HL Deb 07 June 1962 vol 241 cc713-5

2.6 p.m.

LORD FRASER OF LONSDALE

My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.

[The Question was as follows:

To ask Her Majesty's Government whether further consideration can be given to the question of whether, in appointing Justices of the Peace, blindness—although taken into account along with other considerations—is not of itself a bar to appointment.]

THE LORD CHANCELLOR (VISCOUNT KILMUIR)

My Lords, the question whether blindness should be a bar to appointment as a justice of the peace was considered by the Royal Commission on Justices of the Peace which was appointed in 1946, and before which my noble friend Lord Fraser of Lonsdale gave evidence. The Royal Commission, after paying tribute to the great achievements of blind persons in many fields, came to the conclusion that in the administration of justice sight is essential, and they recommended unanimously that no person who is blind ought to be appointed a justice or, if he is already a justice, ought to continue to sit. My predecessors, the noble and learned Earl, Lord Jowitt, and my noble and learned friend Lord Simonds, gave careful consideration to these recommendations, and both of them accepted the arguments advanced by the Royal Commission. I myself have given prolonged and anxious thought to this question, and I have found myself in complete agreement with my two predecessors. Much as we all sympathise with my noble friend's point of view, I am afraid that I must tell him that I know of no fresh evidence which would lead me to alter the clear conclusion which I have reached in accepting the Royal Commission's recommendations, which I believe are in the best interests of the administration of justice as a whole.

LORD FRASER OF LONSDALE

My Lords, while thanking my noble and learned friend for his courteous and sympathetic reply, may I put a hypothetical case to him? Suppose there is a blind man in middle age who has been a successful mayor or chairman of a rural district council who has enjoyed a year's ex-officio office as a J.P.—he may even, perhaps, have been a solicitor; and suppose he has a great public reputation for judgment and justice and is in every respect an eligible person. Might it not be better to appoint him a justice than some local Colonel Blimp? Will my noble and learned friend consider whether blindness of itself should be an absolute bar, or whether, as my Question suggests, it should be fairly taken into consideration along with every other disability, such as deafness, stupidity, prejudice and political bias?

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

My Lords, on one aspect of my noble friend's supplementary question I should like to tell him that I personally consider the record of everyone who is proposed as a candidate for the commission of the peace, and I try to assure myself—and, of course, I am helped by my advisory committees all over the country—that everyone whom I appoint reaches the standard which I think is necessary for this important office.

On the other part of his supplementary question, I hope your Lordships will allow me to quote the reasons that were given by the Royal Commission. After paying tribute, as I said, to the great work of those who are under this incapacity, they went on to say: There are however certain weighty considerations on the other side to which we are compelled to attach great importance. First, it is necessary, if a magistrate is to be deemed capable of fulfilling all the functions of his office, that he should be able to read documents and examine plans. If he has not this ability, he is necessarily debarred not only from attesting documents, but (what is much more important) from forming an independent opinion, in the course of a trial, based on the examination of plans and documents or on a comparison of handwritings. Secondly, great importance is always attached in our courts to the observation of a witness's demeanour by those who act as judges of fact. In order that this observation should be wholly reliable it seems to us that it must depend on sight as well as hearing. Finally, we think that litigants, and especially defendants, whose reputation and whole future are sometimes at stake, could not be expected to feel confident that the value of the evidence for and against them would be correctly appraised by a justice who had not the advantage of seeing the witnesses. These considerations compel us to say that no person who is blind ought to be appointed a justice, or, if he is already a justice, ought to continue to sit. My Lords, with the greatest sympathy, I feel myself bound to accept these conclusions, with which I respectfully agree.

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