Lords Sitting of 4 July 1960

Preamble
The House met at half past two of the clock, The LORD CHANCELLOR on the Woolsack.
Prayers—Read by the Lord Bishop of Ely

UGANDA
2.35 p.m.
LORD REA: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
[The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government whether they have any statement to make on the recent discussions in London between the Secretary of Slate for the Colonies and the representatives of the Uganda Legislative Council.]
LORD ST. OSWALD: My Lords, my right honourable friend held a series of informal discussions with a group of representative members of the Uganda Legislative Council between the 22nd and 29th June. The group comprised members who supported the Majority recommendations in the Report of the Constitutional Committee set up last year, and those who supported the Minority recommendations. The Majority Delegation's principal concern was to express their disappointment at the decision on the Wild Committee's recommendations which the Governor announced to the Legislature on 22nd February, and they sought clarification of a number of other constitutional matters.
My right honourable friend explained that, because so far no coherent pattern of political Parties had emerged in Uganda, and because the problem of the form of Government which would be suitable for an independent Uganda had yet to be solved, he was convinced that the next stride of advance in Uganda should be a cautious one. None the less, it would represent an important advance, with the introduction of a majority of members in the Council of Ministers who were not drawn from Civil Service, and an overwhelming elected majority in
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the Legislature. Thereafter it was hoped that political circumstances in the Protectorate would be such that the country would make swift progress towards the next stage of internal self-government on its progress to independence.
When the Majority Delegation pressed him to agree that if the forthcoming elections should show a clear and coherent result, further advances should at once be conceded, my right honourable friend replied that he would naturally consider the situation after the elections very carefully. Meanwhile his final conclusions on the detailed constitutional matters still outstanding would be embodied in a despatch to be published. He also explained that he was proceeding with the appointment of a "Relationships Commission" whose task would be to recommend a form of Government to meet Uganda's particular needs. This Commission will go to work in Uganda before the election, though it will not report till afterwards. There were also useful discussions about public service matters and about future economic aid to Uganda. The Minority Delegation were generally in agreement with my right honourable friend, but impressed upon him the need for a clear plan of constitutional development for Uganda in the interests of stability and confidence, particularly in the economic sphere.
LORD REA: My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord for his comprehensive and very helpful reply.

CYPRUS
EARL ST. ALDWYN: My Lords, I should like to inform the House that my noble friend Lord Mills will be making a statement on Cyprus at about 3.30 p.m.

SOMERSET COUNTY COUNCIL BILL
THE CHAIRMAN OF COMMITTEES (LORD MERTHYR): My Lords, I beg to move that three Amendments be made to this Bill on Third Reading. Perhaps I should explain to your Lordships that last Thursday this Bill received a Third Reading, and I then rose to move that three Amendments be made—a Motion which I subsequently withdrew because

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of what was said by the noble Lord, Lord Silkin. I then undertook to communicate with the noble Lord and to send him a copy of the Amendments; and I should just like to say that, although I did this on Thursday evening last, by some unhappy chance the noble Lord has not received my letter. May I therefore say now to the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, what I said to him in the letter: that I am satisfied that the procedure adopted last Thursday was in accordance with the usual custom and procedure of the House, and that these Amendments had then been available for some nine days in the Printed Paper Office or in my office, and were therefore available for inspection. I now beg to move these Amendments; and, as I said last Thursday, I am in a position to assure the House that they are all purely drafting; that they are not Amendments of substance, and that they do not contravene the Standing Orders. I beg to move.
Moved, That the said Amendments be agreed to.—(Lord Merthyr.)
LORD SILKIN: My Lords, I do not want to take up the time of the House. These Amendments are exactly as the noble Lord has described them—purely drafting; and had we had an opportunity of seeing them before the noble Lord moved them last Thursday, no question would, of course, have arisen. I would suggest that, if it be correct that this is in accordance with normal practice—that the Amendments are in the Printed Paper Office but that the attention of noble Lords has not been drawn to the fact that they are there, and it is open to the noble Lord thereupon to move these Amendments, without, in practice, noble Lords' having an opportunity of seeing them—we ought to look at our practice again. I would respectfully suggest that we might have an item on the agenda of the Procedure Committee when we might consider whether we cannot in some way give more adequate notice to noble Lords of Amendments of this character.
THE CHAIRMAN OF COMMITTEES: My Lords, I made a slip just now when I said that the text of the Amendments had been available in the Printed Paper Office for nine days. That was not so. They were available
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in my office for nine days, and were there to be seen; but nobody asked to see them. In fact, they were available in the Printed Paper Office for only one day. I regret the slip I made. The noble Lord, Lord Silkin, said that the attention of the House had not been drawn to them, but I should like to point out that for all that period of nine days there did appear on the Order Paper, after the item, "Somerset County Council Bill—Third Reading," the words "Amendments to be proposed". So the House was aware that some Amendments were to be moved. My Lords, I have only to add that I will take due note of what the noble Lord has said about discussing the procedure in the future.
On Question, Motion agreed to.
Bill passed, and returned to the Commons.

ADOPTION BILL
Brought from the Commons; read 1a, and to be printed.

BETTING AND GAMING BILL
2.44 p.m.
Amendments reported (according to Order).
LORD STONHAM LORD STONHAM moved, after Clause 2 to insert the following new clause:
Qualified privilege
". It is hereby declared for the avoidance of doubt that any person prescribed for the purposes of this section may claim qualified privilege in any action for defamation arising out of the publication of matter relevant to the grant, suspension or refusal of a bookmaker's permit."
The noble Lord said: My Lords, I beg to move the first Amendment, which stands in the name of the noble Duke, the Duke of Devonshire, and myself. I would draw your Lordships' attention to the fact that this is related to Amendment 9, and that the two together are an alternative also to the second Amendment on the Paper. I hope, therefore, that it will meet your Lordships' convenience if I refer to the three Amendments together in one discussion, as I believe that this will save time. I will then, if necessary, move the other Amendments only formally.
Your Lordships will recall that on the Committee stage the noble Duke moved an Amendment designed to ensure that the licensing authority could, during the currency of a bookmaker's permit, receive and consider representations to the effect that he had defaulted on his obligations, and, if they thought fit, cancel the permit. There is no provision whatever in the Bill for the cancellation of a bookmaker's permit before it is due for renewal unless, of course, he is found guilty of one of the criminal offences listed in Clause 8. There is thus a real danger that if a bookmaker decides to default soon after his permit is granted, he may, knowing full well that he will lose his permit at the end of the year, decide to make the most of the intervening period. He could, in fact, default on hundreds, perhaps thousands, of punters, and they would have no redress at law because this Bill does not amend the Gaming Act and, although it legalises cash betting off the course, it still does not allow recovery at law of betting debts—and I am not discussing that question at all; I am merely stating the position.
If it should be argued that any off-the-course bookmaker can, under the present law, default with impunity and that this new Bill does not worsen that position. I would say that I disagree, because the permits granted to bookmakers under this Bill would be a badge of respectability. They would advertise them on their notepaper, and unsuspecting backers would have no means of knowing that a bookmaker, perhaps because he has made an unlucky bet or had a very bad time and cannot pay, has decided to make hay while the sun still shines. In my view, therefore, that there is a case for providing for the suspension of permits by the licensing justices is established and undeniable. I believe also, my Lords, that we are all agreed that, so far as possible, backers must be protected against the welshing bookmaker and that it is up to the Government, having made cash betting legal, to provide a means of protection against the continuing operations of those who default. I trust that the noble and learned Viscount who sits on the Woolsack will accept that responsibility, and if he cannot agree to either of the two alternatives which I am putting forward, he will find a better way of achieving the same objective.
In discussing this point at earlier stages of the Bill the noble Duke, the Duke of Devonshire, suggested either that Tattersall's Committee should be converted into a statutory body or that a separate statutory body should be set up for the purpose of hearing betting disputes. His Amendment proposed that such bodies as were prescribed should be able to send a certificate for consideration by the licensing authority, but that the licensing authority should not be allowed to inquire into the circumstances in which the certificate was granted. This was clearly unacceptable. Tattersall's Committee, appointed by the Jockey Club, is an ad hoc body. There are no proper rules for the giving of evidence; there is no evidence given on oath; disputants are not allowed to be legally represented, and there is no appeal against the Committee's decisions. In the noble Duke's own words, it dispenses "rough and ready justice". It has done so greatly to the benefit of racing for a great many years, and in my view—and I attach the greatest importance to this—it is highly desirable that Tattersall's Committee should continue to do precisely the job it is doing now, and in the same way.
After all, many of the cases that come before it are honest disputes in which neither party have arty intention to default; they merely want the dispute settled. And when large sums, as we know, can depend on the flick of the ticktack man's white-gloved finger, it is obvious that misunderstandings can arise. There is, therefore, a continuing need for the Committee's work; and when this Bill becomes law its decisions will be even more seriously regarded and it will have an added importance, because it will save unnecessary reference of disputes to the licensing authority. However, it is, in my submission, unthinkable and quite contrary to our ordinary conceptions of justice and fair play for an unofficial body of this kind to expect its findings to form the basis of an official decision by the licensing authorities. The Amendment which I am now moving, with the support of the noble Duke, meets this criticism whilst still achieving the main objective. It would, in fact, place Tattersall's Committee in the same position as any other person who wished to give reasons to the licensing justices for the cancellation or non-renewal of a bookmaker's permit.
For example, if Tattersall's Committee, having investigated a dispute between a bookmaker and a backer, found against the bookmaker and ordered him to pay up, and if he then defaulted, they would inform the Jockey Club, and he would be warned off. The Committee would then inform the appropriate authority, the justices, who would invite the bookmaker to give his version, and if he responded they would inquire into the circumstances. It would be exactly the same if Mr. Smith "complained, except that the justices would then make preliminary inquiries in writing to make sure that the complaint was not frivolous or malicious—or, indeed, completely untrue. I agree with the noble and learned Viscount that we should not, in his words [OFFICIAL REPORT, Vol. 224 (No. 88), col. 167]:
"put anyone under the danger of an inquiry without consideration for the ordinary principles of justice."
But that would hardly apply to a communication from Tattersall's Committee, although, of course, the licensing justices would act on it only after they had given the alleged defaulter the fullest opportunity to state his case.
In our earlier discussions on the Bill the noble Earl, Lord Bathurst, said that it would be impracticable, indeed, impossible, to make the licensing magistrates arbiters of racing debts. But, my Lords, they will have to be, whether my Amendment is accepted or not. The bookmaker is required to advertise his intention to apply for a renewal. It is then open to anyone to object, and if the objection is based on a betting dispute, the magistrates would have to inquire into it. This position cannot be avoided unless you set up a separate statutory committee to hear betting disputes. I am opposed to the setting up of a separate statutory committee, because it is quite unnecessary. Tattersall's Committee will still do the bulk of the work, and only a small minority of cases will be referred to the justices. After all, the majority of defaulters are backers, not bookmakers, and it will be no use referring the defaulting punter to the justices. We must face the fact, however, that the appropriate authority must be arbiters in a small number of betting disputes, and are quite competent to act. They
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can hear counsel, can consider evidence, evidence can be given on oath, and they can come to a fair and proper decision.
The noble Earl, Lord Bathurst, has also said that, because the licensing authority will be a public body carrying out a public duty laid upon it by Statute, anything said for the purposes of its proceedings will be covered by the law of qualified privilege—meaning that the witness cannot be successfully sued for anything he says in the court which he has a public duty to say. But, despite this assurance, which is obviously based on the highest legal opinion, we nevertheless feel that, for the removal of all doubt, it should be written into the Statute. I hope, therefore, that Amendment No. 1 will be accepted, because it will encourage people to come forward who might otherwise still be deterred for fear of an action for libel.
I cannot honestly see any valid objection which either has been made or could be made to the principle that the justices should investigate a complaint of default as soon as possible. It was argued that interim investigations might involve bookmakers and witnesses in long journeys. I do not see why; but, in any case, the journey will not be any longer in January than in June, or whenever the permit comes up for annual renewal. Indeed, the noble and learned Viscount said that an annual inquiry, similar to that held by the Brewster Sessions, would be preferable. But if a publican does anything wrong, he can come up at any time, which is precisely what we are asking for in the case of bookmakers. I should like to know why a man in a back street, if he has a valid complaint, should not be allowed to bring it up at any time in the year.
Finally, there is the suggestion that our proposal has the effect of making betting debts recoverable because if a bookmaker does not pay up he will lose his licence and his livelihood. But that is implicit in the Bill without my Amendment—and why not? Surely we all want to get rid of the man who welshes and thereby deliberately defrauds his client. These Amendments are designed to do just that, and they will do it without injustice and without throwing a great deal of work on to the licensing authority; and, as such, I hope they merit your support. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
After Clause 2, insert the said new clause.—(Lord Stonham.)
2.56 p.m.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR (VISCOUNT KILMUIR): My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Stonham, for grouping the three Amendments together, and I am sure your Lordships will appreciate it, in view of the business that we have to-day. However, I hope your Lordships will also be indulgent with me if I speak rather longer, because I have to deal with two separate points that are raised by the Amendments. The first Amendment, as the noble Lord, Lord Stonham, said briefly, is declaratory: it wishes to declare that a communication from a body such as Tattersall's Committee to the licensing authority would clearly be covered by the law of qualified privilege. My Lords, I do not think that that is necessary, and I believe that it might even have an adverse effect. The difficulty that has arisen in the past, as I understand the matter, has been when the publication of the result has been of a wider character than was necessary. That could not apply here because, according to the law as it stands, provided that the communication was made to the licensing authority, which is under a duty to receive the communication and to consider its relevance to the holding of a licence, there could be no question of excess publicity.
So far as qualified privilege is concerned, that would apply, provided that the communication was not made maliciously. Again putting it quite broadly, so that your Lordships may appreciate the position, "maliciously" in that context means either knowing that the communication was false or recklessly careless whether the communication was false or true; and I am sure your Lordships will all agree that anyone who makes a communication either knowing it to be false or recklessly careless—whether it is false or true—is perfectly rightly made to stand by the results of that action. But the difficulty of Amend-men, No. 1, as your Lordships will see if you look at it, is that it applies to "a person prescribed for the purposes of this section"—that is, it is limited to persons prescribed. The noble Lord has not indicated who are the persons who should be prescribed, but if the intention is to
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limit it to Tattersall's Committee or someone in a similar position, that would cause the difficulty of limiting a perfectly genuine and helpful doctrine in the law of defamation to a prescribed class.
But the Amendment also has the difficulty (I do not know whether this is intentional) that it would give the
"privilege in any action for defamation arising out of the publication of matter relevant to the grant, suspension or refusal of a bookmaker's permit."
That would extend the privilege beyond what I have just described. Any direct communication from a complainant to the justices, whether intentionally or not, would be a "relevant" publication—for example, a publication to the Press of matter which would be relevant to the consideration of the justices. Therefore, the Amendment is giving extended cover to a limited class. In other words, it is altering the law of qualified privilege, which in my view operates fairly in giving everyone the right to make such publication, provided that the publication is not excessive. The Amendment would give a limited class of people, namely complainants, the right of making the widest publication, which has already been frowned on. The result would be that instead of having the general law limited to action taken which is directly concerned with the proceedings of licensing authorities, it would extend to all persons interested in giving information for the purpose of those proceedings—as I say, to the publication in any way of any matter that is relevant. I do not think that this is right. I think that the law ought to be what it is—namely, the well-understood provisions as to qualified privilege.
I come to the other two Amendments. We had a most interesting debate on Committee stage, and I have given great consideration to the arguments that were advanced. The noble Lord, Lord Stonham, with his usual frankness, stated the objections both to Tattersall's Committee being changed in its mode of acting to a new body and also to Tattersall's Committee being given rights over and above the general public. I need not reiterate his arguments because I think that everyone accepts them. What we have to consider here is, first, the scale of the evil; secondly, the machinery which is advocated to deal with it; and thirdly, whether the scale

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of the evil is something that justifies the difficulties which the machinery produces.
If I may first of all deal with the scale of the evil, in my view, the problem is a very small one in terms of the possible number of dishonest bookmakers with whom it is designed to deal. During the Committee stage the noble Viscount, Lord Astor, said [OFFICIAL REPORT, Vol. 224 (No. 88), col. 152]:
"We do not want the small criminal element who have been mixed un with bookmaking. They are a very small element but we want them out altogether."
The proportion of defaulting bookmakers is very small, according to my information, and I think that your Lordships will agree that not all bookmakers who default are necessarily dishonest. Default may result not from dishonesty but from bad luck—for example, a run of wins by heavily backed favourites; or from an error of professional judgment—for example, failure to adjust odds adequately to the volume of bets upon a particular horse, or failure to hedge bets on a heavily backed horse.
If a bookmaker on the course defaults for reasons which are not dishonest, then there is no reason why he should wish to carry on a dishonest business off the course. I speak subject to correction, but those who know much more about it than I do tell me that an honest defaulting bookmaker can raise the money, pay off his clients and be admitted again to the course. I am told that does happen sometimes. Those with whom we are dealing are those who are deliberately dishonest. I think that it is fair to say this. Some dishonest persons who at present find in bookmaking a means of exercising their dishonesty, will, when faced by the need of getting a permit (because in order to get a permit they have to show that they are of good reputation), either abandon bookmaking or abandon their dishonesty. Of course, there is the obverse of the medal. A dishonest bookmaker knows that his time is limited until the next licensing sessions. The alternative, of course, is that the dishonest bookmaker does not apply for a permit but tries to carry on illegally. There again he will be subject to the heavy penalties laid down in the Bill, which make this course unattractive. I
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would remind the noble Lord, Lord Stonham, that apart from the offences against the Bill, if any bookmaker is convicted of an offence involving fraud or dishonesty, his permit can be cancelled under the provisions of the Bill.
On the general point, of the limited number of dishonest bookmakers, perhaps I may add this. For the first eight years of my professional life, when practising in Liverpool, I largely had a criminal practice, as many young barristers have, and I appeared in very many cases involving either street bookmakers or betting housekeepers. I cannot remember—and from Lord Stonham's speech on Second Reading I think he would be inclined to agree that my recollection is probably based on fact—it ever being suggested that these bookmakers, however illegally they acted, were defaulters and did not keep faith with their clients. In fact, their illegal position made it all the more necessary that there should not be any question of their defaulting.
LORD STONHAM: My Lords, I agree that the defaulting or dishonest bookmaker is rare; but that only confirms the need for proper machinery to deal with him; because otherwise he inflicts great damage on the unsuspecting public.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: We are agreed on the first premise, and, as I said in indicating the line of my remarks, one has now to consider the machinery and see whether one is not using a hammer to crack what is, ex concesso, a very small nut. The suggestion is that anyone who has a complaint—and the noble Lord and the noble Duke have seen that it is impossible to limit it to Tattersall's Committee—should have the power to make that complaint, and that there should then be an immediate inquiry by the licensing justices. On the now admitted basis on which we all approach this Amendment, that there is a very small number of dishonest bookmakers, it is surely a fair point that the other complaints are going to be complaints about the terms of the betting and so forth. There will be the complaints where the man defaults, either, as I have said, in the rare cases of dishonesty, or for the other reasons I have indicated and which I will not repeat. But the other cases will be where there is a dispute as to the terms of the bet—when it was received, or something of that kind.

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To accept the Amendment would mean that any disgruntled punter would not only be able to make the complaint but could cause the licensing justices to have a sitting and to hear it at once. I do not want to put too much upon this aspect, but, as your Lordships are aware, I am responsible for the operation of 16,000 justices in England and Wales; for their work and, roughly, the machinery of the courts. I do say to your Lordships that to begin a new procedure by putting on the justices the burden that they must be available to hear the complaint of any disgruntled punter would inflict upon them an excessive amount of work. I was most impressed by the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Douglas of Barloch, when we discussed this matter in Committee. I am by no means convinced that it is healthy. If people have a real complaint, then let them bring it to the licensing sessions, and let the matter be investigated when the permit comes up for renewal. But to provide them with the chance of starting an argument as to the terms of the bet and the results of the bet—when the bet was received and so on—any day of the year, seems to me, both from the point of view of machinery and, indeed, in the deeper sense, undesirable.
THE DUKE OF DEVONSHIRE: My Lords, I would only say this to the noble and learned Viscount. As I understand the Bill, the licensing justices who give the permits have to meet quarterly, and Amendment No. 9, which stands in the names of the noble Lord, Lord Stonham and myself, asks that they should consider objections "at their next meeting." So it is not asking for a meeting on any day of the year, but only that the complaint be considered at their next meeting. The object is that the bookmaker who defaulted would be called to task within three months, rather than within twelve months, of having defaulted.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I am grateful to my noble friend. I was going to deal with that point, and I will now deal with it straight away. The machinery which we have in mind is an annual meeting, either in April or May—and rather earlier in Scotland—but roughly on the same basis as the brewster sessions; and we have in mind that there should be quarterly meetings, the
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business of which would be limited to new entrants. Obviously, not everyone decides to become a bookmaker in May, and if the new entrants decided to make the application in July, then we think there ought to be the other sittings, but solely for that purpose. I am glad that my noble friend has directed my attention to that point.
I put to your Lordships in Committee the suggestion that we might deal with it say, six-monthly; and that would be at the October meeting. In thinking it over, I had a further idea: that at the six-monthly meeting it would be open to the justices either to decide the matter or to adjourn it to their other meeting. I thought that in that way, I should give the justices the minimum of extra work. I put this point to those advising me on the matter, and they said that, however it was put, even with my suggestion that the justices might adjourn the case if they did not thank it serious, there would have to be such an investigation at the October meeting, to see whether the case was one which ought to be dealt with or not: that it would really make the October meeting almost the equivalent of a second licensing meeting or, at any rate, that it would enormously add to the work. I do not think it would be fair to those whom we are trying to lead from an illegal to a legal method of operation that the period should, in effect, be as short as the six months. I ask your Lordships to believe that I have considered it. That is the only reason why I have bored your Lordships with an idea which occurred to me, but which was found by those advising me not to be practicable. As I have said, I have sympathy with the motives of the movers of the Amendment.
I should put this point to your Lordships in conclusion. As I say, we are, as is now conceded by everyone, dealing with a very small problem. Undoubtedly, it will be possible for the licensing committee to deal with complaints—and by "complaints" I mean the serious matters worthy of consideration. To do more means to try to invent and operate, and find the personnel to operate, a system which I venture to put to your Lordships, is unnecessarily cumbersome for the type of problem confronting us. It may be that in the future, when we have seen how the Bill works, we shall be able to create improvements. But our method is

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simple, and I ask your Lordships not to complicate it, or the work of the justices, by trying to provide at this stage for the perfect method. I am sorry that I have not been able to meet the views of your Lordships. I always try, I think your Lordships will do me the credit to agree, on a Committee stage to give the fullest examination of any points that are raised; and if I can find a method of dealing with them I do so, as I hope to show your Lordships in the course of to-day. I see that the noble Lord, Lord Shepherd, is here. He threw out a suggestion, and it met with the approval of the House. I have put down an Amendment at any rate to try to meet his point. I never intentionally stonewall on a Bill. But I think that, in view of the scope of the problem and the difficulty of the machinery, the step suggested by these Amendments would not be a practical or desirable one. Therefore, I hope noble Lords will not press the Amendments to-day.
3.22 p.m.
THE DUKE OF DEVONSHIRE: My Lords, on behalf of the noble Lord, Lord Stonham, and myself, I am most grateful for the full reply which we have had from the noble and learned Viscount. But I must confess that I am not at all happy with the reply which we have received. First of all, I should like to say how much I endorse what the noble Lord, Lord Stonham, has said, and to express my warmest admiration for the way in which he put this complicated business. As we have dealt with three Amendments together, I will raise point by point the answers as the noble and learned Viscount gave them.
I must confess my ignorance, when talking of the first Amendment, of "qualified privilege". The noble and learned Viscount said that it is better to stick to the well-understood principles of qualified privilege. I confess that I think they are not well-understood, and I am still far from clear about them myself. For example, if an objection is made by any individual or body at a hearing when a licence is to be renewed or granted, are those proceedings reported in the Press? If so, if a Press report quotes anyone as saying that such and such a bookmaker was a defaulter, is it quite clear that the person who said that cannot be prosecuted? Furthermore, it may
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be hard to prove whether it is true, because, as I said during the Second Reading and, indeed, during the Committee stage, all these matters are going to revolve around betting disputes. If the bookmaker did not pay because of a technical betting dispute in which he was right, he is not in default. But the punter may well have brought the case in the genuine belief that he, the punter, was in the right and the bookmaker in the wrong.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, may I help the noble Duke? The test is not truth, but honest belief in its truth. Therefore, in the case my noble friend put he would be clearly within qualified privilege. I am sorry if my exposition of the law of defamation was not sufficiently clear, but if my noble friend would care to ask me about any point I should be only too happy to answer him.
THE DUKE OF DEVONSHIRE: My Lords, I am grateful to the noble and learned Viscount. Provided it can be published that a genuine person can accuse someone of being a defaulter without risk of being prosecuted, then I am sure we are satisfied that that Amendment need not be made.
On the other two Amendments I hesitate to use strong language, but I rather feel that the noble and learned Viscount has been arguing from the premises of convenience. He talks about the scale of evil. He said that there are only a few defaulting bookmakers. Perhaps this is an over-simplification. If there were only a few burglars in this country, would nothing be done to prosecute them? It is just as bad to steal 6d. as £5,000. It is the principle we are trying to get. To say that because there are only a few it does not matter, seems to me a dangerous moral premise upon which to base arguments.
LORD STONHAM: Like the housemaid's baby.
THE DUKE OF DEVONSHIRE: While welcoming this Bill in principle, I think that not enough thought has gone into its working-out. Of course, the fundamental difficulty is that by broadening the scope of legal betting and at the same time refusing to touch or alter the Gaming Act there is a fundamental contradiction in the terms of the Bill. That

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is the real difficulty we are up against. If by making all forms of betting perfectly legal you also made them recoverable, there would be no problem. But by making them not recoverable at law there are bound to be difficulties and contradictions.
I would most earnestly ask your Lordships to support these Amendments, because they are doing a great deal to protect the interests of the backer. After all, if something is legal in the law of this country it should be protected, so that one person is not "gypped" if the other person acts dishonestly and disreputably. Debts on the Stock Exchange and in shops are enforceable, so why not betting debts, too? Why should not those who undertake betting transactions be protected as much as other people? While I have the greatest respect and gratitude for all the work the noble and learned Viscount has put into answering the discussion on these Amendments, I still feel that this Betting Bill would be strengthened if the Amendments were incorporated in it.
3.28 p.m.
VISCOUNT ASTOR: My Lords, I should like to take up what the noble Duke has said. I think it is a bad argument to say that because there are very few cases therefore we can ignore the matter.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, may I say to the noble Viscount that this is not a question of ignoring it. If that were so, there would be great substance in the argument. This is a question of whether, if you have very few cases, they should be dealt with once a year or at any time. It is not a question of their not being dealt with.
VISCOUNT ASTOR: But you are ignoring it until the end of the year. It is as if you were saying that there are very few defaulting solicitors. That does not mean that the Law Society wails for a whole year and gives the defaulting solicitor eleven months' run. Would the Bar Council do that? Would the Stock Exchange do that? Would the police do that? Clearly they would riot. Where an evil is found, it is to the public interest that it should be dealt with as soon as possible, and not have an eleven months' run. While it
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is perfectly true that the bad element in bookmaking is not enormous, what there is is bad. I am sure that the noble and learned Viscount must know from chief constables as well as the racing community that you have a very bad element who must be dealt with as quickly and as ruthlessly as possible.
I venture to say that the noble and learned Viscount has contradicted himself, because one moment he said that this was a very small problem, and then he said that to deal with it will be a great burden on the justices. Surely, if it is a small problem the amount of work which will come up quarterly is going to be very small. If it is a big problem, it is important that it should be dealt with. Therefore, with great respect, I think it is a contradictory argument we have heard from the noble and learned Viscount.
May I suggest what would happen in practice? Normally a justice would say to the odd punter who comes along: "Did you take this to Tattersall's Committee? Why do you not go there first?" That is the normal court of first instance where you go and deal with the normal "muck and truck" of small betting disputes. If a small punter came along without having gone through that established procedure he would not get such a hearing as those who had gone through that sieve of Tattersall's Committee, which would be at least a prima facie case to the justices that here was a serious complaint against a bookmaker. On this point I hope that these Amendments in some form or other will be put into this Bill.
LORD SILKIN: My Lords, I should like to support, very briefly, the speeches that have been made in support of these Amendments. Let me say at once that of course we in this House all recognise the conscientious and thorough way in which the noble and learned Viscount always carries out his undertakings to look into a matter. We are perfectly satisfied that he has to the best of his ability given full consideration to these Amendments, which are based on Amendments that were moved at the Committee stage. I should like to follow the method of the noble Duke and deal with these Amendments in order. On the first, would say straight away that I could not justify its wording. I

931
think it is defective, and if one wanted to take this Amendment strictly it would be unworkable. But that is nothing new; we are always moving Amendments which are defective in their wording.
LORD STONHAM: My Lords, may I interrupt my noble friend? Do I take it that he is referring to Amendment No. 1?
LORD SILKIN: I am speaking of No. 1. The real issue before the House—and this is the way we have always dealt with these matters, at any rate since I have been here—is to look at the principle and not worry too much about the actual wording. What we want to do is to provide in the Bill beyond any doubt that any person who gives evidence or makes a statement about a bookmaker, in good faith and without malice, is protected against an action for slander or libel. If we could secure a statement of that kind in the Bill it would be better that the Government should do it themselves than that we should endeavour to beat the air by putting down unworkable Amendments. But that is the principle behind this Amendment. I am sure that everybody in the House would support an Amendment designed for that purpose. It may be said that it is not necessary because there is the ordinary law; but this really is something special and there are special circumstances which would justify a declaration of this kind in the Bill. We are dealing in the main with ignorant people who might be frightened off by fear of the law of libel and slander, and a statement in the Bill that they are protected would be of great value. I do not want to say more than that on that point.
When we come to the second Amendment, the only case against it is one of expediency. The noble Viscount, Lord Astor, gave the parallel of other organisations—the Law Society, the Bar Council and the Stock Exchange—and I absolutely agree with him. If anyone came along and complained to the Law Society that a solicitor was defaulting they certainly would not say that they would leave it till the next annual meeting of the Law Society and let the solicitor go on practising until then. The same would apply to any other pro-
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fession. I think we must organise the meetings of the licensing authorities so that they can deal with this matter. If it meant appointing 16,500 justices instead of 16,000, I should not be distressed about that. But if it is just that a person should be entitled to complain to the justices that his bet has not been paid, and if it is just that they should be able to consider it, it is even more just that they should consider it quickly rather than wait until the end of the year. To delay justice is to defeat justice. It will not always happen, but on an average it may happen that it will be six months before a matter of this kind can be dealt with. Therefore provision should be made in the Bill for the magistrates to be able to deal with these matters at their quarterly meetings.
The noble and learned Viscount rather assumed that in every case there would be an exhaustive investigation. But it may well be that the licensing authorities would be able to say straight away as regards a certain number of this very small number of complaints that they are frivolous; that it is not necessary for them to have a hearing and that they can deal with them on the spot. That will certainly apply to a good many. As the noble and learned Viscount himself knows, all professional bodies get a number of complaints which they can dispose of without a hearing at all. It may be dealt with by means of a communication to the bookmaker asking for an explanation which he could give and which would then dispose of the matter. The number of cases in which they would find themselves requiring a hearing would be very limited, especially as the number of defaulting bookmakers is, by agreement, very small. In spite of what the noble and learned Viscount has said, I hope that this matter will receive further consideration. I feel that unless the noble and learned Viscount is able to give us that assurance, some of us would like to test the opinion of the House, at any rate on the second Amendment. So I hope that, with the leave of the House, the noble and learned Viscount can give us some assurance on this point.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, has suggested that I should ask your Lordships' leave to speak again, which I do.

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I have been only six years in your Lordships' House, but when I find a position in which so many weighty speeches are made against the view that I have advanced, clearly it would be right for me to examine it again, and I shall do so. The noble Duke, if I interpret him rightly, has suggested that I might examine particularly having some procedure at the quarterly meetings. I should like to consider that, although I have stated the difficulty. While logic is a poor resort for anyone, I should like to justify the apparent lack of logicality which I have conveyed to my noble friend Lord Astor, by one sentence, if your Lordships will allow me, because I do not think that my argument was contradictory. He might have thought it contradictory were I not quoting the noble Viscount himself. I quoted the noble Viscount to say that the number of cases of dishonesty is very small; but our argument was, as the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, has just indicated, that there would not only be the very small number of cases of dishonesty but there would be a number of other complaints which were really complaints as to the operation of the bet, and which were not complaints of dishonesty but complaints of dissatisfaction on the part of the punter. That is, I think, the real difficulty, and I hope on examination my noble friend will acquit me of a complete disregard for the rules laid down by Aristotle which I had to study so painfully some time ago.
I gathered from the general run of the discussion that the noble Duke, the Duke of Devonshire, and the noble Lord, Lord Stonham, did not get the same support for their first Amendment concerning qualified privilege. I feel that that is not really workable, and I think that the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, will agree. On the point about giving an earlier opportunity to a punter who complains about a bookmaker, I promise to consider that matter, and I will do my best to impress the view of the House on all who are concerned with the Bill, including my right honourable friend.
LORD STONHAM: My Lords, of course I accept what the noble and learned Viscount: says; and, as the noble Duke has indicated, we will certainly not press the first Amendment, for we are convinced by the argument upon that. On the second Amendment, I am very grateful for the assurance the noble
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and learned Viscount has given that he will look at the point again. But could he, without binding himself to accept any particular method, say whether he accepts the principle that there could and should be inquiries by the justices at more frequent intervals than one year?
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, this is the Home Secretary's Bill. I will convey to him my belief that that is the view of a great number of your Lordships and that we ought to consider the matter again. If, by any chance, I am not successful, I promise the noble Lord that I will let him know in good time for him to put down an Amendment on Third Reading. As it is not my Bill, that is the most I can do.
THE DUKE OF DEVONSHIRE: My Lords, we are most grateful to the noble and learned Viscount for what he has told us, and I have no doubt that in view of his very handsome assurance the noble Lord, Lord Stonham, will be prepared to withdraw the Amendment.

CYPRUS
3.43 p.m.
THE LORD PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL AND SECRETARY OF STATE FOR COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS (THE EARL OF HOME): My Lords, I think your Lordships would like me to intervene for a moment to give the House a statement on Cyprus which is being made in another place by my right honourable friend the Secretary of State for the Colonies. The statement is as follows:
"The House will, I am sure, welcome the fact that, as announced in a joint communiqué on Friday, agreement has been reached between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot leaders and the United Kingdom Delegation on all outstanding questions.
"It is expected that the documents comprising the settlement will be initialled in Nicosia during the next few days on behalf of all the five parties to the settlement, namely the Governments of the United Kingdom, Greece and Turkey, anti the representatives of the Greek and Turkish Cypriots. The text of the Cyprus Bill and an explanatory White Paper will

935
be published as soon as possible after initialling. It is hoped that the White Paper will be presented before the end of this week. The Government hope that the Bill, which will empower Her Majesty to name by Order in Council the day on which the independent Republic of Cyprus will come into being, may be passed before the Summer Recess. The date for independence will be fixed in agreement with the Cypriot leaders. On that day, which will be after the holding of elections in Cyprus, the Treaties and related documents will be signed and become operative.
"The Sovereign Base Areas will comprise two separate areas totalling some 99 square miles. The villages of Ormidhia and Xylotymbou and the Dhekelia power station will be enclaves of Cypriot territory within the Sovereign Base Areas and there will be special arrangements for access to them. Akrotiri, which is too closely adjacent to the main airfield to permit of an enclave solution, will be the only village under British sovereignty. Her Majesty's Government are satisfied that, with the arrangements for training and other facilities in the Republic itself which have been agreed in full detail, the Sovereign Base Areas are adequate for our requirements.
"A point which was not susceptible of easy and rapid solution and which involved lengthy and involved consultations between all the parties was the future of the Base Areas. Her Majesty's Government's view on this is that since we have no intention of relinquishing sovereignty the question of cession does not arise. Nevertheless, in view of the importance attached by the Greek Cypriots to this issue, an understanding has been reached that should Her Majesty's Government in future decide, in view of changes in their military requirements, that sovereignty should be relinquished, it shall be transferred to the Republic of Cyprus.
"As regards the administration of the Base Areas a Declaration will be made by the United Kingdom Government describing their intentions, subject to military requirements and
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security needs, in respect of various aspects of administration.
"It has been agreed that Her Majesty's Government will provide over the next five years a sum of £12 million. Provision is made for the amount of aid in future five-year periods to be determined, after full consultation with the Republic. In addition there will be payments and commitments made by Her Majesty's Government for particular purposes, including a special grant to the Cypriot community.
"The negotiations have been long and complicated. It has, however, proved possible on all points at issue to reach an accommodation between the essential requirements of the United Kingdom and the requests put forward by the Cypriot leaders and to achieve a settlement in full accord with the Zurich and London Agreements. I trust that these matters will now move forward swiftly to a final conclusion."
That is the end of the statement. I would add only that these have been matters of delicate negotiation over a very long period. I believe that what the House wishes to see, above all things, is the initialling of the Agreement take place on Thursday next. I should myself hesitate to give, in reply to supplementary questions, answers on detail, because I should be afraid that the interpretation by someone here might possibly raise questions out there. Perhaps, therefore, the House would wait for the White Paper and (what I imagine the noble Viscount the Leader of the Opposition will wish) a debate. Probably that would be the most convenient course.
VISCOUNT ALEXANDER OF HILLSBOROUGH: My Lords, I am sure that the House as a whole will join in the opening part of the noble Earl's statement. We welcome the progress which has been made in getting a final solution of this very difficult Cyprus problem. What the noble Earl has said following the official statement is, I think, reasonable. I am perfectly certain that the Cypriots having obtained such very substantial concessions from the original plans which were laid before the British Government, we all look forward to their engaging with us in a mutual effort at establishing progressive and permanent

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goodwill between our communities. I therefore propose to ask no questions whatsoever.
The details we might have to discuss could best be left either to follow a reading of the White Paper or, if it is a question of time—I take it that Her Majesty's Government will want to produce a Bill at an early date—your Lordships might desire to examine that Bill, with the greatest sympathy but yet with all the detail that is required to make it a firm Agreement.
LORD REA: My Lords, I should like to follow the noble Viscount in saying how much we welcome the general trend. We have, of course, no intention at this time of going into further details. We wish the matter well. We cannot help feeling that as something on these lines has been talked over for so long, there perhaps, satisfaction that matters have come to a conclusion in the way they have, even if the delay has been rather longer than we had hoped would be the case. Our best hopes and wishes go towards this Agreement, which we hope will be initialled in the near future.
THE EARL OF HOME: My Lords, I am grateful for the response of the noble Viscount the Leader of the Opposition and of the noble Lord, Lord Rea. My noble friend sitting beside me tells me that I made a slip of the tongue in reading on the financial settlement. What I ought to have said was:
"In addition there will be payments and commitments made by Her Majesty's Government for particular purposes, including a special grant to the Turkish Cypriot community."
It was merely a slip of the tongue that I happened to leave out the word "Turkish".

BETTING AND GAMING BILL
3.51 p.m.
Report stage resumed.
LORD WILLOUGHBY DE BROKE: My Lords, I apologise to your Lordships for asking a question somewhat late, and I will delay you as little as possible. I should, however, like to add to the words of the noble Duke, the Duke of Devonshire, to the noble and learned Viscount who sits on the Woolsack over the way in which he received the Amend-
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ments (with which I entirely agree and should like to support) moved by the noble Lords, Lord Stonham and Lord Silkin, and by the noble Duke himself. There is one point on which I should like to ask a question, which may be relevant to the consideration the noble and learned Viscount has assured us he is going to give to this problem. When we come to the question of qualified privilege, would he look into the question of whether it would be possible for Tattersall's Committee to provide magistrates' courts with their official list of defaulters as reported to the Steward of the Jockey Club? It seems to me that if that list is sufficient evidence for a racecourse to refuse a defaulting bookmaker admission, or to eject him if he has obtained admission, then it would surely be sufficient evidence for a magistrates' court to refuse, or at least to consider refusing, or subsequently to withdraw, a licence to a bookmaker.
Finally—and this is very brief—the question of the number of cases has been mentioned by various noble Lords, and it may interest your Lordships to know the exact numbers. Over the last five years an average of about 20 cases per year of defaulting bookmakers have been reported by Tattersall's Committee to the Stewards of the Jockey Club. There may, of course, be others who do not bet under the names of bookmaking firms but in their own name, and it is therefore not easy always for Tattersall's Committee to get a clear record as to whether a complainant happens to be a bookmaker or punter. Be that as it may, at the present moment there are no fewer than between 350 and 360 names on the defaulters' list. I suggest to your Lordships, whatever may have been said in this House this afternoon, that that is a sufficiently high number to warrant the serious attention of Her Majesty's Government when they come to consider the Amendments that have been moved this afternoon.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, if your Lordships will allow me to answer my noble friend Lord Willoughby de Broke, I should like to look into the procedure. I take his point on that matter. I rather suggested a different procedure on the Committee stage, but if I may I will look into the Point again and write to my noble friend.
LORD STONHAM: My Lords, I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment standing in my name.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
LORD STONHAM: My Lords, in view of the assurance given by the noble and learned Viscount the Lord Chancellor, I do not propose to move Amendment No. 2; nor do I propose to move Amendment No. 9 when the time comes.
3.55 p.m.
LORD SILKIN LORD SILKIN moved, after Clause 2 to insert the following new clause:
Bodies corporate
". Where a body corporate is the holder of a bookmaker's permit and any material change takes place in the composition or constitution of the corporation the corporation shall within 14 days give notice to the appropriate authority of such material changes.
If the appropriate authority is of opinion that such material changes justify a review or reconsideration of the grant of the bookmaker's permit they may at any time, after giving the body corporate an opportunity of being heard, revoke the bookmaker's permit or take such other action as they may think right."
The noble Lord said: My Lords, this is a new clause which is based upon an Amendment with the same object moved by the noble Duke, the Duke of Devonshire, on the Committee stage. I have endeavoured to improve on the drafting of the Amendment which was before the Committee, but I am not at all sure that I have succeeded. Indeed, it may be thought that I have failed even more than the original Amendment. But the purpose of this Amendment is perfectly clear. A bookmaker's permit may be granted to a company and the full information about the company is before the licensing authority, abut it can happen—and probably it does happen—that in the course of a year the character and constitution of that company has completely changed. It may have a different board of directors, a different shareholding, and a change of control. It may even have altered the memorandum and articles of association. All I am suggesting in this Amendment—and all that was suggested by the noble Duke in Committee—is that, in such a case, where there is what I have described as a "material change" in the constitution and composition of the company, that should be notified to the licensing justices.
They may say, "This is quite all right. We do not propose to take any action."
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In that case it would involve no material burden upon them. Or they may think that it is a matter which ought to be looked at further, and they may say, "We granted a bookmaker's permit to 'A' and now an entirely different concern is responsible for the permit and we should like to have further information. We should like the new person in control, the chairman of the company or whoever he may be, to appear before us." In that case they will have the right to call upon such person to appear before them and to decide whether or not the change is to the public disadvantage, or whether they can accept the change and allow the permit to continue. In this case I Clink it would be quite satisfactory if such consideration could be given at the quarterly meeting and, if necessary, the person holding the permit sent for and seen at the next quarterly meeting.
I do not think that this is likely to arise very often. As in the case of the previous Amendment, these cases are not likely to occur often; but when these changes do occur I think it is materially important that the justices should know of them and have the opportunity of deciding whether or not they want to continue the permit to the new company, as it may be in certain instances. I have referred to a "material change" in the composition or constitution of the company, and I have been rash enough to try to define "material change" yin Amendment No. 8. I shall not weary the House by describing What is contained in that Amendment. I merely suggest that if the noble and learned Viscount considers that the definition requires amendment, I shall be perfectly happy to accept any amendment that he might suggest as meeting the case. I am suggesting that the
"'material change' is any change in the composition of the board of directors or of the Memorandum or Articles of Association of the body corporate or any change in the shareholding involving a transfer or change of ownership in the aggregate of more than 25 per cent. of those shares which possess voting rights".
I think any of those circumstances would constitute a material change in the company and should be considered by the licensing justices. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
After Clause 2 insert the said new clause.—(Lord Silkin.)
LORD MESTON: My Lords, I think that there is something in this Amendment and I hope that the Government will give it serious consideration. I am very sorry indeed that your Lordships have decided that a bookmaker's permit can be granted to a corporation. In my view, the finest way of identifying a person is to use the word "person" in a legal sense by addressing yourself to an individual. Let me get to the point and give your Lordships an actual example. You all know my friend Angus McKay from Aberdeen and Jermyn Street. He is a bookmaker who has taken money off you before, and is likely to take money off you again. He is a gentleman who can apply for a permit, and no doubt a permit can be granted to him. But the other day Angus McKay told me that, in order to keep on better terms with the Revenue, he has decided to convert himself into a company and to call himself the Aberdeenshire and Jermyn Street Racing Corporation, Limited. It is going to be a small company, with an authorised capital of 100 shares of £1 each; he is going to own 99 shares; his wife, who is a decorator and carries on business elsewhere, is going to own one share; and, of course, you cart be quite sure that his brother-in-law, Alistair McKenzie, is going to take a debenture for £100 over all the assets of the business so as to safeguard completely and bamboozle all the creditors.
Now that company presents all kinds of problems. In the first place, when it comes to apply for a permit, I should like to know who is what and what is who. However, your Lordships have decided that such a company should be granted a permit. But later on Angus McKay may come to the conclusion that it is better policy for him to transfer almost all his shares in the company to his wife in order that he himself may own only one share, so that if he dies he will not be able to leave very much to the Revenue. In the meantime, the brother-in-law, Alistair McKenzie, may decide to exercise his rights under his debenture, and enter in and take over the assets of the company, and appoint himself receiver thereof. They still have a bookmaker's permit; and, in those circumstances, I submit that the position ought to be reviewed again, which is exactly what this Amendment provides.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, I shall not follow my noble friend Lord Meston into this romantic story of the latter-day activities of the Scottish Highlander, but the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, and the noble Duke have again raised a serious point. However, I remind your Lordships again, as I reminded you on the Committee stage, that, by sub-paragraph (b) of paragraph 17 of the First Schedule, a permit can be refused if
"the business to which it relates"—
in this case the business of a limited company—
"would be managed by, or carried on for the benefit of, a person other than the applicant, being a person who would himself be refused the grant or renewal of such a permit …"
Thus, if a limited company is controlled (I use the word broadly) by an undesirable or dishonest person, a permit can be refused.
My Lords, I am anxious, as I have indicated before, that the procedure under this Bill should be kept as simple as possible, and I ask the noble Lord and the noble Duke to remember two things: first, that the main objective here is to prevent the company from being a façade for an undesirable person; and, secondly (this is a matter of law, and I do not know whether the researches of my noble friend the Duke of Devonshire into the law for the purposes of this Bill have carried him thus far, but in case they have not I will remind him of it to-day), that under Section 200 of the Companies Act, 1948, a person in accordance with those directions or instructions the directors of a company are accustomed to act is deemed to be a director and officer of the company, and his name must be included in the register of directors and secretaries. So that if the directors act under his control, his name must be included.
Now what I suggest is this. The noble Lord, Lord Silkin, has put forward three constituents as constituents of material change: first, a change in the board; secondly, a change in the memorandum and articles; and, thirdly, a change of more than 25 per cent. in the share holding. In my view, the first is the really important one. I do not think that it is likely that the memorandum will be altered into some such words as, "For the future, the object of this

943
company will be to deceive and defraud the punters with whom it operates". It is not likely that we shall see a change in the memorandum and articles to that effect. Although the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, has very carefully considered the difficulties which I myself raised, on the question of shareholding you might, of course, have a small percentage which would affect the control. I am not making technical points to the noble Lord, but I put it in this way: that when you have got control by shareholding, your next step would be to have the board that you want, or else, as I have said, the position contemplated by Section 200, where you have a board which acts in accordance with your wishes. I think that the board is the serious thing here.
Now, my Lords, as to how it is going to "bite", if there were an Amendment saying simply that the company should at once report to the licensing justices any change in the board—that is, if an Amendment were put down making it a statutory obligation to be frank about changes—then, if the person complied with that, the justices would have full information; if they did not comply with it, and it came out at the annual meeting, when his licence came up for renewal, that he had not complied with it, then he would be endangering his licence. If that were done, and if we limited the matter to a statutory obligation to report any changes in the board, and assuming there was a complaint of the kind that the noble Lord, Lord Stonham, the noble Duke and my noble friend Lord Willoughby de Broke mentioned during the discussion on the last Amendment, then, when that complaint came up, there would be the material before the licensing justices as to the change in the board.
What I would therefore suggest to the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, is that he should withdraw this Amendment, and I will do my utmost to draft an Amendment (and if I do not, I will let him know, so that he can put one down) on that line, limiting the obligation to a statutory obligation, mandatory on the company, to report any change in the board. That is a simple matter, and there will not be any reason for them to say, "It was too difficult for us to do"; and the licensing authority will be in a
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position to deal with it with full information should any complaint arise. If the company do not do it, the matter is bound to turn up before the annual meeting, and from the very fact that they have evaded this statutory obligation the company will have jeopardised their licence. I would suggest that that is a reasonable way of attaining the desired object; and, if the noble Lord will agree not to press this Amendment, I will do my utmost to get an Amendment on those lines ready for the Third Reading, if that meets with the approval of the House.
LORD SILKIN: It goes a long way. I do not attach all that importance to the change in the memorandum and articles; I thought I would do it that way as a matter of precaution. Nor do I think that it is vital to consider the shareholding composition of a company. I fully appreciate the importance of the notification of any change in the board to the licensing authority, but I should like the licensing authority to be able to do something, if they think it necessary. In most cases they will accept the change and take note of it at the annual meeting. But suppose that a company were ill-advised enough to appoint someone who had come to the notice of the noble Lord, Lord Willoughby de Broke, and the licensing authority were aware of that fact. In such a case is it reasonable that they should not be in a position to take any action until the annual meeting? Without asking the noble and learned Viscount to give a reply now, I would ask him to consider whether, in addition to making it mandatory on a company to notify the licensing authority, if the licensing authority, after considering the information given them, think it necessary, they should have the right to reconsider the question of licence. This would put the Amendment on the same plane as the previous one. In both cases, the licensing authorities would have the right to consider the position of the bookmaker in the light of new developments.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, I shall treat the noble Lord as not having sat down for the purpose of dealing with this point. I have very much in mind the possible action on the previous Amendment, and if we are able to

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devise a procedure, such as suggested by my noble friend the Duke of Devonshire, for looking into complaints, it might be possible to relate this (though I have not worked it out) to changes in the board of directors in the case of a company, but perhaps the noble Lord will allow me to think over this. I am alive to the nub of his argument—which is, that if changes are likely to produce a board which would operate badly or unjustly or dishonestly, that would be a most material change. I should like to consider this point, if he would allow me to do so.
LORD SILKIN: My Lords, in these circumstances, I beg leave to withdraw my Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 3 [Authorisation and registration of agents by bookmakers and Board]:
4.13 p.m.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR THE LORD CHANCELLOR moved, in subsection (1), after "unless" to insert:
"(a) he has attained the age of twenty-one years; and".
The noble and learned Viscount said: My Lords, I have already taken the pleasant element of surprise out of this Amendment, because I used it for argument in an earlier one. Your Lordships will remember the circumstances in which this Amendment arose. Clause 7 makes it an offence if tit person has a betting transaction with a young person; employs a young person in the effecting of any betting transaction or in a licensed betting office; or receives or negotiates any bet through a young person. A young person is defined in subsection (2) as being a person under the age of eighteen. Under the Second Schedule, a young person may not be admitted to a licensed betting office.
During the Committee stage, Amendments were put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Stonham, which would have made the age twenty-one instead of eighteen in relation to employment in the effecting of a betting transaction or in a licensed betting office or receiving or negotiating a bet through a young person. His Amendments would still have permitted a person between eighteen and twenty-one to place a bet on his own behalf. These Amendments were opposed by my noble friend Lord Bathurst mainly on the ground that eighteen was a more
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appropriate age. But he drew attention to the anomaly that would arise under the Amendments, that it would be lawful for a person between the ages of eighteen and twenty-one to go to a betting office to place his own bet but not to take a bet for someone else as a friendly act. The noble Lord, Lord Shepherd, then raised the point that under the Second Schedule a principal bookmaker must be twenty-one, and he suggested that this age should be adopted also for a bookmaker's agent. This Amendment gives effect to the noble Lord's suggestion. It is achieved by an Amendment not to Clause 7, but to Clause 3, which deals specifically with the control of bookmakers' agents—that is to say (to use the opening words of the clause) persons who
"by way of business receive or negotiate bets as servant or agent to another bookmaker or to the Board"—
that is, the Racecourse Betting Control Board. The Amendment simply says that such a person must nave attained the age of twenty-one. I hope that this Amendment meets the noble Lord's position. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 3, ine 8, at end insert the said paragraph.—(The Lord Chancellor.)
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, may I thank the noble and learned Viscount for meeting the point that I made on Committee stage? I heard the noble and learned Viscount's kind words with some, embarrassment, because I spoke for only a few minutes. However, I am glad that my few words had some effect, for it gives us some encouragement. We must keep on trying.
LORD SILKIN: Beginner's luck!
LORD SHEPHERD: Yes, my Lords. Again may I thank the noble and learned Viscount.
LORD STONHAM: My Lords, I am extremely grateful for the extent to which the noble and learned Viscount has so far met the points I have raised. Does the Amendment mean that no person under twenty-one shall receive bets as a servant and take a bet for a bookmaker on the telephone or by post?
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: No, my Lords, it does not go as far as that. The Amendment does not alter the age limit for employment in the effecting of

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betting transactions in a bookmaker's office or employment in any capacity in a licensed betting office. Such persons are excluded from the operation of Clause 3 by the proviso to subsection (1). The Amendment refers to bookmakers' agents. I am sorry that it does not go the whole way, but it goes to the extent to which it was raised. It is an interesting compromise and we have met it in this way.
VISCOUNT ALEXANDER OF HILLSBOROUGH: My Lords, before the Amendment is passed, may I thank the Government and the noble and learned Viscount on behalf of the Churches Committee on Gambling. Although it does not go all the way of the Amendments which my noble friend Lord Stonham moved, we are nevertheless grateful for what has been done.
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Clause 17 [Gaming Machines]:
4.18 p.m.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR THE LORD CHANCELLOR rose to move, in subsection (2), to insert as a new paragraph (a):
"(a) that not more than two gaming machines are made available for play in any one building or, where different parts of a building are occupied by two or more different persons, in the part or parts of the building occupied by any one of those persons; and".
The noble and learned Viscount said: My Lords, if my noble friend Lord Astor agrees, we might discuss this Amendment and his together. But I am entirely in his hands.
VISCOUNT ASTOR: My Lords, my Amendment covers a different point. I imagine that my noble and learned friend's Amendment will be passed unanimously and the major question might be considered afterwards.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, I will leave my noble friend's Amendment and deal with my own.
Clause 17 permits gaming machines to be provided in premises to which the public do not have access, but subject to two conditions: that the coin to be inserted does not exceed sixpence, and that the proceeds are devoted to purposes other than private gain. During the Committee stage, on the Question whether the clause should stand part of the Bill, my noble friend Lord Mancroft
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(who has asked me to express his regret that he is out of the country and unable to be here to-day for the Report stage) expressed some qualms about the possible results of the clause. He drew attention to articles which had appeared in the Press suggesting that a "racket" might break out in connection with the provision of "fruit machines"—and he referred to them by their colloquial name. He said that, whilst the clause laid down that the profits from the machines should be used for purposes other than private gain, such as for the benefit of club funds, in practice the owners of the machines would be able to demand rent for their hire. The suggestion was that "strong-arm" methods might be used by undesirable characters in other places to extort excessive rents from the innocent hirers of machines. The noble Lord asked me to look into the matter between the Committee and Report stages to see whether these suggestions were well or ill-founded; and, if they were well-founded, to see whether some precautions could not be inserted into the Bill to prevent what—as he put it [OFFICIAL REPORT, Vol. 224 (No. 90), col. 355];
"is normally a pretty harmless and innocent amusement developing into a most undesirable racket".
I have made such inquiries as I could in the period that has elapsed, and the police tell me that there is no evidence of any preparation to operate a "racket." But although that is the position, the observations made by my noble friend Lord Mancroft have led me to look at the clause again to see whether it is capable of being abused in ways which were not intended when it was inserted into the Bill. Its purpose is, of course, to permit the provision of gaming machines on a modest scale—because it is limited to a sixpenny coin—and they are to be used for purposes other than private gain. Your Lordships are aware of what I have in mind: that a number of working men's clubs and political clubs have a gaming machine, requiring insertion of a small coin, and the proceeds, after paying the rent, are used to help the funds of the club. I do not think that anyone would say that it is easy to get into the position of excessive gambling with a sixpenny machine. It takes 40 tries, on the basis that you have no success at all, to expend £1; so

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I think from that point of view your Lordships will agree that, if the machines are going to be permitted, that is a very modest amount. I think that most of your Lordships will agree that, so long as the machines are used for the purpose of a club or some political or sporting purpose connected with a club, this would not be a harmful matter.
There is, however, the possibility that the clause might be abused by the provision of fruit machines on a larger scale in establishments of a less worthy character than those in which they are mainly found at present. There is perhaps the possibility that a disreputable club, of the type we heard about in a recent debate, might establish a considerable number of fruit machines as an attraction for people to go there. It is true that, if the conditions of the clause were complied with, those responsible would not be able to use the profits of the machines for commercial gain, but they might find it worth while to provide facilities for gaming on gaming machines as an inducement to get persons to attend and to spend their money in other ways. If this fear is a genuine one, then it can be met without hindrance to the purpose which the clause is intended to achieve by placing a limit on the number of gaming machines which may be installed in any particular place. That is what the Amendment does. It limits the number of gaming machines which may be installed in any one building—for example, in a golf clubhouse—to two.
There are, of course, clubs whose premises are not separate buildings but form part of a more extensive building which is divided up between a number of occupiers. The Amendment deals with this kind of club premises by limiting the number of gaming machines to two in any part of a building which is separately occupied. Inquiries which have been made suggest that under present practice there are rarely, if anywhere, more than two fruit machines in club premises; indeed, most clubs which have a fruit machine at all provide only one. Thus the clause, with the Amendment, will go far enough to legalise the existing practice and, therefore, not prevent the moderate and reasonable assistance to club funds and other desirable things, without permitting the installation of so many machines
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that a harmless amusement is turned into facilities for excessive gambling or as an attraction for less desirable activities. The following Amendment is purely technical. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 15, line 26, at end insert the said subsection.—(The Lord Chancellor.)
VISCOUNT ALEXANDER OF HILLSBOROUGH: My Lords, I can quite understand the references of the noble and learned Viscount to those places and classes of clubs where these gaming machines may be installed and are often used for different kinds of club or sport purposes, or for charity. I always think it is rather a pity that such channels have to be relied upon in order to obtain the necessary subscriptions for such places. On the other hand, it does not seem to me that this Amendment meets the point of view—which I think the noble and learned Viscount clearly had in mind because of his reference to the fear of gambling—of the Churches' Committee. They feel that in certain classes of clubs, and it may be in other places, there is still a great danger that it would be attractive to gangsterism and the methods described by the noble and learned Viscount. So, in spite of the limitation put here, I should have thought that it would not be beyond the ingenuity of those who wanted to exploit this to get hold of a building and adapt it for the occupation of a number of tenants, and although the tenants might separately be regarded as genuine, nevertheless, there could be some gangster organisation in the background which would bring pressure to bear upon each one of the tenants concerned. It seems to me that this point has not really been met by this Amendment. Whether the matter can be dealt with on the subsequent debate on the other Amendment I do not know, but as it stands I must say I do not like this Amendment.
4.29 p.m.
LORD DOUGLAS OF BARLOCH: My Lords, I sympathise very much with the object of the Amendment which the noble and learned Viscount has moved but, like my noble friend Lord Alexander of Hillsborough, I do not think that it will provide a sufficient safeguard. It says that there are not to be more than two gaming machines in any one building or in part of a build-

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ing in separate occupation. But what size are these gaming machines? I do not know whether they exist at present, but it would be a perfectly simple thing to build a gaming machine which could be one single machine but which 20 different persons could operate at the same moment. If it was arranged in such a way that the stakes were held up, it could easily be quite an accumulation of money which would eventually go to some successful individual. In addition, as my noble friend has pointed out, you might have a building which is sub-let to a whole series of persons who agree with the proprietor to take a portion of it, and who become the occupiers of those portions. You can have quite a large number of machines installed in the building, all readily accessible from one part of it to another.
More than that, it opens itself to other forms of abuse. The clause says that the stakes hazarded are to be applied either in the payment of winnings to a player of the game or for purposes other than private gain. Let us take the first step, that the stakes are all applied in providing winnings. It is a very easy thing to devise a machine, whose working will be known to the owner of it, with which, by taking a certain number or pressing a certain button at a certain time, the person doing so receives the winnings. There is no difficulty at all about that. It is a perfectly feasible mechanical operation, and if the law is going to be open to this you will soon find a number of ingenious people engaged upon operations of that kind. It will not be for the private profit, as I understand it, of the person who owns the machine. The person who gets the winnings will apparently be somebody quite different. No doubt he may be a relation or in other ways connected. It will be somebody the owner of the machine wants to benefit. But will it be private gain? It will be the winning of a stake or a number of stakes hazarded which, by this clause as it stands, is made perfectly legal.
Then let us to come to the other branch of it: that the stakes are to be applied for purposes other than private gain. "Private gain" is not defined in this Bill anywhere, if my memory serves me rightly. What is it? The noble and
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learned Viscount has suggested that if the winnings are devoted to the purposes of a club—a Conservative, Liberal or Labour club—that will be perfectly legal. It will not be private gain. No doubt Conservative, Labour and Liberal clubs are very necessary and commendable institutions, but what about other clubs, and what size will the club be? If somebody forms a club with half a dozen members and the proceeds are used for the benefit of that club, is that private gain? Where is the line going to be drawn? It seems to me that the whole of this clause wants the most serious reconsideration, and that the Amendment which the noble and learned Viscount has presented is not sufficient to cure the possible hazards which there are in it.
Incidentally, on this question of private gain, suppose that the machines are owned by a company whose memorandum and articles of association are framed in such a way that those who control it are not entitled to any dividend on their shares. Or suppose that it is framed in such a way that the profits made by the company are all going to be donated, not even to a Conservative club, but to a charity. Nevertheless the business of a company must be managed by somebody; it employs people who conduct the business. Those persons might perhaps be paid considerable sums of money for their services. Are those "private gain"? I do not know. It raises some intricate and interesting questions. If salaries paid to officers or servants of a company are not private gain, while profits nearly all disappear in that direction, apparently that will be perfectly legal. Therefore, with all respect, I submit that a little ingenuity—and I have not devoted any particular amount of time to trying to think this out—will find a large number of perfectly legitimate ways of evading the provisions of the clause, even amended as the noble and learned Viscount proposes.
VISCOUNT ASTOR: My Lords, may I suggest that the points raised by the noble Lord apply to my Amendment which I am going to move, rather than to this restricted Amendment which has been moved from the Woolsack?
LORD DOUGLAS OF BARLOCH: I do not think so.
VISCOUNT ALEXANDER OF HILLSBOROUGH: My Lords, if this Amendment is carried, and the Amendment of the noble Viscount, Lord Astor, is lost, what is the position then?
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, I think I can answer that question. One must remember that we are now on the Report stage of the Bill and, after all, this clause was explained on Second Reading. There was also the opportunity on the Committee stage for an Amendment that this clause should be omitted, and no such Amendment was put down or moved. I am now moving an Amendment which is restricting the clause—which is making the clause less generally applicable, and is limiting the number of machines. So the position as far as the noble Viscount who leads the Opposition and the noble Lord, Lord Douglas of Barloch, are concerned, is that, although I am not going the whole way in the direction of the Council of Churches, this Amendment is a step in that direction, and if it is negatived the clause will be still further from the position which the Council of Churches desire. So at this stage in the Bill, even from their viewpoint, they would be better off with the Amendment than with the clause as it stands.
The noble Lord, Lord Douglas of Barloch, made a very interesting speech in which he suggested the possibility of choosing winners in these machines. The only time in the course of my life that I have seen a jackpot won on a machine of this kind—that is when all the money in the machine comes out—was in a film called Duck Soup, when that happy position was achieved by a favourite film actor of mine called Harpo Marx. I do not know whether your Lordships remember Harpo, who never spoke. Somebody said to him, "Are you going to get the jackpot?" He gave that ineffable laugh and pulled the handle and the jackpot came out. That is the only time in my life that I have ever seen anyone win a jackpot on one of these machines. I do not think that the fear of the noble Lord, Lord Douglas of Barloch, is one of the more serious.
VISCOUNT ALEXANDER OF HILLSBOROUGH: My Lords, would the noble and learned Viscount regard a £1,000 prize which is produced by "Ernie" as a jackpot?
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, I have discussed that point before, and I am entirely behind my right honourable friend the Prime Minister, who was then Chancellor of the Exchequer, who introduced Premium Bonds. That is, as Mr. Kipling would say, another story.
The point that we have really to consider in this context is the fact that, as we all know, many most worthy working men's clubs and political clubs of all Parties have been having one machine, usually with a small coin condition, even when it has been illegal. We want to ensure that when it is used for a very creditable purpose it is possible, and that it will not be subject to abuse. I think that both the noble Lord, Lord Douglas of Barloch, and the noble Viscount who leads the Opposition would prefer that these things were not used at all, and they were worried about abuse. In the case on which the noble Viscount puts stress, I think the answer is that if a machine were put into every one of a number of rooms in one building it would be practically impossible for anyone to believe—it would be beyond the limits of human credulity, as seen by courts of law, if they did believe—that it was then used for something other than the purposes of private gain. In the case of the undesirable club, again if you have a limit of two 6d. machines I do not think that you are going to add to the temptations of that club. On the other hand, you are going to help the genuine club.
I think we have a reasonable compromise in this matter. On the basis that the machines are going to exist at all, we could not have a less objectionable limitation and it is a reasonable compromise between the points of view. It is with great respect, I assure the noble Viscount, for the views that he is expressing that I ask him to remember that there are other views as strongly held by members of, I should think, many thousands of clubs who will not abuse this. Therefore, I ask him to accept the Amendment.
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, this is a consequential technical Amendment. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 15, line 35, at end add ("and the expression 'building' includes the curtilage of the building").—(The Lord Chancellor.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
4.43 p.m.
VISCOUNT ASTOR VISCOUNT ASTOR moved, after Clause 17 to insert the following new Clause:
"Fruit machines"
". Notwithstanding anything in the last preceding section the Secretary of State may by order made by statutory instrument prohibit, control or regulate the sale, importation or use of gaming machines, including in particular the type commonly known as 'fruit machines'; but any order made under this section shall be of no effect until it has been approved by Resolution of each House of Parliament."
The noble Lord said: My Lords, I beg to move not the Amendment on the marshalled list but an Amendment that has been available in typewritten form. I approach this House in sackcloth and ashes for having raised this point so very late in the consideration of this Bill. My only excuse, which I give in all humility, is that I had devoted my entire attention to the betting side of the Bill and had not devoted sufficient consideration to the gaming side.
I think it is very important that we should consider possible abuses of these machines. They are an American invention, and they are illegal over a great part of the United States because they have been consistently abused by undesirable elements. They consist, as noble Lords know, of a machine in which you put a coin, pull a lever and a variety of cylinders revolve; and according to the particular level at which those cylinders stop, you win or lose. The makers and controllers of these machines can rig the odds against the investor as much as they want. The investor has no means of knowing how far those odds are rigged against him.
I submit that these machines are the most undesirable form of gambling imaginable. After all, if you go to the racecourse you have at least a pleasant day in the open air and a nice holiday. If you are a stay-at-home punter you have at least a pleasant hobby apart from your normal avocations; for following racing form gives people a lot of harmless pleasure. If you invest in football pools you have the interest of following football teams and discuss-
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ing their fortunes with the family. Even if you go to a gambling party you have the social occasion which goes with it. I have always been told that solitary drinking is the worst form of drunkenness, and I submit also that solitary gambling is the worst form of gambling. There is nothing to be said for this particular form of gambling. It takes place indoors; it is something which develops into a vice. One sees, not children but grown men, sitting pulling the lever; on and on they go, hoping to win against impossible odds. In a day when we are much too inclined to take our pleasures without using our minds, by watching television and so forth, this is the most senseless, demoralising, brutalising, animalising form of occupation conceivable. Have we really to think that members of political clubs do not care enough for their cause—that they are not prepared to give an adequate subscription—but have to go through this particular form of robbing their own members? I know that if the Episcopal Bench had been full I should have had support on this point to-day. These machines act, as I say, as a drug on the people who play them; it produces a mental stupor. The fact is that as soon as you have these machines, which are in effect, giving the person who makes them a licence to print money, everybody wants to "get in" on them in some way and abuse his right to operate them. By making it legal for the first time you are inviting everybody to see how it is possible to evade the law.
It is rather sinister, as one has seen in the Press, that the companies who make these machines in America are expecting a substantial export of these machines to the United Kingdom. As the noble Lord, Lord Douglas of Barloch, said, it is easy to produce ways in which to evade the intention of this law. I think that at this very late stage in the consideration of this Bill, it would be too much to ask Parliament to prohibit these machines altogether. Therefore I am asking instead that we should, by the clause I have drafted, give the Secretary of State power to watch how these things work. And if he finds evidence of abuse of the intentions of Parliament in any of these ingenious ways, he will have an easy way of making an order and bringing it to Parliament, in order that these abuses may be rapidly

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checked before they become a dangerous, well-established, public habit. The Amendment is intended to give him that preventive power, though one hopes that it may never be used. But there is here a very serious danger. When you see the way these machines are continually being raided, smashed and hurled into the Hudson River by the New York police, it seems rather absurd that we should be going to encourage their importation into this country, even for the worthiest clubs. So I beg to move this Amendment, in the hope that it will receive the support of the House, even though it comes rather late in the consideration of the Bill. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
After Clause 7, insert the said new clause.—(Viscount Astor.)
LORD SILKIN: My Lords, the noble Viscount, Lord Astor, has made a most powerful speech in support of his Amendment, and I should like to support him. I am bound to say that I had not realised—and I imagine that not many people had realised—the extent of the evil or the gravity of these so-called "fruit machines." But if it is anything like so bad as the noble Viscount has told us, I am rather surprised that he did not oppose the previous Amendment, which authorises the use of two of these machines—and conceivably more—in any establishment. Nevertheless, I am not going to accuse him of inconsistency.
VISCOUNT ASTOR: The last Amendment reduced the number of machines that could be used, and I regarded it as an improvement on the Bill; but I hope that this Amendment will improve it still further.
LORD SILKIN: I thought the point was worthy of comment, because I am bound to say that, had I been aware of the facts the noble Viscount has just given us, I should certainly have objected to any fruit machines being permitted in any building at all. It is rather curious that, these machines having been prohibited, so far as possible, in the United States, we should be solemnly passing legislation here permitting two in any one building, and possibly considerably more where it may be found possible to get a decision that certain parts of a building are different buildings. For what it is
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worth, however, I feel that this Amendment should be supported.
If this is an evil, then possibly under this Amendment the Home Secretary could virtually prohibit the use of these machines altogether, assuming that none of them is made in this country. He could prohibit the importation and use of such gaming machines, and therefore I suppose that under this Amendment he could completely regulate whether or not machines should be in operation. On the facts given us by the noble Viscount, Lord Astor, which I imagine will not be seriously challenged, I certainly feel it is something that the Home Secretary should be empowered to do. It is a little late in the day. I should have been happier if we had had this point raised on the Committee stage, and had a chance to consider it more carefully. This is a rather unusual power to give to a Home Secretary. It is not normally his function to prohibit the importation of any kind of commodity; that is more a matter for the Board of Trade. But that is a technicality which I imagine can be put right, and on the assumption that what we have heard represents the facts, I am sure that we shall all wish to support this Amendment.
LORD JESSEL: My Lords, before the noble and learned Viscount replies, perhaps he will help us by clearing up one or two points arising out of the noble Viscount's Amendment. I take it the noble Viscount, Lord Astor, is frightened of the future rather than concerned over the existing position At the moment there are a great many fruit machines in this country. I presume that they are made here and not imported, and I take it that this threatened American invasion is expected to come to pass after the Bill becomes an Act. I also take it that the existing position in regard to fruit machines is more or less satisfactory, in that where they are in use they do not attract the criminal element. The only machine of which I know is at my own golf club, where it contributes £50 or £60 a year to the funds of the club; and before I sit down I would point out to the noble Viscount, Lord Astor, that I have never seen anyone sitting down while playing a fruit machine, or doing so by himself. Usually there are people sitting round with glasses in their hands.
VISCOUNT BRENTFORD: My Lords, may I add a word as one who must admit that he has considerably more acquaintanceship with these machines than most of your Lordships? I have met them in considerable quantities in other countries, particularly in Havana, in Cuba. I am quite convinced that the restrictions which are applied to the use of machines of this kind, under the provisions in the Bill as it stands at present, are such as to render them quite unprofitable and uninteresting to any commercial development at all. As the noble and learned Viscount on the Woolsack said originally, the limitation on the coin to be used to sixpence is a limitation so great that it is really not going to be worth people's while to gamble seriously. They will insert their sixpence rather in the same spirit in which they used to insert their two shillings on the Tote, having a little interest while not expecting to make their fortune.
Likewise, the limitation that all stakes hazarded are to be awarded to the winner of the game would, of course, eliminate the possibility of the machine's being so advantageous. But where that cannot be the case, in the alternative, a provision that the stakes hazarded are applied for purposes other than private gain would completely eliminate the interest of anyone who had any proprietary interest in the machine. In my submission that would make it quite evident that the only use to which these machines can be put is something other than a commercial use, such as charitable purposes, or for golf clubs and causes of that kind.
I would submit, however, that there is another rather more fundamental objection to the Amendment of the noble Viscount, Lord Astor. It is this. We in Parliament have got nearly seven-eighths of the way towards making this provision a statutory enactment. If we accept the proposal of the noble Viscount, Lord Astor, it would enable us to accept this completely as a statutory enactment in the Bill. But his Amendment is, in effect, such as to give the Secretary of State powers of himself to nullify what Parliament has decided, and I submit to your Lordships that this is not a desirable basis for legislation. For my own part, I hope we shall not accept the Amendment.
VISCOUNT ALEXANDER OF HILLSBOROUGH: My Lords, I thought that that was not so under the manuscript Amendment, because, as I read it, that Amendment, whilst it provides that the Secretary of State can make an Order, that Order shall be of no effect until it has been approved by Resolution of each House of Parliament; and therefore the last point made by the noble Viscount does not really apply. I listened with great interest to the speech he made, and I quite agree that very often, under the present regulations, harm from these machines will not extend over a wide area. On the other hand, it seems to me that Clause 17—and especially the Amendment recently moved by the noble and learned Viscount and carried—certainly makes possible an extension of the use of these machines in other than clubs, or other clubs than the kind we have usually been talking about where these things are used for charitable purposes.
And on this particular Amendment we have not yet said much about its effect upon youth. I think that the more machines of this character that are installed, the larger is the area of demoralisation of young people in these matters. I hope very much indeed that your Lordships will be prepared to ask the Government to accept the Amendment moved by the noble Viscount, Lord Astor. I think it would do a great deal of good. It would give Parliament always a chance to be able to examine the position upon a Draft Order submitted by the Secretary of State. It would be subject to Resolution of both Houses of Parliament; and that Draft Order would be based upon the experience which accrues after this Statute-to-be has been put into administrative operation. We can see then the effect which has taken place, what the dangers are and whether they are increasing, and then leave it to the Secretary of State to bring in an Order and not to go through, perhaps, twelve months' legislation before Parliament considers it in the Executive form.
VISCOUNT BRENTFORD: My Lords, if I may just accept the correction of the noble Viscount, I would say that he had the benefit of the manuscript Amendment in his hand and I had not.
5.3 p.m.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, I hope that my noble friend will not press this Amendment, and one of the reasons was very forcibly advanced by my noble friend Lord Brentford, in the part of his speech which was not disputed by the noble Viscount the Leader of the Opposition—that is, that a sixpenny fruit machine will never become the subject of serious commercial exploitation, because the amount involved is so small. Nor do I think that it will ever become a serious temptation. For those of your Lordships who have complete innocence with regard to this matter, I may say that there are machines with a much greater coin content than sixpence, and, in fact, I think there have been some with a lesser coin content—but very few. It is almost the lowest coin content there has been.
My noble friend Lord Jessel asked me about the position of construction, and I should be glad to deal with that, because your Lordships will realise that what is asked for in this Amendment is to leave complete powers in the hands of the Home Secretary to deal with almost every point. But the position is, as I have told your Lordships, that even to-day, when it is illegal, there are a large number of these machines installed in a variety of clubs up and down the country; and the position would be that, once they are legalised, then of course they could be, to the very limited extent allowed by the last Amendment, installed in working men's and political clubs, and in sporting clubs. Indeed, I think my noble friend Lord Jessel will agree that, if the Home Secretary were to go wrong on the number of figures, that might lead to an unpleasant "cornering" of the number of machines and to putting up the prices and rent.
But, my Lords, from all our information, the Government do not think that there is any fear that, without a form of control such as my noble friend Lord Astor proposes, excessive rents will be charged by racketeers. Once gaming machines become lawful, the price of rent levels will, by the normal operation of economic competition, become adjusted to the proper economic level; and although it may be, as my noble friend Lord Astor says (and he probably knows better than most of us), that there is some danger from foreign-made
962
machines, the Government have no information on that. But we believe that if they came in, and there was an attempt to extort a heavier rent, they would be under-cut by machines made by manufacturers at home; and we are instructed that manufacturers at home have begun production. So there is no information that the Government have of this influx of foreign machines which the noble Viscount mentioned.
My noble friend Lord Jessel gave the picture, I think, of the ordinary user of this machine in one type of club, and I think in most clubs: somebody puts in a casual coin, or half-a-dozen casual coins, as he passes the machine on the way to a place where he is going to get sustenance, or even takes his sustenance and puts in the casual coin as he passes the machine. But I really think that the general picture my noble friend Lord Astor gave of a serious corrupting influence was overdrawn, and I would ask your Lordships to consider that in the light of your own experience of the clubs I have described, and the clubs my noble friend Lord Jessel has described, and also from the point of view of the experience of my noble friend Lord Brentford as to the unlikelihood of commercial exploitation.
I am sorry that the noble Lord, Lord Lucas of Chilworth, has left the Chamber, because he has been here during most of this debate, and he is missing the almost unique experience in your Lordships' House of hearing the Minister make an attack on an attempt at delegated and subsidiary legislation. The number of times on which your Lordships have seen my broad shoulders belaboured because I have endeavoured to introduce subsidiary legislation will be fresh in all your Lordships' memories. Now we have an example, not put in the Bill in the beginning of its passage through Parliament, but on the Report stage in the second Chamber which has considered it, of a provision to give to the Home Secretary the power of delegated and subsidiary legislation on the widest scale that has ever been known in any Amendment to any Bill since the late lamented Henry VIII applied his famous clause. After all, the noble Viscount who leads the Opposition is the most experienced ex-Minister in this Chamber, and if he can quote me an example of

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subsidiary legislation as wide as this in the whole of his Parliamentary experience I shall be extremely surprised.
VISCOUNT ALEXANDER OF HILLSBOROUGH: My Lords, I will have a look.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: The Amendment says:
"The Secretary of State may by order made by statutory instrument … control or regulate the sale, importation or … the use of gaming machines".
The nearest equivalent is war-time Regulation 55, which was the widest war-time legislation that has ever been made. When my noble friend Lord Brentford raised this point the noble Viscount who leads the Opposition said, "Ah! But there is Parliamentary control. There has to be an Affirmative Resolution". I have heard the answer to that point many times when I have been responsible for subsidiary legislation. It is said to me, "What! An Affirmative Resolution—something we cannot amend; something which, when it comes before the House, we cannot override in favour of a better way; something which we cannot deal with? Oh, that will not do. If they are going to take wide powers like that, why does the noble and learned Viscount not put them in the Act?" How often have your Lordships heard that point?
My noble friend Lord Astor has done a service in drawing attention to this matter, but I hope that he will not make us all co-conspirators with him in an act which, if I had suggested it, would have provoked every constitutional fibre in your Lordships' bodies. For those relsons—good, bad and, I hope, amusing—I would therefore ask him not to press his Amendment.
VISCOUNT ASTOR: My Lords, I have listened with great interest to the answer given by the noble and learned Viscount. When one has read Lord Hewart's book on the amount of delegated legislation which has been given, especially in the time of Mr. Lloyd George, by which Bills could be varied and even changed by an act of the Department, even without Affirmative Resolutions, I think it will be seen that the comparison by the noble and learned Viscount of himself with Henry VIII—
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: You, Sir.
VISCOUNT ASTOR: —of myself with Henry VIII is not an entirely accurate one. But I am entirely to blame, and I come before the House in sackcloth and ashes for the fact that I did not raise this matter earlier, at Committee stage. It is entirely my fault; and, as I said at the beginning, I apologise profoundly for not having done so. I have done it in this manner only because I think it is important that we should not ignore the experience of what is happening in foreign countries as regards these machines. It is possible to hire them, and to have all sorts of undesirable arrangements by which pressure is put on the amount of the hiring, as the noble Lord, Lord Douglas of Barloch, mentioned. There is every sort of way of getting round it. After all, with even a sixpenny machine, if one can put in four sixpences a minute for, shall we say, eight hours a day, if you take a profit of about 25 per cent. of what is put in, you very soon clear between £2,000 and £3,000 a year. That is not bad, and with two of those there would be £5,000 a year coming in. It is all very well to say that it is a sixpenny stake only, but if you work the figures out it comes to quite a lot. However, it is obviously no use my pressing this Amendment to a Division, for I feel that I shall not have a victory if I do not carry the Government with me. Nevertheless, I hope that the Government will pay attention to the lessons to be learned from what has happened abroad, and will watch these machines and their extension, which we are making legal for the first time in this country, with the utmost care, vigilance and suspicion. Having said that, I feel I must withdraw my Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Second Schedule [Rules for licensed betting offices]:
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, this Amendment is consequential on the introduction into Clause 5, by an Amendment moved by my noble and learned friend Lord Spens during the Committee stage, of subsection (5), which forbids the advertisement of licensed betting offices. I could explain the Amendment in detail, but I know that there is other business which your Lordships want to get on to. Therefore, as it is consequential on another Amendment, I beg to move it formally.
Amendment moved—
Page 38, line 14, leave out from first ("premises") to end of line 18.—(The Lord Chancellor.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.

ROAD TRAFFIC (AMENDMENT) BILL
5.15 p.m.
Order of the Day for the Second Reading read.
LORD DUNLEATH: My Lords, I rise to move the Second Reading of the Road Traffic (Amendment) Bill, and I must confess that it is with a certain amount of trepidation that I do so: not so much because I fear that this Bill will arouse controversial debate, but because this is the first time that I have had the privilege of addressing your Lordships' House. I had hoped that, before making my maiden speech, I should have been able to put in sufficient attendances to familiarise myself more fully with the procedure; but, unfortunately, the fact that I live and work in Northern Ireland has prevented me from attending except on my very infrequent visits to London. I would therefore ask your Lordships to be indulgent to me on this occasion.
My Lords, the Bill is more or less self-explanatory. Its purpose is to enable the holders of full driving licences in Northern Ireland, in the Isle of Man and in the Channel Islands to exchange these for Great Britain licences without having to take a further test. The situation which has caused this Bill to be introduced is that, in order to obtain a driving licence in Great Britain, it has been necessary since 1934 to take a Ministry of Transport driving test. In the above territories, however, driving tests were not introduced until four or five years ago. It has therefore been quite reasonable hitherto that persons who had obtained such a licence without taking a test should not qualify for a British driving licence without having proved themselves to be up to the standard required of permanent residents in Great Britain. However, now that driving tests have been compulsory for several years in these territories, there appears to be no reason why inhabitants of these territories should not qualify for British driving licences. I think your Lordships need have no fear that there is any dis-
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crepancy in the standards of the tests in these territories as compared with those in Great Britain. I understand that the Ministry of Transport have looked into this matter very closely, and that their experts have visited all three territories during the last five years and have found that the standards of driving required are as identical as human nature will allow.
At present there is a reciprocal agreement which enables any person who has taken out a full driving licence in Great Britain under the Road Traffic Act, 1960, to obtain a similar licence in Northern Ireland, in the Isle of Man or in the Channel Islands. There is one exception only to this, which is Jersey, and there I understand that at the moment amendments to the present road traffic law are being considered which include such a reciprocal agreement. It is therefore only fair that a person who has qualified for a licence on exactly the same basis in any of the above territories should have a reciprocal right in Great Britain.
There are one or two points limiting the scope of this Bill which I think I should mention, but I will not take up your Lordships' time by going into them fully. The first is that for any of these external licences granted in Northern Ireland, the Isle of Man or the Channel Islands to qualify for benefit under this Bill they must have been current during the previous ten years; otherwise, they will not be eligible. Secondly, the Bill excludes the holders of provisional licences: the emphasis is on the term "full licence". Thirdly, it excludes any person who has been disqualified from holding or obtaining a licence to drive any class or description of vehicles in the above territories. In 1956, the practice of disqualifying a driver from driving one class of vehicle only was abandoned. This is still in force in Northern Ireland, but any person thus disqualified will not be eligible under the Bill for any class of driving licence whatsoever in Great Britain. The final point is that a certificate of competence will not be recognised under the Bill in Great Britain unless it has been exchanged for a full licence in the territory concerned.
To sum up, it is felt that a candidate who passes a test in County Down, Douglas or St. Helier should be on even terms with one who has passed an

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identical test in Aberdeenshire, Cardiff or London. I feel that this Bill will remove a source of annoyance from people who have come from these territories to live in Great Britain and that, at the same time, it will ease to a small extent the burden on the British driving examiners. I understand that the Bill has the approval of the Ministry of Transport and that it enjoyed a clear passage through its Second and Third Readings in another place. Therefore I would commend it to your Lordships' favourable consideration. I beg to move that the Bill be now read a second time.
Moved, That the Bill be now read 2a.—(Lord Dunleath.)
5.22 p.m.
THE JOINT PARLIAMENTARY SECRETARY, MINISTRY OF TRANSPORT (LORD CHESHAM): My Lords, I am happy to be the first to congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Dunleath, on his maiden speech, a maiden speech which has been characterised by a capability and lucidity of explanation from which I think we may take an example. I think that he is the more to be praised in that he has ventured to introduce a Bill into your Lordships' House in his maiden speech and that he has selected a Bill which is entirely acceptable. Although the Bill does not deal with a large matter, it is a valuable one. It is really very nice to be able to welcome the speaker and the Bill at the same time.
LORD LUCAS OF CHILWORTH: My Lords, I do not intend to impede the progress of this Bill. I rise only to say that noble Lords on this side of the House will support the Bill and to add my congratulations to the noble Lord on his excellent maiden speech. It makes some of us "old stagers" regret the fact that we did not have the opportunity of introducing a Bill in our maiden speeches. As my noble friend said in another context, we put it down, in jealousy, to "beginner's luck". We accept the Bill and we congratulate the noble Lord.
LORD SILKIN: My Lords, in also congratulating the noble Lord, may I ask him a question, if it is permissible on a maiden speech? Is this reciprocal: that is to say, does a person who holds a driving licence in this country automatically get one in the territories with which the Bill is dealing?
LORD DUNLEATH: My Lords, I am sorry if I did not make that point clear. At present, with the exception of Jersey, a reciprocal right exists. If a motorist holds a full driving licence in Great Britain and goes to Northern Ireland or the Isle of Man or Guernsey, he can exchange it for a full driving licence without having to take a test. The exception, as I said, is Jersey, but I gather that Jersey will no longer be an exception in the near future.
I should like to express my appreciation to the noble Lord, Lord Chesham, for his assistance and for the assistance of his Ministry in getting this Bill through without difficulty. I should also like to thank the noble Lord, Lord Lucas of Chilworth, for his kind remarks and for his helpful assistance in securing the Bill an easy passage.
On Question, Bill read 2a, and committed to a Committee of the Whole House.

ROAD TRAFFIC AND ROADS IMPROVEMENT BILL
5.25 p.m.
Order of the Day for the House to be put into Committee read.
Moved, That the House do now resolve itself into Committee.—(Lord Chesham.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.
House in Committee accordingly.
[The LORD MERTHYR in the Chair.]
Clause 1:
Enforcement and Administration of traffic Laws Punishment without prosecution of offences in connection with lights, reflectors, obstruction, etc.
1.—(1) This section shall apply to any offence created by or under an enactment and punishable on summary conviction, being an offence committed in respect of a vehicle—

(a) by its being left or parked on a road without the lights or reflectors required by law; or

(b) by its obstructing a road, or waiting, or being left or parked, or being loaded or unloaded, in a road; or

(2) Where a constable finds a person on any occasion and has reason to believe that on that occasion he is committing or has committed an offence to which this section applies, he may give him the prescribed notice in writing offering the option of payment of a fixed penalty under this section without prosecution for that

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offence; and no person shall then be liable to be convicted of that offence if the fixed penalty is paid in accordance with this section before the date on which proceedings are begun.
LORD LUCAS OF CHILWORTH LORD LUCAS OF CHILWORTH moved, in subsection (1) (a), after "road" to insert "during the hours of darkness". The noble Lord said: The purpose of this Amendment is to clarify the real intention of subsection (1), which at present reads:
"This section shall apply to any offence created by or under an enactment and punishable on summary conviction, being an offence committed in respect of a vehicle—

(a) by its being left or parked on a road without the lights or reflectors required by law.…"

It used to be the law that the owner of a vehicle had to have lights effectively operating upon any vehicle on the roads during the hours of darkness. The law was altered to get over a legal technicality in the regulations, which perhaps one day will be presented to Parliament, concerning the 10-year-old motor car. A motorist could not successfully plead, "I have no lights on my car because I never use it at night", because under the Construction and Use (Amendment) Regulations, 1956, it is compulsory to have lights in proper working order during the hours of daylight as well as during the hours of darkness. I do not think the literal impression of subsection (1) is its real intention. I do not think that it is intended to create another offence. It is not intended that a traffic warden or police constable should have power to give a ticket to the owner of a vehicle parked in a restricted area just because the lights do not work during the hours of daylight. I think that my Amendment gives effect to the interpretation which the Government intend. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 1, line 9, after ("road") insert ("during the hours of darkness").—(Lord Lucas of Chilworth.)
VISCOUNT BRENTFORD: When I first saw this Amendment, I confess that I thought it was a work of supererogation, but on considering it more closely, I came to the same conclusion as the noble Lord, Lord Lucas of Chilworth. I believe that it is necessary. In addition to the technical reason that the noble Lord proferred—namely, that without
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these words the Bill would in fact create a new offence additional to the offence created under the Construction and Use Order—there is, in my submission, a further objection to it. Basically, I think it is fundamental that it is the duty of a constable or a warden in this connection to verify that an offence has been committed. Without the words which the noble Lord is proposing to put into the Bill, a traffic warden, if he is going to carry out that principle would require to have access to the inside of the car in order to see if the lights will work during daytime. That I am sure is something which the Minister never intended and which your Lordships would not wish to occur. Therefore, for the sake of traffic wardens, as well as for the sake of the public at large, I concur in what the noble Lord said, and I feel that this matter should be clarified, so as to exclude the possibility of there being an offence committed for this purpose under this Bill by reason of the lights not being in proper working order during the hours of daylight.
LORD CHESHAM: Before I deal with this Amendment may I be permitted a personal word of explanation, and perhaps apology, to your Lordships, and in particular to the noble Lords, Lord Lucas of Chilworth and Lord Silkin, who are the co-perpetrators (if I may so call them) of the majority of the Amendments. At the time when they were co-perpetrating these Amendments and the Amendments were arriving in a steady stream, a stream of another kind, a stream of bugs with the queer names that all seem to end in "coccus", unfortunately descended upon me and arrived in the region of my upper lip and nose, which necessitated a feat of skill by my medical advisers even to get me here, including the instruction that I should take only a modest part in the first stages of the Bill in order to be fit for battle in the later stages. Consequently, I am most indebted to my noble friend Lord Bathurst, who has nobly undertaken to carry a great deal more of the heat and burden of the day than we had originally planned. I can only say that the proceedings will be none the worse for that. I think I need only add that the modern method of administering antibiotics makes even sitting in my place a slight inconvenience.

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I turn now to the Amendment itself, and I will deal first with the point raised by my noble friend Lord Brentford. He insinuated that the clause, as drafted, would create a new offence. That, I assure your Lordships, is quite impossible under this clause, because it only identifies what are the offences under the existing law. The clause as drafted cannot, and does not, create a new offence in any shape or form. It relates only to those offences which are offences under the existing law. It identifies them, and the query before us is whether or not the ticket system is to be applied to them. That is all the clause does, and it is misleading to contemplate that any new offence can be created. It is not necessary, and the clause does not try or purport, to go into the details of the way in which these offences become offences. Those are clearly set out in the relevant Acts under the law as it exists at the present time.
Therefore I would start by saying that, at face value, at any rate, the Amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Lucas of Chilworth, is unnecessary. But he is right in saying that there is this provision that a vehicle shall be fitted with the lights that the law requires, as set out in another Act, during the hours of daylight. He is right also in saying that that was a technical measure, and I think I must agree with him that that is not the kind of offence to which it is intended the ticket system should be applied. I do not think it is intended that traffic wardens should wander around looking at all motor cars to make certain that they have two reflectors at the back. Therefore, perhaps I may put it in this way to the noble Lord. This Amendment unfortunately is slightly defective as to wording, but if he would consider withdrawing it now, on my giving an undertaking either to put down an Amendment myself or to discuss it with him to get the wording in accordance with what it should be to match up with previous Acts, I should be glad to give that undertaking.
LORD LUCAS OF CHILWORTH: I am grateful to the noble Lord. The point that struck me was that it is an offence under this clause for a vehicle to be left or parked on a road without the lights or reflectors required by law—
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it does not say which law—and the law as it stands at the present time is that you must have proper lights operating effectively on your motor vehicle during the hours of daylight. However, I accept the noble Lord's undertaking that he will accept the principle of my Amendment and draft out such an Amendment as to make it clear what paragraph (a) means. If that is the undertaking, I accept it and withdraw my Amendment; but if it is not, we shall have to go on arguing.
LORD CHESHAM: If I may speak again, I think we must be clear about what my undertaking is. The noble Lord really must disabuse his mind of the idea that this clause creates an offence. It does not. He referred to "an offence under this clause". It is not: it is an offence under a previous existing regulation, and it is referred to in this clause. It is not created, and no offence is created, by this clause. I cannot say that too often. I accepted the principle of the noble Lord's Amendment, but what I intended to convey was that the words he has used "during the hours of darkness", will not quite stand up: they are not quite specific enough for the purpose he has in mind or to be put into the Bill. It is a question of modifying the words "during the hours of darkness" to the required degree to fit the law I was talking about. I do not mind which way it is done—whether we get together upon it or whether I put down an Amendment which carries out exactly what the noble Lord wants in the right words. That is my undertaking.
LORD LUCAS OF CHILWORTH: Which I gladly accept, although I do not accept the noble Lord's explanation of why he has given it.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
5.40 p.m.
LORD LUCAS OF CHILWORTH LORD LUCAS OF CHILWORTH moved, in subsection (1) (a), after "law" to insert
"or otherwise than with the left or nearside of the vehicle as close as may be to the edge of the carriageway;".
The noble Lord said: This Amendment really paves the way for the third Amendment and, with your Lordships' permission, in order to save time, I should like to argue the case for both together. Together, they are of substance. We must make an effort in this

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Bill to make it clear—or as clear as we possibly can—to the ordinary vehicle driver, be he a private or a commercial vehicle driver, just what the Bill and this clause of the Bill entails. On Second Reading the noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury, said—I paraphrase what he said. I think, correctly—"It is no good passing laws unless we understand what they really mean." This subsection as at present drafted is very confusing. Unfortunately, there is not one motorist in a thousand—in a million, I could almost say—who understands the law of obstruction, and I doubt whether some of your Lordships do. Obstruction can be a very minor thing or a very major thing. So I want to put into this Bill what obstruction really means.
We can understand a lot of other laws. We can understand the speed limit law. But what is obstruction? Obstruction is the most debatable offence that can be committed by a motor vehicle driver. It is prone to many interpretations. Indeed, even under Acts of Parliament it can be a modest thing. Prosecutions for ordinary obstruction take place under Regulation 90 of The Motor Vehicles (Construction and Use) Regulations, 1955, No. 482. Regulation 90 says:
"Save as provided in paragraph (2) of this Regulation no person shall, except with the permission of a police officer in uniform, cause or permit any motor vehicle to stand on any road during the hours of darkness otherwise than with the left or near side of the vehicle as close as may be to the edge of the carriageway."
May I say in passing that the maximum penalty for that is a fine of £20.
Section 16 of the Road Traffic Act, 1960, says:
"If a person in charge of a vehicle causes or permits the vehicle or a trailer drawn thereby to remain at rest on a road in such a position or in such a condition or in such circumstances as to be likely to cause danger to other persons using the road, he shall be liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding twenty pounds, or in the case of a second or subsequent conviction to a fine not exceeding fifty pounds or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding three months."
That is another form of obstruction.
My argument is this. In this Bill we should make it abundantly clear what is the offence for which a driver of a motor vehicle can receive a ticket. We must make it as clear as we possibly can, if this Bill is to do anything that is claimed for it, which is that it would save a lot
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of trouble, expense and unnecessary police court proceedings. In my third Amendment, page 1, line 12, I say:
"by its obstructing a road, or waiting, or being left or parked, or being loaded or unloaded, in a road contrary to directions given by a traffic sign or by carriageway markings."
Now that is perfectly clear. If you leave your vehicle where there is a clear official notification that there is no waiting—which can be a traffic sign. "No Waiting", or by a yellow line on a carriageway—then that is what the noble Lord himself described in his Second Reading speech as, I think he said, not a self-evident offence, but a self-proven offence. I think that was the expression he used, or something like that—if there is such I thing as that; I do not know whether there is. The noble Lord said [OFFICIAL REPORT, Vol. 224 (No. 91), col. 408]:
"… it is proposed to introduce a standard penalty for certain minor offences in which there is no doubt of guilt …"
If you leave "obstruction" in there without a qualification there is every doubt of guilt. If you consult the police, they will tell you that there is no prosecution or alleged offence which causes so much bad blood between the motor vehicle driver and the authorities than a summons for obstruction.
After all is said and done, many of us who have driven cars for years know very well when we have driven over the limit—though we may argue that we did not. We know that. But what is obstruction? On Second Reading I quoted the Divisional Court—I think the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goddard, was presiding at the time—who said that an unreasonable use of the highway can be obstruction. I do not want to minimise the dangers and the seriousness of obstruction, but I do argue that when a charge of obstruction is brought against the vehicle user in the future, it should not be subject to the ticket process of fining; it should be subject to the ordinary prosecution in the courts by summons by the police.
That is clearly stated in what I say in the second Amendment, and if my wording does not clearly define it, then I hope the noble Lord will find better wording. Let me save him the trouble of repeating on every one of these Amendments that the drafting is bad. That I know. But as my noble friend Lord Silkin said on a previous Bill this

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afternoon, you know what I want to do, and I do not doubt that the Parliamentary draftsman can find a better way of doing it, as the noble Lord has graciously suggested they can with regard to the first Amendment I moved. We must be able to make it crystal clear that all the offences that are subject to a limited fine are clearly stated in the Bill, and if he will accept my wording, that obstruction by a vehicle is caused
"by its obstructing a road or waiting or being left or parked or being loaded or unloaded in a road contrary to directions given by a traffic sign or by carriageway markings",
I suggest that that is as near as it is possible to get. The noble Lord himself said that it is proposed to introduce a standard penalty for certain minor offences in which there is no doubt of guilt, and
"I think that in the majority of parking cases it is fair to say there is no doubt"—
that is what the noble Lord went on to say.
An Amendment on these lines was proposed in another place and it was argued by the Government then that if they accepted the Amendment as worded (it had not got the words "carriageway markings" in it) it would prevent the giving of a ticket for other offences, such as leaving a motor car facing the wrong way after the hours of darkness had fallen. So I added those words to this Amendment to help the Government, and I have taken the words literally from the Construction and Use Regulations. Therefore, if it is bad draftsmanship, do not blame me; Parliamentary draftsmen drafted the Construction and Use Regulations, including Regulation No. 90, which I quoted just now.
I think I have made this case perfectly clearly. I say it is a matter of substance. It will force local authorities to mark clearly and without any equivocation where a motorist—and I use "motorist" in the widest sense of vehicle driver—cannot park his vehicle. That would be the first thing. It would also force them to provide places where he can park his vehicle, which is equally important. I know there is an intermediate gap: can he park his vehicle where there is no sign that he can and no sign that he cannot? The literal interpretation of the law to-day is, No, he cannot, because he
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can be summoned for obstruction if he leaves his motor car anywhere on the road if, in the opinion of the police, he is causing an obstruction. I think we have to tolerate that for the time being. But I do not want to put the onus of issuing tickets on anybody in that area; I do not want the onus on a traffic warden, and I do not want it on the constable, either. I think that the ticket system has got to be kept for the self-proven offences, where there is no argument or very little argument. But where it is a contentious decision of obstruction I think the police should do what they do now.
With that explanation, with which I hope I have made clear what I am seeking to do, would your Lordships allow me to move the first of these Amendments. Perhaps I should, to save time, add that I have seen a manuscript Amendment to this Amendment. I do not mind it at all; it may be good, it may be unnecessary. But in Regulation No. 90 of the Construction and Use Regulations to which I have referred, which says that a person must not cause or permit any motor vehicle to stand on any road during the hours of darkness other than with the left or near side of the vehicle as close as may be to the edge of the carriageway, there is a proviso (it is on page 33, Regulation 90 (2) (d)) that that regulation shall not apply to
"any motor vehicle in any road in which vehicles are allowed to proceed in one direction only".
In that, the manuscript Amendment may have force. But we may perhaps argue that. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 1, line 10, after ("law") insert the said words.—(Lord Lucas of Chilworth.)
THE CHAIRMAN OF COMMITTEES: I have received notice of a manuscript Amendment to be moved by the noble Lord, Lord Som̃ers. In case any of your Lordships have not seen it, the Amendment is as follows:
"Amendment No. 2, at end insert ("except in a one-way street").
LORD SOM̃ERS: I beg to move the Amendment to which the noble Lord the Lord Chairman has referred. I have tabled it after conversation with the noble Lord, Lord Lucas of Chilworth, because I feel that even though, as he points out, that proviso

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about the one-way street stands in another Bill, this, as your Lordships will see, is not an Amendment Bill, and therefore unless these words are inserted in the Bill it will be an offence under the Bill to park in a one-way street otherwise than with the left or nearside of the vehicle as close as possible to the edge of the carriageway. The street in which my club is is a one-way street and it is quite a wide one. Parking is allowed on both sides. I feel that in cases like that, where it is made clear that parking is allowed on both sides, cars should be allowed to face in their proper direction. Therefore, I am just adding these words "except in a one-way street".
May I say before I sit down that I am in wholehearted agreement with what the noble Lord, Lord Lucas of Chilworth, has said about clarification of the word "obstruction". I would tell your Lordships a little story about what happened to me at the beginning of last month. I had been leaving my car in a mews which is behind my club. I had been told by the club porter that it was all right to leave it there, and I had been leaving it there quite happily since January. Then, suddenly, at the beginning of June I came out and found a police notice tucked under my windscreen wiper, and among the other things that it accused me of was the offence of obstruction. The construction of that mews is rather peculiar. The entrance at each end is quite narrow but immediately you get in the left hand side goes back into a bay. It is quite possible to park your car facing sideways without obstructing the carriageway at all, so that actually the word "obstruction" was a purely theoretical one; it did not mean obstruction at all. That is why I feel that it is necessary for the motorist to know what the law is and what he may do and what he may not do. I know—or rather I highly suspect—that my noble friend, Lord Chesham, is going to say that that is all made perfectly clear; but I am afraid that, with the greatest possible respect, I cannot agree with him. There have been many times when I have wondered whether I might or might not do all sorts of things on the road, and I think that motorists would be found a great deal less guilty of breaking the law if they really knew what it was. I beg to move.
Amendment to Amendment moved—
At end insert "except in a one-way streert."—(Lord Somers.)
LORD SHEPHERD: May I briefly support the Amendment moved by my noble friend? I do not think anybody would dispute that the general public have a variety of definitions for obstruction, particularly when the police accuse them of obstructing. I believe that we must try, so far as possible, in this Bill—and so far as our command of language makes it possible—to define obstruction. We must do so for one very special reason. My noble friend mentioned the hard feelings that developed a year or two ago between the police and the motorists. It was a relationship which I believe we all resented. But this Bill is going to bring into being the traffic warden, who in any case, until he has established himself in the public eye, is going to have quite a difficult time. I think it is vitally important, therefore, that at this stage, when we are bringing in this new official to deal with the traffic problem, we should endeavour so far as possible to lay down what is an obstruction, so that there can be no dispute or ill-feeling between the new traffic warden and the general public. I do not know whether the noble Lord, Lord Chesham, feels that the expression used by my noble friend will define more closely what is an obstruction, but I believe the words which are written down in the Amendment are sufficiently clear for the general public to realise what is an obstruction, and will make it possible for them to avoid that type of offence.
EARL HOWE: I listened to the explanation by the noble Lord, Lord Somers, of his manuscript Amendment, but there seems to be another point that requires consideration—the position where cars are parked on one side on one day, and on the other side the next day. I do not know whether the existing regulations or the Bill provide for that; but if they do not I think they ought to do so.
VISCOUNT BRENTFORD: I should I like to associate myself with the principle contained in these Amendments as they have been expounded by noble Lords who have spoken, but I feel some apprehension about the actual wording

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of the Amendments. With regard to the first, particularly, it rather appears to me that it seeks to introduce another existing offence within the purview of the road traffic warden which was not previously contained within his purview in the Bill as drafted. I may not be correct about that, but I am sure that the Government draftsmen will have a much more definite view about it. On the main principle which has been laid before the House, however, I submit that this is quite the most important part of the first Part of the Bill, because the basis of it is that the offence of obstruction shall not be one of the offences for which tickets can be given. I believe that those of us who feel very strongly upon this point are already half-way towards winning the battle, and I very much hope that, as a result of this afternoon's debate, we may receive an assurance from my noble friend in charge of the Bill that we can have the whole battle won.
May I remind your Lordships of what was said in the Second Reading debate by the noble Lord, Lord Chesham [OFFICIAL REPORT, Vol. 224 (No. 91), col. 445]:
"I shall merely content myself with saying that so far as the duties of the wardens are concerned it is proposed that in the initial stages"—
and those are the first words of which I am rather frightened—"in the initial stages"—
"they should be in connection with static offences—to do with parking and with not leaving lights on when necessary, and where appropriate, where the local authority agree, with parking meter offences."
There was then an intervention by the noble Lord, Lord Lucas of Chilworth, subsequent to which the noble Lord, Lord Chesham continued the argument. He said:
"His"—
he was referring to the traffic warden—
"duties will not be broadened beyond what I have said… As I have already said, my right honourable friend will be very interested to hear what your Lordships say about the functions of traffic wardens, and he does not propose, to begin with, at any rate, to include among their duties the dealing with offences of obstruction."
I feel that that is exceedingly satisfactory; but it is relying, so far as statutory legislation is concerned,
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entirely upon the time when the Minister exercises the power which he has, or will have, to enable traffic wardens to deal with these particular offences. I should like to ensure that there is no statutory authority whatsoever given for that purpose, and that if, as time goes on, it is felt necessary, desirable and proper, that wardens should have such powers, the Minister should come to Parliament again to seek these additional powers.
I appreciate, as I believe your Lordships have appreciated, that there are many degrees of offence in obstruction; and the noble Lord, Lord Shepherd, speaking just now, expressed, as I understood it, the hope that this Bill would lay down what really is obstruction. I feel that if we were to do that it would involve us in many days' sittings and argument, because as the noble Lord, Lord Lucas of Chilworth, has emphasised, obstruction is something that the law finds is almost impossible to decide upon, in any event at the present time. In fact, I am myself now involved in considerable legal argument with some of my legal advisers to try to ascertain whether, if I were to leave my car in a street which is not subject to restriction but which may be an exceedingly busy street, as many of our streets in Central London are, and if I leave it not within 25 yards of a crossing and not parked opposite to a car parked on the opposite side of the road, and if I do not leave it there for a period in excess of five hours, I am guilty of obstruction. So far as I have been able to obtain an interpretation of the legal expressions of opinion from the highest of our legal authorities, that is about what one is allowed to do. But at the other end of the scale there are exceedingly minor things which one can do which definitely do create obstruction.
For these reasons I greatly support what the noble Lord, Lord Lucas of Chilworth, has said: that the offence of obstruction is just about as far away from any self-evident or self-proven offence as one can get in this country, and that it would therefore not be fair on the wardens, or on the police themselves, to give them the right and duty of deciding whether a person has or has not committed an obstruction. It is essentially a matter for the courts of

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this country, essentially a matter which is open to argument in every case. I am quite certain that it will only bring the whole system into disrepute, and bring the motoring world into antagonism with authority, if we seek to impose on police and wardens the duty of deciding (and obviously without hearing the arguments of the other party, because in the majority of these cases the other party, the motorist, will not be there) whether or not an offence has been committed. Therefore, I am quite sure that the intention which we seek is the intention which the Government have at the present time. I am therefore asking for only two things: first, that they shall confirm that that intention is to last until they seek other Parliamentary powers; and, secondly, that they shall put it in the Bill.
6.11 p.m.
LORD CHESHAM: In considering the two Amendments to which the noble Lord, Lord Lucas of Chilworth, has spoken, I am in a little of a quandary to know quite how to approach the matter. I may as well be quite open, to begin with, and say that I am unable to accept his Amendments, either severally or collectively. I want to avoid, if possible, wasting the Committee's time by speaking for a very long while, and I think it might be better if I were to attempt a short-circuiting move and discuss them together (if I might reserve a right, so to speak, if necessary, to discuss them separately after, because I have definite views about them on both counts), because we might be able to remain more clear and to get on faster if we do it that way.
The interpretation in the mind of any particular man is, as the noble Lords, Lord Lucas of Chilworth, Lord Shepherd, Lord Brentford and Lord Somers, said, a pretty loose one. In fact, I think that what has been said in the last few minutes make this pretty clear. Even my noble friend Lord Somers wrung our hearts with his interpretation of what had happened in his case, an interpretation which might obviously not be shared by the residents of the mews who have been complaining to the police—though I do not know about that. It is sufficient to say that the interpretation in the public mind (if one can use such a term) is loose.
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Perhaps we may look again at what the law says about it—I make no apology for saying this. Section 121 of the Highways Act, 1959, says:
"… a person, without lawful authority or excuse, in any way wilfully obstructs the free passage along a highway …"
And it is an offence under Regulation 89 of the Construction and Use Regulations to cause or permit
"a vehicle to stand on a road so as to cause any unnecessary obstruction thereof."
There is the definition and, of course, there is no question of seeking to change that definition in this Clause 1 (1). It is true, and obvious, that whether an obstruction is or is not being caused is a matter of opinion. It seemed to me from the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Lucas of Chilworth—and it was confirmed by what was said by my noble friend Lord Brentford—that what the combining of these two Amendments seeks to do, quite frankly, is to move "obstruction" out of the Bill.
LORD LUCAS OF CHILWORTH: No, my Lords. It does not. The noble Lord is completely and utterly wrong—I repeat, completely and utterly wrong. What I seek to do is to define "obstruction" which will apply to the ticket system, not any other obstruction. That is not moving "obstruction" out of the Bill; it is saying what "obstruction" is for the purpose of getting a ticket—selfevident obstruction, when a man is doing something when there is a notice in front of his very eyes saying that he must not do it.
LORD CHESHAM: I am amazed. But that point can wait for the moment. In fact, whether he seeks to do it or not, the effect of the Amendment proposed by the noble Lord means that the application of the ticket system to the offence of obstruction as laid down by the existing law is moved out of the Bill. That is what in fact it means; and the fact that it is desired to do that has been amply confirmed by my noble friend Lord Brentford. Whatever the noble Lord sought to do, I can concern myself only with what he is, in effect, doing. Therefore I think I am completely right to address myself to the problem in that way.
Obstruction, for better or for worse, is a prevalent offence, and I do not see how the law against it can be effectively

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enforced by ordinary means. If we are to clear the streets in favour of traffic flow, and clear them of unnecessary obstructions, we may have to use, we feel, more effective means of enforcement than we at present have, including, in due course, the ticket system. I do not pretend that the ticket system is anything other than an innovation, and I am not surprised that some of your Lordships have doubts—anticipatory doubts, perhaps I might call them—as to how it would work at the present time in relation to obstruction. I think that the point for which my noble friend Lord Brentford asks—that "obstruction" should be, as the Amendments of the noble Lord, Lord Lucas of Chilworth, would do, taken out of the Bill at the present stage—is a reasonable request. I believe that in the future, when the ticket system is established and proven, and we know a good deal more about it, it will be perfectly reasonable to utilise it for tackling the problem of obstruction.
It is not, I repeat, the function of this Bill to define "obstruction". It is already defined as are the other offences mentioned in Clause 1, by the relevant Statute elsewhere. I should like in this connection to say this. I know what I said on Second Reading and what I would do—and this is my "short-circuit" procedure, which I hope will perhaps save some time—is this. If the noble Lord sees fit to withdraw his Amendments, at any rate as collective ones taken together, I am quite prepared to give him an undertaking that my right honourable friend the Home Secretary, when he makes the first Order applying the ticket system to London, will exclude from it, under the powers he has in the proviso to Clause 1 (1), the offence of obstruction.
LORD LUCAS OF CHILWORTH: The noble Lord offers me a tempting bait. I do not know whether I am going to nibble at it, because I am not particularly interested in what the Home Secretary says he will do at some future date—he might not be the Home Secretary then, if there is any truth in what I read in the Press. I am interested in what is in the Bill. I should like the noble Lord to give me this explanation. First of all, I do not want to take obstruction out of this Bill. I do not want to interfere with the powers that the ordinary constable has to-day.
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What I want the noble Lord to do is this: will he please define what he meant when he said [OFFICIAL REPORT, Vol. 224 (No. 91), col. 408]:
"Under Clause 1 it is proposed to introduce a standard penalty for certain minor offences in which there is no doubt of guilt …"
Will the noble Lord tell me that? I can only assume that they are the offences set out in this Bill: by the vehicle
"obstructing a road, or waiting, or being left or parked, or being loaded or unloaded, in a road …"
I can only conclude that those are what he calls the minor offences for which the standard penalty will obtain.
It has been said—I think the noble Lord himself said it—that his right honourable friend the Home Secretary does not intend that the ticket penalty shall go as far as this. By moving my Amendment, all I want him to do is to define such a minor offence which will attract a ticket, and to say whether it includes obstruction as laid down here in this Bill or whether it is that obstruction, which, as he said in another place, is self-evident and without any doubt of guilt—when there is a traffic sign which says "No waiting", or when the kerb or gutter is marked by yellow lines that clearly define that you cannot leave a vehicle there or wait there, and that if you do then you have a ticket. That is all I am trying to do—to see that if a motorist stays at a place in a designated street in which he cannot park, or at any place that is clearly marked so that the motorist knows it, he is subject to a ticket. Will the noble Lord define that for me? I want to see it in this Bill.
I might be tempted to accept the noble Lord's offer if I could get two Amendments accepted that I propose to move later on, but I cannot job backwards. I should like to hear other opinions on this point, because this, as the noble Viscount, Lord Brentford, said, is the nub of Clause 1, which brings about this innovation of punishment without trial. That is what it is—punishment without trial. Whether or not the man accepts the punishment without trial does not alter the fact that it is punishment without trial, because he can accept the £2 punishment without going to court.
Now I know what the noble Lord is going to say, because he said it further on in his previous speech, and I cannot

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quite understand it. It is not, as he quite rightly says, an on-the-spot fine, because the motorist has to walk as far as the nearest clerk of the peace to pay it, but that is the only difference. The noble Lord said [col. 409]:
"His right to go to court is not taken away in any shape or form".
I find that rather an ambiguous statement—"His right to go to court". The only time he can exercise a peculiar right to go to court is if he does not pay the line, in which case he gets prosecuted.
LORD CHESHAM: I hope the noble Lord will forgive my interrupting him, but we seem to have rather strayed off the substance of this Amendment.
LORD LUCAS OF CHILWORTH: No, we do not. I am trying to define for what offence you are going to give this man this ticket, which he can refuse to pay, can then be prosecuted and have to go to court, or can pay in twenty-one days and then not be prosecuted. This sets out the offence, and it says here:
"… by its obstructing a road, or waiting …"
That covers all the roads and streets of a town where there is no sign. He can get a ticket if he leaves his car in any street in any town. That is what this says—if he loads or unloads anywhere. I want to say, "No, he cannot get a ticket for that; he can get a ticket only if he leaves his vehicle where there is a clear indication that he cannot". Now am being reasonable?
EARL BATHURST: No.
LORD LUCAS OF CHILWORTH: That, of course, is the Government spokesman's point of view. Perhaps if he were sitting on the Back-Bench, he would not say it. If the noble Lord will tell me that, I shall be grateful. I will ask him another question: why is his noble friend willing by regulation to take obstruction out but is not prepared to do it in the Bill? That seems a peculiar thing to me. I am not moving to take obstruction out of the Bill. The police can always bring a charge for obstruction inside those areas that are designated as "No parking" areas either by traffic signs or by yellow lines. There the warden or the police constable can give a ticket; but in regard to any obstruction outside that clearly-defined area the police should go through the ordi-
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nary processes of the law and state their case as to why the vehicle was obstructing that road or street.
6.28 p.m.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: It seems to me that we are getting into a certain difficulty in this House. The noble Lord, Lord Lucas of Chilworth, has moved a series of Amendments, or proposes a series of Amendments, to two at least of which he has spoken. They both refer to Clause 1 (1) (b). But Clause 1 (1) (b), deals with two completely separate forms of offence. The first is obstruction, and the other is
"… waiting, or being left or parked, or being loaded or unloaded, in a road …"
That, I understand, is an offence, created by a certain number of Regulations which have been passed and approved by Parliament during the last few years. I quite appreciate that this Bill creates no new offence: it creates only a new way of dealing with an existing offence. But the fact remains that there are two sets of offences mentioned in this paragraph. The noble Lord, Lord Lucas of Chilworth, spoke to them together, and, to some extent, I thought, linked them together. The noble Lord, Lord Chesham, said that if he could get his Minister to make a concession with regard to one of these offences, he hoped that the noble Lord, Lord Lucas of Chilworth, would withdraw the whole series of Amendments which he has put down, some of which deal with completely different offences. I feel the House ought to deal first with this question of obstruction. Let us have that out, and get it clear. Then we can come on to these other offences, about leaving, parking, loading or unloading a car in a road, which is a different matter altogether.
At the moment I should like to say a word about obstruction, which I think is the main subject with which the Committee are concerned. I understand that the proper definition of obstructing is "to obstruct the free passage of a road". Undoubtedly that is a matter of opinion. It is different from these other offences, which are technical offences, like not putting a car in the right bay of the parking place or leaving it there too long, which are not allowed by the regulations under the existing law. But obstruction is a matter of opinion. I would urge the

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noble Lord, Lord Chesham, not to dismiss this point by saying that he cannot accept these Amendments. No doubt that is the view of the Ministry of Transport, but it is not necessarily the right view.
If the wardens are given these powers, the motorist will find a ticket on his car asking him either to pay up £2 or go to court. Probably he will go to court, but there may be a strong feeling in his mind that it is better to pay £2 and be shot of the whole thing. I think that it would be a very unfortunate thing if the motorist should pay for an offence that he does not think he has committed, to save the bother of going to court. The noble Lord indicated that the Minister did not propose at present to give the wardens these powers of dealing with obstruction; but, if that is the case, why put it in the Bill? Would it not be better to leave obstruction to be dealt with as at present by the police and the courts, which is the normal procedure?
I cannot quite see why this offence, which is not in the same category as the other offences mentioned in paragraph (b) should not be treated entirely differently. I cannot feel that there would be great loss to the public or to the authorities if that were done. It has been the practice for a great many years and seems to have worked perfectly well. I would also say to the noble Lord that it would give great comfort to many of us if the Minister would take this clause back and look at it further before coming to a final decision, and let us hear more about it on the next stage.
LORD CHESHAM: I am grateful to my noble friend Lord Salisbury for drawing attention to the fact that more than one class of offence is referred to in this subsection. I thought that I had gone some way to indicate that I was talking about obstruction only and that there were other aspects to which I would have to return later. The noble Lord, Lord Lucas of Chilworth, challenges me in ringing terms to define various offences, but I do not think that it is my function to define what is already defined by Statute.
Noble Lords have set the fashion of going back to what they said on Second Reading, and I would remind your Lordships that on Second Reading I said that in the case of minor offences, where there
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was no doubt of guilt, this system would be used. I went on to say that it was because obstruction was open to fairly wide interpretation and was a matter of opinion, and not a self-evident offence, that it was proposed not to include it in the ticket system in the initial stages. I had thought that it was clear that it would not be included among the offences for which tickets could be given until we had sufficient experience of the ticket system on the other self-evident (if that is the word we are going to use) offences, and until the whole thing was working and had the confidence of the public. That would be the time for it to be extended to cover the offence of obstruction.
LORD DERWENT: I do not quite follow the argument. If under regulations the Minister empowers wardens to give tickets where an offence is self-evident, how can that be any guide to what should happen where an offence is not self-evident? There would be no experience of obstruction. I cannot see how one is any guide to the other, however long the scheme has been in force.
LORD CHESHAM: In the earlier stages the scheme will cover only self-evident offences. Not-very-experienced traffic wardens could not be expected to deal with obstruction. In any case, the existing method by which a policeman brings a prosecution for obstruction will still continue. I should say that, in London at any rate, the experience is that 90 per cent. of those charged with obstruction plead guilty by post. I think it is perfectly right and proper for the Government to ask for this power to be retained in the Bill for the time when the traffic warden system is experienced and proved. I do not think that any Home Secretary is going to include obstruction among the offences to be dealt with by traffic wardens if he does not think it is going to work. I should like to repeat the undertaking I gave, but I think that it is perfectly reasonable that this should remain in the Bill. I do not think that there is any more clarification that I can reasonably be expected to provide.
6.38 p.m.
LORD SILKIN: The difference between us has been somewhat narrowed but it has not been explained away. Some of us take the view that in no circumstances

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should traffic wardens be entrusted with powers over matters which are disputable. These are the function of a police constable, and of nobody else; and they should remain so. On the other hand, if the view of the Government is that traffic wardens, when their position, capabilities and value have been established, should be empowered to deal with disputable matters, such as obstruction, then that should be stated in the Bill. As it stands, whatever the noble Lord says, the day after the Bill has been passed it will be open to a Home Secretary to confer on traffic wardens these powers of dealing with obstruction. I should have thought that, on the noble Lord's own view, the right thing would be to take this matter out of the Bill, or at any rate out of this particular clause; and if it should be decided later to entrust these powers to traffic wardens, the Government should do so subject to an Affirmative Resolution of both Houses of Parliament. That would be the way that I would respectfully suggest to the Government of carrying out what the noble Lord has told us is their intention.
Here, however, we are asked to give the Government carte blanche to introduce this thing at any time they choose, without the House expressing its views on the matter. As I say, they can think the experiment of introducing traffic wardens justifies its extension to disputable matters but the public may think otherwise. We surely have the right to express a view as to whether these powers should be extended at some future time. Some noble Lords will take the view that in no circumstances should traffic wardens be entrusted with these powers, but I say that, if the Government take a different view, then it should be done in the form of an Affirmative Resolution in both Houses.
LORD WALERAN: I should like to associate myself with everything that the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, has just said. What I think we want to make certain is that traffic wardens, until they have proved their worth, do not become involved in, as the noble Lord said, any debatable point or matter of opinion as to whether or not an offence has been committed. That surely should be clear in the Bill, and should not be left to a vague whim as to when the Minister may suddenly change his mind and perhaps try another experiment. He may
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say that he would like to experiment with them—and the Minister is very keen on experiments. I think this should be made quite clear, and if it is not made clear and a proper assurance given by the noble Lord, I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Lucas of Chilworth, will press the Amendment to a Division.
LORD HAWKE: I think my noble friend has made a very good offer, but quite clearly there are many who view with disquiet the possible functions of these traffic wardens. Personally, I believe that unless the traffic wardens eventually have full powers this Bill cannot possibly work. Our object, of course, is to clear the roads and free the traffic lanes. But in view of the various fears that have been expressed, I would suggest to my noble friend that it might be a good idea to take the halfway stage suggested by the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, and that, in the first instance, matters of opinion should not be dealt with by these wardens until Parliament has approved. Personally, however, I cannot see why one should regard with suspicion the acts of a man of mature age, possibly a retired policeman, yet be perfectly prepared to accept the judgment of a young police officer on his first patrol.
LORD SILKIN: May I interrupt the noble Lord? We do not know what kind of persons we are going to get. It is all very well to say "a retired policeman", but most retired policemen are offered very good jobs once they retire, and I doubt very much whether you will get many retired policemen. Whom will you get? Until we know the calibre of these people, surely it is wise not to put into the Bill that they should be given these powers.
LORD HAWKE: I was expressing only a personal view that I was satisfied, and the noble Lord will have noted that I suggested that a solution might be for my noble friend to consider the useful halfway stage mentioned by the noble Lord.
VISCOUNT BRENTFORD: I should like to ask my noble friend one question for the purpose of clarification, in order that we may evaluate his offer. He did not, as I understand it, give us an assurance that the Home Secretary would not include in the first order he made any power for giving tickets for the offence

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of obstruction. Could I ask my noble friend if that order would be made under Clause 1 (11)? Because in that case the order would be subject to annulment in pursuance of a Resolution by the House—in other words, subject to the Negative Resolution procedure. My noble friend Lord Chesham did say on Second Reading [OFFICIAL REPORT, Vol. 224, (No. 91) col. 446]:
"The noble Lord, Lord Lucas of Chilworth, was a little critical of my right honourable friend's power to vary the duties of traffic wardens by order, which of course he can do. But the noble Lord must remember that that order has to be laid and is subject to Affirmative Resolution."
The order to which the noble Lord was referring would, I think, be the order under Clause 1 (12) which says:
"An order of the Secretary of State under this section may be varied or revoked by a subsequent order of the Secretary of State."
That subsection does not make it quite clear whether it is subject to Affirmative or Negative Resolution. I wonder if, when he replies, by noble friend could clarify that.
LORD LUCAS OF CHILWORTH: Might I suggest this course? One of the difficulties in which the Opposition find themselves—and when I talk about "the Opposition" I am not referring only to this side of the House, but to the opposition on both sides—is that we get so many conflicting statements by the Government spokesmen. I will quote one by the Under-Secretary at the Home Office on the Second Reading debate in another place. He said:
"The limited range of offences in Clause 1 subsection (1) could, I agree, be extended by order, but my right honourable friend has no intention of doing so."
Has he? I do not know. He has all the powers in the Bill to do it. In this Bill the Home Secretary has the power by order to turn a traffic warden into a fully-fledged police constable.
EARL BATHURST: No.
LORD LUCAS OF CHILWORTH: I will come to that in another place in this Bill. It is in there. "For 'traffic warden' read 'constable'; for 'constable' read 'traffic warden'". That is what it says. But the noble Earl challenges me.
EARL BATHURST: Perhaps I may say that it comes under another clause, and is not really relevant to this particular Amendment. We shall be discussing that fully.
LORD LUCAS OF CHILWORTH: I am not talking about whether it is relevant to this Amendment. I said, "in another place in this Bill" and the noble Earl said, "No". It is in the Bill. By order the Home Secretary can give to the traffic wardens all the powers of constables.
EARL BATHURST: By Affirmative Resolution.
LORD LUCAS OF CHILWORTH: I do not mind by what Resolution. It has got it in the Bill. Do not plead in aid the fact that 90 per cent. of those motorists who are summoned to-day for obstruction write to plead guilty. So would I. So would you. My time is worth more than hanging about a police court. So please do not infer that because 90 per cent. of the motorists summoned under the Road Traffic Act take advantage of the procedure under the Magistrates' Courts Act and say: "I am guilty; tell me what I owe", that they are ipso facto confessing guilt of the offence with which they have been charged. It is a cheap way out.
I will follow the noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury. I do not want to divide the House, but I shall have no compunction whatever in doing so. This is vital in the interests of those potential victims of this new system. I am going to have this, if I possibly can, as clear as crystal in this Bill. I was brought up in this House in a tough school. When I was in the noble Lord's place I had on the Front Opposition Bench not only the noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury, but the noble Earl, Lord Swinton, and the late Lord Simon, who were merciless on this one point: "Put it in the Bill. We are not interested in what your opinion is, or what you say the Minister is going to do. We are interested only in what is in the Bill." I have stood on that precept ever since. So if the noble Lord thinks he is having a rough time now, it is nothing to the time that I had when I was in his position.
I am going to suggest to the noble Lord that I should withdraw both these

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Amendments. The first one, if I may use the vernacular, is just "chicken feed". It is the second one that is important. The first one I put in because that was the ground upon which his right honourable friend the Under-Secretary at the Home Office turned the second one down, not because of the arguments the noble Lord has brought up. So I am willing to withdraw this Amendment. The noble Lord has heard the views of the Committee. I always think it is far better in this House to pay attention to voices first, before going into the Division Lobby. In point of fact, the noble Lord has not had one supporter. I hesitate to say that, but it is the fact. Every speaker has been against him, and they represent the feeling outside this House. If the noble Lord will agree to consider, between now and the next stage of the Bill, all the arguments he has heard and al the suggestions that have been made, and if he likes to consult with me—if it would not be too undignified, of course—shall be willing to withdraw this Amendment, while reserving the right to put it down again at the next stage of the Bill. If the noble Lord will give me that undertaking, I will follow that course.
LORD TEVIOT: I have sat here and listened with great interest to what has been said. There is just one thing that has not been said. I hope the noble Lord the Minister will listen to this, as it is a new idea. You might get a car in one place where it would be obstructing at one time of the day, whereas at another time of the day, or on a different day, it might not be obstructing at all. I should like the noble Lord to consider the possibility that it is not obstructing all the time, and that there might be a moment when you could say there is no obstruction, although there was at another time. You could give the wardens power to determine, under instruction, whether or not a car which is now obstructing is not obstructing at a different time of the day. I should like that matter considered.
LORD CHESHAM: I will say to Lord Lucas of Chilworth that, like obstruction, whether or not one is having a "rough time" is a matter of opinion. Before I come on to the substance of what the noble Lord said, I should like to make this quite clear in simple words. My right honourable friend the Home Secretary does not intend at the outset to
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empower wardens to serve tickets for obstruction. I should like to make that perfectly clear. Constables will be able to do so, but even in that case the Commissioner, I understand, does not intend to instruct them to do so in the early stages until we see how the ticket system works. I see the noble Lord does not like that. Surely on these matters of innovation it is sense to make haste a little slowly, and get the thing working better and better. But that will be perhaps for another time.
I should like to draw your Lordships' attention to the fact that my right honourable friend, or anyone else who should succeed him perhaps in due course, has not a carte blanche to do peculiar things with traffic wardens and police constables and so on—but we shall come to that point later. Neither can he make variations in the duties—as we shall find when we come to Clause 2—in the functions of traffic wardens, except by the Affirmative Resolution procedure. Having made that perfectly clear, I think the words of the noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury, are to be heeded in this matter, and for my part I should like to have the opportunity of meeting the offer of the noble Lord, Lord Lucas of Chilworth, to look at this matter again before we come to the next stage. In saying that, I am b mind to say that at this moment I do not stand here convinced by any means.
I must also say this. Out of the issue about which we have been talking—that of obstruction—will come an answer of one sort or another. But I feel that in my own interests I should say that if we resolve that one, and if the noble Lord keeps those two Amendments down, there could be other grounds upon which I should have to speak to those Amendments separately. But I think perhaps it would be better to take that at the time.
LORD LUCAS OF CHILWORTH: I accept that from the noble Lord. It has been an interesting debate, and I hope it has been instructive to the Government. With your Lordships' permission I beg leave to withdraw Amendments No. 2 and 3.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: Before your Lordships decide, I should say that Amendment No. 3 deals with a

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completely different point. That deals with the other section of offences which I mentioned in the few remarks I addressed to your Lordships just now. So far as I can see, it has nothing to do with obstruction. A car owner can commit an offence by leaving or parking his car, or by loading it and unloading it in a road, whether it is obstructing the road or not. There are quite different regulations. I was rather attracted by the Amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Lucas of Chilworth, that there should not be an offence unless the motorist did it contrary to a parking sign or carriageway markings. That is a completely different point from the one we have been discussing. The noble Lord may wish to withdraw them both. He may be satisfied about the carriageway markings and the traffic signs, but it is a different point.
LORD LUCAS OF CHILWORTH: With that I agree. I was rather linking the two together for further consideration. I suggested to the noble Lord that I would withdraw both these Amendments if the principle in both of them was reconsidered. That I think meets the point of the noble Marquess. I have not by any manner of means given up Amendment No. 3.
LORD CHESHAM: That is rather what I understood. I understood that we had reached the stage when the noble Lord was going to withdraw both Amendments, but owing to our procedure he can withdraw them only one at a time.
LORD LUCAS OF CHILWORTH: That is acceptable to me, because I am with the noble Marquess. I want to argue the other Amendments, too, but I thought it would be better to get the obstruction one out of the way. I hold myself free to put down Amendment No. 3 again at the Report stage.
LORD SOMERS: In that case, may I beg leave to withdraw my Amendment to the Amendment.
Amendment to Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
LORD LUCAS OF CHILWORTH: I will not move Amendment No. 3 in consequence of the undertaking.
7.0 p.m.
LORD LUCAS OF CHILWORTH LORD LUCAS OF CHILWORTH moved, in subsection (2), after "offence", where that word occurs a second time, to insert:
"or having the alleged offence reported to the chief officer of police."
The noble Lord said: This Amendment is very important. Subsection (2) of Clause 1 says:
"Where a constable finds a person on any occasion and has reason to believe that on that occasion he is committing or has committed an offence to which this section applies, he may give him the prescribed notice in writing offering the option of payment of a fixed penalty under this section without prosecution for that offence; and no person shall then be liable to be convicted of that offence if the fixed penalty is paid in accordance with this section before the date on which proceedings are begun."
That subsection could be read to mean that the alleged offender has an option. The Oxford Dictionary definition of an option is that it is freedom of choice. A man can choose, unless the option is taken away—"seven days without the option of a fine". But it is not stated in this subsection what the option is. It goes on rather to imply that the option is either acceptance within 21 days of a ticket fine of £2 or prosecution. If that is the right inference, then prosecution is automatic on not paying the fine within 21 days. That interpretation is strengthened by the words,
"and no person shall then be liable to be convicted of that offence if the fixed penalty is paid in accordance with this section before the date on which proceedings are begun."
It implies that if he does not pay that fine within 21 days the commencement of proceedings are automatic. Is that correct?
Various statements were made in another place by the Minister and the Under-Secretary—I think the noble Lord made a somewhat similiar statement, but I believe his words were slightly more guarded—that if the person does not pay the fine within 21 days the matter will be handed over to the police, because they have to start verifying, if necessary, who the owner of the car is and going through all the normal procedure. But the point I wish to make is that proceedings cannot be automatic unless it is the Government's intention to take away the powers of discretion of the chief officer of police. I do not believe that that is the intention

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of the Government for one moment. But if laymen, the ordinary motorists, read that subsection it will convey to 99 out of 100 of them that they have the option of going to the clerk and paying the £2, or being prosecuted. As the Bill stands it is automatic, because you have not stated what the option is.
Suppose the chief constable, in spite of the fact that the man has not paid the £2, decides not to prosecute, is there anything in this Bill to say he must? You cannot have it both ways. Either it is automatic and you have taken away the discretion of the chief officer of police to start proceedings, or, if you have not taken away the right of the chief officer of police to institute proceedings or not, the wording of this subsection is faulty, because it does not definitely state what the option is. The option is, as I interpret what the Government really intend, that he can pay that £2 within 21 days or have the matter reported to the chief officer of police. It is the same procedure as when you are stopped by a constable on any other motoring offence—exceeding the limit or doing any of those other silly things you should not do. What does the constable say to you? He says, "Sir, you will be reported". He cannot say that here, because he may not see the man to say it to. The ticket may just be put on the windscreen. Do you not think it is fair, if the second interpretation is the right one—that is, that the penalty is not automatic—that in this clause you should say so? You should say that the option you are offering is the payment within 21 days or having the matter reported to the chief officer of police. That is why I have put down this Amendment, to test out what the Government's intention is; because as it reads today the proceedings of prosecution are automatic unless the fine is paid within 21 days of the date of the notice. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 2, line 11, after ("offence") insert ("or having the alleged offence reported to the chief officer of police").—(Lord Lucas of Chilworth.)
EARL BATHURST: The noble Lord opposite made a great deal in the Second Reading about the "or" part of the option which a policeman was going to offer. I think that if the noble Lord would be agreeable to read a little further clown, in the next subsection, sub-
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section (3), he will find that the "or" part of the option is made clear, and it is, of course, that the person who has committed the alleged offence will have to make his own option, and that is that either he thinks he is guilty, in which case he pays within 21 days the fixed penalty, the sum. of £2 or one half of the maximum fine, whatever may be the lesser, or if he so wishes he will be prosecuted in exactly the same way as to-day if a policeman prosecutes.
LORD LUCAS OF CHILWORTH: The noble Earl says "if he so wishes". Can he state "I am not going to pay the fine and I do not wish to be prosecuted"? The noble Earl said he will be prosecuted "if he so wishes". Does he mean that he writes to the court and says, "I do not intend to pay this fine and I do not wish to be prosecuted"? What does the noble Earl mean?
EARL BATHURST: If he wishes to pay the fine, or, in other words, admits his guilt, he will not be prosecuted.
LORD LUCAS OF CHILWORTH: But if he does not?
EARL BATHURST: If he does not, he may or may not be prosecuted—in exactly the same way as at present. At present the policeman sends in the report of an alleged offence to his chief of police and the chief of police will no doubt look into the matter.
LORD LUCAS OF CHILWORTH: I agree with the noble Earl, but the Bill does not say that. Why not put it into the Bill?
EARL BATHURST: I am assured that the present circumstances are in no way altered by the Bill. I would go so far as to say to the noble Lord that if what I have said proves not to be true, perhaps the noble Lord will refer to it again. But I assure him that it is the intention that the chief of police, if he sees fit, will prosecute. This applies when an alleged offender has decided not to take the offer to pay the fixed penalty.
EARL HOWE: May I ask the noble Lord, Lord Lucas of Chilworth, whether he has noticed subsection (6)?
EARL BATHURST: I assure the noble Lord that it is not the intention that there shall be any new penalty involved under this particular subsection. At present if

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the noble Lord, Lord Lucas of Chilworth, was dealt with by a police officer for some obstruction or infringement the chances are that he would be prosecuted.
LORD LUCAS OF CHILWORTH: I am certain I should be.
EARL BATHURST: It is almost a certainty. On the other hand, if there were some extraordinary circumstances the chief of police might not prosecute. He might send a note to the noble Lord, or drop the case altogether. I want to make it quite clear that in no way is it intended to infringe the discretion of a chief of police to prosecute. Equally, I should not like to say that if an alleged offender decides not to pay the fixed penalty he has a better sporting chance of getting off, of the chief of police deciding not to prosecute. It would be very wrong to give that impression. If the noble Lord should find that what I have said is not true, possibly he would return to the point at a later stage, but to the best of my knowledge what I have said is the position. I am assured that the noble and learned Viscount who sits on the Woolsack would give this most urgent consideration should it be found that my words are not true.
LORD SILKIN: The noble Earl is once more doing what the noble Lord did on an earlier Amendment; he is telling us what are the intentions of the Government. He is telling us that it is not the intention of the Government that prosecution shall be automatic in the event of a person exercising his option of going to the court. No one reading this clause would gather that, and all my noble friend desires in his Amendment is that the meaning of the clause should be made quite clear. It should be made clear that a prosecution does not automatically follow where a person does not wish to comply with a ticket, and that the matter will be considered before any such prosecution takes place. It may be that the person does not stand one chance in a hundred of getting off, but that is not the point. The point is that his case is considered and prosecution is not automatic. If the noble Earl will ensure that that is made quite clear in the Bill, then we on our side shall be quite satisfied.
EARL BATHURST: I believe the noble Lord would be satisfied with the situation as it is at present and that neither of the noble Lords has any objection to that. As I am advised and assured, this subsection in no way changes the position as it is at present, except that the alleged offender can take the choice of paying this fixed penalty if he so wishes.
LORD LUCAS OF CHILWORTH: As I have always thought, there is nothing between us on this point. But I discussed the provision with a number of lawyers, and all have taken the same view as my noble friend took: that prosecution is automatic. It has always been almost a guiding rule of the House to try to make legislation in a form which the ordinary man can understand. This business of tickets is an innovation. Surely nobody will lose face by the sense of what I have said in my Amendment, and the sense of what the noble Lord has said, being put into that clause; but that would save a lot of time. Perhaps it was a little unfortunate that the noble Earl should have spoken about an "option", for with an option there has to be a choice. The Oxford Dictionary definition of "option" is "freedom of choice". But freedom of choice to do what: to accept a ticket and pay £2 or be prosecuted? But the option is not that. It is to stand the risk of being prosecuted, to have the matter referred to the chief of police who can initiate a prosecution—and in this context he is about the only one who can do so.
If the noble Earl will give me an undertaking that if I withdraw this Amendment now he will see that there are put into this clause words to give the sense of what he and I agree it means, I shall be prefectly happy to withdraw the Amendment, and he and I can discuss what that wording should be. Whether it is this wording or his does not matter, so long as it is made clear. As we go through the Bill, clouded as it is, I will point out to your Lordships many things which are about as ambiguous as they could possibly be. Let us see if we cannot clear up those points, so that we can present to the public a Bill which they can have some reasonable chance of understanding. If the noble Lord will give me that undertaking I will withdraw my Amendment.
VISCOUNT BRENTFORD: May I, in this connection, make a suggestion intended to be helpful to the Government? I have considerable sympathy for the arguments advanced by the noble Lord, Lord Lucas of Chilworth. I believe the matter is purely one of drafting and that this is a frightfully badly drafted Clause. If my noble friend will have a look at it, with his advisers, I feel sure that some far simpler and more accurate words can be obtained. Because in subsection (2) there is really no option at all—in fact, there is no option anywhere in connection with this matter, certainly no option which an alleged offender has the right to exercise. What happens in that the constable serves upon the alleged offender a prescribed notice which calls attention to his right to contribute the £2. But his attention is not called to his rights for any other purpose. All the prescribed notice can do is to confirm what the constable will have told him—that he will be reported for a summons. I believe that the prescribed notice should do that, and that in the subsection which subsequently deals with the prescribed notice that should be provided. But I submit that the word "option" should be deleted all the way through, including in subsection (6), where it appears to be totally irrelevant.
EARL BATHURST: I cannot quite agree with my noble friend Lord Brent-ford that there is no option on the ticket which will be issued to the alleged offender. It will be made quite clear by some means or another that the alleged offender can take no notice of this ticket at all, and in that case the proceedings may, or will (this is where the difference occurs which the noble Lord, Lord Lucas of Chilworth, is worried about), take place. I have assured the noble Lord that, so far as I understand this Bill, if the alleged offender takes no notice the position is exactly the same as exists to-day.
I am impressed with what the noble Lord opposite has said, and I know that all your Lordships appreciate the great work which the noble Lord has done with regard to traffic and all these complicated regulations. The noble Lord, I know, is out to help and to get the traffic moving. I am quite certain that
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all your Lordships will agree there. I have asked my noble and learned friend whether I could rely upon his judgment and advice, should such complicated legal problems and drafting problems come up, as indeed we envisage in the course of this Bill. If the noble Lord, as he has so kindly offered, will withdraw his Amendment, I assure him that everything he has said, and everything that my noble friend Lord Brentford has said, will be before my noble and learned friend. If, in some way, he feels that better drafting, or different drafting, could be used to make the point, which I myself made, quite clear, I am sure that my noble and learned friend will put something forward or will show good reasons why it is impossible to do so. The noble Lord will realise that I can in no way commit my noble and learned friend, but on that understanding I will certainly ask his advice and help at a later stage.
LORD LUCAS OF CHILWORTH: I am grateful to the noble Earl and I take him literally when he says that he will consult with his noble and learned friend, because there is no one in whom and in whose judgment this House has more faith and trust than his noble and learned friend who sits on the Woolsack. But may I put this point to the noble Earl on the matter which the noble Viscount, Lord Brentford, raised concerning the rights of the public? Making Bills is not a hobby or a cross-game of draftsmanship with the Parliamentary draftsmen's department and a game for us. A Bill and an Act of Parliament should state what the public's rights are as clearly as they state what their obligations are and what the penalties may be. We fail to recognise that in this subsection. I want the public to know clearly what is the option they must accept, and then they may like to take a sporting chance. Because do not forget there are two chances. First, the chief of police might not prosecute; and, secondly, if there were a prosecution the alleged offender might put up such a "hard luck" story—we know what magistrates are—that he might get off with a fine of less than £2.
EARL BATHURST: I do not want this idea of the noble Lord to be put abroad

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—I expect he concocted that suggestion—that this will be any game of chance or of taking a gamble without being prosecuted by the chief of police. I want to make it quite clear that if the alleged offender does not pay the fixed penalty he stands just the same chance—I think that is the wrong word—but his position is in no way different from what it would be to-day if he were run in and reported. It would be most awkward if the noble Lord should let it be thought that it would pay someone not to pay the fixed penalty. I do not think it will.
LORD LUCAS OF CHILWORTH: With that undertaking, may I have your Lordships' permission to withdraw this Amendment?
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
EARL ST. ALDWYN: I think this might be a convenient time to adjourn the discussion on the Committee stage.
House resumed.