Lords Sitting of 27 June 1962

Preamble
The House met at half past two of the clock, The LORD CHANCELLOR on the Woolsack.
Prayers—Read by the Lord Chancellor
The Viscount Norwich—Took the Oath.

PUBLICATION OF MOLONY REPORT
2.35 p.m.
BARONESS BURTON OF COVENTRY: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
[The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government whether they are now in a position to announce the date of publication of the Report of the Molony Committee.]
THE JOINT PARLIAMENTARY SECRETARY, MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE, FISHERIES AND FOOD (EARL WALDEGRAVE): My Lords, my right honourable friend the President of the Board of Trade is hopeful that the Report will be published before the Summer Recess, but the printing has not yet reached a stage which would permit him to announce a firm date.
BARONESS BURTON OF COVENTRY: My Lords, in thanking the noble Earl for that Answer, may I ask whether he is in a position to say when we might hope to be given a firm date?
EARL WALDEGRAVE: No, my Lords. I do not think I can take my first Answer further: the Report will be published as soon as possible, but I cannot give a firm date at the moment.

ENRICHED URANIUM SUPPLIES
2.37 p.m.
VISCOUNT CALDECOTE: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
[The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government whether sufficient supplies of enriched
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uranium are likely to be available to meet United Kingdom needs.]
THE LORD PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL AND MINISTER FOR SCIENCE (VISCOUNT HAILSHAM): My Lords, supplies of enriched uranium available for the United Kingdom programme are now such that some reduction can be made in the output of the Atomic Energy Authority's diffusion plant at Capenhurst, and Her Majesty's Government have decided on this course. The Capenhurst plant, which is in Cheshire, started operations in 1953, and produces enriched uranium for military purposes and for civil research and development. I must make it plain that supplies are fully adequate for the current nuclear deterrent policy, which has not changed. The numbers employed at the plant will fall by some 500 by about the end of this year. Some of the staff reductions will be achieved by wastage and redeployment but some redundancy will be unavoidable. The greatest possible warning will be given to those concerned and every effort will be made to assist them in finding alternative employment. The Authority will immediately discuss these matters with the staff associations and trade unions concerned.
VISCOUNT CALDECOTE: My Lords, I thank the noble Viscount for that reply. Can he say whether, in view of the possible change of requirements of the civil atomic energy programme, the supplies of enriched uranium will be adequate for years to come?
VISCOUNT HAILSHAM: Oh, yes.

DISARMAMENT
2.40 p.m.
LORD HENDERSON LORD HENDERSON rose to call attention to the work of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament; and to move for Papers. The noble Lord said: My Lords, I rise to move the Motion standing in my name on the Order Paper. There could hardly be a more appropriate time for this House to review the problems of disarmament, and I am glad that on this occasion we are able to concentrate on this subject rather than deal with it as part of the whole complex picture of international relations. The world has

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been reminded in the last few months of the massive power of nuclear weapons. Last summer there were many of us, no doubt, who hoped that there would be no more weapons tests. The three years' moratorium observed by the three great Powers had been disregarded only by the French, who carried out four small atomic tests in the Sahara. Unhappily, the Russian Government used these tests as a pretext for its own massive series in the autumn, when more than 40 explosions shook the atmosphere—and, indeed, the world. We are now in the middle of the consequential American series, with the prospect that the Russians may follow suit with another series of their own.
It is a sad fact that after sixteen years of negotiations in Geneva, New York and London we have not found the way even to control the arms race, let alone stop it. We have in recent times been reminded, not only of the massive destructive power of nuclear weapons, but of the refinements in the techniques of production to such a degree that, if we are to believe the Minister of Supply, Mr. Godber—and there is no reason why we should not—a strategic nuclear warhead could now be contained in a cylinder 1½ metres long and 16 centimetres in diameter. Mr. Godber reminded the Geneva Conference that enough of these warheads could be concealed in the council chamber where they were meeting to annihilate the capital cities of all the seventeen countries represented at the Conference. In fact, he said that they could be annihilated several times over.
This debate is also taking place at a time when the statesmen and political correspondents in the world are involved in discussions on the tactics of nuclear policy. In his historic speech in the University of Michigan on June 16, Mr. Robert McNamara, the United States Secretary for Defence, hit out not only at the prospect of nuclear weapons going into the hands of more and more countries, but at the actual dangers of independently-controlled nuclear deterrents. The existence of relatively weak national nuclear forces with enemy cities as their targets, he said, was in certain circumstances inviting pre-emptive first strike against them. He went on to say, in short, that limited nuclear capabilities
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operating independently are dangerous, expensive, prone to obsolescence and lacking in credibility as a deterrent. In his view the creation of a single additional nuclear force encourages the proliferation of nuclear power with all its attendant dangers. On this side of the House we agree with Mr. McNamara's assessment, and it is for this reason that Labour has called on the Government to cease the attempt to remain an independent nuclear power.
This is not, I know, a Defence debate but the question of the national possession and independent control of nuclear capabilities is linked with the spread of nuclear weapons and is of vital importance to those attending the Geneva Disarmament Conference. But perhaps the main reason why this debate is so well-timed is that it gives us the opportunity of reviewing the work of the Seventeen-Nation Conference during its first three months of work. The negotiations have opened with some degree of optimism, not because any of us thought the job was going to be easy but because there were for the first time a number of agreed principles to serve as a basis for the talks.
There was also a feeling that this Conference, unlike the Ten-Nation Conference and all the Commissions which had met before it, had to achieve results. When the Foreign Secretary said in his introductory speech to the Conference:
We are ready to stay here until we have hammered out policies which are acceptable on all matters before us."
he was echoed by many of the other delegates. In fact, it was said by some of the commentators in Geneva that the Canadian delegation, at least, had arrived ready to settle in Geneva for the next three years. I hope that it will not be necessary for them to stay that long, but the results of the first three months have certainly not given any hope that quick results are possible. We cannot deny that there have been real disappointments and some positive setbacks.
It is, for instance, unfortunate that the French Government have refused to take part in the negotiations. Surely they are as concerned to achieve disarmament as we are. The absence of one of the leading Western Powers inevitably casts doubts on the unity of approach

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of the NATO countries to the problem of disarmament. Most of us will also agree that it was unfortunate that agreement could not have been reached before the Conference to include China. A general disarmament agreement will not be worth the paper it is written on if China is not prepared to comply with its terms.
Then we must also face the obvious fact that in certain respects the attitude of the Soviet Union has not been encouraging. What often makes the Russians so difficult to deal with is that what they agree upon one day may be rejected by them the next. We saw this during the prolonged negotiations for a test ban agreement when the seventeen articles, laboriously approved and accepted, were thrown to the winds by the Soviet delegate. There has been a repetition of this conduct in relation to the declaration on war propaganda which had been jointly submitted to the Geneva Conference by the United States and the Soviet Union as co-Chairmen of the Conference. On May 24 it had been unanimously approved by the Conference sitting in committee. When, on May 29, it came up for adoption by the Conference at plenary session Mr. Zorin had received instructions from Moscow that the declaration was not to be approved. He proposed a number of amendments which were totally unacceptable to the rest of the Conference. Then, to add insult to injury, he asserted on June 14 that the United States was the responsible party for rejecting the declaration.
On the vital question of inspection of a disarmament agreement the Russians have also rejected the hopeful plan put forward by the United States for sample inspection. I want to deal with this matter later in my speech. So far as the nuclear tests are concerned, the Russian attitude was re-stated a few days ago in the letter which Mr. Khrushchev sent to 65 Labour Members of Parliament. They had requested the Soviet Government not to retaliate against the nuclear series now being carried on by the United States. His reply was, I am afraid, a cynical piece of hypocrisy. He pretended in his letter that all the blame for the continuation of nuclear tests fell on the United States and the British Governments.
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"Even before the Geneva Conference began",
he wrote,
"the United States carried out extensive series of underground nuclear explosions",
totally ignoring the fact that these tests were a direct consequence of the Soviet tests of the autumn. By resuming nuclear tests the Western Powers were, he said,
"deliberately drawing the Soviet Union into another round in the competition in the sphere of improving nuclear weapons."
This, my Lords, of course, is precisely what the Soviet series had done a few months before.
My Lords, the interim progress report which the co-chairmen have sent to the United Nations Disarmament Commission comprises, in the main, official documents which have been put before the Geneva Conference. It makes no mention of the discussions that have taken place. It records no progress, which is perhaps understandable, because I think the work of the Conference so far should be regarded as of a preliminary nature. Only on its resumption next month will the Conference be getting down to detailed consideration of the American and Russian plans stage by stage. Really serious negotiations, it is to be hoped, will then begin.
My Lords, I hope it is the intention of the Foreign Secretary and his American and Soviet colleagues to be in Geneva for some part of the early proceedings. Their presence and leadership can give a fresh impetus to the negotiations and it would also be an opportunity to resume their own private talks. These talks may indeed set the rate of conference progress, and in particular may be the best means of composing major differences. Mr. Dean Rusk, the American Secretary of State, in a speech made ten days ago, stated,
"There is some basis for hope. For the first time we have been able to identify some of the main problems in talks with the Soviet Union. The joint statement of agreed principles worked out last summer by Mr. McCloy and the Soviet delegate, Mr. Zorin, have been accepted as a basis of the Geneva negotiations. While these eight principles are quite general, they have made it possible to begin discussion with a more nearly common language."
The absence of double talk and the use of a more nearly common language should be of real advantage to the work

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of the Conference in the resumed negotiations.
I hope it will also mean that an end will be put to Russian propaganda tendencies to talk as though only Soviet Russia and her associates are genuinely seeking disarmament. It has almost seemed that the only acceptable proof of other nations' sincerity was acceptance of the Russian draft treaty. Surely it must be clear to all, whether Communist, Western or neutral Powers, that the only possible way to achieve agreement is by concessions being made by both sides. The Russians can no more hope for the rest of the Conference to accept their draft treaty as it stands than the Americans can expect a similar response to their draft plan. What is required is a process of give-and-take through genuine negotiations, the effect of which, at each successive stage, will be to give no military advantage to either side. As the Foreign Secretary told the Conference in its early days,
"if we can agree on principles we can and must agree on the measures to implement them".
If looked at in this way, there ought to be real prospects of progress at Geneva. There is, after all, a good deal that is common in the two draft programmes. Both sides propose a reduction in the means of delivery of nuclear weapons in the first stage, the United States by 30 per cent., and the U.S.S.R. by 100 per cent. The U.S.S.R. couple this with the complete cessation of manufacture of means of delivery of nuclear weapons. Then both sides propose a cut-off of fissile material production, the United States in Stage 1, the U.S.S.R. in Stage 2. Both sides would prohibit nuclear tests in Stage 1 and ban the use of space vehicles for military purposes. Both sides propose a reduction of conventional military forces, to 2·1 million in the United States programme, and 1·7 million in the Soviet Union's.
There are, of course, differences and every attempt must be made to search for common ground. I will suggest only two or three fields in which such common ground may be sought. Let me take first the question of timing. The United States plan envisages three years for Stage 1, three years for Stage 2, and within an agreed period of time, as
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promptly as possible, for Stage 3. The U.S.S.R. suggests fifteen months each for Stages 1 and 2 and one year for Stage 3. The difference is six to nine years under the United States plan and three and a half to four years under that of the U.S.S.R. There is room for compromise here. Three two-year stages would seem reasonable. Psychologically there is value in setting a time limit for the whole operation rather than for the first two stages only. But it is clear that we can proceed to the next stage only after the previous stage is completed.
Concerning manpower levels, in Stage 1 the U.S.S.R. wants manpower cut back to 1·7 million men, and the U.S. to not more than 2·1 million. The difference would not appear to be so great as to present a serious obstacle. If the Americans would accept a lower figure of 1·9 million or 2 million, then it is more likely that the Russians would accept the United States plan for a 30 per cent. reduction in nuclear and conventional armaments in the first stage.
Then there is also the vital question of the means of delivery and foreign bases. The Russians propose the abolition of all the means of delivery and the closing of foreign bases in Stage 1. This is quite unrealistic and obviously unacceptable. It means that in the first stage American and other N.A.T.O. forces would have to withdraw from Europe while Russian troops in large quantities, even though reduced, were in European Russia. But the Americans might well offer to compromise here. They could increase their proposed cut of 30 per cent. to 50 per cent. or some other agreed figure. Alternatively, since the Americans have a bigger nuclear capacity than the Russians have, the Russians might well wish not to relate the cuts to a percentage but to have all measures directed to producing parity or near parity as between the two sides. This, however, makes it all the more important to know what is left.
This, my Lords, brings me to what is without doubt the most important question: inspection. It has always been a point of acute controversy and was the principal question about which disagreement persisted even in the Zorin-McCloy statement of principles endorsed by the United Nations Assembly. Among

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these agreed principles was an affirmation that
"all disarmament measures should be implemented from beginning to end under strict and effective international control".
In arriving at these agreed principles the Russians refused to include an American proposal that verification should ensure not only that agreed limitations or reductions take place, but also that retained armed forces and armaments do not exceed agreed levels at any stage. The Americans made it plain that this clause expressed a key element which must be maintained in any comprehensive disarmament negotiations or agreement. It is surely clear, therefore, that there is little likelihood of a general disarmament treaty if the Russians do not in some way concede the obligation to permit inspection of what is left as well as what has been destroyed. Mr. Rusk has said that
"the Soviet Union must realise that it cannot eat the cake of disarmament and keep the cake of secrecy".
It should be recognised that the Russians have gone further in general provisions for inspection machinery than ever before, particularly in their proposals for an immediate cut-off of the production of all means of delivery for nuclear weapons and the installation of inspectors in all factories making such means, in their widely drafted anti-surprise-attack article, Article 14, and in the plan for budgetary inspection; but the question of verifying retained armed forces and armaments to ensure that they do not exceed agreed limits at any stage is ignored. As disarmament processes will begin only after a general and complete disarmament treaty has been agreed and comes into force, it is not easy to understand why the Russians continue to resist the proposal with the charge of espionage and to toe so concerned to maintain secrecy. Verification of what is left seems to me to be not only reasonable and desirable but also a necessary condition for building up and maintaining the public confidence of nations in the reliability of general controlled disarmament by stages as a safeguard and a guarantee of their security.
I think most of us, therefore, regard the introduction by the Americans of the Sohn Plan for sample verification by progressive zonal inspection as a welcome step towards meeting Russian fears of
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espionage. Under it there can be no roving commissions for snooping at the expense of Russian security interests. The Western Powers and the neutrals must not give up trying to persuade the Russians to accept some form of it, for much is at stake on agreement being reached on this point of verification.
The problem of verification also continues to bedevil all efforts to get a test ban treaty. Ail nations want an end put to testing. I believe that the three neutral Powers are anxious to get a treaty, but there is one major obstacle. The Russians argue that all tests can be detected by national systems: the United States and British Governments deny this. We do not know who is right; it is a technical issue which presumably only the scientists can determine. Surely in that case the Russians should agree to a meeting of scientists on this matter. The Western Governments are concerned about what are termed suspicious events, the nature of which cannot be properly assessed, except by on-the-spot examination. It was with a view to breaking this deadlock that the eight uncommitted nations put forward their proposals.
The plan suggests the setting up of an international Commission, consisting of a limited number of qualified scientists, possibly from non-aligned countries, together with an appropriate staff. Both sides accepted the plan as a basis for discussion, but disagreement centres on the question of whether the international inspectorate should have the right to visit sites of suspected underground incidents when national monitoring systems have revealed something which could be a test and which could not be satisfactorily explained without on-site examination.
The neutrals' plan was accepted by Russia on the basis that verification was permissive. The West insist that such a right must be obligatory. Acceptance of a minimum degree of verification by the Soviet Union not only could give confidence to the other Powers that the ban was being observed, but would show Soviet faith in the whole question of inspection. While recognising some weaknesses in the neutrals' plan, I would urge Her Majesty's Government not to reject it without most careful examination. Russia's acceptance of the plan for an international commission is at least some degree of progress. Further discussion

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may lead to an extension of the area of agreement and help to provide an acceptable solution of this major point of disagreement. I beg the Foreign Secretary personally to take this matter in hand in talks with his American and Soviet colleagues. It may be that there can be no treaty before the Russians have carried out another series of tests; but in the meantime it is not too much to ask that practical international steps should be taken to determine whether national systems are or are not adequately effective. It would be a tragedy if a question of fact were allowed to deny the world the safeguard of a test ban treaty.
Finally, my Lords, there are a number of important subjects on which I should have thought some progress could also be made, even though the general negotiations may be protracted. For instance, there seems to be general agreement that rockets and satellites placed in orbit or launched into outer space should be used for peaceful purposes only, and that a system of notification should be established. There also appears to be agreement on the promoting of technical studies on the means of dealing with chemical and bacteriological weapons. Could we not also get an agreement on the prohibition of the spread of nuclear weapons? This is an important feature of the American draft, and it is supported in the Soviet draft.
We also welcome the fact that the Polish Government have again put forward, this time in much greater detail than ever before, the Rapacki Plan for the establishment of an atom-free zone and an area of restricted armaments in Central Europe. It has always seemed to us that the Rapacki Plan offered an admirable opportunity not only for a limited disarmament agreement but for experimenting in arms control as an area where it would be rather easier than in the Soviet Union itself, or, for that matter, in the United States. Surely it would be reasonable for the Western Powers to enter into discussions with Poland and Czechoslovakia concerning this idea. I have no doubt that it could be improved in discussion, but it does offer the first step towards a practical programme of disengagement, which the Labour Party have been urging for the past five years.
In this connection, my Lords, consideration should also be given to proposals for the establishment of nuclear-free zones in other parts of the world. For my own part, I think we should support the United Nations Assembly resolution calling for the establishment of Africa as a nuclear-free area. Former President of the United States of America, President Eisenhower, argued the case better than I can in his speech to the Assembly in December, 1960, when he said:
"More important, I hope that the African States will use existing or establish new regional machinery in order to avert an arms race in this area. In so doing they would help to spare their continent the ravages which the excesses of Chauvinism have elsewhere inflicted in the past. If through concerted effort these nations can choke off competition in armaments they can give the whole world a lesson in international relations.…"
The House will realise, therefore, that in my view, although there have been discouraging aspects of the first stage of the Geneva Conference, there are many fields in which progress could be made. To the extent that we can look optimistically to the future, it is in part thanks to the presence and rôle of the eight uncommitted countries. It might well be that had they not provided the cement for the bricks the whole edifice of the Geneva Conference would have broken down by now, as did the Ten-Nation Conference before it. Admittedly some of the delegations from the uncommitted countries arrived new to the complex problems involved in disarmament, but they have been learning fast, and I believe that they are now making a very sound countribution to the Conference. What was lacking in the Ten-Nation Conference was the presence of any Powers who were in a position to seek a middle course.
My Lords, there has been a long and disappointing history of disarmament negotiations since the end of the First World War. Hopes have been raised, only to be dashed time and again. Now we are all waiting for some significant sign of progress in the present effort. There is a need at Geneva for patience and persistence, but also for a sense of urgency.
LORD BOOTHBY: My Lords, in view of what the noble Lord has just said, would he not agree that, before you can get effective disarmament of any

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kind, you must have a resolution of the major political problems which divide the world at the moment?
LORD HENDERSON: I think that that is a view that has been expressed, both ways, in all the years I have been listening to discussions on disarmament: that if you get disarmament, you will then find it easier to solve the political problems; if you solve the political problems, it will be easier to get disarmament. I will leave that to be decided by history.
There have been arms races in the past ending in war, and nuclear war would endanger the human race itself. We have got to end the arms race, remove the intolerable burden of world armaments, and free the peoples from the fear of war. As the most reverend Primate the Lord Archbishop of Canterbury recently said, the only safeguard for peace is the abolition or drastic reduction of all weapons of all kinds. I believe that it is the supreme duty and responsibility of the leaders of the nations to make sure that the word "failure" is not written at the end of this latest disarmament effort, otherwise, who knows, it might prove to be the last disarmament opportunity. My Lords, I beg to move for Papers.
3.15 p.m.
LORD REA: My Lords, I do not propose to add many words to the picture which has been given us—a picture, up to a point, of disappointment, frustration and anxiety; and yet, I think, a picture in which one pigment at least is constant: that of genuine and deep hope that we may come through this desperately anxious time with two achievements. The first is that nations do not, by confusion and obstinacy in this generation, put an end to civilisation, and even to existence on earth. That is a negative aim. The second is that we do not merely postpone the holocaust and put the intolerable responsibility for it on to our children, or on to some later generation. We must try to stamp out this danger for all time. That is a positive aim. It is a difficult one, but it is closely linked in every moral sense with the first. My Lords, I am well aware that all these things have been said before.
The record of the Committee on Disarmament, to which the Motion refers, is
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indeed rather worrying. I do not use the word "desperate", because a great deal of sincere hard work has been involved, and we all earnestly hope that that hard work and the effort to meet; to understand; to compromise, when necessary; to agree, may in fact have led the Committee to a point much nearer to success than we ourselves know at present. It is, of course, probably more important than anything else in the world, as the noble Lord, Lord Henderson, said, to be optimistic rather than pessimistic; for pessimism must inevitably lead to disaster. But things are so sinister that optimism is rather difficult to define. One might to-day describe an optimist as one who thinks that the future holds grave difficulties. Yet even that cynical view is better than thinking that the future holds nothing at all. At the same time, it is rather disturbing that only a tentative draft of a preamble to a Disarmament Treaty, and a tentative draft on a single section of that Treaty—both drafts having loopholes and spaces and gaps where agreement was found to be impossible—comprise the total progress report on 46 plenary sessions, eleven meetings of the nuclear test ban sub-committee, seven informal conferences, eight sittings of that Committee as a whole and innumerable quasi-official and private meetings held during the last three months.
But, In spite of this low-gear performance, we have, and very much value, the repeated assurances of the U.S.S.R. that they are with us in a real desire to achieve total world disarmament in the end. Therefore, of course, there can be no reason or excuse for hanging back from a continued exploration of every possible means of getting this. We have complained, I think with justification, that although we of the West are prepared to go half-way, or more than half-way, to meet the difficulties, the counter-offer to our 50 per cent. is very often a mere 2 per cent., or nothing at all. But there exists, apart from the Almighty himself, no disinterested arbiter or referee to lay down the specific limits of reasonableness or unreasonableness, or to say that the Western Powers are 60 per cent. right in argument A, while the Russian bloc are 70 per cent. right in argument B. We can each of us proceed only by our

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conscience and our faith in our own philosophy; and, as the noble Lord said, we have no right to assume that, because our adversaries disagree with us, they are thereby shamefully betraying all that they genuinely believe in.
There is, of course, a tremendous demand upon our forbearance and our patience—and I may perhaps interpose here that I think we have a very good example of that shown in our own Foreign Secretary. No setback, short of total war, should tempt us to lower our sights in the struggle of seeking agreement and settlement on this totally vital subject of disarmament. The Government will therefore have the full support of all Parties While they pursue this line. But I must say that many of us feel that they are in danger of a sort of mental isolationism which represents, in fact, only a sectional view of one part of one British political Party. During their ten years of power the Government have again and again had to go into reverse and adopt methods and approaches urged from this side of the House, which they had earlier totally rejected. Time has been lost, opportunities have been lost, and I think national prestige also has been lost.
To-day I think it is evident to a majority here—certainly to a majority in the rest of the world—that the concept of a national independent nuclear weapon is becoming, or has become, outdated and rather dangerously obsolete. I know that is not a view which is held at all unanimously in this House, but I think a large number of Conservative supporters know this. The Liberal Party knows this, the Labour Party has followed the Liberal Party in knowing this, and I think all who do not have their heads in the sand can see that the United States knows this full well, however much diplomatic protocol has demanded the face-saving of the Government of a friendly nation.
I am not going to deploy all the military, financial and political arguments for or against the abandonment of an independent nuclear weapon, for, of course, these have been set out almost ad nauseam by almost every responsible statesman, newspaper and expert throughout the civilised world. But if we are in the sorry position, as indeed
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we all are, of basing our very existence upon a peace kept only by fear—the fear of the two great menacing deterrents, one in the West and one in the East—is it not strange, my Lords, that, while the Eastern one is at present tightly unified, co-ordinated and controlled under one supreme authority, the Western one is already split into uncertain diversities of responsibility and control, and well may be further dispersed and separated as other individual Allies come forward with claims for individual recognition, and for sovereign rights in the nuclear field? The balance between East and West is already uncertain and variable. Are we to weaken our position by dissipation instead of centralisation?
It has very recently become rather obscure as to whether in fact we do or do not possess an independent nuclear deterrent. The matter was discussed in another place yesterday, but I do not find myself very much more clear about it at all. I would urge that in clarifying the position, as I think it must be further clarified, this Government now have a great opportunity for supporting the concept of a unified Western nuclear authority, and as a result abandoning with grace a position which I think inevitably will have to be abandoned in the course of time.
My Lords, three years ago in this House I supported a proposal that, failing international agreement on disarmament—an agreement which I agree with the noble Lord is, unfortunately, unlikely to come about for many years—this country should take the lead in a universal undertaking to renounce all nuclear armaments in every country in the world, except America and Russia, who alone have the resources to maintain such forces; and, also, who alone are so far committed to them in military rivalry that I do not think either could at present be expected to join in. The idea was that these two giants should be left alone, and should gradually get rid of their nuclear weapons, too At the time that proposal, I am sorry to say, had no support from any political Party at all in the country. But I would still back it in principle, believing that in that way the immense dangers of the spread and proliferation of nuclear possession among more and more nations should, or might be, avoided. To-day,

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of course, the chances of such cooperation are very much less, but I should still like to see France and Britain joining hands and making this great gesture, as an example to all the other nations of the world apart from the two great giants.
I hope that your Lordships will allow me to say a word about the suggestion that the Liberal Party, in advocating the renunciation of an independent British nuclear deterrent, would either put all the hundreds of millions of pounds thus saved into the social services, leaving us without adequate military defences, or else, by building up our conventional forces' strength (which indeed we do advocate), would subscribe to the principle of conscription. My Lords, neither accusation is either true or fair. Conscription may well become a national necessity, if our Government undermines our position by dissipating our resources in this status symbol which is virtually valueless and recklessly ruinous; and it may be that we shall all have to support a move towards conscription if our national position is allowed to deteriorate enough to make that necessary. But I think it is straining the decencies of British political tradition to suggest that the Liberal Party, of all Parties, with its historical background, really inclines its principles to favour either the old naval press gang or a violation of the liberty of the subject, which is, of course, the basis on which conscription stands.
In the general question of disarmament—of which the nuclear aspect, to which I have chiefly confined my remarks, is the primary consideration—I would repeat that the inevitable and growing realistic trend towards more internationalism, and away from nineteenth century individual nationalism, is undeniably becoming stronger and faster. However much we may have nostalgic regrets for our past military splendid isolation, it is becoming more and more clear that, as the Prime Minister has indicated in another context, we must go in with others because we cannot afford to stay out. I ask the Government, therefore, to apply that wise principle not only to trade and commerce, but also to defence and disarmament, where its application has even greater force. They or their successors will have to alter course in the end, and steer towards the close and
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integrated defence communality of the Western powers. My Lords, let it be soon and wholehearted, rather than too late and tragically ineffectual.
3.27 p.m.
THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (THE EARL OF HOME): My Lords, it is very tempting for me to try to follow the noble Lord, Lord Rea, and join him in thinking out loud about the possibilities of Liberal policies, and, in particular, about how they may justify their conscience on conscription. But I must resist this temptation, and the noble Lord will forgive me for reminding him that the debate is nothing about conscription and, indeed, nothing about the organisation of the nuclear deterrent, but is about the disarmament conference which is at present working in Geneva, and what progress they may or may not have made.
It is happily unnecessary in the British Parliament to argue the case for disarmament. Many noble Lords will remember the early days of the United Nations when Mr. Arthur Henderson, the father of the noble Lord, Lord Henderson, worked assiduously in the field of disarmament. Indeed, all Parties and all Governments subsequently have worked diligently to achieve a world-wide agreement, because we have all seen the waste of arms production, and we have all measured it against the needs of a world which is underfed and underdeveloped. Everybody in the House wants to see the curve of armaments production halted and then reversed, and the process of the actual physical destruction of arms begun.
The words "world-wide agreement" are the only qualification I need make to the general proposition that I have advanced. There is a section of the public which advocates that we should set an example to the world, and disarm unilaterally. My Lords, I can respect their sincerity, but I believe that they will remain a tiny minority for this reason, that all the evidence of history, and of our experience, goes to show that weakness does not soften the heart of a potential aggressor. Rather it excites his greed and his predatory appetite. I think the great majority of the people of our country will, therefore, continue

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to feel that, if there is to be disarmament, all must be in it from the start to the finish.
It was because this view was held by all the nations of the world who possess significant quantities of arms that an effort was made to define the principles which should govern the processes of disarmament—principles to which all nations could subscribe. The noble Lord, Lord Henderson, has pointed out to us that that effort was successful, and principles were agreed at the United Nations. It was of particular significance that they were agreed by the United States, on the one hand, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, on the other: although, as I warned your Lordships when I last spoke on this subject in this House—and the noble Lord, Lord Henderson, has reminded us of it to-day—there was in those principles an ambiguity or, rather, a gap concerning the problem of inspecting the armaments which remain after any particular phase of destruction. That gap was a warning, as I said at the time, of trouble ahead.
As a background to this debate—because it must, my Lords, colour all our discussion—I would name two principles which are Of the essence of this matter. At all stages the balance of disarmament, the balance of strength, must remain the same; or, in other words, at no stage should disarmament give one side an advantage over the other—an extraordinarily difficult conception, but one absolutely basic to confidence in the disarmament field. The second principle is this: there should be, during the whole process of disarmament, effective inspection or verification, whichever word you like to use. I think it is true that this Conference, as the noble Lord indicated, has advantages over its predecessors in this way: first of all, the principles are agreed by all the nations that are there; secondly, the preparation for this Conference was probably more intensive than fox any other; thirdly, we have on the table two draft treaties, one laid by the United States and the other by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which go into the matter in great detail; and, fourthly (the noble Lord recognised this, and I recognise it, too), unaligned neutral nations are there who have a great interest in disarmament, and they are there to try to help to
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reconcile differences and to register progress. Also, there are broad similarities between the two plans: between the Russian plan, which goes for general and complete disarmament in four years, and the American plan which, like the Russian plan, divides action into three stages, the completion of each stage being, of course, dependent upon a satisfactory conclusion of the last. As the noble Lord, Lord Henderson, said, there is really, if you come to work it out mathematically, a difference between four years and roughly nine or ten.
I should like, if I may, then, to test the programmes against the principles, and to begin with the Russian plan. It has two features in Stage 1, to which I would draw the attention of the House. In Stage 1, all means of delivering nuclear weapons are to be abolished within fifteen months, and those means include submarines, bombers, rockets and missiles of all sorts. Simultaneously, in Stage 1, the Soviet want an end to all foreign bases, as they call them, and insist that those must be eliminated at the same time. In Stage 2, having dealt with the nuclear delivery vehicles in Stage 1, they want to abolish all nuclear war heads. At first sight that is a pretty attractive proposition, but the more one examines it the quicker one sees that, if this plan were to be adopted, the first principle which has been agreed would very soon be breached.
I will, if I may, take the delivery vehicles and the bases first. If all the nuclear delivery vehicles and all troops in overseas bases had to be eliminated in Stage 1, in fifteen months, the result would be that the Russians would be left with very large conventional forces. We are bound to ask ourselves: in those circumstances, when the British and American troops have been withdrawn from Europe and, therefore, the NATO Alliance is automatically brought to an end, how could those countries of Europe defend themselves? Here I am thinking not only of a possible frontal attack upon Germany from the East—that always seemed to me very unlikely; but we must always remember those countries in the NATO Alliance who are in an even more exposed position, on the periphery of the NATO Alliance, than Germany. I think we are bound to conclude, and that anyone who looks at the Russian plan as it is now is bound to

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conclude, that the countries of Europe, if it were put into operation as it stands, would be put at an unacceptable disadvantage; and it certainly offends against the principle of balance of force to which the Russians themselves have subscribed. Therefore, I would hope that during this recess the Russians would look very seriously at their own plan and recognise and try to rectify this defect.
Now I come to something which is really more serious, and that is the proposal that, in Stage 2, the nuclear warheads should be destroyed—the warheads as opposed to the vehicles. The noble Lord, Lord Henderson, quoted a passage Which was spoken by the Minister of State in Geneva, and the House will understand the nature of these weapons. They are relatively small The noble Lord gave the measurements within which a vast nuclear explosive power can be contained. They can be carried quite easily in adapted civil airliners; they are completely devastating in their effect; and they can very, very easily be concealed. Therefore, my Lords, it is absolutely important that none should be hidden away, because if any were hidden away in any appreciable quantities the Power which is in possession of them could dominate the world. The present position may be risky, but that position would be very much worse. Therefore, in this context of the destruction of nuclear warheads, verification is vital; and we must insist that, if all nuclear warheads were to be destroyed in Stage 2, then at that same time inspection must be complete so that there was no possibility of concealing any of these weapons.
The present position, then, on this matter of general and complete disarmament at Geneva, I can put in a nutshell. The Russians agree that the weapons which it is agreed should be destroyed can be inspected in the "bonfire". That is a convenient illustration which I used at Geneva, and which seems to have caught on. We each put a certain number of weapons into a "bonfire", we light it and they are destroyed, and that can be inspected. But they have scouted up to now all ideas which have been put forward dealing with effective inspection of those weapons which remain. When I recall to the House what I have just said, that
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a handful of remainers, when you are dealing with nuclear warheads, could destroy the world, then no one can risk this form of disarmament unless, at the same time, there is adequate and effective inspection. At present, therefore—and I must stress the words "at present", although attitudes may change—the Russian plan offends not only against the first principle of the balance of force, but against the second principle of inspection which was laid down in the United Nations' statement of principles.
My Lords, in order to meet the Russians' contention that inspection of arms is equivalent to espionage, we have gone to immense trouble to try to design methods which would obviate any such danger, and we have put forward this proposal, to which my noble friend Lord Henderson referred, of inspection by zones. I think it is familiar to your Lordships: a country is divided up as if it were a chessboard; each side has the right to pick a number of squares in the other side's country for inspection; and this inspection should be full in those zones which are selected to make sure that there is no clandestine production and no clandestine storage.
To meet the Russians' fears, we have gone even further. They have said that they wanted inspection to be proportionate to the destruction of arms. Well, all right, we can adopt that principle, so far as the zonal inspection is concerned. Let me suppose that there is a 30 per cent. destruction of arms in stage one. At that point, 30 per cent. of the territory would be under zonal inspection, and so on, so that inspection could be made progressive and would keep pace with the destruction of arms. But your Lordships will see now that not only does the Russian plan make no allowance for 100 per cent. inspection beyond the fringes of the actual "bonfire", but they have rejected the zonal compromise, and, what is more, have refused to put forward any alternative suggestion of their own. So the House will see that the problem of inspection is made much more difficult by the erratic nature of the Russian proposal for the destruction of arms. If all nuclear delivery vehicles were destroyed in stage one, and weapons in stage two, clearly at that point there would have to be universal inspection, because the consequences of cheating are so terrible.

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But any inspection, in Russian eyes, is equal to espionage if it is applied to the arms which remain at any particular stage of disarmament.
My Lords, it was with these differences very much in mind—because the Western plan was tabled rather later than the Russian plan at Geneva—that we tried to make a plan which was simpler and more straightforward. The plan was to have disarmament in three stages, beginning with a 30 per cent. cut right across the board of armaments—all armaments of all kinds included—and the remaining 70 per cent. to be divided into two equal cuts of 35 per cent. The moment the 30 per cent. cut was completed in the first stage to the satisfaction of the participants, you would move on to the next stage, until the process was complete.
Again, I should like, if I may, very shortly to test the proposals against the principles. At all stages in a cut across the board the balance of strength is preserved, and no side is put at a disadvantage to the other. That seems to me to be the great advantage of this kind of scheme. And again, inspection is flexible and can be made adequate to the amount of destruction of weapons which takes place at each stage. Certainly we agree that inspection should include not only the "bonfire" but the factories and the remainders, so that the weapons which we have agreed to destroy cannot be immediately replaced.
As far as warheads are concerned, there is one difference in the Russian plan to which I must refer. Your Lordships remember that they are going to destroy, or propose to destroy, all the warheads in stage two. In the Western plan the destruction of warheads is divided between stage two and stage three. The reasons for this, as I have hinted, are the very complicated nature of verification which is necessary to establish that these weapons are destroyed and are not hidden, and also, as Lord Henderson briefly touched upon, the problems of chemical and biological warfare, which must be covered as well. But we are very conscious of the need to rid the world of these terrible nuclear weapons, and therefore we proposed to the Russians that there should be immediate studies on the methods of
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verification which might be applied, so as to make sure that none of these weapons were hidden; and we suggested that that examination should be put in band without delay. We thought that the studies could be completed well before the time of the signature of a treaty, but we have had no response Whatever on this matter from the Soviet Government, and that makes it very difficult to make progress.
Well, my Lords, on this section of the Conference, I must sum up in this way. We have, at Geneva, been able to pinpoint the differences with some accuracy and to know what they are. The West has made a major concession in the matter of inspection to the Russians in putting forward the plan for zonal inspection. We have now come back for a short recess, and we are studying whether we can make improvements in our own plan, and I hope the Russians are seriously studying the question of verification. We are not asking them to accept anything which we will not adopt for ourselves; but the central problem remains: that confidence is the essence of disarmament, and that unless there is effective verification there will be no disarmament. My Lords, the Russians must understand that, and must try to work out plans for effective verification.
It would be indeed a waste of time at this stage to take your Lordships further into the substance, because until we have jumped these main fences we shall really be a long way off any complete agreement about disarmament. But these are our aims, and I may sum them up very shortly in this way. The first aim is an early destruction of weapons. I am quite sure that when we agree on the destruction of weapons, even if it is only 10 per cent., and they are seen to be destroyed, confidence will grow and we can move on to wider fields of destruction. The second aim is a cut across the board of weapons, which guarantees that neither Russia nor anybody else is put at a disadvantage. The third aim is to find the minimum effective method of verification, and so far nobody has improved on the zonal suggestion. The fourth aim—and I know that the noble Lord, Lord Beveridge, and the noble Earl, Lord Longford, and others, are interested in this—is that in

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the second and third stages of disarmament we must begin to build up the international peace-keeping machinery within the United Nations, and under the authority of the United Nations, so that as nations surrender the capacity to make war, an international police force can acquire the ability to keep the peace. It is much easier to say than to do; nevertheless, this must be part of a disarmament plan, otherwise it would be quite ineffective and unreal. Anybody who has any variants to suggest on the solutions we have tried to put forward I shall be very glad to hear from, and we are willing to adopt them if they can be fitted into the plan within the principles. Therefore, I am eager to hear from your Lordships anything on this matter that you have to say.
I should like to conclude, if I may, with the other section of activities in Geneva. Those are the activities of the Committee on Nuclear Tests. When I have been dealing with these matters I have been glad that my family in very early days had close connections with King Robert the Bruce and his spider, because I am bound to say that time and again one has to draw on deep wells of patience if one is to endure these conferences at Geneva, though the Minister of State has had a worse time of it than I have. Of course, to stop tests is not to disarm. Nevertheless, it is undeniably relevant to disarmament, because either the discovery of some new weapon or a possible breakthrough by one side or the other in the field of the antimissile missile could seriously affect the balance of power on which the peace of the world depends.
In this matter of tests, your Lordships will want to look forward, not backwards, and I shall content myself with only one reference to the past. After the Russians broke the moratorium last autumn and concluded their really massive series of tests, we made an offer to them, of which I will remind the House. We said, "You may keep the knowledge you have gained if you are now satisfied. We will not now try to make up the equivalent ground. We will stop tests now for all time provided there are adequate safeguards." That offer stands. But it is the Russians' suspicions about safeguards which in the case of general disarmament prevent progress, and which in the case of tests prevent
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the actual signature of an agreement—because we are really as near to it as that.
I am not sure that the Russians want an agreement about tests, but for the purpose of the debate this afternoon I must assume that they do. I think that everybody is agreed that unless there is adequate verification tests will in fact go on. And I want to give your Lordships the nature of the scheme which we have proposed to the Russians so that you may be able to judge, first, if it is practical and, secondly, whether it justifies the charge of espionage. This is what the scheme which we have proposed on safeguards and verification in the matter of nuclear tests would mean to the Russians. It would mean the presence in the Soviet Union of 400 persons in 20 hutments in isolated areas. Their job would be to do nothing else but read instruments and report the findings of those instruments to the International Commission. In addition there would have to be visits from small numbers of experts to look at doubtful incidents which were reported by the observers. One really cannot believe that in the enormous expanses of the Soviet Union, confined as these observers would be to the most isolated areas, such a scheme could possibly be labelled "espionage". In addition, of course, a high percentage of the observers would be neutrals, and a percentage of the International Disarmament Commission, too, would be neutral. So there would be no justification for the idea that this instrument might be used for espionage by the West against the Communist world.
I hope that the House understands the enormous trouble to which we have gone to meet the Russian fear of espionage, even though the rest of us who live in open societies feel that it is quite unreal. Can we go any further? Are there any further modifications we can make in detection and verification procedures without endangering the security of the Free World? Are there possibilities in other plans, like the neutrals' plan, to which the noble Lord, Lord Henderson, referred, of putting detection posts outside the Soviet Union? At the moment we are giving that most serious examination. It might be possible to put them outside Russia, but the House must be clear as to the consequences of this and

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the impact of this on the minds of the Russians themselves. Because it is certain that the farther we put the detection system away from the possible points where explosions or incidents might be registered, the more unidentified incidents are going to be registered; and so, if the detection posts are outside Russia, we are going to have more suspicious events registered and therefore the need for more on-site inspections by visiting teams. What the Russians have said at present is that they will not have any on-site inspections at all. So it may be that by proposing a different scheme for moving detection posts outside Russia, we will make the Russian refusal even more certain than it is to-day.
The neutrals had some ideas, which were intended to be discussed as a basis for compromise, and certainly we would not reject them, though there is some difficulty in them. The system of detection they suggest might be based upon existing national networks of observer posts or institutions, or there might by agreement be new posts added to the existing network of posts. They suggest that every signatory to the agreement should agree to help and co-operate with the International Commission. Of course, the Commission would sit outside Russia and it could establish the fact of suspicious events without doubt.
We and the Russians interpret this suggestion about establishing the facts of suspicious events without doubt in rather a different way when we are dealing with the neutral scheme. The Russians say that they are willing themselves to invite inspection teams but they will not commit themselves to do so or accept the obligation to do so. Our view is that, if there is an unexplained event, there must be a right to call for an investigation and that verification is essential—in other words, that in this context verification is a "must" and not a "should".
I would repeat what I said, not I think in this House but certainly in Geneva, about the purpose of investigation and verification, because I do not think that the Russians have yet really understood this. The purpose of verification is not to prove that a country is guilty, but to prove that it is not guilty; not to prove that an explosion is nuclear, but to prove that it is not and that in fact it was an
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earthquake—in other words, not to prove that a country is cheating, but to prove that it is not cheating, because it is only if that is proved, that an effective test ban can proceed. Of course, science is not static and we may be able to suggest modifications, although I am bound to say that that should not be necessary. But I think that the House must ask itself one question to-day, which I myself ask. If the Russians will not face up to the infinitesimal degree of verification, which I have described, which is necessary for a test ban, how can they possibly face up to the inspection which is necessary for general and complete disarmament, where it is absolutely necessary to have control if we are going to proceed at all?
Let me sum up the arguments in the nuclear field. We want a treaty, to which all will adhere, including, of course, China and France and the different countries of the world. We want the right to contract out of such a treaty to rest solely on a breach by another Government, established by an impartial international body. It ought not to be possible to resume testing on the basis of an unchecked national accusation. There should be the International Commission, and if they can make a determination of suspicious events, then no on-site inspection would be necessary. But if they wish to inspect, they must do so. I think that is a position from which we cannot move. Although I am all for middle courses—it was either the noble Lord, Lord Henderson, or the noble Lord, Lord Rea, who said that we might find a middle course—in this matter there is no middle course: if there is no verification, there will be no further test ban.
One further possibility should be examined. The Mexican delegate put forward a suggestion that States might put an end for ever to tests by a certain date which should be fixed well in advance. I feel that that ought to be examined. The House will recall the old and famous beauty who said of her admirers as she got older: "I must have just one more". This device proposed by the Mexican delegate might prevent the chief testers from getting into that frame of mind.
If the review I have given this afternoon is not very hopeful, I do not think

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it is surprising. Certainly we cannot afford to be discouraged, and we must persevere. I will certainly go to Geneva again, if it is necessary to do so; although I would remind the noble Lord, Lord Henderson, that Foreign Secretaries have a few other things to do than to sit there in a state of deadlock. Nevertheless, as I say, I will certainly go if it is necessary to do so. The disentangling of the present complex of armaments, to preserve the balance of power while you disarm and to keep the confidence of nations through verification is a very complicated business and is bound to tax tempers and to consume time. But it ought to be possible to reconcile the Russian plan, which goes for disarmament in four years—and I am bound to say, in doing so, does so little to face the difficulties that it immediately exposes itself to the charge of being mere propaganda—and the American plan, which while much more realistic, might be criticised, as the noble Lord, Lord Henderson, criticised it, on the ground that it is a little too slow. For myself, I am quite certain that the thing to do is to begin the process of destruction of weapons—10 per cent., 20 per cent., 30 per cent. across the board, and then only the destruction of weapons will really break the jam and bring confidence. I hope that after the next session of Geneva I shall be able to record that agreement is near; but all I can possibly promise your Lordships to-day is that the British Government will try to persevere to achieve such a result.
4.3 p.m.
THE LORD BISHOP OF LONDON: My Lords, it is difficult not to approach this debate in a certain sense of pessimism, not removed or lightened in any way by the most admirable, lucid and frank speech which we have just heard from the Foreign Secretary. As we remember the frustration of the high hopes and strenuous endeavours between the wars, and the frequent disappointments of the last twenty years, of what the American State Department called the "decade of deadlock", and the desperate slowness and seeming futility of so much that seems to have been happening, it is difficult not to admit this mood of defeat and to ask whether total disarmament runs so much against the grain of history that we should dismiss it
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as an aim and not let our peoples think any longer that it is a possibility. That we know is not possible, and it would be wrong from every point of view to do it. It was heartening to hear the final sentences of the noble Earl's speech, in which he affirmed the intention of Her Majesty's Government to press forward with every possible endeavour to secure disarmament.
The problems involved in general and comprehensive disarmament or in negotiating any sound agreement on the regulation, control and reduction of arms and armed forces are, as your Lordships well know, highly technical and complex. Their nature changes so rapidly that only the experts and those who have inner knowledge are really in a position to deal intelligently with them or even, it would seem, to speak intelligently about them. But in these very complex and technical questions are moral and ethical problems of the highest moment, and it is with these, rather than with the details, that the Christian churches have been trying to wrestle in the post-war years.
There is, it must be admitted, no clear and single answer. Christians with equal sincerity are divided upon many issues and, as the most reverend Primate rightly said in his Diocesan Conference, there is still an imperative need for hard thinking and praying and a readiness to suffer the dilemma that remains, whatever one's conclusions may happen to be. Nevertheless, some agreement seems to be emerging in Christian thinking. In the Third Assembly of the World Council of Churches at New Delhi a representative expression of a world-wide opinion was made almost unanimously, and two documents, Christians and Modern War, issued by the Board for Social Responsibility for the Church of England, and The Pattern of Disarmament, produced by the British Council of Churches, both represent at least some agreement on the priority of the issues which, from a -moral and ethical point of view, must be faced. If I may presume to speak at all for the churches, we would say that we realise the overwhelming burden of responsibility which Her Majesty's Government must carry; we appreciate their concern and the concern of the leaders of the other Parties for the moral as well as the political

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and military problems which they face, and we will continue to support them with our most earnest prayers and to encourage our people to do so by all means. I know that other members of the Lords Spiritual would have wished to reinforce this if they had not been kept away from the House by a Bishops' meeting in Oxford.
I am well aware that when one endeavours to find some illumination from the Christian faith for the decisions which must be made in order to prevent war in an atomic age there is a grave risk that one may oversimplify the situation so as to make it fit a priori moral principles, and that is from every point of view a wrong thing to do. Indeed there is no disagreement on the vital need to prevent war. A modern allout war is uncontrollable and indiscriminate; and what is uncontrollable and indiscriminate must be clearly contrary to the purpose of God. Total disarmament and the establishment of a stable international order in which freedom and justice are upheld and war is done away must be the final goal of all our endeavours, as has been recognised repeatedly by all the great Powers. We should fail as a people in our moral duty if we did not all have this constantly in mind. I think we need also to remind ourselves, and more particularly others, that the general abolition of nuclear weapons, for which the greater part of mankind longs and prays, is not enough and would not by itself eliminaite the risk of war. It is, at least, arguable, however, that there are now factors never before existing in history which render a disarmed world possible to contemplate. Yet, though we must take all possible steps to secure total disarmament, we have been informed that the hopes of achieving it within any immediate period seem to be very far off.
What is to be done in the meantime, if total comprehensive disarmament is impossible immediately? Do we do nothing? It would be a great relief to know that so much is being attempted in the way of readjustment of plans to seek to control and to reduce armaments that any limited wars which may be fought can be kept limited. The World
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Council of Churches, in its statement at New Delhi to which I have referred, said, among other things:
"Christians must press most urgently upon their Governments, as a first step towards the elimination of nuclear weapons, never to get themselves in a position in which they contemplate the first use of nuclear weapons."
We have, I believe, as a country, repeatedly stated that we would never contemplate the first use; but the question has to be asked of all countries where there is a weakness in conventional armies, which may mean that resisting aggression is impossible without recourse at least to tactical nuclear weapons. If that is so, it is perhaps arguable that the building up of conventional strength may be paradoxically a stage necessary to produce the balance of limitation to which the Foreign Secretary attached, rightly, so much importance. Whether the strengthening of conventional forces does in fact involve conscription or not is a matter on which I believe the experts differ. But whatever sacrifices might be required, whether it be in conscription or in finance, I believe that if the public really understood the facts it would see that any sacrifice demanded of them in the cause of peace was made without hesitation.
I, and many of my colleagues, who reject the unilateralist view on nuclear weapons, seek for a middle-of-the-road position in which this symmetrical balance of power at all levels of fighting may be secured, so that aggression can be deterred or suppressed without incurring total war. If that could be secured, would it not be easier to proceed step by step to that control, limitation and reduction of armaments of all kinds across the board? So far the problems have proved insoluble, and all the efforts of the West to convince Russia of the sincerity of our intentions and the practicability of our plans have failed. We hope and pray, therefore, that the more limited objectives, the measures for regional control and limitation of arms, the measures against local surprise attack, the attempt to prevent the militarisation of space and to secure unilateral arms control within the Western alliance, will never falter.

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Total disarmament would involve also the creation of an effective world authority and an effective international police force, as has already been stated. If we pursue a limited policy, I would hope that we should at the same time be working for those conditions of our ultimate objective, and to keep the peace in the way suggested in the admirable booklet produced by the Wyndham Place Trust is obviously important and vital. In that report it is suggested that the existence of a light standing force could play an indispensable rôle in creating and strengthening the confidence between nations without which no disarmament agreements will ever be secured. If that is so—and the arguments seem convincing—I should hope that perhaps the first stages towards the creation of that international force would not have to wait until stage two, but might be contemplated, in spite of all the obvious difficulties, as something on which attention should be focused even now.
In all the complex and vital political, military and economic issues involved in this question of disarmament, there are, as I have said, moral questions which we know Her Majesty's Ministers are facing, along with the Governments of our allies. We, who try to wrestle with our responsibility for Christian thinking, believe that in this middle-of-the-road position to which we appear to be moving there is less difficulty morally than in any other alternative, and we believe that it will evoke support and sacrifice from our people in this land when they know and realise that every single one of them has also a responsibility for the peace of the world.
4.15 p.m.
LORD BEVERIDGE: My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Henderson, for putting down this Motion, and to all those who have spoken since, for bringing to our notice, from such varied standpoints, the fundamental human problem of all mankind to-day. When human beings differ from one another there are, or have been, three ways in which they seek to settle their differences. One way is that of fighting one another. That is more or less confined now to the wrestling ground, or something similar. Secondly,
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every five years or so in this country there is the method of voting against one another; and, finally, there is the method, when you differ from another human being, of going before a court of justice whose decisions will be enforced by the police. I wish to suggest that to-day something like that third method is more essential than it ever was for disputes between nations.
I am not going to dwell upon the horrors of war as the natural scientists have invented it and made it to-day. We all know that nobody could foretell the result of a war with all the modern methods used, except that it would certainly destroy one nation or other, and might destroy most nations who took part in it—a destruction beyond parallel. I am not going to dwell upon that—I think we all must recognise it. And that, I think, means that the abolition of war is no longer a question of vaguely voting about, or wishing for, peace, but something for which all the people of this country should have been regarded as having voted, on every occasion when they had a vote, and as desiring from the bottom of their hearts and determined to get, if they possibly can. We must have disarmament, and let me just describe the three features which it must carry. It must be total disarmament: all nations, great and small; and all arms, nuclear or other. I am absolutely convinced of the folly of purely nuclear disarmament, because once the art of nuclear armament has been learned, if a war started it could be learned again in six months by the people who take part in wars. Every non-nuclear war, if it were permissible, would become nuclear war in six months. Therefore, all these enthusiasts for nuclear disarmament, a great many of whom come and beg my support and friendship, will, I am afraid, have to be sent sadly away, so far as I am concerned; and I hope that all your Lordships will do the same.
The second feature, of course, of disarmament is that if you abolish killing another man as a means of settling a dispute, and if voting is not available at that particular time, you must accompany your abolition of killing and absence of voting as a means of settling disputes by a positive alternative. We all know that in this country for many centuries we have

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had the provision that if you differ from another person you have to go before a court of justice, whose decisions will be enforced by police. Surely what we have to do now—and we cannot abolish war without doing it—is to accompany the abolition of war not by saying merely that war is wicked but by saying to any who feel they are being wronged that there is a court of justice before which they can go. In other words, as we have instituted a national court of justice with the police for securing justice in this country, we have to do exactly the same for all the nations of the world. We must have a World Court of Justice and a World Police Force.
I am going to say in a moment that my feeling is that there is a good deal of advantage in separating such a world authority from the United Nations. I want to separate it, not because I distrust or dislike the United Nations but because I am sure that there are better things for the United Nations to do when we have abolished war; and I think that, on the whole, they are more likely to do those things. You cannot get peace by voting except by voting, once and for all, for all that is necessary to guarantee peace.
The third feature about disarmament is that I am sure that it should be limited to disarmament and should not include interference with self-government or anything whatever except the making of war. Every country ought to be allowed to have its own political constitution, however foolish it may be. I may happen to think the Communist system an utterly foolish system in every possible way, but I should not object to anyone having a Communist Government; or having a President, rather than a Queen; or having voting in a different way; or elections every year instead of every five years; or anything else. Let the people of every country make up their own minds how they want to manage their own affairs, whether their nation is large or small. I want particularly to emphasise the fact that it should apply to small nations as well as to large; that small nations should be able to establish their own method of managing their affairs; that they should have their own political constitution and their own economic and social policies.
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We must find a means of settling disputes between nations by a court of justice, with a police force to enforce those decisions; and that, as I have said, means a World Authority, with a Court and a World Police Force. That Court will decide by argument, and not by fights between nations. The essence of good government in any country in personal affairs is justice and police. The essence of United Nations, curiously, is something different: it is equality in international affairs. Our aim is war barred to great and small, and freedom secured equally to great and small. While war exists, neither equality nor freedom is possible in the world. There is no equality when a nation can use great power to crush other nations. There is no freedom for a small nation which has to seek safety by doing what the great nation tells it to do. A strong force will always, if it is allowed to use itself on a nation, destroy freedom; will force its own view on the small nation or condition its help on the small nation's being a satellite. On the other hand, When war is ended, every nation will have equality with others, both in disputes—which will come before an impartial Court of Justice and a World Police Force—and in having freedom for self-government in its own way.
Moreover, all nations throughout the world through the United Nations, whose service I look forward to immensely, may and should have the means of making progress in the standard of life and standard of education. If we could convince ourselves, and all others, of the catastrophic dangers of war, we should learn also of the every-growing advantages of peace to all countries. I myself would take at least half the money that every country would save by not having to arm and by disarming, and I would hand it over to the United Nations, for use in raising the standard of life throughout the world in under-developed countries. I was once a university don, which means that I had a university education, and I believe it is essential not merely to feed, shall we say, the poverty-stricken parts of the world better but also to teach them better. Because I see that possibility, because I realise the ultimately irresistible strength of the argument against allowing war to continue and endanger all our lives, I think

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I am frankly still more hopeful than most of the other speakers, much as I have admired nearly everything that they have said.
4.30 p.m.
LORD FRASER OF NORTH CAPE: My Lords, the noble and gallant Viscount—he was a gallant First Lord of the Admiralty—permits me to intervene for a moment. I think that everyone is heartily sick of these disarmament and Geneva conferences. With eighteen nations, of course, you never get an agreement, with all the complications, the percentages and the stages involved. The only way one could get an agreement would be to hold a meeting on a desert island; either no one would go or else they would leave as soon as they had reached agreement. That is the only answer to this problem.
However, to be more serious, I think that the urgent need at the moment is to reach an agreement of some sort, and I feel that the agreement which could be reached is on the decision not to make any more nuclear bombs and to finish nuclear tests. I often speak to Russians on these problems and I have found they are always suspicious that we do not really mean what we say. I feel that what I would do would be to have a Summit Conference now at the United Nations, and at that each Head of State would sign a statement before the world that his State would not make any more nuclear bombs or carry out any more nuclear tests, and there would be no strings attached to that agreement. I think that if any one of those statesmen, having signed that, was found guilty, he would never be able to face the world again; and in those two particular cases I do not think that there is much danger in the next two or three years of somebody cheating or, as the noble Lord, Lord Boothby, said the other day, having devious tactics. After the signing of that agreement I think a lot of the suspicion of the world would be left out.
When we have signed an agreement, then I think we have to form a sort of small working party, as the Foreign Secretary said, to prove the signatories are guilty or to assume they are innocent. I think that if the three statesmen could sign that agreement now, it would give such confidence in other agreements
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and subsequent manœuvres that there would not be much danger involved. I would set up this small working party afterwards to ascertain whether some arrangement could not be made for finding out whether somebody was guilty on suspicion. Being a little modest, I should like to suggest that such a working party should be composed of three naval officers from the three countries. That is what I would do. They are simple, decisive, non-political and capable men. I think you would find they would get an agreement in a month. My Lords, that is my proposal.
4.33 p.m.
VISCOUNT ALEXANDER OF HILLSBOROUGH: My Lords, I am sure that Members on all sides of the House will agree that we have had a valuable debate this afternoon, and I am most grateful to my noble friend, Lord Henderson, for the way in which he presented the case from this side of the House, with reasonableness and covering almost every point. If I may say so to my noble friend—he will always be my friend—Admiral of the Fleet, Lord Fraser of North Cape, I shall to-morrow morning read what he said with very great interest. I was trying to find a lot of holes in it as he went along, and I think perhaps it may repay a little further study. But I felt that he did not really match up to some of the permanent difficulties that seem to dog the course of these negotiations which have been going on, and which I think have been so adequately stated by the noble Earl the Foreign Secretary in the speech he made to the House this afternoon. I want to read the noble and gallant Lord's speech again to-morrow and compare it to some of the notable difficulties which have been pointed out from the actual known facts of the negotiations which have been going on.
I listened with very great interest to my noble friend Lord Beveridge when he was speaking just now about the ultimate work that might be accomplished in forming the views of men, tackling new tasks, the right type of education, and proper organisation of the great international association of the future. I listened to all that with very great interest. But it is quite clear from his speech that he realises that cannot

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really be put into full operation unless we can get disarmament which is effective and general. When I look at the propaganda which is put out in the world to-day, I am exceedingly anxious, unless something very radical is done, about what we shall have to depend upon in majority votes in the United Nations Organisation.
I read faithfully the official statements which are issued by the Soviet Embassy, and when I read these issues from the Soviet Embassy I marvel that persons like Mr. Zorin can make the statements that they made in the Conference or outside the Conference, whichever it is, in view of the statements we see issued officially and publicly from our side. I would take this opportunity, after listening to the Foreign Secretary's opinions on the position again, to say to the Russians, "Can you possibly find any real grounds for the things which are said sometimes in Conference or outside Conference by persons like Mr. Zorin about our real intentions?".
I cannot find, at any rate from our own publicity sources, anything like the direct and personal attacks and the prejudice against nationalities in what we issue from this side compared to what is being issued on behalf of the Soviet authorities. So long as that continues then it seems to me we shall be building up not a third force for peace but a third force to make it more difficult for us to get the general agreement we want to get. I thought just now that I would read out some of the statements, but I do not propose to trouble the House with them. But I do appeal to the Russian authorities to believe that the British people, at any rate, are genuinely desirous not only of universal peace but that we might be able to secure with it a general disarmament throughout the world.
I say that as one of the persons who were responsible in the past for certain types of military administration, and, with my great and noble friend Lord Attlee and the late Mr. Ernest Bevin, largely responsible for the build-up of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. But we wanted that only because in 1946–47 there was actual danger of the whole of Europe being overrun. It could have been overrun almost by the
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threat of blackmail instead of actual breaking out of war, because the situation in Europe had deteriorated so much in defence forces that there could have been no really effective opposition. I am very anxious that we should get the Russians really to understand where we are and what we feel about it. The things that they say from time to time concern me very greatly.
I might say to the noble Admiral of the Fleet, Lord Fraser of North Cape, that the statement which I just let him have on an examination of the position of naval forces in the times which are to come by a high Admiral of the Russian Fleet will give him some partial answers, I think, to what he has suggested this afternoon. Anyway, it is one of the first things that comes to my mind: if he wants a panel of three naval officers representing the three great Powers, I wonder what would happen if that particular Admiral were one of the three. I will say no more than that.
I feel that I might say just a further word about the question of the tests. I accept wholeheartedly the view that was put by the Foreign Secretary on the situation with regard to those tests. It is not to be understood how the Russians can put over their present propaganda in the country after having so shamelessly broken the moratorium which had lasted for so long, and then hold out the tests that have been held since as such a direct challenge to them that they have had to start new tests. I agree with what the Foreign Secretary said. On the other hand, I am concerned about this—and fortunately the Minister for Science, in the person of the noble Viscount the Leader of the House, is going to speak in this debate. Perhaps he can tell us a thing or two about what are going to be the results of these very high altitude tests, about which a great deal has been made by Russian publicity. No doubt the noble Viscount the Leader of the House has observed that British astronomical scientists are also raising grave issues about what might be the consequences to the world in general if certain things were to happen as the result of these particular tests. Most of them seem to be groping, not knowing exactly what would be the result of such nuclear experiments in outer space, or at least in high altitudes

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nearly in outer space. If the Leader of the House could say something about that it might be helpful.
In regard to the deterrent itself, I have always held the view that it is quite impossible to proceed successfully in a conference for achieving general disarmament if either one side or the other is expected to give up the defences they have. I think that is quite clear. On the other hand, I am not quite sure how the Foreign Secretary treats the speech of Mr. McNamara the other day, I think at one of the universities, when he suggested, largely in line with the general idea that you should try to prevent the proliferation of the production of nuclear weapons by countries which have not yet adopted them at all, that in the future it might be wiser in those circumstances for us to leave the possession of the ultimate deterrent to the two great Powers who have both the resources and the progress made already in the use of those weapons; and that we should then be able to concentrate more of our military expenditure programme upon the lines that were in the mind of the right reverend Prelate, the Lord Bishop of London, in putting our conventional forces into proper strength. Perhaps we might have a further word from the Government upon that point to-night.
I must say that never before in my long life have I faced a situation such as we have had set up before us in the last eighteen months to two years. No one can do otherwise than sympathise with the Foreign Secretary and his advisers in the extraordinary difficulty with which they are faced to-day. I feel that the statement he has made to this House to-day is one which cannot, in general, be challenged as not giving a true picture of the situation. Where, then, do we go from here? The Foreign Secretary is certainly right about the need for patience. How can we put over, once for all, to the Russian leaders that the people who for three or four centuries have enjoyed the political freedoms and the liberties which we have built up for ourselves in the free world will never give those things up without a struggle, and that we value, above all, our freedom to worship, our freedom to speak, our freedom in all respects, and
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that we are willing at any time to defend those freedoms. That is my view, anyway, whatever may be said on the part of collective programmes of Parties. I do not believe for one moment that the people of the free world, as I have known them, would ever agree to give up their freedoms without a struggle.
But we have never had such weapons against us. How far is it going to go? I was listening to the right reverend Prelate, the Lord Bishop of London, and was most impressed with what he said about continuing, as we should do, among other things, in prayer. But the more I look at the situation the more I think that the Church would do well to direct its priests, its ministers and its congregations, to a study of Matthew XXIV, and that even the World Council of Churches might have a look at it too, and not imagine that you can, according to any teaching of the Scriptures, so change the world by a great mass Church of the world as to avoid the possible consequences of the provisos as I see them in the Scriptures. Certainly Matthew XXIV is not only most disturbing to read, but it is also something which ought to be moving us all the more through our Church consultations and our prayers for peace.
Let me say, in conclusion, because I do not wish to make a long speech, that I want of all things to see success achieved by this conference which has now adjourned. I want to say not only what the Foreign Secretary has said to the Russians through his speech to-day, but that I cannot see how we can proceed further without getting a settlement of the nuclear test question. I do not see how the Russians can possibly take the line that they do in saying that we and the Americans are responsible for the difficulties and delays. I want to say to them, on the question of inspection—I have not yet heard it said—that there is nobody in this country, or, I think, in the United States of America, who will object for one moment to any neutral observers, appointed by a central international body to make the inspections, including if they like some Russians or members of neutral Communist States, coming into this country to observe what is going on. We do not then call it espionage by those people.

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If they will only face up to that fact and make quite sure that the offer is genuine, I think we may make progress.
Then I agree with my noble friend Lord Henderson, who opened this debate so well this afternoon, that if you could get rid of this difficulty about tests, and get an agreement on tests, it would be much easier to get on to the question of general disarmament. Certainly, while this other business is outstanding the Foreign Secretary, I think, knows that there cannot be much progress with the general disarmament proposals. I hope that when next we come to debate this matter some progress will have been made; and I do not wish this afternoon to add one iota to the difficulties of the Government in dealing with this most difficult question.
4.50 p.m.
LORD GREENHILL: My Lords, before the noble Viscount the Leader of the House winds up this debate, I wonder whether I might ask, most diffidently, a question that has been troubling me since I heard my noble friend Lord Henderson and the noble Earl, the Foreign Secretary, speak? If it be true that the present nuclear warheads are as small in dimension as both my noble friend and the noble Earl, the Foreign Secretary, have apparently agreed they are, are we not trying to achieve the impossible in asking that these be destroyed when, even if the U.S.S.R. or ourselves agree to their total destruction, we cannot possibly guarantee that that has in fact been achieved and that therefore their possible use in certain circumstances has been prevented?
4.52 p.m.
VISCOUNT HAILSHAM: My Lords, the question which the noble Lord, Lord Greenhill, has raised is an important one. I do not know that I could answer it, either directly or plainly, without notice. It raises a number of questions, both as to methods of inspection and as to the desirability of any international police force having a nuclear component of its own, all of which would have to be discussed if we arrived at the state when it became practical politics. I would not myself despair of the destruction of nuclear warheads, although they
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be small. Although the nuclear warheads themselves are small, at present, at any rate, the methods of making enriched uranium, which is one of the principal components, are not small. On the contrary, they are some of the largest installations of an industrial character one could possibly imagine. What will be the situation when there are a great number of civil nuclear power stations producing plutonium, which is an alternative source, I do not know. It is a wide question, and I do not think I could give him a definitive answer this afternoon.
My Lords, we have had a short debate on this Motion. The speeches have been so helpful and so generous to my noble friend the Foreign Secretary that there is remarkably little left for a second Government speaker to say. I should, however, like to thank those who have taken part in the debate, and also to thank the Leader of the Opposition for his generous remarks about the position adopted by my noble friend.
There has been one notable omission from the list of speakers. Nobody came here to defend the rather bizarre positions adopted by the nuclear disarmament people, or the Committee of One Hundred, although a very distinguished member of both bodies is a Member of your Lordships' House. Indeed, I could not help thinking, when we were preparing for this debate, that only last September Lord Russell had written to The Times to say that it was part of the policy of the Establishment—whatever that may be—to prevent his views reaching a wider public. Relying upon this misconception on his part, I did write especially to invite him to take part in this debate on disarmament, in order that "the Establishment", in the shape of the Government, might have the opportunity of discussing with him some of the fallacies of what he thought. However, after a most friendly exchange of letters (which went into double numbers) I failed to persuade him to come, and I can only regret that I am not able to answer what I am sure would have been a remarkable speech from Lord Russell.
In the meantime, there is relatively little for me to answer from other speakers, because, in the main, we have

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been very widely agreed upon a wide range of topics. I confess to a certain sympathy with the interjection by the noble Lord, Lord Boothby. I think he was right to remind us that an arms race is, after all, a symptom and not a cause—a symptom of the fear which men have of war as well as a cause of that fear—and that it is possible that the shortest way home might, in the long run, be the longest way round and that the removal of international tension might assist a disarmament agreement. But whether or not that is so, I am sure that the converse is quite certainly true. A disarmament agreement which did not remove the anxiety and danger of war would be useless or worse than useless. This is why it seems to me quite inevitable, despite what was said by the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Fraser of North Cape, that we should insist, as did my noble friend, and as I think did speakers on all sides of the House, on the two principles of my noble friend's speech: that an agreed process of disarmament which left one side at any stage at the mercy of the other, or which did not at each stage provide adequate safeguards against fraud, would be worse than useless because it would not remove the anxiety and tension on which the arms race is based.
LORD FRASER OF NORTH CAPE: My Lords, if I may interrupt the noble and learned Viscount, surely at the moment we are at the mercy of each side as regards nuclear weapons and nuclear tests. That was the point I was making.
VISCOUNT HAILSHAM: What I said was that an agreed process of disarmament which left one side at the mercy of the other would be worse than useless; and that, at any rate, is a situation in which we do not find ourselves at the moment. I would also agree with the noble Lord, Lord Henderson, in his reply to the interjection of the noble Lord, Lord Boothby, that this does not mean that there is no case for continuing direct disarmament negotiations. The contrary is the case. There is no doubt that, although the origin of the arms race may be the fear of war, there is also a feed-back mechanism whereby the possession by Powers in tension with one
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another of terrible weapons of destruction adds to the anxiety of each, and therefore to the tension between them. And if we could find a means whereby this feed-back mechanism was reversed, if the terrible weapons were put away and destroyed, I have no doubt that the danger of war would be diminished, and perhaps the tension itself would be reduced.
My Lords, a certain amount of the argument during the debate has revolved about subjects only really marginal on disarmament. I would agree with the noble Lord, Lord Beveridge, when he said that it is not really possible, as some people think, to disentangle the question of nuclear disarmament from the question of general disarmament. In the present state of the world the mere abolition of nuclear weapons would do nothing to restore confidence or a sense of security, and would, in fact, violate the first of my noble friend's two principles, in that it would, by itself, leave the West at a significant disadvantage in relation to the East. With their lower standards of life and more brutal methods of coercion, the Communist Powers can maintain, and have maintained, higher armed forces than the West, equipped with sufficient weapons and strategic mobility to overrun Western Europe.
I would not go the whole way with what I understood was the military argument of the right reverend Prelate, that we should necessarily reduce the danger of nuclear war by the process of building up conventional armaments. I do not think that is necessarily true at all. I think that perhaps the right reverend Prelate had overlooked the fact that, with the destruction of nuclear bombs, the bomb would not cease to exist. The bomb will always exist so long as the knowledge of how to make it—which is no secret to any scientist—continues, and so long as there exists a stock of enriched uranium or plutonium from which it can be made. Though, of course, as I said in answer to the noble Lord, Lord Greenhill, the diffusion plants on which the former—that is the enriched uranium, though not the latter, the plutonium—depend for their manufacture are very large indeed, and therefore hard to conceal, I would not myself

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think that even this was quite beyond the power of a Communist State; although they could achieve the same result more easily, as the noble Lord, Lord Greenhill, suggested, by regaining part of their existing stocks or simply by using the plutonium generated by their civil generating stations. For these reasons, it is pretty obvious to me that nuclear disarmament must go hand in hand with general disarmament, and that if a general war did take place based originally upon conventional armaments, whether at their present level or built up, there would be at any rate a danger—perhaps some would say more than a danger—of an escalation after a few months, or perhaps years, to the nuclear level.
My Lords, perhaps I should now deal with one or two other questions which were put to me. There was, of course, very little discussion about fall-out, but perhaps this would be the moment at which I could reply (although without notice I can do so only in a fairly general way) to the question which the noble Viscount posed to me about the high-altitude American test. Scientific opinion, of course, about the virtue of the test from the point of view of science, differs widely. Apart from the Russians' attempt to exploit the dispute, Professor Van Allen—who gave his name to the belts near which the test will take place—was quite violently in favour of it from a purely scientific point of view; Sir Bernard Lovell was almost as violently against, from a scientific point of view. The scientific advice which I have received is more cautious in both directions. What is quite certain, of course, is that the test will have results in that exalted area of a quite considerable kind. What is perhaps more important to me, at any rate, is that the effects on human health are expected to be nil. Indeed, it is far safer than any test in the atmosphere, from that point of view, because what goes up there is more likely to stay up and not come down. So that that is, at any rate, reassuring.
Sir Bernard Lovell's point, was that it is an undesirable thing, in principle, to interfere with the environment of the earth unilaterally, and that if an experiment of this kind is undertaken for, at any rats, civil purposes, it is desirable
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to secure agreement between scientists all over the world; because, to say the least of it, if an experiment of this kind took place it might interfere with other people's experiments. I think there is a great deal of force in that. But again, bringing the argument down to what I might call the practical level, I think we have all to face the fact that this kind of thing, on one side or the other, is going to take place as long as tests go on; and that the real answer, from the practical point of view, to those who do not want tests of this kind to take place, except by agreement between world scientists, is to get a test ban agreement. This is, of course, precisely what we have been discussing this afternoon; and on that I think we are very widely in agreement.
My Lords, I do not want to issue a commentary upon Mr. McNamara's speech, which I have read only in shortened reports. I do not believe that there is really very much between us in this House, or between us and him, about what he said. I think, with respect to the noble Lord, Lord Rea, that he is talking in terms too crude altogether when he talks about purely independent deterrents. The revolution in military technology since the 1940's has imposed interdependence on the countries of the Western Alliance, on both sides of the Atlantic. To-day no single country—and by "no single country" I would even include the United States—can provide the whole range of deterrents required against a possible threat from the other bloc. Conventional and nuclear forces with a very wide range of functions are needed, and they must be of such power that on our side they would have to be based on the full breadth of Western resources. Western arrangements for nuclear defence are being increasingly shaped to suit the need of the Alliance as a whole. This is happening by a process of evolution. I think it would be a mistake to take predetermined attitudes about this evolution, which will obviously take time, and obviously presents both political and military difficulties. I think it is easy to see the goal, which is that the power and resources of the Alliance should find their maximum possible expression, but the particular forms will be governed by changing conditions—economic, political and military.

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My Lords, I think it is important that we should make the point that Mr. McNamara was entirely sincere when he said, and made it quite clear, that his speech was not in fact aimed at the British position at all. We do possess, at the present stage of development, highly sophisticated and deliverable weapons, and our delivery of them would be a substantial proportion—though I think it would be wrong for me to indicate what proportion—of the total Allied deliveries. This would be an integrated part, and not in that sense an independent part, of the joint Allied effort. We do not seek a nuclear potential only for prestige reasons. The question we have to face is whether we should retain what we have for legitimate military purposes or should cast it away. The test of this must be the same and not different from any other defence policy; that is, which course of action, not discussed in the abstract but at the present juncture and in the concrete, is more or less likely to yield peace and security? It does not follow that the answer is the same for us as we might think it is for the French, or the Chinese, or the Germans, or the Indians, or anybody else. We have to judge our own policy in the light of the existing situation.
It is certainly true that Her Majesty's Government are opposed to the spread of further independent nuclear capacities. We recognise that plans of one kind or another could contribute to this, but we think that the way to proceed is on a world-wide basis, as was indicated in the Irish resolution approved by the United Nations last December. Under that resolution, nuclear States would undertake not to hand over control of nuclear weapons to any non-nuclear State or give aid in manufacturing them; non-nuclear States would undertake not to obtain control of or make nuclear weapons. Action on this resolution will, in fact, be discussed at Geneva after the recess.
At the same time, I think I should make one personal doubt known to the House in connection with this matter. I do not believe that this danger of the so-called "nth nuclear power" can be resolved in isolation from the general difficulty about the possession of nuclear weapons. I cannot myself visualise a situation in which the great Powers had
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reached a solution, and had decided to abolish their nuclear weapons, in which they would not also have reached a means of seeing that other nations did not possess them. Equally, I cannot conceive of a situation in which the great Powers remained in antagonism of one another and made no agreement about their own possession and potential use of nuclear weapons and in which the so-called problem of the nth power would not continue to exist in some form or another. Because, after all, these things are not an unknown or a very recondite technology. I could, if it were proper for me to do so, give quite a long list of nations which, if they determined upon this course, in the absence of agreement between the great Powers, could provide themselves with the nuclear potential. I am convinced myself, having said all that I have said, that the key to the matter lies in pursuing, first of all, a test ban agreement, and, secondly, a disarmament agreement in the existing forum by the existing means to secure some kind of agreement between the great Powers; and I do not believe that the other problem will prove in the least difficult once that main question is overcome.
Now, my Lords, I do not want to prolong this speech with more than one or two further reflections. I feel, from what has taken place this afternoon, that the whole House will approve the declaration of the Prime Minister: that this country, at any rate,
"will remain at the conference table until concrete results have been achieved however long this will take."
My Lords, none of us, I think, has tried to conceal from one another our own discouragement at the progress of discussions, and I personally see small evidence, after years of talk, that at this stage the Russians are seriously interested in an agreement. But we are going on until we succeed, if success is possible at all.
I, like some other speakers, feel that I should conclude with a reflection to which I cannot but attach, in the long run, at least as much importance as I do to any of the discussions now in progress. I have long thought, as several noble Lords have, that the logic of modern weapons—perhaps even the

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logic of the continued absence of success of our disarmament negotiations—points inevitably towards some form of international police force and to some form of world authority. Most of us cannot accept this as an immediate object of policy only because of the political difficulties which appear to stand in our way; but, if so, it follows that we must pursue intermediate and more pragmatical aims. Indeed, in a sense, this is the explanation of what we seek to do in the realm of external affairs. But I cannot myself feel, after fifteen years of the cold war, that the present squirrel's cage of accusation and counter-accusation is getting us anywhere. It was for that reason, among others, that I was particularly sorry that the Russians refused to endorse the agreement arrived at, which was aimed at putting an end to the nonsensical war propaganda which is going on, and which one would have thought, in the end, damaged the nations which in dulged in it in the reputation of civilised and educated men and women.
There are times (I hope that perhaps they will happen) when one looks for a new initiative on the part of some far-sighted, imaginative statesman on one side or other of the Iron Curtain. I sometimes wonder whether the direction from which such an initiative might come would be a suggestion that the scientifically developed peoples of the world might co-operate together in some way to improve the material conditions of the human race upon the planet. I am not necessarily talking of what is known nowadays as "aid", the potentialities of which are sometimes exaggerated. Rather I am thinking, perhaps, of something more ambitious in terms of human welfare, health and food production. The House was discussing, I think on June 6, the prospective balance of world population and food production. It would certainly involve, in the first place, some measure of scientific co-operation on the technical plane, some agreement, perhaps at first in one or two selected areas, on a co-operative programme; and if it succeeded there it might be extended to other circumstances.
Obviously, if such an idea were to succeed on an objective and non-politi-
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cal footing, it would in the end make immense drafts on the energies, manpower and resources of East and West—so much, indeed, that it would almost inevitably involve on both sides reductions in armaments programmes to make way for it, whilst the practical experience of working together, instead of in competition, might, I think, help to reduce the tensions and anxieties which form such a large part of the international relations of mankind at the present day. No doubt this would involve the suspension of many prejudices and suspicions which exist at the moment. I cannot help thinking that it was this kind of conception, perhaps not very deeply thought out, which has underlain the speeches of several scientists of international reputation which I have read in the papers in recent months. But nothing can happen in this field without some political initiative coming from a source which would carry the conviction that the enterprise would be seriously considered and sincerely tried. In the meantime, we must pursue those lines of approach on disarmament which already exist. I have not found a great deal of criticism, and I have found a great deal of encouragement, in this debate, in the thoughtful speeches we have all heard; and if there is criticism outside, I have the impression that it is based more on emotion than on reason.
5.17 p.m.
LORD HENDERSON: My Lords, I hope that the House will feel that I was justified in putting on the Order Paper the Motion which has led to this debate, and that we have been able to discuss this most urgent problem of disarmament without reference to the general issues which are involved in an international discussion. Personally, I feel that the debate has been satisfying, if only in one respect; that was that the Foreign Secretary, with whose speech I found myself in almost complete agreement, did promise in his speech that he would not hesitate to attend the Disarmament Conference whenever he felt that a useful purpose would be served. I myself went a little further than that: I asked him to be there for the opening of the resumed discussions. I attach enormous importance to the influence which the Foreign Secretary can exert at Geneva. I think that the private talks

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which he and his two colleagues, Mr. Rusk and Mr. Gromyko, can have are probably more important than the discussions in the conference hall itself. I hope, therefore, that the Foreign Secretary will be good enough to give a little further reflection to the suggestion which I made to him.
I feel that noble Lords in all parts of the House found themselves in pretty good harmony with the views expressed by the Foreign Secretary. I think that noble Lords will probably feel that we have had a most useful and helpful debate, and I do not think that the House
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would wish me to pursue any of the points that have been made. However, I should like to thank the noble Viscount the Leader of the House for the speech with which he concluded the debate, much of which I must read to understand its significance, because I have no scientific knowledge. With the leave of the House, I beg to withdraw my Motion.
Motion for Papers, by leave, withdrawn.
House adjourned at twenty minutes past five o'clock.