Lords Sitting of 10 March 1960

Preamble
The House met at half past two of the clock, The LORD CHANCELLOR on the Woolsack.
Prayers—Read by the Lord Bishop of Ely
The Lord St. Audries—Took the Oath.

MESSAGE FROM THE QUEEN
2.34 p.m.
THE EARL OF SCARBROUGH: My Lords, I have the honour to present to your Lordships a Message from Her Majesty The Queen signed by her own hand. The message is as follows:
"I thank you most sincerely for your loyal and dutiful Address on the occasion of the birth of my third child. The assurance of your joy and your constant affectionate concern for our well-being have deeply moved my husband and me and have added to our happiness in the birth of our second son."

EXPORTS OF STRATEGIC GOODS TO SOVIET BLOC
LORD BIRDWOOD: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
[The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government what measures they have taken to ensure that, in the process of trade operations between the United Kingdom and countries within the Soviet orbit, no goods shall be supplied which could be used for military purposes.]
THE MINISTER WITHOUT PORTFOLIO (THE EARL OF DUNDEE): My Lords, Her Majesty's Government participate in international arrangements to restrict exports of strategic commodities to countries in the Soviet orbit. The commodities which are subject to security export controls include weapons of war, atomic energy materials and industrial goods possessing a strategic importance.
LORD BIRDWOOD: My Lords, I thank the noble Earl very much for his Answer. I wonder whether he could answer this supplementary question. Are jet aeroplanes regarded as peaceful or perhaps as having a warlike potential; and, if so, is it true that the English Electric Company have negotiated the sale of certain electric components which are essential in the construction of jet aeroplanes?
THE EARL OF DUNDEE: My Lords, there are many types of civilian airborne equipment which are not subject to embargo. The East German order for an electrical generating system for civilian aircraft relates to a type of equipment used on civilian aircraft in the West. It is not embargoed and there is no objection to the export of English Electric's system of this type to East Germany.
VISCOUNT ELIBANK: My Lords, may I ask the noble Earl whether he is aware that the question of strategic control so far as the Eastern bloc is concerned has been threshed out time and again in this House, and on July 30, 1958, the noble Earl, Lord Gosford, answering me [OFFICIAL REPORT, Vol. 211, col. 481] said that a substantial relaxation of the embargo list had been achieved
"but also that Her Majesty's Government's objective of confining the list to items of real strategic significance has been in great measure achieved."
May I further ask him whether he remembers that on December 17, 1958, he himself agreed that there was a more flexible approach in this matter and that the Government were anxious to give licences in any cases where they could do so, subject to the undertaking on the general question of strategic control?
THE EARL OF DUNDEE: My Lords, I am most grateful for the noble Viscount's information.
LORD BIRDWOOD: My Lords, may I ask one further question? Would the Government agree that it is very necessary to be equally vigilant in the passing of potentially strategic goods to a potential enemy as it is to be vigilant in the case of the ability of a potential ally to manufacture weapons of defence?
VISCOUNT ELIBANK: My Lords, can the noble Earl give the House an assurance that there is going to be no change in the present attitude of flexibility towards this question on the part of Her Majesty's Government?
THE EARL OF DUNDEE: My Lords, I think that that is another question. The Question asked about the policy which is being applied now.
VISCOUNT STANSGATE: My Lords, has the noble Earl observed that he has not answered the noble Lord's Question at all? In asking about strategic material he asked about supplies which could be used for military purposes. Is it not the fact that £3½ million worth of copper, for example, was sent in the first half of the year 1959 to Russia?
THE EARL OF DUNDEE: My Lords, I suppose that tongs and pokers could be used for hitting people over the head, but that is not the main purpose of them. We must exercise common sense.
VISCOUNT STANSGATE: I am heartily in support of what the noble Earl says, but I am pointing out that the search by the noble Lord, Lord Birdwood, to prevent export of anything that can be used for military purposes is absurd.

BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE
EARL ST. ALDWYN: My Lords, I would inform the House that at some convenient moment after half-past three there will be a statement by my noble friend, Lord Hailsham, on the Guillebaud Report, and also a statement on the Farm Price Review by my noble friend, Lord Waldegrave.

DEFENCE
2.38 p.m.
Debate resumed (according to Order) on the Amendment moved yesterday by Viscount Alexander of Hillsborough to the Motion moved by Viscount Hailsham, to resolve, That this House approves the Report on Defence, 1960 (Cmnd. 952)—namely, to leave out all the words after "House" and insert "while recognising the need for an adequate defence policy, has no confidence that the policy set out in Report on Defence 1960 (Cmnd. 952), in
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spite of increased expenditure, provides an efficient defence for the country".
THE EARL OF SWINTON: My Lords, in the long and interesting debate which we had yesterday there was a certain amount of criticism of the White Paper. I thought the criticism was, for the most part, fairly mild in substance, although not infrequently vigorous in tone. But I must, in fairness, exclude from that the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Rea. He disliked everybody and everything, including the Leader of the Opposition, although he was going to vote for his Amendment, I suppose on the principle:
"… always keep tight hold of nurse
For fear of finding something worse."
At any rate, he left us in no doubt where he personally stood. He said that we in this country must have no defence of our own against the most dangerous form of attack to which we could possibly be subjected.
LORD REA: No nuclear defence.
THE EARL OF SWINTON: But is not the nuclear form of attack the most dangerous form of attack to which we could possibly be subjected? Is not that the only thing of which we are really afraid? It is not a few little pop guns in some distant corner of the world. I would ask the noble Lord whether, in saying, as he now admits, that we must have no defence of our own against nuclear attack, he was speaking for himself in a personal capacity or whether he was speaking on behalf of his Party. I do not know whether he would like to answer.
LORD REA: My Lords, as the noble Earl asks me the question, may I say that if he reads my speech he will see that I said that I sincerely thought I represented the majority view in this country.
THE EARL OF SWINTON: The noble Lord said that he thinks he represented a majority in the country. Apparently the electors did not think so at the last Election.
LORD REA: May I remind the noble Earl that we are not at the last Election.
THE EARL OF SWINTON: I do not think that on the line the noble Lord is at present following he is likely to induce many more people to vote for him after the next four or five years when

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another Election comes round. I must say that I am interested now—and I think it is useful for my noble friends and also for noble Lords on that side of the House who take a much more responsible line in these matters than the noble Lord, Lord Rea—to know that he speaks for his Party. I had not realised—I must apologise to him—that "follow my leader" was such a popular game in either of the Opposition Parties.
The noble Viscount, Lord Alexander of Hillsborough, took a very different line. As one would expect, from his record and the great service which he rendered to the country in Defence Departments, he took a line that was much more realistic and much more responsible.
LORD PAKENHAM: My Lords, may I say to the noble Earl that I know my noble Leader would have wished to be present during the noble Earl's speech. My noble friend will be here shortly, but I know he would wish to express apologies for not being here now.
THE EARL OF SWINTON: I shall not agree with everything that the noble Viscount said, but at any rate when he arrives his noble friend can tell him that I began with a friendly introduction. Then also there were from all quarters of the House—this I think the Government probably expected—a number of questions asking for a little more light and perhaps, in some respects, even for a little more leading. The Government could hardly have been surprised at that, because although the White Paper is well written and contains a number of statements, nobody could say that it was prodigal in information, or at any rate in new information. I am not criticising. I have had to prepare Defence White Papers and to introduce them in this House, and I know the difficulties. Of course, noble Lords have had to speak to their Amendment—that is all right, and I suppose they are going to vote on it, but it did not at all reflect the sort of temper of their speeches, for this debate, for the most part, has been much more the type of debate to which we are accustomed in this House in regard to defence matters: a genuine pooling of ideas and a seeking to clear our own and each other's minds. I hope, therefore, that when my noble friend comes
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to reply he will be able to give us some more information on some of the matters on which he was questioned.
Supposing one had to sum up this White Paper, one might say that the policy is unchanged and the mixture is as before. That is all right so long as the symptoms also are unchanged, and provided, as I think is the case, the original prescription was generally right. Here, as was said by more than one speaker yesterday, the ordinary man is at a considerable disadvantage. He can see what is going on in the world and he can form a reasonable judgment on foreign affairs and on economics, but the situation is much more difficult when one comes to matters like nuclear weapons, which are highly technical and often secret. On its main policy theme the White Paper says that our main aim is the support of N.A.T.O. On that I am sure that we should all agree. For my part, I think it is a wise decision, particularly at a difficult time in N.A.T.O.—there have been difficult times—to keep the seven Brigade groups on the Continent. It is an expensive operation. It is easier, perhaps, for me to say this than for the Government, but I think that that decision is not very generously matched by the decision of the German Government, after this year, to make no contribution at all to the cost of the seven Brigade groups which are maintained in Germany at the request of N.A.T.O., so largely for the benefit of Germany herself. I would add only this: that if facilities are going to be accorded to the German Government and to German forces in this country, I assume—I hope I can be assured of this—that the Germans will make full payment for such facilities.
We all agree about N.A.T.O. I think it is a matter, too, in regard to which we can all help—and we ought to—by making our people, and not the least the younger generation, appreciate how vital to our security the whole N.A.T.O. conception and reality is. I have something to do with N.A.T.O. propaganda in this country, and I sense a feeling of apathy in the country about it. It is not that people are opposed to N.A.T.O.—they are not; they quite accept it. But they accept N.A.T.O. passively and not actively. They accept it rather in the way that a casual Christian might accept the Established

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Church, as an institution which it is convenient to be married in and to be buried out of; but there is not much enthusiasm about it. I think it is up to us all to try to make the feeling among our people for N.A.T.O. active and not passive. I think we are all agreed that we must all—I am sure this would be the wish of whatever Government are in office—seek with all our might for disarmament and for co-existence, but the price of freedom remains eternal vigilance.
There is another risk or danger to N.A.T.O. which I think it would be wrong to slur over. Foreign policy, economic policy and defence are all interdependent. We cannot isolate one from another we cannot put any one of those elements into a watertight compartment. We cannot draw closer together in integrated defence, which is vitally important, in integrated defence in strategy and in integrated defence in the common use of weapons, which is hardly less important, if the N.A.T.O. countries are to drift apart in economic policy. I do not think it is too much to say that if the N.A.T.O. countries were to split into two conflicting economic camps the N.A.T.O. Alliance could not long survive as an effective defence organisation. So it is surely the duty of the Common Market countries and the Group Seven countries to do all they can to get together, and to hammer out a working settlement which would enable us to coexist and to get as far as we can towards a common Free Trade Area. That is a duty which every one of these countries in each group owes to their own people and to the whole of the free world. In saying that, I am making no criticism of the Government or of the Opposition, because both Her Majesty's Government and the Opposition—in this the Government have been consistently supported by the Opposition—have spared no effort to try to reach such an arrangement.
The Defence White Paper goes on to deal with weapons. It says a good deal about weapons without perhaps saying much in detail. In paragraph 21 of the White Paper it is said—and this is an obvious truth—that as the numbers of the Armed Forces are reduced, so their mobility and the quality of the weapons with which they are armed becomes still more important. I think there is a fairly good record on the weapons side to
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which the Government can lay claim. The fact that the United States and Sweden are buying our anti-tank gun is obviously evidence of its success. Then the Australian Malkara (I am not sure how to pronounce the name, but perhaps the noble Lord who lately did such distinguished service in Australia, before he came back to us, will give us the correct pronunciation), an anti-tank guided missile, is a great tribute to Australian ability and to Commonwealth co-operation, as indeed are all the Woomera experiments.
I want to make a concrete suggestion. I hope that it will not scandalise the House or those Members of it who have been Treasury Ministers. The White Paper says that when we have the right weapon it is vitally important to equip our formations with it as quickly as we can. That is obviously true. When we know we have the right weapon and know the formations which we have to equip with it, would it not be wise to do that as soon as possible? When I say "as soon as possible" I mean as soon as it is physically possible to get the weapon, and not as soon as it is financially possible in the sense in which Estimates can be got through the Treasury. I am not in the least advocating any extravagance in the matter, or the spending of any more money than would be spent spread over the Estimates. But would it not be very good business, and pay twice over?—because we shall get the quicker mobility to our troops.
These weapons become obsolescent in an incredibly short space of time and therefore once we have the right weapon in production, the sooner the formations are equipped with it, the better. Would not it be wise to buy the total number of those weapons in the year in which we can get delivery of them and spread the payment by borrowing over two or three years? That would not add anything to the Estimates of the three years—except perhaps a little interest—and I believe that it would pay over and over again. I believe that there is a kind of precedent for this in Army buildings, which of course, are slightly different. I am not quite sure, but I believe that payment has been made for the building of married quarters, barracks and so on, over a period of years.

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The question of weapons naturally leads on to the question of what is the right weapon; and here again the layman obviously is in a difficulty. He cannot know the secret scientific data but he can use his practical common sense. Your Lordships will have noticed that in paragraph 36 of the White Paper the right honourable gentleman the Minister says that we must
"devise a means of delivery that is invulnerable to the opposing defences."
In a nuclear age, what are the defences to nuclear attack? We have gone back. We have gone away from the days of the Battle of Britain when the fighter was vitally important. The fighter won the Battle of Britain but it will not win the next Battle of Britain, should it ever come. We have gone back to what I, in my days as Air Minister, regarded as a rather out-moded view, the view that the right kind of defence was counterattack. Nobody proved more than the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Dowding, how right I was in that respect. But to-day the situation has changed again and the enemy is now going to defend himself against nuclear attack by his own attack—whether by air-carried bombs or by rockets. It means a nuclear attack upon the bases of the other country. I do not think that that can be argued against.
We are told that the development of Blue Streak is continuing but that it may be decided not to rely exclusively on fixed-site missiles; that the possibility of mobile launchers, aircraft or submarines for long-range delivery is being investigated. My Lords, it is time. That really is the fundamental and most important problem. All the old arguments that we used to have about the relative merits of an aircraft carrier or airfields from which to send aeroplanes apply here in a new setting. In those old days the argument, certainly agreed to by everybody in the long run—even some of the Admirals—was that it was wiser to use our aircraft off the ground because if one aerodrome was bombed there were dozens, perhaps hundreds, of others to which our long-range aircraft could come back and land in safety, whereas the aircraft carrier, useful as it was, was still a very vulnerable target; and once it had been sunk or even seriously damaged, aircraft could not land upon it. But the aircraft carrier
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had at any rate one asset: it was comparatively mobile, whereas the fixed-site base from which the missile has to be delivered is not at all mobile. Indeed, it is a colossal installation.
I am told that that installation is to be put a long way below ground, but presumably it will point up a bit when it comes to the surface. Moreover, however far below ground we have it, as one noble Lord said yesterday, the site of the base will be pinpointed. There will be no secrecy about where these bases are. Everybody will know where they are, and with nuclear missiles, of course, such a base would be hopelessly open to attack; and with the great and vast devastation that these missiles can cause, I believe it to be idle to suppose that a fixed-missile base in this country could remain available in action for any length of time.
The situation may be different in the United States, for that country is thousands of miles further away. In order to direct a missile against the United States, a tremendously long-range missile would have to be used, assuming that the missile is not being fired from a submarine off the coast but from a fixed base somewhere in Eastern Europe. But we in this country are very close, and missiles of great range are not required to attack our bases—although to-day even long-range missiles, on both sides, are seen to be getting deadly accurate. From the few hundred miles distant which a potential enemy base would be from us, short-rang missiles, just like the V.2 of the last war, could be sent against us. I should have thought that that meant they would be absolutely devastating in their effect.
If it is true, as I have seen stated, that there is in existence, or on its way, a low-trajectory missile of the shorter-range type—with a range of some hundreds of miles—of which we should have no warning, because it is like a hedgehopping aircraft and, I understand, would hardly be reflected on a radar screen. That is exactly the kind of missile which could be directed against us. That is shown, I think, by the fact that the Air Force have (I think they have published it; certainly I have read it in newspapers, but I think it has been in Ministerial statements, too) as their whole policy and practice in Bomber Command that it shall be able to get the

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aircraft so quickly off the ground that they will be in the air before a missile can be delivered.
There are all these arguments; and, after all, they are not arguments which one has to be a great expert to advance; they are the arguments which all of us who have ever had anything to do with this matter have known from the past and which any ordinary layman, applying what I should have thought was a common-sense view, would find very convincing. Therefore, my Lords, I am very glad this investigation is taking place, but I sincerely hope that it will be carried to a conclusion and a decision taken as soon as possible.
I do not know what will be said later in the debate. Very distinguished Service speakers are following and I do not know what will be said from their view on the relevant merits of the mobile base as against the static base. In what I have said I do not wish to imply that I take exception to the proposal that the United States should have this warning apparatus here. Whether it is convenient to situate it on one of our most agreeable moors in Yorkshire I do not know. Anyhow, we may have to accept that. Although I do not think—particularly if this low-flying missile is going to be the next thing we are faced with—this apparatus looks like being of much value to us, it will certainly be of great value to the United States as part of their early warning system; and we ought to accept that as part of co-operation.
That leads me to another point. This co-operation with the United States surely should be as wide as possible: it lies at the heart of all our defence problems. I should like to ask the First Lord of the Admiralty how much co-operation and pooling of information there is with the United States on guided missiles and on missile-carrying submarines. The better we play our part—and we are playing it to the full now—the more ready the United States Government and Congress will be to share with us; and if they do we shall both, the United States as well as ourselves, certainly be more efficient and save money. And the saving of money is not unimportant. These weapons are terribly costly. I know how difficult it is to estimate for something which is barely designed and of which one has no sort
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of prototype. But the report from the Comptroller and Auditor-General on the actual cost of some of these weapons compared to the estimates is very formidable and shows how vitally important it is to take a decision as to which weapons we are to go for, and how important it is to have this full co-operation with the United States.
My Lords, I want to ask only two more things. One is about the inter-Service co-operation which we heard of in the White Paper of last year, and which I think we all felt was just on the right lines of trying to get the three Services under unified command. It is not in the White Paper, but there does figure in the Naval Paper and the Air Paper with the Estimates the decision which has been taken about Coastal Command: the decision that it will remain a Royal Air Force Command but that the senior naval officer in each area will decide on the operational tasks of the Command when it is engaged in maritime operations and exercises. I welcome that decision. I do not call it a compromise at all. It seems to me to be the quintessence of strategic and tactical good sense, and exactly the kind of co-operation that ought to be between the Services. There is another kind of co-operation that I should like the First Lord to say a word about, too, if he would; and that is co-operation between civil and military-service aviation. The cost of the modern aeroplane is, of course, absolutely vast, and the closer co-operation there can be between civil and military aircraft production the better. Indeed, I should hope that practically the same aircraft, or as nearly as possible the same aircraft, might be used for civil and for military transport tasks.
My Lords, I have one final question to put, again on nuclear weapons, not on their construction but on their control. I am quite sure that the Labour Government, under the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, were profoundly right to make the atom bomb. I am equally certain that our Government were right to make what, for convenience, I will call the hydrogen bomb. I am sure the decision that we should manufacture these nuclear weapons ourselves is absolutely right; and I rejoice that there is such an identity of view and policy, so that continuity is assured whatever may happen between us; that we must have this

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weapon; that we must make this weapon; that we must play our part, and that we must have our own strategic—not, of course, attack but defence nuclear forces. That, I am sure, is right. But I should like to be assured (though I am sure that the answer to this question is "Yes") that, having that force, we are ourselves in firm control of our own nuclear weapons. That, I believe, is of vital importance, and the fact that the reply to a nuclear attack must be immediate to counter the nuclear attack makes it all the more important that that power, that control should be in our own hands.
My Lords, I think that the Amendment was moved as a sort of duty. I feel that there was a great deal more unity of purpose between us, on both sides, in this matter of defence. That is how it should be, because these things belong not to attack, as the noble Lord said; these are the things that belong unto our peace, and it is right that the two great Parties of the State should, so far as they possibly can, think and act together upon them.
3.10 p.m.
LORD SHACKLETON: My Lords, the most striking aspect of this debate is the unanimity of criticism of the Government that has come from Members in both Houses; criticism which has been delivered, I think, on the whole, in a reasonably friendly way—at any rate, the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, took no exception to it. The fact that in some sense it has become a Party issue is something which surely should not surprise the noble Earl who has just sat down. After all, it is possible for a Labour Opposition Party to oppose a Conservative Government on matters other than private enterprise versus nationalisation. Defence (whether or not the noble Lord, Lord Rea, would call it attack) is a matter of such tremendous importance and controversy to us all that it is right that we should back up the criticism that we may have to make with a willingness to put down an actual Amendment to the Government's Motion. But the fault for this lies not so much in the heart of the Government—or even, at the moment, in their head—but in the incredible coyness of their statements.
Several of your Lordships have criticised the absence of much new
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information in the White Papers and in the accompanying Memoranda to the Estimates. We know that it is not possible to put in all the information, but is it really necessary to use such cautious phrases as appear in the second paragraph of the Report on Defence, where the Government say:
"During the third year of the Five-year Plan for Defence, the Government's broad defence policy has undergone no major change".
What the Government mean, surely, is that important changes are in process of taking place; and our complaint is that they have not yet told us that they have made up their minds, and that, in fact, an element of confusion has inevitably been brought about. And this is not a Party point. In the Air Ministry we have been lucky: we have had the same Minister for seven years. In the Ministry of Defence we have had so many that my noble Leader, Viscount Alexander of Hillsborough, could not remember whether it was seven, eight or nine. I believe nine is the correct figure. This has inevitably produced a confused situation and a confused state of the public mind; and it is quite striking the amount of criticism there is at the moment, not only among the Members of both Houses of Parliament and all Parties, but in the Press and among military commentators.
I hope that the Government will begin to show us a little more the way in which their mind is moving. Indeed, the noble Viscount, again using one of these coy phrases, said [OFFICIAL REPORT, Vol. 221, col. 916]:
"I think it is insufficiently appreciated how far our defence policy has moved since the publication of the 1957 White Paper."
Unfortunately, they have not told us in what way; but I think it is apparent that, while the concept of the shield and the sword is still a fundamental one, on which I think there is general agreement, the emphasis to-day has moved a great deal more towards the idea of the shield. Unfortunately, even the word "deterrent" has changed. I rather prefer the word of the noble Lord, Lord Balfour of Inchrye, the "equaliser", when referring to the atom bomb. Originally, the deterrent was the atom bomb: now, apparently, it is all military forces. This is part of the confusion. The Government are

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moving, I think, to the concept of a greater degree of conventional forces. Here, again, I am not sure what a conventional force is, but I suppose it is anything in which a nuclear explosion does not take place. At any rate that is the trend, and I hope the Government will "come a little bit cleaner" on it.
My Lords, I should like to look first at the nuclear deterrent, the equaliser—and here I must disagree with the noble Lord who spoke from the Liberal Benches when he said that we had not got an efficient nuclear deterrent. I believe that we have got one. I believe that in fact Bomber Command to-day is able to do the task that it has been prepared to do: and we are all agreed that we need not qualify these phrases by saying that we hope that it will not happen, because we all know that we hope it never will happen. I believe that the present Bomber Command is capable of doing that. I also believe that, assuming that there is some warning of growing tension, it will be possible, with adequate dispersal and with the degree of training that is going on, to get a very sizeable proportion of our bomber airforce into the air the moment a warning is given—even within the four minutes that have been stated. I accept the Government's view on that matter. I believe that, despite difficulties, and despite some of the changes of policy—some of which, I accept, are inevitable—the R.A.F. is at a very high state of efficiency.
The difficulty we are in is when we come to this question of missiles, and here we move into a world which is so strange and in which the words are so unfamiliar that it is difficult to follow the precise weapons we are talking about. The inventors of that ancient game which many of your Lordships must have played, L'Attaque, would have great difficulty to-day in matching a Sea Slug with a Polaris or a Blue Streak, and I do not know what the comparable weapons are. War was simpler in those days. The fact that to-day it is more complicated is perhaps an encouraging sign, for it may be that it is so complicated and so dangerous that it will never take place.
This expenditure on missiles is one of the main grounds for criticism of the Government. The other day an
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American boasted that his country had wasted 750 million dollars on a missile called the Thor. They have now given it to us, although I believe the Americans still retain the keys to this weapon. However, we have done better than this: we are in process of wasting £600 million on the Blue Streak—or so we are informed by practically every commentator outside the Government; and here we really should like to know what is going on. The Minister of Defence, in another place, again with these cautious phrases, said, when talking about missiles [OFFICIAL REPORT, Commons, Vol. 618, col. 862]:
"… paragraph 36 of the White Paper very clearly sets out the position".
Paragraph 36, which the noble Earl quoted, says:
"The development of the British ballistic missile Blue Streak is continuing. However, it may be decided not to rely exclusively on fixed-site missiles as the successor to the medium bomber armed with the stand-off powered bomb".
What the Government mean is that they now reckon that they are not going to rely exclusively on them, and obviously they are not going to. The one thing they are looking for now is an alternative to the fixed-site missile, and the time has surely come when the Government should take a decision. I agree that we have to give the new Minister of Defence a few weeks during his short tenure of office to get familiar with it, but I should have thought that if there was one thing that was pretty certain it is that some time during the course of this year the Minister of Defence will announce that the Blue Streak Missile programme will be cancelled.
The arguments for and against are, in fact, a good deal more finely balanced than some noble Lords and some critics will admit. I do not accept that it is only useful as a first-strike weapon. It would be extremely difficult to knock out a large number of sites if they were scattered very widely and were properly dispersed. But it is obvious that the limitations of this weapon are such that the Government are thinking again, and I hope they will shortly announce their policy. They must not be perturbed, therefore, if the criticisms which, for the last two years, have been levelled against this weapon grow stronger while they dither and wait to make up their minds

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on what is to be the successor to the present nuclear deterrent. I believe—and this may be some comfort to the noble Lord, Lord Rea—that after the Blue Streak, the days of an independent British nuclear deterrent will be drawn to their close. I believe that this is an inevitable tendency and one which I do not think we should regret.
I should like to ask the Government to be more forthcoming in their expressions of opinion in regard to interdependence. I get the feeling that as the concepts of 1957 under Mr. Sandys, the really radical re-thinking on defence he attempted at that time, begin to draw into the past, the Government are not so enthusiastic with regard to N.A.T.O. as they ought to be. I am sure that noble Lords opposite will deny this, but I think that their statements ought to be a great deal more forthcoming and that they ought to be careful not to offend the sensibilities of our Allies by actions such as the withdrawal of some of our troops from Europe, which they explained in the 1957 White Paper, and the unfortunate phrase in this year's White Paper about leaving three Brigade groups in Germany "for the time being". What they mean by "for the time being" I do not know, nor how it reads when translated into other languages, but I believe that the Government ought to take a much more positive line than they have done.
We also seem to be turning further away from the concept, about which the noble Earl, Lord Swinton, spoke, of unification of the forces. We have had one or two encouraging developments. There is the conception of the commando carrier, which surely must move towards a development of an amphibious force of all arms. In reading the three Memoranda of the three Services, I get the impression that they are three distinct Services, operating with funds that they have scraped out of the Government one way or another and that have been allocated almost on a predetermined basis. This is simply not going to achieve the efficient defence we want.
I should like to move into dangerous waters and question the Government on the rôle of the Royal Navy. I wish to make it clear that I do not want in any way to attack the Navy or the wonderful
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men who serve in it. In 1957 the Government said that the rôle of naval forces in total war is somewhat uncertain. I believe that that uncertainty still remains. Last year, when I questioned the Government on this subject, I was taken to task by one or two noble Lords, who asked whether I was aware of the importance of the Navy in anti-submarine war-ware. It so happened that during a great part of the last war I was involved in the anti-submarine war. I would go so far as to say that under 10 per cent. of the present Navy is designed for antisubmarine warfare, and I would ask the First Lord, when he comes to reply, to say how the carriers that we have to-day are intended to be used in an anti-submarine rôle and what aircraft they have which will be employed in it. We know that they have a number of fast aircraft, which are capable of carrying a nuclear warhead, but they are not suitable for anti-submarine work because they lack rough weather capability, which is essential for anti-submarine operations in the North Atlantic. Perhaps the new helicopter will have that capability and I should like to have an assurance on that if I can.
I do not believe that part of our striking or deterrent activities can come from any tactical force, and I should have thought that the real rôle of the Navy is its traditional one of being a fire brigade, available to go and put out fires wherever they may occur, and in the event of an all-out war breaking out, to do the work of salvage. If that all-out war should ever come, there is no doubt that we should need all the resources we have and all the protection that the Navy could bring.
Something has been said about mobility in the White Paper. I doubt whether we are taking this question seriously enough, and this again springs from lack of a unified approach. We know that the Royal Air Force are getting Britannias, but they ought to have had them a good deal earlier. It should be possible to get commandos and troops to any part of the world within a few hours of trouble breaking out. There was the instance not long ago when four aircraft of Coastal Command arrived in a certain district where trouble was threatening and immediately the trouble disappeared. It is essential

1009
that a high degree of mobility and readiness is achieved. I understand that if we had to move troops from Aldershot, it would take about 48 hours to get them going. As your Lordships know, the world is too difficult a place for us to accept that degree of delay.
I would ask the Government about the state of readiness of our troops in Germany. I think that here some criticism can be levelled at the Government. It has been alleged on a number of occasions that our forces are not up to strength and lack ancillary troops—"tail troops"—and are not fully equipped to perform their rôle. This view is held not just by a few people who have been over in Germany on a short visit. In a recent paper published by the Institute of Strategic Studies, a very distinguished group said:
"It is particularly unfortunate that British formations in Europe are under strength and under-equipped. It is vital that the reorganisation now envisaged should put these difficulties right as speedily as possible."
In another place they said:
"If our forces were fully up to strength… a great deal of recent sniping at Britain would very possibly not have taken place."
Now that they have got over their tremendous first obsession with the equaliser, the nuclear deterrent, I hope that the Government will concentrate on bringing our present forces up to a high standard of efficiency. In conclusion, I would say that I was impressed, as I am sure were all noble Lords, by the speech of the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, and his references to disarmament. I can assure him—and all noble Lords will agree with this—that, however much we may criticise and disagree on details, we are satisfied that the Government are determined to press on with disarmament; and I hope that the words that were used from the Government Front Bench will be widely read and widely known.
3.29 p.m.
LORD BEVERIDGE: My Lords, as one with no previous knowledge of defence technique, I have recently been doing my utmost to learn. I have listened to every speech I could in this House, and those I could not hear I have read carefully through. I hope that noble Lords will not feel it any disrespect to them if I say that I have not been content to learn from them only. I have done
1010
my utmost to read as many as I could bear of the speeches made last week in another place on this same Report. I hope it is no discourtesy to Members of the other place to say that I did not find all the 250 columns of eloquence devoted to this subject easy to read. But at least I have read twice over all the quite essential speeches made in the other place; that is to say, the two speeches made by the Minister of Defence, Mr. Watkinson, at the beginning of the debate and in reply, the speech made by the Leader of the Labour Party, Mr. Gaitskell, and the speech made by the Liberal Leader, Mr. Grimond.
From that study I take as my starting point something said by the Minister of Defence in his reply, when he expressed his surprise that there had been practically no mention of disarmament, he having hoped that disarmament would be one of the central features of the debate. To-day I am happily able to add to that the notable utterance made by the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, in speaking yesterday [OFFICIAL REPORT, Vol. 221 (No. 50), col. 912]:
"I regard either a world authority or total disarmament, in the long run, as the only rational objectives…"
Encouraged by these two vital utterances, I propose to take as my subject to-day the theme that has practically not been touched on at all in this debate—namely, the relation between defence by deterrence, as envisaged in this Report and by Her Majesty's Government, and total disarmament as our aim.
To one who like myself believes that total disarmament of all nations is indispensable if civilisation is to survive, frankly, neither the Report on Defence nor the two speeches of the Minister of Defence in the other place are altogether cheerful reading. The Report, having made a rather hasty bow to peace as its ultimate object, gets down to business by defining as its way to peace deterrence; having more and more destructive weapons under our British control for killing other people—and paragraph 7 of the Report emphasises particularly the growing efficiency and killing power of the weapons now available to this country. I am not going to attempt—I am not qualified—to enter into a technical discussion of alternative weapons; and though sometimes I think I know something about money, I am

1011
not going to say anything about money. To me, the question of more or fewer millions spent on saving us from total destruction is relatively a minor question. I am going to raise two questions only, each of which I think is of some importance, on the relation between the present policy of peace by deterrence and the ultimate aim of peace by total disarmament under a world authority.
My first question is this. If the ultimate aim is peace by total disarmament of all nations, how should we organise defence meanwhile so as to reduce to a minimum the risk of war before disarmament has come? I would remind the House that the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, said yesterday in so many words that, so long as the weapons exist, there is always the risk of war breaking out suddenly. My answer to that question is, first, that we should put our trust in the United States of America, on whom the Western deterrent in substance depends, and work with them as closely as possible. It seems to me hardly short of a tragedy to express, as some people have, doubts as to the intention of the United States to carry out their solemn undertakings to support any N.A.T.O. country in difficulty. Secondly—and here I know that I am going to be fallen foul of by the first speaker on behalf of the Government to-day—I would say that, while making our full and fair contribution to Western defence, we should not insist on establishing nuclear weapons under our independent control. We can contribute to them—and I think we should—but we should put them ultimately under the control of N.A.T.O. and get to work to secure proper political control in N.A.T.O.
THE LORD PRIVY SEAL AND MINISTER FOR SCIENCE (VISCOUNT HAILSHAM): My Lords, I am much interested in this theory. I wonder whether the noble Lord would elaborate on what he is saying. Does he mean, when he says "under the command of N.A.T.O.", that every one of the thirteen or so political heads must be consulted before the weapons are used, or does he mean that the actual question of whether to use them or not is to be delegated to a soldier, the Commander-in-Chief of N.A.T.O.?—because I think he must
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mean one of those things, and I do not know for which he is trying to argue.
LORD BEVERIDGE: I am sssuming that N.A.T.O., to which we all attach great importance, has got self-governing machinery. It is not my responsibility to pose what that should be. It is no good saying, Use N.A.T.O. and work with N.A.T.O.", and saying that it cannot manage its own affairs and you have no idea how it ought to be managed. I am afraid I must, with all courtesy, decline to answer that very ticklish question put by the noble Viscount. But I do want to say that the reason for putting this power, if possible, in the hands of N.A.T.O. is not a question of efficiency, and least of all is it a question of votes in an Election here. I do not think that the voters have any judgment that is worth considering on that topic. The real argument is that the demand for our own nuclear weapons under our control encourages similar demands elsewhere and, therefore, increases the number of nations—we may get ten, twelve or more—having nuclear weapons, any one of whom may suddenly launch a war on the world. That is the real danger. I think it is a danger that should be taken with desperate seriousness, and I press it on the Government with great seriousness to-day.
Let me say that on all the points I have made I am happy to find myself in full accord with what the Liberal Leader in the other place said. He accepted completely the explicit undertakings of the United States of America; and he emphasised the importance of N.A.T.O. and the danger of multiplying nuclear weapons. On all these points I would say that we Liberals are in the somewhat perhaps unusual position of agreeing completely together; and we, at the same time, differ on this question of who should control nuclear weapons—whether we should, or not—from those who sit upon our left, or, at any rate, from those who sit upon our left and follow their Leader, because Mr. Gaitskell firmly took the view of our having our own control.
Let me come to what is to me a much more important question. How long is the process of making more and more killing weapons to continue while we wait for disarmament? "Waiting for disarmament" was the phrase used by the Minister of Defence. Or how long,

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in the words of the noble Viscount facing me, is the long run to be before we become rational, as he says we should become rational? Both the noble Viscount and the Minister have given answers to that question. The noble Viscount has said, among other things, that it might well be fifty years instead of ten before we get disarmament.
VISCOUNT HAILSHAM: My Lords, what I think the noble Lord is referring to is when I said that if the process went on without disarmament, the time when an explosion would take place might be fifty years rather than ten. But I did not for a moment give a term of years to the process before disarmament could take place, because had I done so I should have been saying something which I certainly would never have said, namely, casting doubt on the validity of the current talks, which we all hope will yield a result.
LORD BEVERIDGE: My Lords, I thank the noble Viscount most genuinely for correcting me, and I accept his correction completely. Let me go on, though, to the answer which I say was given to us by the Minister of Defence. He gave his answer in a different way as to how long we might wait. He said that the British Government looked forward to making and owning such killing weapons until the late 'sixties and early 'seventies. That was not a casual remark. It occurred twice, in his first speech and in his reply. It is obviously deliberately looking forward to going on making these weapons for the next fifteen years—and he went on to describe them in detail. The prospect seemed rather dear to him, because he repeated it.
For contrast, I should like to look back to an earlier Report on Defence which was published just two years ago, in February, 1958, under the title Britain's Contribution to Peace and Security. That said, in so many words that nothing less than
"comprehensive disarmament by all nations, coupled with comprehensive inspection and control by a world authority"
makes sense. It went on to declare that there can be no mutual confidence between nations or real peace so long as the arms race continues. This Government said that two years ago in that Report. Does it not mean simply that peace by deterrence is not a real peace at all? I want to appeal to the
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Government to work without any delay for real peace; to turn their words about total disarmament into deeds.
I hope the House w ill forgive me if, on this question of turning words into deeds. I am for a moment personal, speaking of my own experience of turning words into deeds. I have lived nearly all my working life by producing quantities of words. But all my working life I have been also a practical creature: when I had come to believe that there was some definite thing which my fellow Britons needed for a happy life, I could not rest until that need was met. And several of those needs have been met, and can be met, in this country. First of all, there were the labour exchanges, whose Jubilee this year the present Minister of Labour so kindly and generously allowed me to join in celebrating. There followed social insurance for abolishing want and needless disease, leading to a Report in 1942. The Coalition Government, which had asked for that Report, did not like it when they saw it. But the Government of my noble friends on this side of the House put it into force in 1946. Finally, there was the plan of full employment in a free society. I am delighted to think how all Governments that we have had since the war, one after another, have maintained full employment in a free society and have changed the lives of all our citizens.
I come now to the greatest need of all for us, and for every other people in the world—the abolition of war by total disarmament of all nations; substitution of justice for mass murder between nations when they differ; justice declared by an impartial court, and enforced by a world authority and a world police. In this House a month ago, my noble friend Lord Rea introduced a debate with a Motion for disarmament. I found myself being rebuked by the noble Earl the leader of the House for not having recognised that our Prime Minister, and other leading Ministers, had been the first among the great world statesmen to emphasise in so many words this need for disarmament and a world authority for assured peace with justice between nations. Let me say that I had recognised that fact most completely. I had begun with the Prime Minister's statement of March. 1955. I quoted a number of such words, but I went on to ask the Government whether they would kindly turn those words into deeds. The

1015
answer I received on that occasion in this House was given to me by the noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury, who told me, in so many words, that a world authority for justice in place of war was not to be expected in the foreseeable future.
Just a month ago the noble Earl the Leader of the House rebuked me—I think slightly unjustly—for not recognising the excellent words written by the Ministers of this Government. I had read them, and said, "Please act instead of talking." When the noble Earl went on to give his own definition of total disarmament, I acclaimed his words with enthusiasm; and I acclaim them still. But I make an appeal still to the Government, as those in charge of all our fates, to turn their words into deeds without a moment of unnecessary delay. Do not condemn us to another fifteen or fifty years of organising mass killing for deterrence. Natural science has made it necessary to abolish war, by total disarmament controlled by world authority. No sensible person could question that at all. What possible reason can there be why we should conceal from other nations the terms on which we, as a quite important nation, as a leading nation in the Past and as the leading nation we can be again, would be prepared completely ourselves to disarm? Why should we not work it out in detail? There are masses of complicated questions that need thinking out, but is there any reason for keeping secret our view as to how these questions can be solved?
I know that the Government are genuine in their desire for world government, but somehow they do not move from words to deeds with a pace that I personally, and I think the world also would like to see. Remembering what the noble Viscount told us, that so long as these weapons exist there is a risk of sudden unexpected war; I say: let us stop that risk; let us put an end to it. Instead of keeping anything secret from the world, instead of failing to use all our wide knowledge of responsibilities throughout the world, all our practical sense in government, why should we not set out in black and white for friendly discussion with other nations our conditions for disarming ourselves completely? I make that appeal to Her Majesty's Government.

BRITISH TRANSPORT COMMISSION
VISCOUNT HAILSHAM: My Lords, with the permission of the House, may I crave your Lordships' indulgence to interrupt the debate in order to inform your Lordships of a statement about the position of the British Transport Commission which has just been made in another place by my right honourable friend the Prime Minister? The operative part of this statement is as follows:
"The position of the British Transport Commission has to be considered in all its aspects—commercial, financial and social. From the commercial point of view, the expansion of the economy has not led to the recovery in railway earnings which might reasonably have been expected some years ago. The carriage of minerals, including coal, an important traffic for the railways, has gone down. At the same time there has been an increasing use of road transport in all its forms.
"The British Transport Commission's total deficit has increased very rapidly over the last five years and now amounts to some £350 million. For the calendar year 1960 the deficit is estimated at £80 million, which includes interest on British Transport stock. This reflects an operating loss on the railways which on present performance is estimated at £45 million, and includes allowance for the 5 per cent. interim addition to the wages bill. In addition to the £80 million there is the interest on the advances to meet accumulated deficits. This is now running at about £15 million.
"The Report of the Guillebaud Committee on railwaymen's pay, set up jointly by the Commission and the trade unions, has now been presented to them. The Government have been informed by the Commission that they have proposed that the Report should be studied in the normal negotiating committee of the industry. It is a subject of considerable complexity, for it deals not only with the level of wages but also with the grading of jobs and differential wage rates. The implications on the finances of the British Transport Commission will have to be taken into account by the Government

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in considering what action to take as regards the present difficulties of the industry.
"The Government accept the objective underlying the Report of the Guillebaud Committee—that fair and reasonable wages should be paid to those engaged in this industry. At the same time others also must accept corresponding obligations.

"(i) The industry must be of a size and pattern suited to modern conditions and prospects. In particular the railway system must be remodelled to meet current needs, and the modernisation plan must be adapted to this new shape. Those working in the industry must accept this. This is the only way of bringing about conditions in which a fair reward, not only in terms of money, but of satisfaction with their job, can be secured.

"(ii) The public must accept the need for changes in the size and pattern of the industry. This will involve certain sacrifices of convenience, for example, in the reduction of uneconomic services. Some increases will also have to be made in fares and charges, and the Commission intend to take action in this respect as soon as possible. It will also be necessary to examine urgently the question of relieving the industry of restrictions aria obligations which limit the Commission's earnings and prevent them from making the best use of their resources.

"(iii) The Commission must accept a radical alteration of its structure, so as to secure a more effective distribution of functions and a better use of all its assets. Measures of reorganisation should include decentralisation of management so that individual undertakings, including the regions of the British Railways, should, as far as practicable, be made fully self-accounting and responsible for the management of their own affairs. The detailed application of these principles to all the Commission's undertakings is a matter of urgency and will be worked out by a special planning board. Legislation, as well as administrative action, will certainly be required. This planning board
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will be appointed by the Government and will report both to the Government and to the Commission. Meanwhile the Commission are securing expert advice on the question of regional accounting for the railways.

"(iv) Finally there is the problem of finance. Here there is both a short-term and a long-term problem. In the short-term the problem is to devise interim financial arrangements to enable the railway system to be carried on until the necessary reorganisation can be made effective. The Government are now considering what form these should take. In the long-term the financial arrangements must depend on the size and structure of the undertaking, and must indeed form an essential part of the general reorganisation. The life and trade of the nation require a railway system, but it must not be allowed to become an intolerable burden on the national economy.

"The Commission, the trade unions, the public and the Government will all have to co-operate in this new approach."
But, says my right honourable friend in conclusion,
"I feel sure that they are in the mood to do so."
3.59 p.m.
VISCOUNT ALEXANDER OF HILLSBOROUGH: My Lords, it is very useful to your Lordships' House to have this statement made. It at once appears that it has two aspects. In many of its paragraphs it is very tentative; in other paragraphs clearly it is intended to take very wide powers for alterations of considerable substance. I do not think it is possible in present circumstances, without a great deal more thought about this matter and without having further indications of the way in which the Government intends to develop this policy, to say much about it to-day. But I should like to ask in the first instance whether this very long and strong reference to what is almost like a reconstruction of the railways there is any intention to move away from the present situation, to any great change other than making them administratively independent. I hope it is not going to be taken out of the general ambit and final

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accountancy and appraisement of the central board as a whole. I think there ought to be some mention of that.
I am a little concerned about the double reference, in two consecutive paragraphs, to the size and pattern of the industry, and then a little later, the little homily to those who are employed in the industry. I hope there is to be no question, apart from closing some uneconomic branch lines, of so reducing the size of the industry as to interfere with its strategic value—that is of great value to the nation; strategy is most important—and also no intention by Government action still further to injure the overall economic position of the railways by carefully hiving off the most profitable of their undertakings. I think that would be a great disaster.
I also deplore the absence at present of any indication—I do not know whether any basis is going to be followed—of a real plan for the integration of our transport in its general and combined service to the needs of the nation. The last thing that struck me was that there are two or three items in this statement which refer specifically to urgency. I am not quite sure that the same aspect of urgency is attached to the consideration of the wage problems still to be settled as the result of the Guillebaud Report; but I hope very much that they are not going to be so long delayed, or so interfered with by Government action, as to re-exacerbate the feelings of the railwaymen.
VISCOUNT HAILSHAM: My Lords, the noble Viscount referred to the statement as "wide and tentative". I think the supplementary question (if that is what it could be called) merits both epithets. It is a little difficult to know to which of his remarks the noble Viscount really wants me to attend in my reply. Clearly, the Government regard the whole question in all its bearings as urgent. I think the interim payment, which has incurred a certain amount of criticism in some quarters, was evidence of that. As regards the question of overall strategy, I should have thought the last words of my right honourable friend made it plain that we regard an effective and efficient railway traffic system as vital to the life of the nation, and I think it would be better
1020
to await any suggestion about hiving off until the planning board has finally determined what is the best use to be made of the assets available. Our object is to find the best use and then to institute it. I was a little puzzled to know what the noble Viscount meant by an integration of all the transport services. On some lips it is often used as a plea for preventing progress in the interests of vested interests. That certainly is not the Government's policy.
VISCOUNT ALEXANDER OF HILLSBOROUGH: My Lords, I greatly regret the last remark of the noble and learned Viscount. It seems to me that our principal difficulty in regard to the question of the integration of transport was caused by those who protected vested interests for their private profit and, for that reason, took away the control of the railways. I think that is a great pity. But I should like to ask this in regard to the planning board, which may be of great importance. Will Parliament be privileged to have from the Government first the composition of the planning board, and secondly, its terms of reference? That is a most important matter. I should have thought that it would be necessary for those things to come before Parliament.
VISCOUNT HAILSHAM: Clearly, in one form or another. Parliament will have to discuss this matter. The composition and terms of reference of the board are, in fact, still under consideration, and it was for that reason that my right honourable friend did not specify them in his statement this afternoon.
4.6 p.m.
LORD MORRISON OF LAMBETH: My Lords, may I ask the noble and learned Viscount whether, since the Government have decided to set up this planning bound, the request of my noble friend the Leader of the Opposition is not reasonable—namely, that they should inform Parliament as to what the board's terms of reference are to be. We are left in great doubt as to what the planning board is to consider and the sphere within which it will work. Moreover, the composition of the planning board is important, including the point as to whether there is to be included amongst its membership trade unionists who are familiar with the problems of the industry.

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The other point that I should like to put to the noble and learned Viscount is whether the Government have now come to the conclusion that, because of their policy of pushing the vested interests of the road transport industry to such an extent that it has damaged the railway industry, they ought to reconsider it. For example, there was the cutting off from the British Transport Commission of road commercial transport; there has been a whole series of things, including the fact of bigger vehicles being allowed on certain wide roads, all of which is deliberately encouraging the diversion of traffic from the railways to the roads. I have no objection to the roads. They have their job, and they should do their job. But it is open to question whether it is wise for the Government to pursue a policy which was, as I think, of malice aforethought calculated deliberately, to damage the railways and to help their political supporters among the road transport hauliers. Can we have a little satisfaction from the noble Viscount (if he will be serious for a minute) to tell us whether the Government have any fresh thoughts on this aspect of the matter, and will revise their policy upon it?
VISCOUNT HAILSHAM: My Lords, the noble Lord's interest in transport matters is, of course, well known, but I do not think he was either entitled or justified to suggest from anything that I have said, that I was not entirely serious in all the remarks which I have addressed to your Lordships. He, too, has cast his net a little wide, and it is rather difficult to know how, in an answer to a question, to deal with all that he has said. I was sorry that he appeared to think that I regarded his noble Leader's request that Parliament should be informed as unreasonable. I thought I had conveyed exactly the opposite impression, and I think that if
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to-morrow he reads what I said in Hansard he will see that this is so. Obviously, Parliament will have both to be informed and to discuss the terms of reference and the composition of the board. Equally obviously, matters of the kind which the noble Lord has referred to will be passing through our minds as to its composition, which, however, we should like to keep as small as possible.
The latter part of the question developed into a tirade against the supposed policy of the Government, but it was based upon a false premise. The primary cause of the decline in the Commission's financial position, which is the occasion for my right honourable friend's statement, is the decline in the carryings of coal and minerals and, incidentally, the increase of "C" licence vehicles. The first has nothing whatever to do with the policy to which the noble Lord was referring, whatever its merits or demerits, which I should be quite happy to debate with him; and the second is the result of the Transport Act, 1947, for which he was responsible.
LORD OGMORE: My Lords, in relation to that part of the noble and learned Viscount's statement which refers to certain sacrifices of convenience in the reduction of uneconomic services, as this will no doubt fall heavily on rural areas, particularly those in Scotland and Wales, and in view of the already serious de population of those areas, will Her Majesty's Government try to ensure that where railways are removed from rural areas, those areas will not be left high and dry and that some alternative services are provided in place of the railways?
VISCOUNT HAILSHAM: My Lords, that is obviously a question that Her Majesty's Government will bear in mind. I do not think that I ought to be more precise or prophetic than that.

AGRICULTURE: THE ANNUAL REVIEW
VISCOUNT ALEXANDER OF HILLSBOROUGH: My Lords, is the House to have a statement on agriculture?
VISCOUNT HAILSHAM: My Lords, as your Lordships know, the practice in these matters is that we should have these statements after they have begun in another place. From what I apprehend is going on I believe that the necessary green signal has now been received.
THE JOINT PARLIAMENTARY SECRETARY, MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE, FISHERIES AND FOOD: (EARL WALDEGRAVE): My Lords, I am now in a position, with your Lordships' permission, to make a statement, similar to that which my right honourable friend the Minister is making in another place, about the guarantees to agriculture for the coming year. Her Majesty's Government have now determined these in the light of the Annual Review. The statement is as follows:
Good weather last year helped our farmers. The net output of the industry increased substantially, and for 1959–60 is forecast at 68 per cent, above pre-war, the highest it has ever been. Actual net income for the year is forecast at £356½ million, which is £41 million up on the previous year. If we adjust the figures to normal weather conditions, the forecast for the year is £355½ million compared with £362 million for the previous year. Farming costs, particularly labour costs, continue to increase, and on Review commodities are up by nearly £13 million in the year. On the other hand, the industry is continuing to increase its efficiency. The cost of Exchequer support has gone up from £241 million to £259 million. This is a continuing heavy burden on the taxpayer. It also affects trade relations especially with the Commonwealth. Moreover, the cost of support may increase still further if production continues to expand more rapidly than demand. We have had to consider, therefore, how the industry can reduce its dependence on the Exchequer while maintaining its position in our market and increasing profitability.
Taking all these factors into account we have decided to make a net reduction of about £9 million in the total value
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of the guarantees. The maximum reduction we could have made was about £19 million. This means some reductions in the prices for the main cereals, and for sugar beet, eggs, sheep and wool; and also for milk—though in consideration of the Milk Marketing Boards' success in increasing sales for liquid consumption, we have increased the standard quantities by 19½ million gallons. We are also making a small reduction in subsidy rates for fertilisers from next July. There will be no change for fat cattle. There will be an increase for potatoes. For pigs we have increased the standard price by 3d. per score. We have also removed the cost of the quality premiums from the guarantees—an arrangement which in effect adds another 6d., making in all an increase of 9d. per score in the standard price—and we have adjusted the stabilising limits so as to reduce fluctuations in returns to pig producers and to facilitate long-term contracts. These changes should give the industry confidence to bring about that moderate increase in pig numbers which my right honourable friend has often said he would like to see. The full details are given in a White Paper which will be available in the Printed Paper Office when I sit down.
These determinations meet the requirements of national policy regarding the production of the guaranteed commodities. We consider that they provide a fair and balanced answer to the twofold problem of, on the one hand, enabling agriculture to maintain its prosperity and, on the other, protecting the taxpayer from an increasing burden.
4.16 p.m.
VISCOUNT ALEXANDER OF HILLSBOROUGH: My Lords, whilst we are much obliged to the noble Earl the Minister for giving us the text of the statement made in another place, it is very urgent that it should be the subject of debate as early as possible; and I take it he accepts the point of view that in this instance it should be by Government Motion on the White Paper. Perhaps the noble Earl the Leader of the House will confirm that, and will make an early arrangement for Government Business to include a Motion on agriculture and the White Paper on the Annual Review. That would save a lot of questions now.

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For the purpose of clarity I should like to ask just two questions. First, does the statement mean that Her Majesty's Government not only have an estimate of increased production but can also give us an assurance that they are basing their Review upon increased net incomes to farmers? Secondly, I should like to know whether, in the case of milk, the increase of 19½ million gallons in the standard quantities is in addition to that which was made some months ago, or is the noble Earl referring merely to what has already been done?
EARL WALDEGRAVE: My Lords, I have my noble Leader's permission to say that a debate can certainly be arranged. In answer to the second question from the noble Viscount the Leader of the Opposition, the increase of in million gallons in the standard quantities is a new arrangement. An adjustment was made in last year's Price Review, but this present change comes under this year's Price Review. Would the noble Viscount kindly repeat his question about the increase in the level of income?
VISCOUNT ALEXANDER OF HILLSBOROUGH: My Lords, I believe the actual statement refers to the value of production. What I want to know is whether, in all the circumstances, Her Majesty's Government are basing their reduction of guarantee on the fact that farmers' incomes have increased. If we look at the majority of farmers, we see that, with increased costs, their net incomes have declined.
EARL WALDEGRAVE: My Lords, we have not said that farmers' net incomes, adjusted to a normal weather basis (which is always done), have increased this year. Their net income, on a normal weather basis, will be found to be slightly below that of last year, while still running at the high and profitable level of about £350 million a year.
VISCOUNT ALEXANDER OF HILLSBOROUGH: My Lords, perhaps by my question I have given notice that we shall be a little persistent on this point.

DEFENCE
4.19 p.m.
Debate resumed.
LORD HARDING OF PETHERTON: My Lords, I have listened with great interest to the debate yesterday and again this afternoon, and, as an old soldier, I am sure that those now serving in Her Majesty's Armed Forces will take great encouragement from the close interest that your Lordships have taken and are taking in these affairs. I firmly believe in the policy of what I think is best described as "peace by deterrent." I look upon disarmament as the end product, not the forerunner, of the lowering of tension and the removal of causes of conflict between nations, ultimately leading to a world order based on law. But until substantial progress has been made in those directions it is my belief that, precarious though it may be, the best hope of avoiding and preventing a Third World War is by maintaining a state of equilibrium in the military field between the two political and ideological camps into which the world is at present divided.
If that policy is to be effective, however, the state of equilibrium must be whole and not partial. By that, I mean that the deterrent must be a properly balanced one. It must operate effectively in all branches of the military field, nuclear and conventional, so-called, and also in the three elements: land, sea and air. That, my Lords, is, I believe, an inescapable consequence of the political policy in regard to defence that we are pursuing. The great weakness of our defence policy during the past few years, to my mind, is due to a mistaken attempt to escape the inescapable.
It has been claimed that, for roughly the same amount of money and with many fewer men, we can maintain an independent strategic nuclear capability that is up to date and credible and powerful enough to constitute an effective deterrent in its own right; that we can also continue to make roughly the same contribution as in the past to the military strength of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation; and that we can, in addition, provide the Forces needed to meet our responsibilities and commitments in the Far East and Middle East and in the many territories for which we are still responsible. My Lords, in my opinion, it cannot be done—not with the resources

1027
that Her Majesty's Government are prepared to make available. And the result of trying to do it has been to produce a state of strain and unbalance in our Armed Forces which is dangerous and which, unless corrected fairly soon and quickly, will become cumulative.
The bright spot, I think, is that the danger—so it seems from what was said last week in another place and what has already been said in your Lordships' House—has been recognised and there is still time, though not too much time, to put things right. The question, as I see it, is this: what should be done to put things right? It is on that aspect of the problem that I should like to put forward some suggestions.
Dealing first of all with the strategic nuclear element of our defence organisation, I have never believed—and I said so in the defence debate in your Lordships' House last year—that we should attempt to maintain a wholly independent nuclear deterrent. I believe it to be of the greatest importance to us and to our Allies that we should continue to make an effective contribution to the nuclear element of the Western deterrent. I believe we were right to make our own atomic bombs and our own hydrogen bombs, and that we should keep ourselves up to date in the business of bomb making, but without overstocking. I believe, too, that in present circumstances we are right to retain under our own absolute control all the nuclear bombs and warheads that we hold. But, beyond that, I believe in a policy of interdependence with the United States of America in the strategic nuclear field, and with France too, now that she has joined the nuclear club. If attempt to do otherwise we shall only lag further and further behind, the other elements of our defence system will have to be more and more starved and denuded, and the net result will be that the unbalance in our Armed Forces as a whole will grow worse and our contribution to the Western nuclear deterrent will become less and less credible until it ceases to have any military or political significance for us or for anybody else.
As I understand it, the practical problem in this particular field which we have to face at the moment is to decide
1028
the type of carrier and the means of delivery best suited to our situation to succeed the V-bomber force in from some five to seven years' time. With respect, I submit that it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, for anyone without access to all the official scientific and engineering information on this subject to express a view on the precise form and type of carrier or means of delivery that we should adopt. But there is one characteristic on which I have no doubt whatsoever. Having had some experience of war, and incidentally of horses, I have an absolute horror of being dependent on a weapon which, by its very nature, must be permanently anchored to a fixed and known site. I find it difficult to imagine an engine of war that could be more vulnerable or more inflexible than Blue Streak. Whichever horse the Minister of Defence decides to back—and I should have thought he would have to place his bet quite soon, to have a chance of being in on a winning number—I do most earnestly suggest that it should be a horse that can move, if only at a walk.
I should now like to turn for a few moments to the business of mobility, which has been strongly stressed, and rightly so, in my opinion, in the White Paper. It is a critical matter in the defence system of any country, but of vital importance to us, with our worldwide responsibilities and with the reduction, the very big reduction, in manpower that is now in progress. Until recently, very recently, because of this obsession for creating an independent nuclear deterrent powerful enough to act in its own right, R.A.F. Transport Command, on which the Army increasingly depend for mobility, both tactical and strategic, has been deliberately starved for the benefit of Bomber Command. This has probably been the greatest cause of unbalance and lack of mobility in our forces as a whole.
Let me give your Lordships two examples. Whatever we may think about the Suez operation—and here I must digress to say that I cannot accept for a moment the sweeping statements made by the noble Viscount, Lord Alexander of Hillsborough, about the total unreadiness of our forces of war at the time of Suez—it would, I think, be rash in the extreme to assume that we shall never

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again, in a different context, become involved in operations comparable with Suez in the military sense. In his memoirs, Sir Anthony Eden refers to a shortage of parachutists, amongst the other military weaknesses and deficiencies he inherited from the past. In actual fact, there were available, between us and the French, at that time something in the order of six times the number of parachutists actually dropped in the Suez operation. The shortage—and it can only he called a crippling shortage—was in transport aircraft, not in parachutists. In spite of what has been published in paragraph 43 of the White Paper about the strengthening of R.A.F. Transport Command, I fear that the position in this respect is not likely to be greatly improved, or improved as rapidly as I believe to be necessary to give the essential strategic and tactical mobility that the Army, particularly, and the Armed Forces as a whole, need.
That leads me to my second example. On Monday I was talking to the commanding officer of an infantry battalion stationed in Malaya. His unit is due to go to North Borneo for a period of training in the course of the next few months. The battalion is to be air transported from Singapore, but the process will apparently take a week to complete; that is to say, a week to move one battalion some 800 miles. That, so it seems, is because not more than four aircraft, two Beverleys and two Hastings, can be made available. Even allowing for the fact that this is not an emergency operational move, it does not sound to me as if much progress has yet been made in giving strategic mobility in air transport to our land forces in the Far East.
In fact, the information on this subject in the White Paper gives no true indication of the progress made or planned in this matter. It would do so only if the programme were expressed in terms of lift for men and equipment that it is planned to provide year by year as the programme proceeds. I find it hard to believe that our national security would be in any way endangered if that information were made available. In fact, I hold the contrary view: that it would be much more convincing to our potential enemies, and would give much more encouragement to our friends, if they knew what we were able to do in this respect. I hope that the noble
1030
Lord who is to reply for the Government will be able to give some indication of what is planned in the way of expansion of Transport Command in terms of lift, if not this afternoon then perhaps in the course of the debate on the Air or Army Estimates.
My Lords, on this question of mobility a good deal has been said about the commando carrier H.M.S. "Bulwark". On Tuesday afternoon I had the good fortune to be able to have a talk with her commanding officer, and from what he told me I believe that what I am now going to say is not very wide of the mark. Let me say straight away that I most warmly welcome what I might call this adventure, more especially because I hold the privilege—a privilege which I prize very highly—of being allowed to wear the famous green beret. The decision to set up H.M.S. "Bulwark" as a commando carrier equipped with helicopters, and, as time goes on, to provide a sister ship to work with her, is an excellent one, and one with which I do not quarrel at all. But at present the commando carrier suffers from one major defect: it is what one might describe as a fish without a tail.
Having had experience during the past ten or fifteen years of trouble spots in many different parts of the world, ranging from Trieste to Cyprus, I entirely agree with the view that timely arrival and speed of action are of the essence of the problem. But even the most timely arrival and the most speedy action will not, in my opinion, succeed in reducing to a matter of days what up till now has taken years; and some administrative and supporting follow-up will, I believe, almost invariably be needed. Yet in another place last week the Minister of Defence, referring to this adventure of H.M.S. "Bulwark", said that the means required to meet this need of administrative and supporting follow-up, and reinforcement, in the shape of landing craft, are not, as he put it, "an immediate prospect". I trust that some means will be found of speeding up the provision of this vital need—that is, the tail of support and replenishment, and the means of putting in and sustaining the reinforcements from the Army that will, I feel certain, be essential even for Marines.
My Lords, there are many other important points connected with defence

1031
that I should like to discuss, such as the necessity for giving more positive and precise political leadership and greater political cohesion to N.A.T.O.; and the need to reduce the time lag between decision and provision in the administration of our own forces, not only in regard to equipment but also in all matters which affect the efficiency and contentment of the Services. For example, the Grigg Report was laid before Parliament some seventeen months ago, I think, and yet it was not until last month that the follow-up of some of its most important recommendations, in the shape of a new pay code for all ranks and a new career structure for all officers, appeared.
Then there is the importance of avoiding the danger, which was mentioned in your Lordships' House yesterday—and I believe it to be a very real danger—of a gulf developing between the Services and the general public when National Service comes to an end. That is a very important matter. There is the need to reorganise our Reserve forces, and particularly the Territorial Army, to bring them into line with modern requirements. That, again, is something which probably would be better dealt with in the debate on Army Estimates, but it is an urgent matter. Then, last but not least, there is the inequity—and I do not think that is too strong a word—of the failure so far to temper the wind of inflation for existing Service widows, whose unhappy lot continues to be an awful warning to those who contemplate a career in the Services. But, my Lords, there are four more speakers to follow me, so I do not propose to do more than mention those important paints now.
Before I sit down, I should like to remind your Lordships that, although the Services awn a great deal of ironmongery, and occupy a great deal of real estate, they are essentially human organisations. In the final event, and in the face of the enemy, it is the man who counts. Our Regular soldiers, sailors and airmen are just as much a cross-section of the people of this country as their National Service comrades. They do not look for praise, but, like most other people, they readily respond to encouragement. The greatest encouragement
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they can have is to know that they have the respect and the confidence of the nation as a whole; that the people of this country realise that their men and women in the Services have an important job to do; and that, taken by and large, they do it pretty well. And they appreciate it all the more when such words of encouragement come from both sides of both Houses of Parliament, irrespective of Party.
My Lords, some of my criticisms may appear severe, but I hope that they have been constructive. In spite of them, however, I would support the Government in their Motion which is before the House, because I think that in this very difficult, important and complicated business of defence the heart of the Government is in the right place, and their thoughts now appear to be inclining in the right direction. Some real progress has, I know, been made; but I earnestly hope that action to redress the present state of unbalance in the Armed Forces of the Crown will not be long delayed.
4.38 p.m.
EARL JELLICOE: My Lords, as one of the last and one of the lamest in a long list of speakers, and following such a great leader as the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Harding of Petherton, I have a certain fellow-feeling for the stragglers in Mr. Billy Butlin's marathon. Your Lordships will no doubt wish this marathon to be over as quickly as possible. I therefore propose to confine myself almost entirely to one topic, which has been touched on already in your Lordships' House in this debate, and that is the desirability or otherwise of seeking to establish in Western Europe a nuclear deterrent force under N.A.T.O. control.
I hasten to add that this does not imply that I underrate the value of conventional forces, or of more conventional forces: quite the reverse. The deterrent, like peace, is, I believe, indivisible, and rests just as much on a balance of conventional force as on the so-called balance of nuclear terror. Indeed, it is only the possession of adequate conventional forces that makes the nuclear deterrent credible. Therefore, like other speakers, I welcome the information in the White Paper about the re-equipment of our more conventional forces and about their increasing mobility. I believe, with other

1033
speakers, that both processes should be accelerated.
The White Paper rightly emphasises the vital importance of maintaining the strength of our security alliances. Of these, the N.A.T.O. Alliance is by far the most important. N.A.T.O. has come in for quite a "drubbing" from some noble Lords in the last two days. Again, I think quite rightly so. The interdependence about which we hear so much, and which I believe we must achieve, is often much more apparent than real, and the weaknesses are all too obvious. There is the snail's progress towards the build-up target of 30 divisions on the Central N.A.T.O. Sector. There is the failure to achieve a properly integrated and technically efficient air defence system for Western Europe. There are the admitted weaknesses in command structure. There are the pathetic attempts at weapon standardisation. Again, there are the recurrent breakdowns in political consultation, to which the noble Viscount, Lord Lord Alexander of Hillsborough, drew our attention yesterday. I think that it would be no bad thing if some afternoon in the fairly near future your Lordships were to have a good hard look at the health of our most important Alliance.
This afternoon, however, I should like to touch briefly on a problem which I believe, if mishandled, could erode the very foundations of the N.A.T.O. Alliance, and which, if handled wisely, boldly and generously, could do much to enhance its cohesion. At present, as your Lordships know, there is no N.A.T.O. deterrent as such in Europe. Europe shelters under the nuclear parapluie of Strategic Air Command and Bomber Command. Both are under independent, quite independent, American and British control. So far as Europe is concerned, I do not believe that this is now the best or should be the permanent solution.
Last year I rather shyly suggested in our debate that we should take the lead in seeking to establish within Europe—and I include Britain in that Europe—an integrated nuclear retaliatory force under collective control. I shall be just a shade less shy this year, since I see that since then a number of pundits and professionals favour this proposal. The Assembly of Western European Union, at their last session, supported a
1034
proposal for the creation of a joint European strategic nuclear force under Western European union control. In a recent book, published in this country by the Institute for Strategic Studies—a responsible body of which I am perhaps the only irresponsible member—the author, who is Mr. Alastair Buchan, the Director of the Institute, has submitted a powerfully argued proposal for the creation, under N.A.T.O. control, of a nuclear deterrent force in Europe. Finally, and significantly, General Norstad, in a speech in America in December, suggested the creation of a N.A.T.O. nuclear force. I am encouraged in all this by the degree of support which some scheme along these general lines seems to command from all Benches in your Lordships' House.
There are innumerable possible variants of these proposals, but what, in sum, I have in mind has been put succinctly by Mr. Buchan. As he writes:
"There is a strategic requirement for the creation of the least vulnerable I.R.B.M. system that can be built, using if need be the whole real estate of N.A.T.O. Europe from John O'Groats or North Cape to Alexandretta or Palermo, designed and allocated by the most energetic N.A.T.O. committee or ad hoc authority that has yet been assembled, and subject to the most rigorous central operational control that can be devised."
That control, in Buchan's view, might be exercised by the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, or by a special Commander, in whom possibly could be vested the ultimate operational control over the European tactical nuclear forces.
As I see it, the programme might fall into three stages. In the first stage, the Thors, British Bomber Command and that part of the United States strategic forces, both naval and air, which are located in Europe, should be integrated into this system. In the second stage, the system would be reinforced by American I.R.B.M.s, like the Polaris, now under development, in very mobile or extremely hard sites. In the third stage, perhaps in the mid-'sixties, the system might be further buttressed by a more advanced weapons system, tailor-made for European strategic requirements and jointly designed, produced and financed by the United States and its European N.A.T.O. partners.

1035
In my view, a collective programme of this nature might well have great advantages over the present tendency for the nuclear Powers in the Alliance to "go it alone" in greater or lesser degree. On the military side, there would be a certain gain from the increased dispersion within Europe of the deterrent forces. As my noble friend Lord Merrivale reminded your Lordships yesterday, there are l7½ million square miles of real estate in Western Europe. There would be perhaps a greater gain from the increased credibility of the deterrent. In the good old days of American nuclear monopoly or superiority, when the Eagle could overfly the Bear, and the Bear had no chance of catching the Eagle on the ground, United States nuclear power, as a deterrent to a Soviet attack in Europe, was absolutely credible. It may still be that Mr. Eisenhower and General Power would be prepared to risk the obliteration of New York and Chicago to deter a limited Soviet aggression on the flanks of Western Europe. But that is not the point. The point is whether Europe, and above all the Russians, believe this. And on this I must confess to just a twinge of scepticism.
On the economic side, I am far from certain, on reflection, whether it has made real sense for us to try to develop an I.R.B.M. system alone. It may make even less sense for the French to do so, as I now gather they are just starting to do. It is true that we and our Western European Allies have great reserves of skill in this field, but to my mind it would make better sense if these skills and resources were properly integrated in a joint programme with the Americans. Moreover, if such a programme were jointly financed, as I consider it should be, it would give the new rich societies of Western Europe an opportunity, which I hope they would take, of bringing their defence contributions nearer to the standards set by the Americans.
But the main advantages of some such scheme would not be military or economic, but political. Apparently three N.A.T.O. countries in Europe, in addition to ourselves and France, now have the technical and economic capacity to make nuclear weapons. Unless the present drift can be reversed, I have no
1036
confidence whatsoever that these countries will not decide to catch up with the nuclear Joneses. And I can think of nothing that could do more to explode the whole concept of interdependence, the basis of the Alliance, than the existence within it of five or six Powers with independent capabilities, independently controlled. Nor can I think of a situation which would do more to encourage the spread of nuclear anarchy in the world or to impair the prospects for disarmament—and I must say that in that respect I agree wholeheartedly with the words used by the noble Lord, Lord Beveridge. By the same token, I believe that the cohesion of the Alliance would be greatly enhanced were it possible—and I emphasise the words "were it possible"—to contrive a system, under the auspices of N.A.T.O., whereby Europe would regain a measure of control over its own ultimate destinies.
I quite realise that these proposals are fraught with problems, some of them technical and some political. It will be no easy matter to persuade the French Government in its present mood to come into any such scheme, and if they did not come in the scheme would be quite valueless. There is, above all, the crucial problem of the political control of this proposed deterrent force. How can the one or two fingers on the Allied nuclear trigger be replaced by a hand with fifteen fingers? That is a problem of enormous magnitude. I myself do not believe that these problems, extremely intractable though they are, are insoluble. But it may turn out on careful examination that they are. All I ask is that Her Majesty's Government should now—and I think this is the time when it should be done—as a matter of urgency, and in consultation with our principal Allies, give this matter that careful examination.
4.52 p.m.
VISCOUNT GOSCHEN: My Lords, only recently I followed the noble Earl who has just sat down in another debate in your Lordships' House and, as then, I am not now going to follow him into the realms on which he has spoken so well. This debate has, as usual, ranged far and wide. To me it is always one of the most difficult debates in which to speak, and particularly when the clock is creeping on and your Lordships have heard so many speeches; because

1037
one is apt to get drawn away, having been a member of Lord Rea's club of the three "C.'s," purely into Army matters. I feel that other noble Lords also may find that same difficulty.
I feel that we should congratulate Her Majesty's Government on having produced now a much better pay structure for all the Forces. There is no doubt that there is now a proper career for every man of the Regular Forces, and although, as the noble and gallant Field Marshal, Lord Harding of Petherton, said, it took some time after the Grigg Report, the pay code has come out and is a most reasonable one. Accommodation, on which we have had so many debates in this House, is gradually improving, as was said by another noble Lord. I think that the not-so-gentle prods your Lordships have given to this problem, to my certain knowledge for the past three or four years, have borne fruit. There is, however, a difficulty still left in these realms, and that is with regard to pensions. The noble Viscount., Lord Bridgeman, spoke quite shortly on this matter yesterday, and I, too, intend to be quite brief on it, because I feel that the best way of bringing our view before Her Majesty's Government is to put down a Motion on the subject.
The chief trouble is that those who are retiring now, or who have quite recently retired, will get a fair pension, but those who retired before the date of the last pay rise will still be badly off. Another point is that an officer who retires and is under 60 gets no increase in his pension at all. Generally, people say that memories are short; but in some ways memories are long, and people who have had a raw deal, or think they have, over pensions remember that for a long time. It has been said in this House, and to my mind it is quite true, that so far as the sons of ex-soldiers are concerned—and they are the men we want to come into the Army—it will be difficult for them to get rid of the idea that they are going to be let down when they get a pension, because their fathers thrust it at them saying: "Be careful; look what happened to me." The trouble is that under the new scheme the gap between the new pensions and the old has widened. The noble and gallant Field Marshal also mentioned the position of the widows. Widows who lost their
1038
husbands recently, and wives who may become widows, will get a moderately good pension, but those who lost their husbands earlier than before 1958 (I think that is the year) get no more. Their case is bad. But, as I say, we will put down a Motion and discuss this matter on a day when we have more time.
There is one point that rather worries me, and it is this. There is, I believe, a feeling in some quarters—in fact, some noble Lords have mentioned it—that the proposal that has been put out by General Norstad for his small mobile force, of, I think, about a brigade strength, is wrong and that he is not entitled to do this. Surely that cannot be so. He has been appointed by us and by the respective Governments of our Allies in N.A.T.O. as the Commander-in-Chief of all the N.A.T.O. Forces. He is not, to my mind, creating, as the noble Viscount, Lord Alexander of Hillsborough, gave the impression to me that he thought he was creating, "Norstad's Private Army". I consider that all he has done is to make a small regrouping within N.A.T.O. for the use of a fire-fighting force within the theatre for which he is responsible; and that is all.
The noble Lord, Lord Shepherd, asked where he was going to use it. I do not know where he is going to use it, but that, I imagine, is the kind of force he would like to use to get to a trouble spot quickly. We have just heard the noble and gallant Field Marshal, Lord Harding of Petherton, talking about H.M.S. "Bulwark", and that is very much the same sort of rôle that I think General Norstad would envisage for this force. Why should there be so much fuss about it? Surely the Commander-in-Chief is entitled to this without its being debated in the Parliaments of every country in N.A.T.O. The noble Lord, Lord Shepherd, may have been worried as to how it came out; that it came out through General Norstad, instead of through the Governments. But, at least, as the noble Lord pointed out, it did not come out piecemeal, as might easily have been the case; everyone knew about it at the same time. I am much more interested in the fact that there are quite solid plans within the structure of N.A.T.O. for our defence rafter than the way the plans come out in public.

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There are many other small points which one would want to talk about. I think the point brought out by the noble and gallant Field Marshal, Lord Harding, of Petherton, was that we have the job of keeping the troops in front of the public eye. Many British people forget that there are an enormous number of British Servicemen abroad, all doing a job of work, and a great many of them always on an operational basis. The publicity is not always what it might be for them. The British Serviceman is doing a really good job of work, and let us, who do not have to do that job, realise it and tell everyone about it.
5.1 p.m.
LORD SALTER: My Lords, in a two days' debate on so complex a question as that which we are now discussing, it is only natural that many different objectives and principles of policy should have been advocated. For one who speaks at as late a stage as I do now, it is well not only to be brief but to concentrate only upon what he thinks to be the main and essential objectives of Western defence policy. Perhaps most of us will agree that the two main objectives should be, first, to save ourselves from either being destroyed or dominated by the ultimate weapon, and, secondly, if that is achieved, to avoid disastrous retreat or defeat in a more limited war in the face of the use or threat of other weapons. Both of those are, of course, included in the Government policy, both of this country and of the United States. But many of us are, I think, reasonably anxious, after studying both the White Paper and all other evidence available to us, as to whether these objectives are clearly enough defined and agreed, or given the first priority they merit over what might also be desirable but is less essential, and whether the preparations actually made are those most likely to achieve their purpose. It is from this point of view that I propose to offer a few observations on these two objectives.
To achieve the first, the Western alliance must, of course, have an adequate deterrent in the sense that a potential aggressor would be faced by a prospect of retaliation sufficient to prevent him from launching the bomb. That means, since as the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, remarked yesterday, our purpose
1040
is not to win a war but to prevent one, that the possession of such an adequate deterrent must not only exist, but must be known beyond peradventure by the potential enemy to exist. Secondly, since we cannot alone have sufficient power for this purpose, it means that allied unity and the political organisation to maintain it in changing circumstances must be created, and, thirdly—and this is a point I wish to emphasise a little—that our retaliatory forces should not be vulnerable and should be known not to be vulnerable to a sudden first blow. The main methods usually suggested for attaining this third purpose are the hardening of sites or keeping aeroplanes in the air. I think it is doubtful whether we can rely upon the success of the first, which in any case would be extremely expensive; and the second is also obviously a very precarious one, involving, special dangers of its own, which I will not elaborate.
I want to suggest that, more promising than either of these, is to transfer our bases as far as possible from the land to the sea; to rely upon mobile dispersal of the H-bomb in surface craft or in invisible submarines, not necessarily nuclear powered. I have suggested what adequacy of the deterrent must include. Let me add what I think it does not include. We do not need to aim at having, a greater or better deterrent than the potential foe. If we have enough to deter him, we need not worry if he has more than enough to deter us and to make him confident that he has. Enough is enough. The recognition of that in the relatively near future is perhaps among the best hopes we have for the continued peace of the world. There is a reasonable hope that, in the reasonably near future, both sides may feel that they have a sufficient deterrent, and then there will be the real chance of phased disarmament and the reduction both of arms expenditure and of tension.
The second objective, that of avoiding either a disastrous retreat or a defeat in a limited war, of course becomes of more vital importance as the attainment of the first comes nearer. If both sides are confident that there will be no resort by the other to the ultimate weapon, one of them may be tempted to exploit a relative local superiority by conventional weapons. If we have no answer to this, Western influence may be nibbled away

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until the (uncommitted world succumbs to the conviction that the Communists must win. The only answer to this is an adequate, well-equipped and mobile force, which neither we nor America appear to possess now, or, I think, to be preparing with sufficient speed and urgency. I believe it is true to say that, outside official circles, expert opinion is now convinced that too little attention has been paid to this need, and also that their views have now begun to penetrate official policy, but have not yet been translated, or at any rate translated adequately, in actual preparations.
For instance, the Minister of Defence told us that our forces are being reduced from 1957 to the end of the present period to which he was referring from, I think, about 700,000 to 400,000. Of course, policy is also based on the assumption that conscription comes to an end. I do not say dogmatically that those reductions are not possible, and that conscription cannot be permanently avoided, and still adequate, well-equipped mobility of conventional forces be achieved. But I think we ought to realise that to achieve such an adequacy of mobile conventional forces is absolutely essential if we are not to find ourselves again in a disastrous position as soon as we have realised the first objective, namely, of making the danger of war with the ultimate weapon recede into the distance.
I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Balfour of Inchrye, when he spoke yesterday of the importance of not aiming at what is more than is necessary of the ultimate deterrent—aiming at getting more than the enough which is enough, at the expense of achieving this other, and now, I think, visibly essential, purpose of securing an adequacy of conventional weapons to deal with the threat of a local and limited war with other weapons than the nuclear. Had I been speaking at an earlier stage in this debate I would have attempted to elaborate an argument which I have now only suggested. But in view of the hour I propose merely to register those points in the hope that at some later time I may be able to elaborate the reasons for them rather more fully than I feel it would be justifiable for me to attempt to-day.
5.10 p.m.
LORD OGMORE: My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Pakenham, and also to the noble Lord, the First
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Lord of the Admiralty, for permitting me to make a short intervention in this debate, and I do so in spite of what the noble Lord, Lord Salter, called the lateness of the hour, ten minutes past five, in the hope that your Lordships will receive it at least pacifically if not gratefully. I really rise because I feel that the arguments advanced, or one of the arguments advanced, by both my noble friend Lord Rea and my noble friend Lord Beveridge, have not perhaps had the amount of attention from other speakers that they might have had. I consider the point they put up to be one of the most crucial points of modern times: that is to say, do we have a separate deterrent or do we not. I was glad the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton (who made a most interesting spech, if I may say so), gave qualified support to this point of view and said that if the Blue Streak was not successful—and he held out no hope that it would be—he would support us on these Benches in the contention we put before your Lordships.
LORD SHACKLETON: My Lords, I was very careful in what I said. I could not have disagreed more with the noble Lord, Lord Rea. The fact is that we have an effective nuclear deterrent, but that does not alter the fact that with the later developments I believe the independent nuclear deterrent will disappear.
LORD OGMORE: That is what I thought I said.
LORD SHACKLETON: Not quite.
LORD OGMORE: The end result is the same: if Blue Streak disappears there will be no need for the deterrent. We would say there is no need for the deterrent now whether Blue Streak disappears or not.
Why are we in this position? I would say the fact is that we are living in times which I suggest when we were young would have been thought quite impossible. The Kaiser said a comparatively short time ago to King Edward that he was reigning over the only world empire that the world had seen since Roman times. We grew up in those times—not only we, but most of the population of this country—and it is very hard for us, I think, psychologically to get out of the atmosphere that we grew up in and realise that to-day we

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face completely new circumstances. The idea that a Power such as we are can retain an independent nuclear hydrogen bomb I think is an idea which is no longer tenable. It was tenable in the nineteenth century; it was tenable in the early part of this century, because it was just possible, I suppose, for national forces to have very powerful deterrents of one kind and another. To-day I do not believe it is possible for national forces either to have or to use independently very powerful weapons of this kind.
The results of not realising the situation we are in, I think are these: first, we tend to spread the butter too thinly over the various pieces of bread—we try to have all sorts of forces, nuclear and conventional—secondly, we have not given N.A.T.O. and the other European countries the leadership we should. Even in this White Paper, as the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, pointed out, in paragraph 28, we make this extraordinary suggestion that we are going to stay on the Continent and we are going to have these Brigade groups and the air component for some time to come. Considering that these forces and this air component were promised to the other European countries by Sir Anthony Eden, when he was Prime Minister, for an indefinite period, for a very considerable period, I think it is a most extraordinary suggestion to put in the White Paper that as an act of grace we will keep them there for some time longer, and it is quite a wrong attitude. There are many in your Lordships' House, or at least some of us, who have been to N.A.T.O. year by year, to the Parliamentarians' Conferences. We know what other nations think on this matter, and there is no doubt that they believe that we have been dragging our feet. We have not been giving the other nations in Europe the leadership we should do.
I would suggest, therefore, and I would agree with my noble leader, Lord Rea, that we should give up the independent deterrent, the hydrogen bomb—give up making it, give up testing it and give up using it. It is not a moral question at all, as I see it; it is purely a practical question. It is no more immoral to shelter under the fact that the United States is going to have a bomb than to have it oneself. I would suggest that the
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time has come for the Western Powers to say, "All right, we agree to the United States having the bomb in view of the fact that the Soviet Union has got it." That, as it were cancels out. But if any other Power has the bomb, then where does one stop?
I asked this question of the noble Lord, Lord Balfour of Inchrye, yesterday, where do we stop? Already France has tested a bomb. China, we are told—although there seems to be some doubt about it—is about to test a bomb. What other countries are going to test a bomb and will have the potentiality of using it? Can we look with any sort of satisfaction on the fact that President Nasser might begin to test a bomb and even use it? If President Nasser is going to have a bomb can we deny Israel the right to have one? And where does it end? So long as we, the third Power as it were, say to the world, "We are not ourselves independently going to have or use or test the hydrogen bomb", then I think we have a right to use every possible moral and other means to prevent other people from having and testing these bombs. That seems to me a perfectly logical attitude to take up. But so long as we say that it is necessary for us to have an independent nuclear weapon, I cannot see what right we have to tell any other country that they are not entitled to have it. And if they have it, there has to be a testing of these bombs, which means fall-out, and we also have the risk that someone may press the button and start a nuclear war.
It also, I think, has another result: that is to say, if we give up the idea of the independent nuclear weapon we can put much more into N.A.T.O. than we have been doing. I was very pleased indeed to see in one of the paragraphs (I think I said paragraph 28 before, but I believe I was wrong; I should have said paragraph 5), paragraph 28, where the Government refer to international co-operation. This needs to go very much further than at present. Every year since I have been going to the N.A.T.O. Parliamentary Conferences one point the Commander-in-Chief and the various heads of the Services have made, time after time, is that there is nothing like sufficient identity of weapons or equipment. In other words, if they go to war they will have to go to war with sixteen types of three-ton

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lorry; they will have to go with sixteen types of this and sixteen types of that. There is nothing like the amount of standardisation of weapons and equipment that is really necessary.
I would suggest that when we have got rid of this idea that one country like the United Kingdom can in these days launch off on its own on a nuclear war, or on any other kind of war, then we can really begin to play our full part in N.A.T.O. We can give that leadership, both to the European countries and to the Commonwealth, that we should be giving. I would point out, too, that the fact that we are not giving the leadership we should, and have not for years been giving the leadership we should, to N.A.T.O. and elsewhere in Europe, has meant that our place is being rapidly taken by West Germany, both in the military and the economic fields, and I myself feel it is very unfortunate, or it will be very unfortunate, if in a very few years to come the leading power in Europe is West Germany and not the United Kingdom.
5.20 p.m.
LORD PAKENHAM: My Lords, I am glad that my old friend the noble Lord, Lord Ogmore, intervened in this impressive debate. Before I come to the points of difference—and there are very real points of difference—between us on this side and the Government, I am sure that my colleagues, through me, would wish to repeat in the most emphatic way our support for the Fighting Services and the encouragement that we wish to extend to them. I know that the noble Lord, Lord Harding of Petherton, will be glad for that to be said once again. May I say that if we were to be dispassionate in these things it might quite well be that we should all agree that the outstanding event of the last two days has been the speech from the noble Lord, Lord Harding of Petherton himself, which was perhaps to be expected, and I think it duly came about.
It falls to me to draw together what has already been said from this side, and to explain why we intend to divide the House this evening in a vote of strong criticism of Her Majesty's Government in respect of defence. I have certainly no special qualifications, no personal claim in the House in this field. I am the
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least of ex-First Lords, not the worthiest, among those who could be called an ex-First Lord; but by the Grace of God and good luck, and the indulgence of the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, I am one of the predecessors of the noble Lord, Lord Carrington. Indeed, I can boast of having presided over a Board of Admiralty of which the noble Lord, Lord Fraser of North Cape, who I am sorry to see is not here at the moment, and the noble Earl, Lord Mountbatten of Burma, were members. So I have just that little reason for intervention.
We are all delighted that the last speech is to come from the present First Lord, the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, who is, as we all know, most popular in this House and, as I have reason to know, is already greatly respected in the Navy. I understand that, just lately, he had a little trouble when he was mistaken for his private secretary, or his private secretary was mistaken for him—there was a sort of blurring of identity. I do not count that against him. I was never well enough dressed to be mistaken for a private secretary or a properly turned-out official, and I think it is very much to the noble Lord's credit that this little misunderstanding occurred. But I am glad that the noble Lord should be speaking, particularly on this personal ground, and as he is a Service Minister.
I am glad, too, for another reason, arising from the speech, which in so many ways we so greatly admired on these Benches, from the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham. Early on, he used an odd expression and, in a sense, he returned to the point; and I shall return to it later in another connection in these few remarks of mine. The noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, said this: [OFFICIAL REPORT, Vol. 221. (No. 50), col. 907.]:
"…. I am convinced that the public is almost, if not quite, as well aware of the significant and relevant data and facts as the average non-defence-based Cabinet Minister."
That seems to me to be a surprising and rather dangerous doctrine. You have Cabinet Ministers defence-based. There cannot be very many of those, I suppose. I am not quite sure who they are. I suppose they are the Prime Minister and the Minister of Defence—perhaps only two. Then, presumably, there are some defence-based non-Cabinet Ministers, of

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whom the noble Lord is one; and the great majority of the Cabinet are non-defence-based and know little more than the general public. That is what I have to conclude from the remarks of the noble Viscount yesterday.
VISCOUNT HAILSHAM: Then the noble Lord has drawn a wrong conclusion. I intended to convey that the public are kept very well informed of the significant data.
LORD PAKENHAM: I do not think there is any other Member of the House who believes that. I do not think that the noble Lord, Lord Harding of Petherton, believes it. No doubt he has been trying to find it out. It is immensely secret. But in all seriousness I do make this point, because many of us were disturbed, in studying the history of this affair, to find that there appeared the growth of a small crop—I do not know whether they were defence-based or what they were based on, except a general sense of unreality at that time, but at any rate, there was this little crop—which was "in the know", while the others were not. We seem to be facing that situation again—
VISCOUNT HAILSHAM: Let me assure the noble Lord that be is entirely mistaken. Having held the position of First Lord of the Admiralty, he must know as well as anybody else that, with the immense complications of major Departments of State, although the Cabinet remain responsible for policy, the individual Minister has at his hand a much greater wealth of detail than any other member of the Government can have. What I said, and what I say again, is that the truth about this matter is that the really important decisions which this nation has to take are based not upon this wealth of detail, and sometimes very highly secret information, but upon things which everybody knows, even those Cabinet Ministers who are not in possession of the immense detail of a Defence Department. I really think that the noble Lord is, in a way, seeking to pretend that there was some sinister significance in a remark of mine which was made without any sense that it was other than a platitude which everybody, I should have thought, would accept.
LORD PAKENHAM: I do not think it will be accepted by anyone in this country, in this House or, indeed, any-
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where else; because, if I may say so, it is so far removed from fact to say that the leading members of the Cabinet have no more material for making a judgment on these great issues than the rest of us. As I say, I am not going to be provocative, because I have some nice things to say about the noble Viscount, with one or two other little aspects thrown in.
I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Harding of Petherton, that it is most difficult for us here, and for the general public, however closely we try to follow these things, to form a fair estimate of the purposes of the Government. It may be that we are being unduly critical in our attitude towards them, but we can only discharge our duty as public men. The noble Earl, Lord Swinton, whom I have always followed so closely, but perhaps most closely of all on defence matters, said he recognised that we felt we had a duty—I think he said "a sort of duty"—to perform in regard to this matter; but still there was an underlying unity, he believed. I think there is an underlying unity between us all in wishing the defence of this country well. But when we are performing this duty we do it because we consider that the Government, over a period, have proved themselves incompetent in this field. We think that it is our duty to say so, and that we should be failing in our duty if we did not make that claim in the Division Lobby.
However, here is the programme. This is a free country, and we are entitled to study it in our own way. There is this increase in expenditure that I think must give us cause straight away. It would not be possible—and it would not come well, perhaps, from some of us who were in the Labour Government—to say that it must always be wrong to increase expenditure in peace time. We were responsible for a large increase at the time of the Korean War, when it looked as if we might be involved in major hostilities. But I think that an increase in expenditure at a time when international relations are supposed to be so much better must require a great deal of justification. It is generally conceded that the tension has much relaxed. In fact, that was claimed by Her Majesty's Government in a fairly recent foreign affairs debate. Yet they now come and

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say that, for various reasons, the bill has been increased.
I will not take up the words of the noble and learned Viscount for I do not want to be awkward, but I felt that that part of his speech, when he tried to justify defence expenditure, was most exiguous. He said, in effect, that a lot of it goes on pay—and I am sure that all of us on this side agree with the noble Viscount, Lord Goschen, and others who applauded that. Some of the expenditure, we were told, goes on production; a lot on research and so on, and it would be impossible to cut down on any of those aspects without weakening the Forces. All I will say is that from our position of relative ignorance we have yet to see the justification, in a time of improving international relations, for this increase in what is already colossal expenditure.
I turn now to the White Paper. The noble Earl, Lord Swinton, said that it was not prodigal of information, and I believe we should all agree with that. My noble friend Lord Shackleton called it "coy" and most of us feel that it is somewhat evasive. A leading article in The Times last Thursday—a week ago—said that:
"The Government … were conducting a retreat from some of the untenable positions they inherited from Mr. Sandys".
The article referred to the Blue Streak ballistic missile and the strength of the Rhine Army, and to the fact that Mr. Sandys had asserted that peace depended largely upon
"the deterrent fear of nuclear retaliation,"
and that Mr. Watkinson believed that the deterrent comprised the whole and not just the nuclear part of our defence effort. The article pointed out, finally, that
"no Minister had made any reference to the notorious threat in the 1958 White Paper"—
on which I need not dwell now. Various speakers on this side of the House have said, as my noble friend Lord Shackleton said this afternoon, that Her Majesty's Government appear to be altering the policy; but they do not admit that. I suppose the general public are to be hoisted in without being told. We have not been told by the noble and learned Viscount. I do not know whether the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, who is a defence-based Minister, will be able to throw any more light upon that and say whether the recent changes which are supposed to have occurred are, in fact,
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accepted by Her Majesty's Government as, at any rate a new emphasis.
Be that as it may, we are faced with this programme for increased expenditure without any clear justification and also without much attempt in the White Paper itself to justify the increase. We listened with great care to what was said yesterday by the noble and learned Viscount—and may I say how pleased all his old friends and admirers are to see him right back at the top of his form, which gives us all great satisfaction. There were, in his speech, things as profound as were likely to fall from any public man on any side in this country. There were, of course, annoying parts of the speech, but they were fairly brief, and I do not think the noble and learned Viscount took them too seriously. Perhaps he thought his old friends in the Conservative Central Office would want to know what had come over him if he did not stick in some Party points. I thought they were tame and I did not think his heart was in them. But perhaps he will forgive my saying (although I have every reason) that while no one is a doughtier or more successful Party fighter than the noble and learned Viscount—and there we applaud him—to be lectured from some supra-Party elevation on our duty to keep Party politics out of politics is something we cannot take: and I hope that the noble and learned Viscount will not expect us to do so very readily.
I think it is conceded that the noble and learned Viscount did not say much about the White Paper, not being defence-based, and apparently almost excluded by his colleagues from the inner "know". So we must ask the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, to reply more fully on most of the points that have been raised. I do not wish to labour criticisms. I believe the noble Lord, Lord Harding of Petherton, made a speech with a very sharp edge to it. Just at the end he said that he would vote for the Government because their thoughts appeared to be moving in the right direction. I am interested in penal reform and the after-care of delinquents, and I hope that the noble Lord will join me in that work. But it is not generally regarded as sufficient for someone who has been guilty of some grave delinquency to indicate, or create the impression, that his thoughts are moving in the

1051
right direction for him to be at once exonerated and allowed to go his way uncriticised. We cannot all hope to rise to those heights of charity represented by the noble Lord.
LORD HARDING OF PETHERTON: My Lords, if the noble Lord will permit me to intervene, I did add that some real progress has been made.
LORD PAKENHAM: I am grateful for the correction. I felt that before the noble Lord said that he paused and said it was just about true.
I do not wish to detain your Lordships at this stage, but if we take the speeches of the noble Viscount, Lord Alexander of Hillsborough, at his most impressive, and the noble Lords, Lord Shepherd, Lord Winster and Lord Shackleton, and the noble Earl, Lord Lucan, I believe it will be found that most of the criticisms they made, particularly with regard to delivery of the missile, Transport Command and the organisation of N.A.T.O. (to mention only three points which have been running through this debate) were, in one way or another, strongly supported by the noble Lord, Lord Harding of Petherton, who does, so far as we can expect anyone in this House to do so, rise above Party considerations. I do not need to rub in those points, but I should have liked to repeat what was said by the noble Lord, Lord Winster. As he has left us, however, I will write and tell him that I would have repeated what he said. I felt that in many ways his criticism was the most searching of all.
I was particularly glad to hear the noble Lord, Lord Saye and Sele (who has also left us), speaking from the Liberal Benches. He was extremely severe on those parts of the White Paper dealing with civil defence. That reminds me of an old story told of a Professor Sidgwick, I believe it was, though someone may correct me. An essay on some philosophical subject was being marked and he was asked: "What do you think of this essay?" He said, "It's nonsense, of course, but is it the right kind of nonsense?" I gathered from the noble Lord, Lord Saye and Sele, that he not only thought that these passages on civil defence were nonsense but that they were the wrong kind of
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nonsense—and I believe he carried the House with him when he was speaking.
It is difficult for us to accept the record of noble Lords opposite on defence—and no one is impugning their patriotism or their desire to help their country. It is difficult for us to believe that they have administered their trust very well. If we go back to Suez, the noble Lord, Lord Harding of Petherton, felt that my noble Leader, Lord Alexander of Hillsborough, had gone a bit far in saying that we were totally unprepared. The impression left after the noble Lord had been speaking was that my noble Leader would have done better to say we were almost totally unprepared. The noble Lord shakes his head. At any rate, we were far from properly prepared and the preparations made were most inadequate and unworthy.
When I think of Suez, and of our arrangements—without dealing at all with the ethical and diplomatic aspects, but dealing simply with the military aspects—I remember a visit I paid to the War Office to discuss the use of skilled men in the Army, when I was a henchman of the noble Lord, Lord Beveridge, who spoke so well to-day. The noble Lord was asked by someone now a noble Lord, and most respected in this House: "What do you think, Sir William, of our arrangements for the use of skilled manpower in the Service?" The noble Lord, Lord Beveridge (as he now is), smiled, as he is smiling now, and said: "A miserable show, a miserable show!" That is what we said in those days. To do the Army credit, they put it right; so perhaps the same will happen on this occasion.
That was the situation in the eyes of many of us at the time of Suez. Are we to suppose that some great and beneficent change comes over our fortunes when some new Minister of Defence appears on the scene? Most of us thought that the Minister of Defence at that time was one of the best we had had, before or since the war; and looking through Sir Anthony Eden's Memoirs I see a sentence about Mr. Antony Head:
"I have no doubt he would have proved to be the best Minister of Defence the country has had since the end of the war had he been continued in office after I resigned."

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So in the eyes of Sir Anthony Eden there was not likely to be an improvement by a change of Defence Minister after Suez. Without reference to personalities, in spite of what the noble Viscount said, we have not the means of judging exactly. We have not been behind the scenes. But when the defences of this country were tested a few years ago they were then found to be in a very faulty condition, and on the testimony that has come our way from here and there we do not find it easy to suppose that our affairs have been better administered since. Therefore, on technical grounds we feel that we are right to go, and would be doing less than our duty if we did not go, into the Lobby against the noble Lords.
But there is a wider aspect. Here I pay a tribute, though from one point of view a guarded tribute, to one of the finest passages in yesterday's speech of the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham. It was quoted earlier by the noble Lord, Lord Beveridge, who spoke with such great effect. The noble Viscount said [OFFICIAL REPORT, Vol. 221 (No. 50), col. 912]:
"… as I contemplate the hideous weapons on both sides, which even in my partially informed state I know to have been invented—and here I speak only for myself—I regard either a world authority or total disarmament, in the long run, as the only rational objectives; and of the two I must say that I have regarded the first as the more rational."
Well, I am full of admiration for that speech, and of more admiration for the noble Viscount, because it may be that he had to take a certain risk in making that pronouncement. But from the point of view of the country, and indeed the world, we want to know whether the noble Viscount is speaking entirely for himself when he proclaims these lofty ideals. Yesterday he was speaking for himself; but why was he speaking for himself? Is it because his colleagues are not with him?
I recall a debate of last year on world government, initiated by my noble friend Lord Silk in, in which my noble friend Lord Attlee participated. The reply last year was found to be totally disappointing by my noble friend Lord Silkin, as will be seen by your Lordships who care to look it up in Hansard. Has there been some great change? It is a matter literally of life and death, because I believe entirely, and I think everybody behind me believes entirely, what has
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been said on this point from the Liberal Benches in particular: that this world will be annihilated, whether in our time or in the time of our children, unless a World Authority comes about. And if I may say so with great respect, it is not quite sufficient to be told by the noble Viscount that he is speaking for himself in support of a World Authority. Can the noble Lord, the First Lord of the Admiralty, and can the Government, now or later, say something more concrete or definite?—because the whole future of the world depends on it.
We feel that the Government, deeply imbued as we know they are with a desire to support the Services and to promote peace, have shown themselves incapable in administration, confused and dilatory in their defence policy; and, above all, they have not yet given us any clear indications that collectively, whatever may be the case with individuals, they have realised that the peace of the world can be obtained only by something that rises high above national defence—namely, world government.
5.44 p.m.
THE FIRST LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY (LORD CARRINGTON): My Lords, we are now at the end of two days of debate, which I think, all your Lordships will agree, has included a number of stimulating and thoughtful speeches—notably this afternoon from my noble friend Lord Swinton and the noble and gallant Field Marshal, Lord Harding of Petherton, and from the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, opposite; and yesterday from my noble friends Lord Bridgeman and Lord Teynham. As is always the case in defence debates, we have discussed large issues and small issues, and sometimes, if I may say so, we have wandered a little from the topic we are supposed to be discussing. The Government have received a great deal of advice, much of it conflicting.
I must confess that I feel a little that this is where I came in. The last time I replied to this debate in your Lordships' House was almost exactly four years ago. It was opened by the noble Viscount, Lord Alexander of Hillsborough, who ranged, if I recollect rightly, from the anniversary of the martyrdom of the Archbishop Cranmer to the protection round the gun mounting of a "County" class cruiser. It was

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closed by the noble Lord, Lord Pakenham, as it has been to-day. I have a pleasant and happy feeling of continuity and familiarity. I hope it will be many years before the team opposite is removed from those Benches.
On that occasion, the noble Lord, Lord Pakenham, told the House that he did not intend to divide "owing to the special circumstances of this House". Well, it seems that the circumstances have changed, and I make no complaint about that. Indeed, I should like at the outset to congratulate the noble Viscount, the Leader of the Opposition, on his courage in placing his Amendment on the Order Paper. It takes a brave man, after the debacle in another place the other night, to introduce an Amendment of the same character into your Lordships' House; and I was waiting with interest to see which of the many lines advocated by the Opposition in another place the noble Viscount would follow. As I might have expected—I did him an injustice—the noble Viscount followed his own line; and I hope he will forgive me if I tell him that I do not think he made nearly as good a speech yesterday as he did four years ago. Of course, he always makes a good speech, but on this occasion I thought the content was woefully thin.
The noble Viscount was moving a Motion of censure, a Motion of no confidence in the Government's policy. His speech was emphatic, indignant and reproving; but, on re-reading it this morning in Hansard, I found very little in it of substance. Yesterday the noble Viscount roared; to-day he turns out to be a paper tiger. His charges come to this: first, that the Government were in confusion about the means of delivery of the nuclear weapon; and, secondly, that there are inexcusable delays in the re-equipping of our forces with modern weapons and making them more mobile. I shall deal with both these charges in the course of my remarks.
As to the other speakers from the Opposition Front Bench, the noble Earl, Lord Lucan, and the noble Lord, Lord Pakenham, I can think of nobody in the House I would rather listen to than the noble Lord, Lord Pakenham, however dressed, whether badly or well, and I must confess that I thought his speech was very funny; but as a winding-up
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speech on a Motion of censure it left, in my view, a little bit to be desired. I think that some of your Lordships, certainly on this side of the House, will be very surprised if the noble Viscount, Lord Alexander of Hillsborough, persists in his Amendment this evening.
The background against which we review our defence effort would seem to me to involve acceptance of three very important facts. First of all comes acceptance of the fact that we must play our part with our Allies in deterring war, and that all our defence forces contribute to its deterrence. We must continue to make our contribution to the strategic nuclear forces of the West and, at the same time, provide forces to prevent, or help in checking, outbreaks of violence which could lead to major trouble. We must also be ready to undertake certain specific responsibilities to assist those with whom we have treaties. Secondly, it involves acceptance of the fact that none of the three Services can stand alone. We are each of us dependent on the other, and we recognise this in the regular meetings of the Chiefs of Staff, the Service Ministers, the Defence Committee; and in our joint planning, our joint exercises and our joint staff colleges. Thirdly, it involves acceptance of the fact that the total defence budget is necessarily limited. None of the three Services has all the money it would like to have. Although, in terms of cash, as the noble Lord, Lord Pakenham, said, it has never been higher, it is considerably lower in real terms than it was at the time of the Korean War expenditure and immediately afterwards. We accept that there has to be constant scrutiny, care and review of projects to make sure we get value for money.
This, then, is the background to the review of our defence effort, which, as the Minister of Defence told another place, the Government have set in train. We must not keep on digging up the beans to see whether they are growing, but we must look at the garden to make sure we are growing the right things in the right way in the right place.
Some doubts have been thrown on the very basis of our nuclear deterrent policy. The noble Lord, Lord Rea, questions whether we should retain nuclear weapons at all, as does the noble Lord, Lord Ogmore. The noble Earl,

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Lord Lucan, asks whether the present V-bomber force is effective; and I will deal first, if I may, with these points. I thought that my noble friend Lord Hailsham, in his very striking speech, largely answered the questions posed by the noble Lord, Lord Rea, before they were asked.
There is not one of your Lordships who, along with the noble Lord, would not like to eliminate nuclear weapons, and to spend the money saved on social needs; but I am certainly not being cynical when I say that I believe that this country makes a most important contribution to peace by the part it plays in strengthening the nuclear power of the West. Our contribution is by no means so insignificant as some would make out: it is indeed substantial. I was very glad to see the support which the Leader of the Opposition in another place gave to the Government's policy when he argued for the retention of an independently controlled contribution to the nuclear deterrent. Many of those who shout loudest for peace do not seem to me to understand that it is the fear of nuclear war that has preserved the world from a major war. The power of what my noble friend, Lord Balfour of Inchrye, called "the equaliser" is an essential factor for peace. Until we are in sight of our aim of comprehensive disarmament under proper controls, we are determined to continue to share in deterring aggression by maintaining up-to-date nuclear forces under our own control.
I think the noble Viscount, the Leader of the Opposition, will go with me so far; and it therefore seems to me all the more contradictory that he disagrees with what we are doing to keep our deterrent forces effective. He says that the Government are in a dither, but are they dithering to take account of scientific and technical advances—some of which are very rapid? I think that most of your Lordships would welcome some "dithering" on our pant if that meant that we were making quite sure that our plans are the right plans for the task in front of us. New means of delivery, such as the airborne ballistic missile, Skybolt, reach the development stage; and it would be indefensible not to consider them. The Russians carry forward their rocket programmes; and we cannot shut our eyes to what they have achieved. This
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is not "dithering": it is common sense. It would be nonsense for 'us to try to base an effective deterrent system upon weapons and means of delivery which have become obsolete and ineffective. Perhaps I might say in passing, in answer to a question put to me by my noble friend Lord Balfour of Inchrye, that when the West is considering whether or not there is a sufficiency of obliterating power it must reckon not only with the nuclear weapons themselves, but also with the capacity for delivering them.
My Lords, it is this aspect of delivery that has occupied so many of your Lordships in this debate. At present, we have the V-bombers, and improved engines, and the Blue Steel stand-off bomb will extend the capability of the Mark II Vulcans and Victors which are coining into service. Some noble Lords have suggested that they will not be an effective deterrent, either because they would fail to get off the ground or because they would not penetrate the Soviet defences. I do not minimise the threat that may develop from ballistic missiles, but I would say this: the Royal Air Force has developed techniques that can get four bombers into the air from one airfield in under four minutes, and this time is being improved upon. No one could count on destroying at one go our V-bomber force; and armed with the Blue Steel stand-off bomb, our bombers will be capable of hitting enemy targets for a number of years yet. The effectiveness of our part in the deterrent will continue. The noble Viscount has suggested that there will be a gap. This is not so. It is towards the end of this decade that we foresee the need to replace the V-bomber. That is why we are considering several possible alternatives.
The words of the 1959 Defence White Paper were these
"On present knowledge, Blue Streak is the type of missile hest suited to British needs".
My Lords, I think that we should have been failing in our duty if we had not devoted considerable effort to it and to associated matters of ballistic missile technology. But knowledge has a way of growing, and we should be equally wrong not to consider most carefully other developments in this sphere. For example, several noble Lords have pressed the claims of the solid-fuel

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missile, Polaris. The first of the United States submarines for which this rocket is being developed is already in commission and it is obvious that there is a tremendous strategic potential in a Polaris submarine, which has longer endurance, a high degree of immunity against attack, and is able to take up station unobtrusively in almost any part of the world. It is equally obvious that the possibility of having submarines of this kind—which are about twice as large and twice as expensive as the nuclear submarines we are now developing—presents difficult technical and financial problems. Before we embarked upon a project of this size, which would be rather outside the present rôle of the Navy, we should have to be very certain that we should get real value from it. The United States are giving us the fullest information, both about the weapon and about the submarine. I would assure my noble friend Lord Swinton that, in all these matters—guided weapons and ballistic missiles—we have the fullest possible co-operation and collaboration with the Americans.
As to Skybolt, here too we are closely associated with the United States development programme. As the noble Lord, Lord Merrivale, pointed out, the time scale of the production programme is one of the most important factors in considering a new project of this kind. I do assure your Lordships that, as soon as I am in a position to do so, I shall certainly tell the House more about these matters. But I should like to say this, and to say it most emphatically. At the present time, we have the most effective means of delivery with the V-bomber force, and until the latter part of the 1960's we are certain of making a powerful and independent contribution to the deterrent power of the West. Again, I can assure my noble friend Lord Swinton that of course we retain full control of our own nuclear weapons. The problem we have to tackle is what we are to have at the end of the decade, and beyond, and this is what our current review is designed to solve.
My Lords, some of your Lordships—the noble Lord, Lord Winster, the noble Earl, Lord Jellicoe, and the noble Lord, Lord Beveridge—have referred to the possibility of a N.A.T.O. deterrent system. In addition to what General Norstad has
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himself said, there has been some publicity to which my noble friend Lord Jellicoe referred, as a result of an interesting new book by Mr. Alastair Buchan, which I have read and recommend to your Lordships. These are all interesting proposals, and we must of course consider them carefully, but they do bring with them, as the noble Lord recognised, some very complicated problems. For example, there is the question of political control over the launching of a N.A.T.O. deterrent force. There would also be the problem of relating a European nuclear force to the existing elements of the long-range nuclear forces in this country and the U.S.A. I am afraid that there are no ready answers that I can give at this moment.
The noble Viscount the Leader of the Opposition criticised some of the things which General Norstad has been saying, and also the fact that he had been saying them. I should like to say something about this, and about what we mean when we talk about N.A.T.O. authorities. As my right honourable friend explained in another place, the N.A.T.O. military authorities are considering arrangements which would allow units in Europe belonging to certain N.A.T.O. Powers, and already assigned to N.A.T.O., to operate together in an emergency. Detailed planning has not yet been completed. This certainly seems a sensible idea, and I agree very much with what my noble friend Lord Goschen said in his speech. It is completely in accord with the authority given to S.H.A.P.E. to initiate planning with the object of making the most efficient use of the forces made available to N.A.T.O. in S.H.A.P.E.'s command. Of course, there are a considerable number of different authorities in N.A.T.O., military and political. For instance, there is the Standing Group, the Military Committee, the N.A.T.O. Council and so on. The use of the terms "N.A.T.O. authorities" or "N.A.T.O. military authorities" is usually only a shorthand way of referring to the particular authorities concerned. I assure the noble Viscount that there is nothing sinister in it.
VISCOUNT ALEXANDER OF HILLSBOROUGH: My Lords, we have complained not merely this year but in other years of the fact that in the interpretation of the views of these authorities far

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too little use is made of the properly elected Governments of the countries concerned. A large section of the people of this country complain because these announcements are made by military authorities and not by elected Governments.
LORD CARRINGTON: My Lords, speaking for myself, I would say that I have no objection to the example which I have given and the noble Viscount himself gave. It seems to me perfectly proper that General Norstad should make announcements on matters over which he has full control and authority.
To come now to the question of bases in Spain. I think that the facts about this matter are well known to your Lordships. My noble friend Lord Lansdowne has made the Government's position clear. The most important facts at the present time are that the Federal Government have undertaken that there will be no negotiations on this matter except with the full agreement of N.A.T.O. These assurances were repeated at the N.A.T.O. Council last week; and the general question of N.A.T.O. logistics is to be considered by the N.A.T.O. Defence Ministers when they meet at the end of the month.
The noble Viscount went on to refer to the revised Brussels Treaty, which is still, of course, completely valid. That Treaty contains a voluntary declaration by the Federal German Government that they will not manufacture certain weapons within the Federal territory. My noble friend Lord Lansdowne dealt with this point on February 29, but perhaps I may just say this. When the noble Viscount spoke of "a legal quibble" and "German arrogance", I had the impression that he was under a misapprehension. He seemed to be addressing his words to a situation in which the German Government had discovered a loophole in the Treaty and had announced their intention of taking full advantage of it. The facts are exactly contrary. The Federal Government have on many occasions declared that they have no intention whatever of manufacturing these weapons, and that remains the position. There was no question of a German Government manufacturing such weapons outside the Federal Republic at the time of the revision of the Brussels Treaty; nor is there now.
VISCOUNT ALEXANDER OF HILLSBOROUGH: My Lords, may I deal with that point? Surely that does not really fit in with the facts as we know them. The noble Lord has referred to the assurances which have now been given by Dr. Adenauer. The Foreign Secretary's explanation in another place seemed to say to Parliament that the very proposals which Germany had already had talks about in Spain were contrary to the spirit of the Argeement. If that is so, how much has been yet said on behalf of Germany that we can trust?
LORD CARRINGTON: My Lords, I really think that the noble Viscount has misinterpreted this. What my right honourable friend the Foreign Secretary said was that the Federal Government had accepted that the manufacture of nuclear weapons would be contrary to the spirit of the. Brussels Treaty. I think that it would be much better to look at the matter as it stands at present in the light of the assurances given by the German Federal Chancellor.
LORD HENDERSON: My Lords, may I ask the noble Lord a question? I think he said that when the Brussels Pact was revised Germany had given a voluntary undertaking not to produce atomic weapons not only in German territory but also in any other territory. The point to which we are trying to get an answer is why was not that included in the voluntary undertaking at that time, because if they have the legal right to make them outside they can go outside the Brussels Treaty; but if the undertaking had been brought into this Treaty it would be of Treaty value.
LORD CARRINGTON: My Lords, I do not want to get into a long discussion about this at the present time. We are having a defence debate. But I repeat again that the German Government have said that they have no intention of making these weapons and we have no reason whatever to doubt their words.
The second charge the Opposition have made against the Government has been, the delay in the re-equipment of our forces. I think that here there is a real difficulty. A large number of noble Lords in this debate have asked for more information about our Defence Services so that they could judge more accurately what is happening and what it is proposed

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should happen. I very much sympathise with this view, and I think that it our duty to give as much information as possible. But a great deal of information is contained in the Defence White Paper and in the Explanatory Memoranda of the three Services. Weapons are mentioned at a very early stage of their development, and naturally these weapons are mentioned over a period of years before they actually come into service. The noble Viscount will know as well as I do how long it takes to develop a modern ship, or produce an aircraft or a guided weapon, because he himself was Minister of Defence some ten years ago; and he will readily understand that, particularly in the last ten years the complication and elaboration of these weapons have increased enormously. It really is not a bit of good asking for information at an early stage and then being critical when weapons are not in service a year or two after they are first mentioned.
The noble Viscount made some specific charges about certain weapons; but he really knows better than to say what he said yesterday. He said [OFFICIAL REPORT, Vol. 221, col. 927]:
"… there has been Defence Paper after Defence Paper from this Government where particular vehicles, aircraft or weapons are mentioned again and again; but it will take years and years after suggested production orders are placed before there is any delivery."
Let us see what the position is. The noble Viscount said that the NA.39 was hopelessly delayed. He is entirely wrong and completely misinformed. The NA.39 has had a good record, indeed an unusually good record, in meeting its dates so far. In due course it will replace the Scimitar, itself a modern, sophisticated and efficient aircraft with a nuclear capability. The Sea Vixen, the first all-weather fighter has appeared in the Navy Estimates statements on a number of occasions: the first squadron joins the "Ark Royal" this month.
Mobility has been criticised by noble Lords. That of the Navy has been strengthened by the commissioning of the first Commando Carrier, H.M.S. "Bulwark," which I shall be going to see at Plymouth next Monday, when 42 Commando embark. We have recently overhauled and air-conditioned the Amphibious Warfare Squadron, to which the noble Lords, Lord Lucan and
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Lord Harding of Petherton, referred. Of course, the ships of this squadron will not last indefinitely, but we have given them a considerable and valuable lease of life and are working hard on new designs for up-to-date ships. Of the 1960 Fleet, all the carriers, 2 of the 5 cruisers, 22 of the 34 frigates and all 37 minesweepers have come into service within the last ten years. Over the same period, of the ships on trials and training or in Operational Reserve 140 minesweepers, 30 coastal craft, and 12 destroyers or frigates have been completed. These are conventional ships. As the noble Viscount knows, the "Dreadnought" will be launched this year, and we are proposing to order the first all-British-made nuclear submarine.
VISCOUNT ALEXANDER OF HILLSBOROUGH: My Lords, how many of that very comprehensive list of ships are on plans made before 1951? There have still been very great delays and I could mention a number of them. Look at the case of the "Tiger."
LORD CARRINGTON: My Lords, I am afraid that I have not got figures for the number of ships thought of in the noble Viscount's time. I am not trying to take anything away from his time as Minister of Defence. I think that we can discuss all these matters more fully in the debate on the Navy Estimates. I would just point out, however, to the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, that my Explanatory Statement is not at all coy about giving details of our growing anti-submarine capability, and I recommend him to read paragraphs 23, 31 to 33 and 38.
As regards the Army it was announced last year that infantry units in B.A.O.R. were being equipped with the F.N. rifle, the Stirling sub-machine gun, and the Mobat anti-tank gun. This has now been done. In addition, almost the whole of the long-term garrison in Germany has been equipped with a new range of regimental wireless sets. This year and next year will see a very big step forward towards the completion of the current programme for re-equipping Army units. The Saladin armoured car, the Ferret scout car and the armoured one-ton wheeled vehicle will all be fully in service and add greatly to the strength and mobility of front-line units.

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As regards the Royal Air Force, many noble Lords have mentioned Transport Command and have criticised the slowness of its equipment. In looking up the debate of four years ago to which I referred at the beginning of my speech, I noticed that I said at that time that we were giving high priority to providing aircraft for Transport Command. My words were these:
"It is proposed to provide the Command with Beverleys, Comets and, in due course, Britannias."
Four years later this has been done.
The Britannia can carry two or three times as many troops as the Hastings, and its speed is much greater. The high-speed element of the Command is provided by a squadron of Comet Hs, and we intend to replace this aircraft, when its life is over, with a British aircraft already being developed for civil purposes. Design and development work continue on the strategic freighter, the Britannic. Over shorter distances we shall be supplementing the Beverley aircraft, and those Hastings made available by the arrival of the Britannias, with the A.W.660, of which 20 are on order. I would say to the noble and gallant Field Marshal, Lord Harding of Petherton, that the airlift available this year is about 150 million passenger miles a month in normal times and nearly 300 million passenger miles in an emergency. This is nearly three times what it was in 1956.
My Lords, to give some indication of the capability of Transport Command, I should like to draw your attention to the joint Army/R.A.F. exercise "Starlight I" which is taking place in North Africa this month. Aircraft of Transport Command will lift 4,000 fully equipped troops and 130 vehicles of the First Guards Brigade and ancillary units of both the Army and the R.A.F. a distance of nearly 2,000 miles. Some helicopters are also being flown out for use in this exercise. I think that this gives your Lordships a practical example of our capacity for moving our forces rapidly wherever they may be needed.
The essence of the Government's policy is that all three Services should have the maximum all-round ability, and should be equipped with the most modern weapons, so that they can move rapidly and act effectively in any emergency.
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Of course, things do not always go as fast as we should like, and there have been some setbacks. It would be astonishing if there had not been. But from what I have told your Lordships it will be apparent that it simply is not true to say that equipment is not coming into service.
I have said a lot to-day, and a lot has been said in the debate, about new kinds of weapons—and I sometimes think that these catch too much of the headlines. Men are what matter, and in the defence sphere nothing is more important than the strength and conditions of our officers and men. In the highly technical services of to-day the human factor is more, not less, important. By the end of this year the last National Serviceman will have joined up, and by the end of 1962 the Services will be on an all-Regular basis for the first time in more than twenty years. I should say here that we continue to attach great importance to recruiting for the Women's Services. There are many jobs in technical and administrative units which women can do as well as, if not better than, men; and the more we can get, the more men can be released for more active duties.
There has been no criticism by your Lordships of the new pay code or of conditions of service; and I think that one of the best features of the Government's defence policy has been the institution of the regular biennial reviews recommended by the Grigg Committee. We believe that we shall in this way be able to hold our own against the rival attractions of industry. I hope perhaps that in the Service Estimates debates, we may pursue the human side of the Services at rather greater length than I am able to do this evening.
I was interested to hear what the noble Lord, Lord Saye and Sele, and also my noble friend Lord Bridgeman, had to say about civil defence—a subject on which both of them have a great deal of experience. The noble Lord referred to the statement in the Defence White Paper of 1957 to the effect that there was no means of providing protection for people in this country against attacks by nuclear weapons. This is still the case but it does not mean that much could not be done to mitigate the effects of nuclear attack on the population as a whole; and that is the object of civil defence

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planning. This has been stated clearly in successive White Papers. The Government would certainly like to see more people come forward for civil defence training, but I cannot agree with the noble Lord's view that the voluntary system is unsatisfactory. On average, nearly 50,000 recruits have joined each year over the last three years, and a good many of these are younger people. The Government are paying particular attention to the system for training these recruits. I can assure my noble friend that the Government will look carefully at his advice on educating young people in the need for civil defence.
My Lords, I am well aware that I have not answered all the questions that have been put to me. If I were to try to do so, it would take much too long and I should speak to your Lordships at interminable length. I hope, therefore, that I shall be acquitted of discourtesy: I assure noble Lords that I will answer their questions in writing as soon as I can. The main framework of the Government's defence policy is unchanged, and it is interesting to note that the speech I made four years ago could well have been made to your Lordships' House tonight without important alteration. I am very glad indeed that the noble and gallant Field Marshal, Lord Harding of Petherton, has said that he will support the Government because I remember that in those days he was the C.I.G.S. and had a great responsibility for what was done.
Our task is simply to keep the peace until we can see our way to achieve disarmament. Until that time we have to maintain our defences in three ways. First, by our independently controlled contribution to the nuclear pattern—and the House will be told in due course what emerges from our examination of the best way of doing this after the middle of the 1960's. Secondly, by our close collaboration with our Allies in the Commonwealth, in N.A.T.O., in C.E.N.T.O. and in S.E.A.T.O. All of us in the free world are inter-dependent, and it is our policy to foster inter-dependence wherever we can. Thirdly, by having our forces, either in overseas garrisons or mobile in ships at sea, ready to act in order to prevent a small spark setting
off a larger blaze. For these purposes, and within the strength of our economy we are pressing on as quickly as we can with re-equipping all three Services and, perhaps just as important, we are maintaining Services which are satisfied with their pay and with their conditions. The Serviceman to-day is as well rewarded as a man in a civilian job.
I maintain, and I think that the majority of your Lordships will agree with me, that the policy which Her Majesty's Government are pursuing is the right one. The Opposition in the last two days have made no real case for a critical Amendment or a censure Motion. Indeed, if anyone were asked to recite the official Opposition policy on defence, I have no doubt that it would be quite remarkably similar to the one which the Government are pursuing. No sound alternatives have been put forward; no criticisms of principle have been made; and I am confident that your Lordships will give the Government your approval of the proposals in the Defence White Paper of 1960.
6.19 p.m.
VISCOUNT ALEXANDER OF HILLSBOROUGH: My Lords, I would first of all congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, on his first main speech since he returned here, because one sees so many different faces and one always likes to see an old colleague in the House doing well. But I must say that he has not convinced me, by any means, that we can depart from the Amendment which has been put down on behalf of the Opposition. We have had no clarification as to who is going to be responsible for defence, whether it is to be Mr. Watkinson or Mr. Duncan Sandys; and we have had no explanation of the perhaps camouflaged but undoubted retreat from the policy of the Paper of 1957. It is because we have no confidence yet in the way in which the Government are proceeding towards their maybe very good objective in the future that we will continue our intention to vote for the Amendment.
On Question, Whether the said Amendment shall be agreed to?
Their Lordships divided: Contents, 31; Not-Contents, 84.

CONTENTS

Addison, V.

Alexander of Hillsborough, V.

Amwell, L.

Burden, L. [Teller.]

Lawson, L.

Shackleton, L.

Citrine, L.

Lucan, E.

Shepherd, L. [Teller.]

Crook, L.

Macpherson of Drumochter, L.

Silkin, L.

Dalton, L.

Milner of Leeds, L.

Stansgate, V.

Douglas of Barloch, L.

Morris of Kenwood, L.

Stonham, L.

Granville-West, L.

Morrison of Lambeth, L.

Taylor, L.

Greenhill, L.

Pakenham, L.

Winster, L.

Henderson, L.

Pethick-Lawrence, L.

Wise, L.

Kershaw, L.

Rathcreedan, L.

Latham, L.

Rusholme, L.

NOT-CONTENTS

Aberdare, L.

Devonport, V.

Mar and Kellie, E.

Abinger, L.

Digby, L.

Melchett, L.

Addington, L.

Dorchester, L.

Milverton, L.

Ailwyn, L.

Dovercourt, L.

Morley, E.

Amherst of Hackney, L.

Dowding, L.

Northesk, E.

Ampthill, L.

Dundee, E.

Onslow, E. [Teller.]

Ashbourne, L.

Dynevor, L.

Palmer, L.

Ashburton, L.

Ebury, L.

Perth, E.

Auckland, L.

Fraser of North Cape, L.

Remnant, L.

Balfour of Inchrye, L.

Freyberg, L.

Robins, L.

Bathurst, E.

Furness, V.

Rochdale, V.

Blackford, L.

Goschen, V.

Rockley, L.

Bossom, L.

Grenfell, L.

St. Aldwyn, E. [Teller.]

Bradford, E.

Gridley, L.

St. Oswald, L.

Bridgeman, V.

Hailsham, V. (L. Privy Seal.)

Salter, L.

Buckinghamshire, E.

Hampton, L.

Somers, L.

Carrick, E.

Harding of Petherton, L.

Soulbury, V.

Carrington, L.

Hastings, L.

Spens, L.

Clitheroe, L.

Hawke, L.

Strathcarron, L.

Coleraine, L.

Home, E. (L. President.)

Stratheden and Campbell, L.

Colgrain, L.

Horsbrugh, B.

Swinton, E.

Conesford, L.

Howard of Glossop, L.

Tenby, V.

Congleton, L.

Jellicoe, E.

Teviot, L.

Craigton, L.

Kilmuir, V. (L. Chancellor.)

Teynham, L.

Croft, L.

Kinnaird, L.

Torrington, V.

Crookshank, V.

Leconfield, L.

Tweedsmuir, L.

Davidson, V.

Luke, L.

Waldegrave, E.

Derwent, L.

MacAndrew, L.

Wolverton, L.

On Question, original Motion agreed to.