Lords Sitting of 5 June 1961

Preamble
The House met at half past two of the clock, The LORD CHANCELLOR on Woolsack.
Prayers—Read by the Lord Bishop of Manchester

THE OXFORD WESTERN BY-PASS
2.35 p.m.
LORD LUCAS OF CHILWORTH: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
[The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government the contract date for the completion of the Oxford Western By-pass; the reason for the delay, and the date when the by-pass will be actually finished and open to traffic.]
THE JOINT PARLIAMENTARY SECRETARY, MINISTRY OF TRANSPORT (LORD CHESHAM): My Lords, the contract date for completion of the Oxford Western By-Pass is September 16, 1961. It was originally March 15, 1961.
In 1959 it was extended to June 16 because of difficulties in obtaining entry on to some if the land. The further extension to September 16 was approved because of the bad weather of last summer and autumn, and the general shortage of labour in the area.
My right honourable friend has had no further application for an extension of the completion date.
LORD LUCAS OF CHILWORTH: My Lords, would the noble Lord accept my thanks for the helpfulness of his reply. Perhaps he will forgive me for expressing the view that his reply is based more on hope than fact. From personal observation I think we shall all be surprised if this work is completed by the end of the year. But in the meantime, would the noble Lord look into the reason why the Southern by-pass is still closed to traffic, and has, in fact, been closed to traffic for fifteen months? Is the noble Lord aware that the reason originally given for closing the Southern Ely-pass to heavy traffic was because of
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the necessity to join the Botley road end of the Southern by-pass to the end of the Western by-pass? Is the noble Lord aware that this has meant that the heavy A.34 traffic has had to go through the centre of the City of Oxford? As there is no apparent reason why the Southern by-pass should not now be opened, would he use his influence and his endeavours to get it opened to traffic?
LORD CHESHAM: My Lords, in the first place with regard to the Western by-pass, all I can say to the noble Lord is that I do not know of any reason why the date I mentioned should not be effective. Whether the question of the Southern by-pass arises out of the question of the Western by-pass I am not entirely sure; nevertheless, I will look into the situation and see whether it is anything like the noble Lord describes.
LORD LUCAS OF CHILWORTH: My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord. The connection between the two by-passes is a physical one; because one joins the other.

POLICE SURGEONS AND BREATHALYSER TESTS
LORD DERWENT: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
[The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government whether consideration has now been given to the conclusions reached by the Association of Police Surgeons of Great Britain at their recent annual conference in so far as they deal with the proposed introduction of blood tests and breathalyser tests for motorists; and whether it is proposed to take any action as a result of these representations, and if so of what nature.]
LORD CHESHAM: Yes, my Lords. Careful consideration has been given to the representations made by the Association of Police Surgeons of Great Britain. Her Majesty's Government are, however, satisfied that all the points made by the Association are ones that they had already taken fully into account when framing their proposals before presenting them to your Lordships' House. The points were also all discussed during the

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debates on the Second Reading and Committee stage of the Road Traffic Bill. Her Majesty's Government do not therefore think it necessary to take any further action as a result of these representations.
LORD DERWENT: My Lords, while thanking my noble friend for his Answer, is it not a fact that the Bill was drafted, and most of the discussions took place, before the views of the police surgeons became known? In view of the fact that police surgeons have more practical experience than anyone else of dealing with, and testing, drunken drivers, why have Her Majesty's Government closed their minds to the police surgeons' recommendations?
LORD CHESHAM: My Lords, Her Majesty's Government have not closed their minds to these representations. When my noble friend comes to look at my original Answer in Hansard he will see that I said Her Majesty's Government had already thought of the points concerned. Therefore the actual timing of their arrival from the police surgeons does not preclude the fact that they had already been considered.

COMPENSATION FUND FOR KENYA LANDOWNERS
THE EARL OF ALBEMARLE: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
[The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government whether, while it is still within their power, they will set up a fund to compensate our kith and kin who are landholders in Kenya in the event of dispossession of their property.]
THE MINISTER OF STATE FOR COLONIAL AFFAIRS (THE EARL OF PERTH): My Lords, if I interpret the noble Earl's question aright, he is suggesting that we set up a compensation fund now against a hypothetical possibility in the future. If this is the correct interpretation, the answer is that Her Majesty's Government do not believe that this would be in Kenya's interest. Apart from anything else, it would mean that we anticipated the failure of our policy, whereas we are
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determined to do all we can to ensure its success.
Her Majesty's Government's policy for land in Kenya is that it should be regarded primarily in economic rather than racial terms, as the country's most valuable asset. In this connection I would assure the noble Earl that Her Majesty's Government fully recognise the immense contribution made by the European farmers to the best use of the land and that we attach great importance to this contribution continuing.
THE EARL OF ALBEMARLE: My Lords, I thank the noble Earl for his reply. Of course, we all know that the Government are trying to do all they can for the landed interests in the Colony, but recent events have not been reported sufficiently in the papers of this country, so that a great number of people do not know what the position of security is out there. Is the noble Earl aware that in the Legislative Council on May 28 Mr. Swann, the Minister for Internal Security and Defence said that a plot had been discovered to murder the Ministers and their families, and that fourteen arrests had been made in three different places? Settlers in the Rift Valley and elsewhere are saying—
SEVERAL NOBLE LORDS: Order, order!
THE EARL OF ALBEMARLE: I am asking if the noble Earl is aware of all these things, because it is almost impossible to make my point that there is a need for a compensatory fund in this Colony unless noble Lords and Her Majesty's Government are aware of the upset state of the settlers because they now are afraid about security. This is my final question: does the noble Earl not think that, if this country can pump £20½ million into that Colony with the state of security as it is, the Government and the taxpayers can afford to start some fund to which the settlers, who may fall by the way if things go badly, may have some recourse? Many of them have used up all their earnings, have put them into their farms and have no future.
LORD SILKIN: My Lords, before the noble Earl replies, may I say this? This is a very important matter. Does the noble Earl consider that question and answer is the best way of dealing with

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it? There is so much to be said on both sides. While one has a great deal of sympathy with the noble Earl in what he is desiring to achieve, I feel that this method of questioning is not the best way of getting the views of the House on the matter.
THE EARL OF PERTH: My Lords, to answer the last question, I quite agree that the whole of this issue of Kenya, or the land there, is one of great interest to your Lordships and of fundamental importance to the future of the country. Of course it is always open to your Lordships at any time to debate the issue, if that is thought appropriate; that would be arranged in the usual way. But to answer the particular question put by the noble Earl, what I would say is this. I have tried to explain in my earlier answer why we do not think it is appropriate to set up a compensation fund now. On the other hand, I should like to assure the noble Earl that I realise very well the anxiety of many of the settlers in regard to security, and I can assure him that everything possible is being done to ensure that there will be law and order. In that connection I think we are well placed, both in regard to the police force and to the other reserves that may be available if there should be further trouble.
THE EARL OF BUCKINGHAMSHIRE: My Lords, while I am delighted to hear the latter part of the answer of the noble Earl, does he realise the very great disappointment that settlers in Kenya will feel over this compensation question?
THE EARL OF PERTH: My Lords, it is not a new policy that I have enunciated to-day; it is something which has been known for many months. While it may be that some of the settlers feel that a compensation fund would be satisfactory from their point of view, I hope that the great run of them, considering the reasons why we want to follow the line we are taking, will in the end come to realise that it is in the best interests not only of themselves but also of Kenya as a whole.

CEREMONIAL EVENTS AND PARKING METERS
2.48 p.m.
EARL HOWE: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
[The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government whether, on occasions when it is considered necessary to put all the parking meters in any one area out of action, adequate steps can be taken to announce the fact publicly.]
LORD CHESHAM: My Lords, the use of parking meter bays may have to be suspended over an area in connection with ceremonial events or other public occasions. Special traffic arrangements are made by the police at these times, and every effort is made to inform the public fully. Details are given to the Press and broadcasting authorities, and notices are distributed beforehand to frontagers and regular parkers in the areas affected.
EARL HOWE: My Lords, may I ask the noble Lord whether he is aware that last week in Pall Mall all meters were put out of action by the police? It is true that police notices were distributed along the pavement, but could not something have been done the night before, on T.V. or by the B.B.C., to inform people that that would be the case?
LORD CHESHAM: My Lords, about that particular occasion my noble friend is, of course, right. There were 116 meters in that area suspended on that day. Notices were distributed by being put through the letter boxes of the frontagers, and by being tucked under the windscreen wipers of cars parked there previous to the occasion. A Press notice, of which I have a copy, which I shall be glad to show my noble friend afterwards, was issued to the Press and to the broadcasting authorities. Unfortunately, there is no way in which we can make the Press or the broadcasting authorities publish the full text of such notices. If there is anything else that my noble friend thinks could be done, I should be very glad to pass it on to the appropriate quarter.
EARL HOWE: My Lords, may I ask the noble Lord whether he is aware that it is not really enough to put notices in letter boxes and the like, because the cars

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parked at the meters are not necessarily the property of the frontagers to the street? It needs something a little better to inform everybody what is going on; otherwise people arriving there and expecting to be able to park will find they cannot, and then they will clutter up the traffic unnecessarily in an effort to try to find somewhere to go.
LORD CHESHAM: My Lords, I did not pretend that the distribution of notices was all that was necessary. I merely asked whether there was anything else that could be done apart from the issue of a notice, fully descriptive of the arrangements, to the Press and to the broadcasting authorities, which I should have thought was reasonable action for the police to take. I do not know what else they could do in the circumstances. If there are any useful suggestions, as I said, I shall be pleased to pass them on.
LORD OGMORE: My Lords, one thing that could be done is to pay for an advertisement in the Press and on I.T.V.
LORD BALFOUR OF INCHRYE: My Lords, could not the Minister consider putting a notice on the parking meters saying that they will be out of action on the following day for such-and-such a period of time?
LORD CHESHAM: These are suggestions which, as I said, I will pass on.
LORD DERWENT: My Lords, in his first reply my noble friend use a phrase that I have never heard used before—I hope he will give the House a definition. Can he tell us what a "regular parker" is in a parking meter zone?
LORD CHESHAM: My Lords, I have heard it suggested that the only way of finding that out is by acting as a nosey-parker.

BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE
EARL ST. ALDWYN: My Lords, I should like to inform the House that my noble friend Lord Perth will be making a statement on Zanzibar at a suitable moment during the afternoon.
LAND DRAINAGE BILL
Brought from the Commons; read 1ª, and to be printed.
PATENTS AND DESIGNS (RENEWALS, EXTENSIONS AND FEES) BILL [H.L.]
Returned from the Commons, agreed to.

AFFILIATION PROCEEDINGS (BLOOD TESTS) BILL [H.L.]
2.52 p.m.
Order of the Day for receiving the Report of Amendments read.
LORD AMULREE: My Lords, before I move formally that this Report be now received, I should like to explain to the House that on the Committee stage, at the request of the noble Baroness, Lady Wootton of Abinger, I promised that I would put down an Amendment which would ensure that the parties were given a full explanation of what the tests were all about and what their purpose was, before they were subjected to them; and that this explanation should be read to them by the clerk of the court and would not merely be handed to them on a piece of paper. Following that, I had some talks with the Home Office, and we agreed that it would be better if that were to be done by regulation or by rules which would come under the Bill when it becomes an Act. I have spoken to the noble Baroness about this matter and she has agreed that that procedure would meet the suggestion she made to me. Therefore I have no Amendments to move to the Bill at this stage, and I beg to move that the Report be now received.
Moved, That the Report be now received.—(Lord Amulree.)
On Question, Motion agreed to, and Amendments reported accordingly.

ROAD TRAFFIC BILL [H.L.]
Amendments reported (according to Order).
Clause 2:
Evidence on charge of unfitness to drive
2.—(1) In any proceedings for an offence under the said section six, the court shall have regard to any evidence which may be given of the proportion or quantity of alcohol or of any drug which was contained in the blood or present in the body of the accused, as ascertained by analysis or measurement of a specimen of blood taken from him with his consent in the presence of a medical practitioner, or of urine or breath provided by him, at any material time; and if it is proved that the accused, when so requested at any such time, refused to consent to the taking of or to provide a specimen for analysis or measurement, his refusal may, unless reasonable cause therefor is shown, be treated as supporting any evidence given on behalf of the prosecution, or as rebutting any evidence given on behalf of the defence, with respect to his condition at that time.
2.54 p.m.
THE EARL OF DUNDEE THE EARL OF DUNDEE moved in subsection (1) after the first "shall" to insert:
"(subject to subsection (4) of this section)"
The noble Earl said: My Lords, in Committee on April 27 the noble Lord, Lord Taylor moved two Amendments which he suggested were connected with each other. The first one proposed that the Secretary of State shall make regulations prescribing
"the methods of collection of specimens of breath, blood and urine."
I said that the Government would consider this. The noble Lord, Lord Taylor, at that moment was the only occupant of the Benches opposite, but he was encouraged by some of my noble friends on this side of the House not to be content with Government consideration but to press the Amendment to a Division which was carried by your Lordships. In spite of this, the Government are still considering the case which was put by the noble Lord, Lord Taylor, on that first Amendment and it may be necessary at a later stage to move a Government Amendment to take out subsection (4), but, in view of the fact that it was rather peremptorily decided in the Division Lobby, I think it better for me at this stage of the Bill to say nothing further about it.
But the second Amendment, which the noble Lord, Lord Taylor, said was consequential on the first, although it was not strictly consequential, was that specimens of blood and urine in prescrbed containers shall be offered to the accused person. That Amendment I said I would accept in principle, and the noble Lord was good enough to say that he would agree to that, and he withdrew the Amendment. The Amendment which I now move is to give effect to the undertaking which I then gave. The only way in which it differs from the Committee Amendment put down by the noble Lord, Lord Taylor, is that it provides that the accused should be supplied with a specimen of blood or urine only if he asks for it and that the specimen should be so supplied in a prescribed container only if the accused so requires. I think it is reasonable to provide that the accused person should ask for a sample if he wants one, because otherwise, if the police were required to offer specimens of blood and urine to all accused persons whether they asked for them or not, the police might have to ensure that they could afterwards prove that an offer had been made in every case where the accused had not accepted the offer, in case the accused later alleged that the offer had never been made. Therefore, I think your Lordships will agree that it is reasonable to provide that it should be supplied to the accused person if he asks for it. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 1, line 12, after ("shall") insert ("(subject to subsection (4) of this section)"). —(The Earl of Dundee.)
LORD LATHAM: My Lords, my noble friend Lord Taylor has asked me to express his regrets that he is unable to be in his place at this hour of the sitting. He also authorises me to say that, by and large, the Amendment now proposed meets the points that he had in mind, and he would like to express his appreciation of what has been done both by the noble Earl and by the noble Lord, Lord Chesham.
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
THE EARL OF DUNDEE: My Lords, on the Committee stage I agreed to accept an Amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Teynham to the effect that the samples of blood, urine, et cetera,

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taken from an accused person, should be taken in the presence of a medical practitioner. That Amendment was agreed to and it is now in the Bill as it stands at present. After I said it would be accepted the noble Lord, Lord Silkin said [OFFICIAL REPORT, Vol. 230 (No.71), col. 999]:
"Before the noble Earl is so obliging, does this mean that even where there is a medical practitioner carrying out the test there would have to be another medical practitioner present?"
I replied:
"Certainly not".
Lord Silkin said:
"It could mean that. The noble Earl will no doubt look at it again."
This Amendment, which leaves out "in the presence of" and inserts the word "by", is intended to meet that possible objection. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 1, line 16, leave out ("in the presence of") and insert ("by").—(The Earl of Dundee.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
2.59 p.m.
LORD AIREDALE LORD AIREDALE moved, in subsection (1), to leave out all words after the first "time", and to substitute:
"and the court may further have regard to any refusal of the accused without reasonable cause to consent to the taking of, or to provide, a specimen for analysis or measurement".
The noble Lord said: The purpose of this Amendment is to obviate the expression which appears in the latter part of subsection (1) that refusal to provide a specimen for analysis may be treated as supporting the prosecution or rebutting the defence. In my submission, it is not for Parliament to teach the courts how they are to treat particular pieces of evidence. It is much better, surely, to leave the courts free to treat the evidence before them in the only proper manner. Surely they may be safely left to discharge their duty in the proper way. To seek by Act of Parliament to tell the courts that this particular evidence is to be treated in this particular way smacks, in my opinion, of what the noble Lord, Lord Molson, called, in another connection, grandmotherly legislation.
No doubt it is perfectly in order and desirable in a particular case that Parliament shall say that such-and-such
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evidence shall be admissible; and my Amendment seeks to do that in this case. It says:

"… the court may … have regard to any refusal of the accused … to consent to the taking of … a specimen for analysis …."
The Amendment allows the court to "have regard to" that evidence, but leaves the court free to treat the evidence in the only proper manner in which it is to be treated; and in that way the Statute would not be seeking to tell the court how they are to treat the evidence. I am authorised to say that the noble Lord, Lord Douglas of Barloch, would have spoken in favour of this Amendment had he been able to be in his place this afternoon. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 1, line 18, leave out from ("time") to the end of line 24, and insert the said new words.—(Lord Airedale.)
BARONESS SUMMERSKILL: My Lords, may I say one word before the noble Lord, Lord Conesford, and ask the noble Lord, Lord Airedale, to consider this point? This afternoon he has agreed to the Report stage of the Affiliation Proceedings (Blood Tests) Bill, which contained a principle similar to this. Why is it, therefore, that at this stage he objects to the same principle being embodied in this Bill?
LORD AIREDALE: Per incuriam.
THE LORD PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL AND MINISTER FOR SCIENCE (VISCOUNT HAILSHAM): What does that mean?
LORD SILKIN: My Lords, when I first met this Amendment I thought that the noble Lord was trying merely to improve the language of the clause without affecting its meaning, but as he explained it I see that he really wishes to whittle the thing down. He wants the court to take into consideration the fact that the person has refused to allow a medical examination. The clause as it stands says that that is to be regarded as at any rate prima facie evidence that the person is guilty. I think that this is the clear issue between us. I hope that the House, subject to what I shall have to say in a moment about compulsory tests, will accept the view that, if the tests are not to be compulsory, a refusal without good ground is to be

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treated by the court as prima facie evidence of the guilt of the person, subject, of course, to all the other circumstances of the case.
LORD CONESFORD: My Lords, I cannot think that this Amendment is necessary for any of the reasons suggested by the noble Lord, Lord Airedale, who moved it. So far as I can see, in the words as they at present stand in the Bill there is nothing offensive at all to the court. It does not say that this evidence shall be conclusive; it says simply that the refusal may be treated as supporting any evidence, and then it states the point on which evidence of refusal is relevant. If the language of the Amendment were adopted it would not be at all clear what the relevance of this evidence would be. If the evidence is produced it must be produced as tending to show something. The Bill as it stands shows what makes the evidence relevant, and it does it in a way, it seems to me, which in no way prejudices the traditional view we take of the proper function of the court. I think the effect of the Amendment is this. There is a chance that, if the Amendment were adopted, after a time the court would come to the conclusion on the matter being raised and argued, and possibly going to appeal, that the words meant precisely what is in the Bill now; but if they did not, what they meant would be wholly obscure. The Bill as it stands shows clearly what evidence shall be relevant, and in no way binds the court to treat the thing as conclusive, because the words are "may be treated". I hope that the Government will abide by the words at present in the Bill.
VISCOUNT HAILSHAM: My Lords, I was invited to look at this question again on the Committee stage. We have done so, but with the result that we felt our drafting was as good as it could be made and ought not to be altered. The speech which T should have made to the noble Lord, Lord Airedale, has in fact been made—and put rather better—by my noble and learned friend Lord Conesford, and therefore I shall not trouble the House by repeating it. I think that the noble Lord, Lord Airedale, is make a mistake in saying that we are trying to dictate to the
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courts or instruct the courts as to how they should treat this evidence. We are stating what the courts may do in order to remove any possibility of doubt and pointing out that the evidence is relevant.
I think that if the noble Lord looks at the phrasing again he will see that all that has been done is to make it clear that the courts, notwithstanding the fact that submission to a test, as the Bill at present stands, is voluntary, may treat this evidence in this way; I have heard doubts—not shared, I may say, by me—expressed as to whether, if the test was truly voluntary, the courts could look at a refusal although it was unreasonable. We thought it was fair to make it plain beyond peradventure. The only effect, I think, of the Amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Airedale, would be, as my noble and learned friend said, to render obscure what the clause meant. But if it means anything, it is a slightly more mealy-mouthed way of saying what we have put more plainly into the Bill.
LORD AIREDALE: My Lords, I am obliged to the noble Lords who have spoken for what they have said. It is quite clear that noble Lords, on the whole, are against me. Accordingly, I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
3.9 p.m.
LORD CHESHAM LORD CHESHAM moved, in subsection (1), after "requested" to insert "by a constable". The noble Lord said: My Lords, on Committee stage my noble friends Lord Teynham and Lord Somers moved a similar Amendment to this one. The object of their Amendment was to ensure that a request to provide a specimen for a chemical test was not made by anyone other than a policeman. I said at the time that I should like to look at it again with a view to putting down an Amendment on Report; and, my Lords, this is my Amendment. I hope that, in the form in which I have put it down, it will meet the views of the noble Lords concerned and of all noble Lords. It is almost exactly the same as that put down by my noble friend Lord Somers, but it uses the more usual word "constable", which is already taken to include a policeman of any rank.
I think it unlikely that the police will want to request a sample anywhere other than at a police station, but I should

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prefer not to have in the words suggested by my noble friend Lord Teynham, because of the possibility that a sample might be requested at a hospital. Indeed, in due course, with the possible future development of the breathalyser, there would seem no reason why it should not be used on the spot. I mentioned on Committee stage the possibility that the request might be made by a doctor or by a police matron, who would not be covered by the term; but, on reflection, I do not think that that is more than a rather remote contingency and it seems quite unnecessary to provide for it. I feel that, in almost any circumstances when a request for a sample is likely to be made, a policeman will probably be present; in which case, if the request was made by a doctor and was refused, the policeman could formally repeat it. Therefore, my Lords, I think that I this proviso that the police only should request samples is a reasonable one. I hope your Lordships will think so, too, and that this Amendment will be accepted. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 1, line 19, after ("requested") insert ("by a constable").—(Lord Chesham.)
LORD TEYNHAM: I am very grateful to the noble Lord for this proposed Amendment, which I think meets the case.
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
3.12 p.m.
LORD SILKIN LORD SILKIN moved, after subsection (1) to insert:
"() If the accused refuses without reasonable cause shown to consent to the taking of, or to provide, a specimen for analysis or measurement as provided in subsection (1) of this section, he shall be guilty of an offence and shall be liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding one hundred pounds."
The noble Lord said: My Lords, this Amendment is a joint effort by myself and the noble Lord, Lord Elton, to put down something which would, we think, be workable to meet the case of those who feel that the tests should be compulsory and that, if a person does not agree to submit to a test, then he should be subject to a penalty. Noble Lords will remember that this point was fully discussed on Second Reading, and a number of noble Lords—a fairly high proportion of those who discussed this question at all—took the view that they
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did not like Clause 2, particularly as it stood: they had some doubts about the effect of a person refusing a voluntary examination, and they felt that, on the whole, it would be better that the examination should be compulsory.
I share that view, as I have said all along, subject to one point, which is that I must be satisfied that the tests were fairly reliable. I am not sure that I am entirely satisfied now; but if any notice is to be taken of a voluntary test the same question arises. If the results of this test are not reliable, it is just as dangerous to take it into account as in the case of a compulsory test. Noble Lords on the Front Bench have taken rather different views about the reliability of these tests. Some have been more certain than others; and I think my noble friend Lord Taylor, perhaps, has been most certain of all. He has said that the tests really are reliable and can be depended upon as fair evidence of the amount of alcohol in the blood or in the system, and it is on that assumption that I am moving this Amendment. If the noble and learned Viscount who I believe is to reply tells me that these tests are not reliable, or are not substantially reliable, then I shall have no justification for asking that they should be compulsory.
The case has been so full argued, both on Second Reading and on Committee stage, that I do not think I need argue it at any length this afternoon. Apart from the unsatisfactory drafting of the Amendment moved in Committee, the noble and learned Viscount gave two reasons why the principle could not be accepted. One was that it rather assumed that the facilities for testing were universal and were available all over the country, whereas that was not the case. He also went on to say that some of the equipment necessary was not even available in this country at all, and that it was perhaps premature to make the test compulsory. I would ask, if that is true, is it not equally premature to refer to voluntary tests, and to set up the whole paraphernalia of voluntary tests in this clause, when you have neither the equipment nor the facilities for carrying them out? If the noble and learned Viscount were to say that in answer to my Amendment, he would do far better to accept the Amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Teynham, and delete the clause, and to

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put in something else which would hereafter enable the Government, if they so desired, to make provision by Regulation for the carrying out of tests, whether they be voluntary or compulsory. On the whole, I think that that might be a more satisfactory course.
The noble and learned Viscount raised a second objection to the Amendment moved in Committee. He said that compulsory testing was not practicable because, as the Amendment then stood, it would involve using force and compelling people to submit to having their blood or urine taken, or their breath tested. I suppose some tests would be much easier than others; but at any rate I can see the objection to forcing people to give their blood, and possibly holding them down violently. I think the noble and learned Viscount suggested that that might be necessary in some cases. He himself suggested that it would be better to impose a penalty in case of refusal, and that is the way in which the present Amendment has been drawn. I think that, subject to the test being a satisfactory one, it should be universal and compulsory. I think it is the only way.
The noble Lord, Lord Airedale, although I did not agree with his Amendment, was really protesting against something which is inherently unsatisfactory: this suggestion in the Bill that a person who does not agree to be tested is for all practical purposes (I know that the language of the clause does not go as far as that; but it means for all practical purposes) to be regarded as guilty. At least, the onus is shifted so that he has to prove his innocence. The noble and learned Viscount shakes his head, but we are dealing with lay benches all over the country, and a lay bench, looking at this clause, will say to themselves, "Here is this man; he has been wobbling all over the place; he smells of drink; his speech is a little thick and incoherent; he refuses to be tested and gives no adequate reason for it. Of course he is guilty." And the last straw would be his refusal to be tested. It is invidious, and I think the most satisfactory way out of it is to make the test universal and compulsory. For those reasons, I beg to move this Amendment. But I will say to the noble Lord, Lord Teynham, that if he
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is prepared to take his Amendment to a Division, I shall be happy to support it. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 1, line 24, at end, insert the said subsection.—(Lord Silkin.)
3.20 p.m.
LORD ELTON: My Lords, the thought behind this Amendment, as I think my noble friend obviously has made clear, is that we, I think in company with a considerable number of your Lordships, are anxious that there should be available to courts the best and most reliable evidence possible as to whether a suspect was or was not in fact guilty. Some of us tried to bring that about during the Committee stage by moving for a compulsory test. As I understood it, two main objections to a compulsory test were put forward by Government spokesmen, in particular by the noble Viscount who leads the House. The first was that a compulsory blood test might amount to something like a personal assault. I could not help thinking that there were some somewhat imaginative pictures of people—screaming victims—being held down. Many of us have been blood donors, and I am sure we have never seen anything of that sort during that process.
VISCOUNT HAILSHAM: My Lords, my noble friend does not overlook the fact that he is dealing with people who are not entirely sober.
LORD ELTON: Yes; I make allowance for that. I admit that one might get one in a thousand who had to be held down, but let us waive that point. The objection is that it was, or might be, regarded as involving something like an assault. The first object of this Amendment is to get round that difficulty. In Norway they get round it by one of their latest Acts, which I think was brought in last year and which provides that a person who refuses to co-operate with the doctor or to undergo a medical inspection automatically loes his driving licence for two years. If within five years of the first offence he is again found guilty of the same offence of refusing to undergo an inspection when suspected of being drunk in charge of a car, then he loses his licence permanently. I should have preferred something of that sort. But this Amendment, although it does not go as far as that, does put some pressure

977
on the suspect to submit to one or other of the tests which the Government propound in this Bill.
There was, however, another objection, and one which interested me a good deal. It was put forward by the noble Viscount, and I am not sure I understood it. When I moved my Amendment for a compulsory test, the noble Viscount said [OFFICIAL REPORT, VOL 230 (No. 71), col. 982]:
"There simply is not the apparatus available, at the different hours of the night and day at which suspects are taken in, … All the noble Lord "—
that is myself—
"is providing by this particular Amendment is that the police cannot get a conviction in cases of this kind, even though the clinical evidence and the evidence of behaviour is absolutely overwhelming, unless one of these scientific tests is taken—";
and he pointed out that it could not always be taken, because the apparatus is not available. What I want to know is: was not the noble Viscount then thinking in terms solely of the blood test? That objection may be valid in respect of blood tests—I say "may be", because they have had blood tests in Norway for more than 30 years; and anyone who has driven motor cars in Norway, as I have scores of times, knows that the distance between police stations may well be up to seven hours of driving along roads bordered by unguarded precipices. Yet they have blood tests in Norway, and I believe the explanation of it is that the police have the right to take the suspect not to a police station but to a doctor, and a doctor may perhaps be more readily available than a police station in that country, and I should have thought might be available in this country also. However, let us waive the blood test point.
The point I really wish to make is that here we have three possible tests put forward in the Bill. The urine test requires no apparatus whatever, except the bottle suitably prepared which can subsequently be despatched to a registered police laboratory. How can it be said, in a country which is proposing to advance with space exploration, that it is beyond the capacity of our administrators and scientists to provide that bottles should be available in every police station? How can it be said, in other words, that the test is not available? As regards the urine test, I am sorry that my noble friend Lord
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Silkin again reverted to the possibility that the test is not reliable, because I should have thought that anyone who had studied the Drew Report or the B.M.A. Report would have been persuaded that it is infinitely more reliable than any of our present methods, and is quite reliable enough for us to do what the Government are in fact proposing to do in this Bill—that is, to make it one of the means of testing the drunkenness of a suspect.
On May 11, as was reported in several newspapers, the Association of Police Surgeons had its annual general meeting, and they sent to Mr. Marples a telegram in the course of which they said:
"Specimens of urine serve equally well, and may be obtained without risk."
The noble Lord is, of course, aware that for some eighteen years in Glasgow urine tests have been the order of the day. They have been found perfectly satisfactory. The vast majority of persons who have been examined have agreed to the test. The authorities have accepted it as just and fair. Out of 522 persons proceeded against on this basis during the year 1957, which is the latest year for which I have any exact information, only 25 were acquitted. Out of 494, 457 were fined or sent to prison.
In effect, this Amendment is simply designed to put some pressure—pretty feeble pressure, I think, in view of the known reluctance of justices to impose the fines which they may impose—on suspects to submit themselves to this test. Once we dispose of the argument that these facilities are not available, surely we are brought up against the fact that the test is used in Glasgow, and has been used for eighteen years, with complete success. If it can be used with success, it surely brings about what we all want to bring about, which is that the best possible evidence as to guilt or innocence should be available to the courts.
LORD TEYNHAM: My Lords, I am certainly against this Amendment, which seems to me to bring in a form of compulsion. If the noble Viscount the Leader of the House will allow me to quote his words—if he is not going to quote them himself—may I say that I think they meet the case extremely well. He said on the Committee stage, on this same part of the clause [OFFICIAL REPORT, Vol. 230 (No. 71), col. 1007]:

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"It is a reasonable compromise between severity, which would involve the compulsory test of the kind I have resisted, and laxness, which would allow anybody to refuse a test without that fact being immediately in evidence at the trial."
I entirely agree with those words. Then the noble Lord, Lord Douglas of Barloch, who I do not think is in the House, went further and said that the intention of the clause,
"as I understand it, is simply to allow the fact of the man having been asked for a test, and his refusal to undergo it, to be given in evidence. Surely that is sufficient."
I certainly agree entirely with all those words.
3.29 p.m.
LORD DERWENT: My Lords, I opposed this Amendment when it was moved during the last stage of the Bill on the ground that it created an entirely new offence hitherto unknown, and I so argued on that basis. I will not weary your Lordships by doing the same thing again, but if I may take the argument which was put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, in moving the Amendment, I should like to use the same basis against it. First of all, may I say that my noble friend Lord Elton argued a large part of his case not on the clause as it stands but on how it might stand; and he has come down to one of the three types of testing for which the clause is asking.
The noble Lord, Lord Silkin, said that he was against the whole clause and not pressing this Amendment because at the moment testing was unsatisfactory—I think that is a fair way of putting what he said. I propose to go back to the conference of police surgeons, mentioned by my noble friend Lord Elton, about which I had a question down to-day. These surgeons are experts who deal with drunken drivers and test them now. May I quote, instead of the one sentence given by my noble friend, the last two paragraphs of the telegram from the conference? I will run them into each other, though there are some words in between.
"Withdrawal of blood for the purpose of estimating the concentration of alcohol in the tissues is undesirable. Specimens of urine serve equally well, and may be obtained without risk.… It was further agreed that apparatus at present available for the examination of the breath for estimation of the alcohol content is complex, and its results are not sufficiently reliable to be acceptable by a court."
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I put it to the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, that the situation which he described that these three tests are in an insufficiently advanced state to be acceptable—certainly does not apply. I would hope that he may seek to withdraw his Amendment and follow my noble friend Lord Teynham into the Lobby, if my noble friend divides the House on a later Amendment.
LORD CONESFORD: My Lords, I hope that Her Majesty's Government will not accept this Amendment. It is to be noticed that the two noble Lords in whose name the Amendment stands take precisely opposite views on the merits of the clause. The noble Lord, Lord Silkin, has indicated that if there is a Division on the Motion to leave out the clause, he would support its omission. On the other hand, the noble Lord, Lord Elton, likes the clause and desires to strengthen it. I think it is worth pointing out that the two noble Lords are entirely opposed to one another.
LORD SILKIN: My Lords, may I put the noble Lord right? There is not the conflict that he is making out. I am in favour of the principle of testing. I have some doubt whether it is sufficiently advanced and I only want this clause omitted and something else put in its place—that is, power to the Government, when they feel the time is ripe, to provide for testing by regulation. It really amounts to the same thing.
LORD CONESFORD: My Lords, if I in any way misinterpreted the noble Lord, I am glad that he has put me right. I certainly think that scientific knowledge has made sufficient advances amply to justify the clause which Her Majesty's Government have inserted in this Bill. Let me say at once that this Amendment has not quite the objections to it that the previous Amendment for compulsory testing had.
In my submission, the argument against the present Amendment is simply this. It is not useful to create a new criminal offence, if the creation of that offence is wholly unnecessary for the purpose in view. The fact that a refusal of test without reasonable cause can be given in evidence, as it can under the part of the clause which we have already passed, means that there is an effective

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pressure to undergo the test, if there is no reasonable cause for refusing it. For that reason, to make a criminal offence of the refusal is wholly unnecessary for the purpose which the Government have in mind.
It is also worth observing, though I do not profess to have examined all the legal provisions applicable in countries where such tests are used, that in many of them they find it effective to provide for these tests without creating a new criminal offence out of refusal. On an earlier stage, I ventured to give the example of one State in the United States which provided that consent to undergo a test should be presumed in a driver who applied for a licence and, if the test were refused, as in the Norwegian example which the noble Lord, Lord Elton mentioned, there is a sanction of taking away the licence. There are other methods which can be used, but the short point is that there is no necessity at all for a criminal offence to effect the purpose which the Government have in mind. And since the creation of a new criminal offence is unnecessary, it is also, on that ground, undesirable.
VISCOUNT BRENTFORD: My Lords, as your Lordships know, I dislike all the contents of this clause. Nevertheless, I sincerely hope that the Government will not accept the Amendment we are now considering, because to my mind it makes a complete mockery of any sort of justice that we may be seeking to insert into this statutory provision. As I understand it, Clause 2 (1) gives any person who is charged with an offence under this clause the right to refuse his consent to this particular form of test. The Amendment says, in effect, "Yes, but if he exercises this right, which Parliament has given, to refuse his consent to this test, he shall be fined up to £100." That does not seem to me to be carrying out justice in any way at all. I do not see how we can give a person the right to withdraw his consent and then, if he does so, make him liable to a criminal conviction.
3.37 p.m.
VISCOUNT HAILSHAM: My Lords, the Government cannot accept this Amendment, and once more I will try to give our reasons for saying, with my noble and learned friend, that it is a wholly confusing proposal, which would
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achieve nothing worth achieving. We decided, and the House endorsed our decision on Committee stage, after careful consideration, not to create a new offence of having a definite percentage of alcohol in the blood. If we had taken a contrary decision on that point, there might have been some value in compulsory tests. But we decided, at any rate in the present state of development, that these tests were valuable in conjunction with the other evidence—for example, eccentricities of driving and behaviour and other clinical symptoms—in ascertaining the truth about the quantity of alcohol consumed. For that purpose they are as adequate and as reliable as other tests ordinarily used as evidence in the criminal courts. They are not absolutely conclusive or foolproof, but they are perfectly adequate by the standards by which we judge our criminal procedure.
What we decided to do, therefore, was to allow the use of these tests—in fact, they are used at the moment in certain parts of the country for this purpose—and to provide for what their effect would be. We recognised that an unreasonable refusal would be one of the circumstances to which a court could look to draw a proper inference against an accused person in a proper case. That is the purpose for which we are using these tests and in that context they are valuable.
On Committee stage, I pointed out to my noble friend Lord Elton that it is not only unpracticable but undesirable to insist upon a test in every case. Clinical evidence may be quite sufficient without it; and there may be reasons why, in a particular case, a test, whether of urine, of blood or of breath, cannot be made available at the right moment. Urine is easily the most commonly available, but there are subjects who find it impossible to produce a sample, and there may be difficulty in collecting from women when the only persons present are men. I am not as satisfied as my noble friend appears to be that the mere provision of some kind of bottle is good enough in order to satisfy the requirements of the test.
The points about universality that I made on Committee stage do not really arise in relation to this particular Amendment. The arguments that I presented were designed to meet a particular Amendment which my noble friend

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Lord Elton put forward on Committee stage, and which was not persisted in. I am bound to say that I do not understand the argument of the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, that either these tests ought to be applied in every case, whether necessary or not, or they should not be applied in any case. That seems to me to be a false dilemma. They are useful in probably a wider range of cases than they are used in at present, but I should not think that they ought to be used everywhere, or not at all. That would prevent a number of convictions where the evidence amply supported a conviction without any test.
The reasons we have felt impelled to accept against a compulsory test are, I should have thought, amply sufficient. First of all, there is the question of public opinion. I do not suppose that anybody who lived through the Committee stage in this House—and, indeed, nobody who has listened to the three or four speeches which have come from my noble friend in this House during this short debate—could fail to realise that we must have public opinion behind us if we are to carry confidence in the use of these tests by the police. I would say that it is plain beyond peradventure that, if we were to make it an offence to refuse to submit to a test, we should not have public opinion behind us to that degree necessary in the light of the speeches that we have heard in this House, which represent wide and powerful opinions outside this House.
But the ultimate and, to my mind, conclusive answer against the Amendment is that given by my noble and learned friend Lord Conesford. There was a modiæval philosopher who used the latin tag called "Occam's Razor": Entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem. I should like an amendment of "Occam's Razor" to say: Crimina non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem. The only effect of this Amendment is to create a new crime—it does not do anything else—and before we create a new crime we should at least discuss whether any advantage is obtained by anybody if we do so.
The answer, as my noble and learned friend pointed out, is that, in the context of the way in which these tests are being used, there is no advantage in creating
984
a new crime, for this reason: that we have decided to use the tests as an aid to discovering whether a man is fit to drive, and to use a refusal as one of the relevant circumstances to be taken into account if he does in fact refuse. One of two circumstances must be true: either you could prove the substantive offence of being unfit to drive by reason of alcohol in the light of the refusal, as we propose to do, in which case nothing additional is gained by adding refusal as a second charge to the charge sheet, because the more serious offence will be proved; or alternatively, you cannot, in which case any court would be driven to assume that the accused person was innocent of the substantive offence, because he will not have been proved guilty, despite his refusal, in which case I cannot conceive of any court of just-minded magistrates imposing any significant penalty under the new clause. In other words, it is fundamentally a confused state of reasoning which has led my noble friend Lord Elton and the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, to propose compulsion in this particular case. For that reason, I would urge the House not to accept the Amendment.
3.45 p.m.
THE EARL OF ARRAN: My Lords, I do not like this Amendment. I think it goes too far. But since I have moved in the direction of the spirit behind it, this might be a good moment—
VISCOUNT HAILSHAM: I think I can possibly guess some part of what my noble friend is going to say, and I expect he would wish to speak on my noble friend Lord Teynham's Amendment, which has not yet been moved. I am not sure whether he would not find that a more appropriate occasion.
THE EARL OF ARRAN: I do not know whether it is appropriate for me to say so, but I have to get away.
VISCOUNT HAILSHAM: By all means; I am sorry.
THE EARL OF ARRAN: Your Lordships may remember that in Committee I suggested that these tests were somewhat misleading, and I accepted a challenge from the noble Viscount the Leader of the House to undergo further tests. These tests have now been made. I must confess that at the beginning there

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was some little dispute between the noble Viscount and myself as to what form the alcohol should take. The noble Viscount suggested, rather austerely, I thought, neat alcohol; but I pointed out to him that the most vicious drunkard would hardly ask for a double surgical spirit and soda. The noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, smartly countered by saying that with a slice of lemon it tasted quite delicious.
The tests were taken at Scotland Yard, with a doctor from the Medical Research Council in attendance. Here I must stress the extreme courtesy of the police. What I thought would be a minor ordeal turned out to be the most pleasant and informative occasion. Samples were also given to the biochemist who took the previous test. I thought, however, that I should not rest content with purely chemical tests. Other noble Lords, and I myself, expressed concern in Committee about the undeniable fact that one man can absorb far greater quantities of alcohol than another without prejudice to his judgment. It therefore struck me as important that we should have not only evidence of the alcohol content in the system, but also a report from those present at my imbibings on the psychological reactions of the guinea pig and his general capacity or incapacity to drive. This report I also have. I propose, first of all, to give quite briefly the results of the biochemical tests, and I will then follow up with the witnesses' observation of my general condition. I hope, incidentally, that I shall be forgiven if I seem to be reading a great part of this speech, but we finished our tests and discussions only last night.
For the tests I had what I had before, a quarter bottle of whisky, having abstained from drinking alcohol for the previous twenty hours. The results, both from the police laboratory and from the biochemist, were in the last analysis—and I repeat in the last analysis—almost identical. But there was this difference: that when I had drunk nothing, the police reading was 00, but that from my friend the biochemist was 9. That is an important difference, your Lordships may say; and, indeed, it is. But the point is that the methods of distillation are different. In one, with no alcohol in the system, you get a zero reading straight
986
away; and in the other you get a plus figure resulting from what is called the blank. But that figure is constant, and you subtract it automatically when you come to the final conclusion. Your Lordships may say that this makes a standard form of analysis desirable; and this may be so. But what matters is that the final results are the same.
My Lords, a biochemist attached to a hospital cannot afford to make mistakes. On his analysis may depend the life or death of human beings. And I am convinced that my friend does not make mistakes. I make this point most particularly, because in our earlier debate g noble Lord questioned his competence. I was sorry about this, and I would hope that the noble Lord in question would withdraw that remark. What we say in this House under privilege can be of deep consequence to individuals.
That point having been, I hope, satisfactorily cleared up, may I come to the second part of the Report, that which deals with my personal reactions to this large quantity of alcohol? On this the three observers are brief, but deeply informative. They say they were satisfied (1) that I showed evidence of being under the influence of alcohol, and (2), that in normal circumstances I should not be in any danger of being charged with being under the influence of alcohol to such an extent as to be incapable of having proper charge of a motor vehicle. Your Lordships might think that I am going to argue from this that it is safe for anyone to drive a motor car when having drunk a quarter of a bottle of whisky on an empty stomach. I am going to do no such thing. I am convinced that a young woman or a younger person, or someone less accustomed to alcohol than myself, would be quite unsafe after half that quantity.
What I am going to argue is that there is a possibility of injustice in these quasi-compulsory tests. You are going to penalise the man who is found after an accident to have large quantities of alcohol in his blood, though in fact he may be in full, or almost full possession of his faculties. You may let off a man or woman who, for the first time in his or her life, has had two double whiskies and is utterly incapable of driving, though the alcohol content in his blood may be small. For let us not deceive ourselves,

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juries and justices are going to be deeply impressed by these tests, and we can only hope that they will regard them as what they are—purely ancillary evidence.
I would say that in logic these tests cannot be defended. They may be factually and scientifically correct, but they do not take into consideration that most vital thing, human reaction and human element. My reason tells me that we should not have them. But, as I told your Lordships, I spent the day of the tests in Scotland Yard with people who know about death, accidental or contrived —policemen who, because of the grisly nature of their police duties, are not given to sentimentality. During the course of the day they told me much about road accidents, and they gave it as their confirmed view that drunken driving was one of the greatest single factors in road deaths to-day. I could not but be shocked and impressed. What finally settled it for me was when it was graphically pointed out that, had I seen the number of fine young bodies lying on the slab, mutilated and dead for no purpose, I should not only favour a statutory figure for the alcohol content of a driver's blood beyond which he should be declared incapable of driving, but I would demand that no one be allowed to drive if he had drunk any alcohol at all. An emotional argument if you like, my Lords, but from an unemotional man. And it convinced me. I think these tests may in the odd case lead to injustice, but they may save life and, therefore, I believe we must have them.
On Question, Amendment negatived.

ZANZIBAR
3.55 p.m.
THE EARL OF PERTH: My Lords, I think it would be convenient if I now made the promised statement about Zanzibar. I regret that, as noble Lords will know, there has been serious rioting and loss of life in Zanzibar. The disturbances, which began on the 1st June during the election poll, are the result of tension between the African and Arab communities, and started with a number of sudden isolated incidents which took place at polling stations in Zanzibar town. The situation quickly deteriorated. Large crowds gathered in open spaces and small gangs in the maze of small streets in Zanzibar town attacked indi-
988
viduals. There has been a number of incidents on each following day. The British Resident declared a State of Emergency on June 1 and has imposed a curfew from 7 p.m. to 6 a.m. The police have been reinforced by two general service units of the Kenya Police, by the 5th Battalion of the King's African Rifles, and two companies of the 6th Battalion. I regret to say that so far 47 persons have been reported dead, and that among some 300 injured, 78 have been admitted to hospital. The total number of arrests to date is 575, including gangs attempting to loot. The security forces have now been deployed throughout the two islands of Pemba and Zanzibar, and the latest report is of quieter conditions. My right honourable friend is in close touch with the British Resident.
VISCOUNT ALEXANDER OF HILLSBOROUGH: My Lords, I am much obliged to the noble Earl for giving us the statement which has been made in another place. I am sure we shall all be concerned at the size of the serious loss of life and the number of injured which have been the consequence of this outbreak. We are glad to notice that there have been substantial reinforcements in the force available now for the maintenance of security, and I hope very much that the quieter conditions now operating will come back to complete peace in the community. But there has been some criticism as to the state of information in the possession of the authorities as to what kind of contingents there were going to be, and what security forces were required. One is a little anxious about communities of this sort, which perhaps are shaping up for self-government. If we do not see that proper steps are taken to have sufficient security forces to see a general election through, it does not augur very well for the future. I do not know whether the noble Earl could tell us why they should have been so imperfectly provided beforehand with the necessary security forces to see the election through.
THE EARL OF PERTH: My Lords, I know that all the House regrets these events and, as the noble Viscount has said, we hope that the quieter conditions will prevail. On the point about why there were not further security forces at the time of the elections, I

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would say this, first of all. There were elections only a short while ago—some six months ago—and at that time the forces were quite adequate. What happened this time I do not know in detail, but it is quite clear from the reports that the outbreak came on unawares and unplanned. I think there was no good ground to expect something different this time from the last.
LORD OGMORE: My Lords, while agreeing with the noble Viscount that we are all very shocked at the loss of life and the damage to people, and possibly to property, in this territory, may I ask the noble Earl whether, in view of the statement by the Civil Secretary that the situation is quiet but confused and politically dangerous, and also the information which we have that there is considerable apprehension in the island of Pemba, he is satisfied that the present forces in those two islands are sufficient to maintain adequate security there?
THE EARL OF PERTH: My Lords, I think the quotation the noble Lord used was made by the Civil Secretary perhaps yesterday or the day before, whereas my report which talks of the quieter conditions was given to us at about lunch-time. Therefore, to that extent the situation is a little happier. On the question of whether we are satisfied that there are adequate forces, I can only say that if the British Resident felt there was need for any further increase, of course we would take the necessary steps.
VISCOUNT ALEXANDER OF HILLSBOROUGH: My Lords, in view of the explanations he was giving just now as to why the possibility of this kind of outbreak was not known and provided for, may I ask the noble Earl whether the Secretary of State might consider having a special inquiry into the circumstances. It does not seem to me to be a very satisfactory explanation. Usually you do not get an outbreak of this magnitude and with such serious results to life and limb without having at least some intimation beforehand that it is likely to arise. Could we have an inquiry?
THE EARL OF PERTH: I was not trying to give a complete explanation of the reasons for the outbreaks in answer to what the noble Viscount said about
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why we did not foresee the event. I was trying to make the point that there had previously been elections recently and the situation had not been dangerous. On the question of an inquiry, I would say that until things are a little more clear it would not be proper to consider that, but a little later it would be something that I should be glad to look at again.
VISCOUNT ALEXANDER OF HILLSBOROUGH: Perhaps if we repeated the question in a week's time the noble Earl would give an answer.
THE EARL OF PERTH: I think that would be an entirely reasonable suggestion.

ROAD TRAFFIC BILL [H.L.]
4.2 p.m.
Report stage resumed.
THE EARL OF DUNDEE: My Lords, this is part of Amendment No. 1 which we have already accepted. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 2, line 15, at end insert—
(" (4) Where the accused, at the time a specimen of blood or urine was taken from or provided by him, asked to be supplied with such a specimen, evidence of the proportion of alcohol or any drug found in the specimen shall not be admissible on behalf of the prosecution unless—

(a) the specimen is either one of two taken or provided on the same occasion or is part of a single specimen which was divided into two parts at the time it was provided; and

(b) the other specimen or part was supplied to the accused and, if he so required, was so supplied in a container of a type prescribed for the purposes of this section by regulations made by the Secretary of State.") —(The Earl of Dundee.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.
LORD TEYNHAM: My Lords, I put down this Amendment to leave out Clause 2 not perhaps, as the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, may think, with a view to striking out the clause but rather to obtain a statement from the Government as to whether an inquiry has been made as to the extent to which blood, breath and urine tests can be effective in disclosing the amount of drugs which have been taken by motorists—drugs which, either in conjunction with alcohol or otherwise, may have some material effect in impairing his ability to drive,

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Your Lordships will no doubt remember that during the Committee stage of the Bill the Leader of the House, in reply to a question by the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, used these words:
"I should certainly not think that the same tests which would be applicable to alcohol in the blood, urine and breath would necessarily be valid for drugs".
I think he further went on to say that he would cause an inquiry to be made. Perhaps it would be possible for Her Majesty's Government to make a statement on this matter. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Leave out Clause 2.—(Lord Teynham.)
LORD LUCAS OF CHILWORTH: My Lords, I shall find it very difficult not to support this Amendment, if the noble Lord, Lord Teynham intends to press it —he now says that he does not. Perhaps if he had said that before, when he was asked by the noble Lord, Lord Derwent, it might have save the House some inconvenience. Because my Lords, I am one of those who believe that we must have these tests. I think they have to be made compulsory and there must be inserted in this Bill a standard of alcoholic content, either in the urine or in the blood, above which guilt is automatic; as the noble Earl Lord Arran, said, a content of alcohol in the system that is sufficient to impair the proper and safe driving of a motor vehicle.
I believe this sincerely, and during the Recess and since the Committee stage I have made further investigations—though not the same kind of investigations as were made by the noble Earl, Lord Arran. I sat through two whole days of quarter sessions listening to two charges of being drunk while driving a motor car. Incidentally, it was cheering to me to note that, despite popular opinion, in each of these cases a verdict of guilty was found by the jury. They could hardly have come to any other verdict on the evidence. In one case the whole of the evidence was medical: there was no other witness, because the accident which led to the prosecution happened very early in the morning. Unquestionably the accident could not have happened if the driver of the car had not been under the influence of drink: but the question was: to what extent?
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The medical evidence by the police surgeon and by the doctor called for the defence went on for 2½ hours, in examination, cross-examination and reexamination. After the case was over I asked why this was, in spite of the fact that an analyst, who gave his evidence clearly and well, had stated that the alcoholic content found in the urine of this man was sufficient to support the charge. I forget the number he had reduced it to, of pints of beer, or single whiskies; but it was far higher than any content that I have heard in clinical measurements mentioned in your Lordships' House. Now that has convinced me. I asked why all these other tests were necessary, and I was told that the reason is that a police surgeon must be certain that, when he is cross-examined, the defending counsel cannot point to one thing he has not done. As I have said, in the case I heard the interminable argument went on between counsel. And it is, of course, their duty to put questions.
If this Bill goes through as it stands to-day, if this clause goes through without there being prescribed a definite standard, and without any compulsion, in what way will the situation be different from what it is to-day? The noble Lord, Lord Conesford, almost convinced me with his argument that, as the Bill is now drafted, there is as good as a compulsory test. But the argument by defending counsel is going to be: "But my client can stand more drink than that; he is a hardened drinker. Six whiskies and sodas are nothing to him". My Lords, are you going to add to this turmoil of argument? What are you doing to correct the position in which we find ourselves to-day? I hope that the noble and learned Viscount the Leader of the House will give a specific answer to this question; how much further does this clause take us, as it is in this Bill to-day, than where we are without it?
If we deleted this clause should we be any worse off than we are to-day? I doubt it. First of all it will only give rise to more argument, the first grounds of which will be: why did the defendant refuse the test? That is going to be the argument. Is that going to be taken as a sign of guilt? Legal argument on that point will go on and on; then when that argument is finished, in the absence of

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any standard of alcoholic content counsel are going to argue and argue again.
Are we going to take public opinion with us? As I said on Second Reading, I think that the Government have made a mistake. They adopted the principle that to correct the evil of driving when under the influence of alcohol drivers should be subject to a test, and then, in my view, they ran away from it. I do not think they are prepared at the present time—and in this they may be right—to go "the whole hog", if I may use the expression.
VISCOUNT HAILSHAM: No, you may not.
LORD LUCAS OF CHILWORTH: With, of course, apologies to the noble and learned Viscount, the Leader of the House. I do not think the Government are achieving anything by putting this subsection into the Bill until, first, they are satisfied with the tests, and secondly, they are satisfied that they can make one of them compulsory, or if they do not want to have them compulsory, they can make them quasi-compulsory, if I can use that expression, as they are. But there must, in my view, be a standard. Where the content is above that standard there is no argument. The only argument that can then take place, in either the magistrates' court or quarter sessions, is in mitigation, but the man is guilty.
I agree with what the noble Earl, Lord Arran, said. It is no good giving loopholes for argument that one man's constitution can absorb more alcohol than another. You are never going to get anywhere like that. My hope is that the Government—and I think they would be wise to do so—will drop this particular clause entirely, let the matter stand as the law stands to-day, re-think the whole matter out until they are satisfied that they have the apparatus that can satisfy themselves, whether it is an agglomeration of the three tests or any one of the three. I think the Government would be well-advised to have another think, as perhaps they already intend to do, and to drop this clause out of the Bill and bring in, perhaps in another place, or back in your Lordships' House at some time next Session, a proper and well-thought-out standard on which medical opinion can agree and which the House and the public will support.
VISCOUNT HAILSHAM: My Lords, may I deal first of all with the second speech to which we have listened and then come back to that of my noble friend, Lord Teynham? I somewhat faint before the prospect of saying again what I have now said three or four times about the standard of alcohol in the blood. It was argued exhaustively in Committee, and the House has endorsed three or four times our decision not to have one. I would only, therefore, condense in a very shortened form the arguments which seem to me to be overwhelmingly against it. The truth of the matter is that neither the tests nor the standard have adequate scientific validity to justify what is proposed. Assuming that there is—as there certainly is—a wide range of idiosyncrasy in the human body, any Government that sought to impose a standard of alcohol in the blood as a conclusive test for this offence, or alternatively to make the standard itself into a new offence, would be faced with an impossible dilemma, which I thought the House had accepted. Either the standard asserted in the Act would be too low, in which case a number of perfectly innocent people would be convicted or it would be too high, in which case a number of drunkards would treat it as a minimum. There is really no way out of that dilemma. We have taken what we believe to be the reasonable course, and the House has supported us, and I would ask the House to support us again.
As regards the remarks of my noble friend, Lord Teynham, I think I was completely accurate in what I said in Committee, but, as I promised, I have made inquiries about drug tests. I should like, therefore, to make the following observations, which are the result of that investigation. In practice testing for drugs, as distinct from drink, is extremely rare. Testing for salicylates—that is, the aspirin group of drugs—is carried out as a matter of routine in every case where a sample of urine is analysed, but testing for other drugs is not carried out unless the forensic science laboratory is notified in advance that there is reason to think that a specified drug is present in the sample. In the ordinary course the medical practitioner who carries out the clinical examination at 'the police station will ascertain whether the

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accused is suffering from the effects of a drug; sometimes the police inquiries will elicit this information. Chemical testing for drugs on the relatively small specimens usually provided by accused drivers is a more difficult matter than testing for alcohol, and it will not always be possible to make any precise quantitative analysis, although the analyst will probably be able to say whether the drug is present in a relatively large or relatively small quantity.
Of course, it might be represented that since existing methods of testing for drugs do not always produce accurate results, the provisions concerning the admission of evidence of the proportion of a drug, again as distinct from alcohol, found in a specimen ought to be taken out of Clause 2, and, in particular, that a refusal to submit to a test for drugs ought not to be admissible as evidence in support of the prosecution. I think it is relevant to say that the provisions in the Bill with regard to the submission of evidence about chemical testing for drugs, being purely permissive, are better in than out, and in practice there is no danger of the defence being prejudiced, since such evidence would be given on behalf of the prosecution only if it was scientifically valid.
LORD LUCAS OF CHILWORTH: My Lords, before the noble and learned Viscount continues, would he be kind enough to answer the specific question I asked him? If this clause goes through, how will the law be altered from what it is to-day in regard to these tests? Because the noble and learned Viscount himself said in a speech he made this afternoon that the urine test is taken to-day in quite a lot of cases in the country.
VISCOUNT HAILSHAM: I am a little puzzled as to exactly what it is the noble Lord wants. Clause 1, of course, slightly alters the statutory definition of the offence.
LORD LUCAS OF CHILWORTH: I am referring to Clause 2.
VISCOUNT HAILSHAM: None of the provisions in Clause 2 is spelt out in the existing law. One of the advantages of Clause 2 is that it clarifies the existing law. There are people who would say
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that the existing law goes as far as Clause 2, and there are others who would say that it does not go nearly so far. One of the great advantages of Clause 2 is that it clarifies the existing law. It also includes a number of quite valuable provisions, some of which have been inserted by this House in Committee, for the supervision of the tests and for the protection of the subject when they are applied. These are real advances in the protection of the subject, and I should have thought were real improvements in existing practice. It is, of course, quite true, if the noble Lord wishes to take the point, that this is an evolutionary and not a revolutionary clause. It is based upon existing practice. It is based upon the existing offence and not a different offence, and it really provides a clear method of ascertaining, so far as science can, the actual amount of alcohol consumed by means of the blood content, as a guide in conjunction with other evidence, to elucidate the question whether the accused person is fit to drive within the definition of Clause 1. Because the existing law cannot, I think, be stated with complete confidence, it is equally not possible to state with complete confidence how much further we have in fact gone.
LORD TEYNHAM: My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Viscount for his explanation on the question of drugs, and I therefore beg leave to withdraw my Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 3:
Disqualification on conviction of certain offences
3.—(1) Where a person is convicted of an offence specified in Part I of the First Schedule to this Act the court shall order him to be disqualified for such period not less than twelve months as the court thinks fit unless the court for special reasons thinks fit to order otherwise.
(3) Where a person convicted of an offence specified in the said Part I or the said Part II has within the three years immediately preceding the commission of the offence and since the commencement of this Act been convicted on not less than two occasions of an offence specified in those Parts, the court shall order him to be disqualified for such period not less than six months as the court thinks fit, unless the court for special reasons thinks fit to order otherwise.
4.20 p.m.
LORD CHESHAM LORD CHESHAM moved, in subsection (1), to leave out "otherwise" and insert:
"him to be disqualified for a shorter period or not to order him to be disqualified".
The noble Lord said: My Lords, these are minor Amendments to Clause 3 (1) and, if I may refer to it at the same time to save your Lordships' time, Amendment No. 14 is a similar Amendment to Clause 3 (3). These are the first Amendments to that clause; there are some others, and no doubt there will be some discussion about certain provisions of the clause. If I may, with respect, suggest this course, I think that perhaps the discussion would be better taken on the next or subsequent Amendments, and not on these Amendments because they are so minor. Perhaps your Lordships would consider accepting them in the meantime.
What they do is this. In subsections (1) and (3) there is provision that the court shall order disqualification in certain circumstances for minimum periods, unless the court for special reasons "thinks fit to order otherwise". The words "thinks fit to order otherwise" originated in the Road Traffic Act, 1930. Those words were right at that time to deal with cases where disqualification followed automatically from a conviction unless the court ordered that it was not to follow. They are not right to describe accurately the situation envisaged under this Bill, where the courts are required in certain circumstances to order disqualification but, if they do not wish to do so, are allowed to refrain from making an order, instead of making a definite order that it shall not happen. These Amendments are moved merely for greater clarity in the law, to make it plain that if the courts decide not to impose disqualification, they merely refrain from doing so, and are not required to make an order that the offender shall not be disqualified.
The only reason why the Amendment is not virtually drafting is that it makes clear and spells out that the court may also for special reasons order a period of disqualification less than that which is specified in Clause 3. I would ask your Lordships to accept these Amendments on that. As I said, my noble and learned friend the Leader of the House will in
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the near future be saying more about this, because it is an innovation. It is not one of great principle, but it enters into what he is going to say to your Lordships. I therefore ask that your Lordships will accept these Amendments, of which I beg to move first, Amendment No. 8.
Amendment moved—
Page 2, line 35, leave out ("otherwise") and insert the said new words.—(Lord Chesham.)
LORD SILKIN: My Lords, I am speaking personally when I say that I am willing to be accommodating and to go a long way in taking on faith what the noble Lord has said. I should like to be clear about one thing. There is reference in this clause to "special reasons". As I understand it, the law is that "special reasons" relate to the circumstances and not to the particular person who is accused. If this Amendment makes no change in that position, but merely clarifies the word "otherwise" as meaning less than twelve months or no disqualification at all, then I am perfectly satisfied. I should be glad to have the noble Lord's assurance that that is the position.
LORD CHESHAM: Yes, my Lords. It is rather difficult to explain so simple and small a matter without making it look most complicated, and I am sorry if I was not able to do it quite so explicitly as I should have liked. But that is what it means. It clarified the word "otherwise", but it would not have been honest, I think, if I had put it to your Lordships simply in that way without drawing attention to the fact that there has been inserted this provision that the time of disqualification may be less than that specified in the subsection as printed. In short, the answer to the noble Lord opposite is, Yes.
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
4.26 p.m.
EARL HOWE EARL HOWE moved to leave out subsection (3). The noble Earl said: My Lords, I have listened throughout much of the debate that took place on the Committee stage and to everything that has taken place here to-day. There is one thing about this Bill which does not inspire me with any confidence at all. I understand that under the Bill the power is taken from the courts to consider a

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case on its merits, and automatic disqualification takes place following the most minor incidents—those connected with tail-lights or headlights, or any minor incidents of that character of which one may think. May I ask the noble Lord, Lord Chesham, whether it is really a fact that, for some of the most minor offences, a person may suffer disqualification?
Then there comes the question that has just been referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Silkin—that of "special reasons". The ordinary motor driver will have no idea of what "special reasons" mean unless he can be told by the Government quite definitely what they are. We are told that "special reasons" depend upon a decision of one of Her Majesty's Courts of Justice. I do not know anything about that. I have not seen it in any Bill; I have not seen any definition of it, nor have I even heard one. In view of the very large number of cars and commercial vehicles on our roads to-day, surely we ought to be able to give better guidance than can be got from reading this Bill.
Take the case of a lorry driver whose tail-light goes out once, or perhaps twice; or maybe he takes a wrong road and goes somewhere where he ought not to go. He is convicted and his licence is taken away for six months. That man has lost his livelihood. Are you really going to take away a man's livelihood for offences of that sort? It seems to me a most tragic thing. I suppose it will be justified by saying that it is in the interests of road safety. But does road safety depend on a tail-light? Does it depend on a fellow taking a road that he ought not to take? Does it depend on silly things like that? It seems to me that we must have a definition of what are "special reasons", so that everybody can understand the definition, and so that a person knows that where special reasons are set out in the Act and that sort of thing, he will probably suffer for it. I, as a road user, have no idea of what "special reasons" may be. I have listened to the whole of the discussion on this Bill, but I have heard nothing to improve my knowledge.
I do not know whether the noble and learned Viscount who replies for the Government can do anything to help us,
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but I would ask, most sincerely, that the Government should, if possible, give us an idea of what "special reasons" are. And if, as I rather imagine from what has been said by the noble Lord, Lord Chesham, there is to be some alteration in the whole set-up of the Bill, I hope that it may be clearly explained to us, so that the ordinary individual like myself, without too much intelligence in these matters, and no legal knowledge, may quite clearly understand the position and thus avoid breaking what will be the law. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 2, line 39, leave out subsection (3).—(Earl Howe.)
LORD DERWENT: My Lords, I moved this self-same Amendment on the last stage, and the noble and learned Viscount my Leader persuaded the Committee that he was right and I was wrong. I still disliked the clause, but I was quite prepared to accept the judgment of the Committee. But what has happened? The noble Viscount the Leader of the House persuaded your Lordships on my Amendment, which was exactly the same as this Amendment we are now discussing, that this was not a matter of detail but was a matter of principle; and I agreed with him.
My noble friend will correct me if I am wrong in saying that the case for the Government was simply this: that there were certain offences (and they appear in Part I of the First Schedule) which were in themselves serious or dangerous. Then Part II of the same Schedule contained those offences which might be serious or might be dangerous. They could in most cases be trivial, but they were of such a kind that the Government felt that, even if they were trivial, if a man committed any of them three times in three years it meant he should lose his licence for six months. The principle had nothing to do with the seriousness of the offences; it was simply that he should not be on the road. We then came to the less serious offences in Part III of the Schedule. The case was put to the Committee and was accepted by a comparatively small majority.
But, my Lords, what do we find now? The whole principle on which my Amendment was defeated is thrown overboard. Certain offences which in themselves can be serious or deliberate.

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or which can be trivial are to come out of Part II of the Schedule. I quoted the actual case of a tail-lamp which had gone out when the driver was not in a position to know that it had gone out. Something of that nature is quite trivial. But suppose that a man, on a rather dark, foggy night, is late leaving his office and is going somewhere to dinner in the pouring rain. He finds that his tail-lamp has gone out and that he has not a spare bulb. If he takes the view, "I cannot be bothered; I must get to dinner", and gets in his car and drives to the dinner that is a most serious and dangerous offence, because it is deliberate. I should be glad if everything came out of this Part II. But why is this offence being taken out? It is not on the principle enunciated by the Government when they defeated my Amendment. I showed that an offence could be merely silly, and I said then that this subsection (3) could not be amended to make sense. I think that this proves it. There is, evidently no principle involved of the kind the Government put forward. I agree with what the Government said first of all: that this is a matter of principle. I maintain that this subsection is wrong in principle.
LORD TEYNHAM: My Lords, during the Committee Stage I put down an Amendment to subsection (3) of this clause which would have ensured that no individual would be unfairly or unreasonably penalised for offences which did not involve actual danger. Her Majesty's Government, in resisting this Amendment, said—and it was suggested by the noble Lord, Lord Derwent, I think—that the words "likely to involve danger" would better meet the case. The noble Viscount the Leader of the House indicated that he would consider this in relation to other undertakings, but he said that his difficulty was on the use of the word "danger". With all due respect, I would point out that this very word already appears in the Bill, in paragraph 22 of Part II of the First Schedule. In this it is laid clown that it is an offence to use a vehicle on the road under certain conditions
"so as to cause, or to be likely to cause, danger".
Those are, in fact, the very words suggested by my Amendment during the Committee stage. I hope, in view of the fact that the question of danger is al-
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ready covered in the Bill, that the noble Viscount will look at the whole matte again.
4.35 p.m.
VISCOUNT HAILSHAM: My Lords, I think it would be convenient if I used this Amendment from my noble friend Lord Howe to explain the various Amendments to Clause 3, to which we shall come a little later, which have been set down on behalf of the Government in the light of the criticisms of the clause which were made in Committee. I should like to say, to begin with, that I personally regard Clause 3 as, so far, the most valuable in the Bill; in fact I think that it is the acid test of the seriousness of this House in dealing with road accidents. I must say that absolutely plainly. Of course, I have some reason personally for knowing, I think, a little about motoring accidents. A very large part of my practice at the Bar was concerned with them. I have also departmental responsibility nowadays for the Road Research Laboratory, and I know how strongly they feel about matters of this kind.
Many, many times in your Lordships' House I have heard the kind of speech which says, "Let us deal severely with serious offenders but leave the ordinary motorist out of it." There is a certain amount of truth in that in dealing with drunken driving or with reckless driving which creates accidents. But it is my belief—and I say so quite frankly—that we have achieved the maximum or, at any rate, very nearly the optimum deterrent effect on really wicked driving by existing penalties and those which we propose in the Bill. In my experience, as in the experience of anybody who has a long acquaintance with accidents and their results, I think one is driven to the conclusion that the great majority of accidents in this country are due to negligence. They are not due to wickedness; they are due to negligence—the same kind of negligence that leads to accidents on the shooting field; the same kind of disregard of safety precautions that leads to accidents in the Army; the same kind of disregard of safety precautions that leads to accidents in factories. So unless we are going to deal with negligence we are not going to deal with accidents.

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Of course, one answer is better roads. We are not discussing that point at the moment, but no account of the matter would be adequate or proper unless one placed it in the perspective of better roads. Better roads are part of the policy of the Government and, I hope, of this House towards accidents. They reduce accidents enormously, because they reduce the consequences of human negligence in relation to driving; and, of course, that is part of the answer. But no amount of better roads will prevent fatal accidents with the increase of motor traffic; and it will be a very long time even on the most optimistic forecast, before we have a road system that will be adequate to reduce accidents even to the maximum to which good roads could reduce them.
In the meantime we have to face the fact that people disregard safety precautions. They go too fast; they do not keep a proper look out; they shoot over traffic lights; they drive on the wrong side of the road, and they disregard the white lines. Of course, danger is not always involved. That, quite honestly, is my answer to my noble friend Lord Teynham: it is impossible to say that danger is always involved. It depends on whether there is another man there. But that is the kind of practice which must be treated, I am afraid, as potentially lethal; and unless we are prepared to deal with this with a certain degree of seriousness of mind, without undue tenderness about it, we are not serious in our attempt to prevent motor accidents.
We know from experience that disqualification is the one punishment which is both appropriate to the crime and is effective. In 99 cases out of 100, imprisonment is wholly inappropriate. Imprisonment is always inappropriate for negligence, I should think—it is an appropriate punishment for wickedness—but disqualification is both appropriate and effective. The one fact on which there is absolute agreement among both those who have studied the question scientifically and those who have studied it in the courts is that it is an effective punishment.
We are not removing the discretion of the courts; my noble and learned friend is quite wrong about that. We never were. Still less are we removing the discretion of the courts under the
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proposals which I am about to explain. They will have a discretion except in the three or four most serious offences contained in Part I, and except in the circumstances where an accused person has committed three offences in Part II in three years. In each case then, the disqualification is automatic, subject to something which I am about to say, and in the absence of special reasons—another subject to which I must obviously refer, in view of what my noble friend has said. But I am afraid I must insist that, if we are serious about tackling accidents, there must be a class of cases in which disqualification becomes automatic for the disregard of safety precautions. There is room for a great deal of argument as to the circumstances in which that is right; there is room for a great deal of argument as to which offences it should apply: but I seriously say that, unless we are prepared to do it in some circumstances in relation to some offences, we shall not make a serious attack upon the accident figures.
Now I should like to cite one particular experience which establishes the importance of an automatic disqualification. We have, as a matter of fact, some very precise figures. Until three or four years back (I think 1956, but it was three or four years back) the punishment for the offence of driving while uninsured was automatic disqualification. The figures then were that there were about 22,000 convictions a year, and, under the automatic disqualification, 80 per cent. were disqualified. In the remaining 20 per cent., special reasons were found. We took it off in 1956. The result has been that the convictions have doubled—that is to say, the incidence of the crime has multiplied by two in less than four years—and the disqualifications have gone down to just over one-third. The truth of the matter is that if we want the end, which is to reduce the road accident figures, this is the means. We can refuse to take it, but then we are not serious about attacking road accidents—and I say that seriously.
I make no concealment of the fact that when this proposal was put forward on Second Reading every individual offence had been argued and re-argued by officials and Ministers inside the Government. I will say perfectly candidly to my noble friends that, if one looked

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at a Schedule containing about 35 offences (which I could name), one would find no two intelligent people who held exactly the same views about all 35. Therefore I approached the Committee stage without any preconceived ideas or dogmatism, except about one or two things which I have either mentioned or will mention. The result of the Committee stage, in my mind—and I was able, after having reported to my right honourable friend, to persuade him that this was right—was to lead me to two broad conclusions.
Perhaps I should say, by way of introduction, that Part II of the Schedule, which is the one we are really talking about at the moment, started on Second Reading with 24 offences in it. The result of the Committee stage, purely statistically, was that, owing to the Amendments proposed by my noble and learned friend Lord Conesford, that figure has arisen to 27 or so. I make no complaint about that. My noble friend Lord Conesford was slightly more severe than my colleagues had been at first blush in this matter; and, on the whole, the House supported him, and did not support the Government when we resisted his severity. That has been accepted by the Government as a clear indication of the wish of the House; and we accepted it in good faith and, I hope, reasonably. I am paying no idle compliment to the House in saving that I was quite convinced, when I brought these proposals to the House, that only an open discussion in Parliament would really improve them. We had gone as far as internal discussions inside the Government could possibly take them.
However, I came to two conclusions about the criticism which came from the other side. The criticism of my noble and learned friend Lord Conesford, in substance, was that we had omitted offences which ought to be there. The other criticisms were, on the whole, that we had been too severe: that we had included offences which we ought not to have included, and that the field was open, despite the fact that, among the millions of drivers that there are, there are relatively few—probably I could find out the statistics, but there are very few drivers—who are convicted three times in three years of these offences, even among the
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professionals who do over 100,000 miles a year. But there were criticisms that certain offences, by their very nature, were too trivial to be included in these severe offences; and, also, that the courts should be given a limited discretion. When I answered the Amendment of my noble friend Lord Derwent on Committee stage, I said frankly that I would go through the offences in the Schedule very carefully indeed to try to reduce those about which there could be legitimate doubt as to whether they ought to be included in the more severe provisions of Part II; and, secondly, that I would look into the question of a limited discretion.
My Lords, I and my colleagues have done both those things. In the first place, we have given the courts a limited discretion. We have done so by a machinery which I describe here only shortly, but which will be dealt with more fully in one of the subsequent Amendments. We have tied the automatic disqualification in Part II not to the fact of conviction, but to the fact of endorsement. If there are three endorsements, there is automatic disqualification. The question of endorsement, both in the first two offences and in the third, is now a question of limited discretion; but the discretion is limited by the doctrine of special reasons—special reasons fortified by the provisions which the noble and learned Lord on the Cross Benches, Lord Goddard, asked for in the Committee stage: that those reasons should be set out in a form in which they can be challenged in a superior court.
The provision as it stands, therefore, is that three convictions will result in endorsement on three occasions, and three endorsements make a disqualification if they take place within three years. But in the case of each endorsement in turn the court may, for special reasons, forgo it, and, in that case, it does not count for the purpose of automatic disqualification. After very careful consideration of all the alternatives, we have adhered to the phrase "special reasons", and we have decided, after various attempts, that it is quite impracticable—and, indeed, not in the interests of the motorist himself—to give an exhaustive or precise definition of what those special reasons can be. We think that would fetter the discretion of the courts too much.

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All I think the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goddard, said when he was sitting in a judicial capacity, was, in substance, two things. The first was that a special reason must be special and not general; the second was that it must apply to the circumstances of the offence, and not to the circumstances of the offender. Subject to that, the court can find anything a special reason, so far as I know, and the wider the discretion, the more I should have hoped my noble friend Lord Howe would have been pleased with the width of the definition. We thought at one time of introducing words like "trivial" or "inadvertent" into the definition, but we came to the conclusion that this was really not practical politics, and that the existing phrase, which has now been the subject of three or four decisions either in the Divisional Court or the Court of Criminal Appeal, is really the best way of tackling it. That is the first thing we did: to reintroduce a limited discretion of the court for special reasons to forgo endorsement, and thereby secure that each offence can be disregarded for the purpose of any subsequent automatic disqualification. That is a very substantial concession, but I think it is an improvement.
Secondly, we have, in a great deal of detail in Amendments which come later, pruned the list of offences which come within this part of the Schedule. That, again, I personally think of advantage. It so happens that all Lord Howe's examples have now been pruned away from the list. Every one that he chose will no longer count against the lorry driver: neither the lighting offence nor the choosing of the wrong road. So we have done a great deal to make concessions to criticisms we received in Committee. I do not agree at all with my noble friend Lord Derwent that we have thereby abandoned the principle. On the contrary, all we have done is to take account of the criticisms which have been levelled at us—that we were adopting too serious a view of what safety precautions to employ within the more severe provisions of the Act.
LORD DERWENT: My Lords, I, myself, never made that point about Part II. I never said that some were too serious or were not serious enough. The
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whole of my argument was that Part II left no discretion for the court at that time, whether serious or otherwise.
VISCOUNT HAILSHAM: My Lords, we have sought to take account of my noble friend's point, and I think we have kept the principle. There is one other thing that I ought to say, which I am afraid may not be altogether agreeable to my noble friend Lord Howe. One of the happiest memories of my youth was when I read in the paper that the Prince of Wales had fallen off his horse, and that the honourable Frank Curzon had been convicted of speeding. I am afraid the offence of speeding is still there, and I must say that it is there for a very good reason. We are convinced, and so is the Road Research Laboratory, that this is something which requires a realistic speed limit and requires just enforcement, and wise and legitimate enforcement. It is one of the things we have to tackle seriously if we want to reduce the road casualty figures. We are under no manner of doubt about that.
A very wide series of experiments in traffic engineering have been carried out, which have been published by Doctor R. J. Smeed, of the Road Research Laboratory, and the publication was reproduced in the publication Roads and Roads Construction. The effect of these is this. I want now to quote from a statement in another place by the Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister for Science, made only a few days ago. He said, in answer to a question [OFFICIAL REPORT, Commons, Vol. 640 (No. 111), col. 1089):
"The Road Research Laboratory has analysed data from a number of countries on the speed of traffic and on accident frequency before and after speed limits were imposed.
"It was found that speed limits, although exceeded by a high proportion of drivers, produced a major effect in reducing very high speeds. Their imposition in urban areas was usually followed by a marked reduction in serious accidents …".
Then he went on to say that it had little effect in reducing speeds just above the limit, or on the number of slight accidents.
That is our conviction, and I think it is the conviction of anyone who has had long experience of road accidents, either forensically or scientifically. I am

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bound to say that I regard the general provision that there should be some automatic disqualification attendant on what I might call "offence proneness" after a certain time, and on the inclusion of speeding within those offences, subject only to the revision of speed limits in a realistic sense, as the acid test of our seriousness in dealing with the question of road accidents. That is the attitude of the Government on this Amendment; and I hope, in defining it, that I have also made clear what is really being done in the Amendments which follow in the name of my noble friend.
4.55 p.m.
VISCOUNT BRENTFORD: My Lords, I should like to express my personal thanks to the noble Viscount the Leader of the House for having so fully explained the position of the Government in regard to this matter and for having taken us into his confidence as to the intention and object of the future Amendments which deal generally with this clause. May I say, straight away, that I share with him to the full, as I know he does, the passionate desire to do something to reduce road accidents? I also agree with him that this House will very largely be judged on the attitude it adopts towards seeking to achieve that aim. Also, I would remind him that on a previous discussion of this Bill I committed myself to the view that I had no personal objection to the principle of automatic disqualification.
Having said that, I must repeat that I do not think that this clause is the right way of achieving the objects that we have in mind. I wish I could think constructively of something better to offer the noble and learned Lord, but it is, as I think your Lordships are aware, exceedingly difficult for a Back Bencher to offer, on such a comprehensive and complex subject as this, a constructive Amendment which is going to be all-embracing. I think, however, that the Government have gone some way—a considerable way—toward meeting the criticisms which were addressed at a different stage in regard to this matter, and I am grateful to them for having done so.
I was surprised and rather apprehensive at one remark made by the noble and learned Viscount, if I understood him aright. In the first place, he argued, as I entirely agree, that the one effective
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deterrent and punishment in regard to the commission of offences which give rise to a lack of road safety is disqualification. But, having gone on to say that we are now seeking to establish the fact that the Government, and public opinion as a whole, is determined to improve road safety, he then, as I understood it, indicated that the probability is that, out of all the millions of drivers on the road, there would be only very few who would be likely, under the provisions of this Bill, to become subject to automatic disqualification. If that, in fact, is so, I think it is going to be exceedingly difficult to see how we are going to achieve our object. It is difficult for me to argue that there are going to be more disqualifications than my noble and learned friend anticipates—I hope with him that there will not be, for the reason that there will not need to be—but, on the other hand, if we are going to use disqualification as a deterrent, then I think it must so be used. I am exceedingly anxious, however, lest the number of offences which will qualify for disqualification should become so great as to render that particular form of punishment one which the courts become loth to inflict simply for the reason that it is becoming too common. I think that in the history of our country we have found that reaction coming from our courts, where they have felt that public opinion had swung round against the official view of what punishment fits the crime.
May I add one word on the question of speed limits? I think that this all depends on whether the Government intend speed limits to be imposed in a realistic and constructive manner. If the speed limits are in built-up areas, where there is a danger of children running across the road or of vehicles coming out from hidden turnings, I entirely concur. But I beg the Government to avoid falling into the error, which has been fallen into by many other countries, of imposing an all-over speed limit in open roads all over the country. This is totally unenforceable, unless there are speed cops and police traps all the way up such roads as the Great North Road. And they largely do away with their own object. Therefore I trust that the Government, if they are seeking to pursue this line, will adopt a realistic and sensible attitude towards it.

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Finally, I am frankly not seized with what are going to be considered "special reasons". Probably we shall have an opportunity of going into this in greater detail a little later, but I enter my caveat that, if special reasons are the reasons such as I have come to understand them to be from listening to the debates here, they may be too narrow for the purpose for which they are required.
LORD SOMERS: My Lords, I share with the noble and learned Viscount the Leader of the House the desire to reduce accidents on the road, but I venture to disagree with him on the question of speed limits. I also venture to disagree with the Road Research Laboratory on this point, though perhaps that is a bold thing to do. Any experienced motorist knows what is the safe speed to drive at. This word "speeding" is a very misleading term. Driving at a modest speed of 31 m.p.h. in a built-up area is, technically speaking, speeding. Let me make this quite plain. I am not in favour of driving faster than is absolutely safe on any given stretch of road in any given car by any given driver. But there are so many totally unnecessary speed limits that it is practically impossible, unless one drives with one's eyes glued to the speedometer, which I think is an extremely dangerous thing to do, to know whether one is going too fast. A great many people exceed the speed limit daily with impunity, but if this regulation comes into force, I fear that that impunity will no longer be there.
If a motorist is driving through London at 12 o'clock at night, I cannot see that there is much danger of a child suddenly running across the road, and though I would certainly not drive at 60 m.p.h., I do not see any harm in going up to 40 m.p.h., or something like that. Would it not be possible perhaps to put a time limit on speed limits? Would it not also be possible to restrict speed limits to those areas in which they are really necessary? We have only to drive round the country to see numberless futile impositions of speed limits on roads that are in open country. There is a stretch between Epsom and Leatherhead, which is completely open with the exception of Ashtead, yet is subject to a 30 m.p.h. limit the whole way.
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Disqualification is a very heavy punishment, and though I am all in agreement with its use for offences which are going to cause danger, I cannot see why a punishment of such severity should be imposed on anybody for exceeding by two or three miles a totally unreasonable speed limit. I have an Amendment down to move this offence from Part II to Part III, but I thought that this would be an appropriate moment to speak about it.
5.7 p.m.
LORD CONESFORD: My Lords, I think that the House would be prepared in a moment to come to a decision on this Amendment. I rise only because my noble and learned friend the Leader of the House was good enough to mention the Amendments which I sought to make, and which have been accepted by Her Majesty's Government, to add certain offences to Part II of the First Schedule. The only important point on which I differ from the speech which my noble and learned friend made in dealing with this Amendment is that he sought to connect the merits of subsection (3), which this Amendment proposes to omit, with the number and nature of the offences which should be included in Part II.
Many of us took the view, because we shared my noble and learned friend's view of the effectiveness of disqualification, that everything should be included in Part II as an offence for which we might disqualify if it was already on the list of offences for which drivers could be disqualified and there was no reason to believe that the right to disqualify had been abused. Many of us, including my noble friend Lord Derwent, for that reason did not wish to diminish, but on the contrary wished to increase, the number of offences included in Part II of the First Schedule. The point on which we were doubtful was the merits of subsection (3). I think that the whole House, whatever view noble Lords took on that, agree that the Government have made a real effort to meet many objections that were then raised.
I am going to reserve my attitude on the proposed omission of offences from Part II until we reach the Amendments concerned, but I thought it right to make clear that my objections to subsection (3) had nothing to do with the number of

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offences that might be included in Part II. We may find subsection (3) agreeable or not agreeable. I am not going to raise this again because on a Division at an earlier stage the Committee decided that it was in favour of subsection (3) in principle. I may say that I voted against the Government on that occasion, but the Committee decided that point, and I think that we should accept it at this stage as a matter that has been decided, especially as the Government have gone a good way to meet the various points of criticism that have been made. I raise the matter now only because I do not think that it follows, merely because some discretion has been given to the court and on account of various other improvements that the Government propose to incorporate, that it is right for them to claim, as a matter of course, that there is merit in reducing the number of offences for which disqualification can be awarded.
LORD ELTON: My Lords, I do not want to prolong the argument, but I should like to say how grateful I am to the noble Viscount for what he said, both on disqualification and about speed limits and about this being the acid test of how serious we are in our desire to reduce accidents. The only other thing I would say is this. I hope that he will not take too seriously my noble friend Lord Brentford's plea that we should never consider imposing a speed limit on the open road. It has already been tried on special occasions in holiday seasons with considerable success—and by that I mean a reduction of mutilation and death—and it has been introduced in many European countries and in most of the States of the United States of America without the difficulties of enforcement which are sometimes alleged against it. The noble Viscount said that the Government have statistics showing that after the introduction of the speed limits there had been notable reductions in death and serious accidents. He did not say whether he was referring only to speed limits in built-up areas, but I think I am right in saying that that reduction of serious and fatal accidents did follow not only on the introduction of speed limits in built-up areas, but also on their introduction on the open road.
LORD SWAYTHLING: My Lords, I rise only to say that I thoroughly agree
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with what was said by the noble Lord, Lord Conesford, about its being unwise to take too many of these offences out of Part II of the First Schedule. But would not what he seeks to accomplish be achieved by some Amendment such as the next one, to be moved by the noble Lord, Lord Merrivale, under which we could keep discretionary disqualification for certain offences without having those offences all included in subsection (3)? I think this would be achieved by some such provision.
EARL HOWE: My Lords, in view of what has been said, I do not propose to press the Amendment. I should, however, like to tell the noble Viscount the Leader of the House that for the first time I think I understand the Bill a little. I feel that the Government have done their best to improve it, and I only hope that events will show that they have improved it. I hope the noble Viscount will not be too severe on the speed question, in spite of what the noble Lord, Lord Elton, has just said. I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
5.15 p.m.
LORD MERRIVALE LORD MERRIVALE moved, in subsection (3), after "or" to insert "paragraphs 8, 9 and 11 of." The noble Lord said: My Lords, I beg to move the Amendment standing in the names of my noble friend Lord Gosford and myself. Without wishing to repeat what I said on the Committee stage, I should like to state that the sole object of this Amendment is to ensure that there will be compulsory disqualification for a third offence within three years only for the following three offences: dangerous driving, careless driving and being in charge of a vehicle while under the influence of drink or drugs. Noble Lords will recall that on the Committee stage the noble Viscount the Leader of the House stressed the wish of the Government to discourage the habitual offender with regard to serious offences. That, I feel, is a justifiable attitude, and if the two previous offences were of a serious nature, and were included in Part II, then it would seem right that the third offence should bring about this compulsory disqualification.
But to take, for example, offence No. 13, failure to comply with traffic

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directions, that may be committed unknowingly, possibly in the mist, to which my noble friend Lord Chesham referred on the Committee stage. Then, with regard to offence No. 22, committed in contravention of the Construction and Use Regulations, it could happen that it would be theoretically right to convict, but wrong in practice, because a horn might have gone out of action due to a flooded area in winter. Surely, in a case like that it would not be practicable to abandon the vehicle. Then, with regard to reflectors which are fitted in accordance with regulations, these are frequently stolen by children when a vehicle is stationary. In a case of that sort, surely it would be absurd to abandon the vehicle.
As a further example I would mention the possibility of a driver of a public service vehicle or a lorry finding himself in charge of a vehicle with a defective or punctured silencer—it could be that the silencer was in a rusty condition and had become punctured during the course of the vehicle's outing. It would be the operator of the vehicle and not the driver who would be to blame on account of faulty maintenance. In that case, there could be no blame attaching to the driver—because it is not his duty to inspect the vehicle before he takes it out—but he would be liable to lose his licence.
May I now consider offence No. 19, that of a contravention of pedestrian crossing regulations—
LORD CHESHAM: I am sorry to interrupt my noble friend, but he made rather a long statement about faulty silencers and so on, and I am afraid I had some difficulty in following him. I am not sure under which paragraph of Part II he is suggesting that disqualification will follow.
LORD MERRIVALE: I understand that it would come under the Construction and Use Regulations (I believe it is Regulation 77), which is offence No. 22. With regard to offence No. 19, contravention of pedestrian crossing regulations, again an offence may be committed under conditions of mist or fog, or purely because the driver just at that time finds the sun in his eyes. He may be an extremely careful driver, and it would not be his fault if he unknowingly committed an offence.
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With regard to Offence No. 14, it is conceivable that a vehicle could have a breakdown—for instance, a rear-axle could "pack up" just round a blind corner. If the driver was in charge of the motor car, no doubt he could see that the vehicle was removed from the road; but in the case of a lorry or a public service vehicle that would not be practicable. As I understand Section 16 of the principal Act, this offence constitutes an absolute liability, and the driver would in my view appear to have no defence. This offence may be the third within three years, and the driver would therefore lose his licence and livelihood at the same time.
Before ending, I should like, with other noble Lords, to refer to this question of "special reasons", because I feel, as other noble Lords have said, that it is an important point. As I see it, the Government Amendment to Clause 3 constitutes a clearer indication to the court by the substitution of the word "otherwise" in lines 35 and 46 of page 2. But in effect, in conjunction with the next Amendment to be moved by the noble Lord, Lord Chesham, it is little more than window-dressing, for I am advised that, as a result of decisions of the Divisional Court of the Queen's Bench Division, the circumstances in which courts are entitled to decide that special reasons exist are unsatisfactorily restricted. Also, as my noble and learned Leader said on Committee stage [OFFICIAL REPORT, Vol. 230 (No. 73), col. 1248]:
"'special reasons' means special to the offence."
It may be, however, that the two previous offences committed within three years were of a less serious character, and that, in spite of mitigating circumstances, the driver was convicted. The third court would be unaware of the circumstances which had been brought up before the two previous courts, and therefore they could do nothing but automatically disqualify, in spite of the fact that it might be the first serious offence of that driver. I would therefore ask your Lordships to support this Amendment, because the court would still retain discretionary powers of disqualification for all the offences in Part II, and if the circumstances warranted it the driver could still be disqualified for a third offence committed within three years. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 2, line 40, after ("or") insert the said words.—(Lord Merrivale.)
THE EARL OF GOSFORD: My Lords, I am grateful to my noble and learned friend for the obvious care he has taken to meet some of the wishes of the House in the Amendments which he and the noble Lord, Lord Chesham, will be moving. But it seems to me that we are still very much in the position that the motorist is guilty unless he is proved innocent, instead of the reverse.
VISCOUNT HAILSHAM: My Lords, can my noble friend point to a single provision in this clause which says that the motorist is guilty unless he is proved innocent? If he can, I shall be very much surprised.
THE EARL OF GOSFORD: I am afraid I am batting very much as a local cricket team against a Test bowler. But it strikes me that the motorist will suffer automatic endorsement, if he is convicted, unless there are "special reasons". That seems to me rather going towards the situation I mentioned. I am with the noble Viscount in everything he said about the serious necessity of reducing road accidents, and it may be necessary (and I think it is) to produce this new Bill so that the motorist knows full well that if he misbehaves himself, in the jargon, he has "had it".
There are still, however, some offences—those in Part II, other than offences 8, 9 and 11—which seem to me to be too technical in character for this harsh treatment to be meted out. I am not going into detail. My noble friend Lord Merrivale has already cited some of the possible cases, and it seems to me that these offences should not be subject to automatic endorsement—unless, of course, the court decides otherwise—because there are so many occasions where these particular offences cannot be the responsibility of the driver. The result of this legislation will be that where at present, if drivers are summoned on any of these offences—I apologise for stopping, but I should like my noble friend to hear this particular point.
VISCOUNT HAILSHAM: I am sorry.
THE EARL OF GOSFORD: The point, as I see it, is this. For these offences, other than 8, 9 and 11 in Part II, in
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most cases at the present time the driver, or the owner of the vehicle, if summoned, usually writes in, pleads guilty and pays £2 or £3 in so far as he considers it to be a technical offence. Now I think it will be found that anybody who is summoned for one of these offences will automatically fight it. What the result will be in the courts I leave to your Lordships' imagination. I think you will find that business in the courts in motoring cases will almost come to a standstill. To come back to the original reason why I joined my noble friend Lord Merrivale in putting down this Amendment, it seems to me quite wrong that these purely technical offences should be automatically subject to such harsh treatment. As Lord Merrivale has already said, anybody convicted for the offences can be disqualified.
LORD SOMERS: My Lords, I should like to add one point which has not been mentioned during all the stages of this Bill; that is, that when there is an accident on the road it is not necessarily the motorist's fault. There are others who misuse the roads—for instance, pedestrians (though I think perhaps my noble friend Lord Elton, as Chairman of the Pedestrians' Association, would not admit that), and also cyclists and dogs. I do not think that the motorist should be held guilty for something which he cannot prevent. I regret to say that, although I have the greatest respect for the magistrates of our country on the whole, there are quite a considerable number of them who share the view that when there is an accident the motorist is always guilty. In fact, I know of some courts where any motorist knows that he might as well plead guilty at once. There are not many I admit, but there are such courts. As I have said before, I think disqualification is too severe a punishment for offences which either are not the motorist's fault or do not cause danger to other people.
5.30 p.m.
LORD HAWKE: My Lords, the Bill as originally drafted was obviously unacceptable to the House, and we must be grateful to our noble Leader for having gone out of his way, in a rather ingenious manner, to try to make it less objectionable, but I still believe that the method put forward by my honourable friend Lord Merrivale is a better one

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than the one put forward by Her Majesty's Government, because one simply cannot deny that there are a number of offences which, per se, are likely to be left in and I believe it to be quite wrong for there to be automatic disqualification on an accumulation of trivialities.
We are, of course, arguing to some extent in the dark, because we do not know to what degree our noble Leader is prepared to meet my noble friend Lord Teynham on Amendments Nos. 12 and 13 dealing with special circumstances, because as the special circumstances now stand the position would be most unsatisfactory. I agree with my noble Leader that disqualification is the greatest sanction. The courts can, of course, disqualify, and if they will not do so and do not do so it is either because they are refusing to administer the law, in which case British justice is not functioning as we always believe British justice does function and there should be some reform of the courts, or else there are far more cases of mitigating circumstances than the Government are willing to admit. I cannot believe that the right principle is to lay down automatic penalties for the courts to impose because that is thought to be the only way by which the courts will impose penalties severe enough.
Curiously, to-day, on browsing through that national daily the Daily Herald, I came across a relative passage in an article by a barrister. He said:
"Less than a century ago English Statutes prescribed minimum sentences for a lot of offences, both grave and trivial. They belonged to the Dark Ages of futile severity and perverse acquittals by sympathetic judges. They have all been repealed because they did not work."
It is Her Majesty's Government's claim that this country is not a régime of perverse acquittals by sympathetic courts, but that would appear to be the burden of the case they are making over this particular matter.
The three offences Nos. 8, 9 and 10, which my noble friend seeks to include, are severe ones and I would compromise with my principles to the extent of being willing to admit automatic disqualification for three offences of that nature, but I should be very reluctant to admit automatic disqualification for three cases of speeding quite regardless of the
1020
circumstances. I welcome the Government's conversion, and believe it is a conversion, to the belief that speed causes fatalities. Of course it always causes accidents and the faster you go the bigger the bump; therefore, the faster the speed the more likely you are to have fatal casualties. But to-day the limits are not realistic. Even the new commercial vehicle speed limit put forward by the Government for 40 m.p.h. is not a realistic one when one knows that traffic has to proceed at 45 m.p.h. to keep the trade of the country going. But, as I say, we are arguing very much in the dark because we do not know Her Majesty's Government's attitude to the special reasons Amendment further on.
LORD GODDARD: My Lords, may I say one word on this Amendment? I certainly feel that there is a great deal to be said for automatic disqualification with regard to a person who consistently breaks the law, consistently driving dangerously or something of that sort, but I think there is a great deal in what Lord Merrivale has said, that many of the offences contained in Part II are hardly what one would call offences justifying automatic disqualification. I submit to the noble Viscount the Leader of the House that maybe some considerable difficulty will arise in this respect. Subsection (3) provides for automatic disqualification if three offences have been committed in three years immediately preceding the act for which the driver is charged, and then he is to be disqualified unless the courts have special reasons why they think fit to order otherwise. What are those special reasons to have regard to? What are the special reasons? I can well understand that in many of the instances which Lord Merrivale gave the courts may say: "That was a very trivial offence and we ought not to take it into account." But I am not sure that they can, because under this clause it will rank as an offence.
If there have been three offences within three years it seems to me that there is little room for the application of special reasons. Magistrates will apply special reasons in the most extraordinary circumstances. That is one of the reasons why, in a case to which various uncomplimentary references had been

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made, the court over which I was presiding thought it necessary to lay down that the reasons must be special to the offence and not to the offender. I am leaving that matter out for the moment. But I am in great difficulty to see how this provision is going to work, because circumstances which would give a court discretion—not to enable them to exercise discretion—would have nothing to do with the offence which the driver has actually committed; because it is not the offence which he has actually committed and for which he is before the court which will lead to his disqualification, but because it is the third occasion on which he has been before the court. There is no getting away from that. The application of special reasons to avoid automatic disqualification will give rise to very considerable doubts and difficulties.
LORD SILKIN: My Lords, the House is bound to respect any view which the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goddard, expresses on a matter of this kind. I have approached this particular provision with a certain amount of suspicion; I felt very much as the noble Lord, Lord Merrivale did. On the other hand, we have to do something about the persistent offender, and I think a lot of cloud has been engendered in this by calling some of these offences technical. When you describe an offence as technical you are thereby implying that it is not at all a serious matter; yet I submit that it can be a serious matter. Take one of the technical offences—driving over a pedestrian crossing. You can call it technical if you like, but I have seen some people driving over a pedestrian crossing to the very great danger of pedestrians, missing them by inohes.
THE EARL OF GOSFORD: My Lords, as one who is co-sponsor of this particular Amendment, may I say this? I am sure that particular offence would come under the heading of dangerous driving, under No. 8.
LORD HAWKE: Or at least under the heading of careless driving.
VISCOUNT HAILSHAM: Not necessarily; otherwise it would not be necessary to have a regulation to enforce it.
LORD SILKIN: I merely instance that as dealing with the thing by a misuse of
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words. You call it technical. You call it technical also if a person has been deprived of a certain apparatus, his horn. That is a technical offence; but it may be very dangerous indeed.
I do not want to go through all the various paragraphs under which Clause 3 (3) can operate. I would suggest the possibility that one or other might be eliminated, but I could not possibly agree to a wholesale elimination. The clause provides that there may be special reasons, and, with great respect to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goddard, I cannot myself see the difficulty that a court would have in applying it. The noble Lord, Lord Merrivale, gave a number of instances. There may be a fog or a mist which would prevent a person from seeing the pedestrian crossing. If it was so bad I do not know whether he ought to be driving at all, but at any rate he might not see the crossing in time. Would that not be a special reason?
LORD GODDARD: That is a special reason with regard to the previous offence. What makes him liable to disqualification is the fact that there have been two previous offences.
VISCOUNT HAILSHAM: With respect, I think what is misleading the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goddard, is that he has not really considered the effect of the Amendments on the Paper, which I did endeavour to explain before, and which render his observations inapposite to what is in fact proposed.
LORD SILKIN: Of course, it is the fact that three offences have been committed, but it is the last offence which counts to make up the three. Subject to what the noble and learned Viscount will say in reply, I should have thought that the court could quite properly say "This is a special circumstance" if some child had stolen a piece of apparatus and the owner was not aware of it. While he might be guilty of the offence, because the Statute says so, there would be a special circumstance which the court could take into account. At any rate I hope so—I hope that the courts can be sensible about these things. It may be necessary to widen or define what is a special circumstance. I myself should not be prepared to agree that it should go so wide as to cover the

1023
offender himself. I do not think there should be different law for different types of people. But if the existing understanding of what is a special circumstance is not wide enough, I think that the Bill should so widen it as to enable the court to take into account the kind of thing that the noble Lord, Lord Merrivale, had in mind.
LORD MERRIVALE: Would it not be a factor that one court may consider the stealing of the reflector by a child as a special reason—I do not know at all; I have no legal knowledge on the matter—while another court might take a completely opposite view?
THE EARL OF GOSFORD: I do not know if the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, realises that our Amendment does not stop endorsement of licences. All we are asking is that for offences 8, 9 and 11 disqualification should remain automatic unless the court decides otherwise, but that in the other cases the court should have a discretion.
LORD SILKIN: I follow that. But I think disqualification should be automatic unless the court decides that there are special circumstances. If the noble Lord had his Amendment it would mean that there would be no automatic disqualification for a good many of the offences which I think are serious and which are referred to in the second Part of the Schedule, whereas my own view is that the words "special circumstance" ought to be wide enough to cover the exceptional case, of a reflector being stolen, or of the weather being so misty that the driver could not see the crossing, and so on. I think that if that were the case then this provision would be perfectly satisfactory.
VISCOUNT HAILSHAM: My Lords, if I may say so, with the greatest respect to the noble Lord, Lord Merrivale, I think that he has largely confused himself by not studying the Amendments which are down in the name of my noble friend as to what is proposed. He gave the House a whole series of examples which one after the other are dealt with under those Amendments, and only one which was not. The first was the reflector. The reflector will be out; that point the Government have accepted. The next was the silencer.
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The silencer was never in, and is not there now. It is simply the noble Lord who thinks the silencer is in. It is not there now because of the words referring to danger which are in the First Schedule, in No. 22. Then there was the car which broke down at a corner and was supposed to be left in a dangerous position. If the court has the discretion which I propose, I cannot myself conceive of a much more obvious example of special reasons.
Of course it is quite true, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goddard, said, that as the Bill was originally drafted it was the third offence which counted. But this is not so under the concessions which I tried to explain to the House about a quarter of an hour ago. What counts now is each separate offence, because the automatic disqualification now attaches to three endorsements and not to three convictions as such, and each endorsement has to be considered by the Bench which tries that offence. The Bench which tries that offence will, if these concessions which I have tried to explain take place, be entitled to find special reasons why it should not endorse. It follows that the great difference between the Bill as originally drafted and as we hope it will emerge from Report is that it is not only the third offence which counts.
It is true, of course, that speeding is still there; I have never concealed that. And it is also true that the pedestrian crossings are still there. I must say that I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Silkin. These are not trivial offences, and the Government cannot consent so to deal with them. We can have the argument once more, as one always does on Road Traffic Bills; you can say that if there is a child actually on the crossing you can prosecute for dangerous or careless driving. So you can. You can say if there is a car on the other side of the corner when you disregard the double white line you can prosecute for dangerous or careless driving. So you can. But the truth is that experience over 50 years now has taught us that there are safety precautions which have to be observed whether or not there is danger. The Government are not prepared to treat as trivial offences which disregard these safety precautions simply because danger is not actually caused.
What is proposed by this Amendment is to limit the automatic disqualification

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to the seven serious offences listed in Part I of the First Schedule, together with the first offence of dangerous driving (the second offence already being in), careless driving, and the offence of being in charge of a vehicle whilst under the influence of drink or drugs. For the reasons which I explained, the Government are not content to limit the automatic disqualification to persons who have committed these offences three times. Of course it is true that if you impose regulations regarding pedestrian crossings, or if you impose a speed limit, there is an element of the arbitrary; but there is also the fact that those regulations have been found to be necessary in order to ensure safety on the roads, and unless they are supported with adequate penalties, whether or not a prosecution for dangerous or careless driving accompanies them, we are not really being serious in enforcing those regulations. Having said that, I would say that we have done all that we could to assuage the legitimate feeling of anxiety which noble Lords have expressed.
I do not think it is a coincidence that all the examples which have been given, with, I think, only one exception, are cases with which, in my belief, our proposed Amendments already deal. On only one, that of speeding, I frankly admit there is a difference between us; but I think we should be deceiving ourselves if we thought that the mere fact that you quarrel with the actual speed limit is a reason for not treating speed limits seriously—it is a reason for changing the speed limits. Nor should we, I think, be doing other than delude ourselves in imagining that the ordinary prosecution for exceeding the speed limit applies to people who have just exceeded it. Obviously, if you are going to have a limit at all there is a group of people who have only just committed the offence. But that may be an argument against having a limit at all.
However, it is inherent in the nature of a limit that you ought to draw the line somewhere. All you can do about that is to make sure that there are not any prosecutions for trivial offences of just exceeding it or, in the case to which we revert from time to time in these discussions (which I must say I have never heard of in practice), of the driver who is driving just in excess of the speed limit on an empty road in bright moon-
1026
light at 2 o'clock in the morning. Nobody with actual experience of the way in which these limits are enforced really thinks that this is a typical case I have never heard of one. Of course, this may be a reason, as my noble friend says, for putting some kind of clock on the speed limit, to say that after a certain hour it shall not apply. That is quite a separate issue. The issue with which we are confronted in this Amendment is whether we should be sufficiently serious about speed limits, which, in practice, have justified themselves, to attach an automatic disqualification to persistent offenders even though they do not happen to have been prosecuted for dangerous or careless driving in the same connection. This is a perfectly clear point, and I must say that it is one to which the Government attach importance and on which, beyond the point which I have tried to explain, we cannot make many more concessions.
LORD SOMERS: My Lords, I never thought that I should be able to claim that I know anything which my noble and learned friend did not know. But I do know of the case of a young friend of mine who was fined £5 and had his licence endorsed for driving through Holyhead at, I think, past midnight when there was nothing else on the road.
VISCOUNT HAILSHAM: It may be that he should have appealed against his sentence. Obviously, I cannot deal with individual cases of that kind. I can only say that it is an extremely rare one.
I should only like to say this to my noble friends Lord Gosford and Lord Somers. There is nothing in the Bill, or in this clause, which presumes a motorist guilty until he is found innocent. The Bill deals with the penalty which may or may not be imposed if he is proved guilty by the ordinary standards of criminal justice. There is no basis at all for their fear that a motorist is to be presumed guilty. I do not myself agree with the rather different point made by my noble friend Lord Somers, that there are, in fact, magistrates who presume motorists guilty despite the clear law to the contrary. If there were any case of such a bench, I should hope that my noble friend would feel it his duty at once to report the magistrates to the Lord Chancellor for an extraordinary dereliction of duty, or

1027
alternatively, that the litigant might have the common sense to appeal, either by way of a writ of certiorari to the Divisional Court, or to the Quarter Sessions to get the decision reversed.
But I tell my noble friend that certainly my own experience of lay magistrates—I think it is fair to say that many of your Lordships are actually magistrates—is that they are excessively tender to offenders, and that if they have a fault it is that they do not impose disqualification where a more stern but a more just judge would do so. They are mostly motorists themselves and they have every reason to be tender towards motorists. I think that my noble friend Lord Somers is dwelling in the world of Kipling's particular village that voted the earth was flat. This may have been true 60 years ago, but it has no relation to my 25 years of experience in the criminal courts, either those presided over by trained lawyers or those presided over by lay magistrates, who I think, do a fine job in accordance with the provisions of the criminal law.
LORD SOMERS: I was not born 60 years ago.
LORD TEVIOT: My Lords, unlike my young noble friend Lord Somers, I am not young—I am now 87—but I have driven a car since cars came on to the road. I have never been before a court in any way whatsoever, for dangerous driving or any other sort of breaking of the law while driving. I have sat here I think for the whole of this Bill, and I do not think it is going to get us anywhere unless we insist that those who break the speed limit at 12 o'clock on a moonlight night—and they have broken the law—are punished, whether or not there is any danger on the road. Unless you insist on the speed limit being rigidly adhered to you are going to have a continuance of death on the roads. The chief thing about this Bill is that you must definitely decide upon whether or not the speed limit is to be adhered to. When anybody exceeds it he must be punished for so doing. With great respect to my noble Leader and others who use the roads, as I have, I say that we must insist upon that. The speed limit is the chief thing, and if you do not adhere to the legal speed limit you will continually have these appalling casual-
1028
ties on the road. I hope that the Government will insist upon such a rigid adherence throughout this whole matter.
LORD WALSTON: My Lords, there was one point upon which I should be most grateful to have the noble and learned Viscount's clarification. As I understand it, under the Bill as it now stands with the Amendment about to be introduced, a person may be convicted of two offences, both of which carry compulsory endorsement. If he is then convicted of a third, let us call it a minor or technical offence, which does not carry obligatory endorsement, he must, despite the Bill as it stands with the Amendment, be disqualified. Reading the Bill, as I understand it, there is no question but that if he has already been convicted of two offences and he is then found guilty of a third offence, he must be disqualified, even though the third offence does not necessarily carry disqualification. If on the other hand, he is convicted of the same offences but in a different order—No. 1, carrying obligatory endorsement with it; No. 2, carrying endorsement at the discretion of the magistrates, and they do not endorse; and No. 3, again carrying obligatory endorsement—he gets oft lighter. I do not know whether I have made this clear.
VISCOUNT HAILSHAM: My Lords, I can speak again only by leave of the House. But the position is exactly the same, in whatever order the offences are committed. In Part I there is an obligatory disqualification, anyhow—on the first, the second or the third one, if it comes within Part I. If he comes within Part II, then the licence will be endorsed unless there are special reasons. If there are no special reasons, three endorsements carry a disqualification in whatever order the offences are committed. But if in respect of any offence special reasons are found, there will be no endorsement, and that offence, in whatever order it is committed, will not count for the purpose of automatic disqualification.
LORD MERRIVALE: My Lords, I am entitled to speak only by leave of the House, but I should like just to say that I still believe that the courts should retain discretion with regard to the third offence; that is, an offence contained in Part II. I feel that the courts can perfectly well appreciate whether or not the

1029
offence is serious. With those few words I would say that I do not wish to withdraw the Amendment.
VISCOUNT HAILSHAM VISCOUNT HAILSHAM moved, in subsection (3), after "Parts" to insert:
"and particulars of the convictions have been ordered to be endorsed in accordance with section five of this Act."
The noble Viscount said: My Lords, this is the first of the series to which I have referred, and I have, I think, explained how this works. Clause 3 replaces the existing provisions of the 1960 Act as to disqualification from holding or obtaining a driving licence. Subsection (3) provides that where a person commits any offence listed in Parts I or II of the First Schedule and has already had two convictions for any such offence within the three years immediately preceding the third offence, the Court shall order him to be disqualified for not less than six months unless, for special reasons, they think fit to decide otherwise. The reasons for that original provision I have fully explained, but the experience on Committee led us to believe that the discretion given to the court should apply to all three of the offences, and not just the one; and that there should therefore be a limited
On Question, Whether the said Amendment shall be agreed to?
Their Lordships divided: Contents, 20; Not-Contents, 45.

CONTENTS

Airedale, L.

Foley, L.

Sinha, L.

Allerton, L.

Gosford, E.

Somers, L. [Teller.]

Atholl, D.

Hawke, L.

Strathcarron, L.

Buckinghamshire, E.

Howe, E.

Swaythling, L.

Colwyn, L.

Massereene and Ferrard, V.

Terrington, L.

Cork and Orrery, E.

Merrivale, L. [Teller.]

Teynham, L.

Cross, V.

Montagu of Beaulieu, L.

NOT-CONTENTS

Ailwyn, L.

Falmouth, V.

Macpherson of Drumochter, L.

Amory, V.

Fortescue, E.

Merthyr, L.

Auckland, L.

Goddard, L.

Molson, L.

Balfour of Inchrye, L.

Hailsham, V. (L. President.)

Newall, L.

Bathurst, E.

Hampton, L.

Newton, L. [Teller.]

Bethell, L.

Hastings, L.

St. Aldwyn, E. [Teller.]

Bossom, L.

Iddesleigh, E.

St. Oswald, L.

Brentford, V.

Kilmuir, V. (L. Chancellor.)

Silkin, L.

Chesham, L.

Lansdowne, M.

Strang, L.

Conesford, L.

Latham, L.

Stratheden and Campbell, L.

Denning, L.

Lawson, L.

Teviot, L.

Derwent, L.

Lindgren, L.

Torrington, V.

Digby, L.

Listowel, E.

Walston, L.

Dundee, E.

Lucan, E.

Williams, L.

Elton, L.

MacAndrew, L.

Williams of Barnburgh, L.

Resolved in the negative, and Amendment disagreed to accordingly.

discretion in the case of each of the three offences not to allow it to count for the automatic disqualification.
The machinery by which we propose to achieve that is, I think, most clearly to be seen from Amendment No. 17. This series—Amendments Nos. 11, 16, 17 and 20—I think we might conveniently take together. The way we have done it is to provide, first of all, that, on the occasion of the third offence, the court may for special reasons omit either to endorse or to disqualify: on the two previous offences, the court may, for special reasons, not endorse. In each case, by a subsequent Amendment, the court must state what its special reasons are: it must state the reasons which have influenced it to use its discretion in favour of the motorist.
The expression "special reasons" has come in for a certain amount of judicial comment; but, as I say, the only limitations imposed by the courts of which I am aware in relation to the reasons are, first, that they should be special to the offence and not general reasons; and, secondly, that they should not apply to the offender, but should apply to the circumstances of the offence. The kind of thing which I would say was a special reason was very well exemplified. I think,

1031
by my noble friend Lord Merrivale in the course of his previous Amendment, when he gave the case of a man whose car broke down on a dangerous bend. He was incapable of moving it and he found himself, by some quirk of misfortune, prosecufted for leaving his car in a dangerous place. I am not myself sure that he was rightly advised that he had left his car at all. I should have thought that, in a sense, the car had left him. But, assuming against him that he had left his car, I am certain that special reasons would be found in that case.
A fairly general but not, I think, unreliable indication of the scope of special reasons is afforded, I think, by the figure which I gave in rather a different connection two or three Amendments ago. Before we removed the automatic disqualification for driving while uninsured, there were about 22,000 convictions a year, of which about one-fifth were not disqualified, the bench finding special reasons. Therefore, I suppose that one might find that, in a fairly wide minority of cases, for one reason or another, the bench would certify that there were special reasons, and a motorist would accordingly be exempt from the imposition of the automatic penalty.
I feel that this is a better protection for the motorist than if we were to seek to categorise what the special reasons are. It is difficult to foretell the hazards of the road or the misfortunes which can overtake motorists. My own feeling is that one can trust the bench, for the reasons which I have given—largely because they are themselves motorists—to recognise when an offence has been trivial or inadvertent, or has arisen purely through circumstances which the motorist cannot control; and if they can be satisfied about this in a sufficiently clear way, not amounting to mere sentimentality or tenderness of heart, I think it would be adequate for the purpose.
EARL HOWE: May I ask the noble and learned Viscount: when do the special reasons start? There are people going about at the present time who have endorsements on their licences. Do those come in?
VISCOUNT HAILSHAM: This is nothing to do with special reasons. These provisions will not begin to operate until
1032
the Bill becomes law. I think the noble Earl will be able to start with a clean sheet. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 2, line 43, after ("Parts") insert ("and particulars of the convictions have been ordered to be endorsed in accordance with section five of this Act").—(Viscount Hailsham.)
LORD SWAYTHLING: My Lords, I hesitate to challenge something that the noble and learned Viscount has said, but he just now gave an answer to the noble Lord, Lord Walston, about the question of a third conviction causing an automatic disqualification. If one reads subsection (3) with the proposed Amendment in it, it would appear that, if the two previous convictions have been endorsed on the licence, the new offence, the third offence, would cause an automatic disqualification whether or not it was endorsed on the licence. If I may read it, it says:
"Where a person convicted of an offence specified in the said Part I or the said Part II has within the three years immediately preceding the commission of the offence"—
that is without any qualification about endorsement—
"and since the commencement of this Act been convicted on not less than two occasions of an offence specified in those Parts, and particulars of the convictions have been ordered to be endorsed in accordance with section five of this Act …",
and so on. That would seem to indicate that it does not matter whether the third conviction has an endorsement or not, provided the first two have endorsements. I may be entirely wrong in my reading of what was suggested should be the amended subsection, but that is how it appears to me to read.
VISCOUNT HAILSHAM: My Lords, I can only speak again with the leave of the House, but I think the noble Lord is not so much wrong in his reading as in not having read far enough. He should have read on to the clause which says
"unless the court, for special reasons, thinks fit to order otherwise".
VISCOUNT BRENTFORD: My Lords, would this be a convenient moment for me to ask my noble and learned friend one point for clarification? Suppose that the third offence—we always seem to assume that people will commit three offences within the specified period—is a Part I offence, so that he is automatically

1033
disqualified for not less than twelve months on that Part I offence, and also becomes automatically disqualified by the cumulative effect of having been convicted of three offences, two of which have been endorsed, and the third of which carries obligatory disqualification. What I want my noble and learned friend to tell us is whether the two disqualifications run concurrently or consecutively. Because previously during the course of these debates we have been somewhat apprehensive about the cumulative effects, and I understand that it is the Government's intention to clarify those parts of the Bill, when they come under consideration, so as to ensure that, if there is an accident in which a multiple collection of offences has been committed, one of which carried the liability of endorsement, there will be only one endorsement to count in respect of that cumulative episode of events. Therefore, I hope that the Government will say that in this case, where there are two liabilities for disqualification, they shall run concurrently and not consecutively.
VISCOUNT HAILSHAM: My Lords, I think there may be two separate points here. This, of course, does not arise on the Amendment at all, so I am being a little unguarded in replying without taking counsel on the matter. First of all, it does not count twice in respect of the same occasion, even though there may be two different charges in relation to the same set of circumstances. It is quite clear that it does not count twice. It is the occasion, not the number of charges effectively proved, which counts.
I think my noble friend may find the answer to what he asked in subsection (5) of Clause 3, which provides at the moment as follows:
"The period of any disqualification imposed under subsection (3) of this section or on a conviction of an offence under paragraph (b) of section one hundred and ten of the principal Act"—
which is the section on driving while disqualified—
"shall be in addition to any other period of disqualification imposed … under this section or under the principal Act or an enactment repealed by that Act or under the Motor Car Act, 1903".
Therefore, that means that the period is additional to, and not, I suppose, concurrent with, the automatic disqualification imposed by this clause. I think that
1034
is right, but I am afraid I was taken slightly off my guard.
LORD GODDARD: My Lords, I feel exactly the same difficulty as my noble friend Lord Swaythling feels about this clause, and I hope the Government will look into it again. I think there will be great difficulty in applying this clause, because if there are two endorsements on a licence, then if a third offence is committed, according to the Bill the offender shall be disqualified for a certain time, unless the Court, for special reasons, thinks otherwise. But what special reasons could there be? The fact is that he is liable to disqualification because, in the past, he has had two endorsements on his licence and has now been convicted of another offence. This other offence may be the kind of offence where the magistrates, if it had been a first offence, would have said that they could not give disqualification at all. Then the answer is: "Yes, but he has already been convicted twice". Therefore, as I read the clause, he would have to be disqualified. However, Heaven forbid that I should try to elucidate a matter which I am sure will give rise to a great deal of litigation and several briefs to the Bar! I will not say any more. I can only say that I think there will be great difficulty.
VISCOUNT HAILSHAM: My Lords, I do not think difficulty will arise, but having regard to the fact that the noble and learned Lord feels some difficulty, out of respect to him, and indeed out of respect to the noble Lord, Lord Swaythling, I will have this matter looked at again by the draftsman. If there is a difficulty, it is purely a drafting difficulty; but I do not see the difficulty at all, myself. The Bill, as originally drafted, said that on the third conviction—and it so says now—the court must order a disqualification unless, for special reasons, it orders otherwise. That means that in relation to the third offence there always was a discretion. The discretion, however, did not arise in relation to the other two offences, and the difficulty which arose on the original draft related to the fact that, if two previous offences had been committed and the offender had incurred automatic endorsement, the only set of special reasons the court could consider were the special reasons attaching to the third offence.

1035
The only difference we have made to that—but it is a vital difference—is to provide that the court need not endorse on the two previous occasions for special reasons. That means that in each case, in the absence of special reasons, there must be an endorsement; and in the third case there continues to be an automatic disqualification, in the absence of special reasons. In each case the court may find special reasons in the appropriate way in favour of the motorist. If there is a difficulty—and the noble and learned Lord feels that there is one—it can certainly be dealt with by draftsmanship. Therefore I will refer this matter to the draftsman to achieve the result which I have endeavoured to explain and which I think has already been achieved.
LORD LINDGREN: My Lords, may I put this point to the noble Viscount? Arising from practice, it is my view that it will in fact automatically be the third offence where the discretion of the court has to be considered. Take the average petty sessional bench. They do not imagine that those who come before them are perpetual criminals or perpetual breakers of the law. My experience has been that successive endorsements, except for speeding, are not very common. Therefore, on the first two offences, the court is almost bound to endorse if the penalty carries endorsement with it. Where they are likely to start further consideration will be on the third offence, which carries the additional disqualification.
Arising from that, the noble Viscount made it quite clear—at least I understood it clearly—that the "special circumstance" is surrounding the offence, and in no way the person. If that is so, it falls harder on some groups of persons than on others. May I illustrate that? We may have two offenders, one a practising doctor, the other not. The disqualification of the practising doctor would be a much more serious thing than the disqualification of a person who does not have to use a car in the course of his professional life. Therefore, is it quite clear that it is completely outside the discretion of the court to include the personal circumstances of the offender as well as the offence?
LORD DERWENT: My Lords, I am being very stupid, I know, but could my
1036
noble friend explain to me again whether the third office, for subsection (3) of Clause 3 to come into force, has to be an endorsed offence, or can it be an offence which is not endorsed, but the man will still lose his licence if the first two offences have been endorsed? That is what is not clear to me.
VISCOUNT HAILSHAM: My Lords, on the third offence, in the absence of special reasons, he will lose his licence and have it endorsed. He will get both; but, of course, it is disqualification which will count.
LORD DERWENT: My Lords, I still do not understand. On the third offence, his licence will be endorsed but he will lose his licence.
VISCOUNT HAILSHAM: My Lords, neither will it be endorsed nor will he be disqualified, if the Bench find special reasons. That is the intention. But I will look at the drafting again, in case there is more in it than I now think in respect of drafting.
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
6.31 p.m.
LORD TEYNHAM LORD TEYNHAM moved, in subsection (3), to leave out "for special reasons". The noble Lord said: My Lords, with the permission of the House, perhaps we may debate Amendments Nos. 12 and 13 together. We have heard a great deal to-day about "special reasons". The object of this Amendment is to ask Her Majesty's Government what is meant by the words "special reasons", which have a very special bearing on the discretion of the court. The noble and learned Viscount the Leader of the House has already mentioned the difficulty of effective definition. Subsection (3) of this clause, as now amended, gives the courts the discretion to order disqualification for not less than six months or not to order any disqualification at all, subject to a finding of "special reasons". I would suggest to your Lordships that, if there is no clear definition in the Bill as to what may constitute "special reasons", it would be preferable to delete any reference to "special reasons" and give the courts an unfettered discretion. Surely this is the fairest thing to do, owing to the difficulty of defining what are special reasons. If Her Majesty's Government feel unable to accept this Amendment, perhaps they

1037
would be prepared to accept my alternative one, which makes clear that the courts would be able to exercise their discretion in regard not only to the offence but also to the circumstances of the offender, such as his previous record or any special hardship which might occur in the case of a long period of disqualification. I suggest, too, that minor offences might be considered "special reasons." I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 2, line 45, leave out ("for special reasons").—(Lord Teynham.)
LORD GODDARD: My Lords, I should like to say a word about this, because I was party to the decision in Whittle v. Kirby, in which it was laid down that "special reasons" must be, first, something which was not a general reason and, secondly, something special to the offence and not to the offender. When the Act which enabled the courts to exercise discretion for special reasons first came into force, the special reasons which were given were often of a remarkable description. If a man was a first offender, that was put forward as a special reason, but it is a reason which could apply to hundreds and thousands of persons. If Parliament had intended that a first offender should not be disqualified, it would have said so. Another reason which used to be given as a special reason was that a man had been free of any offence for, say, five or six years. Is that an excuse for driving a car under the influence of drink or without insurance, or something of that kind? A third "special reason" advanced was that of hardship in the case of the professional driver. To a man who made his living by driving and who had committed an offence for which he was liable to disqualification, it was much harder on him than on a man keeping a car for his own pleasure. Again, it had not been said anywhere that the fact that a man was a professional driver was a special reason, and there are so many professional drivers on the road that it could not be said that professional driving was a special reason. It was a perfectly general reason.
In the courts we have had to decide on many occasions what are—or at least what can be—special reasons. We have had to decide whether there was any evidence which would justify the court in holding
1038
that a reason was special. It was only after a great deal of thought that we gave the judgment in Whittle v. Kirby that special reasons must be special to the offence and not the offender; and that, to some extent has channelled the cases. It is very difficult, but I hope that the House will not abandon this qualification, which the Court brought in in about 1948 and which has been followed ever since, because it is the only way in which any sensible qualification can be put upon this very wide expression, "special reasons".
VISCOUNT HAILSHAM: My Lords, after that explanation from my noble and learned friend Lord Goddard, I do not think that there is much that I ought to add. I think that my noble friend has forgotten that the expression "special reasons", which has been convassed a good deal in this debate, has been part of the law of the land since 1930, when it appeared in the Road Traffic Act of that year, and magistrates have found no difficulty in finding "special reasons." I think that it was about 1946 when my noble and learned friend made his decision, which I am bound to say was abundantly justified by the practice which had grown up of magistrates thinking that they had an unfettered discretion—which they had not—in cases of drunken or uninsured driving, or in cases in which endorsement was compulsory in the absence of special reasons.
In the Divisional Court, my noble and learned friend made it plain that the fact that it was a first offence was not a special reason, because the Act of Parliament had said that endorsement or disqualification, as the case may be, should attach to that offence; and, equally, that a clear licence for some long time was not a special reason. Again, the mere fact that somebody earned a living by driving was really irrelevant to this question upon which Parliament had pronounced. Of course, it is much harder on a professional driver than on an amateur, but it would be at least as hard on a doctor, who is not a professional driver, and it would be just as expensive. But if Parliament has decided that a particular kind of driving makes a man a danger to a child crossing the road, unfortunately he cannot earn his living in that way. That is our view.

1039
We do not intend that there should be unfettered discretion. Experience has shown that if there is unfettered discretion to the courts, they do not exercise this penalty sufficiently strongly. If we are seriously concerned about tackling accident figures, we can see no better way than sticking to the words which have been part of the law of the land since 1930, and which I think have not given rise to any great difficulty, in the light of the decision of my noble and learned friend, which, in my opinion, did nothing but good—although one must recognise, of course, that, like other things in the administration of criminal law, it inflicts hardship on those who break it.
LORD HAWKE: My Lords, I am sorry that my noble friend the Leader of the House has turned down so abruptly my noble friend's Amendment, because I think that it goes a long way towards reconciling many noble Lords to the Bill. Not being a lawyer, I have no idea of how "special reasons" have been defined by the courts. May I ask this question? I think it would be possible to say that the committing of a motoring offence must vary to some extent according to the distance which a person travels, and it is more reasonable to expect that someone who motors enormous distances will commit more offences than someone who does not. Would the fact that a driver covered 30,000 miles in three years be a
special circumstance when it came to a third conviction or endorsement, or would that be considered as a purely personal matter? If the former, I think it would reconcile one a little towards the arguments of my noble Leader; but if the latter, it would be a rather unsatisfactory position.
VISCOUNT HAILSHAM: My Lords, again I do not want to impose upon the House, but I afraid I cannot give my noble friend much comfort here. My experience of professional drivers, for what it is worth—and I cannot pretend that it is anything like so great as I should wish it to be—is that they are better and more careful drivers than amateur drivers. This is not generally the view held by amateur drivers, but I think it is correct; and I feel that it ought to be so, because they are on the road a great deal more. But I do not think we could allow magistrates to decide whether to endorse or disqualify by reference to the mileage covered. That I think would make nonsense of the position.
LORD TEYNHAM: My Lords, I appreciate the remarks of my noble Leader. I gather from him that he does not very much like my second Amendment and, in the circumstances, I feel that I must press the Amendment.
On Question: Whether the said Amendment be agreed to?
Their Lordships divided: Contents, 10; Not-Contents, 44.

CONTENTS

Allerton, L.

Foley, L.

Massereene and Ferrard, V

Colwyn, L.

Gosford, E.

Somers, L.

Cross, V.

Hawke, L. [Teller.]

Strathcarron, L.

Tevnham, L. [Teller.]

NOT-CONTENTS

Airedale, L.

Fortescue, E.

Newall, L.

Alexander of Hillsborough, V.

Goddard, L.

Newton, L. [Teller.]

Amherst of Hackney, L.

Hailsham, V. (L. President.)

Peddie, L.

Amory, V.

Hastings, L.

St. Aldwyn, E. [Teller.]

Atholl, D.

Jellicoe, E.

St. Oswald, L.

Bathurst, E.

Kilmuir, V. (L. Chancellor.)

Silkin, L.

Bossom, L.

Lansdowne, M.

Stratheden and Campbell, L.

Buckinghamshire, E.

Latham, L.

Swaythling, L.

Burden, L.

Lawson, L.

Terrington, L.

Chesham, L.

Lindgren, L.

Teviot, L.

Colville of Culross, V.

Listowel, E.

Torrington, V.

Conesford, L.

Lucan, E.

Walston, L.

Derwent, L.

Merrivale, L.

Williams, L.

Digby, L.

Merthyr, L.

Williams of Barnburgh, L.

Dundee, E.

Molson, L.

Resolved in the negative, and Amendment disagreed to accordingly.

LORD CHESHAM: My Lords, this is the second of the minor Amendments

1041
similar to that which I introduced at No. 8 and which your Lordships were good enough to accept. I do not think it is necessary for me to go into the matter again, because it is little more than drafting. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 2, line 46 leave out ("otherwise") and insert ("him to be disqualified for a shorter period or not to order him to be disqualified"). —(Lord Chesham.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Clause 4 [Removal of disqualification]:
6.50 p.m.
LORD CHESHAM LORD CHESHAM moved to leave out Clause 4 and insert the following new clause:
Removal of disqualification
4. In subsection (2) of section one hundred and six of the principal Act (which specifics the periods which must expire before an application to the court for the removal of a disqualification may be made) the following shall be substituted for paragraphs (a) to (c):

"(a) two years, if the disqualification is for less than four years,

(b) one half of the period of the disqualification, if it is for less than ten years but not less than four years,

(c) five years in any other case."

The noble Lord said: My Lords, on the Committee stage my noble friend Lord Molson put down an Amendment whereby there should be no remission of disqualification, and there should be no way at all of getting your licence back once it had been suspended. I undertook to reconsider this matter with a view to putting down an Amendment and to consult with the noble Lord. Unfortunately, I was unable to carry out the consultation because my noble friend went to Italy. Of course, I am always conscious of my duty, and unsparing of myself in pursuing it, so I went to Italy to look for him and to carry out the consultation. Although I searched diligently I was unable to find him, through looking in the wrong place. Therefore, I had to put this Amendment down without the consultation, which I am sorry did not take place.
The original clause was put in because we were concerned at the rate of successes of applicants in getting their licences back after a certain period. The whole point of this Bill, with which your Lordships in principle agreed, was greater use
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of disqualification, and therefore it was thought essential that it should be more difficult for drivers to get their licences back when they had been disqualified. Our way of doing it at the time was to say that applications should be considered only by the appropriate court of quarter sessions, and then only if it was presided over by a legally qualified chairman. Your Lordships did not like that very much, and perhaps it was right that you did not.
In the light of the views expressed, we came to the conclusion that it would be best to drop entirely the original proposals in Clause 4, in so far as they required applicants to go to quarter sessions. As I said, your Lordships seemed to support the view that disqualification was a useful weapon, and that it should be more difficult for drivers to get their licences back, though not in that way. Putting it fairly generally, the position at the moment, under Section 106 of the 1960 Act, is that a driver can apply at the end of half the period of the original order for the removal of any disqualification ordered. What we now propose is that the minimum period before such an application can be made should be two years. We also propose that, in the case of periods of disqualification exceeding four years but less than ten years—at the moment it is more than one but less than six; we upgrade it to exceeding four and less than ten—the person convicted should wait for half the period of that disqualification. If the period is longer than ten years, then he should have to wait for five years. That compares with the present provision of having to wait for three years if the period is longer than six years.
It may not at first sight appear as stringent as perhaps your Lordships felt was indicated. But may I point out to your Lordships that in 1959 33,570 orders of disqualification were made. Of those, 30,155 were for periods of two years or less. If, therefore, in 1959 the proposed provisions had been in force, only 3,415, or roughly 10 per cent., of the drivers disqualified that year would have been entitled to apply—leaving aside, of course, the proportion of such applications that would have been successful. That number would have been entitled to apply and what I am trying to draw from that is that it

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would seem that our proposal will bite on at least 90 per cent., or a little over, of drivers who are disqualified. That seems to me a pretty high proportion of drivers who are disqualified who have to serve the full term.
My noble friend Lord Molson moved an Amendment in Committee which would have prevented their getting any remission at all. The noble Lord, Lord Silkin, I think, supported that view. I would resist going so far as that, and there is one cogent reason that I should like to bring to your Lordships' notice. It is that the power of the court to order disqualification is an exceptional one, in that, unlike their power to order a fine or imprisonment, there is no statutory maximum, which is the case in almost all fines and sentences of imprisonment that courts have power to order. Therefore the length of the period of disqualification is subject to no control, even from the immediate right of appeal on merit to a higher court. I think that is a rather formidable power to give to courts, because they can interfere with the liberty of an offender for a very long time.
We should be reluctant to interfere with the discretion of the courts to impose substantial periods of disqualification where they are justified, but I think that such a stringent power is not reasonable without some provision somewhere for the more serious orders to be subject to review after a minimum period. Of course, we are putting up the minimum period. Having said that, I hope that your Lordships will find that this Amendment meets with the views expressed, and in particular that my noble friend Lord Molson may see his way clear to accept it. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Leave out Clause 4 and insert the said new clause.—(Lord Chesham.)
LORD SILKIN: My Lords, it is quite true that I was a supporter of the noble Lord, Lord Molson, in his Amendment. I thought there was a case for it, but in the light of the figures which the noble Lord has just given I think he has gone a very long way. It means that more than 90 per cent. of the cases in which there is a disqualification for two years or less will be covered, and to the extent that it covers that percentage of cases
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the noble Lord, Lord Molson, has really succeeded.
As to the 5 per cent. of cases, they will have the opportunity of making their case. I think, on consideration, it also meets the case of the person who is a driver by profession. Perhaps after a period of disqualification of at least two years he ought to have the right to go along and point out that there are special reasons, which could not make any difference under the deciding case, but at any rate he has suffered very much during that period through not being able to carry on his normal employment; that he should be allowed to come back; that he has tried to make good, and so on. I have no desire to influence Lord Molson in any way but I think the Government have met that case, and handsomely.
The other point of this Amendment is that it will no longer be necessary to go to quarter sessions. I think that point has been met, too. The person making the application will be able to go to the court which made the original decision. That, I think, is an improvement also. For the reasons which I give—and I think I had an Amendment on that point on the Committee stage—I am glad that the Government have seen their way to meet that point, and I hope the Amendment can now be accepted.
LORD SWAYTHLING: My Lords, I am glad that the noble Lord, Lord Chesham, has moved this Amendment, and that, as mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, the necessity of going to quarter lessons for the restoration of a licence has been abandoned. There are two questions I should like to ask: first, whether, when this Bill becomes law, it will apply to disqualification passed before the Bill has been passed, or whether people who have been disqualified previously will be allowed to apply in the way they have hitherto. The second question I want to ask is this. In the present Act I believe the re-application, if the first application is turned dawn, is limited to certain specific periods. Is that going to be continued? If the first application is turned down by the court, the driver is allowed to apply again after six months under the present Act. I should like to know whether that will still apply when this clause becomes operative.
LORD MOLSON: My Lords, it is now, according to the standards of hours of work of your Lordships' House, a little late, and, as a result, some of my friends and associates are no longer here. It may well be that had they been here there would have been more who would have raised their voices to say that they did not feel that the Government had really gone quite far enough in this matter. I do not wish to repeat all that I said when I moved my Amendment in the Committee stage. At the same time I would remind your Lordships that this power of a court subsequently to reduce the period of disqualification is quite exceptional. My Amendment did not in any way interfere with the rights of an accused person to appeal against his conviction. All that I sought to do was to see that when he had exhausted all his rights and when he had been sentenced to disqualification after a proper hearing of his case, that decision of the court should be as final as it would be if they had imposed a fine or a sentence of imprisonment.
I still maintain that there is no logic at all in treating disqualification in an entirely different way. Indeed, I would say to the contrary; for in the case of imprisonment, which is intended to be punitive, it might be arguable that there might be some remission of the period. But it has been agreed by your Lordships on both sides of the House that disqualification is not a punishment; that it is the removal of a privilege. If a person has so behaved in driving a vehicle as to show that he is undeserving of that privilege, then, when it has been decided to suspend that privilege for a period of time, I see no logical justification whatsoever for that period to be subsequently revised. In the case of imprisonment, a prisoner can obtain remission of his sentence by good behaviour. But the only logical way in which a driver would be able to justify a reduction in the period of disqualification would be if he had been able to show that he had been driving a vehicle safely and carefully over a considerable period of time; and that, by the very nature of disqualification, he could not do.
Now my honourable friend, the Parliamentary Secretary, has justified this exceptional right on the ground that there is no statutory maximum in the
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period of disqualification. But there is a maximum. The maximum is the lifetime of the person disqualified, and there are a great many offences on the road, such as repeatedly driving when under the influence of drink, sometimes culminating in the injury or death of people on the road, when I would say that disqualification for life is the only appropriate punishment and the only way in which the public can be properly safeguarded. I recognise that more than 90 per cent. of those who at present are disqualified will not have any opportunity of seeking a reduction in the period of the disqualification, while others, who will still be entitled to go to the courts and obtain a remission, are exactly those who have been guilty of the worst offences.
My noble and learned friend Lord Denning, who unfortunately cannot be here, authorised me to say that in his experience, both as chairman of quarter sessions and as a Judge, it is only in exceptionally bad cases that disqualification for more than two years is imposed, and he takes the same view that I do: that it is entirely illogical and unreasonable that in the case of offences which have resulted in injury and in death there should be this entirely exceptional and illogical right.
Having said that, I remember the old adage that "half a loaf is better than no bread", and if I sought in any way to reject the concessions the Government have made to me I should be doing a very foolish thing. But if they care to look up the discussions on the Act of 1956 and before, they will find that those concerned with road safety have been wanting all along to curb the unreasonable tendency of the courts to restore licences to those who have been disqualified. My honourable friend, the Parliamentary Secretary, told us in the Second Reading debate that 50 per cent. of those who are disqualified for two years get their licences back after six months.
LORD CHESHAM: My Lords, perhaps I may interrupt. I think my noble friend said that before, and it is not quite right. I said 50 per cent. of those who applied.
LORD MOLSON: I am much obliged, but I think it is in the general knowledge of everybody that a very large proportion of those who are disqualified, knowing

1047
how easy it is to get their licence back if they do apply, do in fact apply. I hope I shall not be thought to be ungrateful or ungracious in saying what I have said, but I believe that it has been generally in line with the policy of the Government as explained by my noble and learned friend the Lord President, when he spoke about special reasons, and I cannot regard it as being entirely logical that they should not have gone a little further to meet my Amendment than they have done.
LORD AIREDALE: My Lords, I wholeheartedly agree with everything the noble Lord, Lord Molson, has said.
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Clause 5 [Endorsement of licence]:
7.12 p.m.
VISCOUNT HAILSHAM: My Lords, this Amendment is consequential on the general group of Amendments I have already explained. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 4, line 5, at beginning insert ("Subject to subsection (2) of this section").—(Viscount Hailsham.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
VISCOUNT HAILSHAM: The same applies to this one. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 4, line 11, at end insert—
("(2) Particulars of the conviction shall not be endorsed as aforesaid if—

(a) the court, in accordance with subsection (1) or subsection (3) of section three of this Act, for special reasons does not order that the said person shall be disqualified; or

(b) in any other case, the court does not order him to be disqualified and thinks fit for special reasons to order that the particulars of the conviction shall not be so endorsed.").—(Viscount Hailsham.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.
LORD CHESHAM: My Lords, this is the first of a group of three Amendments, Nos. 18, 19 and 21, which are minor procedural Amendments. They are designed to ensure that the provisions of Clause 5, which deal with the endorsements of licences, are amended to fit in rather better with the way the licensing authorities actually work. The first one, No. 18, in this connection is purely drafting. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 4, line 21, after ("endorsed") insert ("with any particulars").—(Lord Chesham.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
LORD CHESHAM: My Lords, this Amendment is a little more than drafting. It is concerned merely with the case where an offender who does not hold a licence is ordered to have any licence he does hold endorsed. He has to produce any new licence in court within five days. As a new licence when issued after an endorsement order will have the endorsement already on it, it seems unnecessary then for him to have to produce it after five days. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 4, line 24, after ("endorsement") insert ("unless the particulars have been entered under subsection (5) of this section or he has become entitled under subsection (7) of this section to have a licence issued to him free from those particulars").—(Lord Chesham.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
VISCOUNT HAILSHAM: My Lords, this is part of the series of Amendments that I have already explained. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 4, line 40, after ("offence") insert ("and the court makes an order under subsection (1) of this section").—(Viscount Hailsham.)
On Question Amendment agreed to.
LORD CHESHAM: My Lords, this is the third Amendment of the three I mentioned, and is really concerned only with a word. On any new licence the licensing authority are required, as the Bill is drafted, to copy any endorsed particulars from any previous licence held by the person in question. They do not copy them. They either issue a new licence by pasting on a new renewal slip and leave the endorsement alone, or if it is a new licence, they enter the endorsement on it. Therefore, "copy" is the wrong word and this Amendment puts it right. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 5, line 5, leave out from beginning to ("become") in line 6 and insert ("ordered to be endorsed on any licence held by him shall be entered on the licence unless he has").— (Lord Chesham.)
On Question Amendment agreed to.
LORD CHESHAM: My Lords, this Amendment is a little more substantial, but not much. It is in the nature of a unifying step. Under subsection (7) of Clause 5 it is provided that where an order for endorsement has been made the person whose licence is to be endorsed can get a new licence—that is a clean one—issued to him free of the endorsed particulars if he applies not less than three years after the date of the conviction in consequence of which the endorsement was made. In other words, the position will become that you can have an endorsement removed after three years irrespective of whether you have had another endorsement. At the present time you cannot do that; you have to wait three years from your latest endorsement before you can get the previous one off. In view of the fact that endorsement is no longer regarded as a punishment but is to be used only in connection with automatic disqualification, there is no harm in each endorsement disappearing after three years, because the court is no longer interested in it. It seems ridiculous to have two sorts of endorsement, one pre-Act and one post-Act; and this Amendment means that endorsements which would have had to wait for the expiration of three years from the latest one will also be able to be taken off as they become three years old, although they will not count for the automatic disqualification system. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 5, line 17, after ("section") insert ("or any previous enactment").—(Lord Chesham.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
7.18 p.m.
LORD CHESHAM LORD CHESHAM moved, after Clause 6 to insert the following clause:
Statement of special reasons, etc.
".In any case where a court for special reasons exercises its power under section three or section five of this Act not to order any disqualification or endorsement or to order disqualification for a shorter period than would otherwise be required, or, having regard to special circumstances, imposes a fine as an adequate punishment for an offence under section one hundred and ten of the principal Act, it shall state the special reasons or special circumstances in open court and, if it is a magistrates' court or, in Scotland, a court of summary jurisdiction, shall cause them to he entered in the register (or, in Scotland, record) of its proceedings."
The noble Lord said: My Lords, this is an Amendment I put down as a result of an undertaking I gave to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goddard, who had put down an Amendment on the Committee stage. The noble and learned Lord pointed out to us at the time that provisions of this kind, relating to special reasons, had been responsible for a large number of appeals to the High Court, and that it was often difficult to understand what had been the special reasons the magistrates had had in mind. The effect of the Amendment is to provide what I think the noble and learned Lord had in mind; that where there are special reasons why the court —which includes a court of assize and quarter sessions, as well as magistrates' courts—decides not to order disqualification or endorsement, it must state its special reasons in open court, and in the case of a magistrates' court must enter them on the register or record of the court's proceedings. I hope that is what the noble and learned Lord had in mind, and that the Amendment will find favour with your Lordships. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
After Clause 6, insert the said new clause.—(Lord Chesham.)
LORD SILKIN: My Lords, the general purport of the Amendment is good and right, but I wonder whether it could be improved by asking the magistrates to state the special reasons in writing. Under this clause they are under no obligation to do so; all they need do is state them in open court verbally. There may be no reporter, no shorthand writer or anything of that kind.
LORD CHESHAM: My Lords, if I may speak again, in the case of the magistrates' court it is provided that it shall be entered in the register, or in the record, as they call it in the case of the Scottish courts.
LORD SILKIN: I had not noticed that.
LORD GODDARD: My Lords, if I may reassure the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, I think that would be enough. We want it in the event of a special case being stated. If these are put into the record the clerk who will draw up the special case will have them before him, so I think it will be enough.
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Clause 16 [Minimum age for driving certain motor vehicles]:
7.20 p.m.
LORD WILLIAMS OF BARNBURGH LORD WILLIAMS OF BARNBURGH moved, after "but" to insert:

"(i) such regulations shall not authorise a person under seventeen years of age to drive a tractor on a road except when proceeding from land in the occupation of his employer to other land in the occupation of his employer; and

(ii)".

The noble Lord said: My Lords, in the absence of the noble Earl, Lord Albemarle, who unfortunately had earlier on to leave your Lordships' House for another engagement, I beg leave to move this Amendment in his name. I cannot say that I am really enthusiastic about it, although it at least enables me to make one or two observations which I should in any case like to make.
May I again draw your Lordships attention to paragraph (b) of Clause 16, which reads:
"that the age under which a person may not drive on a road a tractor used primarily for work on land in connection with agriculture shall …".
This paragraph seeks to reduce the age from 17 to 16. Noble Lords will observe that so long as a tractor is taken from one agricultural area to another—that is, land anywhere in any part of the country so long as it is agricultural land —then a boy of 16 years of age can drive that tractor. There is, of course, a qualification—namely
"… if the tractor is of a description specified in the regulations and is driven in circumstances so specified"
Therefore your Lordships will observe that if this clause in its present state is left in the Bill, a boy of 16 years of age will be able to drive a tractor on the roads from one agricultural unit to another anywhere in the country, unless the regulations specify in some form that he cannot do so.
I know that certain conversations are going on between Her Majesty's Government and the trade unions representing agricultural workers. That is all to the good. I am simply warning the noble Lord in charge of the Bill that they will be taking note of what is said in this short debate. The Amendment itself simply widens slightly the possibility of
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a boy of 16 driving a tractor on the roads for miles and miles. I am sure the noble Lord cannot resist this. Even the Amendment states that
"such regulations shall not authorise a person under seventeen years of age to drive a tractor on a road except when proceeding from land in the occupation of his employer to other land in the occupation of his employer."
That widens the margin just slightly. But even so, it is well worth drawing it to the attention of the noble Lord in charge of the Bill. It means that a boy of 16 can drive a tractor on the roads for any distance in any part of the county or in any part of the country, unless disqualified by the regulations, as I assume he will be ultimately. I am sure the noble Lord never intended that, and I am sure that his right honourable friend the Minister never intended it either.
I have in mind one farmer, living not a great distance from me, who at the moment owns 22, or it may be 23, farms which are separated over several counties. As the Bill now stands, and even with this Amendment, a boy of 16 can drive from one county to another so long as his employer owns a farm, shall we say, in Yorkshire, Nottinghamshire, Lincolnshire or any other shire. So long as it is the same employer, and it is used on agricultural land, there is nothing in the Bill to prevent a boy of 16 years of age driving on the road with all the variety of trailers behind the tractor that are in use on farms in these days. Perhaps that is taking an extreme view. I quite understand that. I cannot imagine that the noble Lord himself would be happy unless, in the regulations, there was something to restrict the distance on the roads for which young boys at 16 years of age shall be allowed to drive a tractor with the massive machines that they haul behind them.
I do not want to waste your Lordships' time, but I ask the noble Lord to tell us that Clause 16 was intended radically to be amended by the conditions that are intended to be laid down in the regulations. I hope that he will bear in mind that the Bill, as it now stands, would mean chaos on the roads, particularly in rural areas, if boys of 16 could travel from the home farm to an outlying field perhaps two or three miles away. As the Bill now stands, there is nothing to prevent that. I am hoping

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that, in replying to this Amendment, the noble Lord will tell us exactly what it is intended to do in the regulations. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 12, line 24, after ("but") insert the said words.—(Lord Williams of Barnburgh.)
LORD AIREDALE: My Lords, I should like to support this Amendment. The only hesitation I feel about it is that I suppose it might be said that if a boy of 16 can drive a motor-cycle, since a farm tractor is probably a good deal less dangerous a vehicle on the roads, perhaps no great harm is done in allowing a boy to drive a farm tractor upon the roads without restriction. On the other hand, certain attendant advantages go with permission to drive a motor-cycle. A boy may get great advantages thereby which perhaps may be said to outweigh the possible disadvantages of the slight element of danger that he may encounter upon the roads with a motor-cycle. Where a farm tractor is being driven beyond the confines of the farm the only person who benefits is, I think, the farmer—it is not the boy at all. I should have thought that if a farmer wished his tractor, for whatever purpose, to be driven on the roads beyond the confines of his farm, it was reasonable to expect him in the interests of road safety to supply a driver over the age of 16. For those reasons I support this Amendment.
LOB CHESHAM: My Lords, I was not quite certain whether the noble Lord, Lord Williams of Barnburgh, really wanted me to consider accepting this Amendment. He made a good case against it, as I think reference to the OFFICIAL REPORT will probably show. I was not quite sure where I was with this one; but I do not think it matters very much.
LORD WILLIAMS OF BARNBURGH: If the noble Lord will excuse me for one moment, he will note that there is a slight difference between paragraph (b) of Clause 16 as it now stands and the Amendment. So long as the boy is driving a tractor that is used on agricultural land, as the clause now stands the boy can drive it on the roads all over the country. The Amendment says that he may do so only on his employer's land.
LORD CHESHAM: That is quite true. I was only taking the opportunity of
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administering a small tweak to the noble Lord's leg. As I was saying, it does not really matter because there is little, if anything, between us on this Amendment. I can certainly see the point of this Amendment; indeed, from a private word I had with Lord Albemarle, I thought that he had another point as well that he was concerned about: that such lads might be working for contractors and thereby going greater distances. I can easily agree that the purpose of this clause is one, and one only—namely, to make it possible to avoid unnecessary dislocation of operations on farms. There is no wider purpose behind it. There is no deep and dark intent, no thin end of the wedge, or anything like that.
I would only say, before I come on to something else, that the Amendment as it stands does not seem to do exactly what it is that the noble Lord who moved it had in mind; because, in the first place, so far as I can see, by restricting the provision (and I can see what is wanted) to journeys between land in the occupation of the driver's employer we should rule out the farmer's son if he worked with his father but not under contract of service. Therefore, a lot of benefit to the smaller farms would be lost, which I think would be a great pity. It singles out—the noble Lord made a certain amount of this point—a particular consideration which is really not the most important one. I think that those to concentrate on for the regulations are the safeguards concerning the type and dimensions of the tractor and the trailer and load, if any, which the sixteen-year-old can be directed to drive, because they are very much more important, as also is the proficiency of the driver, which is to be established by a Ministry test before he drives on the road. Those factors are very much more important than the actual distance over which he drives. I think your Lordships would agree with that.
I should like to say at this stage that the Government fully agree with the idea of this Amendment to confine the operation of the concession to driving for the purpose of—may I call them?—individual farming operations and not, as it were, public ones. But what I should like to do would be to consider whether this purpose would be best carried out by putting down a further Amendment

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on Third Reading (I do not like doing that, but I would if necessary) or whether the point ought to be dealt with, which I think I should prefer, in the regulations when they come to be drawn.
The noble Lord asked me to state what the regulations will be. That I am unable to do to-day because they have not been drawn. I should like to repeat to the noble Lord that the Minister has given an undertaking that the regulations will not be drawn and will not be brought in without consultation, and full consultion, with the unions concerned. I know exactly, as does he, what is the position of the unions at the moment and what they feel about it; and the Minister has given that undertaking which will be carried out. In fact, I myself am meeting representatives of the Trades Union Congress on the 19th of this month for a preliminary discussion, so I think my assurance on that matter must carry some weight. I hope therefore, that by accepting it, as it were, in principle, to be brought into effect probably by regulation or possibly by Amendment, the noble Lord will see fit to withdraw his Amendment.
LORD WILLIAMS OF BARNBURGH: My Lords, after the Parliamentary Secretary's statement I shall be happy to withdraw the Amendment and await the production of the regulations.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
7.34 p.m.
LORD MONTAGU OF BEAULIEU LORD MONTAGU OF BEAULIEU moved, after Clause 16 to insert the following new clause:
Commencement of section 102 (4) of principal Act
". Subsection (4) of section one hundred and two of the principal Act shall come into operation not later than six months after this Bill receives the Royal Assent."
The noble Lord said: My Lords, I am raising this point again in the hope that we shall perhaps have a slightly more satisfactory and sympathetic reply from the Government than we had during the Committee stage. At the moment anybody can hold a provisional licence, year after year, without any legal obligation to take a test. The Government, in their wisdom, in the 1960 Act put in a clause which in fact, if I read it aright, means that if you hold a provisional licence for more than about two years you should
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not be given another one unless you first submit yourself to a test or satisfy the local authority that you have tried to do so.
This, I feel, is a very reasonable and not at all a strong measure to prevent young motor-cyclists from going on from year to year without a test. I am entirely sympathetic with regard to the great difficulties concerning increasing the number of testers, and I know this is a difficult problem, but in view of the number given in Committee—1,700,000 people running around with "L" plates, and this number will probably increase —surely the time has come to state quite firmly that at some date in the future this method of going on year after year has to stop. I think all sides of the House will agree that it is not the car driver who is really at fault; it is the young motor-cyclist who now can get a machine and need never take a test. In fact, unless the Government say something definite to-night, it looks as though this may go on for many years. I think your Lordships will agree that a motorcyclist who goes in for the Royal Automobile Club training scheme and bothers to take his test is someone who is probably safe on the road. Those who are bad drivers of motor-cycles are the ones who are probably not going to do so.
It is strange that in Clause 17 the Government go to so much trouble to make sure that people turn up for their driving test. Although I am sure it causes great inconvenience if people fail to do so, it has nothing to do with road safety. Here is a provision which I am asking the Government to bring into effect. I think the time has come for a stand to be taken, and I am sure the Government will agree it is not going to cause an absolute flood at the testing stations, because, after all, with the provision as it stands here, people will come in gradually over a period so far as the tests are concerned. I hope that the Government will look into this provision carefully, because I am certain that it will contribute to road safety.
Amendment moved—
After Clause 16, insert the said new clause.— (Lord Montagu of Beaulieu.)
LORD MOLSON: My Lords, in a very few words I want to beg the Government

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to give a more forthcoming reply on this stage of the Bill than they did on the Committee stage. When I began to be concerned with the drafting of the Road Traffic Bill in 1955 the case of people who went on taking out provisional licences year after year without submitting themselves to a test was considered to be a matter of the utmost importance from the point of view of road safety. In the first Bill we introduced we provided that a local authority could refuse a provisional licence if they were satisfied that the applicant had no intention of taking a test and had really made no effort to do so. That was criticised in another place, and, as a result, in the second Bill that was introduced after the General Election of that year we provided the wording which is now Section 102 of the Act of 1960.
There are a number of cases of people who drive motor cars who continue to take out these provisional licences without submitting themselves to a test; but, because of the obligation to have a qualified driver with them, it is not an abuse of any great dimension. In the case of motor-cyclists, where there is not that obligation, it has become an abuse of the first importance. I confess I was astonished when my noble friend Lord Dundee told us that if this clause were put into operation it would result in an extra 1,700,000 persons submitting themselves for test. My Lords, this is really an alarming and astonishing figure. It means that, as regards motor-cyclists, a very large proportion are habitually riding, year after year, upon the roads without submitting themselves to a test. In view of the fact that such a large proportion of road accidents are associated with motor-cyclists, it seems to me that the Government should do something about it.
My noble friend Lord Dundee said that the reason that the Minister had not been able to do anything about it so far was the difficulty of dealing with even the present rate of applications for driving tests. My Lords, there should be some priority in this matter associated with road safety. It is of the utmost importance that those who are habitually riding motor cycles on the road should be obliged to take a test. That should be done, in my submission, even if it does result in a further delay
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in the testing of new motorists. I regard this as a matter of the utmost importance. It seems to me anomalous that we should be considering a new Bill in order to try to improve road safety and that one of the important provisions of the Act of 1956 should not yet be put into force. I hope that, as a result of what my noble friend Lord Montagu of Beaulieu and other noble Lords said on Committee stage, we may have a slightly more responsive reply from the Government this evening.
THE EARL OF DUNDEE: My Lords, the noble Lord who has moved this Amendment, which is identical to that which he moved in Committee, says he has done so in the hope of getting a more satisfactory and more sympathetic reply. I quite understand that the reply may not have been satisfactory, but I do not really see how it could have been much more sympathetic than it was. If your Lordships will look at the debate in Committee, you will see that I assured your Lordships then that my right honourable friend the Minister is just as anxious as any of your Lordships to bring in this subsection as soon as he possibly can. He wants to do so with as little delay as possible; and, as I quoted to your Lordships in Committee, he stated in the House of Commons a short time ago that
"Section 102 (4) of the Act will be brought into force as soon as we are satisfied that the increase which it may well cause in the number of applications for a driving test will not lead to applicants for a test having to wait unreasonably long for an appointment."
My right honourable friend is doing his best to increase the number of trained examiners in order to reduce the number of applicants awaiting driving tests; and, as my noble friend Lord Molson suggested, and as I thought I had made plain on Committee stage, he wants to do this on the principle of priority. Now, he cannot do this merely on his own authority. And I would point out to your Lordships that this is perhaps more a question of administration than of legislation. Suppose that Section 102 (4) was brought into force now: it would still be only permissive upon the local authorities, who have the power to apply it or no to apply it as they think right. If it were to become law to-morrow, it would be open to licensing authorities either to continue as

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at present, issuing licences to all applicants, irrespective of whether they were covered by the conditions of the subsection—that is to say, the local authorities, if they thought there was going to be too much congestion of applicants awaiting driving tests in their area, could go on doing nothing—or, on the other hand, a local authority could apply the formula rigidly, not with any principle of priority at all, and refuse a licence to everyone who was covered by the provisions.
What my right honourable friend the Minister of Transport would like to make sure is that they will agree to do it by stages, as my noble friend said, on the principle of priority; beginning with the refusal of licences to what you might call the worse cases—probably most of the motor cyclists, as my noble friend said—who have had a provisional licence for an exceptionally large number of years; then, after they have been dealt with, dealing next with those who have had one for a lesser number of years, and so on until it is brought down to more reasonable proportions. I can assure your Lordships that no one could be more anxious to start this, in cooperation with local authorities, than the present Minister.
When my noble friend Lord Molson asks me to be more forthcoming, I wish I knew exactly how I could be more forthcoming than I am trying to be. I will certainly, if my noble friend likes, consult the Minister and see what he thinks would happen if I were to accept the Amendment. I think he would probably say that it would make very little difference to what would happen. He might be able to bring it in much sooner than six months after this Bill comes into law. I understand the date on which this Bill will come into law is not altogether certain; but, anyhow, he might be able to do so sooner. On the other hand, tying him down to a legislative date might conceivably do more harm than good; I do not know. I do not think the Minister wants to be tied down to a date. I can assure your Lordships that he is anxious to do it as soon as possible. If my noble friend wants me to be as forthcoming as I can, I will certainly consult him and see whether he thinks there would be any harm in accepting the Amendment, but I do not think it would do any particular good.
LORD MOLSON: My Lords, may I just interrupt my noble friend? I think that in my time applications for driving tests were dealt with strictly in order of priority of application. It seems to me that, when you have this problem of 1,700,000 motor-cyclists riding on the road without submitting themselves to a test, it would be desirable to give priority to their tests when they seek to have them; and pressure could be brought to bear upon them to do so by the local authority.
THE EARL OF DUNDEE: I hope that is what will happen. My noble friend speaks of 1,700,000 motor-cyclists on the road. What I said—and I think I made it clear—in Committee [OFFICIAL REPORT, Vol. 230 (No. 75), col. 1461] was:
"The Ministry of Transport has not got any close estimate of the number of additional tests which would arise if it were now put into force, but it is estimated that if it were applied to all classes of driver, and everybody covered by the section who wished to drive applied for the test, there might be an increase of about 100 per cent.…"—
that is, 1,700,000. It does not mean 1,700,000 motor-cyclists, as my noble friend said just now, although I agree that many of the people who have these provisional licences may be motorcyclists, and it is with them, largely, that we want to deal. If my noble friend will accept my assurance on behalf of the Minister that he is doing all he can administratively to bring this in as soon as possible, I should be very glad. If he would like me to approach the Minister and see whether it would do any good to accept the Amendment—I honestly do not think it would make any difference on the favourable side—I will certainly do that. I am most anxious that my noble friend should not regard me as adopting an attitude which is otherwise than forthcoming on this question.
LORD SILKIN: My Lords, I do not feel that the reply can be regarded as satisfactory, and I am sure the noble Earl himself does not think so. If it is merely a matter of tactics, as to whether it is better to accept the Amendment or not accept it, I have no doubt in my own mind that it would be better if the Amendment were accepted. At least it would give the Minister a target—six months. It is true he might have been able to do it earlier; but, from everything that the noble Earl has said, I can

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hardly believe that it is as likely as that. I think the probabilities are that, with the best will in the world, other things are more pressing, and this thing will drag on. It has already been dragging on for five years. I feel it would be a very great advantage if we now gave the Minister a target and said, "This has got to be done within a certain period". The noble Lord says six months, and I think that is not unreasonable. I hope, therefore, that the Amendment can be accepted. I will not put it to the noble Lord that he should divide the House, but if he were to divide the House I should certainty support him.
THE EARL OF DUNDEE: If the Amendment were to be accepted, there would have to be some drafting alterations; for instance, "Act" instead of "Bill". In view of what your Lordships have said, may I consult my right honourable friend and see whether he would agree to this point being put down by the Government on Third Reading? I will certainly do that, if that is what your Lordships desire. There is no question of principle here—we both want the same thing. The Minister is just as anxious as your Lordships to do this as quickly as possible, and if your Lordships feel that it would help him to have a statutory date put in, I will certainly put the point to him and see whether we can get his agreement to it.
LORD MONTAGU OF BEAULIEU: My Lois, I feel that I am in the hands of the House on this matter, and I should like the Amendment to go forward.
THE EARL OF DUNDEE: My Lords, I must point out that I cannot accept the Amendment in its present form.
LORD SILKIN: I would advise the noble Lord, in view of the undertaking which has been given, which I think is very reasonable, to withdraw the Amendment.
LORD MOLSON: I feel that my noble friend has gone as far as can reasonably be expected, and I hope the noble Lord will agree to withdraw his Amendment.
LORD MONTAGU OF BEAULIEU: I am sorry, I misunderstood the noble Earl. In view of that, I shall be pleased to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
7.53 p.m.
LORD SWAYTHLING LORD SWAYTHLING moved, after Clause 17 to insert the following new clause:
Restriction on display of "learner driver" distinguishing mark
".—(1) A person authorised to drive a motor vehicle by virtue of his holding a licence (not being a provisional licence) granted under Part II of the principal Act shall not drive the vehicle while there is displayed on it a distinguishing mark of a kind prescribed by regulations under section ninety-nine of the said Act such as would have to be so displayed if the person driving the vehicle were the holder of a provisional licence:
Provided that this subsection shall not apply if there is present in the vehicle another person who would be authorised to drive the vehicle by virtue of his holding a provisional licence.
(2) A person who contravenes the provisions of the foregoing subsection shall be liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding twenty pounds."
The noble Lord said: My Lords, on Committee stage a number of your Lordships expressed views about the use of L-plates as being a very valuable provision in helping to ensure safety on the roads by seeing that special care is taken when motorists are passing or going near cars driven by learner-drivers. It appears that there is no provision in the law which insists that an L-plate should be taken off a car when no learner-driver is actually in the car. It has seemed to me for a long time that there is a case of calling "Wolf!" too often, and that if motorists continue to drive cars carrying L-plates when there is no learner in the car at the time, the value of this safeguard is considerably reduced. Furthermore, drivers may well continue to keep L-plates on purpose in order to get through the traffic more quickly if they think that people will make way for them. This will all add to decrease the value of carrying L-plates.
There is a second reason why I have put down this new clause, and that is because I thought it would be of considerable help to the police. At the present moment it is more or less obligatory for the police to stop any car carrying an L-plate which contains only the driver and no passenger. That is because, on the face of it, it appears that an offence is being committed; it is assumed that the driver of the car has only a provisional licence, and has no competent driver with him. On stopping the car, the polce often find that the

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driver has an ordinary licence, and therefore they waste their time in stopping cars of this sort, and so are unable to do a good deal of other work which they should carry out. For those two reasons, therefore—namely, to maintain the advantages that the L-plate has, and to assist the police—I put down this Amendment. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
After Clause 17, insert the said new clause.—(Lord Swaythling.)
THE EARL OF GOSFORD: My Lords, I should like to support the noble Lord's Amendment. I know a certain lady by acquaintance whom I have often seen driving about with an L-plate on her car. I asked her why she did that, knowing full well that she had passed her test, and she replied that she always carried it because she received priority and better treatment from other users of the road. I think it seems quite unfair that people should carry an L-plate on their car when they are no longer learner-drivers.
LORD SILKIN: My Lords, this seems a somewhat far-fetched evil which we are trying to legislate against. So far as I can see, anyone who continues to use an L-plate after he is licensed is a fool. He is liable to be stopped by the police, so that any advantage he thinks he might get he is liable to lose. I do not think we want to clutter up our legislation with far-fetched possibilities of this kind. If the noble Lord had been able to establish that this was a real evil, and that large numbers of people who.already had a licence were driving around the country with L-plates, perhaps we should deal with it. But I cannot conceive that there can be any substantial number of people, if anybody, who do this. In fact, I should imagine that the first reaction of anyone on getting a licence is to remove the L-plates as quickly as he could. I have no strong feelings about this matter, but I suggest that it is an entirely unnecessary Amendment.
LORD CHESHAM: My Lords, I am a little caught on the hop. The noble Lord opposite said most of the points I had in mind to make. While I confess that I have a little personal sympathy with the idea underlying the Amendment, it really is not one that I could
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advise your Lordships to accept. Apart from what the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, has said—with which I completely agree—the Amendment is, as it were, self-defeating. The whole nub of the thing lies in the proviso which comes after subsection (1) in this proposed new clause. Without that proviso, the Amendment would be very harsh indeed in operation. The proviso, however, weakens the Amendment so much that it would achieve nothing. If there is any virtue in the noble Lord's point that it is wrong for a licensed, experienced driver to drive by himself a car carrying L-plates, why should it be all right—I know what is coming, and I will give way in a moment—for him to organise himself a passenger who happens to hold a provisional licence? If this abuse is as widespread as the noble Lord seems to indicate, that is surely what it will do. It will not stop anything; it will merely make the abuse, if abuse is determined upon, more difficult. I know what is coming, and I will let the noble Lord say it now.
LORD SWAYTHLING: I was only going to say that when a person is teaching somebody else to drive, they may well want to change places in the car, either because the situation is dangerous or because the teacher may want to demonstrate what the learner should do. Obviously, he cannot jump in and out to change L-plates on those occasions, and it is for that reason that the proviso was put down.
LORD CHESHAM: That is so, but it also has the effect of weakening the Amendment almost to vanishing point in value for the purpose the noble Lord has in mind. It merely makes it a little more difficult and does not prevent such abuse. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, that we cannot cater by legislation for every piece of undesirable behaviour which motorists perpetrate on us. Even if the police were up to fullest possible strength, it would be very difficult for them to enforce the existing law and deal with all the varous kinds of offences which are committed. I do not think it can be right to create some motoring offences unless we can show that it will make a positive contribution to road safety. Frankly, it is difficult to claim that this one has any great harm in it from the point of view of road safety.

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I have dug into the Home Office figures as best I can and cannot find anything which indicates that this is a serious problem. I appreciate the noble Lord's desire to help the police, but I do not find myself able to accept that it helps them very much, to relieve them of one offence by creating another which is more difficult to detect and enforce than the first. If, at the end of the evening, we may have a cocktail of metaphors, I would say that, while there is a thimbleful of merit in the noble Lord's Amendment, I think that he is taking a sledgehammer to crack a nut—and a rather small nut which is not guaranteed to be good inside when he has cracked it. I appreciate the noble Lord's helpful attitude throughout the Bill and I would hope that he will not press his Amendment.
LORD AIREDALE: My Lords, is it not vital that police officers should be encouraged, if they see a single person alone in a car with L-plates, to stop that car, since a prima facie offence is being committed because there is no qualified driver sitting beside the driver of the car? Is it not vital that they should not be discouraged from that duty by saying themselves that this is only another case of a qualified driver who has not bothered to take off the L-plates? Is not the result of that going to be that the daring and foolhardy L-plate driver will take a chance and drive unattended, knowing full well that the police, even if they observe him, will not stop him because they will take the view that he is another of those qualified drivers alone with L-plates?
LORD CHESHAM: My Lords, in view of what we can find out about what goes
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on, I think that we can leave this to the police, who can manage perfectly well for themselves. Whatever we do, we are bound to get a few people who get round it. I think it would be easier for the police to pull up a single driver with L-plates than L-plated cars containing two people just to see if they have the right sort of licences for sitting in the right sort of places. I do not see any advantage in making this more complicated and more difficult to enforce than it is already.
LORD SWAYTHLING: My Lords, while I do not agree with everything the Parliamentary Secretary has said, I thank him for his reply and beg leave to withdraw my Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
VICOUNT HAILSHAM: My Lords, I am not sure whether this is not a good moment to propose that we may adjourn. I think that we have made very good progress and, if it is in accordance with the wishes of the House, I beg to move that further consideration of the Bill be adjourned.
Moved, That further consideration of the Bill be adjourned.—(Viscount Hailsham.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

GREAT OUSE WATER BILL
RIVER RAVENSBOURNE &c. (IMPROVEMENT AND FLOOD) PREVENTION) BILL
Brought from the Commons; read 1ª, and referred to the Examiners.