HL Deb 02 December 1963 vol 253 cc872-92

4.35 p.m.

Order of the Day for the House to be put into Committee read.

Moved, That the House do now resolve itself into Committee.—(The Duke of Devonshire.)

On Question, Motion agreed to.

House in Committee accordingly.

[The LORD STRANG in the Chair.]

Clause 1:

Provision for fully responsible status of Kenya

1.

(3) In this Act "Kenya" includes the territories comprised immediately before the appointed day in the Kenya Protectorate.

THE EARL OF LYTTON moved to add to subsection (3): "except the North-East Region." The noble Earl said: The significance of my Amendment, which is to add four words at the end of the first page, is to exclude from the area transferred to an independent Kenya Government the area wherein the inhabitants have shown that they are unanimously desirous of joining the Somali Republic. My reasons for persisting in this matter are that I feel we are doing something unjust, and on that point I have had a full hearing. I do not wish to repeat anything I said last Thursday. But I also feel that we are doing something highly imprudent which is letting loose the dogs of war, starting with terrorism, going on to the unexpected war without "the bomb," and at least extending the sphere of Soviet influence from Cairo to the Lorien swamp.

I want, then, as the first part of my attempt to persuade your Lordships to have second thoughts at the last minute, to review briefly, in diary form, the events that have driven the Somalia Government into the camp of the Soviet Union. I start in 1941, when the Emperor of Ethiopia distributed his claim to the ownership of the whole of the former Italian Somaliland and Eritrea by pamphlet from the air, dropped by the R.A.F. My authority is Sylvia Pankhurst—a recognised authority on these matters.

Then, on April 29, 1946, Mr. Bevin addressed his letter to various Powers recommending, as we know, the unification of all the Somalis. That was 41 years after Sir Charles Eliot, one of our greatest administrators, had suggested precisely the same thing. It is now about 60 years since Sir Charles Eliot, and they are still at it. The next date is June 4, 1946, when Mr. Bevin, our Foreign Secretary, repeated what he had recommended to the Powers. He gave a short historical review, quite contrary to that distributed by the Emperor, and a correct one. It is in Hansard of that date. On June 16, two days afterwards, the Emperor of Ethiopia gave an interview to Reuters protesting against the recommendations of Mr. Bevin on the grounds of Ethiopian strategical requirements.

On October 20, 1946, the Emperor addressed a lengthy memorandum to the United Nations embodying his version of history, and claimed the whole of the area I have already mentioned. This claim was repeated in almost, but not quite, the same words when I was in Delhi in April of this year, in a letter from the Ethiopian Embassy to the Statesman. I think the date was April 19, but I am not quite sure since my cutting has disappeared. In November, 1949, at the United Nations, the Pakistan delegate, Sir Safrullah Kahn, not only recommended complete Somali unity but predicted that they would unfailingly claim it. In 1950, the United Nations decided to establish a trust territory out of one of the dismembered portions of the Somali nation, the former Italian territory, and to appoint Italy as the trustee. On September 20 of that year the Emperor of Ethiopia telegraphed to the United Nations protesting against the selection of Italy and claiming, on the grounds of self-determination, that he should be the trustee.

On August 31, 1956, The Times published an important speech by the Emperor of Ethiopia—I am not sure about the date of the speech; I have checked The Times of August 31, 1956—in which he declared, in the Ogaden territory, that he was in favour of Greater Somalia and added: Thereby our country will be stronger and larger. and he concluded: We do not claim what is not ours; but we will not give up what is our own. What he meant, has been made clear by a Mrs. Saunders, who had the Emperor's ear and who wrote a book: he intended to assimilate the whole of the Greater Somalia on what he called the Eritrean solution. We have had an illustration of what he means by "the Eritrean solution" because he has swallowed it up; it is the same idea of assimilation as that of the python.

In 1958, a friend of mine, eminent in the Colonial Service of British Somaliland, was greatly concerned at the extreme slowness and at the way in which the British Government were dragging their feet and declining to say whether they would allow British Somaliland to join the former Italian Somaliland in a joint independent territory. Therefore, in order to discover what the obstacles were, he made approaches to the Foreign Office and to the American Embassy. At the Foreign Office they said: "The joining of British Somaliland to Italian Somaliland in one territory is regarded as a hostile act by the Emperor of Ethiopia. That is the obstacle." When he consulted his opposite number, who was also his friend, a man of substance in the American Embassy in London, the American replied to him: "In the event of conflict between your Somalis, and their undoubted rights on moral grounds, and the claim of Ethiopia, my Government will on international grounds always support Ethiopia." That was said, I presume, before President Kennedy.

On April 11, 1960, Mr. Macmillan made a statement in another place which is generally regarded as a pledge to the Emperor of Ethiopia. The general effect of that statement (which appeared in Hansard of that day and which was made in answer to a question by a Back-Bench member of his own Party) was to subsititute for the modern accepted principle of self-determination territorial integrity in three areas ripe for self-determination, each of them concerned with the Somali nation. That was one aspect of what he said. The second effect of what he said was to renounce the British Government's undoubted right at that time to grant permission to the Somali section of Kenya to secede, if it so wished, to Somalia. That was a very important occasion and a very important statement, which I took, when I first read it, as a casual statement, but which I am led to believe by Her Majesty's Ministers was in fact a pledge.

On July 1, 1960, Somalia became independent, with two States, British Somaliland having joined in at the last minute. The Somalis, with their trusted British colonial servants, who, indeed, are the salt of the earth, had managed to overcome the numerous objections, and the two parts came together. In November, 1961, Mr. Kenyatta, not yet, I think, having a Government and only recently out of detention, was the guest of the Emperor of Ethiopia in Addis Ababa. There he fixed up with the Emperor another exchange of pledges to ratify the boundary and guarantee the integrity of the existing frontiers of Kenya. Although he had no status at that time with us, he came away with a publicly-handed-over cheque for flood relief victims in Kenya. He was publicly treated by the Emperor as Her Majesty's representative; and this he was not.

April 15, 1962, was the date of the publication of a celebrated Report, the Kenya Constitutional Conference Report, with the phrase "promised decision on the findings". In July, Mr. Kenyatta was entertained as a hero in Mogadishu by the Somali Government. Here I should like to say that, from what I know of the Somali Government, Mr. Kenyatta's connection with Mau Mau is no sort of obstacle to honour, respect and popularity in the Republic of Somalia. But he arrived too late. He had already been pledged to the Emperor. Moreover, when the pledge was given to the Emperor, he had never been to the N.F.D., if I can rely on what the Provincial Commissioner at Isiolo said at the time. When I was in Isiolo, Mr. Kenyatta was in Addis Ababa. Nor had any other non-N.F.D. politician been there, with the exception of one, who flew there during the rains and was unable to see anybody or to be seen by anyone. It seems, from remarks which Mr. Kenyatta made immediately afterwards, that he quite misconceived the nature of the N.F.D. at the time when he exchanged what, to him, was the most advantageous and beneficial pledge for Kenya to ratify the boundary, which I believe was hitherto unratified. I would have brought this out before, because I think it has a bearing on the situation, but I felt that your Lordships would not believe me. So, about a year ago, I tried to get a photostatic copy of this Agreement, but I was unsuccessful. Fortunately, however, Mr. Kenyatta has blurted it out himself.

In 1962, at some time or another, the Emperor, having got worried about the reactions to this N.F.D. Commission, reminded Mr. Macmillan on October 10, 1962, of his pledge. Post hoc, and I suggest, propter hoc, a private memorandum was sent by the Colonial Office to the members of the Commission, which first came to my notice when the Commission's Report was published, when it referred to it rather obscurely, and it was later again brought to my notice by one of Her Majesty's Ministers. The effect of that memorandum was to approve talks on the problems of secession, but to make it clear that Her Majesty's Government were debarred from making a decision in favour of secession before independence—which means, of course, not at all. On August 18, 1963, Her Majesty's Government confirmed, in the conversations in Rome, what we all knew all along, though Her Majesty's Government had never said so—that there would be no permission to secede before independence.

I have omitted to say why my friend went to the American Embassy. It is because the Americans have a base somewhere in Eritrea, or in Eastern Abyssinia. I do not know whether it is an "ear", a "voice", or a trigger, but it is something. Someone told me once what it was and I have forgotten, and it does not matter; but my friend went to discover whether the Americans were an impediment to justice to the Somalis, and I have given you the answer.

That is the end of my first part. May I sum up the answers which the Somalis have received?—from noble Lords on the Government side, "Too difficult"; from the Opposition side "Too dangerous"; from the Liberal Benches, "Too late", a statement which is now echoed, I believe, by almost everybody; from Mr. Macmillan, "I cannot; I am pledged"; from the Emperor, "Sentimental rubbish"—I presume that the official Press, the Ethiopian Herald, is the expression of the Emperor's views, and that is what they said about my remarks when I first addressed your Lordships' House in 1962. Mr. Kenyatta, for whom I have great sympathy in this matter, says, "I cannot; I am pledged. Not an inch". From the United States they got: "The Emperor is always right"; from Mr. Khrushchev, "I will help"; from Mr. Mao, "I will help"; from British justice, "I am deaf"; from the United Nations, "We approve the swallowing of Eritrea". I think that this unfortunate little country, so full of determination to be free once more, could do nothing else but appeal to the tiger, as it has done. By approving, by saying, "Content" to my Amendment, your Lordships could check the dirty work that has been going on.

I should like here to say that among those prominent in giving adverse answers on the Somalis I have mentioned Mr. Duncan Sandys, and in previous debates perhaps I have had occasion to say things which might be deemed harsh. I should be glad if the noble Duke would convey to his colleagues, the noble Marquess, Lord Lansdowne, and Mr. Duncan Sandys, that the responsibility rests far above them, and at the time I was not aware how far. If I have said anything objectionable, I should like, though one cannot withdraw what the moving finger has written, at least to say that I am sorry. In that connection, I would say that, but for the help of former colonial servants, including three Governors, I should have had great difficulty in compiling for your Lordships this sorry tale.

It seems to me that we are quite likely at any moment to have a situation where the N.F.D. is conceded to the Somalis in return for something, that something probably taking one of two forms: either the Eritrean solution, which I have explained sufficiently, or a territorial guarantee of Ogaden, which is by far the most important part of what remains outside the control of the Somali nation.

In order to suggest a parallel to your Lordships and to bring into clear focus the problem of the Ogaden, I would go back a little and compare the present situation of the Ogaden with that of Mussolini thirty years ago, when we quite needlessly drifted into war. Your Lordships will forgive me for saying some things that some noble Lords may know, but I find that many people like to be reminded. Ethiopia means three things in history, and there were two Ethiopian Empires. It is simpler to talk about the Empire of Menelek I and Menelek II, or about Abyssinia and her Empire. Menelek I founded his Empire possibly thirty centuries ago. It was founded on one of the most glamorous episodes of universal history. This Empire was a small one of three or four tiny kingdoms in the inland highlands of Abyssinia and, with all its stagnant, suspicious, heroic, fascinating history, I have no wish to suggest that I should want anything other than its continued survival. But when Great Britain relieved Abyssinia of the fear of her two Northern neighbours, Egypt and the Sudan, at the end of the 19th century, and with all Europe seeking the favours of an Emperor by providing him with arms, he collected for himself an Empire, having seen how his European contemporaries were doing precisely the same thing. It is that Empire which I want to talk about.

In connection with Ethiopia, there is one episode to which one must refer; that is, the 16th century invasion of Abyssinia by Muslim forces, which derived impetus from the fall of Constantinople in 1453. It was perhaps a misfortune for the Somalis to-day that the leader Ahamed Gran is alleged to have been a Somali, because you can read in the correspondence of the Emperors that every Emperor grinds his teeth at the memory of Ahamed Gran. And it gives a false picture, because the Somalis have no natural desire for any portions of Ethiopia; nor have the Ethiopians any desire for Somalia. It is a case of desert dwellers with camels, nomads on the low level, Somalis, and at the top, Abyssinian agriculturists. There is no natural hostility; and, so far as I can see, there has been relative stability as between these two for several centuries since the Portuguese shot Ahamed Gran.

The disturbances in that area were due to European rivalries as much as anything else, and they were settled by a Treaty between Britain, Italy and France in 1906. They agreed to sustain the integrity of Ethiopia. Ethiopia was then four times the size it had been ten years before, and that is its present position. The decision was not taken to acquire Ethiopia in the Treaty. There is nothing to indicate that Ethiopia's interests are of the smallest interest to the three contracting parties. It was their own interests. One of the unfortunate things was that the acquired Empire of Ethiopia produced an immensely long and wide boundary of territory, several times the size of England, incompetently managed, with either no administration or a very indifferent or intermittent administration. But it was our policy to maintain it.

In 1934 in the incident over the Ogaden, which compares with the present incident, Mussolini invoked Clause 4 of that Treaty in order to bring to our notice that he was contemplating the occupation of a part or of the whole of Ethiopia. He inquired whether, under that clause, the interests which had to be considered would in any way be impaired if he did occupy Ethiopia. In our characteristic way, we pretended that we did not know, and set up quite a high-powered Commission, under Sir John Maffey, which duly reported.

Mussolini, of course, knew all about it, and he obtained a copy by photographing it in the Rome Embassy, a fact which is recorded in Lord Templewood's memoirs. This is the copy which I am using, because, although I was offered a copy by the Colonial Office to read, they said: "We cannot let you quote from it." It has the great drawback of being in Italian, and I am not a speaker of Italian, although I can browse through the newspapers. But in order to make sure that certain small passages are correct, and to give your Lordships an opportunity of correcting them, I want to point out what the Commission set out to do with regard to the Ogaden, and what they reported about the integrity of Ethiopia and the condition of the Ogaden; because after that Commission reported, Mussolini occupied the Ogaden, we occupied the Ogaden, and it has only gone back to the Ethiopians sixteen years from now.

I hope that I may succeed in telling your Lordships what is in the passage which I want to quote, and I hope that I may pronounce the Italian reasonably correctly. It starts in Part III. This Part was dedicated to examining, and then it quotes from the Report: …in quale misura gli interessi britannici sarebbero pregiudicati: a) da una occupazione italiana dell'Ogaden fino alle colline di Harrar o con Harrar inclusa; b) da una conquista di tutta l'Etiopia de parte dell'Italia."

SEVERAL NOBLE LORDS: Order, Order!

EARL ST. ALDWYN

Speak in English.

THE EARL OF LYTTON

May I translate?

LORD FRASER OF LONSDALE

Yes, please.

THE EARL OF LYTTON

I am really a novice in this House, and I do not quite know what the chorus was, whether it was to stop me or to encourage me to go on.

EARL ST. ALDWYN

Perhaps I can enlighten the noble Lord. It is not customary to use a language in the House other than English except for short quotations.

LORD SALTOUN

Surely it is not out of order for a noble Lord to quote a foreign language in this House. I remember when the late Duke of Devonshire, in a debate on water, quoted from Herodotus in Greek because he felt a little embarrassed at translating it into English. I remember the difficulty I had in trying to get it properly recorded in Hansard, but your Lordships will find it there.

THE MINISTER OF STATE FOR COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS AND FOR THE COLONIES (THE DUKE OF DEVONSHIRE)

I suggest to the noble Lord that the sins of the father should not be visited on the son.

LORD SALTOUN

The noble Duke is perfectly correct.

THE EARL OF LYTTON

I did not quite hear what was said.

SEVERAL NOBLE LORDS: Translate.

THE EARL OF LYTTON

If I may translate that first paragraph, the terms of reference of this Commission were to consider whether British interests would be prejudiced, first, by occupation on the part of Italy of the Ogaden up to a certain region, or a little more, or by a conquest of the entire area of Ethiopia. The conclusion from this is, "There do not exist any vital British interests in Ethiopia and her neighbouring territories of a kind to make it necessary for His Majesty's Government to resist an Italian conquest of Ethiopia. From every point of view the Italian control of Ethiopia would be for us advantageous."

In connection with the Ogaden it says, "There are also tribes on the boundaries as, for example, that of the Ogaden, over which the Ethiopian control is only intermittent and uncertain. These regions are a sort of Alsace and the source of continual embarrassment for neighbouring countries. Raids on stock do not begin to diminish, and it is always difficult to obtain the punishment of the guilty, who are often guilty also of killing people. Every incident which takes place gives rise to long procedures reaching Addis Ababa, and it is not uncommon for governors to disobey the orders from higher up. Criminals continue to find a refuge in Ethiopian territory, and there is the constant risk that conditions of disorganisation on the frontier may fall back again into that state of complete confusion which succeeded that period after the war. "It was then that preserving the integrity of Ethiopia ceased to be a vital British interest. Self-determination has now become a vital interest for everybody, at least in portions of Ethiopia, the Ogaden in particular, and that is the reason for the Emperor's intervention—to keep the Ogaden out of Somali hands. It is wholly Somali. It has become desirable to apply forthwith the principles of self-determination because the Somalis are going to be united; nothing will stop them, even if it takes another forty years.

In that connection, I want to conclude my third part, which will take not very long, with an account of the Somali character, and the way in which I can foresee that terrorism will spread. I take an account from what your Lordships' Librarian told me is the most authentic book by a man called Jardine, with a preface by Lord Milner: Bloodthirsty tyrant and cut throat; slaver of innocent women and children, cattle thief, profligate and libertine. On the same page and the following page: Great achievements. Fought the British Empire for 21 years. Five campaigns with massive orders of battle, field hospitals and heaven knows what. Venerated by his followers even when his fortunes were at their lowest. His name invoked in the heat of battle and at the cold hour of execution. Scoffed at terms offered no matter how favourable. Extraordinary tenacity. Did not know when he was beaten. The cost in premature deaths to his unfortunate people, probably 200,000. When old, he sought no comfort or repose, but tried once more to recover all that he had lost. What did he lose? What had he lost? Only his liberty, the liberty of his people. This is Mohamed Abdilie Hasan the Mad Mullah. When I met his son the other day at a cocktail party given in my honour, I had hoped that I might be able to invite him and introduce him to Her Majesty so that we could laugh about this period. But, alas! We are to go over it all again.

This is the way I foresee the terrorism developing. First, it must be remembered that the part which is being grievously injured is not the Somali Republic; it is Her Majesty's subjects, formerly loyal, in the N.F.D. Whether or not the Somali Republic agrees to anything, it is they who have been deprived of their uhuru and it is there that the resistance will start. They have the following characteristics. First, the nomads require very little to eat; can even live entirely on milk. Secondly, the young men are capable of doing, two nights in succession, 60 miles each night with a light load. Thirdly, they are capable of learning to use a precision weapon—officers of the Rifle Brigade have taught them. The Kikuyu would blame his rifle if he did not shoot well, but a Somali will learn to use precision weapons. Lastly, he will be assigned with others to a particular target: "Get so and so". This is likely to spread, and every incident will be attributed to the Somali Republic. They will be asked to catch the offenders, when they can lodge anywhere in Southern Abyssinia, anywhere across the Abyssinian boundary with Somali, which is 1,000 miles; 400 miles of Abyssinian frontier with Kenya; 350 miles between Kenya and Somalia a depopulated desert. If they are unhappy there they can go to the Sudan or elsewhere in Kenya; and this will spread to three-quarters of Ethiopia—that is the colonial part—and to four-fifths of Kenya which is the non-Negro part. That is where I think it is likely to spread.

There will be these dreadful reprisals. I myself am an honorary citizen of the village of Kalávryta in Greece. I was elected by the population consisting of some 700 widows. All their men folk had been killed by machine guns in cold blood one morning because of a reprisal. This is the sort of thing that is going to happen. Who will benefit? These Somalis are going to have their freedom, and if it requires the help of the Soviet Union they will perforce go to it. That is my reason for asking your Lordships to pass this Amendment now—to exclude from self-governing Kenya the part which is entitled to a separate self-government. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 1, line 16, at end insert ("except the North-east Region").—(The Earl of Lytton.)

5.18 p.m.

LORD HAWKE

I believe that the noble Earl has been a district commissioner in this part of the world, and is well known to many of us as an extremely charming author on that part of the world, and on many others. He has sought to raise the general question of the future of the Somali race on this smaller matter of the Kenya Bill. I have long been anxious and aware that this particular problem was an extremely grave one, and might well be a source of a local, and possibly spreading, war before very long. British Somaliland was an extremely poor country when it was a British Colony, and when we took over Somalia from the Italians it was completely and utterly unviable. The Italians had started some irrigated agriculture on the river there (I think it is called the Juba), and they had banana plantations, the produce of which the unfortunate Italian populace were made to buy at very high prices. They also attempted to establish a salt industry somewhere up by Cape Guardafui. At any rate, there was a colony there heavily subsidised by the Italians.

For the rest, both British Somaliland and Italian Somalia existed by nomadic grazing; and by heavily over-grazing. The British Military Government sent many reports home about this overgrazing and the steps they suggested to try to stop it, but there was a war on and nothing could be done. The noble Lord, Lord Rennell, if I remember aright, was Chief Officer of the British Military Government at the time. The people are nomads entirely dependent on their seasonal grazing in what is within Ethiopian boundaries in the Ogaden. When the British Military Government was in charge, British Military Government police used to accompany the tribesmen across the border into Ogaden for their grazing—I think their winter grazing—and these police kept the peace within the tribes and also between the tribes and the Ethiopians. Now, of course, we have withdrawn, and there the Muslim faces the Christian, the Muslim Somali tribesman the Ethiopian border guard; the Muslim defending his immemorial grazing rights in what is acknowledged to be a foreign territory, yet a territory a long way from Addis Ababa. And who knows to what degree the writ of the Emperor runs over his own border guards? It is a very explosive situation indeed, with Egypt fishing in troubled waters and the Russians and Chinese seeking to take sides.

The United Nations was created to try to stop wars before they started, and I should have thought that this unquestionably was a case where the whole problem should be put to the United Nations to arbitrate and produce a solution for this border situation between the new Somali Republic and Ethiopia. And at the same time they could, of course, consider the question of this province of Kenya which the noble Earl seeks to exclude from independent Kenya. I do not believe that his solution, to exclude it from independent Kenya, is the right one. That would be, politically, quite impossible and wrong. But if the United Nations were to produce a pan-Somali solution in which some sacrifice was demanded of Kenya, then presumably it would be possible for independent Kenya to implement such a suggestion. I shall not vote for the noble Earl's Amendment, but I thought that I should like to say those few words, having read so many reports from the field on this particular problem during the war years.

5.23 p.m.

LORD FARINGDON

I should like to apologise to your Lordships' House for coming in late and joining in a debate of which I have heard only a small part. If I do so it is because I have some small experience and knowledge of the Somalis, and I feel very strongly that Her Majesty's Government would be well advised to accept this Amendment. In saying that, I recognise that the Amendment does not solve the problem. It leaves entirely open what would be the position after Kenyan independence of this particular area. But I have no doubt at all that Her Majesty's Government are doing a very considerable disservice to the new State of Kenya in throwing this problem of the Somalis into their laps at a time when they are establishing that independence and when stability is of the essence of their future prosperity.

I share the anxieties of the noble Earl who has moved this Amendment, and I believe that Her Majesty's Government would have done a much better job by the people of Kenya had they excluded this province until such time as agreement satisfactory to all parties could be reached. I hope that Her Majesty's Government will reconsider this matter.

LORD OGMORE

I rise because the noble Earl, Lord Lytton mentioned my name twice on the Second Reading of the Bill and, by implication, again to-day. It was, in fact, a private letter that I wrote to him. I make no particular complaint, but it is more usual, I think, to ask permission if one is going to quote from a private letter. That, however, is not the point, and, as I say, I do not object to it. But, unintentionally no doubt, the noble Earl has misquoted me. The reason I am against what is behind the Amendment is that it would, of course, be quite impossible to try to cut off this huge area of Kenya at this moment in time. To ask this House and Her Majesty's Government to leave out the North-East district of Kenya is to ask something that is quite unreasonable and quite impossible. In my view, the noble Duke and the Government are quite right in keeping the boundaries of Kenya as they are, and I cannot understand why the noble Lord, Lord Faringdon, should think that at this late stage we could do anything else.

It is true that in this hot and arid region of the North-East tribesmen wander around the various areas and try to cross the frontiers. But that is not the point. The fact is that for many years past this whole area has been administered by the Government of Kenya; it has sent officers up there; it has had a Regional Commissioner for the area; and it has been administered as an integral part of the country. How can we at this moment, when granting independence, suddenly snatch it away and give it to some undisclosed or even disclosed authority? How on earth could that be done? It may be, as the noble Lord, Lord Hawke, says, that in the future the Kenya Government would be prepared to throw the whole thing into the melting pot and get the United Nations involved in it. I do not know, but I myself feel that it is highly unlikely they would do anything of the kind. It is not up to us. That is for the future. I support the Government, and I hope that the Committee will reject the Amendment.

THE EARL OF LISTOWEL

Perhaps, before the noble Duke replies, I may be permitted to say a very few words on the noble Earl's Amendment. The noble Earl asked us for second thoughts about the Somali problems, and I listened carefully to everything he said in his speech. I have listened carefully to all his speeches, both on the Second Reading of this Bill and on the debates on Kenya that we have had from time to time in this House, and I have not noticed that he has used any fresh arguments. All the arguments he used did credit to his very sincere championship in the cause of the Somalis, but I did not notice anything new in what he said, and for that reason I am afraid that I remain unmoved. The terms of his Amendment are that the whole of the North-Eastern Region of Kenya should be left out of Kenya when Kenya becomes independent. But, as the noble Earl would agree, this would include many tribes, and not only Somalis.

THE EARL OF LYTTON

May I offer what I believe is a correction? This is a very complicated problem: for on the same pages of the Kenya atlas you find different terms used. The present term for the Province just before independence was "Northern Province". It was divided into the N.F.D., about which we have all been talking, and other districts with which I need not bother. The N.F.D., although 86 per cent. of its people are believed to be Somali or pro-Somali, has indeed got portions which are homogeneous anti-secessionist and which could be retained in Kenya and have been retained in the Eastern Region. The Regional Boundaries Commission gave as one of their arguments for doing this that if, at a later date, it was decided to lop off the North-East Region it would cause no administrative confusion and would be quite simple—that is, apart, I believe, from some very small exceptions.

THE EARL OF LISTOWEL

The noble Earl is a great authority on this subject, but I should very much doubt if all the inhabitants of this region want to go to Somalia and be excluded from Kenya. I should have thought, even if his case had been accepted, that the wiser course would be to have a plebiscite to decide which people in that area wished to go to Somalia. But that is on the very narrow question of the Amendment, and I myself do not believe the noble Earl's reason for putting down this Amendment was the hope of getting it carried, but rather to have another opportunity to state his case for the Somalis. I agree with what the noble Duke said on Second Reading and with what the noble Lord, Lord Hawke, and the noble Lord, Lord Ogmore, have said, that in fact it would be a political impossibility to transfer this region to Somalia and to exclude it from Kenya at this stage. The Somali problem in relation to Kenya is no longer a problem for the British Government; it is an African problem and it is a problem for all the African Governments concerned, the African Governments with Somali minorities and of course Somalia itself.

The noble Lord, Lord Hawke, suggested that this is a matter which should be dealt with by the United Nations. There is something to be said for that solution. I do not think it arises strictly on the Amendment, but this is a general discussion and I think we are entitled to go rather beyond the Amendment. There is something to be said for that solution, but I do assure the noble Lord that it would be a great mistake for the British Government to take the initia- tive. I am sure that would be resented in Africa; and if it were brought to the attention of the United Nations, this should be done by an African Government.

LORD HAWKE

Who is entitled to take to the Security Council the fact that there is some problem in the world which is likely to lead to war? This is likely to lead to war.

THE EARL OF LISTOWEL

I am open to correction, but I think any member of the United Nations is entitled, under the Charter, to bring to the notice of the General Assembly of the United Nations any matter which is likely to cause a disturbance of world peace. I think that the British interest in all this is primarily the maintenance of peace in that part of Africa, and that what we should do is to appeal to all the people, individuals and Governments, concerned to settle this problem by discussion, negotiation—by peaceful methods and not by violence or what the noble Earl, Lord Lytton, called terrorism, because not only would this be disastrous in this part of Africa but it might easily bring the cold war into Africa. Somalia has already been armed very heavily by the Soviet Union, and we do not want other great Powers doing the same kind of thing in order to assist Somalia's neighbours. So I do think that the noble Earl would be well advised to withdraw this Amendment having had this very full discussion on the Amendment; and say this in spite of the view of my noble friend Lord Faringdon, although I welcome his view because it shows that noble Lords on the back Benches on this side of the House also have independent minds.

THE DUKE OF DEVONSHIRE

I must say at once that Her Majesty's Government cannot accept the noble Earl's Amendment. The effect of accepting it would be that this area of Kenya, the North-East Region, would remain a British Colony. Special constitutional arrangements would have to be devised for it, and the Colony would not only be completely landlocked but also economically totally unviable. Clearly it would be a hopeless task for the British Government to have to rule such an area without the active co-operation of the neighbouring Powers. The British Gov- ernment have repeatedly made it clear that they have tried hard to find a peaceful and honourable solution to the problem of the Somalis in Kenya, and I dealt at some length with this during the debate of last Thursday.

I would remind your Lordships that the British Government initiated the talks which were held in Rome early this year between the British Government and the Somali Government at which the Kenya Government was represented. Our hopes of securing an agreed settlement were not realised, and we came to the conclusion that it would be wrong for the British Government to take a unilateral decision about the frontiers of Kenya without reference to the wishes of the Government of Kenya, whose Ministers had already made it clear that any such decisions would be quite unacceptable to them.

At this point I would take up the cudgels with the noble Lord, Lord Faringdon, who said that we are doing a disservice to the Kenya Government by putting this problem in their lap. That is not the view taken by Kenya Ministers—in fact, very strongly the reverse. The Rome talks were not intended to close the door to an agreed solution. On the contrary: we sought to make the British Government's position clear and to promote agreement through negotiation between the African Governments concerned. The Kenya Government were prepared to engage in such negotiations, and recognised the interest of the Somali Government in the future of the Somali people residing in Kenya. It was the Somali Government's insistence that their own proposals must be accepted as a pre-condition of their acceptance of the offer of Kenya Ministers to resume talks between the Kenya and Somali Governments that led to the Rome talks being concluded without agreement. Both the British and the Kenya Governments naturally felt that such a pre-condition could not be accepted, and I am quite sure noble Lords in all parts of the House will agree with that attitude.

The matter was referred to again during the Kenya Independence Conference when the future of the North-East Region was again considered, and it was agreed that the people of the region should be given a fresh opportunity to elect a Regional Assembly, either before or shortly after independence, and to send representatives to the National Assembly. These arrangements would give adequate opportunity to the inhabitants of the North-East Region to enjoy in full measure those benefits of the new Constitution which are, I would remind your Lordships, expressly designed to give all the people of Kenya a large measure of autonomy in the conduct of local affairs. Some recent developments, such as the personal discussions between the Somali Foreign Minister and Kenya Ministers, have given grounds for hoping that a peaceful solution may be found. On the other hand, recent outbreaks of violence illustrate the potential dangers. A peaceful solution of this problem is essential to the peace and stability of this part of Africa, and Her Majesty's Government believe that such a solution must be achieved by direct negotiations between the Governments immediately concerned, and they do not consider that it would be achieved by the means proposed by the noble Earl in the terms of his Amendment. With Kenya's independence less than two weeks away, it must surely be clear that this problem can be resolved only by the two Governments primarily concerned. I can only repeat that the noble Earl's Amendment is quite unacceptable to Her Majesty's Government.

THE EARL OF LYTTON

May I begin by offering an apology to the noble Lord, Lord Ogmore? I seem to have broken the rules of protocol in referring to the substance of a private letter. I assure him that, as I learn the ways of your Lordships' House, I will try to avoid stepping on people's corns and dropping bricks.

May I refer to one or two of the points that have been made? First, the non-viability of the N.F.D. Of course it is non-viable; nobody would want it, except the mother of children. The Somali Government, out of £30 million foreign aid (and this foreign aid, incidentally, existed long before the China arrangement; it was more than a year ago) have allocated £300,000 a year for it. According to figures I obtained from the Provincial Commissioner, that should be more than enough to cover it in the stagnant, unprogressive, non-welfare state in which we have preserved it all the time we have had it.

The noble Earl, Lord Listowel, mentioned the question of Somali arms from the Soviet Union. I have no information about what they are; but from time to time I have had information about Ethiopian arms, and I suggest that Ethiopia keeps five divisions in or near the Ogaden for the suppression of self-determination of Somalis, and a great many more elsewhere. That is the reason. The new factor—or what I thought was the new factor—was the intervention of the Emperor of Ethiopia at every stage to stop every contribution to the reunification of the Somali people, together with Mr. Macmillan's—that is, Her Majesty's Government's—underwriting of a principle quite contrary to that of self-determination. That I thought was a new factor—but never mind.

With regard to the United Nations, there are tremendous difficulties. It is we who have the authority in the N.F.D. They discussed this matter for four years, and, as I mentioned last time, the pan-Africans have adopted the sanctity of colonial boundaries, which they have always denounced as a means of getting us out—a most ungenerous thing in view, as I said last time, of the fact that Somali independence set the pace from which they have benefited. It was most unfair. But I am not hopeful of the United Nations. The Somalis have gone round to London, to Washington, to Bonn and to Rome. They made Mr. Kenyatta a freeman of their city. They have been to Addis Ababa. They have been everywhere ever since they were born in 1960, trying to get further unification. There is "No" in every direction. What more can they do? That is my view.

I must deny the noble Earl's suggestion that I am here to air my views. It has been a great inconvenience to me to come here all this year. I am not a political Peer. I do not come often enough to cover my expenses by putting in a claim. It is a great inconvenience. I am here to get freedom for all the people I like in Kenya; that is the only reason. There was this question of the pre-condition. Her Majesty's Government had a pre-condition which the Somali Prime Minister brought to my attention more than a year ago. This is the renunciation by Mr. Macmillan of the British Government's right to give freedom. He knew about that pre-condition.

I do not think I have missed anything that any noble Lord might wish me to answer. I am extremely grateful for the forthright support of the noble Lord, Lord Faringdon. I do not wish to withdraw my Amendment. In these cases I believe it is customary for one, when asked—I say this because I am a novice—to say "Content", which is a disposition of mind I do not enjoy at this moment, and then, on the second occasion, to remain silent and to have the Amendment negatived. Unless anybody else is going to insist on any other formula, that is what I am assured is the best thing to do. But I could not withdraw the Amendment.

On Question, Amendment negatived.

Clause 1 agreed to.

Remaining clauses and Schedules agreed to.

House resumed.

Bill reported without amendment; Report received.

Forward to