Lords Sitting of 9 May 1961

Preamble
The House met at two of the clock, The LORD CHANCELLOR on the Woolsack.
Prayers—Read by the Lord Chancellor

PRESS AND THE DEFENCE OF THE FREE WORLD
2.5 p.m.
LORD BIRDWOOD: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the first Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
[The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government whether in their relations with the National Press it is possible in any way to control or influence the publication of material inimical to the defence of the Free World.]
THE PAYMASTER GENERAL (LORD MILLS): My Lords, save in the most exceptional circumstances the Government has no wish to limit the freedom of the Press. Of course, freedom of any kind carries with it the possibility of aberrations from time to time, but by and large I think the Press can be expected to handle matters with a full sense of responsibility.
LORID BIRDWOOD: My Lords, while I would certainly accept that, by and large, the Press do treat these matters with responsibility, I. wonder whether the noble Lord would agree that there are occasions when particularly anti-American and anti-German material appears in the Press. Is it possible to envisage such things as occasional meetings between either the Prime Minister or the Foreign Secretary and editors of newspapers, with a view to influencing the Press?
LORD MILLS: My Lords, I think that most Ministers, like the Opposition, have opportunities from time to time of discussing matters with the Press; but I should not like to comment on the noble Lord's statement as to the directions in which sometimes the Press may go. I have said in my reply that aberrations do occur from time to time, but on the whole I think we are very well served by the Press.

LONDON AND MOSCOW TELEVISION PROGRAMME EXCHANGES
2.7 p.m.
LORD BIRDWOOD: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the second Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
[The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government whether the initiative for the B.B.C. Television programme from Moscow on May Day came from the Soviet Union or from this country; and also whether the arrangements included any reciprocal programme for the benefit of viewers in the Soviet Union.]
LORD ST. OSWALD: My Lords, I would remind my noble friend, as I reminded my noble friend Lord Teviot, three months ago, that programme content is a matter for the B.B.C. The Corporation did, however, put out a Press statement on April 27 in regard to the agreement they had reached with U.S.S.R. officials to the effect that a live exchange programme would soon be transmitted from London to the Soviet Union. I understand that the initiative for the May Day broadcasts came wholly from the B.B.C.
LORD BIRDWOOD: My Lords, I thank the noble Lord for that reply. Would he tell me what reciprocal arrangements have been made? I think that is a point in my Question. Further, is it true that a report that appeared in The Times alleging that a reciprocal arrangement had been made reads to the effect that Soviet reciprocity takes the form of their being in a position to choose the programmes which they will receive from the B.B.C.?
LORD ST. OSWALD: My Lords, I cannot give my noble friend the details of the reciprocal programme, because that is, in fact, under discussion in Moscow during this week. I did not seethe reference in The Times from which he quotes and I certainly have no reason to think that reciprocity will be on the basis suggested. I will, of course, find out and let my noble friend know, but personally, I do not know the newspaper's source of information, and it certainly has not been offered to me. Therefore, I cannot tell him what truth, if any, there may be in it; but I should imagine that so far the basis of any reciprocity is still being discussed.
LORD BARNBY: My Lords, may I ask the noble Lord whether any indication is given to the B.B.C. from outside, possibly from Government sources, as to the proportion of time in total broadcasts which is to be allotted to one country, for instance, Russia, as against others?
LORD ST. OSWALD: No, my Lords. I think that reasonably comes under the heading of "programme content" which is left entirely to the B.B.C.
LORD LAWSON: My Lords, may I ask the noble Lord whether he will draw the attention of the B.B.C. television authorities to the Durham miners' demonstration, which Sir Stafford Cripps put on record as being a bigger and better demonstration than the Moscow one?
LORD ST. OSWALD: My Lords, I am perfectly certain that the noble Lord's suggestion is a most valuable one, as are all his suggestions, and I will certainly see that it reaches the attention of my right honourable friend.
LORD REA: My Lords, would the noble Lord say whether the proposed reciprocal programme is one isolated instance, or is it the beginning of an interchange?
LORD ST. OSWALD: My Lords, I am happy that the noble Lord asked me that question. In fact, it is hoped that it will become part of a regular interchange of programmes.
LORD BIRDWOOD: My Lords, could the noble Lord perhaps further say that when a reciprocal programme is arranged it will be a programme chosen in this country and not in Moscow?
LORD ST. OSWALD: My Lords, I think I said in my reply to my noble friend's first supplementary that I was not knowledgeable on exactly what the arrangement was, and I do not think it would be proper under the Charter for the Government to lay down anything of that nature to the B.B.C.
VISCOUNT ALEXANDER OF HILLSBOROUGH: My Lords, would it not be natural that if you are proceeding to reciprocal arrangements there should be reciprocity as to which side chooses the particular programme?
LORD ST. OSWALD: My Lords, I am sure that if the noble Viscount the Leader of the Opposition regards it as such, then the B.B.C. is likely so to regard it as well.

U.N.O. COSTS AND CONTRIBUTIONS
2.13 p.m.
LORD BARNBY: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
[The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government:—

(1) what is the current daily expenditure by U.N.O. in Congo operations;

(2) what members of U.N.O. other than Russia and France have notified their intentions not to contribute; and

(3) what is the believed current monthly rate of cost to the United Kingdom Treasury of its membership of U.N.O.]

THE JOINT PARLIAMENTARY UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNE): My Lords, my noble friend the Foreign Secretary gave details of the cost of the United Nations operations in the Congo to the end of 1960 in his reply to my noble friend Lord Barnby on December 21. The Answer to the first part of his Question to-day is that the daily expenditure on the Congo Operation in 1960 averaged about £83,900. The corresponding figure for 1961 is likely to be about £98,200. The Answer to the second part of my noble friend's Question is that although a number of countries have indicated unwillingness or inability to pay their full share of the Congo costs, only the Soviet bloc countries have publicly refused to pay anything. The Answer to the third part of my noble friend's Question is that for 1961 Her Majesty's Government's financial commitments to the United Nations, both assessed and voluntary, total about £897,400 per month. This figure does not take into account the cost to Her Majesty's Government of such items as its representation at the United Nations Headquarters at New York and Geneva.
LORD BARNBY: My Lords, might I ask the noble Marquess whether it is to be understood that France has not indicated her intention not to pay anything towards events in the Congo? I have a cutting from the Press before me which says that France has so refused and that this adventure is costing over £40 million a year. Also, with regard to his

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Answer to the third part of the Question, may I ask the noble Marquess this: is it to be understood that, included in the sum he has mentioned, there are any special contributions, particularly with regard to the Congo? If so, would he state whether, in order to exert pressure such as was suggested in a letter from a Member of this House in The Times on Monday, there would be a requirement by Her Majesty's Government for a supplementary payment to the U.N.O. in order to act in the manner suggested?
THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNE: To deal with the first of the noble Lord's three supplementary questions, the answer, my Lords, is No; at no time has France publicly announced her refusal to contribute to the costs of the Congo operation, but the French Government's statements in the General Assembly have indicated their inability either to approve the estimates or to vote in favour of any financing resolution. But I think we should be extremely unwise at this stage to pre-judge the case; and we hope, of course, that all members of the United Nations will pay their share.
In regard to the question of special contributions, there have, of course, been special contributions of which I think the noble Lord, Lord Barnby, is aware. Our first instalment was a sum of 3 million dollars. That was a special contribution outside our assessed obligations. In addition, we have promised a further sum of at least 2 million dollars, subject to other substantial contributions being forthcoming from other countries. I think that deals with the second of his questions and also with the third, on the supplementary payments. We have promised at least 2 million dollars, subject to substantial contributions from the other countries. I think that answers the noble Lord's questions.
LORD BARNBY: My Lords, I did not get it quite clear from the noble Marquess. Assuming it was thought appropriate to apply pressure in the form suggested in this letter from a Member of this House, published on Monday, is it to be assumed that such would be done without any further or additional contributions being made?
THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNE: My Lords, I do not want to dodge a reply to this, but I do feel it is a hypothetical question. I do not think the noble Lord can expect a reply.
VISCOUNT ALEXANDER OF HILLSBOROUGH: My Lords, in view of the type of question, would the noble Marquess be aware that the general conclusion, I think, of the country at large is that the intervention of the United Nations Organisation as such saved things from being much worse than they were; and that in those circumstances the British people would want to support, at any cost, their proper contribution to the cost of such beneficial operations?
THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNE: My Lords, I am very grateful to the noble Viscount the Leader of the Opposition for his intervention. Of course Her Majesty's Government have consistently done everything they can to support the United Nations operations.

BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE
LORD NEWTON: My Lords, I should like to inform the House that it has been agreed through the usual channels that the proceedings on the Committee stage of the Road Traffic Bill should be continued to-day until 11 o'clock, by which time it is hoped that the Committee stage will be concluded. I should also like to say that it has been agreed that the House shall meet to-morrow at 2 o'clock instead of 2.30, in view of the number of speakers.

AFFILIATION PROCEEDINGS (BLOOD TESTS) BILL [H.L.]
2.19 p.m.
Order of the Day for the House to be put into Committee read.
Moved, That the House do now resolve itself into Committee.—(Lord Amulree).
On Question, Motion agreed to.
House in Committee accordingly.
[The LORD MERTHYR in the Chair.]
Clause 1: [Power of the court to require blood tests]:
LORD AMULREE LORD AMULREE moved, in subsection (1) to omit all words after "the court may" down to "blood", and to insert:
"at the request of the mother, if site is the complainant, and shall at the request of the alleged father, give a direction for the use of".

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The noble Lord said: Before I attempt to move the first Amendment standing in my name, I should like to explain to the Committee that the Bill as your Lordships see it now does not bear a great deal of resemblance to the Bill to which you were good enough to give a Second Reading. I should like to record my gratitude for the very great help which has been given to me by the Home Office, who have spent considerable time talking with me about this matter, to get the Bill transformed into its present, more satisfactory shape.
The purpose of this Amendment is not to do anything very definite to the Bill, but is merely to change round some of the powers which the Bill will confer. The present Amendment removes the power of the court to order blood tests otherwise than at the request of one or other party. This power is re-inserted in the new clause which I shall move after Clause 1. The second point of the Amendment is that it changes the phrase, "the court may, … by order require" to the phrase, "the court may, … give a direction for the use of". It was thought preferable to use that particular expression. It was thought that the requirement for a blood test is not a suitable matter for a formal order of the court, which would automatically attract the penalty provisions of Section 54 of the Magistrates' Courts Act, 1952; and those, as your Lordships will remember, are quite substantial.
The third point is that we haw, retained the mother's right to seek a blood test herself, although I am afraid that, in a way, it would be better if she could not, because the blood tests, as I tried to explain to your Lordships on Second Reading, can do the mother no good at all; it can merely do her harm. However, for the sake of sex equality, I thought it was better if that power were kept in. But it will depend upon the mother herself applying for the affiliation order. Where the order is applied for by the National Assistance Board or the local authority, in particular, the right will not apply. I hope that I have given sufficient explanation of the reasons for this Amendment, and I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 1, line 7, leave out from beginning to ("blood") in line 9, and insert ("at the request of the mother, if she is the complainant, and
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shall at the request of the alleged father, give a direction for the use of")—(Lord Amulree.)
THE CHAIRMAN OF COMMITTEES: I should, perhaps, explain to the Committee that Amendment No. 2 is an Amendment to Amendment No. 1. It is therefore proper to call the mover of No. 2 first, and there can then be a general debate on the two together.
THE JOINT PARLIAMENTARY UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT (EARL BATHURST): First of all, I want to thank the noble Lord, Lord Amulree, for his generous compliment to the staff of the Home Office. As your Lordships will see, we have a completely new Bill in front of us. In fact, those noble Lords who "did their homework" over the week-end brought it to my attention that we would not even be dealing with the Amendments as they were written down. That, I am glad to say, has been sorted out this morning in the new Marshalled List. I must make it clear that I can accept the Amendment the noble Lord has put before the Committee provided he can accept my Amendment to his Amendment.
I think it would be best if I first give an outline of the position as it originally was in the noble Lord's Bill. Subsection (1) stated that
"the court may, and at the request of the mother or the alleged father shall,"
make an order for a blood test. In other words, the court "may" of their own free will cause a test to be taken; but if the alleged father or the mother asks for it then the court "shall" order the test. Now the noble Lord's Amendment changes that situation slightly. He will have it that the court "may" at the request of the mother and "shall" at the request of the alleged father order a test; and later on, in another clause, we get the case that the court "may" order a test of its own choosing. The effect of my Amendment will be that we take the mother right out of the clause. As the noble Lord has explained, in fact, the appearance of the mother in the clause at all may be a trap for an unwary person. I think the noble Lord will agree with my Amendment, that the mother should be taken out, as it cannot in any way affect her case at all. It seems a sad thing to have to say, but such is logic and such is medical science

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that these blood tests cannot do anything but disprove a possible father. It cannot in any way help the mother.
Coming back again to my Amendment to the Amendment, the mother is out, and the result is that the court may, at the request of the alleged father, order a test. We believe (this is jumping the gun a little, but this will be the effect if my Amendment to the noble Lord's Amendment is accepted) that the court should have the option. If, because new evidence is produced, or for any reason whatever, the court should see fit to use its discretion, it "may ", (instead of an obligatory "shall") give a direction for there to be a blood test. So, if the noble Lord can see his way to accepting my Amendment to his Amendment, I would advise your Lordships to accept the amended Amendment of the noble Lord. I beg to move.
Amendment to Amendment moved—
In the words proposed to be inserted, leave out from the second ("the") to ("alleged")—(Earl Bathurst.)
BARONESS SUMMERSKILL: The noble Lord, Lord Amulree, has mentioned the fact that this appears to be a different Bill. I also should like to thank the noble Earl, Lord Bathurst, and his advisers, for redrafting the Bill. In fact, if your Lordships will forgive me for being so immodest, he has incorporated in it every point that I raised on Second Reading. Indeed, your Lordships will recall that I was put in a rather curious position as a newcomer to this House, because I am a responsible person: I have been a Minister on two occasions. In no circumstances should I have divided this House unless I had felt very strongly about certain principles which were embodied in the old Bill; and it is a little unhappy to realise that the unmarried mother, in this House, certainly had no "pressure group" except in the form of the noble Earl, Lord Longford, and myself. He and I went into the Lobby alone on the part of the unmarried mother, because we felt so strongly that certain principles embodied in the Bill were of such a character that, in fact, if they were implemented, they would deny her justice.
I realise that Bills of this kind are a little technical; and, no doubt, because the Bill deals with blood tests, many people thought, "This really is
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something that I cannot understand". But this new Bill is entirely different, and, so far as I am concerned, it completely reflects what I think all people of compassion in the middle of the 20th century would ask to be the treatment of the unmarried mother and her child. I entirely support what the noble Earl, Lord Bathurst, has just said. The Amendment which he is moving does, of course, provide for the approach which I outlined on Second Reading. May I just say this to the noble Lord, Lord Amulree? I cannot understand why he comes to this House and puts an Amendment in this form. The fact is that he has forgotten the elementary fact that, in these blood tests, there can be no positive result; it is in fact a negative result, because the man can only be adjudged not to be the father. If the result of a blood test could be only to show that a man was not the father, would an unmarried mother ask for a blood test? Of course it is not in her interests to do so.
As we heard on Second Reading, this is a man's Bill and not a woman's. The Amendment which has been proposed by the Government is quite right. It would be grossly unfair to trap a woman into asking for this test when her evidence has already been corroborated, when the court has already said that a certain man is the father. I would remind the noble Lord of what the Lord Chancellor said in 1938 when this Bill was introduced into the House. He turned to the House and said: "I am a little uncertain about this. I am advised by eminent pathologists in this country that these tests may be inaccurate". The noble Lord is saying to an unmarried mother, who has already provided evidence that has convinced the court, that she has the opportunity to ask for this test; and there is the one chance in a million that it may be inaccurate, and all the evidence is then null and void. And the noble Lord turns to this House and says that he is doing this because of sex equality. The truth is precisely the opposite, my Lords. It is not sex equality; it is sex inequality which the noble Lord is emphasising here and is trying to uphold in this House. I say that because he has introduced something in this Bill—and I use the noble Lord's own expression, which, in my opinion, is an understatement—"to trap the woman". Is that equality?

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I suggest to the noble Lord that he should examine his conscience and decide whether he will protect this woman, who is surely in need of our protection.
The other point is this. The noble Lord says that whereas the court may test the blood at the request of the woman, if the alleged father asks the court to test the blood the court shall do it. I apologise to the House for repeating that part of my speech which dealt with this question on Second Reading, but the position is this. If the evidence proves without doubt that a man is the father of the child, there are men who become stubborn, who have already quarrelled with the girl, her mother and family, and who say: "In no circumstances will I pay the affiliation allowance". But they say: "Ah! there is such a thing known as a blood test. If I ask for that, the court is compelled to direct a blood test". In other words, it is possible for a man to ask for a blood test on frivolous grounds in order to delay the court's decision, and any delay at this time will, of course, beat harshly on the unmarried mother and her child. Therefore the Government, who have thought about this and who have considered it behind the scenes very carefully, are of the opinon that, not only to do justice to the woman but also to protect public funds, the court should not be compelled but should have an option to decide whether it shall order a test or not. I ask the noble Lord, Lord Amulree, to consider this very fair point, which I am certain any large audience will agree, on reflection, is the right approach.
2.35 p.m.
BARONESS HORSBRUGH: I am glad that this Bill has been, as most of us have realised, practically rewritten. The principle is the same, and it is for that that many of us voted at the end of the Second Reading debate. The noble Lady opposite must be very glad, as she approves it now, that we were able to carry it in spite of her opposition. I agree with the point that has been brought out by Lord Bathurst's Amendment, and I agree with the noble Lady; it is quite ridiculous to think that the mother would be asking for a blood test. If she knew what it meant, she certainly would not. I think it is an extraordinary suggestion that she should
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be brought in. I can see absolutely no reason whatsoever why she should.
I was a little surprised at the noble Baroness, Lady Summerskill, when she talked about the unmarried mother having no "pressure group", as if the rest of us in this House were not in any way anxious to help the unmarried mother and did not know anything about her case. I realise that on the Second Reading debate the noble Lady, when addressing your Lordships, said, in the form of a question, that it was women, in the majority, who should always decide these questions; and when I disagreed with her she said that I probably knew nothing about the subject whatsoever and had no ideas about it. I did not interrupt the noble Lady because I knew perfectly well that she was not meaning to be rude; it was simply ignorance of the work I had been doing and of the amount I had learned over a number of years.
As many of your Lordships know, a Committee on the Adoption of Children was set up in December, 1938. I had the honour of being appointed Chairman. This very subject concerning the father was gone through very carefully, because, as your Lordships will now understand, we were anxious, with all these adoption cases, that we should know who the father of the child was. Then, our report having been made, about a year later I had the luck of the ballot in another place and was able to bring in a Bill dealing with this subject. I am glad to say that that Bill, when it came to your Lordships' House, was in charge of the noble Lord, Lord Kinnaird, and it received the Royal Assent in July, 1939. During the time my Bill was going through the House of Commons, the Bill of the noble Lord, Lord Merthyr, was in this House. There was, therefore, a great deal of interest in the two Bills, and I was frequently asked what was my opinion, and my opinion was strongly in opposition to the Bill, in 1939, of the noble Lord, Lord Merthyr.
It has been explained that the National Council for the Unmarried Mother and Her Child were opposed then but are now in favour. And so am I, for this reason: we are far further on now with the subject and in our knowledge of blood tests than we were then. Having a blood test is now not a terribly frighten-

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ing operation for anybody. As we heard during the Second Reading debate from those who are best able to tell us, this is practically a routine experience now for every woman in pregnancy. So these mothers, in all probability, would have had a blood test during the time of pregnancy; it will not be something alarming or dangerous for them; and, in addition, the result will be much more accurate than we could ever have thought in the year 1939.
I hope, as we continue with this Bill, that we shall see that we are doing something to make for justice, and I am perfectly certain that it should not be looked upon simply as a Bill for men as against women, as I do not think it is anything of the sort. I found in my Committee, and those who gave evidence before my Committee, that men were just as eager and keen to see that justice was done to the woman as were the women themselves; and women have not always been tremendously sympathetic with the unmarried mother and her child. But, in doing so, I think we have to get justice, and if we can get justice, the work we are doing on this Bill will be worth while. For it is not only that a man may be wrongly accused of being the father of a child, but—a point which has always struck me—it means that the real father has got off scot-free. That we want to change. But I do think that the Bill as it now stands, and if these Amendments are accepted, has been improved. I feel that, after being against the scheme in 1939, I can now support it, but I would urge the noble Lord, Lord Amulree, not to press the idea of putting in this right for the woman, because I think that there is no good in it and that it might lead to a great deal of harm.
2.40 p.m.
LORD REA: Leaving aside for the moment the reference of the noble Baroness, Lady Summerskill, to unmarried mothers in this House, as she put it, having no support, may I ask the noble Earl whether he is not asking the House to deal with two matters at the same time—first of all, to consider taking out "mother" altogether, and secondly to decide whether, with respect to the father, the word is to be "shall" or "may"? I cannot speak for my noble friend Lord Amulree, but on the hypothesis that we are prepared to take
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"mother" out of the Bill, can we be put in a position to support or oppose "shall" or "may" with respect to the father? Perhaps that is a point for the Lord Chairman, but it seems to me that we have to vote for both or neither.
EARL BATHURST: What the noble Lord says is true. Possibly, I was running on a little too far, but I wanted to make clear what the effects of the two Amendments would be to the original clause. First of all, we are considering only the mother, and my Amendment to the Amendment will remove from the Bill the mother's right to apply, as the noble Lord has already said.
LORD REA: But it will still read "may" in respect of the father, instead of "shall"?
EARL BATHURST: The full result of the Government's Amendment will be to bring in "may".
LORD AMULREE: I have listened to what your Lordships have said about the Amendment, and personally I shall be quite willing to remove the mother from Clause 1 of the Bill, because I have always had great doubts whether it was right to keep in the mother and because, as the noble Lady said, it is really a trap for her. However, I felt constrained to keep the mother in until we could debate the matter in your Lordships' House. I was told by certain women's organisations that they thought the mother should have an equal chance. I tried to convince them that they were wrong, and I am pleased indeed to-day to have support on this. I shall be pleased in future to drop the mother from the Bill.
When I come to the question of the words "may" or shall", I am in some difficulty. If I may take your Lordships back a little, when the Bill was first introduced, in February, 1939, it contained the word "shall" in Clause 1, and was given an unopposed Second Reading. It was then referred to a Select Committee, which sat quite a long time and discussed the question at great length. When the Bill came back from the Select Committee the word "shall" was still there. It was given a Second Reading in your Lordships' House a month or two back and the word "shall" was approved by a majority, which, I may say without undue pride, was a big majority. Therefore, I feel reluctant to drop the word "shall".

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Another reason for keeping it in is that it may be of great help in aiding justice. I have been informed by people who know more about the courts than I do (practically, I know very little about them) that some courts may not agree with the test at all, and that, no matter what the position was, if the alleged father were to ask for a test, if the power were only permissive, they might say, "No" That is why I am anxious to retain the word "shall" rather than replace it with the word "may". It may be possible to compromise on this point to get us out of the difficulty, and I wonder whether the noble Earl could give us any assistance in this.
EARL BATHURST: I should like to give the noble Lord assistance, but I do not think that I can. When we get down to Amendment No. 7, which I shall ask your Lordships not to accept, we shall see that the noble Lord sets out the conditions for the compulsory power to take a blood test. The arguments against are much the same, and I wonder whether I can use one of them now which may convince the noble Lord. In view of the new rules that have only just come to be applied to such cases, whereby legal aid can be obtained by the parties in an action, I think that one, or even both, of the parties may almost certainly be aided legally, or may qualify for such aid. That being so, it will no longer be necessary for the court to have to make an order for a blood test, and for that reason I should like to see the court with only the power of "may". I would ask the noble Lord to think on these lines.
BARONESS SUMMER SKILL: May I put this point to the noble Lord to try to persuade him? He will be quite logical if he gives way on this point. I would remind him that, in a later Amendment, he is asking us to provide that the courts
"may at any time revoke any such direction previously given".
In other words, the noble Lord has not shut the door. He feels that he should not move away from the position that the courts "shall" do something, but later on he says that the court may change its mind. Therefore, he is being quite logical if he gives way now.
LORD AMULREE: That being so, I think it is possibly more important to
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get "mother" taken out of the Bill than to have "shall" in. But I say that with great reluctance, because it takes away a little of the sharp edge of the Bill, which may be important in the case of a recalcitrant bench of magistrates. I want the Amendment to be put, though I shall not divide the Committee.
EARL BATHURST: I think that the court would use this power only in the case of the stupidest of stupid men. But with legal aid the stupidest of stupid men should be able to get properly qualified advice. If, having done that, he still refuses, I wonder whether we need bother too much in such a case—though far be it from me to say so. In view of the Legal Aid Scheme I am sure that the necessity which the noble Lord would like to see provided for will have disappeared.
BARONESS HORSBRUGH: I should prefer to keep in the word "shall". I would say to the noble Earl that there are lots of stupid men and stupid women. While we think that they could all be led to seek justice and rightness and the sense of things, they are not always first led. If the majority of your Lordships wish to take out "shall" and put in "may", I shall not oppose it, but I think it would be better if the word "shall" were left in.
EARL BATHURST: With great respect to the noble Lady, I think she knows that the noble Baroness, Lady Wootton of Abinger, has an Amendment on the Marshalled List, which I think would go a long way to look after the point she has raised, and I would ask your Lordships to bear this Amendment in mind.
LORD AMULREE: What I had in mind was not a stupid plaintiff, but a stupid bench of magistrates.
EARL BATHURST: I do not think that the noble Lord would wish me to comment on that.
On Question, Amendment to Amendment agreed to.
Amendment, as amended, agreed to.
2.50 p.m.
LORD AMULREE LORD AMULREE moved, in subsection (1) to omit "if the mother refuses the court shall dismiss the application", and to insert:
"may at any time revoke any such direction previously given.
(2) Where a direction is given under this section at the request of the mother or of the alleged father, she or he (as the case may be) shall pay the cost of taking and testing blood samples for the purpose of giving effect to the direction (including any expenses reasonably incurred by the mother or by any person having the custody, charge or care of the child in taking any steps required of her or him for the purpose), but the amount paid shall be treated as costs incurred by the mother or alleged father, as the case may be, in the proceedings.
(3) The results of blood tests taken for the purpose of giving effect to such a direction shall (in such form and manner as may be prescribed by rules made under section fifteen of the Justices of the Peace Act, 1949) be certified to the court by the person carrying out the tests, together with his opinion on the question whether the alleged father is thereby excluded from being the father of the child, and the court shall take the certificate into account as evidence in the proceedings of the matters certified; but the results of blood tests so taken shall not in any event be treated in those proceedings or in any other proceedings for an affiliation order under the Affiliation Proceedings Act, 1957 (including proceedings on appeal) as satisfying the provision of that Act requiring the mother's evidence to be corroborated.
(4) In any proceedings for an affiliation order under the Affiliation Proceedings Act, 1957 (including proceedings on appeal) things done for the purpose of giving effect to a direction under this section, whether given in those proceedings or not, may be proved by documentary evidence in such cases, and in such manner, and subject to such conditions as may be provided by rules made under section fifteen of the Justices of the Peace Act, 1949.
(5) A court of quarter sessions on the hearing of an appeal against an affiliation order under the Affiliation Proceedings Act, 1957, or against the dismissal of an application for such an affiliation order, shall have the like power to give a direction under subsection (1) above as a magistrates' court has on the hearing of such an application, and subsections (2) and (3) shall apply accordingly.
(6) A court shall not give a direction under this section where a previous direction has been so given by any court in respect of the same persons and the results of blood tests taken to give effect to the previous direction have been duly certified to the court giving that direction"
The noble Lord said: This Amendment replaces a number of provisions as they were originally drafted, and also contains a certain amount of new material. The opening words of the Amendment give the power to revoke a direction for the use of blood tests. This is inserted to give the court a power to dispose of the direction if blood tests are not to be used. For example, it is a formal consequence of the provision which gives the court a dis-
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cretion whether to dismiss an application for an affiliation order where a direction for a blood test is not complied with. It would also be used if the mother, after a direction had been given, produced a good reason for not undergoing a test.
Subsection (2) provides that the party who asks for the blood test shall initially meet the costs, and that the court shall have the usual power to order the other party to repay all or part of the costs, as costs incurred in the proceedings. Where the party to the blood test is entitled to legal aid, these costs will be supplied from the legal aid fund. Subsection (3) replaces, in a more generous form, some of the provisions of the original Clause 3. There the details of the certification procedure are left to the rules of court, as is appropriate to cases of this kind. The new subsection simply requires the court to take account of the certificate, which meets the criticism made during Second Reading that the clause had an air of mystery and that the certificate whether it was positive or negative might be concealed from the court. It provides, however, that the results of these blood tests shall not be regarded as corroborative of the mother's evidence. This is in accordance with the expert advice I received, as in the present state of medical knowledge tests cannot show that a particular man was the father.
Subsection (4) replaces another provision in the original Clause 3 by making provision for evidence of a blood sample to be given in the form of a certificate. This means that it will not be necessary for a witness to attend the court. It is intended to make provision in the rule which will come under this clause for oral evidence to be given if either of the two parties so desires. This corresponds to the original Clause 3. Subsection (5) corresponds with the original Clause 5, except that the power of quarter sessions to order a blood test to be carried out in a case where blood tests have already been carried out for the purpose of the original proceedings disappears. There is no point in having this duplicated. Subsection (6) prevents the court from giving two directions for a blood test in one case. There is no advantage in giving the court power to try a second time to see if the result is the same. Such a course would merely cause delay and expense, probably leading to great hardship on the parties, and might cast doubt

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on the reliability of the scientific nature of blood tests. If something is known to have gone wrong with the original test—for example, where there had been personation, or where a wrong sample had been tested—a test which suffered from such a defect could not be regarded as compliance with the court's direction. I hope that this explains this somewhat long Amendment. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 1, line 1, leave out from ("and") to end of line 13 and insert the said new words.—(Lord Amulree.)
EARL BATHURST EARL BATHURST moved, as an Amendment to the Amendment, in the proposed new subsection (2) to leave out from "section" down to the first "shall" and insert "the alleged father".
The noble Earl said: I can accept the noble Lord's Amendment if he will accept my two Amendments to it—Nos. 4 and 5—which are really consequential on my last Amendment. Having taken out "mother" in his first Amendment, we want now to modify subsection (2) of his Amendment No. 3 so that the mother is no longer referred to. We have deleted her from his first Amendment, and therefore there is no need to refer again to her case in Amendment No. 3. If the noble Lord will accept Amendments Nos. 4 and 5 as Amendments to his Amendment, I can accept all that he has just said. I beg to move.
Amendment to Amendment moved—
In line 1 of subsection (2), leave out from ("section") to ("shall") in line 3 and insert ("the alleged father")—(Earl Bathurst.)
EARL BATHURST: This is a consequential Amendment. I beg to move.
Amendment to Amendment moved—
In line 8 of subsection (2), leave out ("the mother or alleged father, as the case may be") and insert ("him")—(Earl Bathurst.)
BARONESS SUMMERSKILL: I should like to take this opportunity of thanking the noble Lord, Lord Amulree, for the most generous way in which he has responded to all the suggestions and points we made on Second Reading. The new Clause 1 is hardly recognisable, particularly when we think of the words as they were:
"if the mother refuses the court shall dismiss the application."
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The noble Lord has now deleted all that, and I think he will agree with me that it was a harsh and inhuman provision. Indeed I said on Second Reading that I thought it would be establishing a precedent if we denied justice to a woman who refused to have a blood test. I must point out that when blood tests were being discussed on a recent traffic Bill there was a great storm when it was suggested that people should be compelled to have blood tests; but we did not have much support when it was a question of the unmarried mother being subjected to a blood test. I thank the noble Lord.
He then said that he will insert, in place of that provision:
"may at any time revoke any such direction previously given".
I reminded him just now that it is quite logical that he should have withdrawn the first point, because he is still holding the fort and the order can be revoked by the court. I am sorry that my noble friend Lord Longford has gone, because he was anxious that a "conscience clause" should be included. As I said on Second Reading, there are some young women who would object on religious grounds to a blood test. Here is what I consider an opportunity for a woman to be able to give a good reason (it is mentioned later on) for not having the blood test. I feel that in this matter the noble Lord has exercised mercy while justice is still being done.
The other point I want to congratulate him on is this. I am pleased that he saw the point about the certificates. I felt that that was a harsh provision: that only the certificates which were of benefit to men should be submitted, and if the woman wanted any other evidence she had to ask for it—and, indeed, probably pay for it; which might be very expensive, if it was professional evidence. Now the whole position is changed; and not only will the certificates he submitted, but the person responsible for the test will be able to go to the court and explain precisely what it means. Therefore, I feel that the noble Lord has very generously met all the points we raised; and I am sure the other Amendment, which the noble Earl, Lord Bathurst, said is purely consequential, will be accepted.
LORD AMULREE: I should like to thank the noble Lady for her kind words.

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I am pleased that this Bill has now become a more reasonable, humanitarian and, at the same time, just measure. I can tell the noble Earl, Lord Bathurst, that I have much pleasure in accepting the Amendments that he has moved.
On Question, Amendments to Amendment agreed to.
Amendment, as amended, agreed to.
3.0 p.m.
BARONESS WOOTTON OF ABINGER BARONESS WOOTTON OF ABINGER moved, after subsection (1) to insert:
"() Before giving a direction under this section, the court shall take such steps as seem practicable to ensure that the mother and the alleged father understand the nature and possible results of blood tests."
The noble Baroness said: The purpose of this Amendment is very simple. It is to honour the principle that not only should justice be done, but that it should manifestly be seen to be done. That principle is always important, but it is perhaps particularly important in a case of this kind where a complicated scientific operation is to be carried out by means of what, in other circumstances, would rank as a physical assault upon an individual. It is not suggested by this Amendment that any elaborate, high-powered lecture on the laws of Mendelian inheritance need be given to unfortunate women in this position, or to men who are defending actions of this kind.
I think the only points that need to be made clear are, first of all, the nature of the operation itself. To women that will probably need hardly any explanation, because, as has been pointed out, a blood test is usually a matter of routine during pregnancy, and she will therefore have experienced what a trivial thing it is. But, further, I think it must be pointed out that the test may produce no result affecting the case and leave everything exactly as it was before; secondly, that it can in no circumstances establish that a particular man is the father of a particular child, and, thirdly, that in certain cases it can establish that a man is not and cannot be the father of the child. I think it should also be explained that the reason for this is that a child gets its blood grouping from its two parents and from nowhere else,
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and that therefore a man cannot be the father of a child in whose blood is a factor which is not in either his or its mother's. That, I am sure, is as much as need be explained. Perhaps the duty to explain this will have one valuable side effect, if I may so put it. It has been suggested that there may be courts who are not apprised of the principles of Mendelian inheritance, and if the court has a duty to explain this to the parties it follows that the court will have to appreciate the essentials of the procedure itself.
Just one word as to the method by which the explanation might be given. I think it could be done by the chairman of the court. It could be done by an officer of the court or by the clerk of the court, or possibly, preferably, it could be done by a probation officer acting under the instructions of the court, because probation officers are perhaps more experienced than anybody else in this field in giving simple explanations of complicated matters to people who are not well versed in them. Or we could follow the precedent in the Act to which the noble Lady opposite referred, and which she herself sponsored in another place. Under that Act, before a child is handed to an adoption society for the purposes of adoption the mother or the parent is required to be given a document in ordinary language explaining what the effect of such an action will be. He or she is required actually to sign a statement that they have read and understood this document.
There are many alternative ways by which the necessary explanation can be given. I myself think it is best to leave this in the hands of the courts so that they may make such provision for carrying out this requirement, if it is written into the Bill, as they think fit, because the courts will have the parties before them and will be able to judge the degree of understanding. They will proceed better in that way than if some standardised procedure is imposed upon them. That would not preclude the Home Office from producing a model leaflet or formula showing what kind of information it is essential to give to the parties. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 1, line 11, at end insert the said new subsection.—(Baroness Wootton of Abinger.)
BARONESS HORSBRUGH: My Lords, I rise to support what the noble Baroness, Lady Wootton of Abinger, has said, and I support it strongly. In my experience over a certain number of years, to which I have already referred, I am absolutely convinced that there are many people who do not understand what is taking place unless it is explained to them in very clear language—as I put it in that Act, "ordinary language". It may be the case that the person is somewhat frightened and is in new surroundings. When a new scheme is put to her I believe she simply does not understand it. I agree with the noble Lady that perhaps it should be left to be decided what particular way is to be found, as long as we are assred that the case is made plain by those who are dealing with it, and made plain in the simplest possible language with the outline of the scheme so that they understand it. The longer I went on interviewing many unmarried mothers and working on my Report, the more convinced I became of the enormous number of cases where there was not real understanding, although perhaps on some occasion somebody when asked, "Do you really understand it?" would say, "Yes", although she did not. So I think it is of the greatest possible importance.
LORD AMULREE: This is an Amendment which I look upon with great sympathy, but I am not at all sure whether the wording is the best wording for the future. If the noble Baroness would allow me to take up her point and discuss it with Her Majesty's Government and the officials of the Home Office, I should like to see whether we can draft a better formula for this procedure, which I am sure is right and with which I have great sympathy. If the noble Lady would withdraw her Amendment, I promise to get something done before the next stage of the Bill.
EARL BATHURST: Perhaps it would be for your Lordships' convenience if I said that I am completely in agreement with what the noble Lord has said. If the noble Lady will withdraw her Amendment we shall be most pleased to look into all that she has said this afternoon. We will try to find the best method of carrying out what she would like, and I will be in touch with the noble Lord, if he will allow me.
BARONESS WOOTTON OF ABINGER: I am very appreciative of what the noble Lord, Lord Amulree, and the noble Earl, Lord Bathurst, have said. So long as some formula is put forward which requires a simple explanation of the essence of this procedure to be given to ordinary people, I feel extremely happy to accept it; and in the circumstances I beg leave to withdraw my Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 1, as amended, agreed to.
3.9 p.m.
LORD AMULREE LORD AMULREE moved, after Clause 1 to insert the following new clause:
Power of court to require blood tests without request of party
"—(1) A magistrates' court on the hearing of an application for an affiliation order under the Affiliation Proceedings Act, 19:57, or a court of quarter sessions on the hearing of an appeal against such an affiliation order or against the dismissal of an application for such an order, may of its own motion give any such direction under subsection (1) of section one of the Act as it could give at the request of the alleged father.
(2) Where a court gives a direction by virtue of this section, then—

(a) unless the application for the order was not made by the mother, the mother shall pay the cost of taking and testing blood samples from the child (including any expenses reasonably incurred by any other person having the custody, charge or care of the child in taking the steps required of him for the purpose);

(b) if the application for the order was not made by the mother, the applicant shall pay the cost of taking and testing blood samples from the mother and the child (including any expenses reasonably incurred by the mother or by any other person having the custody, charge or care of the child in taking the steps required of her or him for the purpose);

but, subject to subsection (3) below, the amount paid by the mother or other applicant shall be treated as costs incurred by her or him in the proceedings.
(3) Where a court gives a direction by virtue of this section, the court may by order direct that the amount of the costs incurred by the mother or other applicant for the affiliation order or by the alleged father (or both) in respect of the taking and testing of blood samples shall he wholly or partly repaid to her or him out of local funds.
(4) Any amount directed under subsection (3) above to be paid out of local funds shall he paid out of the county fund of the administrative county or general rate fund of the county borough comprising the area for which the court making the order was acting; and sections eight, nine, eleven and twelve of the Costs in Criminal Cases Act, 1952, shall (so

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far as they are applicable) apply in relation to orders under subsection (3) above as they apply in relation to orders under that Act."
The noble Lord said: This clause contains certain provisions which were originally in Clause 1 of the Bill, and the purpose of the new clause is to enable the court to order blood tests of its own motion: if the alleged father, the defendant, does not ask for a blood test himself, the court can do it instead. Subsection (1) gives this power, and subsection (2) deals with the payment of costs. The general principle is, I gather, that each party to proceedings in a magistrates' court meets his own costs initially, and this subsection deals only with costs which have not been covered by the general rule. Subsection (2) (a) says that unless the application is not made by the mother—I do not know whether that still stands, in view of the Amendment we have already moved; that is where the mother applies for the affiliation order—she shall pay the costs of taking and testing blood samples from the child. Most of these cases will be under the legal aid scheme, so I presume the costs would be paid by them.
The next paragraph, paragraph (b), provides that when the mother is not the applicant for the affiliation order but when the application is made by the National Assistance Board or the local authority, the applicant shall pay the costs of taking tests. I think this is only fair, because if the mother has not been a party to the proceedings she cannot be ordered to pay the costs or have costs awarded to her. Subsection (3), which is the original Clause 4 (2), provides for repayment from local funds of costs incurred in taking blood samples where the court's direction was not at the request of either party. Subsection (4) explains the meaning of "local funds" in the previous subsection, taking up and altering the definition of the original Clause 9. "Local funds" cannot, in this context, be defined simply by reference to the Costs In Criminal Cases Act, 1952, because that Act deals only with criminal proceedings and places the burden of costs on the local authority in whose area the offence was committed. In affiliation cases there is, of course, no offence, and the principle adopted is that the responsibility falls on the funds of the local authority for whom the court is acting. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
"After Clause 1, insert the said new clause."—(Lord Amulree.)
BARONESS SUMMERSKILL: I think this new clause of the noble Lord should be accepted. I would only remind him that if he looks at his paragraph his emphasis is on the "may" and not on the "shall".
EARL BATHURST: We really have had a considerable discussion already upon the principle of the noble Lord's Amendment. Given that the noble Lord accepts the principle that it is "may" and not "shall", I have given one good reason which the noble Lord was courteous enough to agree with: that the legal aid position has made a new circumstance. But there is also another question that we should consider. A court, who ought to judge evidence which is put before it by the two parties in these civil proceedings cases, should not have the power to order a special kind of evidence of its own motion. Furthermore, that evidence can be of use to only one of those parties—in other words, the father. It would seem a wrong principle that the court should be able of its own free will to order parties to produce evidence which will not in fact benefit either of those parties fairly; it can benefit only, as I have said, the alleged father.
Then there is the question of the costs of the case. That, again, is a question of new principle. Who is to pay the costs of evidence which the court has ordered and which neither of those two parties may possibly desire? Finally there is the question of sanctions. We had a little discussion about the stupidest of stupid men. Supposing he refused to undergo the test, then the only sanction that is left to the court is to send him to prison, and it seems rather ridiculous to send a man to prison for refusing to undergo a test which could have been helpful only to the case he was putting over. For all those reasons—though possibly the new provision of legal aid is the most compelling reason—I ask your Lordships not to accept the noble Lord's Amendment.
LORD AMULREE: I am bound to say the noble Earl tries very hard to convince me of the justice and truth of what he says, but I am afraid he does not succeed

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very well. I can see no objection; if the court wishes to have certain information before it, it seems to me only proper that the court should be able to obtain that information, even though the parties do not supply it themselves. The court might find it difficult to decide, on the evidence already given, whether the alleged father was the father of the child, and they might therefore wish a test, if the father did not ask for it himself. I agree that legal aid will make a very big difference. I think it is improbable that this power will be called in, but there is no reason why it should not be there in case there is difficulty. I wonder whether the noble Earl would look at it from that point of view, as something in the background which might be used.
EARL BATHURST: What the noble Lord is asking for is for a serious precedent to be given to the courts. We doubt that the reasons which the noble Lord has advanced for having this precedent are really essential enough or compelling enough in this particular case. Her Majesty's Government, and the Home Office in particular, have always to bear in mind what may happen as a result of precedent, and it is really a most revolutionary precedent the noble Lord is asking for. For the reasons I have given already, we do not believe such revolutionary precedents are warranted in this case.
BARONESS WOOTTON OF ABINGER: Is not the noble Lord really asking for an inquisitorial to be substituted for an accusatorial procedure in an English court—which is indeed, as the noble Earl said, a very revolutionary departure?
On Question, Amendment negatived.
LORD AMULREE LORD AMULREE moved, after Clause 1, to insert the following new clause
Power to prescribe nature and conditions of blood tests, etc.
"—(1) The Secretary of State may by regulations make provision as to the administration of this Act and the manner of giving effect to directions under section one, and in particular may make provision—

(a) for regulating the taking, identification and transport of blood samples;

(b) for prescribing the blood tests to be carried out, and the person by whom and the manner in which they may be carried out;

(c) for regulating the charges that may be made for the taking or testing of blood samples;

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(d) for securing that in all cases the blood samples of the mother, child and alleged father are tested by the same person.

(2) The power of the Secretary of State to make regulations under this section shall be exercisable by statutory instrument, and on any proposal to make regulations for a purpose mentioned in paragraph (b) of subsection (1) above he shall consult such persons or bodies of persons as appears to him to be requisite."
The noble Lord said: This is a new clause which takes the place of part of the original Clause 6. It is thought that some of the matters to be dealt with by rule which were listed in the original Clause 6 are within the scope of the Lord Chancellor's existing powers (as expanded in subsections (3) and (4) of the amended Clause 1) to prescribe procedural rules for magistrates' courts. I think that makes for simplification there. It is thought appropriate to have two separate powers to fill in the necessary working arrangements of the Bill because the objects of those powers are slightly different. There is first the Lord Chancellor's power to make rules for procedure in and by the court, and secondly there is the power of the Secretary of State—that is the Home Secretary—to make regulations about the actual carrying out of these tests, which will be somewhat unusual in Rules of Court. Subsection (2) requires the Secretary of State, before making regulations for prescribing the blood tests to be carried out, to consult such persons or bodies as appear to him to be requisite. This provision replaces, in a much simpler form, the more complicated proposals for the blood test in the original 13ill. There was a good deal of doubt whether a blood test board was necessary, and I think this is a simpler way of carrying out our intentions. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
After Clause 1, insert the said new clause.—(Lord Amulree.)
BARONESS SUMMERSKILL: I welcome this Amendment because it removes the chance of impersonation. Your Lordships will recall that under the original Bill the unmarried mother was given the opportunity of going to her general practitioner because it was thought that she might be rather nervous if she went to a strange doctor. On the other hand, the man involved could go to his practitioner, and perhaps on one dark night he could take his brother

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with him and offer his brother's or some other person's blood instead of his own. I felt then that that was most dangerous and that a new clause should be inserted which would give the power to somebody—happily, the Secretary of State has been chosen—to make regulations. I think this is highly desirable. I am most impressed with paragraph (d) which says that the blood samples of the mother, child and alleged father are to be tested by the same person. I think that is most important.
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Clause 2 [Conditions under which tests must be carried out]:
3.24 p.m.
LORD AMULREE: This is an Amendment to omit Clause 2, because the Bill, as amended, leaves the matters dealt with in this clause to be prescribed by rule. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Leave out Clause 2—(Lord Amulree.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Clause 3 [Admission of certificates in evidence]:
LORD AMULREE: This is an Amendment to leave out Clause 3, because the provisions of this clause have been taken up in subsections (3) and (4) of the amended Clause 1, or are left to be prescribed by rule. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Leave out Clause 3.—(Lord Amulree.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Clause 4 [Costs]:
LORD AMULREE: This is an Amendment to leave out Clause 4. The provisions of this clause are replaced by the provisions in the amended Clause 1. No separate provisions on the lines of subsection (3) are required; the general provisions in the Bill and in the Magistrates' Courts Act, 1952, about costs are sufficient. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Leave out Clause 4.—(Lord Amulree.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Clause 5 [Appeals]:
LORD AMULREE: This is to leave out Clause 5. This clause has been re-
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placed by subsection (5) of the amended Clause 1. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Leave out Clause 5.—(Lord Amulree.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Clause 6 [Power of Lord Chancellor to make rules]:
LORD AMULREE: This is an Amendment to leave out Clause 6. The provisions of this clause are replaced in part by the second new clause after Clause 1, which gives the Secretary of State power to make regulations. The rest are covered by the existing power of the Lord Chancellor (as expanded by subsections (3) and (4) of the amended Clause 1), to make rules governing magistrates' court procedure. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Leave out Clause 6.—(Lord Amulree.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Clause 7 [Constitution and powers of the Board]:
LORD AMULREE: This Amendment is to omit Clause 7, and this clause is omitted because it is no longer necessary. On procedural matters the noble and learned Viscount the Lord Chancellor already has the assistance of the Rule Committee. On other matters the Secretary of State will take expert advice without the need for the somewhat cumbersome apparatus of a blood tests board. Subsection (2) of the second new clause after Clause 1 requires him to do so in certain cases. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Leave out Clause 7.—(Lord Amulree.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
3.31 p.m.
LORD AMULREE LORD AMULREE moved, after Clause 7, to insert the following new clause:
Enforcement of directions
".—(1) Where a court gives a direction under this Act, and the mother or any person having the custody, charge or care of the child fails without reasonable cause to take any steps required of her or him for the purpose of giving effect to the direction, the court may dismiss the application for the affiliation order or, in the case of quarter sessions, allow the appeal of the alleged father or, if he is not the appellant, dismiss the appeal.
(2) Where a court gives a direction under this Act at the request of the mother or of its own motion, and the alleged father fails without reasonable cause to take any steps required of him for the purpose of giving effect to the direction, the count may by order require him to take those steps; and as regards orders made under this subsection, subsections (1) to (3) of section fifty-four of the Magistrates' Courts Act, 1952, shall apply to a court of quarter sessions as they apply to a magistrates' court.
(3) If for the purpose of providing a blood sample for a test required to give effect to a direction under this Act any person wilfully and fraudulently personates another, or wilfully and fraudulently proffers a child other than the child named in the direction, he shall be liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for a term riot exceeding two years, or on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding one hundred pounds or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding three months, or to both."
The noble Lord said: This new clause contains certain provisions for enforcing the directions and orders of the court and for punishing offences. Subsection (1) empowers the court to dismiss an application for an affiliation order if the mother, or any person having custody of the child, fails without reasonable cause to comply with the direction of the court. This corresponds to the closing words of the original Clause 1 (1); but, at the same time, it incorporates a "conscience clause", so that, supposing a mother has reasonable and genuine grounds for objecting, she should not be penalised. It seems best that this should be left in general terms, rathet than that it should refer specifically to seasonable grounds that may exist for non-compliance. I feel sure that it will give the mother applying for the order full protection if there is reasonable ground.
Subsection (2) deals with the case as at present written down, where the court gives a direction other than at the request of the alleged father; but as that power has been taken away from the court I do not think one need proceed with that particular subsection. We shall be dealing with the Amendment of the noble Earl, Lord Bathurst, which is to come after, and I think we should accept that. The third subsection provides something to take the place of the original Clause 8 (2) and provides penalties for impersonation or any fraudulent depositing of the wrong child for the test. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
After Clause 7 insert the said new clause.—(Lord Amulree.)
EARL BATHURST: As the noble Lord has quite rightly indicated, since we have moved the mother out of the Bill subsection (2) is not required; and if the noble Lord will accept that, I advise your Lordships to accept his Amendment.
Amendment to Amendment moved—
In the new clause, leave out subsection (2).—(Earl Bathurst.)
LORD AMULREE: I accept that.
LORD DOUGLAS OF BARLOCH: I should like a little more explanation about this new clause. I should like to know whether, if subsection (1) were not inserted in the Bill, the court would not still have power to dismiss an application for an affiliation order. It seems to me that the effect of this subsection may very well be to create in the minds of courts of summary jurisdiction a presumption that some evidence has been given which has not in fact been given. All that the court knows is that there has been a refusal, but it does not necessarily follow from that that the application is not a genuine one. Nor does it follow that it has not been amply proved without any blood test being taken. If that is so, then it seems to me that subsection (1) is entirely superfluous. I wonder whether the noble Earl who speaks for the Government has given consideration to that.
EARL BATHURST: We certainly will consider what the noble Lord has said. But as the noble Lord, Lord Amulree, has explained, subsection (1) gives effect to the "conscience clause", about which we had so much discussion. Also, should there be specific evidence which the court has already heard and which makes the position clear, then that court need not order the blood test. That is the point of the noble Lord's Amendment. But if there should be something in what the noble Lord opposite has said, we certainly will look into it. However, to the best of my knowledge I do not think he need have any fears.
BARONESS SUMMERSKILL: I am not quite clear whether the noble Lord. Lord Amulree, said he would accept the whole of the Amendment. Certainly he should accept that part dealing with the mother. Of course, we have already argued that the mother would not request a test of this kind, but it seems to me here that

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the noble Lord once more has fallen from grace. I have to admit that before I came here to-day I harboured all sorts of uncharitable ideas, but he has acted on so many of our requests that I am rather surprised he should include this paragraph, which, after all, again gives support to a man who is undeserving. Here, the court may ask the man to have a blood test in order to enable him to prove he is not the father. The man fails to do this. What can we deduce from that? If it is explained to the man that the result of the blood test can only be beneficial to him, because it can only be negative and say he is not the father, he must be a very curious man if he says, "I will not have this test". A man who says he will not have a test and help to prove he is not the father must be guilty or extremely careless. The presumption is that he is guilty.
Then the noble Lord says, "If he refuses the court must come along and make him have it." I feel that this is really leaning over backwards to help the man who has almost declared his own guilt. I would remind the noble Lord that there is one case in a million or perhaps less when the test can be inaccurate. Where a man has shown that he is guilty by not doing what he is asked to, it is proposed that he be compelled to have a test; but if the test were to be inaccurate that would reverse the whole position. Therefore, I certainly support the Amendment of the noble Earl. I am not quite sure whether the noble Earl's approach was the same as mine, but I certainly support his Amendment.
LORD AMULREE: I am afraid that, quite frankly, I cannot quite follow what the noble Baroness is getting at at this moment. I thought that subsection (2) of the new clause, which I have agreed with the noble Earl should be dropped—
BARONESS SUMMERSKILL: You are dropping the whole thing?
LORD AMULREE: Not the complete clause. But the noble Earl has moved that subsection (2) be dropped from the clause; and the removal of subsection (2) is, I think, consequential on an Amendment moved some time ago. If the father fails to comply, we have
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taken away the power of the court to order a test, and if he fails to comply the court order would be enforceable under the provisions of Section 24 of the Magistrates' Court Act, 1952. That was the provision I was agreeing with the noble Earl should be deleted from the clause, and by that I am prepared to stand.
EARL BATHURST: I want both provisions removed from the clause. I think I did explain, did I not, that, as a result, both the independent power of the court has been taken away to a "may"—
LORD AMULREE: Yes.
EARL BATHURST: —and, as the noble Lord has already said, the mother is out of the Bill. It is the whole of that subsection (2).
LORD AMULREE: Yes.
BARONESS SUMMERSKILL: The whole of it?
LORD AMULREE: Yes.
On Question, Amendment to Amendment agreed to.
On Question, Amendment, as amended, agreed to.
Clause 8 [Penalties]:
LORD AMULREE: This Amendment is to omit Clause 8. Subsection (1) of the clause disappears because it is not usual to make the infringement of procedural rules a criminal offence or to prescribe penalties, and there does not seem to be any necessity for such a provision. Subsection (2) is replaced by what was subsection (3) but which now presumably becomes subsection (2) of the new clause which was agreed to after Clause 7. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Leave out Clause 8.—(Lord Amulree.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Clause 9 [Interpretation]:
3.43 p.m.
LORD AMULREE: May I take all these Amendments together? These are Amendments to the definitions, most of which are consequential. The first Amendment inserts a definition of "affiliation order", which is necessary because the term is given other definitions in other Statutes. The second

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Amendment is really a drafting Amendment, to cover those cases where an application for an affiliation order is made not under the 1957 Act but under other Statutes—for instance, the National Assistance Act, 1948. The third Amendment leaves out the definitions of "approved person" and "approved testing centre", because these terms are not now in the Bill. The fourth Amendment is a drafting Amendment to remove words which, again, are no longer necessary. The fifth Amendment removes the definitions of the words "payment out of local funds" and "undergo blood tests", which are not now necessary in view of the revised drafting of Clause 1. I beg to move.
Amendments moved—
Page 3, line 32, at end insert ("the expression affiliation order' means an order adjudging a man to be the putative father of a child")
Page 3,line 34, leave out ("made")
Page 3,line 34, leave out lines 36 to 43.
Page 4, line 4, leave out ("and under the rules")
Page 4, line 4,leave out lines 9 to 14.—(Lord Amulree.)
LORD SILKIN: I do not propose to oppose these Amendments. I do not know enough about them, and I am prepared to accept the noble Lord's view that they are right; but I do want to draw the attention of the House to what looks to me like a considerable abuse of procedure. We gave this Bill a Second Reading on the assumption that this was the Bill we were going to deal with. I now find that, with the exception of Clause 9, every single clause has been withdrawn and that an entirely new set of clauses has been substituted. Clause 9 is the one which has not been withdrawn, and that is dealing merely with definitions and interpretations; but every other one has been withdrawn and we have had something else put in its place. I feel that that is going far beyond the proper procedure of this House. If one had known that the Bill to which we were going to give a Second Reading was going to be withdrawn and something else put in its place, I wonder whether we should really have given the noble Lord carte blanche to introduce something completely different. I do not know what we can do about it, but there ought to be some remedy, and I appeal to the Lord Chairman to tell us whether this kind of thing is quite proper and
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in is with our procedure. If it not—or in any case—I think it is a matter which ought to go to the Procedure Committee for us to consider.
BARONESS SUMMERSKILL: Could I just say a word on that point? This is a very small Bill which is highly technical, and it was taken, I think, late at night. Surely, this indicates that the noble Lord who introduced it is a man of high intelligence and of generous impulse. After having read Hansard and examined all the arguments which were put forward—arguments which were logical and cogent—he came to the conclusion that it should be amended in this way. We have not taken much time on this Bill, and it is one which affects a large number of very helpless women in this country. I would ask the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, to be a little patient, to exercise his compassion and to allow it to go through.
LORD SILIKIN: As I said at the outset, I am not opposing it, and I am sure the Committee would not wish to oppose this Bill; but I wanted to point out that it is an entirely different Bill from the one to which we gave a Second Reading.
LORD AMULREE: When I first began the Committee stage of this Bill I explained that the Bill had been changed enormously, but I think that, apart from a few points which have come in by way of these Amendments, little has been changed in the substance of the Bill. A great deal of the previous Bill has been put into a different form; but, broadly speaking, the Bill remains the same in substance, if not the same in shape, as when I introduced it on Second Reading. The only Amendments which have come in are quite proper Amendments, I think, not dealing with the fundamentals of the Bill. I hope the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, will accept that: that is was a change made in order to make it a tidier Bill, and not a change made to alter the whole structure.
EARL BATHURST: I wonder whether, from this side of the House, I might say that I very much sympathise with what the noble Lord opposite has said, but I assure him that as the noble Lord, Lord Amulree, has said in no way at all has the Bill been changed from the ideas which were expressed in your Lordships' House during Second Reading. It

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was to take note of those ideas that it has been necessary to re-write the Bill. In fact, what is now embodied in the Bill which is before your Lordships' Committee was spoken about at some length when we were considering the Bill during Second Reading. So I assure the noble Lord that in fact, I think, no great damage has been done by this method, but I do sympathise with him. Of course, had there been any revolutionary change which your Lordships had not had a chance to discuss, I am certain that such a procedure would not have been used. However, I appreciate his point of view.
LORD SILKIN: In conclusion, may I say that I raised this point, not because it was a matter of supreme importance but because I felt that we ought to be quite certain where we were going. It should not be open to any noble Lord to get a Bill approved here, and then, when it comes to Committee, to withdraw every single clause, one by one, and to put something else in their place. It may not always be as innocent as it might be in this particular case. I feel that perhaps, even in this case, if that were the intention it might have been better to have withdrawn the Bill and to have substituted a new Bill with a new face on it, with perhaps the same ideas which have been put forward by way of Amendment. I think it is a matter which ought to be looked at by the Procedure Committee. Perhaps I can arrange to give notice that that should be considered.
THE CHAIRMAN OF COMMITTEES (LORD MERTHYR): Since my name has been mentioned, may I just say that I am satisfied that the procedure adopted this afternoon is in order. As to whether it is the best procedure or otherwise, I do not think it would be proper for me to express an opinion to-day, but I am satisfied that it is in order. I would remind the Committee that, of course, there is a Third Reading stage when the matter might be considered.
On Question, Amendments agreed to.
Clause 9, as amended, agreed to.
Clause 10 [Extent]:
LORD AMULREE: This Amendment is to enable the Secretary of State to say when the Bill shall come into operation.
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Although I am rather sorry about this, I think there is quite a sound reason for it, because there is a good deal of procedure to be set up under the Bill, where the tests can be carried out, and so forth. Therefore, it is not quite fair to put down a certain day, when it may not in fact be possible to implement the Bill on that day. Therefore I beg to move this Amendment.
Amendment moved—
Page 4, line 18, leave out from ("on") to end of line 19 and insert ("such day as the Secretary of State may appoint by order made by statutory instrument.")—(Lord Amulree.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Clause 11, as amended, agreed to.
House resumed.

OATHS ACT, 1888 (AMENDMENT) BILL
3.53 p.m.
Order of the Day for the Second Reading read.
LORD CHORLEY: My Lords, I beg to move that this Bill be read a second time. Its objects are to provide for an extension of the making of an affirmation, instead of taking an oath, in proceedings in a court of law, and other proceedings which come within that category, to cases where it would not be reasonably practicable to administer an oath to the witness concerned in a manner appropriate to his religious beliefs.
I think that this Bill will perform a very useful purpose, and will fill a gap in the law which, while not a very serious one, has from time to time given rise to difficulty, and is obviously tending to do so increasingly as more people come to live among us in this country whose religious beliefs entail their taking oaths, when called as witnesses or when required so to take an oath for one reason or another, which are, from the point of view of citizens in this country, rather strange and peculiar. One might say that "they are full of strange oaths", to use a quotation from Shakespeare. Therefore, it is necessary to provide for this situation. I think that in bringing forward this Bill in another place, Mr. Arthur Lewis has done a very considerable service to the administration of justice in this country. I should also like to thank the Home Office and

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the noble Earl for their help and courtesy in this matter, and particularly for providing me substantially with the speech I propose to address to your Lordships on this particular problem.
As the Title of the Bill suggests, it is technically a Bill to amend the Oaths Act, 1888. Perhaps I should remind your Lordships that that Statute, which was passed as a result of a very bitter controversy which went on in the House of Commons over the case of Bradlaugh, the famous radical politician of the nineteenth century, provided that a Member of Parliament, or indeed a person becoming a witness in a court of law and in certain other proceedings, might make an affirmation instead of taking an oath in a case where the person had no religious belief at all (which, of course, was the case of Bradlaugh) or in cases where it was contrary to the person's religious belief that he should take an oath.
The first part was obviously directed at people like Bradlaugh, who was an atheist or an agnostic, and to a growing section of the community. The other part was put into the Bill because, although Quakers and Moravians had been allowed to make affirmations, there was considerable doubt whether that w as proper according to the law; and cases which were decided afterwards in connection with other religious faiths rather suggested that those doubts were justified. So I think it was sensible and reasonable to put the second limb into this Statute. But what the Act did not do was to provide for the possibility that, although it might be perfectly right and proper for the witness to take an oath according to his religious belief, his method of taking the oath might be such that it would be quite impracticable to carry it out in any ordinarily organised court of law; or, at any rate, would lead to such delay as to hold up the whole proceedings for an appreciable period of time. It is this sort of case at which this Bill is aimed, and which has given rise to a good deal of difficulty from time to time in the courts.
Indeed, my Lords, not long after the Oaths Act was passed, there was in 1892 a case in which two Indians, one of whom was a Sikh and the other an interpreter, I think, called to interpret for him, indicated that their method of taking the oath would be a rather complicated one,
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whereupon the Judge said, "Well, let them affirm"; and that was done. Then the case was taken on appeal to the Court of Appeal, on the ground that the oath was not within the Oaths Act because the men had a religious belief which allowed them to make an oath. The Court of Appeal said that that was so, that it was not within the Oaths Act, and it was held that the evidence had been wrongly admitted on the basis of affirmation when an oath was, in fact, possible, although not very practicable in the circumstances of that case. There was in the same year another case, in which the Aly Khan of that time was involved. In that case it was held that if a witness, while not in any way objecting to taking an oath, considered that the form in which it was offered to be administered to him did not comply with the ceremonial requirements of his religion, and therefore would not be binding on him, he could not be permitted to affirm.
From time to time in other cases, a similar position has arisen. Many of them have been cases in which Sikhs have been involved, because their method of taking an oath is a complicated and unusual one. In one of these cases, which came before a magistrates' court only two or three years ago, a prisoner, when called upon to give evidence as a witness, said that he was willing to take an oath upon the Sikh sacred book, the Granth; but as there was not a copy available he was allowed to affirm. This is rather surprising, in view of the decision in the earlier case, but I suppose that the magistrates were not aware of it. He was allowed to affirm, but the evidence which he gave was regarded as being perjured evidence. On this he was indicted for perjury, but it was held that he was not properly indicted, because the evidence which he had given ought to have been given on the Sikh oath and not by affirmation as he was not within the liberty of making an affirmation, which was conferred by the Act of 1888.
My Lords, those cases are not isolated. There was another case at Manchester Assizes in 1940, to which I need not refer in detail; and fairly recently there was a case referred to in legal journals. That again involved a Sikh, who gave evidence by placing the Granth on a cushion in court, with two

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cows' tails, one on each side of the Granth, which in his view was the correct way of taking an oath according to the Sikh religion. To put a court into the state of having to provide a copy of the Granth, a cushion and two cowtails, would almost invariably lead to considerable delay, and obviously the procedural requirements of English courts could not be conducted on the basis that the authorities at the courts should be required to make provision for all possible varieties of the taking of oaths which must exit, not only in the countries of the British Commonwealth of Nations but all over the world. So it will obviously be a great convenience, in this type of case, to enable an affirmation to be made instead of insisting that an oath be taken.
But the matter goes further than that. Obviously, the law as it stands at present provides the possibility of a man evading the need to give evidence by saying that the particular ceremonial which the court is providing for him is not one which his sect of religion requires, and that if he takes an oath in this form it will not be binding on him. In that way a man may escape altogether from giving evidence in a case in which his evidence might be materially vital. Therefore, it has been felt not only that it is necessary to enable an affirmation to be made in a case of this kind but also that the law should go further and require of a witness that he should make an affirmation in this type of case. The Bill which is before your Lordships this afternoon takes that further step.
That, in substance, is what is in the Bill. Perhaps I ought to draw your Lordships' attention shortly to the two clauses which it contains. The main operative provisions of the Bill are contained in subsections (1) and (2) of Clause 1. Subsection (1) provides that a person to whom it is not reasonably practicable to administer an oath in the manner appropriate to his own religious belief may be allowed to make an affirmation instead. The expression "reasonably practicable" is defined later on in subsection (2). The Oaths Act, 1888, and consequently the amendments to it made by this Bill, apply to the taking of an oath or to the making of an affirmation in all places and for all purposes where an oath is or shall be
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required by the law. Consequently, the effect of this Bill is not restricted to oaths taken in courts of law but is, as I indicated earlier on, wider in its application.
Subsection (2) provides that a person may be permitted to affirm instead of to take an oath, if it is not reasonably practicable for him to be sworn in accordance with his own religious beliefs. This is necessary, as I have explained for otherwise a reluctant witness might evade giving evidence by claiming that some ceremonial, which is essential to the oath which he was proposing to take, could not be complied with in the circumstances of that particular day and occasion. The term "reasonably practicable" is defined here as meaning "reasonably practicable without inconvenience or delay." There is a subsection (3), which brings in the Army and Air Force Acts, 1955, and the Naval Discipline Act, 1957. These Acts, in fact, permit affirmation, but do not go on to give the courts power to insist on affirmation in the sort of cases I have explained, and it is felt that it would be valuable to extend that power to cases falling under these Acts.
Clause 2 contains the Short Title and citation. The Bill applies to Scotland, and while it does not, in terms, extend to Northern Ireland generally (because it deals with a matter which is within the power of the Parliament of Northern Ireland), it deals with two points in which the powers of the Parliament of Northern Ireland are restricted—that is, in relation to courts-martial and to matters provided by Section 18 (2) of the Government of Ireland Act, 1920, which relates to oaths taken by Members of Parliament—Members of the Senate and of the House of Commons of Northern Ireland. It has been felt that these two points ought to be brought within the present Bill. Naturally, the consent of the Government of Northern Ireland has been obtained to this course being taken. I hope that I have said enough to enable your Lordships to feel that this is a very useful measure, and I beg to move that the Bill be now read a second time.
Moved, That the Bill be now read 2ª.—(Lord Chorley.)
EARL BATHURST: My Lords, I want to thank the noble Lord opposite for the kind remarks he made with regard

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to the Home Office. I would commend the Bill to your Lordships and ask your Lordships to support the noble Lord, Lord Chorley, in giving it a Second Reading.
On Question, Bill read 2ª, and committed to a Committee of the Whole House.

RESTRICTION OF OFFENSIVE WEAPONS ACT, 1959 (AMENDMENT) BILL
4.10 p.m.
Order of the Day for the Second Reading read.
LORD MORRIS OF KENWOOD: My Lords, as your Lordships are aware, the Restriction of Offensive Weapons Act became law in May, 1959, and it has, I believe, been largely successful in removing the danger of these flick knives, particularly from young children. At the time when the original Bill was drafted it was thought by lawyers and non-lawyers alike that its wording covered all possible eventualities concerning the sale or hire, or offer for sale or hire, of these knives. However, in November of last year an interesting decision was reached in a case where a shopkeeper was prosecuted for exposing in his window a flick knife, with a ticket on it marked, "Ejector knife—4s."
When this case came before the Queen's Bench Divisional Court the question was whether this exhibiting of the flick knife with a price label on it constituted an offer for sale within the meaning of Section 1 of the Restriction of Offensive Weapons Act, 1959. This section reads:
"Any person who manufacturers, sells or hires or offers for sale or hire, or lends or gives to any other person any knife which has a blade which opens automatically by hand pressure applied to a button, spring or other device in or attached to the handle of the knife, sometimes known as a 'flick knife' or 'flick gun' … shall be guilty of an offence".
I will not bother your Lordships by reading out in full the words of the Lord Chief Justice, as printed in The Times of November 11, but will merely refer to the salient point. This was that the law of contract of this country says that the display of an article with a price on it in a shop window is merely an invitation to trade and not an offer for sale. This means,
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in fact, that a shopkeeper may expose an article for sale with a price tag upon it but, according to the law, is not bound to sell it. Since the 1959 Act does not use the words "exposed for the purpose of sale", the shopkeeper in this particular case was found not guilty. It is to rectify this omission that the Bill has been introduced.
Another difficulty which has arisen, and which was pointed out by the Government during the Committee stage of the Bill in another place, is that since the Act does not extend to Northern Ireland it is possible for these weapons to be imported into Northern Ireland and then brought into this country. This does not constitute the importation which is prohibited by Section 1 (2) of the Act. At the request of the Northern Ireland Government, it was therefore suggested by Her Majesty's Government that the new clause relating to Northern Ireland be included in this Bill. I hope that this House will accept that these provisions are necessary, and that the Bill will now receive your Lordships' undivided support. I beg to move that the Bill be read a second time.
Moved, That the Bill be now read 2ª.—(Lord Morris of Kenwood.)
EARL BATHURST: My Lords, I congratulate the noble Lord and his honourable friend in another place upon introducing this Bill, and I can assure your Lordships that the Bill will close the gap in the Restriction of Offensive Weapons Act, 1959, to which the noble Lord referred. I commend this Bill to your Lordships, and I would mention that your Lordships might be interested to see the selection of these offensive weapons which is now in the Library of the House.
On Question, Bill read 2ª, and committed to a Committee of the Whole House.

CARRIAGE BY AIR BILL
4.15 p.m.
Order of the Day for the Second Reading read.
LORD ABINGER: My Lords, I beg to move that this Bill be read a second time. In commending the Bill to your Lordships, I think I should say a few words in an endeavour to clarify what, at first sight, may seem rather complicated provisions. This Bill is a useful

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one, and it deals with a subject of some importance to those members of the public who travel by air. It is an unusual Bill, in that it has one Schedule in French, and there is an English translation attached to the Schedule, The Bill is primarily' a ratification Bill. It seeks to enact into the law of this country the Hague Protocol of 1955, which amends the Warsaw Convention of 1929 relating to international carriage by air. In those circumstances, it might be useful if I first referred to some of the Articles of the Warsaw Convention and the amending Protocol set out in the First Schedule.
The intention of the old original Warsaw Convention was to unify the domestic law of the different high contracting States which related to carriage by air and particularly in respect of the carrier's liability for his passengers and his liability for freight, and to unify documentary procedure between the different States. The original Warsaw Convention was embodied in the British Carriage By Air Act, 1932, and under the Convention a carrier's liability in respect of passengers was limited to a sum equivalent to about £3,000. His liability in respect of freight was limited to a sum equivalent to about £2 10s. per lb. avoirdupois weight, in the absence of any special declaration of value. But under the Convention, both passengers and consignors received two valuable benefits. First, in the event of their suffering accident or loss, they could sue for damages in the courts of their own country, regardless of the fact that such damage or loss may have occurred in a foreign aeroplane travelling over a foreign country, provided, of course, that the aeroplane itself was operated by a nation who was party to the Convention. The second benefit that passengers and consignors received was the fact that the onus of proof was transferred from the claimant to the carrier. The carrier would have to prove that he had not been negligent, and the claimant would not have to prove that the carrier had been negligent. While I am not a lawyer, I think that is in conflict with the normal practice at Common Law in our courts.
The change in liability introduced by the Hague Protocol of 1959, which this Bill seeks to make law, is quite simply
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to double the maximum liability of air carriers in respect of their passengers: that is to say, to raise it from about £3,000 to about £6,000. It makes no change of liability in respect of freight. In the First Schedule of the Bill, Articles 17 to 24 set out the general circumstances of the carrier's liability, and Article 22 defines the limits of liability precisely. The 250,000 French francs referred to have nothing to do with the current new French franc: they refer to an obsolete franc, the old gold franc; but sufficient to say that 250,000 francs in those francs are the equivalent of about £6,000.
It may be suggested that £6,000 is a fairly modest limit on liability for a passenger's life, but there is nothing which we who support and sponsor this Bill can do about that. The £6,000 figure was the one negotiated at the Hague Conference: it may be that some delegates to the Conference would have preferred a higher figure of liability and that others would have preferred a lower one. It may be that there was an element of compromise about the £6,000. All we who support this Bill can do is to recommend the Hague Protocol as it stands. We have no power whatever to suggest amendments to detail of the Protocol now that it has been published. The fact that the Hague Protocol makes no change in the carrier's liability for freight meets, I think, the wishes of both carriers and their consignors. I understand that the consignors prefer to take a fairly low basic limit of damages which they can claim in the event of loss, because it tends to keep freight rates low; and there is nothing in the Hague Protocol, or in this Bill, which would prevent any consignor from striking a special bargain with his carrier, possibly by paying a slightly increased freight rate and getting extra cover. I think that is general practice.
Articles 3 to 16 of the First Schedule deal with documentation. I mentioned that the original Warsaw Convention of 1929 sought, among other things, to unify the documentary procedure between international airlines. Documents tend to be visible evidence of a contract, and it is helpful if the procedure for handling them and the form of the documents is uniform, fairly simple and standardised, to some extent, between all international airlines. These

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Articles in the Schedule set out the minimum basic requirements for documents, whether they be air-passenger tickets, baggage checks or air cargo weigh-bills.
Articles 25 and 25A in the First Schedule are important. Article 25 describes the circumstances in which a carrier's limit of liability may exceed £6,000. I think it would be a very rare set of circumstances now, and one that would demand an element of wilful misconduct—which in law is considerably stronger, of course, than negligence, or even recklessness. It would be a difficult thing to prove in the courts. Article 25A gives a carrier's agent or servant the same protection under the amended Convention as the carrier himself receives. I think this Article was inserted to deal with an anomaly which had existed under the old Convention. It is possible that, though carriers themselves had a limit of liability, their servants and agents did not do so, so there might have been some limitation under the old Convention for a claimant to sue not the carrier but the carrier's servant or agent. It was felt that the position was unjust. I do not know if it ever occurred, but this particular Article tries to put that anomalous position right.
All the points I have discussed so far are dealt with in the different Articles,of the First Schedule, which sets out the terms of the Warsaw Convention as amended by the Hague Protocol. I should like now to turn to consider some of the clauses of the Bill itself. At the present time, the unamended Convention has the force of law in Britain. It was amended in the Carriage by Air Act, 1942. Now that an International Conference has sat at The Hague to bring the original Convention up to date, particularly in the light of money values, it surely seems sensible that our country should be ready to co-operate, too. I say "ready" because the new Protocol does not come into force until 30 States have ratified it, and so far only about 18 have done so. It is thought, nevertheless, that fairly soon 30 will have ratified. I think it is urgent that we, too, in this country should ratify the Protocol. This Bill seeks to enable Her Majesty's Government to do just that by incorporating the amended Convention in our law, and Clause 1 is the relevant clause.
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As your Lordships will see, there are other clauses in the Bill. Most of them are fairly clear, and tend to explain themselves. But there are two clauses to which I should like to draw your Lordships' attention. Clause 10 is important in that it seeks to apply the provisions of the amended Convention to domestic air travel—that is to say, air travel within the United Kingdom, or between the United Kingdom and its Colonies and dependencies. It may be suggested that here again a £6,000 limit of liability for a carrier is too low. It may be asked: even if we have to accept that figure in regard to international air journeys, need it be accepted for domestic journeys? I do not, however, think that that criticism is altogether valid.
Clause 10 of the Bill says that Her Majesty may, by Order in Council, apply the amended Convention to domestic travel. The clause in no way fetters the discretion of the Minister concerned. He may apply the amended Convention, or he may presumably apply any other items he thinks fit. My own view is that he would be wise to apply the provisions of the amended Convention. This is not a new principle, because the original Warsaw Convention was applied by the Air Navigation Order, 1953, to domestic air carriage, and I am inclined to think that no serious anomalies would arise if we had one limit of liability for passengers travelling in the United Kingdom, and another limit of liability for carriers in respect of their passengers travelling on international routes. Surely some balance in equity should be struck between carriers and their customers. If a carrier's possible liability is placed very high—not just a limit of £6,000, but a limit of £20,000, or even £30,000—he would have to cover himself by increasing fares; and I think that the, majority of air travellers would prefer, a cheaper fare in return for lower damages in the event of their suffering accident or loss, or even death. But if particular passengers feel very strongly about this matter, the most sensible course for them to take is for them to take out a small insurance policy to give them any excess cover they require. These very simple policies can now be bought at all the airports and they cost, I think, about 2s. per £1,000 cover for 24 hours.

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I would refer your Lordships to Clause 13, which seeks to apply all provisions of the amended Convention to the Crown. I understand that the Crown has never been bound by the original Warsaw Convention. It seems right that the Government, when acting as an air carrier, should be as much bound as private operators are. Some of your Lordships may remember, if you have travelled by Government aircraft on Government business, that you have been asked to sign a paper acknowledging that the Government do not accept unlimited liability for you as a passenger. I have not seen the paper myself, but I understand it says it accepts no liability. It is giving you a free passage. Whether the possession of such signatures will exonerate the Government in law I cannot say, but this clause in the Bill seeks to regularise a position which has in the past been confused and unsatisfactory. Finally, I would mention Clause 7 (2) which excludes purely military aircraft from the terms of the Convention. I do not mean just fighters and bombers; I mean transports.
My Lords, I think I have said enough to outline the main purpose and aims of this Bill. At the risk of some oversimplification, I might summarise them in this way. The main purpose of the Bill is to incorporate with the law of this country the provisions of the Warsaw Convention as amended by the Hague Protocol of 1955 relating to international carriage by air. The main feature of the amending Protocol is to raise the limit of liability of air carriers in respect of their passengers from about £3,000 to about £6,000. Air travellers are, I think, largely unaware of their rights at law in the event of their being unfortunate enough to have an accident in an aircraft. I must say that I do not think the airline operators go out of their way to explain to their customers what their rights are.
I should like to quote from a notice on a recent airline ticket. This is what it says:
"Subject to the provisions of the Carriage by Air Act, 1932, and Orders made thereunder, passengers, their luggage and belongings are carried on the terms contained in the Corporation's General Conditions of Carriage, Regulations, Timetables and Notices, which may be inspected at the Corporation's offices."
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Should a passenger decide, on reading such a notice, to go to the carrier's office, my guess is that he would be shown a very long schedule of notices in very small print, and by the time he had read and understood what his rights were in the event of an accident he would have missed his plane in any case. Air travellers will be wise, I think, to remember that if they initiate a claim against a carrier at the moment, the damages will normally be limited to £3,000. If this Bill is passed, and the new Convention ratified, the limit of damages will be raised to £6,000. I commend this Bill to your Lordships, and beg to move that it be read a second time.
Moved, That the Bill be now read 2ª.—(Lord Abinger.)
4.35 p.m.
LORD SHACKLETON: My Lords, this is an important Bill, much more important, I think, than the Government have realised; and notwithstanding the amount of business that is still to come before the House, I should like to take up a few minutes, not in attempting to harry the noble Lord, Lord Abinger, who, like myself, is a layman, but to put some responsibility on the Government in this matter. The first question I would ask is why a Bill ratifying an international Convention should have to wait for the initiative of a Private Member in another place and then of the noble Lord in this House to bring it into effect. In this country we have always had the view that, however slow other Governments were in ratifying international treaties and conventions, we were never one of the sinners. But although 18 countries have ratified it, the first move towards this is from a Private Member in another place. This seems to me to be really an intolerable thing. It is not for me to comment on the proceedings in another place, but they are short enough of Private Members' time there without having to take it up with what can only be described as Government business.
This is not intended to be a reflection on the merits of the Bill, which I warmly support, or on the initiative of the noble Lord, Lord Abinger, but I would draw attention to the fact (I do this with some embarrassment, because the noble Lord, Lord Abinger, told me last week that this Bill was coming forward) that it appeared on the Order Paper on Thursday and we are giving it its Second

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Reading on Tuesday. There are some important principles of a legal kind, and I should have thought we needed the help of some Government lawyers. The noble and learned Viscount is not on the Woolsack to help us. My noble friend, Lord Chorley, will, I am sure, help us. There are some questions I should like to ask, and if the noble Lord, Lord Abinger, feels it is unfair for him to answer them, then I hope the noble Lord, Lord Jellicoe, as Government spokesman, will be able to guide the House.
The first question I would ask the noble Lord, Lord Jellicoe, is why we have had to wait five years for this Bill, and I am almost tempted, if it would not have been out of order, to ask how many other treaties there are waiting for action by the Government to be ratified. The arguments in favour of the Convention and of the Bill, which have been so very clearly deployed by the noble Lord, Lord Abinger, are quite overwhelming. It is highly desirable that the £3,000 should be raised to £6,000. The change in the time limit for making claims in respect of damage to property also represents an improvement.
I would take up the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Abinger: it is a fact that the general public have absolutely no idea of the extent of this Convention. There are large numbers of people who probably insure themselves under the impression that there is nothing coming, anyway, if they are killed, and there may be others who have inflated ideas of the damages it may be possible in the last resort to get out of a carrier. I would suggest that we ought to consider at Committee stage perhaps putting in an Amendment requiring that some sort of intelligible digest is displayed in airports of the application of the Convention so far as passengers are concerned. Perhaps the noble Lord could tell me whether that is done. It would seem to me to be right. We take great trouble in regard to the Factories Acts to make sure that workers in factories know certain conditions, and again in the shops and other places wages council orders are displayed. I see no reason why, in this country at any rate, the Ministry should not take steps to see that the relative provisions are drawn to the attention of the public.
I am a little bothered, as possibly other noble Lords are, by the existence
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of a French section to this Bill. I realise that we cannot amend it, even if we could understand it, because it is part of the Protocol, but here I am a little bothered also by the fact that certain sections of the Protocol defining the High Contracting Parties are missing. I imagine they are available in the Library, but since this French text is included with the admirable object of producing a comprehensive Bill—and again I congratulate the sponsors on having put the French text into the Bill—I am wondering whether in fact we ought not to republish the whole Convention. There may be a reason why that should not be done.
I was interested in what the noble Lord, Lord Abinger, said about the application to the Crown. I am not quite clear how far the Government can, by Order under this Bill, in fact avoid the application to the Crown. It seems to me that there are clauses which we shall be examining on Committee stage under which in fact it will be possible to avoid the application to the Crown. If this point can be dealt with, then I am delighted to think that in future we shall no longer be called on to sign blood chits; the difficulty about getting insurance if we are flying in a Service aircraft will not apply, and we shall be safe for £6,000, or whatever the figure will be if it is altered in the future.
As I understand it, this Bill and the Convention will apply only to those countries which are signatories and which ratify the Convention. But there is provision in Clause 10 by which the Minister can, by Order, make the terms of the Convention, with suitable modification, applicable not only to countries which are not parties to the Convention but also to internal travel. Although I appreciate that this has been the practice since the 1952 Air Navigation Order, it seems to me to raise important issues to which we in this House ought to give some attention. Is it right, with the increasing amount of internal air travel, with the large number of operators who are coming into the field, that liability should be limited as it is now to £3,000, and as it will be when this is ratified, to £6,000? Equally, would it not be possible for the Minister not to wait for the Convention to be ratified but immediately to raise the limit, by Order, so far as internal travel in con-

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cerned? Again, this is not a matter on which we can discuss the extent to which the subject was debated in another place, but it is quite apparent that, following the narrow balance on a particular decision there, it was expected that we in this House would do something to clarify some of the difficulties which were then raised.
I think we should properly accept that the level for insurance of freight should be that in the Convention. It is perfectly possible for individuals to increase that insurance, to take on special insurance in regard to valuable freight; and there is no reason why that should be spread over all those who wish to send freight by air, which would happen if the level were raised. But I cannot for the life of me see why, so far as internal travel in this country is concerned, in regard to passengers the limit should be only £3,000 or £6,000. This seems to me to be carrying international tidiness rather too far. We know that if somebody in civilian life is killed in an accident where negligence can be established—there are limitations again in certain directions—the damages may be much higher. Before the application of the 1932 Convention and the 1952 Air Navigation Order I understand that the airlines proceeded by way of ex gratia payments. I do not know whether they were smaller or larger than the amounts that are at present proposed. But if this is to be done, and if we are to give power to the Government to do this sort of thing—that is what we are doing—I think it ought to be done not by Order but by the Bill itself.
Your Lordships are as well aware as I am that there are difficulties in dealing with Orders; they are not susceptible of amendment. Yet in Clause 10 we are proposing to give great powers to the Minister, which I admit he has had in the past and which he exercised in the 1952 Air Navigation Order. But this is an opportunity, I should have thought, to deal with it properly in legislation. Again, if I may say so, it is through the negligence of the Government that we have had to wait all this time and only due to the energy of the Private Members concerned that we have had an opportunity to discuss this subject.
I hope this Bill will not go through too quickly on Committee stage. I hope
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we shall have the benefit of some legal advice on these points. In particular, I should like to know how far certain changes which the Bill introduces and which were not contained in the original Convention ought to be the subject possibly of some additional schedule or protocol to the Hague Convention. For instance, I believe that in Clause 5 there is a provision by which certain liability in terms of time is extended to carriers' servants or agents. That was not in the original Convention. It was explained by the mover of the Bill that no doubt this had been overlooked at The Hague. But ought it not now to be made of general application? Will this have validity, or shall we not be putting our own nationals at a disadvantage in this matter? Will the agents and servants of British carriers still be exposed in foreign countries? These are all matters of a kind on which certainly I am not competent to express an opinion, but on which, none the less, before this Bill passes into law we ought to have some advice and help from the Government.
4.47 p.m.
LORD CHORLEY: My Lords, I should like to follow up some of the remarks which have just fallen from my noble friend Lord Shackleton with regard to this matter. In the first place, I should like to support what he said in congratulation of the noble Lord who has moved the Second Reading of the Bill this afternoon and of Mr. Ronald Bell who brought it forward in another place. This is a most important Bill. It deals with a rapidly developing area of transport which is of the greatest importance to hundreds of thousands of people, their lives and limbs, and also to the transporting of a great deal of exceedingly valuable merchandise.
This is one of the most important transport Bills that has ever been before Parliament, and I entirely agree with Lord Shackleton that it is quite inexcusable that the Government should have allowed it, so to speak, to stand still for all this period of time. The sum of £3,000 as the maximum that a person can recover under the rules as they stand at present is quite ridiculous in the light of the depreciation in currency which has been taking place since the end of the war. After the Convention in relation to increasing the figures in the Merchant Shipping Act had been agreed,

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the Government acted with great promptitude and vigour to get that Bill on to the Statute Book three or four years ago. Why they should have taken this extraordinarily dilatory attitude in regard to this particular matter passes comprehension. It is true, in a way, that shipping is much more important to us than air travel. But air travel is becoming more and more important, and the lives and the valuable property of the people who use air travel ought not to be dealt with in this cavalier fashion, with the whole business ignored in this way.
I suggest to your Lordships that a Bill of this importance and complexity is not suitable to be dealt with as a Private Member's Bill. I entirely agree with what my noble friend Lord Shackleton has said on this particular point. This is a Bill of outstanding importance; and, much as one admires the initiative shown by Mr. Bell, in another place, and by the noble Lord, Lord Abinger, here, that does not, I think, in any way excuse the Government for taking up this supine attitude in regard to this matter.
My Lords, I have always felt that a mistake was made with the Carriage by Air Act, 1932, in introducing this limitation policy at all. It is a policy of very dubious wisdom. It has, of course, been used in connection with sea transport for some hundreds of years, but this country introduced it only after very considerable delay and doubt in the eighteenth century because provisions of this kind had been put upon the Statute Book by our great carrying rivals, the Dutch and Hansa towns, in the early seventeenth century; and that was followed by the French. Eventually, in order to protect our own interests, to protect our own shipowners and carriers by sea, we had to follow suit. But there is obviously a very great deal to be said against limitation rules of this kind, because they mean that the right of a man to recover against the transporter is seriously curtailed. While the noble Lord is no doubt right to say that in respect of personal injury it is possible to take out an effective policy of insurance to get more, assuming that you think about it, that does not, of course, apply to insurance of goods, because that is an indemnity insurance, and the insurance company with which
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you are insured is entitled to stand in your shoes in regard to claims against the air transporter who is carrying the goods. The difference between an insurance of goods, which is an indemnity contract, and an insurance of life, which is not, is of course well known to lawyers. It seems to me that it is rather unfortunate that limitation has been extended in this way.
I would remind your Lordships that, in regard to carriage by railway and other forms of land transport, there has never been any question of introducing this. A man who is carried by British Railways and who is injured in a railway accident is entitled to full compensation, and will get very heavy compensation indeed. In the old days, juries awarded very heavy damages in cases of this kind: and in recent cases some outstanding damages have been awarded by Judges—in my recollection, three or four times as much as the new maximum obtainable for a man who goes by air and is injured instead of going by railway and having the misfortune to be injured in a railway accident. That, of course, applies to carriage in coaches and all sorts of other forms of transportation by land.
Why should there be this difference? Because, as the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, says, this international limitation of liability has been introduced into internal transport by air in this country by the Minister's Regulation of 1952. I confess that I do not remember its going through. I feel a certain sense of shame at not having noticed it at the time and at not having protested against it. I think that this is very much one of the matters which ought to be gone into in the Committee stage. As my noble friend Lord Shackleton has said, while we may be giving, and are very ready and anxious to give, this Bill a good reception in general terms, there are quite a number of points in regard to which we ought, I think, if we do our duty effectively, to pay very close and careful consideration when we come to the Committee stage.
One such point was referred to by my noble friend Lord Shackleton: it is in. Clause 5, which introduces a new limitation period to protect the servants and agents of the carrier. There has been a, great deal of cutting down of limitation

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periods during my time in the law, which has resulted in an extraordinarily complicated situation, so that it is very difficult for an ordinary practising lawyer to carry all these limitations periods in his head. And here we are proposing to introduce another one by Clause 5. Why should it be in one case two years, and in another case six years, or in another case some other period? And it is a very short period in terms of enforcing a legal obligation. It is easy for two years to slip away before the parties have realised that the time has gone. If the writ is not issued within the time limit, then the right is lost altogether. So, there again, I think we ought to pay careful attention to this matter.
Of course, there is this point which I have already discussed and which my noble friend Lord Shackleton has emphasised: the question of whether it is really in the interest of the citizens of this country as a whole that we should continue this limitation policy, which was initiated in 1952, in regard to inland air transport. There are, of course, arguments on the other side, but I think that they would be much better made and dealt with when we come to deal with the Bill clause by clause at the Committee stage. As your Lordships have a great deal more work before you this evening, I will not pursue the topic any further than to say that, subject to the points I have indicated, I welcome the Bill.
4.58 p.m.
LORD DENNING: My Lords, may I say a word in support of what my noble friends Lord Shackleton and Lord Chorley have said? This is a most important Bill affecting the liabilities of all the air companies. In so far as there is an International Convention to raise the limit of liability from £3,000 to £6,000 it is excellent to give it the force of law in this country, and I am glad that it was a former pupil of mine who brought this Bill forward in another place. But the important clause in the Bill, towards the end, is concerned with how an Order in Council can be made by a Minister here, applying it to inland transportation by air, which in effect is a limitation which the airlines can put on limiting liability to £6,000 for any individual. That is far less than would be recovered in an accident in any other
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form of transport. It is done by Order in Council. Under our ordinary law, if a contract is to be made limiting liability there has to be fair and reasonable notice of it in the contract. Indeed, there have been many complaints as to the way in which notice is given.
As the noble Lord, Lord Abinger, said, would it not be a good thing in regard to contracts for air transport at least to ensure that the limitations of liability are publicly known and notified, so that people can see there is a need to insure themselves further and be apprised of the position? Indeed this Bill, affecting as it does the liability of airline companies throughout international transport, and which can be applied by Order of a Minister to inland transport, certainly needs careful scrutiny. But it must be much welcomed. The limitation of servants' liability to a period of time of two years, less than our ordinary period of three years, also needs scrutiny. Whether they can be limited in liability, I do not know. So, while welcoming the Bill, I would suggest that it needs very careful consideration.
5.0 p.m.
EARL JELLICOE: My Lords, I wish first, on behalf of the Government, to congratulate my noble friend Lord Abinger on the way in which he moved the Second Reading of this important Bill. It is a somewhat complicated one, as a number of your Lordships have mentioned. Not being a lawyer, I must confess that I have found parts of it not particularly easy to understand. I am sure that those Members of your Lordships' House who, like me, are not altogether at home with legal language, will be grateful to my noble friend for the clarity of his exposition. He has explained the purposes of the Bill so clearly and comprehensively that he leaves me, I hope, very little to do. For this, I am duly grateful. Further, I feel I am right in expressing your Lordships' gratitude to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Denning, for his contribution to this debate this afternoon.
The object of this Bill, as my noble friend has explained, is to enable Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom to ratify the Hague Protocol of 1955 by giving effect to the Warsaw Convention of 1929 as amended by the Protocol. The amended Convention is

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attached as the First Schedule to the Bill now before your Lordships. The original Warsaw Convention of 1929, which at present governs international carriage by air, was given effect to by being embodied in a Schedule to the Carriage by Air Act, 1932. That Act will be repealed and replaced by the present Bill if and when it is enacted and comes into force. As your Lordships know, the present Bill has already received a Third Reading in another place.
Before turning to the Bill itself, I should first like to deal with a point made by a number of speakers in this debate: was it appropriate for this important Bill, covering (as it were) an International Convention, to be introduced into Parliament by a Private Member rather than by the Government? It is true that the 1932 Act began its life as a Government Bill; but, my Lords, it seems perfectly fitting to the Government that this Bill should have been introduced by a Private Member. It is undoubtedly an important piece of legislation, but many important Bills have been introduced in both Houses of Parliament by Private Members. The Bill before your Lordships to-day undoubtedly also deals with an International Convention, but, so far as I know, there is no convention (of another sort) that Private Members should not introduce Bills of this nature. Indeed, there is a very recent precedent in the Merchant Shipping Act, 1958, which gave effect to the Brussels Maritime Convention of 1957 on shipowners' liability. Moreover, in so far as this particular Bill touches closely the rights and liabilities of individuals and commercial enterprises, it seems peculiarly fitting that it should have been introduced in this way.
I must say that this particular line has somewhat surprised me, seeing how jealous Members of Parliament justly are of the rights and responsibilities of Private Members, and in view of the fact that, so far as I know, a Private Member's Bill has constitutionally no less weight and no less authority than a Government Bill. Another reason why I have been surprised by this particular line is because of the Godparents of this particular Bill in another place. They included, from the Party opposite, Mr. Geoffrey de Freitas, Sir Frank Soskice and Sir Lynn Ungoed-Thomas—a Front
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Bench spokesman and two former Law Officers.
LORD SHACKLETON: My Lords, may I interrupt the noble Earl? Why is he picking on "the Party opposite"? This is not a Party issue at all. The matter was raised from both sides, and not just the Opposition.
EARL JELLICOE: I am dealing merely with your Lordships' debate this afternoon. In this House this afternoon the point has been made, so far as I know, only from the opposite Benches, and I was merely referring to the fact that what was good enough for two former Law Officers in another place is apparently not good enough for the. Benches opposite here to-day.
May I now turn to the reasons why your Lordships are being asked, as I understand it, to give this Bill a Second Reading? The first reason, as I see it, is a negative one. The amended Convention is due to come into force under the provisions of Article 22 of the Hague Protocol when it is ratified by 30 States; and, in answer to the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, the reason why the Government have not acted up till now is that 30 ratifications are required and, so far, only 17 or 18 have been obtained. Up to now, therefore, there really has not been this vast degree of urgency attached to ratification. However, it has now been ratified by 18 Governments, or 17 if the German Democratic Republic is excluded—which, as your Lordships know, we do not recognise. The ratifying Governments include countries like the Soviet Union, France, Australia and the Netherlands, which are important in the international civil aviation field.
The President of United States has recently recommended ratification to the United States Senate. It is not for me to predict what the United States Senate will do about it, as its ways, like the ways of your Lordships' House, are sometimes a little inscrutable. However, if we are realistic, I think we can be fairly certain that if and when the Americans do ratify the Convention a lot of other States are likely to follow suit possibly enough to bring the amended Convention into force. Should it come into force without the United Kingdom being a party to it, we might find ourselves in a pretty awkward position. Take, for example, the North

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Atlantic air route—possibly the most important air route in the world. If the United States ratify the Protocol and we do not, the question would arise whether carriage between this country and the United States would be governed by the provisions of the original Convention, of the amended Convention or of no Convention at all. I leave it to your Lordships to imagine the chaos which would result from the litigation in either or both countries—or, indeed, in a third country—unless some answer to that question could be found.
The other main reason why the Government support this Private Member's Bill is a more positive one. It is because we feel that the new Convention has definite advantages over the old Warsaw Convention of 1929. It is therefore to our positive advantage to ratify it, and thus to encourage other Governments to do it. Of course, like all International Conventions, this is a product of a good deal of give-and-take. From our point of view, it may not in all respects be ideal, but it does have clear advantages, the Government feel, over the earlier Convention. I think that those advantages have been fully rehearsed by my noble friend Lord Abinger in introducing this Bill. I do not think I need say anything from the Government's point of view about what I may call the subsidiary advantages.
I should just like to dwell for a moment on what we consider to be the most important advantage, as my noble friend made clear: that is that Article 22 of the new Convention doubles the maximum liability of the carrier from about £3,000 to about £6,000 in the case of the injury or death of a passenger. Some of your Lordships may feel that a maximum liability of some £6,000 is not sufficient: that many of your Lordships' lives and limbs are worth a lot more than that. Indeed, the noble Lord, Lord Chorley, tended to query the whole principle of the limitation of liability. I should just like to explain that, as I understand it, the principal reason for limiting liability in such a case is that, but for some limitation, the less valuable passenger in an aircraft would find that he or she was paying a part of his or her fare for the insurance of the airline against the enormous potential liability
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of other, more valuable passengers—like Miss Sophia Loren or, indeed, one of your Lordships. An incidental advantage is that a reasonable limit results in the avoidance of litigation, because the airlines and their underwriters are usually willing to dispose of the case by paying the limitation sum. At the same time, the Convention requires a passenger to be warned that liability may be limited, so that he has every opportunity of taking out any additional insurance which he thinks is necessary to cover his or her particular circumstance.
The noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, made the point that it might be very desirable, when (I hope it is a case of "when") the amended Convention comes into force, that its main provisions should be well publicised at airports. I shall be very glad to bring that suggestion to the notice of my right honourable friend the Minister of Aviation, but I would express some slight scepticism as to whether the average air traveller, rushing for his aeroplane, would spend very long in studying the detailed provisions of this very complicated Convention. However, I am sure the suggestion has merit, and I shall be glad to convey it to my right honourable friend.
So much for the Convention itself, my Lords. In the interests of brevity, I should like to confine my remarks on the Bill to a couple of points of substance. The first concerns subsection (2) of Clause 1, to which the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, referred, which provides that, in the event of any inconsistency, the French text scheduled in the Bill shall prevail over the English one. There are, of course, many precedents for this in International Conventions. What is different in this Bill is that it actually schedules the French as well as the English text. To those of your Lordships who have an antiquarian bias, there will be nothing specially unusual about this. The early Statutes of Parliament were, as your Lordships know, in Latin, but during the second half of the thirteenth century, French was used as often as Latin, and after 1310 much more often. However, my researches, such as they are, seem to show that there appears to be no instance since 1485 of an Act, or part of an Act, appearing in the French language. The last was an Act of 1484, annulling the

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letters patent made to Eliza, wife of Sir Joseph Grey.
Why, in this instance, have we reverted to this somewhat earlier precedent? I think the explanation is quite simple. It is to enable lawyers and their clients to have immediate access to the French text. It would appear that if the French text had not been scheduled, courts of law would still have referred to it, but there would then have been the disadvantage that it would not have been readily available as part of the Act. But, that said, I should like to make it quite clear that this is an exceptional circumstance and is by no means to be regarded as a precedent for the scheduling of all future Conventions.
LORD MERRIVALE: My Lords, may I interrupt my noble friend for a second? He said that the French text would be followed at law. I may be wrong, but with regard to Article 13, subsection (2), the French text and the English text do not seem to have exactly the same meaning. For example, one is the question of "stipulation", and the other the question of "agreement". As I understand French, when you stipulate something, there is no question of previous agreement.
EARL JELLICOE: I am grateful to my noble friend for pointing out that sometimes there are inconsistencies, or may be inconsistencies, between the French and the English texts. It is precisely for that reason that there is a master text, as it were.
LORD LATHAM: Would the noble Lord say which prevails?
EARL JELLICOE: The French.
LORD LATHAM: Notwithstanding that the claim arises here?
EARL JELLICOE: Notwithstanding. Finally, I come to Clause 10, to which a number of noble Lords, Lord Shackleton, Lord Chorley and Lord Denning, have referred. This clause replaces section 4 of the 1932 Act, with two principal changes. It enables the rules of the Convention to be extended not only to non-international carriage, as under the 1932 Act, but to any carriage not covered by the Convention. This would include carriage free of charge by someone other than an airline—for example, in Crown
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aircraft, as my noble friend has explained. Secondly, under Clause 10 an Order in Council is required to be laid in draft before both Houses of Parliament, and will be subject to Affirmative Resolutions. This is also an innovation and, I am sure your Lordships will agree, an improvement.
Some speakers in another place, and indeed some of your Lordships here, have been inclined to question Clause 10 on the ground that it could limit the maximum liability of the domestic carrier on a domestic flight to the maximum of about £6,000. Indeed, as your Lordships probably know, another place divided on this matter, with two Members voting both ways. I do not wish at this stage to argue the pros and cons of this matter. It seems to me, at least, more suitable for a later occasion, but I should like to say this. In the first place, there is a considerable different of opinion as to whether £6,000 is or is not a reasonable maximum for liability on domestic flights. If the maximum were raised, it would almost certainly, as my noble friend pointed out, entail an increase in domestic air fares. An individual can, of course, increase his own personal insurance cover, in the same way as a consignor can increase his (might I so call it?) insurance cover on baggage and cargo. Again, as has been pointed out, it would certainly create serious anomalies and complications if we were to introduce what one might term a two-tier system of liability.
Secondly, Clause 10 of the Bill, as at present drafted, provides for considerable flexibility. An Order in Council could, if it were thought expedient, raise, or indeed lower, the maximum liability foreseen in the amended Convention. Apart from this, any such Order will, of course, be subject to the Affirmative Resolution machinery. Therefore your Lordships can revert to this particular charge at that stage, if you so desire, rather than possibly pre-judging the question now or at the Committee stage. Of course, it can 'be gone into more thoroughly, as I feel is probably your Lordships' wish, at the Committee stage.
This is admittedly a complicated and difficult issue. As a result of the debate in another place, the Government are already discussing it in some detail with the airways corporations, with the independent operators, and, indeed, with

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the insurance market; and I can assure your Lordships that what has been said in the House to-day will certainly be borne in mind in those discussions. I think I can also assure the noble and learned Lord, Lord Denning, who asked (if I understood his question aright) about the warning on the ticket for domestic flights, that any Order in Council made under Clause 10 would include provision for adequate warning, probably corresponding to that required, in the case of international tickets, by Article 3 (1) (c) of the Schedule to the Bill.
My Lords, I am sure that I have detained you for long enough. I can only, in conclusion, express the hope that I have helped to convince your Lordships that the Bill moved by my noble friend is a useful one, and one which should receive a Second Reading this afternoon.
5.18 p.m.
LORD MORRISON OF LAMBETH: My Lords, I do not think the noble Earl, to whom we are indebted for the courtesy of his reply to the observations of my noble friends, has adequately covered the point as to the application of the Convention by the Order in Council to internal air traffic in the United Kingdom. It is true that there will have to be an Affirmative Resolution, but that is not particularly exceptional, and it means that this not altogether simple International Convention will be applied, or can be applied, by Order in Council as domestic law within the United Kingdom. Presumably it will be applied in the French language, because the French text is to have precedence over the English text in the Convention. So far as it is the Convention which is applied to the United Kingdom, presumably our courts will have to try the case taking account of the fact that the law, in this instance, is in the French language. Let us hope that the judges, and juries (if any), the plaintiffs and the defendants, are all experts in the French language. There is no guarantee of that. It may not be so.
But there is another point which is perhaps even more important. It strikes me as extraordinary that this matter should be dealt with by a Private Member's Bill. The noble Earl defended this on the ground that three Members of
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the Opposition in the House of Commons had been found to put their names on the back of the Bill. With great respect to him and to my honourable and right honourable and learned friends in the other place, that argument does not impress me greatly. Members of the House of Commons like to see their names in print. That is not uncommon in politicians, of all colours. We all like to see our names in print, because it shows that we are being remembered and taken notice of, and that is very pleasant. There is nothing easier than for a Private Member to go to the other side of the House and get somebody to put his name to a Bill. It is an old technique, perfectly easy. He is bound to find somebody simple enough to put his name to the Bill.
But the Opposition in the House of Commons, like all Oppositions, is partly concerned in delaying the Government's business, and what have these simple souls done in this case? The Law Officers (I am quite ready for them to be simple souls) and one other Member, very honourable and meritorious, all three of them, put their names on the Bill and have persuaded three members of the Opposition to do likewise—which shows what charming, Christian, simple souls British politicians are! It does not impress me a bit that three members of my Party in the House of Commons have put their names on the Bill. I have great respect for all three and I understand their motives, which are honourable, courteous and decent; but nevertheless they were simple souls to do it
How do Private Members' Bills originate in the ordinary way? A Member of Parliament, either in another place Of in this House—I had better not put all the criticisms on the little customs of the House of Commons—may have a bee in his bonnet about something and may think that a Private Member's Bill would be a good way of ventilating it. There is all the excitement of being the father of possible legislation, of bringing it in and debating it and possibly of getting fair publicity for it. That is perfectly natural. Some Private Members' Bills are good and useful; some are controversial and some would be described by some people as silly, though that is a matter of opinion. There are

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Private Members' Bills which are promoted by some well-meaning, honourable and public-spirited societies representing good causes. They are often in the queue to persuade Members of one House or the other to bring in a Private Member's Bill on their behalf. That is all right. Usually they are successful, and the Member is grateful to them, because they save him the arduous task of drafting a Bill and they give him advice.
There is a third device for bringing in a Private Member's Bill (in which, let me say, I have taken part as a former Leader of the House of Commons), when the Government have a nice, innocent, quiet, little Bill for which time cannot be found in the Government's legislative programme, and are glad if some honourable Member took it on as a Private Member's Bill. This is commonly known. Such Bills are directed by the Whips and the Leader of the House, and are useful to the Government Departments concerned. But they are usually small, restricted, innocent Bills, desirable in themselves, which the Department concerned want to get through but could not get past the appropriate Committee of the Cabinet and into the legislative programme. That is all right. But when it comes to Bills of substance, including such a Bill as this, which ratifies and put into legal form an important and complicated International Convention, I think that it is an abuse of governmental procedure that the Government should land this on to a Private Member.
This is a matter which essentially ought to be Government responsibility. A precedent has been quoted of some other Convention. I would say that in regard to any International Convention to which the Government are a consenting party it is for the Government to get the legislation consequent upon that International Convention through Parliament, and they ought not to farm it out to a Private Member simply because they have a lot of objectionable legislation which they want to push through Parliament. They are farming out this Bill, which ought to be a Government Bill, to a private Member, with the acquiescence of three Members of the Opposition, and as a result are lightening their own legislative programme.
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This is too important a Bill to be a Private Member's Bill. It ought to be brought in not by a Private Member but by a Minister of the Crown, with the Law Officers in attendance and with all the influence and accountability of the Government behind it.
I am sorry to speak with such emphasis, because I know that your Lordships do not always like emphasis, but I feel strongly that this is an abuse of Parliament and it ought not to be done in this way. I hope that we may hear something from the noble and learned Viscount on the Woolsack, who is an important member of the Cabinet, about how this procedure has been adopted. I think that it is open to objection as an abuse of Private Members' legislation, which ought to be really Private Members' legislation. I do not believe that this is Private Members' legislation at all. I believe that it is Government legislation which has been pushed through Private Members' channels.
5.27 p.m.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR (VISCOUNT KILMUIR): My Lords, I respond with great alacrity to the remarks of the noble Lord, Lord Morrison of Lambeth? May I say how much pleasure it gives me to reply to him once again? We both look back to many happy opportunities, when one or other rose to answer the points of the other, and I should like the noble Lord to know that it gives me real pleasure to be doing it once more.
The noble Lord has raised two points. The first is with regard to Clause 10 and the application to air transport, other than international air transport, of the provisions of the Convention by Order in Council. May I direct his attention to the last line and a half of subsection (1), which say:
"… subject to such exceptions, adaptations and modifications, if any, as may be so specified."
I think that, on reflection, the noble Lord will see that any terrors which may be in his mind about the difficulties of the French tongue can be eliminated by that method on any grounds that are necessary. I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, will forgive me, but I had to leave the House for a quarter of

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an hour on an important appointment and missed his speech. I was courteously informed that he had indicated that legal consideration should be given to his points. I want to assure him that I shall read his speech carefully, and I will consider the points he has raised, and also the points raised in this regard by the noble Lord, Lord Chorley.
I come to the point of the noble Lord, Lord Morrison of Lambeth, with regard to Private Members' Bills. I have heard that speech several hundred times in the last 26 years. I have always heard it from a member of the Government who wanted to damp down the ardour of a Private Member introducing his Bill. Finding it difficult to bring any other arguments against the Private Member's Bill, he fell back on that time-honoured chestnut: "this is no subject for a Private Member's Bill".
LORD MORRISON OF LAMBETH: Has the noble and learned Viscount, within his recollection, heard a Minister of the Crown oppose a Private Member's Bill on the ground that it ought not to be a Private Member's Bill, and that the House had better not carry it; that it should be a Government Bill and should be considered in that light, "but we are making no promises"? If it be a sin to put forward that argument, it is a sin that is committed by Ministers of the Crown, as well as by other people.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: It is a sin that is committed by Ministers of the Crown. My point is that it is a sin to which Ministers of the Crown are unduly prone when they are short of other arguments against the Bill. I wanted to put this to the noble Lord quite seriously, but not too seriously—he will understand what I mean. I think that the development in Private Members' Bills which has taken place since 1945 is one of the most valuable developments in our Parliamentary life. If the noble Lord will refer to a book dealing with Parliament 50 years ago, written by Hilaire Belloc, on the Party system—and after all, there is no greater authority on the Party system than the noble Lord, Lord Morrison of Lambeth—he will find that one of the great complaints of Parliament made by Hilaire Belloc and his coadjutor was the great difficulty that
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Private Members had in playing a full part in politics. I have spent at least half of my 26 years out of office, and I believe it is important that private Members should be encouraged to play a full part.
Looking back to the period between the wars, I think, with great diffidence, that one of the troubles about Private Members' Bills was that they fell within the category which the noble Lord, Lord Morrison of Lambeth, desired, and to which he would like them to be restricted. They were then used largely for one of two reasons: first, by the Party in Opposition to make a gesture as to their programme or an attack against the Government; and secondly, by those (I do not want to be unkind and call them "cranks") whose ideas did not find general approbation. The result was that many of the Fridays on which we used to discuss Private Members' Bills were—I will not say wasted, but not occupied as profitably as they could be. Since the war Private Members' Bills have taken a new turn. They have consisted largely of efforts to supplement the legislative programme of the Government of the day on most useful and practical lines.
I want to urge this upon the noble Lord. I enjoyed his flourish this afternoon, but he must remember that he is regarded as one of the serious thinkers in this country on the functioning of Parliament and our machinery of Government. He knows me too well to think that I am saying that in a fulsome way: I have read his books, and I state it as a fact. I think that someone in his position should, at any rate, give thought to the other point of view. I say that Private Members' Bills have been used as an adjunct in putting forward serious and practical measures. The noble Lord knows two things. One is that in the modern State, with its greater complications, and in a period of scientific advancement it is an inevitable consequence that any Government must govern and legislate over a wider sphere. That is common ground, although there would be arguments about how far the sphere should extend. That means that in the very restricted period—which, apart from the Finance Bill and various matters that have to come up every day (my noble friend Lord Margesson will correct me if I am

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wrong), permits something in the nature of 60 days, more or less, for the legislative programmes of any Government—it is more and more difficult for a Government to do more than their main-programme Bills. On the other hand, every Government sets up Commissions, sends delegations to international Conferences and is then faced with the problem of putting their recommendations into effect.
Although the Royal Commission was set up by the late Lord Jowitt, the Report of the Morton Commission on Marriage and Divorce, under my noble and learned friend Lord Morton of Henryton, came to me. The Commission put forward a large number of proposals, many of which have reached the Statute Book, largely owing to the efforts of Private Members who have supplemented our legislative programme; and I have done my best to help them along the way. There is a great deal of legislation to-day which is not Party political but is generally desired by the people of this country and is helpful if it is brought to the Statute Book. I feel that the efforts of Private Members in the extended field that they take are a healthy and sound development in our Parliamentary life.
I am sorry to have occupied so much time, but I would always do the noble Lord the honour of replying to a remark of his. Apart from the pleasure it gives me to make yet another reply, I should be grateful to him, in his position, as an old colleague and foe in both Government and Parliament, if he would consider that point seriously. We shall no doubt have another chance of returning to it, but I hope he will do me that honour; and that after my reply noble Lords opposite will give a Second Reading to the Bill, on the understanding that the important points raised are thoroughly examined and threshed out in Committee.
On Question, Bill read 2ª, and committed to a Committee of the Whole House.

ROAD TRAFFIC BILL [H.L.]
5.30 p.m.
Order of the Day for the House to be again in Committee read.
Moved, That the House do now resolve itself into Committee.—(Lord Chesham.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.
House in Committee accordingly.
[The EARL OF BUCKINGHAMSHIRE in the Chair.]
LORD LATHAM LORD LATHAM moved, after Cause 17 to insert the following new clause:
Probationary Licences
".—(1) A licensing authority receiving an application from a person who has not held any driving licence since he passed his test shall, subject to the provisions of the next following subsection, issue to that person a probationary licence.
(2) Probationary licences shall remain in force for one year, but shall otherwise be issued on the terms and conditions laid down in section one hundred and one of the principal Act.
(3) A person holding a probationary licence shall not drive any vehicle without exhibiting fore and aft the prescribed sign in the prescribed manner. The Minister may by statutory instrument prescribe the sign referred to in this subsection and the manner in which it is to be exhibited; any statutory instrument made under this subsection shall be annullable in pursuance of a resolution of either House of Parliament.
(4) If the holder of a probationary licence is convicted of any of the offences described in paragraphs 1 to 11 of the First Schedule to this Act, the court convicting him shall order that his licence be revoked, and such revocation shall have the effect of cancelling his driving test, and thereafter he shall not hold any form of driving licence, other than a provisional licence, until he has again passed a driving test."
The noble Lord said: This new clause seeks to give effect to a proposal which I adumbrated with some particularity when speaking on the Second Reading of this Bill. I then expressed the hope that the Minister would give serious consideration to this proposal which, in my submission, could and would make a valuable contribution to the promotion of road safety. I know of, and appreciate, the sympathetic consideration which the noble Lord, Lord Chesham, has given to the proposal, but he feels that there are difficulties on grounds of administration and enforcement. That may be. In these days of complexity of life and living, most changes or extensions of the

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procedures of behaviour in society involve difficulties. It is the obligation of Governments and of Ministries to surmount them, and I know the noble Lord, Lord Chesham, will agree with that.
When the issue of licences to drivers was first made subject to a prescribed test, there were difficulties of administration and of enforcement. There were, of course, those who said the procedure would not work. They were wrong; it has worked. The provisional licence procedure, and the test associated with the grant of a full licence, have proved, on the whole, satisfactory. Bad as they are to-day, one hesitates to think what death traps our roads would be if, with the volume of motor traffic they now carry, one could still get a licence without a test and for the simple payment of 5s. I submit that the procedure of licensing should be extended. In my view, the full licence is granted too early, and it is granted unconditionally. It is issued before the licensee has had an opportunity, in point of time, for reasonable and adequate experience of driving on his own responsibility, even though he has passed the prescribed test. The procedure devised years ago, when road conditions were vastly different, needs to be extended, in my view, to meet these changed conditions. Licensing procedures cannot remain static when all else in road user and control is changing.
The new clause would introduce an intermediate stage or, shall I say, a probationary stage between the grant of a provisional licence and the grant of a full licence. This could be done by the issue of a probationary licence operative for a period of, say, twelve months from the passing of the test by the holder of a provisional licence, on the terms and conditions set out in the clause in the Marshalled List, or as may otherwise be determined. One of these would be that any vehicle driven by him during those twelve months would carry the letter "P" as a sign, in place of the letter "L". There would be no requirement that the probationer should be accompanied by a licensed driver. It may well be that the clause as drafted is defective in one or more respects—so be it; these defects can be remedied. What is important is the acceptance of the proposal in principle; the precise drafting of the clause can then follow.
What are the merits of this proposal, and what is the case for it? I sought to give these when speaking in the Second Reading debate on the Bill, and I would not wish to repeat them to-day, except that I spoke at the end of a long two-day debate to a somewhat sparse House, and it may well be that some of your Lordships are not fully seized of the case for this proposal. May I, then, briefly recapitulate? At present, the holder of a provisional licence must have an "L" fore and aft on the vehicle he is driving, and he must be accompanied by a licensed driver. The "L" sign is a notice to others using the highway that the person in the vehicle is a learner, which is a valuable safeguard both to the learner and to other drivers who are put, as it were, on their guard to be ready for the unexpected and/or wrong action on the part of the learner. Moreover, fully experienced drivers, and this is no less valuable, are generally considerate and patient towards the learner, as much in their own interests as in his. In this respect, it is of course the case that some of the drivers under a full licence may the day before have been themselves driving under the protection of the "L" sign, which circumstance, in my submission, is an added point in favour of this proposal.
In addition, the learner with a provisional licence must be, and is, accompanied by a licensed driver to guide and advise him, and to keep him from doing the wrong thing; and, indeed, keep him from doing the right thing at the wrong time. In many cases it will be an instructor, the majority of whom are competent and efficient, although there are, of course, some black sheep in the flock. Finally, there is the tester himself.
The learner duly passes his test, it may be after only a few hours of actual driving and experience of road conditions, and, having passed, he is thereupon entitled to go on to the highway with a vehicle, large or small, high-powered or low-powered, without the company of a licensed driver and without the "L" sign to give notice to other drivers that he is an initiate driver with only limited experience, often very limited—indeed, derisory experience. He thus loses the consideration he formerly enjoyed from other drivers, the comfort and confidence

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which comes from having a licensed driver with him, and the knowledge that if he was going to do the wrong thing he would be corrected or stopped by the licensed driver. But now, after he has passed the test, he is alone, maybe in a vehicle much more powerful than the one he learned to drive on, or the one on which he passed out.
When a learner takes his test, he is normally keyed up, and the tester will tell him to do this or that, but only—and this is very important—when it is proper and safe to do it. The situation is quite different when the erstwhile learner is on his own. He has no one to advise him or restrain him from doing the wrong thing, and none of that forbearance from other drivers which the "L" sign attracts. As I have said, he is alone as a driver, with very limited experience, in charge of a potentially dangerous vehicle, amid a multitude of other vehicles, all dangerous in certain conditions and certain circumstances, including some being driven by learners and some being driven by persons who, like himself, were learners the day before yesterday. The safeguard of the "L" sign is no longer available to him or to the other drivers on the road.
The proposal does not cast any reflection on the person who passes the test, or upon the quality of the test. Nor am I questioning the sense of common responsibility to other road users of the learner himself, or his sense of responsibility to his passengers and to himself. I submit that this proposal is as much for his benefit—namely, the learner or the one who has passed the test—as for other road users, not excluding pedestrians. The fact that for a year his vehicle must carry the letter "P" which would signify that he has passed the test and is a probationer, ought not, in my submission, to wound his self respect or his dignity. It is better for him to be alive as a probationer than dead from being too proud to acknowledge it.
Subsection (4) of the new clause provides that if, during his probationary licence period, the holder is found guilty of any of the offences described in paragraphs 1 to 11 of the First Schedule of the Bill, the court convicting shall order
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that his licence be revoked, and that he shall not again hold any form of driving licence, other than a provisional one, until he has again passed a driving test. In short, he would revert to the position of a learner required to pass another test which, if he passes, will entitle him to have, subject to the decision of the court, a probationary licence and later, if no further offence be committed, the full licence at the end of twelve months of his passing the second test. As to what offences should involve this disciplinary penalty is a matter for consideration, since it may be regarded by the court as a part of the penalty otherwise appropriate to the offence or in addition thereto.
THE MINISTER WITHOUT PORTFOLIO (THE EARL OF DUNDEE): I am sorry to interrupt the noble Lord, but as we have a Royal Commission at six o'clock I must now move that the House do now resume.
Moved, That the House do now resume.—(The Earl of Dundee.)
On Question, Motion agreed to, and House resumed accordingly.
House adjourned during pleasure.
House resumed.

ROYAL COMMISSION
6.0 p.m.
The following Bills received the Royal Assent:

White Fish and Herring Industries,

National Health Service,

Mersey Tunnel,

Allhallows Staining Churchyard,

Rio Tinto Rhodesian Mining Limited,

Shell Brazil,

Winchester Cathedral Close,

Clerical, Medical and General Life Assurance,

Great Northern London Cemetery Company,

Lancashire Quarter Sessions.

House adjourned during pleasure.
House resumed.

ROAD TRAFFIC BILL [H.L.]
6.13 p.m.
House again in Committee.
LORD LATHAM: After that important interpolation I will resume. As to what offences should involve this disciplinary penalty is a matter of consideration, since it may be regarded by the court as a part of the penalty otherwise appropriate to the offence, or it may be that they will regard it as an appropriate addition thereto. I readily admit that there may be more than one opinion as to which should be the offences which should attract this, as it were, revocation of the licence which has been granted. It may well be that there are other offences scheduled in the various Schedules to the Bill which may be more appropriate for consideration in connection with this proposal. However, I am not wedded to the offences described in paragraphs 1 to 11 of the Bill. As I have said, it is a matter for careful consideration.
As I said on Second Reading, I realise that this is an important extension of the licensing procedure; but it is not oppressive; it is protective both of the probationary driver himself and of third parties, including the pedestrian who, I submit, cannot be ignored, not only in connection with this proposal but in connection with the whole terms and provisions in the Bill. A pedestrian may be stupid at times, but he is perhaps not more stupid than the motorist is at times. As a motorist myself of over 40 years' standing, I blush at times at the stupid things which I do as a pedestrian. I think I am not different in that respect from most of us when we are pedestrians. I am encouraged by the circumstance that, according to to-day's newspapers, the Minister of Transport is proposing to control in some way and in some measure what is pleasantly described as the "jay-walker", and I am sure that everyone concerned with the promotion of safety on the roads will wish him luck and assure him that he will have the support of all persons of good will in any proper steps he may take to see to it that pedestrians conform to the provisions which are made for their own safety.
Of course there may be objections from motorists as a class, and from prospective learners and others. There
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are those who, in chorus, will say that administratively it cannot be done; that there will be difficulties of enforcement. Always there are difficulties with changing procedures; it is our business to overcome them, and I am sure that the Minister, if he really wishes to do so, can overcome the difficulties and can make this a contribution towards increased road safety.
Here we are dealing with life and death. We are dealing with the dreadful, horrifying toll of death and mutilation on our roads, and no personal or private interests, no prejudices, no questions of pride or armour propre must be allowed, I submit, to stand in the way of our taking any steps, even the most drastic, to lessen this toll; nor should difficulties of operation, real or imaginary, be allowed to hamper or hinder us. If it should be done, then it can be done. That, I submit, should be our approach; and it is, of course, a good motto for any Minister. I honestly believe—I think that I am not alone in this that this proposal offers a worth-while contribution towards the reduction of road danger and the increase of road safety. I earnestly implore the Minister and, through the Minister, the Government, to accept it in principle, and to devise with energy and resolution such procedures as are necessary to carry it out, and to carry it out as soon as the Bill becomes an Act. I also believe that the proposal will receive the support of your Lordships generally, and that you will join with me in the hope that the noble Lord who is to reply for the Government will bring us the comfort of an assurance that the Government will so do. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
After Clause 17 insert the new clause.—(Lord Latham.)
LORD SOMERS: I should like warmly to support this Amendment; in fact, I should like to see it go a little further. I should like to see the period for the probationary licence extended for more than one year and make it impossible for the holder of a probationary licence to gain a full licence until he had passed a further test. I say that because the ordinary test as it stands to-day is so obviously, I regret to say, in many cases futile. But, of course, that is not in the Amendment: and I merely say that, although I should

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like to see it go farther, I support it very strongly indeed.
LORD STONHAM: I strongly support my noble friend in the general principle he is putting forward of this probationary period, but I am very concerned about the fourth subsection of the proposed new clause. It seems to me that the words:
"such revocation shall have the effect of cancelling his driving test"
mean that if he commits any of these offences during his probationary period he is further back than he was when he started.
The other difficulty is this. I was glad to hear my noble friend say that he was not tied to the offences, Nos. 1 to 11, in the First Schedule. It does not seem to me that any single one of those eleven offences has any relevance at all to one's ability to pass a driving test. The question of drink or drugs and matters of that kind has no relation to the driving test whatsoever, as I see it. Therefore, however desirable this probationary period may be after the driving test is passed, it appears as if the removal of the qualification, as it were, of having passed a test is quite unfair. There are people—I am one of them and perhaps my noble friend is another; I have been driving 41 years—who have never passed a driving test. If I commit any of these offences in the First Schedule, Nos. 1 to 11, then no doubt the proper punishment will be awarded. But presumably I should not have to pass a driving test, because none of these offences is related in any way to one's ability to drive and knowledge of the Highway Code, which are, in fact, what the inspector requires of the applicant for the driving test.
LORD LATHAM: May I just correct the noble Lord? It is not intended to apply to the holder of an existing licence, and therefore the noble Lord would not be under that disability, whatever he did on the road.
LORD STONHAM: I am quite aware of that; that is exactly what I said. In other words, a person who has passed a driving test would be, during the probationary period, suffering under a disability which would not apply to a person who has not passed a driving test, and that seems to me a double injustice. Although I support the principle of the
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probationary period, I hope that some further thought can be given to the apparent injustice and irrelevancy of this fourth subsection, because I should not like the idea to be spoilt because of something like this. I should have to oppose the whole thing if this subsection (4) were to remain in.
LORD HUGHES: I feel exactly as my noble friend Lord Stonham on this matter. When I read what my noble friend Lord Latham had said on Second Reading I found myself very much in agreement, because the tenor of his remarks, as I understood them then, was that the clause to be inserted would be one which would be helpful to the person who had passed his driving test but who, through passing it, was deprived of the protection which the letter "L" on his car had given him. I, like so many other of your Lordships who have a driving licence, have never passed a test. My wife, on the other hand, is not in that position. The first time she went out in her car after passing the test she felt that the absence of the letter "L" deprived her of a great deal of moral support; and that was what I thought my noble friend Lord Latham had in mind.
But in subsection (4) he imports something quite different. He is to subject the person who has passed a driving test to something which is an additional punishment or, alternatively, depending on how one reads this, perhaps to a lighter punishment. I am not at all clear from subsection (4) whether this is in substitution for the penalties imposed in paragraphs 1 to 11, or whether it is in addition to those penalties. If it is in substitution, one must look at the First Schedule, where it will be found that in some cases there is a mandatory disqualification for a period of not less than twelve months unless the courts so otherwise order. A person who is on probation and who has his licence removed under subsection (4) might sit a driving test and gain a licence again within a period of three or four months. So we have the situation that the person who is being struck at in this new clause, because he is not as fully qualified a driver as he might otherwise be, could be back on the roads sooner than if he had been a driver of 30 or 40 years' experience.

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If I am wrong in reading this as an alternative, then we have the other situation: that two different types of penalty are being imposed for the same offence, because a person must have his disqualification of twelve months, or whatever it may be, and thereafter must apply for a provisional licence and wait his turn for passing a driving test again. It depends entirely on the area in which he or she lives whether that opportunity will arise in a month or three months or in six months. I think, therefore, that I could have supported this new clause with enthusiasm if it had been confined to subsections (1), (2) and (3).
I appreciate that it may be that without subsection (4) the Amendment cannot go through. It is an undoubted fact that if a person does not have the confidence to go about with the full authority that having passed a driving test entitles one to, he or she can get the protection which he or she has had hitherto of continuing to have the letter "L" on his or her car; because I understand that it is no offence to drive a car with the letter "L" on it if you are not a learner. The only disadvantage I see in that is that a person may be subjected to the inconvenience of being stopped by a policeman who sees him driving without someone else, to find out whether or not he is a learner. It may therefore be that, without the last punishing part of the clause, it serves no useful purpose. I do not venture to suggest any opinion upon that point. But I certainly cannot bring myself to support an additional punishment of this kind being levied on a learner or, worse, permitting him if he has committed a serious offence to go back on the road with less than the statutory disqualification that would be imposed on other people. It seems to me that the Amendment is weak on one or other of those grounds.
LORD SILKIN: I am sorry that my noble friend could get enthusiastic about alleged defects in the Amendment and really get away from what is behind it. What is behind this Amendment is a very simple principle: that is, that nobody who has merely been driving a car as a learner and has been accompanied by somebody else, having passed the test, is really in a fit `position to embark on the roads without any further
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qualification or restriction at all. After all, this is the position in many walks of life. Take the example of a doctor. A doctor has five years' training, but he is not then allowed to go into life and practise on patients without some further period of probation; and the same applies to other professions. I cannot see what is the objection to applying this principle for a period to the person who is driving on the roads, at a time when our accident rate is increasing, when the number of cars is increasing and when it becomes more and more perilous to drive a car at all.
Both my noble friends have raised the point that this is going to be unfair as between the person who has had to pass a test and those fortunate people who have been driving since before tests were provided for in our legislation. The same applies to the professions. There are a good many people who are qualified to practice to-day but who have not passed certain tests. Take, for example, the dentist. There are many dentists practising to-day who are allowed to practise because they were practising before registration came into effect, and we do not want to stop them; but that is no reason why we should not impose necessary restrictions on the dentists of to-day. The people who have been driving without having to pass a test are naturally a dying race. There will come a time when everyone on the road will have had to pass a test. I think, therefore, that this is a good principle: that a person should have to spend a year—the noble Lord Lord Somers, thinks it should be longer; I am quite prepared to discuss that, but at least there should be a period of one year—during which he should make it known to the public, by having this plate, that he is a probationer.
If I had had the privilege of drafting this Amendment I think I might have imposed a speed limit, as I think I should have done on the learner, too. It seems to me an anomaly that a learner should be able to drive at 70 or 80 miles an hour on the road. The same, I think, should apply to a probationer, but that is not in the Amendment. However, my noble friend has said that he will be very willing to consider any alterations of this Amendment, and I would myself respectfully suggest to him that that is

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one that might be considered: a speed limit for the probationer, as well, of course, as for the learner.
It has been said that Nos. 1 to 11 of the First Schedule are not offences which should give rise to the disqualification which is provided for in the Amendment. I do not know whether my noble friends have actually read the First Schedule, but perhaps I could remind them of some of the offences that are referred to. Number 1 is manslaughter by the driver of a vehicle. Does my noble friend suggest that if a person is found guilty of manslaughter while being the driver of a vehicle he should not be disqualified and required to pass a test?
LORD STONHAM: Will my noble friend allow me to intervene? I was not suggesting that at all, but I am suggesting that if a person taking a driving test committed the offence of manslaughter he would be unlikely to be granted a licence. Similarly, if a probationer had to take a driving test again he would be unlikely to commit any of these eleven offences whilst he was taking his test. Therefore, they are irrelevant to the actual passing of a test.
LORD SELKIN: Perhaps I am a little difficult of understanding this afternoon, but I cannot see the relevance of that. It seems to me quite natural that a person who has just been a learner and who has killed somebody on the road should then, if he wants to drive again, have to pass another test. For the life of me, I cannot see what is the objection to that. Surely it is prima facie evidence that his experience as a learner has not been adequate; nor has his passing of the test. The next one is causing death by dangerous driving. I should have thought that that was clear evidence that the person who was driving the car was not yet competent to drive it and should be subjected to another test. So I could go through them, but I do not want to bore the Committee. Careless driving is another. These are offences which really go to the root of a person's capacity to drive; and if, by being convicted of any of these offences, he is shown not to be fit to drive, it seems to me quite reasonable that he should be required to pass a test.
I hope that the noble Lord who is going to reply will give some encouragement to this Amendment. It is a new
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idea; but, of all the Ministers in the Government at the present time, I would say that the Minister of Transport is the the one most susceptible to new ideas. He has had a great many of his own: some good, some not so good—but that is quite natural. I would rather have a Minister with a lot of ideas, a fair number good, than a Minister with no ideas at all. This is a new idea, and I really think it is well worth exploring. I hope that the noble Lord will not reject this Amendment out of hand but will give my noble friend encouragement in the pursuit of a form of words which would be acceptable to the House.
6.37 p.m.
LORD HAWKE: The Amendment deals with a subject which one can only describe as ingenious. I see that there could be administrative difficulties in having so many different types of licence on the road, and for that reason I have no doubt that my noble friend's official advisers may have set his mind against it. As one who perhaps spends rather longer than any of your Lordships accompanying learner drivers from time to time, I appreciate the protection which the "L" plates give, and I would certainly welcome the protection that a further grade up would give at the next stage. But I am afraid I simply could not accept the thesis that the perpetration of any of the first eleven offences in the First Schedule should not only be punished by the ordinary processes of law but should also involve going down a snake and starting up another test.
That, I think, would be quite irrelevant, particularly as one of the offences concerned is our old friend, speeding, and notwithstanding the fact that my noble friend announced that for certain types of commercial vehicle the maximum speed limit has gone up from 30 miles an hour to 40 miles an hour. He said that the new law was going to be enforced, whereas the old one never was. Therefore, in my humble, estimation, the drivers of those commercial vehicles would be in a much worse state than they are at the moment. You would get the state of affairs where a probationer driver, driving one of these commercial vehicles, travelling, in the interests of road safety, at his normal speed, which would be about 45 miles an hour, would get convicted for speeding. His probationary licence would be

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withdrawn, and thus his livelihood would automatically be forfeited, because he would be no good to his firm as a driver. So far as that offence is concerned, at any rate, I could never willingly submit to this withdrawal of the licence.
I do not believe that the vast majority of offences in that list are the result of incompetence in driving. It is the human error, which we all make from time to time, which has the misfortune to coincide with various other circumstances and thus creates a situation which perhaps the more experienced person might get out of but which the inexperienced person cannot, however many tests he may or may not have passed. I hope that my noble friend will have a look at this Amendment, but will certainly reject subsection (4) out of hand.
LORD TEYNHAM: I entirely support the views of the noble Lord, Lord Stonham, and those of the noble Lord, Lord Hawke, and I certainly have no objection to the proposed new subsections (1), (2) and (3): I think they are a good idea and worth a try. But I do not agree with subsection (4) as drawn. I think it wrong that the revocation of a probationary licence should be used as an additional punishment on conviction of any of the offences contained in paragraphs 1 to 11 of the First Schedule. That is really what it would mean, and I cannot accept subsection (4) as drafted. The noble Lord, Lord Silkin, mentioned a 30 m.p.h. speed limit for a learner driver; but a 30 m.p.h. speed limit for a learner driver would mean that he would never drive properly.
LORD SILKIN: I do not suggest a 30 m.p.h. limit: I would leave it to the Minister to prescribe.
LORD TEYNHAM: That is what I understood the noble Lord to say, but I was merely pointing out that a learner must drive faster than that in order to learn how to drive.
LORD AUCKLAND: As a learner-driver myself, I should like to say a word about the Amendment. I certainly do not attack it wholeheartedly—in fact a great deal of it meets with my support. But there seems to be one glaring omission. Supposing I, who am learning to drive with a Triumph Herald, passed my
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test at 10 o'clock to-morrow morning, I could still go along M.1, in a Jaguar with a probationary plate, accompanied or otherwise, if I understand the clause aright. That seems to me to be wrong. Unless some more drastic condition in that respect is put into the clause I do not feel it will work. It seems to me that the driving test itself needs stiffening. I am going to take a test for the second time quite soon, so for my own part that would not be very congenial; but as a national matter I think it certainly needs stiffening. I should have thought a stiffening of the driving test, so as possibly to include a test on maintenance of a car and on manoeuvring a car into a confined parking space, would meet the requirements of the clause more than a probationary licence.
6.45 p.m.
LORD CHESHAM: I have been listening, with considerable interest, to what your Lordships have been saying, none the less because the reception your Lordships have accorded this Amendment has been a bag of rather mixed biscuits. Before I make any comment, I think I ought to slip in a word of apology to the noble Lord, Lord Latham. As he said, he asked on Second Reading that serious consideration be given to the scheme which he outlined at that time, and I told him privately that I hoped to come back and talk to him about it in the meantime, which, due to his official duties taking him abroad, and the pressure of mine over a few days, I was not able to do until to-day. I thought I would say that, because I should not like him to think that serious consideration was not given to what he suggested on Second Reading.
Perhaps his thinking in the meantime has been beneficial, because the scheme he has put forward is rather a refinement of the scheme he outlined at that time. We did, as I say, consider the scheme with care and we considered it as a whole. I know that the noble Lord intends that it should be taken as a whole, but as it falls into what are, in effect, three separate proposals, I think they must to a certain extent be taken individually in the process of examining the whole.
With regard to the first proposal, that a driver for the first year should have a probationary licence, I am sure the

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noble Lord will not mind if I say that this is probably the least important part of his proposal. It is obviously intended as a method of identifying the driver who has passed the test within the preceding year. But administratively it might be simpler to provide, for example, that the first three-year licence, or annual licence, issued after success in a driving test should be one of a different colour, with the date of the test stamped on it. I do not see the real advantage in making a completely new category of licence; for it is, after all, mostly a question of procedure and depends, to a considerable extent, on what happens in respect of the other parts of the Amendment.
The second proposal is a variant of the general principle of a two-tier structure of tests for drivers. We have considered various schemes at various times in the past, and I think there clearly would be an advantage in a structure of that kind. One way to do it, of course, would be to have a formal second test of a more advanced standard after the "L" test had been passed, and drivers would not get a full licence until they had passed it. But they would, of course, be allowed to drive solo, so to speak, after they had passed the "L" test. There is a major reason why we have not thought it possible, or practicable, to introduce such a system, and that is the extra burden, which would be a very heavy one, which would be placed on the driving test organisation. The noble Lord said that it was the duty of Ministers and Departments to find ways around snags when they crop up, but this is a very solid one indeed, and it is not a matter that can be dealt with by saying that difficulties are made to be overcome.
Lord Latham's scheme for displaying "P" plates (as he called them) would avoid the difficulty which arises on the question of a second test. But we should need a certain number of new administrative arrangements to make sure that it could be properly enforced. The noble Lord and I had a private conversation earlier, and I now rather tend to agree with him that it is probably not more difficult to enforce than an "L" plate; but the snag really arises in the numbers which would be involved. We tried to do a sum of how many people might be said to
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be carrying "P" plates at arty given moment of the year, and it worked out, as near as one could tell, at about 800,000, which is 10 per cent. of the vehicle population on the roads. The difficulty would lie in having 800,000 more people who might be committing an offence. The noble Lord may not think that is a very great disadvantage, but it is a disadvantage just the same.
Another disadvantage is this. If a new driver had to carry his "P" plate for a fixed period (the noble Lord suggested a year, but some other period might be thought suitable—six months perhaps), it would not correspond, as I see it, with any particular degree of additional experience for the driver. During that year, or six months, some drivers might drive little and not gain much experience; and others might drive 20,000 miles. Therefore the benefit it would confer is very variable and this is a disadvantage over the second test, which can be taken only when a driver is fit to do it and involves no fixed time.
My noble friend Lord Teynham said he thought it would be worth a try; but that is not tremendous enthusiasm. I think that there are other considerations which have to be borne in mind. My noble friend Lord Hawke told us—and I was glad to hear him say it—that the "L" plate gives a degree of protection to an inexperienced driver. Generally speaking, I think it is right to say that "L" plates are respected by other drivers. I wonder whether "P" plates would cause ordinary drivers to show extra consideration to cars which carry them. Would they show the consideration they show at present for "L" plate drivers? I wonder whether the proliferation of plates for which motorists have to look is not going to depreciate the currency of plates. At the moment there are nearly 1¾ million driving tests taken per year, so I suppose that there are something like that number of learner drivers on the road. With a further 800,000 "P" plates, we should have something like 2½million plates on the road. Will people, when they see so many plates, simply not respect either? I think that that would be a bad thing.
Another point is that if ordinary drivers wear their "P" plates for a year and show themselves good drivers, going along with efficiency, safety and accuracy, people will begin to think

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that "P"-plate drivers seem to drive almost as well as anyone else and there is no need to show them the consideration which the noble Lord wants. Would it be a good thing for drivers at this stage to be shown the sort of consideration which was shown to "L" plate drivers? I do not know whether it is going to enable them to gain the full experience they should get, if they are treated as special cases by ordinary drivers. It is difficult to say. If I may sum up, while we are certainly sympathetic to the two-tier structure in order to give a further probation period, we rather doubt whether this is the way to do it. In any case, I doubt whether all the detailed provisions, which would have to be worked out to make it effective could be worked out in time for this Bill. Therefore, I am doubtful whether the provision of "P" plates by themselves will be worth while.
I like rather better—at any rate in principle—the third proposal, to which several noble Lords have taken exception. I am not much interested in what offences may be included; I am more interested in the effect, which may well be to encourage drivers, during their first year of driving by themselves, to set about it with particular care. I think that in the first year of full driving that would be a very desirable thing to do, because that is the period when drivers consolidate the instruction they have had and begin to marry it up with the experience they are getting. I think that a proposal such as this may do something to ensure that drivers get into good habits at the early stage in their driving careers. Of course, a scheme like this would throw up a requirement for additional driving tests. We have tried to do a little sum about this, on the assumption that they are spread pro rata between probationary drivers and others, and it looks as if the number of additional tests arising out of this would be something like 20,000 to 30,000 a year—a figure with which we could well cope.
LORD HAWKE: Does that take into account that, if the new commercial limit of 40 m.p.h. is strictly enforced, every probationary driver of a commercial vehicle will have committed that offence more than once a year?
LORD STONHAM: As the noble Lord has already been interrupted, may I ask whether he can say what effect it would have on the vast number—the noble Earl, Lord Dundee, said 1,700,000—of motor cyclists who have not yet had a test and for whom it was impossible to fix a year in which they would be tested? Is it better to test them first rather than test somebody else twice?
LORD CHESHAM: I think that that raises a slightly different issue. I do not see what effect that is going to have on them at all. I must stand on what I said. The likely number of extra tests that would arise on this could be handled. I do not think that what the noble Lord has raised would cause me to alter my view on that point. What would this do? The Bill already provides, in the case of any offence for which a court can order disqualification, that the court can order a test to be taken, whether disqualification is ordered or not. This would make that provision, which is discretionary, obligatory for probationary drivers. Opinions are varied on whether that is a good thing or not. For myself, I do not see any very great objection to it.
What I should like to do is to have a chance to look at this matter again, now that we have had this debate. It is difficult for me to give an undertaking that will be a positive commitment; I am sure that the noble Lord will understand that. Though not very keen on it, I will have another look at the "P" plate suggestion. Although I am not hopeful about changing my view about it, I will certainly look at it carefully once again. I should also like to look at subsection (4), with a view to seeing whether we cannot get out of it, in an acceptable way, some of the undoubted good that it contains; but I do not think it would be possible to do that in time for the next stage of the Bill in your Lordships' House, and perhaps it could be put into the Bill in another place. I am bound to say, if the noble Lord will allow me, that I cannot suggest that your Lordships should accept this Amendment, because of the defects which I regret to say occur in the drafting, especially with regard to the various forms of licence, which I need not weary your Lordships by describing. I hope, therefore, with the consideration I have

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promised in mind, that the noble Lord will see his way to withdraw the Amendment at the present time.
LORD LATHAM: Having regard to the passage of time and the agenda that we have to get through this evening, I do not propose to seek to refute some of the criticism that has been passed both by my noble friends behind me as well as by noble Lords facing me, including the noble Lord, Lord Chesham. I accept the noble Lord's assurance that both aspects of the matter—I think they go together—will have consideration. I doubt whether they are fully understood by the speakers who have criticised them but that can be dealt with later. On the assurances that have been givel by the Department, I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
LORD TEYNHAM: Before the noble Lord withdraws it, with the permission of your Lordships, I should like to put it to the noble Lord, Lord Chesham, that I think a good many noble Lords would like to deal with this matter in this House before it goes to another place.
LORD CHESHAM: If I may also speak again with permission, I appreciate the noble Lord's point and I want to do What I can to meet it. With the complication of drafting, consequential Amendments and that kind of thing, I do not think that it would be physicality possible to do it. But I will certainly do what I can.
LORD HAWKE: I should like to suggest to the noble Lord that if he wanted to accept the substance of the Amendment at the next stage it would be perfectly possible to draft something quite simple and to leave out subsection (4) which is so objectionable to many noble Lords.
LORD WALERAN: I, too, would say that subsection (4) is most objectionable to a number of noble Lords, and I feel that we should have an opportunity of dealing with it in this House.
LORD HUGHES: I should like to associate myself with what the noble Lords, Lord Teynham and Lord Hawke, have said. The only part of the proposed new clause which has been criticised is that part to which the noble Lord is undertaking to give favourable consideration. Everyone else has
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welcomed the first three subsections, and the noble Lord throws out little hope of doing anything about them; but the one subsection we do not like he is to try to have incorporated elsewhere at a later stage. It seems to me that that is not taking very much account of the debate at all.
LORD CHESHAM: I do not think the noble Lord is entirely justified in saying that. I cannot remember giving an undertaking to give favourable consideration to subsection (4). Let me be clear as to what I understood myself to be undertaking to do. It was to consider the underlying principle of subsection (4), in which I am of opinion, as are others of your Lordships, there is some good, in an endeavour to extract that good and incorporate it in some way at a later stage. If that has to be done in another place, because of the physical difficulties that I mentioned of doing it here, then of course your Lordships will at a later stage have a chance to debate it.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 18 agreed to.
7.5 p.m.
LORD CHESHAM LORD CHESHAM moved, after Clause 18, to insert the following new clause:
Exercise of powers for mitigating traffic congestion in London Traffic Area
". The power of the Minister under sub-section (3) of section one hundred and thirty-seven of the Highways Act. 1959 (which provides for the drawing up of schemes relating to the execution of such works as may involve the closing to vehicular traffic of parts of certain highways in the London Traffic Area) to draw up such schemes as are mentioned in that subsection may be exercised without previous reference to the London and Home Counties Traffic Advisory Committee; and accordingly that subsection shall he amended as follows—

(a) for the words "shall refer all statements" there shall be substituted the words "may refer any statements";

(b) for the words "those statements" there shall be substituted the words "any statements so referred"; and

(c) after the words "after considering" there shall be inserted the words "(in the case of any statements so referred)"."

The noble Lord said: This is not an Amendment of major importance. The Minister twice a year has to produce a statement of road maintenance and improvement schemes in the London Traffic Area for the purpose of drawing

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up a timetable of orders being made by his divisional road engineers for forthcoming work, to avoid confusion and the streets where the work is taking place being unnecessarily blocked up. He has a statutory obligation to refer those statements to the London and Home Counties Traffic Advisory Committee. Apart from two points regarding the imposition of speed limits that are dealt with by Clauses 8 and 9 of the Bill, if the Bill becomes law as it stands, there will only be one remaining statutory obligation left for the Minister to consult the London and Home Counties Traffic Advisory Committee, and that will be in respect of these half-yearly statements.
Meetings of the Committee in future are likely to be at rather irregular intervals, and I think it could be a serious waste of the time of the 45 members of the Committee if, by law, they had to be summoned together twice a year simply to consider these half-yearly statements, particularly if they had nothing in them on which the advice of the Committee was necessary. I should tell your Lordships that in recent years no points of substance have been raised by the Committee which would have been likely to be missed had the Minister not referred the statements to them.
There is one other point with regard to consultations with the bodies primarily concerned. The highways authorities compile the original statements which are sent to the Minister. The Minister consults the police in detail before compiling his composite statement, and that when done is sent to the London Transport Executive, as well as to the police. I can tell your Lordships that this consultation will be continued even if the Traffic Advisory Committee is not consulted. The A.A. and the R.A.C. will also be informed direct. I hope that I have said enough to persuade your Lordships to accept this Amendment, and I will only add that removal of this obligation would effect a considerable saving of labour and paper. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
After Clause 18, insert the said new Clause.—(Lord Chesham.)
LORD LATHAM: I should like to ask the noble Lord one or two questions with regard to the future of the London and
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Home Counties Traffic Advisory Committee, of which I was a member as far back as 1930 and until 1939. Are the Committee to have nothing to do except to meet sporadically? Do the Committee consent to the withdrawal of almost all the remaining powers from the Committee and their transfer to the Minister? I am not questioning the propriety of it; I have doubted for some time as to whether, in the altered circumstances, the Committee were as useful, if I may say so, with respect, as before the war. There were occasions, sometimes not unmixed with humour, when the Committee quite energetically disagreed with the Minister, and notably in connection with the provision of pedestrian crossings. The Minister was right on that and the Committee, in the light of experience, were proved to be wrong. But it would be interesting to know whether the Committee are to continue and, if so, what they are to do.
LORD CHESHAM: As I understand it, the Committee will certainly continue in being. They are, after all, an Advisory Committee to whom the Minister will have to refer a great number of problems for advice. The only thing that is happening is this. They are not being cut out but it is merely a question of tidying things up in order to be able to speed them up. Instead of the word "shall" refer to the Committee the word "may" is preferred, because at the moment a good deal of material is going to the Committee which is rather wasting their time and holding up the procedure unnecessarily. The Committee still have a useful function to continue to fulfil, and I am sure that the Minister will refer a good deal of work to them.
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Clauses 19 to 24 agreed to.
7.10 p.m.
LORD TEVIOT LORD TEVIOT moved, after Clause 24 to insert the following new clause
Dangerous conduct by pedestrians, etc.
"Any person who, on or near a highway, so behaves himself as to endanger in the use of the highway himself or any other person shall be guilty of an offence, and shall be liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding one hundred pounds."
The noble Lord said: I shall be as short as possible at this late hour. This

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Bill undoubtedly has as a primary object that of saving life and injury. I must just give you a personal experience of my own. I am now unable to walk more than a hundred yards. The consequence is that I am always driving in a taxi, and I get a great deal of experience of what takes place on the roads by just sitting there and watching what goes on. In my view, the taxi drivers are amazing people. How they are able to avoid killing a great many people, I cannot understand. What do I see? I will tell you, and I am not inventing anything and not exaggerating anything. I find that the pedestrians are careless and inconsiderate. Of course, I must include children, but then they have no experience.
This is the sort of thing that happens. The other day, while I was driving in a taxi from here to my flat, what do I find?—a fellow walking across the road reading a paper. Luckily, my taxi driver saw him before he struck him, but how he did not strike him I do not know. There was this fellow reading a paper in the middle of the road. Now can you imagine anybody being so foolish as that? But if he had been punished for it he would never do it again. As it was, he looked rather insulted that we had pulled up and hooted at him.
We had a debate on the subject of light, and the question of the yellow lighting in Paris was raised. I think we all have experienced being dazzled, whether we have been walking or in a car, by the white lights that we use, and I feel most strongly that the Government should take further steps to consider the question of changing the lights from white to yellow. There is no question about it, so far as my experience goes, that that would make things safer.
Then there are crossings, Zebra crossings, and so on. My son went to stay with his friend in Moscow, and he came back much impressed by the strict manner in which those who controlled the traffic in the roads insisted upon no crossing except at certain places. I-le did not know whether people were being punished, but, judging by the way the roads were treated, he thought that undoubtedly there was a serious punishment for anybody who tried to cross roads at unspecified places. I do not know whether your Lordships have
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noticed it, but there are quite a number of people who come and stand at a Zebra crossing. If you or I have to cross, I am quite certain that we warn the traffic. We hold up our hand to show that we are going to cross. But we see these people standing there, perhaps talking to somebody, and suddenly, without giving any warning to the traffic, because they are on a Zebra crossing they start to walk across. What chance has the wretched driver when that sort of thing suddenly happens? It is marvellous how these taxi drivers manage to pull up in time.
Then there are the women with prams. They stand on the pavement, with the pram sticking out in front of them into the road. Why not keep the pram on the pavement? They are on the pavement, but the pram with the child in it nearly always is sticking out in the road, or practically in the road. Then there are the people who are waiting to cross the road. Why stand in the road? Every day I find it, and even here, in the square opposite the other place, one sees people waiting to cross the road and standing in the road. Why not stand on the pavement? That is what it is meant for. How these taxi men escape killing them, when they come round a rather blind, tall lorry, I do not understand.
This is a thing which annoys me very much. You get a taxi that is going along al a normal pace, not too fast, and suddenly a pedestrian walks in front of it. How he gets there you cannot tell, but the taxi-driver jams on his brakes, the brakes screech, and he pulls up in time without hurting the pedestrian. They only laugh about that, but it is nothing to laugh about. Why do they laugh? It is mostly girls who do that, when they just escape being hurt. We have had a good deal of discussion about the behaviour of motor drivers and taxi drivers, and the question of manners on the road has been mentioned. Now why should we not ask the pedestrians to acquire the same manners that we want from the drivers of cars? I see no reason why they should not be punished if they do not do that.
I have a Stationery Office book here, and perhaps your Lordships might take the trouble to yet one of them and read it, with regard to the casualties of pedestrians. In Tables 8, 15, 19 and 20 there is detailed information on thousands of

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casualties incurred by pedestrians, and a great many of those casualties, so far as one can make out, are quite unnecessary. I feel most strongly that something should be done to correct this haphazard method of walking about in the roads, of which the pedestrian seems to have a habit. I hope the Government will take all the activities of the pedestrians into careful consideration with a view to fining or punishing in some way those who do not carry out what is the safe way of using the roads, and will try to drive into them the same spirit that we are trying to drive into those who drive cars and taxis. I think we should find that there would be a change in the numbers of deaths, serious injuries and injuries which run into thousands. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
After Clause 24. insert the said new clause.—(Lord Teviot.)
LORD TEYNHAM: I must say that I am inclined to agree with this Amendment. Of course, there is nothing in the Bill at the present time about the behaviour of a pedestrian who may, perhaps through drunkenness or lack of care and attention, be the cause of a serious accident. I think one of the examples given by my noble friend Lord Teviot was a very good one—a man walking across the road reading a newspaper. There are others who run across the traffic without taking any care at all. I am not sure that this Amendment will fully meet the case, but I certainly accept the principle of it, and no doubt the noble Earl who is to reply will tell us about that particular point.
VISCOUNT MASSEREENE AND FERRARD: I also support the principle of the Amendment, but I cannot support the way it is worded. For instance, it appears to be confined to members of the male sex. It says:
"… so behaves himself as to endanger …"
What about the "herselves"? Also there are a great many pedestrians who endanger the safety of the public highway through no fault of their own. For instance, there are the extremely pretty girls, who so often take the eye of a driver off his wheel. I remember reading that in America many hundreds of thousands of accidents are caused
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every year by either gaily or barely dressed females. As it is worded, I think there are two great difficulties in this Amendment. First of all, it accuses only our sex; and, secondly, there are many thousands of people who, as I say, through no fault of their own—like pretty girls—can endanger the use of the highway.
THE EARL OF NORTHESK: I should like to support the Amendment of my noble friend Lord Teviot in principle, but I do not think it is worded widely enough. I think that what he is aiming at, and what I am sure a great many of your Lordships would desire, is that the pedestrian should have to obey traffic lights in the same way as the motor car. When lights turn to the benefit of the motorist, there are still pedestrians who ignore that signal. If a pedestrian had to obey the traffic lights, as exhibited to him, in the same way as traffic, that would go a long way towards reducing the appalling casualties on our roads, which is the main theme of this Bill. I should like to support my noble friend's Amendment, if it can be redrafted to make the pedestrian obey traffic-controlled signals on the roads.
LORD HAWKE: This clause certainly raises a very wide issue. So far as I am aware, it would be a completely new principle of English law that the walkers on the Queen's highway shall have to obey particular rules of walking, and so on. I am not at all sure that the British public would be prepared to stand for it, because not only does it involve such things as penalties for crossing the road against the lights—which would perhaps not be an unreasonable thing—but presumably it would also involve directions as to which side of the pavement we should walk and would make it an offence to step off the pavement into the road, which, of course, could be a dangerous operation, and so on.
I do not deny that, if we were prepared to be such a regimented nation on the pavements, it would make a considerable difference to road casualty figures, because, as anybody knows, the difficulties of driving, particularly on rainy nights in the winter, in the office rush hour or later on in the amusement rush hour, are such that a slight lapse by any walker is liable to produce an

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accident. It is on conditions of that sort that I am convinced that the people who maintain that a large proportion of the accidents on the roads are caused by drink base their quite erroneous case. I am afraid I could not support this Amendment, though I believe that perhaps I would go so far as to make a provision to make it an offence to cross the road against the lights.
VISCOUNT CROSS: May I say—
THE EARL OF DUNDEE: Perhaps the noble Viscount, Lord Cross, will have an opportunity of speaking after me. I think it would be convenient if I said a word on this Amendment on behalf of the Government. There is no reason why others of your Lordships should not speak for a long time afterwards, if you wish to do so. I would inform the noble Viscount, Lord Massereene and Ferrard, that it is no objection to this Amendment that it contains the word "himself". I think the noble Viscount should be aware that it is a well-known principle in the drafting of Parliamentary Bills that "man" embraces "woman". This is the second evening my noble friend Lord Teviot has sat up late in the hope of reaching his Amendment, and I think we all agree that in a great many cases accidents are almost entirely or quite the fault of the pedestrian, and that the need of better manners is often just as great among pedestrians as it is among motorists.
The Minister has already certain powers in regard to pedestrians under the Road Traffic and Roads Improvement Act, 1960. He has now the power to impose traffic restrictions on pedestrians on roads within the London Traffic Area, and, as my noble friend Lord Chesham announced on Second Reading, the Minister is proposing to try some experiments with the control of pedestrians in this area; and work is now going on in preparation for these experiments. The Minister also has certain powers, which he has not so far used, to control pedestrians, also in the London area, in the neighbourhood of pedestrian crossings.
LORD LATHAM: Ministers always seem to try it out on the Londoner.
THE EARL OF DUNDEE: That is perfectly true, and particularly true in this case. But I think that all the examples,
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or most of them, which were given by my noble friend Lord Teviot were examples of what happened in the London area. My right honourable friend considered very carefully whether he should take more drastic control over pedestrians generally in other parts of the country in this Bill, but he came to the conclusion that it would be better to experiment in London first and to see whether more control would have the effect of reducing accidents. If so, he will then consider providing for control of pedestrians outside the London Traffic Area. He did not think it right to include in the present Bill general provisions about pedestrians, because he had not yet applied the experiments in London which he is proposing.
My noble friend's Amendment does not, of course, provide for any particular regulations to be enforced. It is merely a general provision that it will be an offence for a pedestrian anywhere to walk in a dangerous manner or otherwise behave in a dangerous manner at or near the roads. I think your Lordships will probably agree that a general law of that kind would be a difficult thing to enforce, and it would impose a heavy burden on the police. And I am not sure that it would have tile support of public opinion. I hope my noble friend will agree that it is a more practical course to proceed by experiments on specific regulations about crossings, and other matters if it is thought suitable, in particular places, and to see how those experiments work out.
LORD TEVIOT: I am very interested in what my noble friend has just told me, and it gives me a hope that something is going to be done. If I may, I would thank my two noble friends who have spolcen for the suggestions that they made. Those points were meant to be covered by the clause, although they were not mentioned; I did not want to make the new clause too long. The main idea is that people should not walk against the light, which I think is called "jaywalking ". With regard to what the noble Viscount, Lord Massereene and Ferrard said, I mentioned the lady with the pram, and I mentioned the girls who laughed when the brakes were crashed on and they just escaped. Of course, as the noble Earl, Lord Dundee, said, the male, to him, involves the lady as well. I shall look with great interest in the

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future and hope (that from what I and other noble Lords have said, something will come in the reduction of the 'appalling casualties. I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 25 [Pedal cycles]:
7.35 p.m.
LORD CHESHAM LORD CHESHAM moved, at the commencement of the clause to insert:
"(1) For subsection (1) of section seventy of the principal Act (which provides for regulating, in certain respects, the equipment of bicycles and tricycles and the use of such equipment) there shall be substituted the following subsection:—
'(1) The Minister may make regulations as to the use on roads of bicycles and tricycles, not being motor vehicles, their construction and equipment and the conditions under which they may be so used; and in particular, but without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing provision, as to—

(a) the number, nature and efficiency of brakes and their maintenance in proper working order;

(b) the appliances to be fitted for signalling approach and their maintenance in proper working order; and

(c)the testing and inspection, by persons authorised under the regulations, of any equipment prescribed under this subsection and of lighting equipment and reflectors.'

(2) At the end of the said section seventy there shall be added the following subsections:—
'(4) Regulations under this section as to the use on roads of bicycles or tricycles may prohibit the sale or supply, or the offer of a sale or supply, of a bicycle or tricycle for delivery in such a condition that /he use thereof on a road in that condition would be a contravention of the regulations, but no provision made by virtue of this, subsection shall affect the validity of any contract or any rights arising under a contract.
(5) If a person sells, supplies or offers to sell or supply a bicycle or a tricycle in contravention of any prohibition imposed by regulations made by virtue of the foregoing subsection he shall be liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding fifty pounds, unless he proves—

(a) that it was sold, supplied or offered for export from Great Britain; or

(b) that he had reasonable cause to believe that it would not be used on a road in Great Britain, or would not be so used until it had been put into a condition in which it might lawfully be so used.'"

The noble Lord said: Of the four Amendments down in my name this one is of the most substance. Section 64 of the Road Traffic Act, 1960, gives the
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Minister power to make regulations as to the construction, equipment and use of motor vehicles. Section 70 of that Act, however, enables him to control by regulation only the number, nature and use of brakes and the audible warning devices to be fitted to pedal cycles. The purpose of this Amendment is to give the Minister the same kind of powers in relation to cycles as he has in relation to motor vehicles and trailers.
There are two points under the heading of intention. The first is to ensure that regulations already made about brakes can be enforced, because evidently there has proved to be some doubt about the vires of the regulations requiring brakes to be efficient and empowering the police to inspect them. That is the first intention. The second is to allow the Minister to make certain general regulations about the maintenance of pedal cycles in a safe condition. It may be said that the poor condition of cycles is not a very serious source of road danger, but police reports for 1958 attribute nearly 1,900 accidents to defects in cycles, which is only a little less than those attributed to defects in motor cars. I think your Lordships would agree it is desirable to make it illegal for pedal cycles in an unsafe condition to be used on the roads.
The regulations that it is in the Minister's mind to make would provide that all cycles used on the road should be maintained in a safe condition, and that any load carried should be carried in a way that no danger is likely to be caused. Perhaps they might also include that the rider shall be in such a position that he can properly control his machine and retain a full view of the road and traffic in front of him. Also, of course, the regulation would authorise persons to inspect cycles to see that the requirements of the regulations had been complied with. My right honourable friend does not have the intention to make detailed specific regulations as to other constructional features of bicycles, except about the maintenance and inspection of brakes, and I think that is a perfectly reasonable thing for him to do.
The new subsection (2) adds to Section 70 of the 1960 Act a power which enables the Minister to prohibit by regulations the sale of cycles which do not comply

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with the regulations made under subsection (1). This again brings cycles into parallel with motor vehicles. But there is a much bigger private market in bicycles, and I do not think it is wholly appropriate to make it an offence under the Act to sell any cycle not complying with the regulations. These powers if taken now, will enable the Minister to take steps to deal with the sale of unroadworthy bicycles if it seems necessary to do so. Under Section 12 (2) of the Road Transport Lighting Act, 1957, it is, of course, an offence to sell a reflector for a bicycle which does not comply with the regulations. But, oddly enough, it is not an offence to sell a bicycle without any lights or reflectors—or, indeed, without any brakes at all. I think that is sufficient justification for my Amendment, and I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 16, line 13 at the beginning insert the said subsections.—(Lord Chesham.)
THE EARL OF NORTHESK: Might I ask the noble Lord whether the rear light of the bicycle is included in what the Minister proposes? To-day a great number of bicycles are constructed with dynamo lighting, an excellent system provided that the bicycle is in motion, but the moment the bicycle ceases to move, all the lighting on it stops. I think I am right in saying that under the 1960 Act, provided that the bicycle is within a reasonable distance of the left-hand side of the road, no offence is committed. I would suggest that often a dangerous position arises where a cyclist wishes to turn to his right on a road which has traffic travelling in both directions. Quite rightly, he signals, pulls to the centre of the road and halts there until approaching traffic has cleared, so that he may cross. At that moment he is completely non-illuminated, either in front or behind. I would suggest that on that occasion he is committing an offence. I wonder whether my noble friend could tell me whether some regulations are envisaged under this Amendment to cope with such a situation.
THE EARL OF LUCAN: I think the answer to the noble Earl is that nearly all dynamo sets have an auxiliary battery which can be switched on. Is that not so?
THE EARL OF NORTHESK: Not in every case.
THE EARL OF LUCAN: The Minister mentioned regulations concerning loads carried on bicycles. I think he mentioned dangerous loads. I do not see that referred to in Section 70 or in the new clause. But if what he says is the case, are regulations going to be made on the subject? Window-cleaners are one of the commonest types of users of bicycles with loads. As we all know, window-cleaners are highly competent cyclists, but the load which is carried might be considered by a police officer to be dangerous if the window-cleaner is carrying a bucket on the handlebars and a ladder over his shoulder. Does the Minister think that there could be any risk of such regulations being applied unreasonably in the case of window-cleaners and, of course, other commercial bicycle users as well?
LORD CHESHAM: May I deal with this matter backwards, coming straight away to the answer to the question of loads—
LORD LATHAM: You will have an accident if you do.
LORD CHESHAM: I trust I shall have nothing of the kind; I expect to sit down again exactly as I am now. The noble Earl, Lord Lucan, has made a perfectly reasonable point here. It is natural that when one is legislating for loads on bicycles the importance or otherwise of the window-cleaner must be something that one is bound to take into consideration. Expert as some are, others are perhaps not quite so expert, and there may be alternative means. But on that type and other types of load the Minister certainly has it in mind to be fairly specific, to avoid the kind of hardship about which the noble Earl is speaking. There are quite a number of other types of load. People have been known to carry half a sack of potatoes on their handlebars. It is reasonably unnecessary that these things should be carried. I will certainly call the attention of my right honourable friend to the noble Earl's point, to try to avoid any unreasonable application of these regulations.
Turning to dynamo lighting sets, I think that the noble Earl, Lord Northesk,

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has a point. Where an auxiliary battery is fitted, it is all right. I have no figures, but I believe that that often is not the case. I do not know how much of a problem to road safety is constituted by halting, in the middle of the road, but it could be quite considerable. I think that this is a point well worth while my mentioning to my right honourable friend when he comes to consider this matter, and I am grateful to the noble Earl for having brought it up.
THE EARL OF LUCAN: May I revert to the question of loads on bicycles? I am sure all noble Lords—most of all, according to their own claims, noble Lords on the other side of the House—would be against imposing any regulations that are not shown to be necessary. We have all seen bicycles with strange loads on them, but is there any evidence that they cause accidents? For the most part, I should say that the bicyclists who carry the heavy loads and habitually carry the tools of their trade on their bicycles are men who are highly competent and do not have accidents. I would ask the noble Lord, before any such regulations are issued, to ask his right honourable friend to find out what are the facts; whether this is a cause of accidents or whether it is merely a question of administrative tidiness—somebody has seen an unreasonable load carried on a bicycle and thinks there ought to be regulations to stop it. I hope that the noble Lord will bear that in mind.
LORD CHESHAM: Yes, I will.
Viscount CROSS: May I say one word about paragraph (1) (c) and the words "and reflectors"? I am not certain whether the Minister is going to be able to make regulations under this paragraph to enforce the fitting of reflector studs in the pedals of bicycles—when I say "reflector studs" I mean what are commonly known as "cat's eyes". Many of your Lordships will have seen these "cat's eyes" in the pedals of bicycles abroad and will know how effective they are. A bicycle fitted with "cat's eyes" in its pedals can be seen—I do not think I exaggerate—at a distance of three or four hundred yards when illuminated by the headlamps of a car. I do not think there is any one
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other single feature that would make a bicycle safer on the roads at night. The cost of these pedals is not much, and I greatly hope that perhaps two years from now it will be the law of the land that all bicycles must be fitted with these pedals. I think the noble Lord, Lord Chesham, said he was not making any regulations other than those concerning brakes. I hope he will change his mind on this subject.
LORD CHESHAM: Of course, I am interested to hear Lord Cross's contribution on this matter, and I had certainly previously heard that this type of reflector fitted on the pedal was a most effective measure. I understand that there are occasional objections, and of course this reflector is not called for at present as a reflector which the law prescribes. That, too, is a matter of which I might at the present stage take note. I do not think I can undertake to do more than that just at the moment.
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Clause 25, as amended, agreed to.
Clause 26 agreed to.
7.50 p.m.
LORD CONESFORD LORD CONESFORD moved, after Clause 26 to insert the following new clause:
Amendments of Section 86 of principal Act
". Section eighty-six of the principal Act shall have effect subject to the Amendments specified in relation thereto in the Fourth Schedule to this Act."
The noble Lord said: On behalf of my noble friend Lord Derwent, who is unable to be here, I beg to move the Amendment standing in his name. It should be considered together with Amendment No. 77.
The purpose of these Amendments is to give to the authorities, in prescribing the charges to be made for parking on highways, more flexibility than is provided by Section 86 of the principal Act. That section provides that where there are parking meters there are two possible charges, and two only: the initial standard payment for the standard period and half that amount for half that period. My noble friend is of the opinion that in certain areas more use could be made of parking meters, for

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the general good, if the authorities had rather more flexibility in prescribing possible charges and periods. He thinks, for instance, that greater flexibility is needed in many seaside resorts. I believe that my noble friend has discussed the matter with my noble friend the Parliamentary Secretary and others at his Ministry. The sole object is not to affect any existing scheme of parking meters, but to give the authorities greater flexibility in future, should such flexibility be needed.
Amendment moved—
After Clause 26 insert the said new clause.—(Lord Conesford.)
LORD WALERAN: I should like very much to support the Amendment moved by my noble friend. I have recently had the privilege of visiting all the States in Australia and meeting a number of Ministers of Transport, traffic engineers and commissioners of police. Throughout the States in the big cities you find the system of the flexibility of the time of the parking meter. It is a most useful thing. So far as I see, this clause will do no harm; and all that is being suggested at the moment is that the power to be able to do it should be put into the Bill in case it is desired later on to use it. I wholeheartedly support the Amendment moved by my noble friend.
LORD CHESHAM: I think that my noble and learned friend Lord Conesford definitely has a case here, and I think he has made it. I am glad to hear the support of my noble friend Lord Waleran. Now that we have more experience of the working of the parking-meter schemes, and now that they are becoming more generally acceptable to the public and to motorists, I think there is quite a bit to be said for giving the Minister greater freedom to prescribe different periods and charges in the designation orders that he makes. I think it is quite right to say that there is very real evidence that the demands for parking space in different parts of the country will be of a widely varying sort; and local requirements are likely to vary, I think, even more considerably outside London than they are in it.
It seems very reasonable that this extra flexibility should be introduced, and I should be quite happy to accept
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these few Amendments in principle. I am going to ask my noble and learned friend to withdraw them to-day on the ground solely of drafting. I must record for the noble Lord, Lord Derwent, that I think he has made a most praiseworthy effort of drafting in what is, under the Road Traffic Act a very complicated set of provisions. I compliment him on the effort he has made, but I think we ought to look at that again. If my noble friend will withdraw the Amendment I will undertake to do that and to put an Amendment down at the next stage.
THE EARL OF LUCAN: I certainly should not wish to oppose this, but I wonder whether the Minister could elucidate a little more. Is it the contention that this lack of flexibility is leading to insufficient use of the parking space available in cities, or is it leading to excessive revenue accruing to the local authorities who run the parking meters? How is it supposed to work?
LORD CONESFORD: My noble friend will know better, but I believe that my noble friend Lord Derwent thinks that the principal need for flexibility exists because it would enable parking meters to be tried in certain areas where they have not yet been tried at all, simply because the limitations and the charges that can be made would make them unattractive for the use of the places concerned. I think that that is 'the main point, but my noble friend the Minister can probably amplify what I have said.
LORD CHESHAM: I should like to elucidate a little, because the real reason is, in fact, none of those at which the noble Earl has had a guess. The root of the matter is that in any particular parking area only one specific period of time can be prescribed under the Act—the standard time. It is normally two hours in 'London, but it can be another period. The only flexibility within that is that you are allowed to sell half the time for half the fee. You prescribe a period and a fee which are standard, and you may sell halves. You may not, in the same parking area, prescribe a standard time which is different. There can 'be only one, and it is proving in various areas that two hours, or four hours or five hours, is not necessarily the proper time to meet the local demand.

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The case of a seaside town has been mentioned. In the shopping area of a town they will probably want a shorter period, but in some cases they will want a longer period. On the sea front they will want longer, but there ought to be provision for shorter periods as well. It can be done only by having different standard times in different car parks—so that you have one with five hours, say, at one end of the town, and another for two hours at the other end. The need is to give greater flexibility within parking areas, which I think will be for the benefit of the country as a whole.
LORD CONESFORD: I thank my noble friend for the reply he has given, and beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
LORD FRASER OF LONSDALE LORD FRASER OF LONSDALE moved, after Clause 26 to insert the following new clause:
Vehicles left on footways
". Any person leaving a vehicle on a public footway in such a position that it may cause danger to the users of the said footway shall be liable on conviction to a fine not exceeding £5."
The noble Lord said: I hesitate to introduce what I think must be new law, because it involves the police in more anxiety and responsibility, and it involves the motorist in some trouble and care. I want to make it quite clear that I am not opposed to the motorist in any way—I am a very considerable motorist myself—but I think it is necessary to deal with this matter. That is my first point. More and more motorists are parking their motor cars half on the pavement—sometimes wholly on the pavement—either sideways, with two wheels on the pavement or with the boot and back of the car, sometimes a very extensive back, sticking out on to the pavement. My first submission is that this is unnecessary; my second is that it is unfair.
We are more and more making it difficult for people to walk on the roads which, as has been rightly pointed out, are the Queen's highway and may be said traditionally to belong to all, not least the pedestrians. We are more and more making it difficult for them—and I think rightly so. But it seems to me fair enough to say that the road shall
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be more and more for the motorist and the pavement more and more for the walker. Indeed, I think the pavement should be wholly for the walker. But if we must include any wheeled carriage, let us include the pram.
My only two other sentences are that I think people sometimes park their motor bicycles, their bicycles or their mopeds against a shop window, and the shopkeeper comes out and shoos them away. That is all well and good, but I do not think he has any right to shoo them away. When somebody parks a car on the pavement, a policeman comes and says, "You should not do that, Sir", but I do not think he has any right to say that. So I ask, because it is timely and because it is necessary, that this clause should receive your Lordships' sympathy.
I shall be very surprised if the noble Earl who answers me does not say that the wording of my Amendment is inadequate. I am quite sure it is: it is the wording of an amateur. I suspect that the word "vehicle" may not cover all the creatures that may be used on roads which I have in mind to cover, such as bicycles, mopeds, motor bicycles and so on. So it may be that "vehicles" should be altered. It may be also that "danger" should be altered, and that "obstruction" might be a better word. It might be hard to prove in court that the presence of a vehicle across a pavement was a danger until danger had actually occurred. So perhaps "obstruction" is the right word there. Perhaps, also, my fine is not harsh enough; I do not know. But it seems to me clear that the words mean what I want to say, and I am sure that most reasonable men, including your Lordships, will understand what I mean to say. I therefore ask that this Amendment be given consideration, and I shall be very happy to withdraw it if the noble Earl says that he will do that between now and the next stage.
I have one last word. I have had quite a number of letters from blind persons who tell me that it is peculiarly disadvantageous to them, when they walk to work, to meet motor cars and motor vehicles on the pavement. They at least feel that the footpath is for them to walk on. It may surprise your Lordships to know that, having made some inquiries, I find that there are no fewer than 13,000

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blind persons known to the major societies who are employed in this country and who do walk part of the way to work. I do not think that it is a good thing to pass special laws for the blind: they themselves would rather wish to be treated as ordinary persons. But if, by passing a little clause that is justified on its merits, we can help blind people, then perhaps we ourselves may be pleased. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
After Clause 26, insert the said new clause.—(Lord Fraser of Lonsdale.)
THE EARL OF LUCAN: I should like to welcome this Amendment, and to support it most heartily. The present tendency seems to be to park cars at right-angles to the roadway, with the rear end projecting over the pavement. Sometimes three feet of the pavement is obstructed; and it is not only the blind people to whom it is a hazard, but sighted people as well. Certainly in poor light, and with the tendency of motor car design to go into great fins, standing about four feet from the ground, this practice is positively dangerous and not merely an obstruction. As to whether there is a drafting flaw in saying, leaving a vehicle on a public footway "when in fact the vehicle's wheels are in the roadway but the car projects over the footway, I would say that that is a matter for the draftsman, and is something which I should not like to go into now. But I believe that it is a menace to life in cities nowadays, and it would be a good thing if it could be stopped.
THE EARL OF DUNDEE: This is a matter, I think, for the police rather than for Parliament, because our legislation already makes it an offence to park on the pavement, or to leave a vehicle on a road (which legally includes the footway, so that there is no difficulty about the definition there) in such a position as to cause danger to other road-users. It is an offence in three separate ways. First of all, there is the 1960 Act, Section 16. My noble friend Lord Fraser of Lonsdale need not have apologised for the wording of his Amendment, because it very closely follows the wording of this Section 16, though no doubt by accident. The section provides that it is an offence to
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leave a vehicle on a road—and I would repeat that "road" includes a footway—in such a position as to be likely to cause danger to other persons using the road. The maximum penalty here under the 1960 Act is a fine of £20, which is being raised under the present Bill to a maximum of £50.
Then there is Regulation 89 of the Construction and Use Regulations, which again makes it possible for the police to deal with obstructions by vehicles on the carriageway; and there is no reason at all why this provision should not also be used to deal with parking on the pavement, particularly if the vehicle is projecting over the carriageway. I do not think the police make much use of either of these two provisions—mainly, no doubt, because they are generally in the habit of proceeding under another Statute, which is not one of those affected by this Bill. That is the Highways Act, 1835, which makes it an offence to drive any carriage of any kind, or any cart, on a footpath. I understand that, at least in the metropolitan area, it is always the practice of the police to take action under this Act. We should prefer that they would sometimes take action under the other provisions which I have mentioned, because the penalties are higher. In the case of this 1835 Act the penalty is only 40s. But that is not a matter in which either the Home Secretary or other Ministers have any authority to give directions. The question whether proceedings should be taken in any particular case is always one for the discretion of the chief officer of the police.
The real question here is one of enforcement, and it would not help the situation to enact a new clause in this Bill when the existing law, if it is used, is already so fully adequate to meet the case. However, I am grateful to my noble friend for having drawn attention to the position, and for having ventilated it this evening.
LORD FRASER OF LONSDALE: I am grateful to the noble Earl for having explained the matter to me so fully and so clearly. I hope that the few words we have said to-night may become known, and may cause the police to clear motor cars off the pavements when they see them. I may say that last night in Regent's Park I counted eight cars which

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were on the pavement. I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clauses 27 to 31 agreed to.
First Schedule: Part I [Offences involving obligatory disqualification]:
8.9 p.m.
LORD TEYNHAM LORD TEYNHAM moved, in Part I, to leave out paragraph 7. The noble Lord said: I would venture to draw your Lordships' attention to the fact that the offence of driving a motor vehicle uninsured is included in the list of offences involving obligatory disqualification. Now by the Road Traffic Act, 1956, compulsory disqualification for this offence was removed because it was then realised that there were many insurance offences of a technical nature in regard to which such a penalty was considered far too harsh. In fact, hardship to other road-users injured in such circumstances has been prevented to a large extent by the Motor Insurers' Bureau's scheme, which enables them to obtain compensation. The deliberate intention to drive a motor vehicle while uninsured against third party risk is a very serious offence indeed. On the other hand, I suggest that it is essential to allow a discretion to the magistrates concerning the penalty to be imposed in the case of convictions where there is no deliberate intent to commit an offence, and I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 18 line 41, leave out paragraph 7.—(Lord Teynham.)
LORD CONESFORD: I rise only to point out for the record what is already known to noble Lords in this Committee, and that is that this Amendment has the support of my noble and learned friend, Lord Goddard, who regretted that he could not stay later this evening. My noble and learned friend is of the opinion, as a result of his experience, that the offence described in paragraph 7 would be better in the second Part of the Schedule than in the first.
8.12 p.m.
THE EARL OF DUNDEE: This Amendment is associated, I think, with another Amendment later on which re-enacts the provision in Part II of the Schedule, and the question at issue, therefore, is whether the disqualification should be
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compulsory, except for special reasons, under Part I of the Schedule, or whether it should be left to the judgment of the magistrate under Part 11 of the Schedule. My noble friend Lord Teynham mentioned that between 1930 and 1956 disqualification for this offence was compulsory, and that it was placed at the discretion of the magistrates by the 1956 Act because it was thought that compulsory disqualification might be apt to cause hardship. My noble friend did not mention that between 1955 and 1959, In the years since it ceased to involve compulsory disqualification, the number of offences of driving without proper insurance more than doubled. In 1955, there were 22,857 convictions for this offence, of which over 19.000 were disqualified.
LORD TEYNHAM: If I might interrupt my noble friend for a moment, could he say how many of those offences were the evasion of third party insurance?
THE EARL OF DUNDEE: No; I am giving the total figures. There were 22,857 offences, of which 19,000 were disqualified. The remainder were exempted from disqualification by the discretion which the court exercised, and could still exercise under Part I of the Schedule if there were special reasons. By 1959, the number of offences resulting in conviction had risen to 47,930, more than double the 1956 figure. Even if you take into consideration the rise in the number of motor vehicles on the roads, the proportion works out at just under double. The percentage of disqualifications to convictions dropped a great deal, from 80 per cent. to 37 per cent.; but whether that was because a great many of the offences were technical, or whether a great deal of leniency had been exercised, is a question which could not answer at this moment.
My noble friend has mentioned the Motor Insurers' Bureau, which I think, as a whole with some success, tries to arrange that people who are injured in an accident, even although the driver is not properly insured and cannot sometimes be found, receive compensation by arrangement between insurance companies. I do not think that that is a good reason for exempting drivers from making sure that they are properly insured against third party risk. The

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law—if I might just look forward for a moment to my noble friend's other Amendment about knowing whether you were insured or not—presumes, I think I am right in saying, that you know what your insurance policy contains. If you have taken reasonable care to ascertain it, and have taken reasonable advice, but in spite of that you still do not know—for instance, if you have been deliberately misled—then you have a good defence. But if you do not know because you have not taken the proper trouble to ascertain what your policy is about, then the law presumes you do know.
My noble friend Lord Conesford has mentioned that the noble Lord, Lord Goddard, would have liked to speak in favour of this Amendment, and I should very much have liked to hear what he had to say about it. This is not the sort of thing one ought to decide in a hurry. I do not think I could accept the Amendment without a good deal more information and argument from those of your Lordships who have great experience in the matter. I would put it to my noble friend that the special conditions which apply to Part I ought to relieve the court from the necessity of imposing disqualification in cases where they think it is unduly hard or unfair that that should be done.
LORD TEYNHAM: I am grateful to the noble Earl for his views. I understand it would be fairer to look at the matter again, and I think it would be most useful to the House if we were to hear what the noble Lord, Lord Goddard, had to say on this point. In view of that, I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
First Schedule: Part II [Offences involving discretionary disqualification]:
LORD CONESFORD LORD CONESFORD moved, after paragraph 8, to insert:

("—An offence under section 35 of the Offences against the Person Act, 1861 (injuring persons by wanton or furious driving), committed by a person having charge of a motor vehicle.

—")

The noble Lord said We now come to a series of Amendments designed to restore to the courts the power to dis-
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qualify which they possess at this moment but which, under the Bill as it now stands, has been taken away from them. I dealt with this matter on Second Reading, as did many other noble Lords in all parts of the House; and I also dealt with it in an Amendment to Clause 3 of this Bill. But my noble and learned friend the Leader of the House, in resisting the Amendment which I then moved, said, quite rightly, that the right way of doing this was by Amendments sot down to the Schedule; and it is the first of these Amendments which I now move.
This Amendment, No. 68A, restores the right to disqualify for an offence under Section 35 of the Offences Against the Person Act, 1861 (injuring persons by wanton or furious driving), committed by a person having charge of a motor vehicle. At present that offence is the third offence in the list, contained in the Eleventh Schedule to the 1960 Act, of offences for which the court can disqualify, only manslaughter and causing death by reckless or dangerous driving having precedence. I know of no good reason for the omission of this very serious offence from the list of offences for which the courts can disqualify.
From the intervention of my noble and learned friend the Lord Chancellor in the debate on Second Reading, I can well understand that the prosecution of a driver of a motor vehicle for this offence might be very rare indeed, because there are generally sections of the Road Traffic Acts under which he can be more appropriately prosecuted and disqualified. But there is still the possibility that there may be a prosecution and conviction under the Act of 1861, and nobody, in any quarter of the House, would dispute that if there is such a prosecution and conviction the person concerned deserves to be disqualified. Nor would it be true to say that a prosecution under this Act will never, in any circumstances, be necessary. Most of the other offences of dangerous driving are offences that can be committed on a road. This present offence is not limited to a public highway at all. It may be, indeed, an unusual thing for such an offence as is described in the 1861 Act to be committed on private property, but there is a possibility.
To sum up, whilst a prosecution under this Act would be very rare indeed, the fact remains that such a prosecution is possible; and if such a prosecution takes place, and the person accused is convicted, he undoubtedly ought to be disqualified. The final point is that no harm of any sort will be done if this Amendment is accepted. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 19, line 14, at end insert the said paragraph.—(Lord Conesford.)
THE EARL OF DUNDEE: My noble friend has waited very patiently to reach the series of Amendments at which, to our great delight, we have now arrived. This one, about the Offences Against the Person Act, 1861, I have naturally looked at very carefully, because my noble friend raised it on Second Reading and, as he remembers, my noble and learned friend the Lord Chancellor made an interruption from the Woolsack during my noble friend's speech. When I replied, I said—and this is a matter which I always approach with some diffidence, because I have not any legal training and this is largely a legal question [OFFICIAL. REPORT, Vol. 230 (No. 65), col. 513]:
"I do not think I need go into that any further except to say, with respect, that, not having any legal training, I find it very difficult to see how anybody could drive wantonly and furiously without also driving either dangerously or carelessly, in which case he would be disqualified under the Act in any case."
I have taken the best legal advice that I could since Second Reading and I am told that this is true. It would be inconceivable that anybody could drive wantonly and furiously on the road without rendering himself liable for an offence under both previous legislation and this Bill, which would involve disqualification.
LORD LATHAM: Would the noble Earl say whether that would apply off the roadway?
THE EARL OF DUNDEE: I am coming to that in a moment. I have done my best to find an example of any prosecution which has taken place during our lifetime under Section 35 of the Offences Against the Person Act, 1861. I have been able to discover only one, and that was not against a man who was in charge of a motor vehicle. He was a tram driver in Glasgow who drove his tram
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wantonly and furiously towards a person in front of him. He could not be deprived of his driving licence, because he did not have a driving licence. I have not been able to discover any case of a man who had a driving licence and who committed an offence of this kind on the road.
I think that this provision was passed mainly with the intention of punishing people who drove dangerously with horses. If a man did that to-day, we could not prevent him from driving his horses dangerously again by taking away his car licence. I would say that the same applies to the possibility which the noble Lord has just raised about driving wantonly and furiously on private property off the road. Of course, that is a bad and wicked thing to do, and anybody who did that could be punished in all sorts of ways, and possibly under this Act; but by depriving him of his driving licence we should in no way prevent him from doing the same thing again, because a person does not need to have a driving licence in order to drive a vehicle on private property or in a field or, indeed, anywhere except on the public road. So that the effect of depriving a man of his driving licence for driving wantonly and furiously off a public road would in no way prevent him from committing exactly the same offence again next day, because he does not need a driving licence to do it.
The only thing which does puzzle me, and which no doubt provided my noble friend with his reason for moving this Amendment, is why the Offences against the Subject Act, 1861, was ever included in the 1956 Road Traffic Act. It was not included in previous Acts. For some reason best known to themselves, those who drafted the 1956 Act chose, for the first time, to insert this offence under the 1861 Act as one of those for which a motorist could have his licence removed. Before that, it was not an offence for which a motorist could have his licence removed, and why it should be put into the 1956 Act I have failed to ascertain. I suggest to your Lordships that not only would it perhaps be unnecessary but it might also tend to bring our legislation into some ridicule if we were to retain it now.
LORD CONESFORD: In moving this Amendment, I said that, of course,

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a prosecution for an offence under this Act would be extremely rare, but it was not impossible, and if such an offence did take place it was conclusive proof, so far as I could see, that a man should be deprived of his driving licence. My noble friend, for whose perspicacity and intelligence I have the highest regard, says that to commit this offence on private property a motorist does not need a driving licence. Of course, he does not; I never said that he did. But the fact remains that if a man were so minded to drive recklessly, it might be a real deterrent to him if he could be deprived of his licence, which alone makes it possible for him legally to drive a motor car on the road. I think that this is a good reason for retaining this power to disqualify that exists at the present moment. Nevertheless, I do not say that this Amendment compares in importance with some of the others which we are about to consider, and, since I do not wish to weary the Committee on the less important Amendments, I do not press this Amendment and I beg leave to withdraw it.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
8.32 p.m.
LORD CONESFORD: This Amendment restores to the list of offences for which the court can disqualify an offence under Section 8 (2) of the principal Act (carrying a passenger on a motor cycle in contravention of the section). The section prohibits the carrying of more than one person, in addition to the driver, on a two-wheeled motor cycle, and provides that the passenger must sit astride the motor cycle on a proper seat securely fixed behind the driver's seat. I apprehend that the reason for Section 8 is that the Government believe this section to be necessary for road safety; they believe that a contravention of these provisions in regard to a motor cycle would increase the danger on the roads. The Government propose to increase the monetary penalty. The monetary penalty is something about which the reckless motor cyclist may not care at all. What he may be very much concerned about is whether or not he will be prohibited from driving altogether through the loss of his licence. If this is of importance for road safety, on what possible grounds is the most effective of all deterrents removed? I wish to
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know from Her Majesty's Government whether they now consider this offence less important than they used to think. If they do, I wonder why they have increased the monetary penalty. If, on the other hand, they still think it important, I cannot imagine why they suppose that the young man should not be deterred from committing this offence by running the risk of disqualification. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 19, line 34, at end insert—

("—An offence under section 8 (2) of the principal Act (carrying passenger on motor cycle in contravention of the section).

For the words "to a fine", in the first place where they occur, to the end of the subsection, there shall be substituted the words "to a fine not exceeding twenty pounds.")

—(Lord Conesford.

LORD CHESHAM: I have been listening with interest to my noble friend's reasons for advancing this Amendment, and I have also been thinking about this particular Amendment and what is involved in this offence. In pillion-riding there are only three things that can be done wrong: one is that you have not the proper kind of seat securely fixed, in which case there is obviously an element of danger; another is that you do not ride astride; and the other is that you have three people on the machine. If any of your Lordships have, as I once did, ridden three on a machine, you will know that it is a very dangerous thing to do; and fortunately it is rare. So far as riding on the pillion astride is concerned, I know that they do it differently in Italy. I do not know whether my noble friend holds any brief for them, or whether there are different shapes, but to me it looks highly dangerous. I think that is borne out by the fact that the motor-cycle world has accepted this state of affairs for many years, and the number of offences committed under this section is not large. I think that there is a case for including this Amendment, and, on balance, I feel inclined to accept it.
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
LORD CONESFORD: This Amendment seeks to add to the list of offences for which the courts can disqualify an

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offence under Section 66 (1) of the principal Act (contravention of requirement as to test certificate). This section of the principal Act provides for obligatory test certificates for certain old motor vehicles. If a test certificate is not issued, it is unlawful for a person to use the vehicle on the road. If he does, then under the present law he can be disqualified; and I think that is right. On this matter the Government's present proposal is, frankly, extraordinary. They increase the monetary fine for a first offence from £20 to £50; but for subsequent offences they greatly diminish the existing penalty by abolishing both three months' imprisonment and disqualification. Either it is necessary to have these tests of old vehicles, and to provide that until the vehicle concerned has passed the test it is unlawful to drive it on the road, or it is unnecessary. If it is necessary, I cannot see why, in the interests of road safety, the most real of all the penalties and deterrents against the evasion of the law should be abolished. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 21, line 41, at end insert—

("—An offence] under section 66 (1) of the principal Act (contravention of requirement as to test certificate).

For the words from "to a fine", in the first place where they occur, to the end of the subsection there shall be substituted the words "to a fine not exceeding fifty pounds.")

—(Lord Conesford.)

LORD CHESHAM: I am sorry that I cannot quite so readily accept my noble friend's arguments in this case as I was able to do on the last Amendment. When I have explained why, I think he will understand a little more about our view of the penalties to which he has called attention, taken in conjunction with our attempt to rationalise the penalties for this offence, about which I think he already knows, having regard to modern conditions and the relative gravity of the various offences. This I look on as much more of a technical offence. It is one that can be serious, perhaps, but will not necessarily involve danger. The point is that if there is an infringement, and danger is involved, it will be possible to bring a prosecution for contravention of the appropriate Construction and Use Regulations under Section 64, a
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section which is already included in Part II of the First Schedule. We thought, therefore, that this offence was not an appropriate one to bring into this Schedule and would not require a provision for disqualification or count towards the obligatory cumulative disqualification under Clause 3. Therefore, we thought it right to put it in Part III, and I hope that, on what I have said, my noble friend will leave it there.
8.39 p.m.
LORD MOLSON: I am not wholly happy about the reply the Parliamentary Secretary has given. If I may venture to say so, I went through the whole of this question of the testing of vehicles. In the 1956 Act, at one time the Government decided to drop the requirement of compulsory testing of old vehicles. The arguments that were advanced by the Opposition, showing how serious is the result of unsuitable and unserviceable old vehicles—perhaps I should not say old vehicles, but unserviceable vehicles, many of which are old—and the figures which were given by the Opposition were such that the Government really had to look at the matter again. It is for that reason that, despite the difficulty and the cost of these compulsory tests of vehicles, they have been introduced. It has taken a long time before it has been possible to devise the necessary machinery for these tests to be carried out.
It is perfectly true, as my noble friend the Parliamentary Secretary has said, that in some ceases it may not involve any direct danger upon the roads; but in point of fact, as he knows, the regulations which were made under the Act of 1956 applied only to the most serious defects in vehicles more than 10 years old. That was done for purely practical reasons, and it applied, generally, to brakes, lighting and points of that kind, things which have a direct bearing on road safety. And in the vast majority of cases, where a pet-son knowingly and wantonly drives upon the roads a vehicle which has not satisfied the requirements laid down by the Minister he is quite deliberately doing something which involves great danger.
I do not ask my noble friend the Parliamentary Secretary necessarily to accept this Amendment in its present form, but I think that if he looks at it again, and considers how very modest are the

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requirements at the present time under his right honourable friend's regulations, he will agree that anyone who wantonly and deliberately drives upon the roads a vehicle which has not been subjected to those tests—and it might well be knowingly driven after it has failed to satisfy the tests—is committing a serious offence. I think that this Bill ought to be amended, in order to provide that in such a case there should be a discretionary power of disqualification. I do ask my right honourable friend to undertake to look at this matter again between now and the Report stage.
8.43 p.m.
THE LORD PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL AND MINISTER FOR SCIENCE (VISCOUNT HAILSHAM): May I say something to my noble friend about this Amendment, because I think perhaps there are rather more general considerations involved in this than meet the eye at first sight? I think he has really to consider whether what he is doing is ultimately, and as a whole, going to improve road safety. I have been very anxious throughout, and I am quite certain in my own mind that the one constructive thing we can do to increase road safety is to impose in some form or another a kind of automatic disqualification, which we have been urging, and which the House passed after a Division.
I may be wrong about this, but I should like to record my opinion that if we are going to get public opinion with us on that—and to my mind it is the only thing worth doing if we are going to make a sizeable contribution to solving this problem—we must try to keep out of this Part of the Schedule offences which it might be argued ought not to be there. I quite agree that the noble Lord has made a very sensible case about this, and of course I shall report what has been said to my right honourable friend. But my own judgment in the matter—and I should like him to consider it—is that we shall not add to road safety by inserting a great number of new offences, or re-inserting a lot of old offences, into Part II of the First Schedule. Because although, in theory, disqualification may be imposed, in fact it is not imposed by magistrates in these cases. It is unreal to suppose that that is what happens in magistrates' courts, or that it will happen in cases of this kind. All
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that he will achieve, if Part II of the Schedule is overburdened, is to make the provision regarding automatic disqualification so unpopular that it will be unworkable, or possibly unpassable through Parliament. I think it will do a great deal of harm if it is done.
Having said that, I will of course see that what has been said is reported to my right honourable friend, who is anxious, as we all are, not to let people who take deliberate risks escape without disqualification in suitable cases, but I would like to tell you what my own judgment is about this, because I think it may affect quite a number of cases of this class.
LORD CONESFORD: I should like only to say a few words. I am going to ask leave to withdraw the present Amendment, but in view of what my noble and learned friend the Leader of the House has just said, I want to make one thing as clear as I can. I quite agree that the re-drafting of subsection (3) of Clause 3 is a difficult and complicated matter, deserving much thought and the greatest skill from those who are devoting their minds to it, but I want to make it absolutely clear that, in my view, the consideration as to what that subsection ought to be must not lead us to omit from Part II of the First Schedule anything that ought to be there on its own merits. For the reasons given in the first speech opposing my present Amendment, and the possibility of there being other remedies open to the authorities in prosecuting, I ask leave to withdraw this Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
8.45 p.m.
LORD CONESFORD: This Amendment would restore to the courts the power to disqualify for an offence under Section 97 of the principal Act: that is, driving, or causing or permitting a person to drive, a motor vehicle in contravention of the provisions of the Act relating to the minimum age for driving motor vehicles of different classes and descriptions. Your Lordships will be familiar with the fact that you can drive a motor cycle at the age of 16, a motor car at the age of 17, and a heavy locomotive at the age of 21. These minimum ages are, presumably, prescribed because they are thought to contribute to road safety; if so, I should have thought that

203 in the event of those provisions being disregarded there ought to be a power to disqualify. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 21, line 49, at end insert—

"(—An offence under section 97 of the principal Act (driving, or causing or permitting a person to drive, a motor vehicle in contravention of the provisions of the Act relating to the minimum age for driving motor vehicles of different classes and descriptions).

—")

(Lord Conesford.)

THE EARL OF DUNDEE: We originally took the view that offences in respect of this section might be of a technical nature, not necessarily involving danger, and that it would be inappropriate that such offences should be disqualifiable and hence count for the purpose of obligatory cumulative disqualification under Clause 3 of the Bill. As your Lordships know, one of our anxieties about this Bill is that if you put too many offences in Part II, which can be totted up, you may reduce its acceptability to the courts and to the public. But there is, of course, no obligation under Part II to impose disqualification, and in view of the considerable support on Second Reading that disqualification should be available for offences of this type, we have decided to accept my noble friend's Amendment. As I have explained to him, we shall have to ask him to withdraw it and to introduce a new one, or the Government will introduce another one on Report, which I have actually got typed out. Unfortunately, I was unable to bring it to my noble friend's notice until just too late for him to familiarise himself sufficiently with it to move it now, and I think it will be more satisfactory if he withdraws this Amendment and we will produce the Amendment, which I have shown him, at the Report stage of the Bill.
LORD CONESFORD: I am most grateful to my noble friend for showing me his draft Amendment just now, but I think noble Lords in all quarters prefer to have before them the matter under discussion. Therefore, I think the most convenient course will be for me to ask
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leave to withdraw my present Amendment, and to ask my noble friend whether he will be good enough to move the Amendment in the form of his draft as a Government Amendment on Report. I understand that is his intention, and in those circumstances I ask leave to withdraw my Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
LORD CONESFORD LORD CONESFORD moved to insert in Part II, after paragraph 22

("—An offence under section 98 (3) of the principal Act (driving or employing a person to drive without licence).

For the words from "to a fine", in the first place where they occur, to the end of the subsection there shall be substituted the words "to a fine not exceeding fifty pounds.")

The noble Lord said: This restores to the courts the power which they at present possess to disqualify for an offence under Section 98 (3) of the principal Act: driving or employing a person to drive without a licence. In this case, the Government propose to increase the penalty for a first offence but to abolish imprisonment for subsequent offences and to abolish disqualification altogether. I am doubtful of the wisdom of taking away this power from the courts. In an earlier debate my noble and learned friend the Leader of the House treated the offence of not having a licence as simply an offence against the Revenue. I am advised by magistrates and judges who have great experience of this branch of the law that it is a great deal more than that. After all, the present Bill has new provisions about the endorsements that have to be made on licences, which are very useful for the enforcement of the law. It seems very odd if we do not provide for the motorist who causes great difficulties to the authorities by saying, "Rather than have a licence with a lot of endorsements, it is much more convenient not to have a licence at all". In some of these offences legal difficulties may arise if the courts have no power to disqualify for the offence I have described. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 21, line 49, at end insert the said paragraph.—(Lord Conesford.)
LORD HAWKE: Does not a rather strange possible consequence arise if we make this one of the list of offences

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for which a cumulative three offences constitutes compulsory withdrawal of the licence? It includes not necessarily only the person who drives a vehicle on the road without a licence, but the man who employs him. One can well imagine a state of affairs in which a manager of a big undertaking, who is presumably the employer, may find that, through carelessness or otherwise of his drivers, no fewer than three of them may have allowed their licences to lapse. They then drive their vehicles on the road and get caught, and the three offences count up to disqualify the manager of the undertaking himself from driving. That seems to be a very queer result, and follows from this extraordinary clause which my noble Leader has undertaken to reconsider and redraft—this compulsory disqualification for a third offence of a mixed bag of trivialities and gravities. For that reason, I wonder whether we are right in inserting my noble friend's Amendment without sonic sort of qualification on this particular point.
THE EARL OF DUNDEE: Without wishing to anticipate anything my noble friend wants to say, perhaps he would allow me on1 this Amendment to make some reference to his next Amendment about provisional licences, which I am proposing to accept. As for this Amendment, we could not agree that all offences under Section 98 (3) should be included in Part II and should be capable of being totted up so as to impose compulsory removal of a licence if the offence is committed three times. A good many offences under Section 98 are likely to be purely technical. A driver might forget to renew a driving licence and pay his 15s. for a day or two, and although that is careless of him it would hardly be right that this should count as one of the offences which could be added up and result in a compulsory removal of the licence. I think there is great force in what my noble friend Lord Hawke has said about the employer. Although the employer is, of course, usually responsible for seeing that his employees have driving licences, it may be difficult for him to check occasional carelessness on the part of his subordinates. While he may be liable for any fine which would result, it would be a little inappropriate that the employer himself should be
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deprived of his driving licence on account of three offences in two years on the part of his servants. Therefore, I cannot accept this Amendment.
This is where is impinges upon the next Amendment, to which I have already referred. The point has been made by a number of people that it often happens that a person who is entitled to drive only on a provisional licence fails to apply for such a licence. If he is caught driving without supervision or "L"-plates he has committed the offence only of driving without a licence, and cannot be charged with the offence of contravening the conditions laid down for holders of provisional licences, which is dealt with in the next Amendment of my noble friend.
What I should be willing to do would be to put down at a later stage an Amendment which would provide that disqualification could be ordered for the offence of driving without a licence in those cases only where the person involved would have been entitled to apply for a provisional licence—that is to say, where he has not, in fact, passed the appropriate driving test. I think it is appropriate that I should mention that, without anticipating anything my noble friend may wish to say on the next Amendment, although I am afraid I cannot accept this one.
LORD CONESFORD: I am again grateful to my noble friend. On his undertaking to introduce on the Report stage the Amendment he has just described, which does most of what I had in mind, I ask leave to withdraw my present Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
LORD CONESFORD: My noble friend's indication, in dealing with the last Amendment, that he was going to accept this one, makes it possible for me to deal with it very briefly. This Amendment restores to the court the power of disqualification for an offence under Section 102 (3) of the principal Act (failure to comply with the conditions of a provisional licence). Those noble Lords who were present in the debate on Second Reading know the great importance attached to this by the noble Baroness, Lady Wootton of Abinger, who said that this was an offence for which it was her invariable

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practice, as a magistrate, to disqualify. I am also authorised to say that the restoration of the power to disqualify in this case has the strong support of my noble and learned friend Lord Goddard. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 21, line 49, at end insert—

("—An offence under section 102 (3) of the principal Act (failure to comply with conditions of provisional licence).

For the words "to a fine", in the first place where they occur, to "or to imprisonment" there shall be substituted the words "to a fine not exceeding fifty pounds or to imprisonment.")

(Lord Conesford.)

THE EARL OF DUNDEE: This was another matter which we omitted from Part II, partly because we were anxious not to overcrowd that Part with offences which might have the cumulative effect of imposing compulsory disqualification. But after considering the arguments put forward by many noble Lords on Second Reading, we have decided that we can accept my noble friend's Amendment, as I have already indicated.
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
LORD CONESFORD: The purpose of this Amendment is to restore to the court the power to disqualify for an offence under Section 192 (2) of the principal Act, which is driving a heavy goods vehicle, or employing a person to drive a heavy goods vehicle, on a road in contravention of the section. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 21, line 49, at end insert—

("—An offence under section 192 (2) of the principal Act (driving a heavy goods vehicle, or employing a person to drive a heavy goods vehicle, on a road in contravention of the section).

—")

(Lord Conesford.)

THE EARL OF DUNDEE: This is another Amendment which has a slight flavour of unreality about it. It provides that disqualification can be ordered if a driver of a heavy goods vehicle does not have a special licence, which was necessary before the war. Now the only
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different qualification required to drive a heavy goods vehicle is that you must be over 21. Since the beginning of the war it is no longer necessary to have a special licence in addition to the ordinary licence. The need for special licence was suspended at the beginning of the war; it has never been renewed, and my right honourable friend the Minister has no present intention of bringing this part of the Act back into effect. It would therefore perhaps be a little unreal if we were to provide that disqualification should be imposed for doing something which cannot be done. The Minister has no reason to think that the lack of a special licence in any way adds to the danger on the roads in present circumstances. Therefore, he has no intention of bringing back this pre-war provision which is in suspense. I hope my noble friend will not wish me to argue that we ought to provide in advance for the possibility that in some future generation some future Minister might bring it back. I think perhaps it would be a little unreal to do so.
LORD CONESFORD: I thank my noble friend for his explanation. The reason why I put down this Amendment is that this offence is at present No. 19 in the Eleventh Schedule to the 1960 Act. But in view of what my noble friend has just said I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
9.3 p.m.
LORD CONESFORD: This is the most important of all the Amendments that I have brought before this Committee. This is the Amendment which provides for the continuance of the power to disqualify for an offence under Section 217 (1) of the principal Act (taking a motor vehicle without authority). My noble friend Lord Dundee was good enough to say that I had convinced him of the necessity of my present Amendment when he made his final speech on the Second Reading, and I hope that none of his thought in the interval has made him doubt the conclusion to which he then came. The view which I formed was supported in every section of the House—by the noble Lord, Lord Molson; by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Denning. It is very strongly supported by my noble and learned friend Lord Goddard and by my noble and

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learned friend the Lord Chief Justice, among others. This offence is so serious that there is a considerable volume of opinion that it ought to be one of the offences for which there is compulsory disqualification under Part I. I have not gone so far as that, but I beg to move the present Amendment, which would add that offence to those for which the courts can disqualify, as they are now doing.
Amendment moved—
Page 21, line 49, at end insert—

("—An offence under section 217 (1) of the principal Act (taking motor vehicle without authority).

For paragraph (a) there shall be substituted the words "(a) on conviction on indictment, to a fine or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding twelve months or to both a fine and such imprisonment.")

—(Lord Conesford.

THE EARL OF DUNDEE: My noble friend is going a little too far when he says that he convinced me on the Second Reading. I did not say that I had been convinced. All I said was that I thought my noble friend had made a strong case, which is not quite the same thing. However, we have reflected upon this and we have decided to accept my noble friend's Amendment, which I expected would be discussed under the previous Amendment in the name of Lord Elton, but that was not moved. I should just like to remind your Lordships that the reason why this was not included among those offences for which disqualification may be ordered was the fact that taking somebody's car without leave does not in itself, involve anything dangerous. It is very wrong, very wicked and very bad; and the man ought to be punished. But he has not necessarily done anything dangerous. What has weighed most with us in deciding to accept the Amendment is the presumption that the majority of people who go off for joyrides and take other people's cars without leave do, in fact, drive in a dangerous manner, and I think your Lordships were fairly unanimous in desiring that this should be included in the Bill as a disqualifiable offence. We are therefore ready to accept the Amendment.
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
LORD CONESFORD: This is the only Amendment which introduces a ground for disqualification which does not at present exist. As noble Lords have just heard, it will now remain possible to disqualify for taking a motor vehicle without authority. It has sometimes been argued, however, that it was rather illogical to be able to disqualify for taking a vehicle without authority when it was impossible to disqualify for the more serious offence of larceny of a motor car. As I informed noble Lords at an earlier stage, my noble and learned friend the Lord Chief Justice has had experience of cases where a man has pleaded guilty to the larceny of a motor car simply in order to avoid the risk of disqualification for the lesser offence. It was after discussion with my noble and learned friend the Lord Chief Justice that I put down this Amendment.
The noble Baroness, Lady Wootton of Abinger, also stated the case, at an earlier stage, for not limiting the power of disqualification entirely to offences under the Road Traffic Acts. I think that in general I should not advocate going very much beyond that; but in this particular case, in view of the matters brought to my notice by the Lord Chief Justice, I think it would be a good thing to add larceny of a motor car to the list of offences for which the courts can disqualify. Larceny of a motor car is very often the precursor of many other crimes, and I think with the present record of crime, and the use made of motor cars in the commission of those crimes and in facilitating escape, we shall be well advised to add larceny of a motor vehicle to those offences for which courts have power to disqualify. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 21, line 49, at end insert ("—Larceny of a motor vehicle—").—(Lord Conesford.)
THE EARL OF DUNDEE: I hope my noble friend will allow me to say that I think he has made out a fairly strong case, though without admitting that I am convinced by it. There are, I think, two important differences between this and the previous Amendment which we have just agreed. One difference is that although larceny of a motor car is a much graver offence than borrowing a motor car without leave, it does not seem to have much relevance—indeed,

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my noble friend did not argue that it had any relevance—to road safety. It might be argued that a man who stole a car with the intention of selling it would be exceptionally careful in driving it away so that he might not damage it.
But the real argument which my noble friend put forward, which is not really relevant to the question of safety, is that it is often done by people who are going to commit some other crime. If you hit a man on the head and knock him out and steal a bag of money with £4,000 in it, you have done a wicked thing and ought to be put in prison for a long time. But is it particularly relevant at the same time to take away any motor vehicle licence which he may have? Again, if you commit any crime which is even remotely connected with someone who is driving, would any magistrate or judge, or any reasonable system of law, think it sensible, besides the appropriate punishment which the criminal has deserved, at the same time to take away his motor driving licence?
My noble friend gave one relevant reason which he had already quoted: the statement of the Lord Chief Justice that people sometimes contrived to plead guilty to the charge of larceny although it is a more serious offence than taking a motor car without leave, simply because they preferred to have a heavier punishment and not have their driving licence taken away than to have a lighter punishment and also have their licence taken away. I should like to look into that a little more carefully. I do not quite know in what circumstances it would be possible for a man to decide with which offence he should be charged. I suppose this must be in cases where the police have preferred two alternative charges and the accused person can choose to plead guilty to one and not to the other.
But the other important fact is one which my noble friend himself stressed: that, unlike all his other Amendments, this is an entirely new law which has never existed before. In the case of his other proposals he is merely protesting against the removal of the penalty which exists under the 1960 or the 1956 Acts; in this case he is proposing an entirely new penalty. I think that before we can agree with that, we ought to consult particularly with the Home Office, and per-
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haps other Departments, to see what their reaction to it is. During the Second Reading debate I remember the noble Baroness, Lady Wootton of Abinger, putting forward the tentative idea that it might be a good thing if quite a lot of other offences which do not seem necessarily to be connected with road safety involved, in addition to the ordinary punishment, possible disqualification from driving. I think it is a wide question which we ought to look into a little more carefully, and I should prefer not to come to any conclusion on it on Committee stage.
THE EARL OF LUCAN: If I may refresh the noble Earl's memory, my noble friend Lady Wootton of Abinger did indeed bring this point up quite powerfully. The logic of her case was that if the stealing of a motor car is the preliminary to a smash-and-grab raid, by taking away his licence the person who perpetrates that crime is prevented from attempting another smash-and-grab raid. I remember that she quoted existing laws—for instance, the Deer (Scotland) Act and I think the Salmon and Freshwater Fisheries (Scotland) Act—which include clauses precisely to the effect that if somebody is found guilty of this crime his motor car is confiscated. The argument is a fairly powerful one.
LORD AIREDALE: Did I rightly understand the noble Earl to say, in replying to the last Amendment, which he accepted, that a person who borrows a car or a vehicle without the owner's consent tends to drive dangerously? Does the noble Earl say, as part of his argument on this Amendment, that a person who, instead of taking without the owner's consent, steals a vehicle does not tend to drive dangerously, except in the possible instance that he mentioned, where a vehicle is stolen for resale? It seems to me a very fine distinction indeed, and I should not have thought it really held much water.
THE EARL OF DUNDEE: I think it is a very fine distinction. What I was really trying to do was to justify acceptance of the first Amendment on the ground of road safety. The principle we are trying to keep to, if we can, is this: that if you are to get public opinion to accept the totting up provisions of the Bill you must not allow

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disqualification to be imposed for offences which are not relevant to road safety. As I explained to your Lordships, the reason why we left out the offence of borrowing a car without leave was that it has no direct bearing on road safety; and it was in order to try to reconcile it with our principle that I said what I did, which I think is often true, that it is a tendency of the kind of young person who goes off on a jaunt, taking somebody else's car without leave, to drive carelessly, and often to abandon it and leave it in a dangerous position in the road. One may think that that is a special pleading. Perhaps it is a fine distinction, and I do not wish to press it too far. I was merely trying to make it easier for those of your Lordships who want to reconcile the Amendment which we are accepting with the principle of relevance to road safety.
LORD TEYNHAM: There is another point, is there not: that conviction for larceny of a motor car would invalidate the convicted person's insurance policy, and he would therefore be automatically disqualified?
VISCOUNT HAILSHAM: I do not know about that.
THE EARL OF DUNDEE: I should like to look into that, together with many other points. I have already told my noble friend that I think he has made out a case which ought to be considered.
LORD CONESFORD: My noble friend Lord Dundee has been eminently reasonable. I said in moving this Amendment that it went beyond all my previous Amendments because it did more than restore the existing law, and I think his plea that he should consult his right honourable friend the Home Secretary is certainly reasonable. My general impression is that the Home Secretary will not be against the clause, on the ground that it is likely to diminish crime, even if it is not wholly relevant to most of the provisions in the present Bill.
I am about to ask leave to withdraw the Amendment for an additional reason—namely, that it has already served its main object. I put it down in order to thwart my noble and learned friend the Leader of the House, who was arguing against the acceptance of the last Amend-
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ment, now accepted, that it would be illogical to accept it because you could not disqualify for the more serious offence. In order to deal with the logic of the Leader of the House I made myself impregnable by putting down the present Amendment. I find the argument of my noble friend Lord Dundee most persuasive. I hope that the Home Secretary takes the same view on the merits of this Amendment as I and the Lord Chief Justice take. In those circumstances, I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
LORD CHESHAM: I did not quite follow my noble and learned friend Lord Conesford, but I can assure your Lordships that this Amendment is not put down to thwart anybody. Nor does it contain any point of substance. The position is that traffic directions for particular one-way working can be imposed in one of two ways: either under Section 26 of the principal Act (which is already in paragraph 14 of Part II of the Schedule) or under Section 85 of that Act, which is not in the Schedule. The purpose of this Amendment is to put it into the Schedule and so put right a small anomaly. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 22, line 18, at end insert—

("24. An offence under section 5 (2) of the Road Traffic and Roads Improvement Act, 1960 (contravention of designation order) committed in respect of a motor vehicle by a failure to comply with a requirement to proceed or not to proceed in a specified direction or along a specified part of the carriageway.

For the words from 'to the like penalty' to the end of the subsection there shall be substituted the words 'in the case of an offence committed as mentioned in paragraph 24 of the First Schedule to the Road Traffic Act, 1961, to a fine not exceeding fifty pounds and, in any other case, to a fine not exceeding twenty pounds'.")

—(Lord Chesham.

On Question, Amendment agreed to.
First Schedule: Part III [Amendment of certain enactments relating to offences not involving disqualification]:
LORD CONESFORD: I will not move Amendment 71A.
LORD CHESHAM: If I may say so, Amendment 71A is consequential on the

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one that I accepted earlier on. Therefore, if I am not out of Order, I would say that it should be moved.
LORD CONESFORD: I thought you did not accept it. Is my memory wrong?
LORD CHESHAM: The one I accepted was 68B.
LORD CONESFORD: I had forgotten that my noble friend accepted it. I apologise to the Committee, and beg to move Amendment No. 71A, which is consequential.
Amendment moved—
Page 22, line 29, leave out paragraph 25.—(Lord Conesford.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
LORD CONESFORD: I beg to move Amendment No. 71D, which is consequential.
Amendment moved—
Page 24, line 2, leave out paragraph 34.—(Lord Conesford.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
LORD CONESFORD: I beg to move this Amendment to leave out paragraph 38. This, again, is consequential.
Amendment moved—
Page 24, line 27, leave out paragraph 38.—(Lord Conesford.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
LORD AIREDALE LORD AIREDALE moved, in paragraph 43, to leave out "twenty" and insert "fifty" [pounds]. The noble Lord said: On behalf of my noble friend Lord Swaythling, who was present until the late rising of this Committee last Thursday but is unavoidably unable to be present this evening, I beg leave to move this Amendment, which stands in his name. The Amendment seeks to amend paragraph 43 of the First Schedule which itself seeks to increase to £20 the maximum fine for the offence of failing to produce a licence.
There are three kindred offences of failing to produce documents which are dealt with by paragraphs 35, 44 and 46 of the Schedule. The documents concerned are a Northern Ireland licence, a certificate of insurance, and a test certificate. In respect of those three other documents, the maximum fine under this
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Bill for failure to produce them is £50. Accordingly, my noble friend, seeking to bracket together all these offences of failing to produce documents under the same heading with the same maximum fine for each, put down this Amendment in order to increase from £20 to £50 the maximum fine for failing to produce a licence. That is not to say that my noble friend considered that failure to produce a licence was so grave an offence that it necessarily warranted a fine of £50. My noble friend would be perfectly content if the Government were to take the view that a £20 fine in this case would be an adequate maximum and in that way to equate the three offences with a maximum fine of £20. My noble friend's sole concern is to ensure that, whatever maximum fine is imposed, it shall be the same in the case of failing to produce any of these documents. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 25, line 10, leave out ("twenty") and insert ("fifty").—(Lord Airedale.)
THE EARL OF DUNDEE: I think that this is not a matter of principle. It is perhaps rather a difficult borderline case. We have looked at it and the Amendments in the First Schedule to the principal Act are an attempt to give effect to a decision that the penalties for road traffic offences should, so far as possible, he more rational. The noble Lord, Lord Airedale, has given reasons for thinking that this is not quite so rational as we think it is. But in Part HI of the First Schedule, which lists certain offences for which disqualification cannot be awarded by the courts, we have put the fines at £50 maximum for what we think are the more serious driving offences, and at £20 for the less serious offence.
May I just give one or two examples? Offences which are to incur a fine not exceeding £20 are carrying a passenger on a motor cycle in contravention of the 1960 Act; contravention of temporary prohibitions or restrictions of traffic on roads imposed under Section 36; selling reflectors not complying with regulations under Section 12 of the Road Transport Lighting Act. And £20 is also fixed as a maximum fine for breaking traffic regulations not involving moving vehicles. The offence of failing to produce a licence when so required need not necessarily be very serious, and in trying to

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rationalise these penalties we felt that the maximum fine of £20 would be appropriate. I still feel that we were right. I am very glad to consider any further arguments and comparisons that may be brought to our notice, but I think the Committee will probably agree that there are many cases in which failure to produce a licence would not be a sufficiently serious offence to come into the category of a £50 maximum fine.
LORD TEYNHAM: I must say that I strongly object to this Amendment. I would say that £20 is an ample fine for not producing a licence.
LORD AIREDALE: The offences enumerated by the noble Earl just now were, I think, all offences connected with the actual driving of vehicles on the roads and, in that way, possibly involving danger. These offences of failing to produce documents are, in my submission, in a totally different category altogether. As I moved the Amendment on behalf of my noble friend, I do not feel that I can take upon myself the responsibility of dividing the House upon it, but I would commend to the noble Earl the serious consideration of paragraph 35. I would ask him to consider whether, if £20 is the right maximum fine for failure to produce a United Kingdom licence, £50 is the right maximum fine for failing to produce a Northern Ireland licence. This is another fine distinction which this evening I am unable to follow. But, in view of everything that has been said, I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
First Schedule, as amended, agreed to.
Second Schedule [Minor and Consequential Amendments]:
9.32 p.m.
LORD CHESHAM: This is a drafting Amendment. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 27, line 43, after ("virtue") insert ("in the first place where they occur").—(Lord Chesham.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
LORD CHESHAM: This is a small Amendment to assist the work of the police. Under Section 226 of the principal Act, it is provided, among other things, that the driver of a vehicle must in certain circumstances give the police details of the owner of the vehicle. Section 231 provides that the owner must supply the police with details of the insurance policy which
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covers the vehicle. Section 257 defines "owner" in relation to a vehicle which is subject to a hire purchase or hiring agreement as being the person in possession of the vehicle under the agreement. This raises a difficulty for the police in obtaining information about the insurance of hired cars. Some drivers who hire one claim to the police, if they are asked, that the insurance details are known only to the company from whom they hired the car, and say that that company effected the insurance. The company, however, can then claim that they are not obliged to give any information about the insurance because they are not the owner as defined in the Act. There is not any common practice about effecting the insurance of hired cars. Sometimes the hiring company does it, and sometimes the driver who hires the car does it.
This Amendment seeks to avoid the difficulties which the police are having by providing that in the sections of the Act concerned the term "owner" shall include both parties to the hiring agreement. Therefore, where this difficulty crops up, the driver of a hired vehicle, where the company had effected the insurance, would be required to give details of the company from whom he had hired the vehicle. The police could then go to them, and they would be required to give the necessary details of the insurance. Of course, where the hirer himself effected the insurance the police would be able, as now, to require him to supply the necessary details. It is a tidying operation which will help the police a bit. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 28, line 50, at end insert—
("Duty to give information

Section two hundred and twenty-six.

After subsection (2) there shall be inserted the following subsection:—

'(3) In this section "owner", in relation to a vehicle which is the subject of a hiring agreement, includes each party to the agreement.'

Section two hundred and thirty-one.

At the end of the section there shall be added the following subsection:—

'(3) In this section "owner", in relation to a vehicle which is the subject of a hiring agreement, includes each party I o the agreement'.")

—(Lord Chesham.

On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Second Schedule, as amended, agreed to.
Third Schedule agreed to.
LORD CONESFORD: On behalf of my noble friend Lord Derwent, I do not propose to move the Amendment standing in his name.
LORD CHESHAM: Again, if I may say so, I think that the noble Lord intended to move it, so that I could, as a consequential Amendment, accept it in principle, as I did the other, so that he could then withdraw it.
LORD CONESFORD: I must again apologise. My memory was faulty. I thought I had withdrawn the earlier Amendment with a view to a different one being introduced. On behalf of my noble friend Lord Derwent, I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
After the Third Schedule, insert the following new Schedule—
("Amendments of Section 86 of the principal Act
In subsection (1), after the word 'charge' there shall be added the words 'or charges'.
In subsection (1), for the word 'calculated' there shall be substituted the word 'prescribed'.
For subsection (2), there shall be substituted the following subsection:
'(2) The designation order shall prescribe the period or periods not exceeding which vehicles may be left in each parking place and shall prescribe the amount of the charge or charges to be made for those periods. The prescribed charge appropriate to each such prescribed period is hereinafter referred to as the "initial charge".'
In subsection (4), paragraph (c), the words after 'is less than' shall be omitted and the following words shall be inserted:
'the prescribed period for which the appropriate prescribed charge has been made paragraph (b) of this subsection shall not have effect, but it shall be presumed unless the contrary is proved that the appropriate prescribed charge has not been duly paid for the vehicle.'
For subsection (5), there shall be substituted the following subsection:
'Where no such apparatus is in use, the designation order may provide that the appropriate prescribed charge shall be payable on the vehicle's being taken away from the parking place.'").—(Lord Conesford.)
LORD CHESHAM: As in the case of the main Amendment. I should like to accept the principle of this Amendment,
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if the noble Lord will withdraw it now, subject to redrafting.
LORD CONESFORD: I now think I was completely right in saying that I did not intend to move the Amendment. But if my noble friend prefers it that way, I have much pleasure in withdrawing the Amendment which I never meant to move.
LORD CHESHAM: If I have done the wrong thing, I apologise.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
House resumed.