THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION

HL Deb 13 April 1960 vol 222 cc1061-78

3.3 p.m.

LORD HENDERSON rose to call attention to the international situation; and to move for Papers. The noble Lord said: My Lords, in rising to move the Motion to call attention to the international situation, I am sure that the House will realise that this is likely to be the only opportunity we shall have of considering matters which will come before the Summit Conference early in May. Although there is to be no formal agenda, we all know the main subjects that will be discussed: disarmament, Germany and Berlin, nuclear tests, China and no doubt the Middle East. This is a formidable list. All these are problems which have contributed to international tensions and anxieties or crises in recent years. There can be no doubt about the wisdom of making another effort—perhaps the first of a series—to break the deadlock which has for so long prevented agreements from being reached between East and West and has frustrated the hopes of the peoples for the attainment of peaceful co-existence. We on these Benches wish the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary success in their coming task at the Summit Conference. We hope that some worthwhile result will be recorded and that there will be no going back to the era of the cold war and crisis.

We shall be dealing mainly with the differences that divide the Western world from the Soviet Union, but it would be a mistake to ignore the fact that there are differences within the Western Alliance which, if we are not careful, may endanger Western unity and co-operation. I will mention two of them. The main danger is that a real rift may develop between Britain, on the one hand, and France and Germany, on the other; and I believe that we must take every possible step to avoid it. This danger may demonstrate itself soon in terms of a trade war with the Europe of the Six. I hope that the noble Earl or the noble Marquess may have something to say about this, because there is real ground for anxiety. I am not going into the matter in detail, though no doubt other speakers may do so.

I think the Prime Minister was quite right to say after his return from Washington—I notice that he repeated it again yesterday in another place—that he welcomed the closer links which have been developed among the Six countries of the Common Market. But so much of Government policy seems to belie this statement. The impression has been gained, rightly or wrongly, that it is the intention of Britain, if possible with her Allies of the Outer Seven, to oppose the European economic community. It really is time that we recognised that the Common Market has come into existence and is here to stay. Of course it presents a challenge to us, and to this extent it is a danger to us; but we must face up to it in a sensible manner. I am not arguing that we should have joined the Common Market when the opportunity was first presented, or that we should do so now; but I do believe that we have to come to some form of settlement that will remove the danger of economic conflict. If we do not, and the split widens, Europe and the Western community will suffer.

The second danger is that we may allow an anti-German mood to develop in this country, with a corresponding anti-British reaction in Germany. This could be most dangerous. Undoubtedly there are some forces at work who wish to denigrate the extent to which the West German Government has moved, after the dark past, and joined with us in the Western Alliance. There are some who make use of the recent demonstrations of anti-Semitism in Germany to suggest that the Nazi forces are much more powerful than in fact they are. The campaign now being conducted against providing Germany with any sort of storage or training facilities in this country is another example of the attempt to isolate Germany. I think this is wrong. If we accept Germany as an Ally we must treat her as such. That does not deny us the right to disagree with Germany over basic matters of policy, as we do with the United States or any other of our Allies. But if we hope to influence her by our criticism, then this criticism must be voiced as friends and not as potential enemies.

The German problem, including Berlin, still lies at the heart of European insecurity. It is true that Mr. Khrushchev's blunt challenge of November 17, 1958, was not pressed to the point of crisis, and that a relatively stable situation has been maintained since that time. One cannot help wondering how that situation will be affected by the Summit Conference. Will it be maintained, or improved, or worsened? Will Mr. Khrushchev force the issue? Noble Lords may have noted that during his visit to France the Soviet Prime Minister reaffirmed his views on the German Peace Treaty and on Berlin; but it seemed there was a moderation of tone which was lacking in his original statement.

With regard to a German Peace Treaty Mr. Khrushchev is reported as saying: If the leaders of the countries with whom we fought Nazi Germany could not agree, and we had no other way out, we would with others who fought sign a separate Treaty with East Germany. We are left to speculate on the words "and we had no other way out". Have they any special significance? Curiosity is further aroused by the fact that Mr. Khrushchev went so far as to describe the solution of a separate Treaty as an "undesirable" one. I have no doubt that these points will have been carefully noted at the Washington talks which are now being held and in which the right honourable and learned gentleman, the Foreign Secretary, is taking part. For it may be that, while the basic positions of East and West remain what they were when the last East-West negotiations took place, the Summit Conference may provide an opportunity of avoiding the differences on this issue being pressed to the point of danger.

If that were to happen it would be a good thing, but the present position cannot remain frozen indefinitely. With every year the division of Germany becomes hardened, and there, so long as Europe continues to be split into two camps, the political solution will be among the most difficult in history. I know there is a school of thought which is satisfied with the status quo, but it is within the status quo that potential dangers lurk. Moreover, to maintain the status quo will depress and discourage the spirit of the captive nations who long for the restoration of their freedom and independence and are looking to a relaxation of the tension in Europe to bring them increasing liberalisation.

For myself, I believe that the ultimate reunification of Germany lies within the context of European security and disarmament. In support of this view I would remind your Lordships that during his visit to Moscow a year ago, the right honourable gentleman the Prime Minister agreed with Mr. Khrushchev that: a further study could usefully be made of the possibilities of increasing security by some method of limitation of forces and weapons, both conventional and nuclear, in an agreed area in Europe, coupled with an appropriate system of inspection. Since then little has been heard of the idea, but why should it not be studied? Did the Prime Minister change his mind and throw the idea overboard, or was he overruled by his Western colleagues? It is difficult to envisage any other initial step which could lead towards the reunification of divided Germany and the setting up of a controlled and limited arms zone in Central Europe to act as a pilot scheme for comprehensive controlled disarmament.

We have to remember, also, the immediate danger of Berlin. The dispute here has twice brought us to a state of acute crisis. While it is left to aggravate the situation it can, at any moment, erupt into crisis again. I repeat what I have said before: that we would never be a party to any arrangement which might compromise the freedom and security of the West Berliners. But I do not think that this necessarily prevents us from considering the idea of a free city, which has been put forward from the Soviet side. Obviously, the Soviet proposal is unacceptable in its present form. The presence of Western troops in West Berlin is now the only guarantee for the population of the Western Sector. They could not be withdrawn unless an alternative effective guarantee were provided. Moreover, the idea of a free city would become a contradiction in terms unless the processes of democracy could be applied to the city as a whole. After all, West Berlin is already free, but it is not a city. It is only part of the city of Berlin.

What is needed, I suggest, is a temporary arrangement that will take the heat out of the Berlin issue. It is in the interests of Soviet Russia as well as those of the West that the chances of an unwanted explosion, perhaps by accident, should be removed. A real step forward in the direction of European peace and security could be taken if a temporary settlement could be reached with Soviet Russia whereby the whole of Berlin could be placed under a separate administration, with United Nations participation in some appropriate form to provide the effective guarantees at present maintained by the West. In return, could not the West jointly repeat the declaration about the stability of the Oder-Neisse frontier which was made by President de Gaulle a little over a year ago? Obviously, concession must be met with concession. I offer this as a constructive suggestion.

My Lords, I believe that the chief topic at the Summit Conference will be disarmament, which has been described by President de Gaulle and Mr. Khrushchev as the most important and urgent problem of our time. Although there has been a very welcome easing of tension between the great Powers in the last year or two, we cannot escape from the fact that the arms race continues. I suggest that we dare not let this new opportunity pass without making a start on the road to disarmament. If the curve of the graph does not turn downwards towards safety, it may turn upwards once more towards destruction.

There are very influential groups, particularly in the United States, who really believe that the present high level of destructive power provides greater safety and security than a lower level. To maintain that high level requires constant improvements in our striking power, and that means: on with the arms race. But the other side, undoubtedly, would do the same. We must not under-estimate President Eisenhower's victory over his defence advisers in offering a moratorium on the smaller and, as yet, undetectable tests. If no progress is made in the discussions to secure a disarmament agreement, then these opposing elements may win the next round.

I am equally confident that although Mr. Khrushchev has none of these public disagreements to trouble him, there are groups in the Communist world who believe that his policies are risky. If he has nothing to show for his new attempt to find agreement with the West, the "Old Guard," with a good deal of backing from those in power in China, may force him to return to the kind of diplomacy which typified the Stalin era. If we do not achieve some success in the present and forthcoming negotiations we shall most certainly see the spread of nuclear weapons to more and more countries. In 1960, France; in 1961, China—and then how long before India, Pakistan, Egypt, Israel, East and West Germany, and so on? This would create a situation far more dangerous than we have to-day. That is why we want to see a greater sense of urgency on the part of the Governments of all the Powers involved in the talks at Geneva.

This applies first to the test talks. I am sure we were all immensely relieved when the Russians changed their policy suddenly, as they often do, and agreed that there is as yet no sure way of detecting the lower-range underground tests, and to join the West in studying this question. We also welcomed the statement that followed the Prime Minister's visit to Washington: that the Western Powers were prepared to give an undertaking for a period that they would not carry out these smaller tests. There is now very little to be settled before a test agreement is completed. The two main issues are the length of the moratorium and the number of veto-free on-site inspections. In a spirit of compromise both can be settled quickly. Surely it is clear that an agreement to end all tests would not only, in itself, be an achievement of first importance, particularly as we now read that only a few months ago the level of strontium 90 in the bones of children here in Britain was almost at the danger level; a test agreement would pave the way to progress in general disarmament and improve the opportunities in other fields at the Summit.

That is why I have always urged that a test ban agreement should have high priority in the scale of disarmament, and why the sooner it was concluded the better it would be for all. And therefore I think it would be a mistake to bring into the discussions at this late stage the newest nuclear Power, France. It would, I fear, be bound to lead to delay, and I cannot believe that France herself would wish that to happen. I feel confident that France will welcome an agreement and will join it; and I hope, also, that all other nations would immediately be invited to adhere to it.

My Lords, this brings me to the ten-Power talks in Geneva. From what I can gather from the Press and from other sources, in spite of a relatively good atmosphere very little progress has yet been made. There is even talk already of a deadlock. And at the end of this month the Conference is to go into a five weeks' recess. This is all too reminiscent of other moments in the long and disappointing history of disarmament negotiations. We seem to be watching the absurd spectacle of each side rejecting the other's plan and insisting that their own, and only theirs, be taken as a basis of discussion. How can we expect the Russians to swallow their pride, drop their plan and accept ours? No more than they can reasonably expect the West to give them a tactical victory.

The impression is given that both sides are devoting more attention to exposing the differences between the two plans than in searching for common ground. The Times Geneva correspondent wrote on April 6 that …the two sides are thus engaged in a sort of 'phony' war in which they never really engage in direct discussions of specific issues. My own impression is much the same as his. But I disagree with his conclusion that until the Summit Conference there is nothing that the Western delegates can do except sing a daily roundel in praise of their own proposals and continue to rebut repeated Soviet accusations. That, it seems to me, is a counsel of despair.

After all, there have been some encouraging signs. Mr. Zorin has been more forthcoming about Soviet willingness to accept a control system than on any previous occasion. He has said that control machinery and international inspectors should be established on the territories of the signatory Powers from the beginning to the end of the disarmament process, and he has also agreed that controls should remain after disarmament to ensure that no States should secretly prepare for war. He has accepted the very sensible formula first proposed by the French delegate, Monsieur Jules Moch: No disarmament without control, no control without disarmament. He has also agreed that the Soviet Union is no longer insistent upon the disarmament process being completed in four years. He has further agreed that nuclear disarmament need not remain in the third stage of the Soviet plan. I am not suggesting for a moment that we should be satisfied with the Soviet position: far from it. They have failed so far to put forward the details of their proposed control system, and they must recognise that disarmament can never begin as long as there are only vague assurances of inspection and control. But neither are we completely satisfied with the Western plan, though it is an improvement on earlier schemes.

My first criticism here is that there is no real disarmament in the first stage of the Western Plan, in spite of the view expressed by the Foreign Secretary in another place that there should be some action in the first stage; that the action should be reductions in armed forces and in the levels of conventional armaments. The collection of information, the commencement of important studies, yes; but no disarmament. Why, for instance, do we propose in our first stage force level ceilings of 2½ million for Russia and America, when that figure is higher than the present American level and about equal to the Soviet figure when its present reductions have been completed? And why no ceilings for other Powers?

My second criticism is even more fundamental. The real obstacle in 1955 was the realisation that there were no effective means of ensuring that no country maintained concealed nuclear stocks. There may never be any 100 per cent. effective system. What is our conclusion? That nuclear disarmament is but a pipe dream? If so, then all forms of disarmament must be pipe dreams, because we have always said that conventional and nuclear disarmament must proceed hand in hand. Our conclusion must be that we must abolish the means of delivery of these weapons. That should be a major target. It can be ensured that missiles and bombers are destroyed. This is a point which has been made again and again. It has not been accepted in the Western Plan. The Russians, on the other hand, have proposed the complete abolition of the means of delivery.

My Lords, it is not my intention to analyse these two plans section by section. I believe I have said enough to show my belief that it is folly to set the two plans against each other and let the two sides argue themselves into a stalemate. What should be done, and quickly, is to put the two plans aside for a while and search for common ground. I thought there is much common sense in Earl Russell's plea in The Times a little time ago for a small committee to produce a compromise plan which both sides could then discuss. Could not the Secretariat undertake such a task in view of the coming recess and the tiresome discussions which have preceded it? I suggest that this is a matter to be considered by the Summit Conference. They could provide an agreed basis for the disowned disarmament conference.

Then, when we speak of both sides, do we include China, too? We cannot any longer postpone this issue. The Americans recently moved a little from their stubborn insistence on pretending that 600 million Chinese do not exist, when the State Department announced that if a disarmament agreement were worked out they would be prepared to discuss it with the Chinese. The Western plan envisages in its second stage calling a disarmament conference with the other States having significant military capabilities, to consider their accession to the disarmament agreement. Why should China accept an agreement which she has been excluded from discussing? She has already said that she will not be bound by any agreement unless she has had a part in negotiating it. Would we not take the same attitude? This is no longer an academic question: it is an urgent one. We take the view that Britain must take a lead in securing the removal of this absurd and dangerous anomaly.

Finally, there is the Middle East. I hope it is the intention of the Prime Minister to ensure that the Summit Conference takes a close and constructive look at the Middle East. This continues to be an area of political instability and a danger to peace. There is ample evidence of action and counter-action within the area, as well as from outside. Iraq and Jordan have to be constantly on the alert to safeguard their independence. They are the objects of Colonel Nasser's bitter hostility, which takes the form of subversive activities and intimidation. He still sees these two independent States as obstacles on the road to his domination of the Arab world. As regards Israel, Nasser's inveterate hostility continues undiminished. He keeps up the pretence that a state of war still exists with Israel; he persists in his economic blockade; and he denies Israel freedom of passage through the Suez Canal.

But, my Lords, the burning and most immediate problem of the Middle East is the continued flow of arms into that area. The main recipient of Russian arms shipped to the area is still the United Arab Republic. Israel sees herself compelled to match these supplies, at least qualitatively—though, with her resources strained by her development and construction efforts, she cannot hope to offset them quantitatively. In my opinion, the great Powers should take steps to prevent an arms race developing in the Middle East, just as they are seeking to end their own arms race. The Prime Minister of Israel, during his recent visit to this country, publicly stated that he was in favour of complete disarmament in the Middle East, with mutual inspection. The reaction of Cairo to Mr. Ben-Gurion's call for disarmament in the Middle East was given over Cairo radio: The guarantee of peace in the Middle East is in our weapons and the strength of our army. We shall impose peace, Ben-Gurion. We shall impose peace when we drive you into the sea. It must be clear, therefore, that any amelioration of the dangerous and unsettled conditions in the Middle East can be achieved only if the four Powers decide to bring it about.

It is important, if this is to be done, that at the Summit Conference consideration should be given to the need for a Four-Power declaration which would express the common desire: first, to increase stability in the Middle East; secondly, to preserve the political independence and territorial integrity of the countries in that area; and, thirdly, to urge the various conflicting parties in the Middle East to enter upon direct negotiations in order to settle the issues outstanding between them. I hope, therefore, that it is the intention of the West to seek Mr. Khrushchev's agreement to such an effort to bring peace and security to the Middle East. We ask for that to be done.

My Lords, the peoples of the world are looking to the Summit Conference to take a step forward along the road to a more relaxed and a more secure world. We hope that they are not going to be disappointed. I beg to move for Papers.

3.36 p.m.

BARONESS HORSBRUGH

My Lords, in rising to speak in your Lordships' House for the first time, I crave your indulgence; and I am comforted to know that in the position that I am to-day, that indulgence is always very generously accorded. My difficulty has been that I was told that when I spoke for the first time in your Lordships' House I should speak when there was under debate a subject on which I was an expert. But, my Lords, I cannot claim to be an expert on any subject. What I can say, however, is that in the realm of foreign affairs I have listened to experts, I have worked with experts, and I have had a good deal of advice and help from experts (for which I am most grateful) at the conferences and assemblies that I have attended. For my mind goes back to Geneva, where I was on several occasions a delegate to the League of Nations Assembly; to San Francisco, at the time when the Charter for the United Nations was drawn up; to the Assembly of the United Nations; to U.N.E.S.C.O.; and now, during the last four years, I have been a delegate to the Assembly of the Council of Europe and to the Assembly of the Western European Union.

Now I know that there are people who say that some of those councils and assemblies are just a complete waste of time. I do not agree, although I would say at once that not every word that is spoken and not every word that is recorded in those tomes of the verbatim record of the debates is of great international importance. I would confess that sometimes at Strasbourg, when attending the Council of Europe, at the end of a long day—a day that may have begun with a committee meeting at half-past-eight in the morning; and I can assure your Lordships that my enthusiasm for international goodwill is at that hour at its lowest ebb—I have said to myself, "Are we doing any good? Is there any value in this?" But, my Lords, I have always been able to reply, "Yes, I think there is." Because, if we do nothing else—and I think we do do other things—there is a value, as in the Council of Europe, in the meeting together of the Parliamentary representatives of fifteen European countries, in their learning something of each other's points of view, in discussing the opinions that are put before them by the Ministers of those countries, and in trying, perhaps, to formulate their own suggestions. I believe that in that way we may be able to build up an informed international public opinion. At any rate, it may help to prevent some of the misunderstandings.

The idea that personal contacts are useful and that the opinions of people in the different countries have some importance is surely supported by the latest methods of diplomacy at the highest level. We remember that less than two years ago we were conducting negotiation by correspondence. Mr. Khrushchev sent regular letters to the heads of all the Western Governments. After a pause for finding out what the replies should be, and consulting together, the replies went back. Then Mr. Khrushchev wrote again, and the same procedure went on, until our Prime Minister, by his visit to Moscow, cut through it and ushered in a new era, an era of personal visits and private consultations. This scheme of personal visits and private consultations has continued.

And as the heads of the States in what I may call without disrespect, I hope, their merry-go-round tours of the world have continued, another sideline has been added—what I would call the "meet the people" activities. This, I think, shows, at any rate in the opinion of those who are studying the problem, that the opinions of the peoples of the countries do have an effect. I would urge Her Majesty's Government more and more to give us as much information as possible, and to send out to the peoples of the world the British point of view, whether by broadcasting it or in any other way: because it seems to me that public opinion can hinder or can help good international relationships.

I should like to give two examples of what has happened recently—and some of it has been referred to already by the noble Lord, Lord Henderson. We know that a sense of ill-feeling and resentment has been engendered between us and the German people—due, I think, to a blunder; I do not believe myself that it has a sinister background—when the suggestions were made about the German bases in Spain. It was most unfortunate that these difficulties came between the German people and the British people at that particular time. But then we can look at the other side. I believe that the visit of General de Gaulle to this country and the reception he received has given us hope that there is a re-awakening of that spirit of friendship between the British and French peoples which unfortunately has been sadly diminished in the recent past; and I only hope that that feeling is reciprocated in France. It had been diminished for various reasons, but partly, as the noble Lord, Lord Henderson, has pointed out, through the difficulties that have occurred in the trade relationships of what are called the Six and the Seven.

I should like to say a word or two about that. Discussions are going on at the present moment, I believe, at various levels and in various places, and it would be not only presumptuous of me but very unwise to put forward any definite suggestions as to what should be done. I might, however, just outline, as I see it, the background and the origin of some of these difficulties. I must do so briefly and point out what I might call the milestones. We all know that when, in August, 1949, the Council of Europe was set up, it started with great enthusiasm, although there were those in Europe who were strong federalists and who wanted something much more distinct, like a federal system and a European Parliament. Still, there was this enthusiasm, and it was perhaps greatly inspired by the presence of Sir Winston Churchill and the speeches that he made. That was in August, 1949.

But within a year came the first blow, when the Government of the United Kingdom decided not to join in the negotiations for the Coal and Steel Community. I intend to be completely non-controversial, so I am going to say here that I think they made a mistake; but in a minute I am going to say how a subsequent Conservative Government made a mistake, and so neutralise it. We did not join, and I well remember the debate about it in another place. But we did conclude a Treaty of association with that Coal and Steel Community. From that time onwards there has been a feeling in Europe that Britain likes to be on the sideline to get the best of both worlds.

What do I look to next? I look to the European Defence Community, and its failure. I think, though I know that many of my friends disagree with me wholeheartedly over this, that we were right not to go into that and the European Army. There was great despair. But almost at once it was the United Kingdom who took the initiative. We remember the journey of Sir Anthony Eden to the capitals of Europe and the desperate efforts then made to save the situation. And it was saved. Later it was termed by President Adenaur "a monument to British statesmanship". What was done? The Brussels Treaty was extended, Germany was brought in and—and this was the main thing—Britain decided and elected herself to keep British troops on the Continent. Germany was then getting back her full sovereignty. Germany came into N.A.T.O., with the Bonn Agreement, the Paris Agreement and the rest, and Western Europe was set up.

The point is this, as I see it: that that very success, in which Britain was the leader, brought us to our next difficulty. Those who had been wanting some really federal scheme had been very disheartened at the failure of the E.D.C. Now they had new hope, and it was suggested that there should be a meeting to build up a strong unity in the economic world; and the hope was to extend that to the political. The Messina Conference was called—this was at a time when a Conservative Government was in power—but we declined to send a Minister to the Conference. The reason was perfectly logical and sensible. We said: "Economic matters will be discussed. We have already got O.E.E.C., and those matters should be discussed in O.E.E.C. We have always had the feeling not to set up more organisations and assemblies." But the mistake was that more was aimed at than just economic unity. I think—and probably many people think now—that if our Foreign Minister could have joined the other six foreign Ministers, and if from the start they had talked about the future of this economic unity, it might well have been possible for there to grow up together a Common Market and a Free Trade Area. Both would have fitted in if they had started at the same time. But this was not done.

We then had the Rome Treaty in 1957, and there had grown up a very large organisation. Some people say: "Join the Common Market: it is merely a matter of certain tariffs." But it is much more than that: it is a large organisation, which is political as well as economic, and we have that European Parliamentary Assembly, which within a year or two hopes to be elected by direct election in Europe. I think it was right—it was essential for our trade—that the Free Trade Association of the Seven was set up. It was not set up as a rival; it was set up, I am convinced—and we tried to convince our European friends, some of whom have been convinced—to make trade organisation in Europe possible. And this it has done. It gave the chance that it might become a link, and then one could join up with the Six.

That brings us practically to the present situation, except to add that we have new consultations going on in O.E.C.C., because there again the very success has meant some change. O.E.E.C. was set up at the time of the Marshall Plan to bring back prosperity to Europe. Europe is now prosperous, and a new scheme is being put forward, mainly at the suggestion of the Americans, as the result of Mr. Dillon's visit. Now, twenty nations are discussing the problem, including the Six, including the Seven, including those that are neither in the Six nor the Seven; and an extra place has been made for the European Economic Community. What is going to be next? Mr. Selwyn Lloyd, in a speech to the Council of Europe at Strasbourg last January, made things absolutely plain. He claimed that we were Europeans and said the fact of our voice in the Commonwealth in no way took away our European status. He stated then—and I am certain all sensible people must believe—that we do not want to sabotage the organisation of the Six. We all realise that if that were to break down there would be chaos in the economic situation in Europe. We do not want to rival it; we want to find some link with it. We agree that if in the European Community they had an exclusive policy; if they made all their arrangements politically for their external international arrangements without consulting their Allies, that would be fatal to policies such as disarmament, East-West and all the rest. We realise that, if the external tariff was very high, and if there was rigid protectionist policy, that might make for a trade war. I realise how serious the situation is.

Time is not on our side, my Lords. We have already heard the suggestions of Professor Hallstein that now the timetable is to be brought forward. Time is running very short. I believe that what we want is discussions at the highest level. It must be the policy of the Governments, and we must all speak frankly. Do these Governments want to go forward to a rational federal system in Europe—is that what they are aiming at?—in which we and other Europen countries could not be included? If they do not, is there any scheme in which they are suggesting political or economic discussions within that Six of a definite nature, but not going further? We know that there are still federalists in Europe, and they have a right to have their own opinion. We know that if you are in an Empire which you have built up, you want to see that Empire going forward with all strength and energy, and have no one interfering with it. But I think we must know the aim, and as quickly as we possibly can.

It must be done at the very top. We must find a way of getting rid of these discords in Europe. It is absolutely essential that we get in Europe political and economic stability. It is absolutely essential that we get that unity which can give those Europeans, us Europeans, the opportunity of doing what we can in the world for peace and prosperity. We must have a Europe that is outward-looking. With this job to do, we cannot waste more time and more energy on discussing our own difficulties within Europe.

I should like to say one further thing before I sit down, and that concerns the question of the Summit Conference. First, I would ask Her Majesty's Government whether they have prepared carefully all their arrangements for public relations or publicity—call it what you like—because I am absolutely convinced that, as soon as that Conference is over, the different nations will be putting to the world their views on what has happened. I am not asking that every word that is said should be given publicly. The more that is said in confidence the better, if it remains confidential. What I am asking is that, when the time comes for the leaders of the different nations who have attended that Conference to give their views to the world, we shall not find that the views of the Soviet Government have gone out to the whole world first, followed perhaps by the Americans, and Britain coming at the end, perhaps rather trying to water down what has been said. May we be assured that on this occasion the view of the British leader in the Conference will be known as quickly as possible? And might I be bold enough to ask: Will preparations be made, before that for dealing with any leak, and dealing with it rapidly, whether the leak be official or unofficial?

There is only one thing else that I want to say. People considering the Summit Conference at one time had the feeling that it was going to do everything; that it would solve all our problems—rather like a bottle of patent medicine: after taking one dose the patient would be cured. Then matters went to another extreme, and for a time it seemed that nothing would happen. Now, at any rate, we have a view in between, and, I think, a view that most of us would support. That view was given us, it seemed to me, by President de Gaulle. At the close of that remarkable speech in Westminster Hall, he spoke of the Summit Conference and of what he called rational hope. It seemed to me that in that speech he inspired us all with rational hope. He told us that France and Britain would stand shoulder to shoulder. He spoke of wisdom and resolution, and he said that the four who were going into the Conference were like travellers undertaking a long and difficult voyage. My Lords, I am sure that every one of us wishes those travellers Godspeed.

THE EARL OF HOME

My Lords, I suggest that the House should now adjourn during pleasure for the Royal Commission. The statement will follow immediately afterwards.

House adjourned during pleasure.

House resumed.