Lord Sinha to come here from neutralist India at any time he pleases.
LORD MOYNE: Lord Sinha is always here. He is one of the best attenders in your Lordships' House. That of course, vindicates what is being said by the noble Earl, Lord Sandwich.
LORD SALTOUN: Anybody who knows the history of the Sinha Peerage knows the history of something of which everybody in your Lordships' House ought to be particularly proud.
THE EARL OF SANDWICH: Your Lordships must not, please, imagine that I am casting aspersions in any degree upon the character or attainments of Lord Sinha. I think my words stand. He may be living here at this moment. He has an address in India, and he no doubt goes to it from time to time. I am told, though I have not established the fact—I think it would be a little invidious to make such researches—that he puts in for the expenses of his journey.
LORD AMULREE: If I may interrupt the noble Earl for a moment, I do not believe that Lord Sinha does put in for the expenses. I tried to secure that those expenses should be paid to him, but they have been refused every time I have mentioned the point. I should like to correct that impression on the part of the noble Earl.
THE EARL OF SANDWICH: I am grateful to the noble Lord for establishing that fact, and I am glad to withdraw the reference to that part of what I have said. But I think my words are correct when I say that he is entitled to come here from neutralist India. Those words cannot be disregarded; let them stand. Lord de Villiers, a Peerage created in 1910, could come from estranged South Africa. I do not believe he ever does. He can come here if he likes, but he would have to go through the process of a Writ of Summons. Lord Dunboyne, a Peerage created in 1324, who lives in London, cannot come to your Lordships' House. India, South Africa and Ireland are all republics. They all were formerly Her Majesty's territories. None is now Her Majesty's territory, except in so far as India acknowledges the Queen as Head of the Commonwealth. All these three countries would seem to qualify, under the British Nationality Act, 1948, for Peerages created in those territories, for admission to your Lordships' House. Appendix 5 of the Joint Select Committee Report, sent in by the Official Group, whoever they may be, expressly states—and I quote:
"Whatever may have been the position before 1948, it is clear that under the British Nationality Act, 1948, Section 31, Schedule 4, Part I, and the Ireland Act, 1949 Section 3(1)(b) an Irish Peer who was a citizen of Eire would not now be disqualified from membership of the House of Lords on grounds of alienage."
I have tried to answer Lord Morrison of Lambeth's question to me in the Second Reading debate. It is clear that the way is wide open to test the Irish Peers' case, more particularly if the debarring words in Clause 5 are removed. I should be quite prepared to stop at that. I am not suggesting that the Irish Pears should form a posse and rush the doors of your Lordships' Chamber, in the sense that was agreeable at one time to Mr. Wedgwood Benn. It would,

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I think, be a little more seemly if they tested the position in the courts. The effect of the Amendment of Clause 4 which I am now moving would be to anticipate that judgment in the courts and to declare the law as I believe it should be and as it ought to be. But I am quite prepared to take guidance from your Lordships as to whether it would not be better to leave it for a court case to determine the issue, as was done in the Wedgwood Benn affair, and to legislate thereafter if necessary.
But I hope that your Lordships will decide to do something to this Bill. Parliament is not at the moment very popular. It is supposed to be a rubber stamp for the executive and its agencies, and one of the agencies I believe to have been the Joint Select Committee in these particular circumstances. The edicts of a Joint Select Committee are not compulsive doctrine to be absorbed by your Lordships. They are not the sole diet upon which we all feed. I hope that your Lordships will swallow the little morsels I have held out to you and go away satisfied.
Amendment moved—
Page 4, Line 16, after ("Scotland") insert ("and the peerage of Ireland")—(The Earl of Sandwich.)
VISCOUNT MASSEREENE AND FERRARD: I support the noble Earl in his arguments, and as I hold Irish and United Kingdom Peerages I feel rather strongly on this matter. I was always brought up to understand that if one held an Irish Peerage one represented the whole of Ireland, the North and the South. I do not see that the fact that the South of Ireland is a Republic has anything to do with the matter at all. The Peerage of Ireland was created by the Crown, and the fact that two-thirds of Ireland is a Republic has, so far as I can see, no bearing at all on the rights of the Peerage of Ireland to be represented in this House.
The noble Earl has explained this matter very fully but I should like to point out that Halsbury's Laws of England points out that any Representative Peer of Ireland in this House is not a Representative Peer of the Republic of Ireland or of Northern Ireland, but of the Peerage of Ireland. As the noble Earl pointed out, Article 4 of the Act of Union with Ireland of 1800 states that
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28 Lords temporal are to be elected to represent the Peerage of Ireland in the United Kingdom. It seems quite illogical if we are now going to have the Scottish Peers in this House that we cannot have the Irish Peers. I quite appreciate that Her Majesty's Government probably do not wish to increase the hereditary element in this House, but, to be fair, if one is to allow in all the Scottish Peers I maintain one has to allow in the Irish Peers, too.
The noble Earl said that there are only 69 Irish Peers who will be affected by this. The Peers in this House total something like 900-odd, of whom a third, at the most, attend this House. Therefore, if the Irish Peers are allowed in I cannot see more than 20, at the most, attending this House from Ireland. So it is not really going to swell the numbers in this Chamber to a great degree. But I should also point out that three-quarters of these Irish Peers reside in England, and also own land in England. In fact, far more land in Ireland is owned by English Peers and United Kingdom Peers than by Irish Peers. I support the noble Earl in this Amendment, and if he takes it to a Division I shall vote for it. I believe that if one excludes the Irish Peers from this House it will be the poorer, because one will be excluding a great deal of Celtic wit, charm and knowledge. I support this Amendment fully.
LORD MOYNE: I should like very strongly to support this Amendment. So much has been said so eloquently that I shall add very little; but I have always understood that I had the right to stand for the Senate in Ireland. I have been told so. I have not done so because I am not industrious enough to wish to sit in two places. I cannot see why this Amendment should not be allowed, to give effect to the mutual rights of voting and sitting which prevail between our two countries. It seems to me quite wrong that the Irish Peers, who derive rights from the time when Ireland was part of this country—but who of course have no part in the present political constitution of Ireland by virtue of their Peerages—should not be allowed to come here. I should also point out that, naturally, they would have to swear the Oath of Allegiance. Some might not be prepared to do that; others would. I

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agree with my noble friend Lord Sandwich that the noble Lord, Lord Sinha, is a magnificent example of the way somebody who belongs to a Republic can still take part in the proceedings of this House and can be a magnificent attender. I feel that there is nothing more I can add, except to repeat my very strong support of this Amendment in order to remove what I feel is a very great injustice. It has been lying buried for many years, but I think it ought to be dug out and put right.
5.38 p.m.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I have listened with interest to the arguments advanced by my noble friend Lord Sandwich and by my noble friends who have just spoken. They have indicated that they would not hesitate to support this Amendment. I hope that they will glance at it more carefully before they finally reach a decision to do that, because the Amendment has a somewhat curious effect in relation to the holders of Peerages in Scotland. If your Lordships will look at Clause 4 you will see that it says:
"The holder of a peerage in the peerage of Scotland shall have the same right to receive writs of summons to attend the House of Lords … as the holder of a peerage in the peerage of the United Kingdom …".
The noble Earl has moved an Amendment to insert words of limitation—to insert after "Scotland" the words "and the peerage of Ireland". So it is only if you are a holder of both Peerages at the same time. This is what the Amendment does, and this is the Amendment for which your Lordships are being asked to vote. Clause 5 deals with quite a different matter. I am going to meet the argument which my noble friend addressed to the Committee at some length, but I thought it right to draw your Lordships' attention immediately to what this Amendment purports to do. There can be no dispute about that.
So far as the question that he raised is concerned, he seems, if I may say so respectfully to him, to found his argument on a number of anomalies. I am not going to debate to-day the interesting question just on merits, as to whether Members of the Irish Peerage should now be admitted to your Lordships' House. It would be a very radical change in the present Constitution. The Joint
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Select Committee, who were criticised by my noble friend Lord Sandwich, had before them memoranda dealing with this question. I have not the least doubt that all members of the Committee, including my noble and learned friend Lord Kilmuir, gave the most careful attention to what was said. I am sorry that my noble friend thought it would advance his argument to criticise what the noble Earl, Lord Kilmuir, said in Second Reading. I myself did not think it did so. But all those arguments were, I am sure, fully considered by the Joint Select Committee; and in paragraph 10 of their Report they said this:
"After giving careful attention to the problem, that Committee"—
that refers to the Committee of the previous Session—
"were not in favour of the revival of any form of representation for the Peerage of Ireland in the House of Lords nor of any scheme for the surrender by Irish Peers of their Peerages. That Committee considered, however, that Peers of Ireland should be accorded the same status as commoners with regard to the House of Commons of the United Kingdom."
The Committee went on to say, in paragraph 11:
"The Committee have now given the matter further consideration"—
and they go on to make their recommendations which are in accordance with the provisions of this Bill. So the matter has been twice considered and fully considered; and it was considered in this House when we debated the Report of the Joint Select Committee.
I must advise your Lordships to resist these proposals. The effect, of course, would be to increase the hereditary element in your Lordships' House by about 70 Irish Peers. I have no doubt myself that such a substantial increase of the Members who are entitled, as holders of hereditary Peerages, to come to this House would be unacceptable to a considerable number of people; and, I should have thought, unacceptable in any House which has already considered the provisions of this measure. It is for those reasons that I must ask your Lordships now to resist the Amendment moved by my noble friend. He deployed all the arguments, and I hope he will not think that I am guilty of any discourtesy if I do not deal with them seriatim, because I think that

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would only occupy the time of your Lordships' House to no avail. Because at the end of the day, this Bill having been considered in the other House and having come here, I should have to advise your Lordships not to make at this stage such a radical change in the constitution of your Lordships' House.
LORD CLITHEROE: May I just add one word? I have the greatest sympathy with the views that have been expressed in regard to the Irish Peers. But I accept what the Lord Chancellor has just said: that this would make so drastic a change as not to be acceptable in another place. Personally, that would not worry me at all, because I would not mind if this Bill did not go through. But that is not the view of the greater number of your Lordships, and therefore I think the Committee would probably be wise to accept the Lord Chancellor's advice.
The Irish Peers have been under serious disadvantages for a very long time. Not only have they not been allowed to sit in this House, but they have also been prevented from electing their representatives to sit here; and they have been prevented even from voting for an elected Member of Parliament in the House of Commons. That is to be remedied by Clause 5 of this Bill, and I am glad, at least, that that disability is removed from Irish Peers who live in this country. There is one small crumb of comfort that I can offer to Irish Peers; and that is, that they are not caught by Clause 3, which we were just recently discussing. So if the noble Earl, Lord Longford, or the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, or the noble Viscount, Lord Massereene and Ferrard, wanted to go to the House of Commons and stand for election there, they could call themselves by their own names.
VISCOUNT MASSEREENE AND FERRARD: May I just point out that, under Article 4 of an English Act of George III, any dispute over the Irish Peers has to be decided by the House of Lords only? Therefore, that Act would appear to rule that the Committee of both Houses has been out of order on this matter.
EARL ALEXANDER OF HILLSBOROUGH: I should have thought that
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the noble Viscount would remember that there have been Parliament Acts since then which have interfered quite seriously with the powers of the Lords.
THE EARL OF SANDWICH: I can hardly thank the Lord Chancellor for the answer he has given to me. He started off with a narrow little point, a point of fact, and I suppose of substance, if it was a fact at all; that by substituting the word "and" for the word "or" I brought about a terrible result which I did not envisage. If there were any chance of getting this Amendment through I would seek your Lordships' leave to change the word "and" to "or", which would put the situation quite right, and would reassure the Lord Chancellor and his office. I can imagine some little clerk in the office who would be absolutely ecstatically—
SEVERAL NOBLE LORDS: Order, order!
THE EARL OF SANDWICH: If your Lordships deem this to be out of order, I will—
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: If the noble Earl will forgive me, I do not think he ought to accuse any of my officials. I would also say this to him, that there were other more numerous and more technical objections that I could have detailed to the form of drafting that he put forward.
THE EARL OF SANDWICH: These are observations that are well known, well recognised and frequently used in another place. I apologise to your Lordships if you have special rules of nicety here which I have not yet learnt to understand. The Lord Chancellor then went on to say that he would deal with the arguments, that he was not resting himself on this narrow point, but would deal with the arguments which I produced. He hardly spoke for another three minutes before he refused to deal with them, and said there was not time, it was too late in the Bill, the thing had been arranged, it had gone through another House. What is your Lordships' House for, but to make Amendments to legislation and to stand up on its own feet and do something for a change, instead of dotting the i's and crossing the t's of everything which comes from another place? Has this House any meaning

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left in it at all? Does it attempt to excite public interest except as a place of baubles? The only cogent argument which it seems to me the Lord Chancellor used, was his reference—and it was also used by the noble Lord, Lord Clitheroe—to the fact that a drastic change would take place in your Lordships' House if our 70 Irish Peers were admitted here. I am told that some of them are too old and too mean, and too sad and too tired ever to think of such a thing. Perhaps only twenty or thirty, as my noble friend on my left said, would come here, and that is about all.
The Scotsmen seem to be more alive and more active. They at least go to Holyrood House once a Parliament and elect somebody, so admitting sixteen Scotsmen will probably bring sixteen persons here. The Labour Party can envisage sixteen Scotsmen coming here, but they cannot envisage twenty or thirty Irishmen. They have been campaigning for years for the admission of Life Peers, and they have now got 40 of them. That has all happened in a very short time. Why boggle at another twenty or thirty Irish Peers? Where is your Lordships' consideration? It seems to me to be madness that you do not see the strength and purpose of the argument and have sympathy and understanding for these people in their predicament.
However, I understand that efforts will be made by the body of Irish Peers to take some action to test their circumstances in the courts. I only regret terribly that we are disabling them further by passing the words in this Clause 5. If your Lordships would only relegate that into limbo for a time it would at least give them an opportunity of testing their position. Wedgwood Benn tests his position all right: rushes the doors of the House of Commons, is restrained. Do your Lordships think the Irish Peers are going to behave like that, and come in in this way? It will be a much more dignified proceeding which they will establish if they want to put their claim and their case. I have every intention of carrying this Amendment to a Division, and I only hope that natural sympathy for the case of the Irish Peers will result in as many of your Lordships as possible coming into
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the Lobby to give them encouragement, hope and faith for the future.
EARL ALEXANDER OF HILLSBOROUGH: All I would say is this before the Question is put. If there were any real sympathy for the Irish Peers, I should have thought that the noble Earl, Lord Sandwich, has done his very best to destroy that sympathy by the manner of his speech and by his undue references to honoured Members and servants of the State that we have in this House—although, personally, I have always been against the hereditary system, and will continue to be so. His remarks with regard to Lord Sinha have greatly offended many of the Members of this House who, like the noble Earl, have also been Members of another place and know something about the modern history and development of our democracy. Lord Sinha's father was created a Peer of the Realm when India was part of the Empire and, apart from his other services to the State, was an Under-Secretary of State for India in a Government of this country and I think it is an absolutely wrong thing for the noble Earl, in spite of all his claims to Norman descent, to come here and use such language in order to try to advance his case for the Irish Peers, when he knows perfectly well that such disabilities as those under which the Irish Peers have suffered (which I do not want to go into to-day) have been there for a very long time.
When he charges the Labour Party with having been participants in a "package deal", it may be that he can say that in words, but in fact he has no right then to make a charge of undue haste on the part of my noble friend by right of Peerage, Lord Stansgate, who is wanting to do what the noble Earl has professed he wants to do—to go back and remain in the Commons. He has no right to make the sort of remarks he has made about him here this afternoon. I hope everybody who likes the proper presentation of a case in this House of Peers, whatever his particular Party views may be, will resent the manner in which Lord Sandwich has presented his case, and will vote against him.
THE EARL OF SANDWICH: The noble Earl has imported a great deal of passion, prejudice and suspicion into my

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allegations, as he calls them, about Lord Sinha. I said nothing whatever about Lord Sinha except that he was entitled to come here at any time he pleased, from India. Noble Lords then said, "He is living here now", and then a noble Lord over there said, "I tried to get him his expenses from India". Why should he not have his expenses from India? Why should he not live in India? Why should he not come here when he likes, from India? I have said nothing more than that. It is the noble Earl, whose mind is tortuous and twisted on this matter, who has put into his own
6.0 p.m.
THE EARL OF PERTH THE EARL OF PERTH moved, to leave out Clause 4, and insert the following new clause:
Increase in number of Scottish Representative Peers
"4. The number of Scottish peers to be elected to sit and vote in the House of Lords shall on and after the commencement of this Act be increased from sixteen to twenty, and
mind thoughts on my part about Lord Sinha which I never expressed, and I call upon him to apologise here and now.
EARL ALEXANDER OF HILLSBOROUGH: I am quite content to stand by the printed word to-morrow, as to what the noble Earl said, and I shall continue to do more honour to Lord Sinha than to the noble Earl.
5.55 p.m.
On Question, Whether the said Amendment (No. 13) shall be agreed to?
Their Lordships divided: Contents, 5; Not-Contents, 90.

CONTENTS

Gosford, E.

Massereene and Ferrard, V. [Teller.]

Moyne, L.

Lilford, L.

Sandwich, E. [Teller.]

NOT-CONTENTS

Addison, V.

Falmouth, V.

Milverton, L.

Ailwyn, L.

Faringdon, L.

Molson, L.

Airedale, L.

Ferrers, E.

Morrison, L.

Albemarle, E.

Ferrier, L.

Napier and Ettrick, L.

Alexander of Hillsborough, E.

Forster of Harraby, L.

Nathan, L.

Ampthill, L.

Fortescue, E.

Perth, E.

Amulree, L.

Fraser of North Cape, L.

Robertson of Oakridge, L.

Attlee, E.

Grenfell, L.

Rusholme, L.

Auckland, L.

Haddington, E.

St. Just, L.

Balfour of Burleigh, L.

Hanworth, V.

Saltoun, L.

Barnby, L.

Hastings, L.

Shackleton, L.

Bossom, L.

Hawke, L.

Shepherd, L.

Boston, L.

Henderson, L.

Silkin, L.

Brocket, L.

Hertford, M.

Simonds, V.

Carrington, L.

Hodson, L.

Sinclair, L.

Champion, L.

Horsbrugh, B.

Sinha, L.

Cholmondeley, M.

Iddesleigh, E.

Stamford, E.

Colyton, L.

Lawson, L.

Stonehaven, V.

Conesford, L.

Lindgren, L.

Stonham, L.

Coutanche, L.

Long, V.

Strabolgi, L.

Crathorne, L.

Lothian, M. [Teller.]

Strang, L.

Croft, L.

Lucan, E.

Summerskill, B.

Crook, L.

Lucas of Chilworth, L.

Swanborough, B.

Darwen, L.

Mabane, L.

Swinton, E.

Denham, L. [Teller.]

MacAndrew, L.

Taylor, L.

Derwent, L.

McCorquodale of Newton, L.

Todd, L.

Dilhorne, L. (L. Chancellor.)

Mancroft, L.

Vestey, L.

Douglas of Barloch, L.

Mansfield, E.

Waleran, L.

Ebbisham, L.

Margesson, V.

Williams, L.

Eccles, L.

Merthyr, L.

Wolverton, L.

Resolved in the negative, and Amendment disagreed to accordingly.

accordingly for any references to sixteen peers in the enactments mentioned in Schedule (Enactments concerning entitlement and election of Scottish Representative Peers) to this Act there shall be substituted references to twenty peers."
The noble Earl said: With the Committee's permission, as it is rather late in the evening I should like to move as one this Amendment and the Amendments in my name which come later. They are not really consequential; but my reason for moving that the number

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of Scottish Representative Peers be increased from 16 to 20 is that I want to make allowances for Scottish Peeresses. Therefore I wish to address the Committee at this time on all the various Amendments I have put. Before I go into the reasons why I want our system of election to remain, I wish to deal with two points which came up on Second Reading when the noble and learned Viscount the Leader of the House seemed to imply that my reason for moving these Amendments was a personal one, in that I and those who supported me would be ensured of a seat in the next elections. I think that a moment's reflection will show that, if I had that in mind, the simplest way to achieve my end is by not suggesting this at all; because under this clause I automatically have my right to a seat in the House. So I hope we can discard that as one of the reasons behind my action in moving this Amendment.
The second point I want to deal with—and it is on the negative side—arose when this clause was considered in another place. It was thought that in some way this will do grave injustice, political injustice, to individuals, and in another place they felt that if there were injustice to individuals, and particularly political injustice, that must be removed. I would accept that if there were grave political injustice it should be removed. But what are the facts in this case? I am certainly ready to accept that the Scottish Representative Peers should be in exactly the same position as any other Peers in regard to the disclaimer; so that Scottish Representative Peers can disclaim in the same way as anybody else. And if my Amendment does not give effect to this, then I hope it will be changed to put that right.
What is left to the Scottish Peer if he does not want to disclaim? There are, at present, 31 of us, and, if the Peeresses are admitted, there will be 38. Those 38 will, if my Amendment is accepted, have the opportunity of electing 20 of their number to represent them and Scotland in this House. They will have the, chance both to elect and to stand as candidates. This election is not just once and for all; it takes place at the same time as any other Parliamentary election, so the individual concerned has his opportunity not only to vote but to stand as a candidate at each time there is a General Election in the same way
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as is the case with anybody else who has the right to vote. I think from the political viewpoint he is going to suffer no great injustice or hardship. Not only does he have the right at the time of the General Election; he also can stand, if has has been unsuccessful in the first election, when there is a by-election.
Indeed, I first came to this House as a result of a by-election; and it was rather an historical by-election, because, there we were, all of us at the Palace of Holyrood on either side of the long table in the Long Gallery with the various kings of Scotland looking down on the ceremony and the public watching the performance. At the end of the election there was a tie; and then the Lord Clerk Register, fortunately for me, gave his casting vote and I came as one of the representatives of Scotland. Incidentally, the office of Lord Clerk Register, one of the high offices in Scotland, which has this particular function to perform, will fall into disuse if the proposal goes through that there will no longer be elections for Scottish Peers. That, to put it no higher, would be a pity; because it is one of the oldest and highest offices of Scotland.
I have tried to show that there is no grave political injustice in what I propose: namely, that the elections should continue. Why am I moving this Amendment? Why do I want only 20 of our number representing Scotland, as opposed to the advantage of possibly 37? What is wrong with the other 17? Would they not be a reinforcement? Would it not be better if they came when they felt like it and spoke in the House? I must admit that in logic there is no argument. On the basis of arithmetic, 37 is better than 20. But this is only on paper and in logic: in practice, I believe—and I believe it very firmly—the result is quite different. I must justify that statement, because if I fail to convince your Lordships that in practice the effect is quite different, there is no real cause for your Lordships to support me, as I hope you may.
What is this practice? I can go back only a little way—say, over the last 25 years. During that time we have seen in every one of the elections we have had only one or two candidates who have failed to be elected. It may be that only 18 stand for the 16 seats. So, on the

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basis of past performances, there would be only one or two Peers who would not come to your Lordships' House. On the other side (and this is the point I want to make, above all else), the 16 of us who are elected have a very special feeling of responsibility. We have the feeling not only that we have to serve our constituents who have elected us but, more particularly, that we have been elected especially to help on any question in which Scotland is concerned. I assure the House that in practice we who are Scottish Representative Peers come here very often and take part in debates on Scottish matters. If I may put it this way, we are the hard core, plus the Scottish Life Peers, on which one can build when there is any question that affects Scotland.
That is my main reason for wishing the existing election to remain. I am clear in my own mind that it is a compulsion on those elected to come to your Lordships' House more than they would otherwise do. I have checked on this with friends who are Scottish Representative Peers and they confirm this. Often they ask themselves whether they have to attend the House when they have other things, business or pleasure, which they would rather do. They do come to the House, not only because they feel it their duty but also because, looking over their shoulders, they feel that if they did not have a good reason for not coming, perhaps they would not be elected next time. That may be a base human motive, but it is a fact. So I believe that the result of continuing with the system of election is of benefit to Scotland. I am suggesting that we increase the number from 16, as it is to-day, to 20, because if this Amendment is accepted, and if a subsequent Amendment about Scottish Peeresses is also accepted, we shall have seven Peeresses eligible to stand, and I want to give them a chance by increasing our number. So much for the reasons for my Amendment.
There is another point that I want to touch on—that is, the value of the pageantry and tradition of the election. I do not think that we can altogether dismiss the value of these. In this respect I have a strong ally in the Lord Lyon King of Arms, who is a formidable figure in our country, and I am
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happy at this moment to be publicly on the same side as the Lord Lyon King of Arms. I have every reason to be. In long ago days one of my ancestors was bold enough to hit the Lord Lyon King of Arms, and lie quickly found himself in prison in Blackness Castle. There he languished for three years before he was let out and given back his estates. I am making amends for history long ago. The Lord Lyon King of Arms and I now stand together, in the hope that, in the interests of pageantry and tradition, your Lordships will be prepared to allow what is existing practice to continue, rather than have a change for which nobody has asked—or at least very few. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Leave out Clause 4, and insert the said new clause.—(The Earl of Perth.)
6.16 p.m.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I hope that in replying immediately I am not preventing my noble friend from speaking, but he can speak after me. I thought that, as it is getting late, it might be to your Lordships' advantage if I were to indicate at this stage the Government's attitude towards this Amendment. My noble friend Lord Perth has put forward his argument against that which I advanced on Second Reading against this change, when I was supported by my noble friends Lord Ferrier and Lord Balfour of Burleigh. I agree with my noble friend Lord Balfour of Burleigh in the view he then expressed, that in the present circumstances it would be unjustifiable to exclude a single Scottish Peer from admission to the House.
The proposal in the Bill was unanimously agreed by the Joint Select Committee. What it amounts to is that 16 additional Peers and seven Peeresses will become entitled to sit in the House. While there may have been justification in 1707 for limiting the number of Scottish Peers able to sit in your Lordships' House, I can see no justification for any such limitations today, despite the arguments persuasively put forward by my noble friend. In the debates on the Bill, the view has been expressed from both sides that, whatever view may be taken of the hereditary principle, so long as it subsists the proposal to include

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the Scottish Peers and Peeresses is reasonable. The abolition of an historic ceremony which occurs about once in five years and is witnessed by some 500 people is, I suggest, a small price to pay for removing a long-standing anomaly. I must confess that I do not share my noble friend's fear that the Scottish Peers will become less effective in the House because they are no longer elected. I suspect that the additional number of Scottish Peers will have the opposite effect.
I thought it right to express these views from this Box at this moment, because time is getting on; and while I am aware that my noble friend may have some supporters who share his point of view in relation to this matter, I am wondering whether it is really necessary to prolong the debate and whether it might not be easier to resolve without further debate the issue, which has been put so clearly, on the one side, by my noble friend Lord Perth, and for which I have put, I hope equally clearly, the arguments on the other side.
LORD BALFOUR OF BURLEIGH: I rise to say only that, as a Scottish Representative Peer. I am sorry to differ from my noble friend behind me, but I entirely accept what the Lord Chancellor has put forward, and I oppose the Amendment.
THE EARL OF HADDINGTON: I do not intend, in view of what the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor has said, to detain your Lordships for more than a few minutes. Much as I should like to find myself in agreement with my noble friend Lord Perth, I am sorry not to be able to support his Amendment. Like him, I am a Scottish Representative Peer, and I have been for nearly forty years; and I am grateful to all those who have elected me during that time. No one respects the tradition more than I do, and I shall be sorry to see the end of the elections of Holyrood. I think it will also be rather sad to see one of the principal functions of the Lord Clerk Register fall into abeyance.
But I think I must say this, because it is something that I do not think has been mentioned yet: the limiting of Scottish Representative Peers to sixteen was written into the Act of Union for a definite purpose—namely, to prevent your Lordships' House from being over-weighted by the large number of Scots-
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men who at that time held titles. It was a condition of the Union, and many considered that, in consequence, Scotland failed to secure a just representation in comparison with England. Now, of course, the number of Scottish titles is much smaller, and what matters, above all, is to be fair to all those other Scottish Peers who are at present ineligible for a seat in your Lordships' House owing to the limitation imposed by the elective system. My noble friend's Amendment would increase the number of Representative Peers, with Peeresses, to 20, but that does not meet the point at all. There are fifteen more Peers who may well wish to come here and speak in your Lordships' House on Scottish or on any other questions. I think that the more there are who are eligible, the better will Scotland be represented.
The only other thing I have to say is this. My noble friend Lord Perth lays great stress on the fact that Representative Peers, being elected, feel a greater responsibility to Scotland and their electors. But those Peers who stand for election stand for the reason that they are public-spirited people; and merely because the election is abolished they are not going to be any less public-spirited or less interested in the affairs of Scotland or of the United Kingdom. There may well be other Peers who are young Peers and too shy to come forward if they think they are going to oust older Peers who have been elected Scottish Representative Peers for many years. I know one case where a Peer fought two, if not three, elections. He at last succeeded in becoming a Representative Peer, but he had to go through three elections before being elected.
THE EARL OF PERTH: May I interrupt my noble friend on that point? The particular Peer to whom he refers—I know whom he means—is, for what it is worth, on my side.
THE EARL OF HADDINGTON: I have nothing further to say, but I believe the majority of Scottish Peers wish this clause to stand as it is, and I hope the Amendment will be resisted.
LORD SALTOUN: I wish to speak for only a minute, but there are two things that I might say on this point. One is that my noble friend Lord Perth moved

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this Amendment with great modesty. He told your Lordships about his own election, but did not tell you the most remarkable thing about it. It is a longstanding unwritten law in the election of Scottish Peers that you never elect a son in succession to his own father, so that no family may think they have a claim on a place as a Representative Peer. The qualities of my noble friend Lord Perth were so well known that he was the first Peer ever to be elected in the place of his father.
Like the way my noble friend introduced his Amendment, the Amendment itself is also on the modest side. I might remind your Lordships that the Committee of 1874 that sat on this matter recommended that the number of Scottish representative Peers should be increased to 21, and it was felt to be so natural and proper that all Scottish Peers at that time should appear in your Lordships' House that Lord Elphinstone and my grandfather made a Minority Report recommending that. So if the noble Earl is annoyed at my opposing him, it is due to the working of the hereditary principle.
THE EARL OF MANSFIELD: It is, I know, a lost cause, but I rise to support my kinsman Lord Perth, speaking as one who holds three Scottish titles and also sits in your Lordships' House with a great British one. I entirely endorse all that the noble Earl said. In reply to what my noble friend Lord Haddington has said about the unfairness of keeping anyone out, I would point out that if the number were raised to 20 there is little doubt that hardly anyone would ever be kept out, because of the 37 (in fact of the 31 that there have been up to date) one has to remember that up to the present a certain number of Peerages have been held by women. That will be rectified in due course, but under the Amendment there would be an extra four to cover that, and I know that at least one noble Lady is not only willing but anxious, to take her seat. On the other hand, there are always a certain number of Peers who are minors, or too old or infirm to attend, or who have business which makes it impossible for them to come regularly and do not want to be elected, or who are regular members of the Armed Services, the diplomatic service et cetera, which means that the
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number who are available, as has already been said, seldom exceeds eighteen for the sixteen places. In fact, one could go further, because I know that on one occasion there was difficulty even in raising the actual number of sixteen, although an unexpected candidate appeared at the last moment and thereby caused an election.
We, in Scotland, are much more bound up in our traditions than is the case in England, and if this further incursion into the provisions of the Act of Union, so often flouted in the past by neighbours in the South, is allowed to go on, we do not know where it will end. As I say, I know we shall not get anywhere here, in view of what the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor said, but, at the same time, I think it should be made clear that among, Representative Peers in Scotland, as well as other Peers and people in Scotland, as a whole, there will be great regret at the disappearance of our system which has served us so well for 350 years.
THE DUKE OF ATHOLL: I, too, should like to support my noble friends Lord Perth and Lord Mansfield, but for slightly different reasons. I remember that when I was elected I was very much in two minds about whether I would take an interest in your Lordships' House or not, but because I was elected as a Scottish Representative Peer I felt it my duty to do so (probably many of your Lordships have regretted it), although I must admit I have greatly enjoyed myself in the process. But I have a strong feeling that had I not been elected (and I may say that when I stood in a by-election the Daily Telegraph laid 100 to 8 against me; so I was not a great favourite), it would have been unlikely that I should have taken such an interest in your Lordships' House.
Secondly, I think the Representative Peers tend to speak more for Scotland than for any particular personal interests. I do not know whether this is an advantage or not, but, on the whole, probably it is. With the abolition of the election of Peers, I think this interest may, to a certain extent, go. Thirdly, I should like to ask the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor whether we poor sixteen, now that we are no longer elected—assuming that we fail to carry

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the Amendment—shall have to apply for a Writ of Summons in order to come to your Lordships' House, or continue to come as heretofore, and whether or not our names will appear on the first day after the Bill becomes law under the Minutes of the House.
THE EARL OF PERTH: I had better state my position shortly, and it is this. Frankly, the fact that the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor said that there was unanimity in the Committee does not impress me, because there was no Scottish Representative Peer to represent our views. We put in our views under the chairmanship of my noble friend Lord Balfour of Burleigh, but not on this particular point. This was a blind vote, without knowledge of how we felt, and I think it is fair for me to say that most of the Scottish Representative Peers—many of whom, unfortunately, cannot be here to-night—are behind me. The wheel has turned from what was a disability to the Scots to our advantage, and I hope it will remain so. On this occasion I feel that we should carry on with my clause as it stands.
On Question, Amendment negatived.
Clause 4 agreed to.
Clause 5 [Irish Peerages]:
THE EARL OF SANDWICH: I have argued this Amendment and explained to your Lordships the need for the exclusion of this clause from the Bill in order to avoid the incompatibility of service in both Chambers from deterring the Irish Peers from making their best case at law. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 4, line 22, leave out Clause 5.—(The Earl of Sandwich.)
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: We discussed this Amendment when we discussed an earlier one moved by my noble friend, and I really do not think I can or need add anything to the reply I then gave him.
LORD MOYNE: Would the Lord Chancellor feel that this clause would not debar Irish Peers from raising their case? I am afraid I am out of my depth in knowing in what form their case could be raised, but would this clause prevent them from raising it?
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: It is no part of my responsibility to advise Irish
1526
Peers as to the best way to bring the system before the courts.
On Question, Amendment negatived.
Clause 5 agreed to.
Clause 6 agreed to.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: We have now made very good progress in this Bill, having regard to the issues involved. The next Amendment raises an issue of considerable magnitude, on which I expect many of your Lordships would desire to speak. There is a considerable amount of other Business to be completed this evening, and therefore I should like to move that the House do now resume.
Moved, That the House do now resume.—(The Lord Chancellor.)
EARL ALEXANDER OF HILLSBOROUGH: Before the House resumes, I want to say that, through the usual channels, up to the Lord Chancellor, we have made this arrangement to adjourn now, for reasons which are apparent, but we have done so on the condition that we have this Business as first Order on Tuesday. I should like to put that into the OFFICIAL REPORT.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I am glad the noble Earl mentioned it.
On Question, Motion agreed to, and House resumed accordingly.

CONTRACTS OF EMPLOYMENT BILL
6.38 p.m.
Order of the Day for the House to be again in Committee read.
Moved, That the House do now resolve itself into Committee.—(Lord Carrington.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.
House in Committee accordingly.
[The Lord AIREDALE in the Chair.]
THE FIRST LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY (LORD CARRINGTON)THE FIRST LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY (LORD CARRINGTON) moved, after Clause 5, to insert the following new clause:
Power to vary number of weekly hours of employment necessary to qualify for rights
.—(1) The Minister shall have power by order to provide that this Act shall have effect—

(a) as if for the reference to twenty-one hours in section 4(2), or

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(b) as if for each of the references to twenty-one hours in paragraphs 3 and 4 of Schedule 1 and paragraph 3(3) of Schedule 2,

there were substituted a reference to such other number of hours less than twenty-one as may be specified in the order.
(2) Orders under the foregoing subsection may specify different numbers of hours for the purposes of paragraphs (a) and (b), and an order under paragraph (b) shall affect the operation of Schedule 1 to this Act as respects periods before the order takes effect for the purposes of sections 1 and 2 of this Act, as well as respects later periods.
(3) An order under this section may contain such transitional and other supplemental and incidental provisions as appear to the Minister to be expedient and may be varied or revoked by a further order so made.
An order under this section shall be made by statutory instrument, but no such order shall be made unless a draft of the order has been laid before Parliament and approved by a resolution of each House.
The noble Lord said: The Bill applies only to employees who normally work for their employers 21 hours or more a week. As I said during the Second Reading debate, the intention is that the Bill should benefit those who depend on their employment for at least a substantial part of their livelihood and that inconsiderable and spare-time employments should be excluded. I imagine that your Lordships will agree with that principle. The line has been drawn at 21 hours a week because 21 hours represents half the normal working week in industry, and it seems reasonable to draw the line there. To raise the limit appreciably would exclude some employments of substance, and to lower it would let in others rather less important. I recognise that it is very much a matter of judgment as to where the line should be drawn, and when the Bill was discussed in another place the 21-hour dividing line as it applies to Clause 4 was challenged on more than one occasion. Some speakers said that it was set too high and some said it was set too low, and you can say, by and large, that confirms 21 hours as being about right.
At the conclusion of the discussion at the Report stage the Parliamentary Secretary said that the figure of 21 seemed about right at the present time, but that the Government would consider whether the Minister of Labour should have power to vary the figure as he saw how things were working out. Having considered this again, we have thought it
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would be right for the Minister to have these powers. Clause 5 of the Bill already enables the Minister to alter the scope of the exclusions from the Bill in the light of any developments. The new Clause now before your Lordships will similarly enable the Minister to alter the 21-hour limit so that in future, if there are many people who derive a substantial part of their livelihood from working less than 21 hours a week, they can be brought within the scope of the Bill.
The proposed powers will enable the Minister to reduce the number of hours below 21 but not to raise it above, and will also enable him to lower the limit of 21 hours a week separately for the requirements on written statements or the notice requirements of the Bill. It may be that it will be found desirable to fix the number of hours at different points for the two Parts of the Bill in the light of the experience we have of the working of the Bill.
Lastly, I should like to point out that orders under this new clause will be subject to an Affirmative Resolution of each House. The view was taken in another place that it was right for orders under Clause 5 to be subject to this procedure and so it seemed right that it should be so under this new clause. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Aster Clause 5, insert the said new clause.—(Lord Carrington.)
LORD LINDGREN: I should like to express appreciation to the Government for giving consideration to the representations made to them in another place. I agree in that the number of cases affected will be comparatively small, but we can all think of types of employment in which people have a permanent employment over a period of years and do not work more than 21 hours a week. I can think immediately of office cleaners and others in this type of work. We appreciate the Amendment and we support it from this side of the House.
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Clause 6 [Interpretation]:
LORD CARRINGTON: This is little more than a drafting Amendment. Its purpose is to remove any possible doubt whether the notice provisions of the Bill are to apply to contracts already existing when the Bill comes into operation

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Obviously, they must do so, and this Amendment is intended to clear up the position. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 7, line 5, after ("apply") insert ("in relation to any contract made before they come into force and").—(Lord Carrington.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Clause 6, as amended, agreed to.
Clause 7 and Clause 8 agreed to.
Schedule 1 agreed to.
Schedule 2 [Rights of employee in period of notice]:
LORD CARRINGTONhad given Notice of three Amendments to paragraph 1(1), the first being, after "and", to insert, "subject to the following subparagraph". The noble Lord said: I think it would be convenient to take the next three Amendments together. Paragraph 2 of Schedule 2 contains a guarantee of minimum pay during notice for employees who have "normal working hours", and paragraph 1(1) gives guidance for deciding whether an employee has normal working hours and also what those normal working hours are. It provides that any employee who receives overtime pay for working more than a fixed number of hours is to be regarded as having normal working hours, and, furthermore, that the fixed number of hours in question is to be regarded as the normal working hours. This provision is essential to give precision to what is meant by "normal working hours" in this Schedule, and in the great majority of cases it will work fairly and reasonably without any need of qualification.
When this Schedule was under consideration at Report stage in another place it was suggested that it failed to take sufficient account of overtime. At the conclusion of the discussion the Parliamentary Secretary undertook to consider whether any change should be made as regards overtime, though he drew a sharp distinction between cases where overtime is a regular and accepted feature of the job and cases where it is exceptional and optional, and pointed out that there was no case for including the latter.
The Government have considered the matter further, and it is suggested that there are cases where the provisions in
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paragraph 1(1) will not, in point of fact, work satisfactorily. This is because there are a number of employments where the employee receives overtime pay for work performed in hours which unquestionably form part of his normal working day. For example, a milk roundsman commonly works seven days a week, and this often includes a regular number of hours of overtime rates of pay. Another example would be an employee engaged, perhaps, in an engineering works under a contract with fixed regular hours of work at 45 hours, although the agreed standard hours in the industry would be 42, and he gets overtime pay for the three hours. The Amendments I am proposing to your Lordships will meet these rather exceptional cases which I have explained. I hope that my explanation will be agreeable and that you will accept these Amendments. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 11, line 7, after ("and") insert subject to the following sub-paragraph.—(Lord Carrington.)
LORD LINDGREN: Again, I have to express appreciation of the attention given to this matter by the Government. We shall be quite frank from this side of the House and say that overtime is a penalty, and we do not like it. But it is true that in many trades it is convenient, both to the employer and to the employee, that there should be what we call "rostered" turns which include overtime. That Amendment does cover the point and we are grateful for it.
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
LORD CARRINGTON: This Amendment is consequential. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 11, line 8, after first ("hours") insert ("(in this paragraph referred to as 'the number of hours without overtime')").—(Lord Carrington.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
LORD CARRINGTON: This Amendment is again consequential. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 11, line 8, at end insert—
("(2) If in such a case—

(a) the contract of employment fixes the number, or the minimum number, of hours of employment in the said week or other

1531
period (whether or not it also provides for the reduction of that number or minimum number of hours in certain circumstances), and

(b) that number or minimum number of hours exceeds the number of hours without overtime,

that number or minimum number of hours (and not the number of hours without overtime) shall be the normal working hours.")—(Lord Carrington.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
LORD CARRINGTON: This is a drafting Amendment. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 11, line 25, after ("done") insert ("in the period")—(Lord Carrington.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
LORD CARRINGTON LORD CARRINGTON moved, in paragraph 2(2), after "throughout" to insert "the part of". The noble Lord said: Amendments Nos. 14 and 15 go together and they make a further change in paragraph 2(2) of Schedule 2. The provisions of paragraph 2 apply if at any time during notice an employee finds himself in one of the circumstances listed in paragraph 2(1)—that is to say, he is put on short time, laid off or is away sick or on holiday. In paragraph 2(2), as it stands at present, a worker in this position is to be paid not less than if he were working throughout the normal working hours. This guarantee, I think, could occasionally have rather odd results. To give an example, if an employee, through sickness, missed a day in his first week of notice, the guarantee would, therefore, apply. If, later on, during notice the employee took an afternoon off to see a football match, the guarantee would mean that he was entitled to pay for the hours he was watching the football match. Obviously, it would be wrong for the Bill to have this effect. The two Amendments will prevent it by modifying the guarantee to provide that the employee's pay during notice is not to be less than it would have been if he had been working during the hours he missed owing to shortage of work or sickness or holiday. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 11, line 28, after ("throughout") insert ("the part of")—(Lord Carrington.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
LORD CARRINGTON: I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 11, line 28, at end insert ("covered by paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) of sub-paragraph (1) of this paragraph").—(Lord Carrington.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
6.51 p.m.
LORD CARRINGTON LORD CARRINGTON moved, in paragraph 2(3), to leave out "paid to him" and to insert instead: "payable to him by the employer". The noble Lord said: I think it would be convenient to take the next three Amendments together, because they hang together. They relate to the guarantee of a minimum payment to piece workers during notice. Under paragraph 2(3) and (4) pieceworkers whose contracts fix normal working hours, but who through shortage of work, illness, injury or their holidays, are unable to work those hours in full, are to be paid for the hours not worked at not less than their average hourly rate of pay during the four weeks before notice was given. Paragraph 2(4) lays down certain rules about calculating the average hourly rate of pay. In working it out no account is to be taken of periods of sickness or holidays or of the sick pay or holiday pay during those periods. I am sure your Lordships will agree that this is right, since pay at these times is often at a reduced rate and it would therefore be unfair to the employee to include it in this calculation.
The reason we have put down these Amendments is that on further consideration we have concluded that there are other circumstances in which the employee may have a reduced rate of pay which should not be reflected in the averaging calculation. For example, work might be temporarily held up by the weather or a breakdown and an employee who is standing by, unable to work at such a time, may be paid at perhaps only half his normal rate. Under a guaranteed-week arrangement, an employee may have to be available for work throughout the week—say 44 hours—but receive the equivalent of only 36 hours wages. The Amendments will put this right by providing that only the hours actually worked and the pay for those hours are to be taken into account in working out the average. They thus ensure that the principle underlying this part of Schedule 2 is applied—namely, that an employee should receive during notice not less

1533
than the contractual rate for his full normal working hours. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 11, line 34, leave out ("paid to him") and insert ("payable to him by the employer").—(Lord Carrington.)
LORD LINDGREN: The first Lord has used a number of words in his explanation of these Amendments, but it is quite normal, where piece rates are applicable in industry, for there to be a day rate and for the piece rate to apply only as an incentive bonus for enhanced earnings and to prevent what some people call slacking or not pulling their weight in industry. I should have thought that certainly in most of the industries where trade union agreements are involved, the day rate would have been the applicable rate to apply. Under these Amendments the average hourly rate will be worked out on piece rates, and that might quite easily be above the day rate. We shall not oppose these Amendments, but even now I should have thought there was some opportunity to include the day rate in the Bill. I have gone through it fairly closely, but there is no reference in the Bill to what are the normal basic rates. But we accept the Amendments.
LORD CARRINGTON: I am interested in what the noble Lord says. I should like to look at it. I do not think that anybody is going to suffer as a result of the Amendments. In fact, from what he says, the reverse will be true. I will have a look at it and see whether any further Amendment is necessary.
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
LORD CARRINGTON: I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 11, leave out lines 38 to 42 and insert ("only the hours when the employee was working, and only the remuneration payable for, or apportionable to, those hours of work, shall be brought in.")—(Lord Carrington.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
LORD CARRINGTON: I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 11, line 43, after ("no") insert ("such").—(Lord Carrington.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
6.55 p.m.
LORD MCCORQUODALE OF NEWTON LORD MCCORQUODALE OF NEWTON moved, in paragraph 2(5), after "otherwise" to insert:
"and any sickness benefit or injury benefit in respect of the relevant part of the period of notice to which the employee is entitled under the National Insurance Act 1946 (as amended) and the National Insurance (Industrial Injuries) Act 1946 (as amended) as the case may be".
The noble Lord said: I spoke at some length about this matter on Second Reading and will paraphrase as briefly as I can the points I made then. As I interpret Schedule 2, it appears that it would be to an employee's very considerable financial benefit if he were away sick during his period of notice. The man away sick during this period will receive, apparently, the wages to which he is entitled under the Bill, and in addition any National Insurance or Industrial Injuries benefits to which he is entitled. Also he will be excused from paying contributions under the scheme, so he will be considerably better off if he is away sick than if he is working. Thus, the Bill may provide an incentive to go sick during the period of notice. He would have to prove to his employer that he was incapable of working, through sickness; but, as we all know, it is not unknown for people to obtain medical certificates on somewhat doubtful grounds on occasions. I do not think it is right to put temptation in front of people.
An increasing number of employers are introducing contributory or non-contributory sick pay schemes for their employees, and it is usual—I think it is almost universal—that these schemes provide for full payment of wages but a deduction is made in respect of National Insurance benefit to which the employee is entitled. These schemes operate successfully and, I think, with the blessing of all concerned. I think it would be reasonable to have this principle put into the Bill. This Amendment may not be the best way to do it. There are all sorts of complications in regard to the three-day waiting period and the position of the Ministry of Pensions. The Government may have a better way of doing it. But, as I said on Second Reading, and I think with general approval, this is obviously an anomaly that should be put right; the man away sick gets his full wages and he should not benefit over the man who works out his notice. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 12, line 1, after ("otherwise") insert the said words.—(Lord McCorquodale of Newton.)
LORD ROBERTSON OF OAKRIDGE: I raised indentically the same point on Second Reading and I did so for exactly the same reasons as the noble Lord, Lord McCorquodale of Newton. I support the Amendment as worded.
LORD LINDGREN: Both noble Lords have considerable association with a variety of industries. No trade unionist would in fact support a proposal that an employee should make a profit out of sickness in particular. After all, the employer has made a considerable contribution towards the National Insurance, as has the employee. But equally, there is a practice in which some employers indulge—not the best employers; after all, if every employer were as good as the best we should not want this Bill at all, but we are not dealing with the good employer; we are dealing with the employer who does not play the game—to give the employee notice during sickness.
I was rather surprised at the attack on the doctors. A doctor wants to be satisfied that the man is worthy of a certificate before he gives it. Illness is bad enough; but when a man has been injured in the employment and is on Industrial Injuries benefit, surely that is in itself a very difficult time in which to give a man notice to leave the employment. Equally, if during the period of employment the man receives an industrial injury and is accepted for industrial injury benefit, I think it is a little difficult or harsh in that instance to deduct what in any case would only be about three days of his industrial injuries benefit. He has gone out handicapped. There is no liability on the employer to maintain a man's employment because he has been injured. I agree that most employers do, and if the injury is such that he is handicapped at all, light employment and rehabilitation is generally fostered by the best of employers. But particularly to include industrial injuries within this Amendment seems to us to be a little harsh. We on this side of the Committee would not divide, but I must say that we are not over-enthusiastic about it.
LORD ECCLES: I should like to support this Amendment because I believe that it is most important that as many schemes as possible should be introduced whereby sick pay is made up by the employer. I believe that the schemes are growing in number. But it is rather unreasonable to ask people to introduce a scheme of this kind if, in certain cases, the effect is to be that the man is better off by the amount of sick benefit he receives when he is sick. I should think, in answer to the noble Lord, Lord Lindgren, that few people give their employees notice when they are sick as a kind of excuse for doing it. I believe that to be not a common practice, and I do not think it will make any difference to the one or two bad cases whether or not this Amendment is accepted. What I do think is important is that we should try to see that all employers help their people when they fall sick, and I do not think that leaving the Bill as it is will aid these schemes. Therefore, I hope that the Committee will accept the Amendment.
LORD CARRINGTON: I think that there is a good deal of agreement between everybody who has spoken on this Amendment, although perhaps the noble Lord, Lord Lindgren, would not be quite so enthusiastic about the Amendment as my noble friends Lord McCorquodale of Newton and Lord Eccles and the noble Lord, Lord Robertson of Oakridge. But it is, of course, quite true that the effect of the Bill is that a man who is off sick is guaranteed not less than the wage for working the normal week, and that he will get on top of it whatever he is entitled to under the National Insurance Scheme. The effect could be that a man with a wife and two children could draw up to £7 ls. a week in sickness benefit, so that if his normal wage is £10 a week he will be considerably better off during notice if he is ill. However, in spite of what my noble friend has said, I think we must be careful not to assume that it would be easy for employees to take unfair advantage of this, or that it would lead to widespread malingering. There are many existing schemes in industry under which an employee is better off when he is away ill than when at work, and there is little evidence that this has led to abuse.

1537
At first sight the actual wording of the Amendment which my noble friend has put forward looks reasonable enough, but there is a fundamental difficulty in that an employees entitlement to the benefits of the National Insurance Scheme cannot always be decided immediately. The Amendment mentions sickness benefit in the first place. Normally, a man will have been sick at least a week before he receives any payment at all of National Insurance sickness benefit, and even then, because of the rules relating to the waiting period at the beginning of the time when he is sick, it will often be some time before it is known whether benefit will be payable for the whole of the first week or for only part of it, and it may not be possible to determine straight away what dependants' benefit the employee can claim. Similar practical difficulties may arise, and I think it is undesirable that there should be so much uncertainty about his rights.
Secondly, the Amendment mentions injury benefit under the National Insurance (Industrial Injuries) Act, 1946. It is frequently not possible to determine immediately whether a person is eligible for industrial injury benefit and, pending a decision, he will be paid the sickness benefit which is at a lower rate. Supposing, after the necessary inquiries, he is in fact awarded injury benefit later, how then is the employer to take account of the difference? Is he to be allowed to make a retrospective adjustment in some later week? If the notice has already expired, how can he hope to recover the difference which would be due to him under the Amendment?
These, I think, are practical difficulties in the way of my noble friend's Amendment. But I think there is one objection to the Amendment on grounds of principle. The Amendment envisages that the whole of the sickness or injury benefit, including the dependants' benefit, might be offset against the employer's liability. As the rate of a National Insurance benefit depends, among other things, on the claimant's family responsibilities, this amount can give some insight into the employee's private life which the employee has every right to feel should be kept private, as it is to-day. One must consider seriously whether this incursion into people's personal privacy would be
1538
justified where an employee is ill and under notice.
Another point is that the National Insurance benefits are paid for not only by the employer but, as the noble Lord, Lord Lindgren, has said, also by the employee, and it might therefore seem odd that the employer should be able to offset the whole of the benefit against his liability under the Bill. I am not seeking in any way to undermine the principle which my noble friend is trying to put into the Bill, but I do not think it would be wise to accept his Amendment as it now stands. But, as I said at the outset, I recognise—indeed, the noble Lord, Lord Lindgren, recognised this—that there is considerable force in what my noble friend has said. I personally think that something should be clone, and, if my noble friend will withdraw the Amendment, between now and the next stage I should like to examine the position and perhaps be able to put down an Amendment which is both fair and practicable to both sides and which meets my noble friend's point.
LORD SHACKLETON: May I just follow that point to say that I think this is an extremely difficult Amendment to make? I hope the Government will succeed in doing so, but it is not easy to dismiss the three-day question. I should find it difficult to get exact words of the right sort for "entitlement", because there are certain benefits which are, in a sense, optional for which certain people may opt to qualify. In certain respects, married women may do so, but may not have chosen to do so. I am a little nervous about this from the point of view of the administrative consequences of what is already a complicated matter. There are some employers who, in regard to the three days or even other periods, find it so difficult to cope that they prefer not to deduct. It is arguable that if there is no deduction there is a greater incentive to get rid of people while they are ill. But I hope that when consideration is given to this it will be most thorough. I am sure it will be. I think it will be necessary to study the practices of quite a number of firms in regard to this matter. I do not think we disagree with the principle. I am really just not sure whether it is worth the candle.
LORD ECCLES: I wonder whether I might help my noble friend by saying that, in the scheme in which I am most interested at present, we deduct only the basic rate—that is to say, we do not pay any attention to the children's allowances; we allow the sick worker to keep them. I think that is a rather fair division. What I do not want to see is that a man who is sick and who is within our sick pay scheme, but who has not been given notice, is getting less when he is sick than his neighbour who has been given notice. I think that is somewhat unfair.
LORD CARRINGTON: The points raised by the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, are very much in mind, and I raised one or two of them in my answer. There is a difficulty involved in arriving at an equitable division in this matter. The suggestion made by my noble friend Lord Eccles is something which we are at the moment examining. It may well be that this is the right way of doing it, but there are difficulties. I would therefore like to have the opportunity of a week or so in order that we may examine it to see whether we can provide something which is both fair and practicable.
LORD McCORQUODALE OF NEWTON: I am most grateful to my noble friend for the care he has taken in answering this complicated point. It shows how complicated it is to put this into legal language. It is something that we could put into an ordinary agreement between trade union and employer in quite simple language on one sheet of paper. A valid point was made about dependants' allowances. It would have the further anomaly, if we did not leave that out of account, that the employer would gain if a man had a wife and family, in that more would be deducted. If the man had not a wife and family even further anomalies would arise, and one could go on ad infinitum. I would not stand in the way of excluding anything but the man's basic benefit, but I think it is important to stand on the principle. I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
7.13 p.m.
LORD LINDGREN LORD LINDGREN moved to add to paragraph (4):
"but this paragraph shall not apply to an employee who proves that he was absent for the purpose of seeking other work."
The noble Lord said: I should like to make it clear, particularly in view of the intervention of the noble Lord, Lord Eccles, on the last Amendment, that if all the firms with which we had to deal in the country were such good employers as the firm with which he is associated, or the printing trade with which the noble Lord, Lord McCorquodale of Newton, is associated, there would be no necessity for this Bill. On the Second Reading I made the point that we in the trade union movement are apprehensive in some ways because the general standards of this Bill are much lower than those already provided by the best employers. We are a little afraid that, instead of this being the minimum, it might become the maximum—which would be to the detriment of employees. Under this paragraph, where an employee asks his employer for time off and the employer grants it, there is a deduction from his wages.
LORD McCORQUODALE OF NEWTON: It is not necessarily a deduction. It "may" be deducted.
LORD LINDGREN: Yes, it may be deducted. What happens in the best of industries? Because the Ministry of Labour offices are not always open or conveniently sited to enable the men to visit them before or after working hours, most employers arrange with the Ministry of Labour—who are extremely co-operative in this matter—to send one of their officials to interview the men at the firm to see whether they can place the men before they leave. That type of employer would never think of deducting a man's wages. If the man went to see the foreman or went into the office and said, "I have a chance of a job with Smith and Co. Can I have a couple of hours off to go round and see them?" the decent employer would say "Yes; the best of luck, my lad", and would not make a deduction from his wages.
However, I would again make the point that we are not dealing here with the best of employers. This is a Bill which gives the right of basic treatment to an employee from the less-favourable sort of employer. If a man is on notice and goes to his employer and says "I cannot go and see the prospective employer in my own time, but I have the opportunity of an interview", and gives proof of that, why should the employer

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penalise him by deducting his wages during the period of notice? After all, it is the employer who is sacking the man, not the employee himself who is giving notice. If it were the other way round we should not be raising the objection; but in this case, as I say, it is the employer who is severing the contract. The man is likely to be unemployed, and the best of employers will try to get the man employment during his period of notice. Any employer who has given a man notice ought to help him as early as possible to get another job. Therefore, we move this Amendment so that, in the period while the man is seeking other employment, pay should not be deducted.
Amendment moved—
Page 13, line 2, at end insert the said words.—(Lord Lindgren.)
LORD ROBERTSON OF OAKRIDGE: While one naturally has great sympathy with the point of view put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Lindgren, I feel bound to query whether this is a very wise Amendment. There are many reasons for a man to be absent. He may get leave of absence for something which deserves one's sympathy; others may be searching for a job; or there may be compassionate or other reasons for absence. It seems to me that this Amendment throws the door wide open, and that it would mean that a man will be entitled to be paid for going to see a football match, provided that he can show that he has called in at the labour exchange. That is what I fear about it.
LORD MCCORQUODALE OF NEWTON: Although one has every sympathy with what the noble Lord, Lord Lindgren, says, and the spirit behind it, I do not see that this proposal is practicable. I do not think any employer, decent or otherwise, would wish to deduct wages from a man who came to him and said, "I have an offer of a job with John Smith and Co. Can I go round and see him? "But if he came every day of the week and said "I think I might get a job with so-and-so", and repeated the performance regularly, in the end the man would not be doing any work at all, and that would defeat the object of the Bill. If I might make a suggestion, could there not be some provision in the Bill that wages should not be deducted for time spent visiting
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the employment exchange or something of that sort, because it could easily be proved that the man had gone there, had registered and had come back again? I do not know whether that is a helpful suggestion. I should not like to go further.
LORD SHEPHERD: I feel that I must rise in support of my noble friend's Amendment. I must admit, quite frankly, that I do not like sub-paragraph (4). Is it not a fact that, in the first instance, the employee has a contract with his employer, and obviously one envisages reasonably long-term employment? If the employer then says, "I am sorry but conditions of trade are such that I must dismiss you. I must give you notice," I should have thought that all reasonable employers would regard that period of notice as a period in which they, as employers, would render all possible assistance in finding alternative employment for the persons being dismissed. I think that that would be accepted by all employers. Of course, if you are a large employer it is not so easy, but I think that is the right attitude for the good employer.
However, this Bill is dealing with the employer who does not quite play the game. The clause says that if an employee obtains the permission of his employer the employee should not receive any payment. The employer himself is breaking the contract, terminating the contract, and this short period is merely the sort of notice which I think the noble Lord, Lord McCorquodale of Newton, would expect. If a contract with one of his suppliers were to be broken suddenly he would expect a period of notice during which the supplies would be coming to him. It would seem to me, therefore, that during this period, the employer having agreed, he should be liable, but according to this paragraph he would not be liable.
The noble Lord, Lord McCorquodale of Newton, nodded his head to my noble friend when he suggested that the good employer would in fact make these payments. In some ways, therefore, the good employer could well be costed out by the bad employer. This is one of the problems of trade unions and of raising of standards. We have never wanted to see a bad employer having an advantage over a good employer because

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he does not give the same standards, the same rates, the same conditions of work. Therefore, it would seem to me wrong that, while the majority of good employers would look after their workers during this period, the bad employer should be able to make a lesser contribution.
I can see some difficulty in deleting sub-paragraph (4), but I cannot help feeling that the Government and the Committee should accept at least the spirit of Amendment No. 20. This refers to the employee who proves (and I would stress this particularly to the noble Lord, Lord Robertson of Oakridge) that he was absent for the purpose of seeking other work. There is no question of going to a football match, no question of going to the cinema, as he proves that he goes off to find work. The noble Lord, Lord McCorquodale of Newton, asks; How can he prove it? I would accept the suggestion of the noble Lord, Lord McCorquodale of Newton, that he should be paid for the time during which he goes to the Ministry of Labour for his interview, and perhaps they themselves would give him information about work that is available and would introduce him. I would suggest to the noble Lord, Lord McCorquodale of Newton, that in that particular case, where there is proof, the man should obtain his pay. But to prove to his employer that he was going to be absent in order to be interviewed, a man could well produce a letter, either from the Ministry of Labour—I think it is a green card—or from the future employer. The words in the Amendment are, "who proves".
LORD MCCORQUODALE OF NEWTON: Perhaps I did not make myself clear. I was not arguing that he could not prove it. But we are dealing with a recalcitrant employer and, sometimes, an employee who is trying to take every possible advantage. We are not dealing here with the decent employer or the decent workman. A man might take the whole fortnight and be able to prove that he was looking for a job, getting letters from everybody and being away all the time. We do not want that in this Bill.
LORD SHEPHERD: I certainly do not want it either. I do not want to stand
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on the side of the worker who is going to cheat his employer by saying: "I am going to get my pay. I am going to tell you that I am going to take a job", but who goes to a football match. I am not on that side at all. I am suggesting that he can prove to his employer, by a letter from the Ministry of Labour where he has had his interview, or from another employer to whom he has been sent by the Ministry of Labour, or, where he has perhaps responded to an advertisement in a newspaper, from that possible employer, giving the time and naming the day on which the interview should take place.
I am not suggesting that the words of this Amendment should stand, but I believe the spirit is there. The proof can be obtained. It is up to the worker to prove that he was absent looking for work. I cannot believe that this House would say that a worker who was having his contract broken by his employer should not make use of that time to obtain further employment, and that during that period while looking for work he should suffer financially.
What is the alternative? I suggest to the noble Lord, Lord McCorquodale of Newton, what he could do. He could say: "Well, I will not do anything. I will wait until I am unemployed. I will then go on the dole and let the State keep me until I get another job." But instead of that he says: "I want to find another job. I do not want to be unemployed." I should think that that is what this House would wish to see. I do not see why the worker, when he is having his contract broken by his employer, should suffer a loss, and it might be a substantial daily loss, while he seeks other employment. It is quite clear in the Amendment that the burden of proof will lie upon the shoulders of the employee. If he gives the proof to his employer, then I suggest that in equity, considering that his contract is being broken, the employer should pay his wages for the time in which he is seeking employment.
LORD FORSTER OF HARRABY: I would agree in principle. I have great sympathy with the principle proposed in this Amendment, but my experience has been that when it comes to a question of proof great practical difficulties are going to arise. I think that you should

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not go—it would be wrong to go—beyond what has been suggested by the noble Lord, Lord McCorquodale of Newton: you should accept proof from the Labour Exchange, but not from anybody who happens to give a letter of a note to an employee to say that he has called for work at his place of business, or whatever it may be. I can see great practical difficulties, interminable struggles, over this question of proof, unless there is some definite evidence to go on. I should be all in favour of accepting proof from a Labour Exchange, but not in general from anyone who chooses to write a note.
LORD SHEPHERD: If the Ministry of Labour were then to send a man to A, B or C factories, or A, B or C offices, and there was a registered time of appointment, would the noble Lord take that as evidence?
LORD FORSTER OF HARRABY: I would accept proof from the Labour Exchange that a man had applied for a particular job. But that is as far, I think, as one ought to go on this Amendment, because of the difficulties and squabbles that are going to arise if any other proof is accepted, and if there is an attempt to get any proof accepted other than something which is going to be backed by the Labour Exchange.
LORD CARRINGTON: I wonder whether I might courteously refer your Lordships back to the terms of the Amendment which has been moved by the noble Lord, Lord Lindgren, because I am not at all sure that they would, in point of fact, achieve the object which he has in mind. Perhaps I ought to say so. The guarantee in paragraph 2 of the Schedule applies only if during the notice the employee is ready and willing to work, but there is no work for him or he is off sick, and so on. It is not brought into operation if the employee is away from work with leave granted at his own request. It is not at all certain that the Amendment which the noble Lord has proposed would alter this, and it would therefore quite possibly fail in its intended effect. But I appreciate that we are really discussing the purpose behind the noble Lord's Amendment, and not its exact words.
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I think that there are difficulties about this matter, and difficulties about the concept—not perhaps so many difficulties about the concept proposed by my noble friend, but the concept of the Amendment. My fight honourable friend the Minister of Labour went into this question very carefully, as a result of the discussions in another place, but he came to the conclusion that it is very difficult to make a practicable alteration. One cannot lay down an entitlement to a fixed amount of time off, because in some cases it would be too small and in other cases it would be too much. It is impossible to lay down a flexible entitlement, such as a right to a "reasonable" amount of time off, because that is so vague; it lacks precision—and it is bound, I should have thought, frequently to give rise to doubt and dispute. This is, in fact, a matter which, in the Government's view, is much better settled, and really can satisfactorily be settled, only by voluntary arrangements between the employer and the employee in the light of the particular circumstances of the case.
I know—indeed, your Lordships who have spoken have borne this out—that the whole Committee would agree that people under notice should have reasonable time off to seek another job. There is, of course, no dispute of any kind about that. I should have thought that commonly this already happens, though there may be cases when it does not. I should have thought that the great majority of the employers already do give their employees help at this very difficult time. But, once having concluded (if your Lordships agree with me) that the question of time off ought to be settled voluntarily, I do not think there is much point in laying down that, if the employer does allow the employee time off, he is compelled to give him minimum pay during that time. Many employers already make this a practice, and for the others it is on the cards that this obligation would make them less inclined to do so. I think it would be counter-productive. The trouble is that the obligation introduces rigidity into what the Government believe should be a flexible arrangement. Might it not be reasonable, perhaps, for an employer to say to his employee during notice, "You can have a day off each week on full

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pay to look for another job, and you can have more time off unpaid if you want it"? I think that, if we accepted the intention of this Amendment, we should make it very difficult for the employer to make such an arrangement with his employee.
I hope that the noble Lord opposite does not think I am unsympathetic to what he is trying to do; and I hope, as all your Lordships will, that employers will be as considerate as possible in allowing employees under notice to have time off to look for other jobs. But, as I have indicated, there are great difficulties in this problem. I agree very much with what the noble Lord, Lord Robertson of Oakridge, and what my noble friends behind me have said; and for that reason, I think I must ask your Lordships not to accept this Amendment. However, my noble friend Lord McCorquodale of Newton has made a suggestion as to what might conceivably be done, which was taken up by the noble Lord, Lord Shepherd. I can foresee difficulties in accepting this suggestion (I do not think it is quite so straightforward as my noble friend and as the noble Lord opposite suggested), but I will most certainly look at it and see if there is anything we can do in this particular regard, if the noble Lord would be good enough to withdraw his Amendment to-night.
LORD LINDGREN: I am most grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, for his approach to this matter. I do not want to indulge in tedious repetition—I have said this so many times—but the best employer will do more than this: he will bring the Ministry of Labour up into the firm. This is not a criticism of the Ministry of Labour. Because of full employment, Ministry of Labour offices have in a number of areas been reduced, and in small communities they have made a central office; for those who are so unfortunate as to be out of work, they have reduced the number of days on which they have had to sign on, and the rest. So the fellow who is on shift work, for instance, can go into the labour exchange and tell them that he is likely to be unemployed at the end of the week, the Ministry of Labour look at the vacancies, and he is even sent round during his off time.
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As to the fellow who starts work at seven-thirty and does not finish until five, he cannot get to the Ministry of Labour offices because they will be closed, sometimes because they are not sited in the area in which he is. What we are concerned about is making it possible for a man, before his employment is terminated, to be in touch with the Ministry of Labour in order that he can see about another job. The best of employers already do that, and the Ministry of Labour are most co-operative in regard to it. I should not have thought it was impossible (and I am grateful to the noble Lord for agreeing to look at it) for some arrangement to be come to between the Ministry of Labour and the employers in this regard when the men are under notice. I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
7.35 p.m.
LORD CARRINGTON LORD CARRINGTON moved, in paragraph 5, after "if" to insert "after the notice is given and". The noble Lord said: I will, with your Lordships' permission, take these last five Amendments together, because they all basically cover the same point. The first affects paragraph 5 of Schedule 2. The purpose of this paragraph is to prevent an employee who gives notice of an intention to go on strike from having his pay protected by the Bill during the period of the notice, and I should have thought that that was surely right. The purpose of the rules in the Schedule is to safeguard the pay of an employee when having to change jobs, not when he is about to go on strike. It was, however, pointed out in another place that paragraph 5 could possibly be construed as meaning that, if at any time during his employment an employee has gone on strike, he is to be deprived thereafter of the protection of Schedule 2 during any notice. That, of course, is far from the intention, and the Amendment will prevent any possibility of paragraph 5 being taken in this way.
Very much the same point can be made about paragraph 6. This is needed to clear up what is to happen to the rights in the Schedule if there is any breach of contract during the period of notice. But, again, as it now stands, it could possibly be taken as being applicable if at any time during the whole

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course of the employment there had been a breach of contract. The last of these five Amendments also makes another change. At present, paragraph 6, sub-paragraph (2), is brought into operation by any breach of contract by the employee, however trivial. In other words, a clerk could arrive a minute late at his office, and therefore forfeit his entitlements under the Schedule for the rest of the period of notice. The Amendment puts this right by providing that the employee forfeits his rights only if he commits a breach which the employer rightly treats as terminating the contract. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 13, line 5, after ("if") insert the said words.—(Lord Carrington.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
LORD CARRINGTON: I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 13, line 11, leave out from ("If") to ("notice") in line 12 and insert ("during the period of").—(Lord Carrington.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
LORD CARRINGTON: I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 13, line 13, leave out ("period") and insert ("part of the period of notice").—(Lord Carrington.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
LORD CARRINGTON: I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 13, line 15, leave out ("period") and insert ("part of the period of notice").—(Lord Carrington.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
LORD CARRINGTON: I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 13, line 16, leave out sub-paragraph (2) and insert—
("(2) If during the period of notice the employee breaks the contract and the employer rightfully treats the breach as terminating the contract, no payment shall be due to the employee under this Schedule in respect of the part of the period of notice falling after the termination of the contract."—(Lord Carrington.)
LORD LINDGREN: At this late hour, I am sorry to detain the Committee again. As the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, admitted, sub-paragraph (2) is defective from many points of view, but I am afraid we are a little apprehensive in regard to the wording of the substituted para-
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graph. Here, again, let me make it quite clear that we are talking about those employers who are going to look for every reason they can find and every wriggle they can make to avoid this Bill: we are not talking about the good employer. Here it talks of where the employer "rightfully treats". Let us take it in sequence. First of all, a contract has been broken because the employer has given the employee notice. Under this Amendment, if the employer "rightfully treats" there is no question of there being any appeal or that he has to establish it. One is not a Parliamentary draftsman. If I were a trade union officer trying to make an agreement with an employer, then the words "establishes that" there has been a breach is better than "rightfully treats", where the whole basis is in favour of the employer and not the employee, and there is no right of the employee to contest it.
Here, again, in the best of employers and where there are trade unions there is no difficulty. In the printing industry, for example, if something went wrong the father of the chapel would be round in no time; or, in other industries, the shop steward or the collector or the responsible official would interview those concerned and put it right. We are concerned here not with the best of employers but with those employers who are trying to avoid the responsibilities and the obligations which are put on them by this Bill. I do not want to oppose this proposal. If the noble Lord would agree to look at this from that point of view and give an opportunity to the employee, so that the employer should not have all the determination but that there shall be some right to contest it, or to establish his position, then I should be happy to let the Amendment pass.
LORD CARRINGTON: Naturally, I would accept that; but I do not think that the noble Lord need worry too much. This Amendment makes the position very much better from the employee's point of view. Until I moved this Amendment your Lordships accepted that by any breach of contract the employment could be terminated. But I think that the word that is important in this particular Amendment is "rightfully". I think the employer has to establish that he has "rightfully" treated the matter. Of course. I think the

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determination of whether it was rightful or not would depend on the terms of the contract and the employee would have exactly the same rights as if the contract were terminated for any other reason. It is not the intention of the Government that it should be otherwise. But I will look at it again.
LORD SHEPHERD: I am sorry to continue the discussion at this hour, but I want to make two points. A few moments ago we were discussing Amendment No. 20, in which we were trying to see that the employee whose contract has been terminated should have time to seek employment and, during that time, should be paid. The noble Lord, Lord Carrington, suggested that there might be cases where the employer might well refuse his employee the right to go to the Ministry of Labour. He might well refuse the right of the employee to seek other employment in view of the fact that the contract has been broken. If the employee in this particular case is offered a new job and must go for an interview on, say, Tuesday, and the employer says: "No, you must be here", and if the man then goes. I should have said, from my expedience, that he has, in fact, broken the contract. The man has refused to work; he has gone against the instructions of his employer.
According to the Government Amend-that man will then face the loss of all monies that will be due to him. The prospective employer may or may not have taken him on; or, he may not start his work for some days. In any event the employee might feel he could not, when he was having his interview, promise to start work immediately; because he is under some responsibility to his present employer. It seems to
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me that the man seeking employment could well be in a bad position. The other point is that, while I quite understand the power of the words "rightfully treats", until this has been made clear, perhaps by a case in law, it might be arguable to what extent an employer can "rightfully treat". It may lead to a series of strikes which we should wish to avoid. I hope that the Government will consider these words between now and the next stage.
LORD CARRINGTON: It seems to me that the first point the noble Lord, Lord Shepherd, has made may be a good argument for the last Amendment which the noble Lord, Lord Lindgren, moved, but not for this particular Amendment. He would not, I imagine, dispute the fact that if the man breaks his contract the employer has a right under this provision. I do not think that is entirely relevant to the point was are discussing. With regard to the second point, I should have thought that "rightfully" did, in fact, meet the case. It means that he had established that there was a breach of contract. But I will certainly look at the point again between now and the next stage.
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Schedule 2, as amended, agreed to.
House resumed: Bill reported with Amendments.

SALE OF DEAD WILD GEESE PROHIBITION BILL [H.L.]
Report of Amendments received (according to Order).
House adjourned at thirteen minutes before eight o'clock.