§ 2.55 p.m.
§ LORD SHACKLETON rose to call attention to the Memorandum accompanying the Air Estimates, 1960–1961 (Cmnd. 950); and to move for Papers. The noble Lord said: My Lords, I rise to call attention to the Memorandum accompanying the Air Estimates and to move for Papers. I am sure it would be your Lordships' wish in the first instance that we should take note of and once again congratulate the Royal Air Force on the high standard of achievement and the progress that has been made; and I think it would be unkind not to include the Air Ministry, at least in this stage of my speech, in those congratulations, since I shall have some criticisms to make at a later stage. We can all take a great satisfaction in the high efficiency and indeed the high morale of the Royal Air Force. Those of your Lordships who from time to time have an opportunity to visit R.A.F. stations or to return to their old units and possibly see their friends will recognise that the R.A.F. is at a very high state, both in regard to morale and, indeed, in regard to the efficiency that they can attain with the equipment they have at their disposal.
§ It is interesting, when we look at this large sum of £527 million, to make a brief comparison of the size of the Air Force and the number of aircraft that it possesses with the position immediately before the war. Some figures were recently given in another place which showed that in 1939 there were 9,700 aircraft in the R.A.F. as against 5,000 to-day; and that officers and air crew then numbered 8,500 against 13,600 today; and other ranks 105,000 against 161,000. It illustrates, I think, how inevitably the tail in the Armed Services, in the Forces, must lengthen, because we know that the striking capacity of the R.A.F. must be infinitely greater than it was before the war, even if we leave out the nuclear weapon.
§ But it is, of course, as the provider of the deterrent, of the fission and hydrogen bomb, that the R.A.F. has its main rôle. It is my view, and I think that of most noble Lords, that it is the nuclear deterrent, even though now it has become something of a mutual suicide weapon, which has most brought home 730 to people everywhere the impossibility of war to-day; that the inconceivable horror of these weapons makes peace the only proper objective in foreign and defence policy. I do not wish to enter at too great a length into the arguments on the desirability of having such weapons; we have had opportunities to do so in the Defence debate and on other occasions. I must, however, repeat my own conviction from the Royal Air Force point of view that this Government, like previous Governments, the Labour Governments, were absolutely right at the time to build these tremendous and horrifying weapons; and it is, I believe, the capacity of the West, matched now possibly by an equal and maybe a greater capacity on the other side of the Iron Curtain, to blow man off the face of the world, that has perhaps brought mankind to his senses. And it is the Royal Air Force, together with the American Air Force, who provide the all-important "sword" as part of the "sword and shield" strategy in present circumstances. Whether the nuclear weapon, the hydrogen bomb, the "equaliser" as it was called by one noble Lord, is still a credible weapon to-day would give rise to another difficult and rather sophisticated argument which I would not attempt to go into.
§ We have to take into account in our consideration of the Royal Air Force that its rôle at the moment is mainly to carry the deterrent; and the 200 V-bombers—about 200 V-bombers, Vulcans and Victors—are capable, I understand, of delivering this deterrent. It is to that extent an independent deterrent, although it is inconceivable, I think, that it would ever be used independently. We have it now, whether we like it or not, and the cost, though heavy, is still by no means the largest part of our defence costs. In regard to the use of this deterrent and the operation of Bomber Command, who would have the responsibility for delivery, it is satisfactory to know (it has been said on previous occasions, and I have confirmed it to some extent among my friends) that, with the development of dispersal and training, it is virtually certain that, with proper readiness—which means a high degree of readiness and anticipation—it should be possible to get a sizable proportion of this force into the air in the event of an attack being detected. 731 This is at the moment certainly preferable, and is a less difficult decision to take than to have to decide whether or not to press a button and release missiles, whether they be Thors or, later, Blue Streaks, which cannot easily be recalled. In fact, I doubt whether they can be recalled at all, although it might be possible to arrange for their destruction in mid-flight. I should be very glad, as I am sure would other noble Lords, to hear, either from the First Lord or from the noble Earl, Lord Bathurst, who is to wind up this debate on behalf of the Government, something of how this high degree of readiness and dispersal are to be achieved. And where are these airfields to be? In this country or abroad? How far do the Government and the Air Ministry reckon they can, if necessary, bring back into use some of the aged runways throughout the country which et the present time are being used as experimental motor tracks, and so on?
§ My Lords, I do not propose to discuss the early warning station at Fylingdales, on which many things have been said, except to ask the Government again whether they regard this as a significant part of our defence system, not with a view to achieving any effective warning to the civilian population (for we know that probably that will be impossible) but to ensure that the deterrent, on which our defence strategy is at present based, is capable of being made effective.
§ While I am discussing Bomber Command it is interesting to note—and I am sure noble Lords who are interested in the Air Force will agree with me—that the transfer of certain aircraft, namely, some of the Valiants, from Bomber Command's strategic force into a more tactical rôle under "Saceur" provides another striking example of the flexibility of air power, and the gains that can be derived from the unity of air power. This is a principle which I think has never been properly understood outside the Royal Air Force. I should particularly like to draw the attention of the First Lord to it, because those of us who are interested in air strategy and have followed the teaching of Lord Trenchard in the past realise that we still have an obligation to instruct what I might call the older disciplines in the significance of air power.
732§ I should now like to turn a little to the future. Here we find ourselves, as do the Government, faced by the most acute problems of decision; and it is clear that at the moment the whole of our defence policy with regard to the use of the deterrent and the means of delivery is to some extent in the melting pot. In regard to the rocket deterrents, we already have in this country a number of Thors deployed and in the hands of the Royal Air Force, although I understand that we still have not immediate operational control over them and that there is some system, which none of us has yet been able to understand, by which a decision can be taken. This is, of course, one of the major issues of defence which is hound to give rise to much debate in the future, and on which we have yet to hear some really satisfactory statement from the Government.
§ But, my Lords, when discussing the value of these Thors—and I think there is a very considerable doubt now as to the wisdom of having these rather vulnerable weapons—we have none the less to return once again to this vexed question of Blue Streak. The Blue Streak, which is a liquid-fuelled ballistic missile—a very large one indeed; I think it has a diameter at the base of about 12 feet—has been attacked. I believe, probably more than any single weapon that has ever been produced. Practically everyone has had something nasty to say about it. The Government never say anything nice about it: they merely suggest that they are having second thoughts. It is notable how much criticism of this rocket, on the grounds of its relative immobility and vulnerability, has been made by noble friends and honourable friends of mine in another place, as well as by many critics outside Parliament, among the military commentators in the newspapers and elsewhere.
§ On the other hand, there are still some passionate proponents of Blue Streak. In a speech by Sir Frederick Brundrett which I saw reported in the newspapers, and which was nearly the subject of some action under the Official Secrets Acts (though I do not quite know why) he said, quite frankly, that he believes it to be the best weapon. Indeed, he said that it is the only weapon, and that if Blue Streak is to be dropped we shall, at any rate during the latter part of this decade, 733 be without a deterrent of our own. I do not necessarily regard that as wholly disastrous, but it would almost certainly mean the end of an independent British deterrent. I said this in the defence debate, fortunately, a little before Sir Frederick Brundrett spoke; although, of course, it is a very obvious statement. It is not long ago that the Government said the day of the bomber was pretty well over. Now we see the Government moving back to a position where they are looking once more at the bomber to supply the need in the deterrent field.
§ My Lords, I myself, in so far as those of us without secret information can possible tell, am probably in as great a state of confusion as the Minister for Defence. He will have the advantage that shortly he is to go to America, where he will learn a good deal more about the experiments going on over there. He will know whether it is in fact possible to fire Blue Streak out of an underground cellar of some kind (a "silo" I think it is called), or whether reports that that is impossible have been confirmed. We have been told that when the Americans fired Minuteman the noise was such (something over 200 decibels) that the entire structure collapsed inwards; and the Americans, I see, are not thinking of hardening their sites by sinking their ranges underground but of putting them on flatted cars. It will not simplify the transport problems of this country if we have these vast pieces of apparatus, measuring 12 feet across at the base moving up and down the railway lines of this country; and I do not know how it can possibly be achieved. It may well be that the sites can be hardened or can be put underground. In that situation, I would accept the view that, provided the dispersal was not confined to places in the unfortunate counties of East Anglia but might be anywhere in the British Isles, it would be almost impossible wholly to knock: out these sites, to the point of rendering Blue Streak's deterrent effect of no avail.
§ If, however, Blue Streak does go, we should like to know what the Government's thinking is going to be on this matter. They would, I believe, free themselves from a good deal of the very heavy criticism which has been levelled at them on defence matters if they would tell us a bit more about what their thinking is. 734 What is said openly by everybody who is interested in defence from outside, and is now openly said by people inside the Services, whether they be serving Generals or ex-Chief Scientific Advisers, might well be said on occasion by Government spokesmen. We should like to hear from the Government, though perhaps it may be a vain hope, how this controversy is going. I am, in any case—and I think this must now be the view of the Government—beginning to wonder how far it is really sensible to build up in America and in this country these enormous and highly able design teams, each working on the same problem.
§ I am told, for instance, that in this country there are two inertial working systems being designed for missiles (and I can tell my noble friend Lord Morrison of Lambeth that they will undoubtedly incorporate germanium transistors) and the Americans are also working on this. It may be that a certain amount of competition in this field is a good thing, but when we set it against the resources which we have for our defence effort generally, and for our fire brigade rôle (and I should like to say a word or two about this later) I think the time has come when once again we should look to see whether national pride ought not to give way to a greater increase in interdependence; and particularly now as we think about the new-time scale that the Government have given us. Whether the move is to the powered bomb or, later, to Skybolt, and whether or not Blue Streak is maintained, it is quite certain that we shall have to look to the United States for a good deal of our defence equipment, as we have already done with regard to Thor. I hope that in this matter we shall, in the course of a fairly short time, see the fruits of the visit of the Minister of Defence to America.
§ Before I leave Blue Streak, I should like to return once again to a matter which was raised briefly last year and to suggest what is possibly a more profitable use for Blue Streak, especially if the Government now abandon it for defence purposes. It was again Sir Frederick Brundrett who suggested that Blue Streak was the only British vehicle which would be capable of putting satellites in orbit. We now know that 735 the Government, even if only in a small degree, are beginning to take this question of space research seriously, and there is a special section in the Meteorological Office engaged in designing and preparing the instruments to go into the Scout satellites which are being provided by the Americans. Despite the fact that there are many of your Lordships, many people in this country, and many scientists who are busily engaged in useful science, who think that that kind of science ought to come first, the fact remains that the world's instruments are going out into space, and I hope that the Royal Air Force, which is undoubtedly the right body to move in this field, will begin to develop in regard to space research in the same way as the United States Air Force.
§ It was not long ago that the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, when talking about space, said that people never say exactly what they mean and what they want. But we have the authority of the Under-Secretary of State for Air in another place who tells us that if we get the results which are expected by scientists, the effect on long-range forecasting, which affects us all very much and which we can all appreciate to-day, may be almost revolutionary, and the reporting and photographing of the cloud cover on the earth could benefit mankind by marry millions of pounds a year. There are other rôles, in communication and control, and I suspect that it may be only a matter of time (though I hope that the Disarmament Conference will prevent this) before atomic weapons are in orbit round the earth. This is a horrifying thought which, none the less, we should do well to recognise. As we move through this difficult technical era, I think we must recognise that there are a large number of extremely able first-class designers, technologists, scientists and others, who are passionately interested in this field, and as new methods of propulsion come along, whether it be the ion drive or whatever it is, it is certain that they will want to participate in the activities of their fellow men in this field. I hope that they will do so in co-operation with other N.A.T.O. countries and particularly with the United States of America.
736§ Returning from that brief visit to space, I should like to come back to aircraft which will continue to fly in the atmosphere, or, at least some of them, in the upper reaches of the atmosphere. I would ask the Government whether they can tell us a little more about how the new Mark II Vulcans and Victors are coming along. We know the tragedy that befell the prototype Victor, but I understand that the new types of powered bomb and standoff weapon—Blue Steel, I think it is called—can be carried only by these more advanced marks of aircraft. I should like to ask the Government what the real rôle of the TSR2 is. We have been told that it is essentially a general purpose fighter reconnaissance tactical bomber. But is it possible that in fact it is intended as a successor to the existing V-bombers, and that this is a way in which the Government are trying to get round their difficulty of explaining their statement in the past that the V-bomber was finished? I would ask the First Lord, in particular, who is equipping the Navy with N.A.39's, whether in this matter there ought not to be some agreement as to the type of aircraft that ought to be used, and whether we ought not to develop these separate types. We shall, of course, have an opportunity of discussing that matter on the Naval Estimates.
§ There was also a decision not to provide the supersonic fighter. Now we have been told that the Lightning is already capable of flying at a speed twice that of sound. I would ask the Government again whether this British-developed aircraft is going to have the same performance as either the American Star fighters or the Russian Mig.17 and Mig.19, which we have been told can fly at 2½ mach. We have, I think, some grounds for anxiety as to whether the enormous expenditure in this field is going to lead to good results and whether, in the end, we may not see a repetition of the fiasco that took place over the Swift.
§ I turn now to the subject of the future of Transport Command. At last there are some encouraging developments. Critics of the Government in the past have complained about the slowness in the ordering of aircraft. We realise that to a large extent the emphasis on the deterrent has handicapped the build-up 737 of Transport Command. I do not know why we had to wait until 1956 to order the Britannia. I remember discussing Britannias in Ottawa with some friends in the Canadian Air Force, back in 1950 when they were on the way, with a view to their being used not in the transport rôle but possibly in the maritime rôle. It seems unfortunate that so long a time has been taken. On the other hand, we have been encouraged by the news that at least Transport Command are to get Comet IV's. Furthermore, the Argosy is shortly coming into service.
§ But the real anxiety—and this is, I believe, the anxiety, particularly in military circles—is as to the delay in placing orders for the Britannia. It looks as if we shall not get the Britannia before 1965. The last time there was a try-out of air mobility on a large scale was in the Lebanon operation. On that occasion I understand that our air transport facilities, even by bringing in every aircraft, was stretched to the full, and we had to obtain the help of the Americans with Lockheeds. I do not wish to advocate the making or the buying of American aircraft in preference to British aircraft, but we ought to have these aircraft now, so that the Army is able to discharge its job as part of the world fire brigade. If they have to wait four or five years more before they get the Britannia, ought we not to consider ordering, or possibly manufacturing under licence, aircraft like the Lockheed 130.C, which bears a considerable resemblance to the Britannia?
§ I should like also to raise the question of other aspects of Army support. How far are the Royal Air Force likely in the near future to get any of these aircraft that are really essential to enable the Army to carry out quick operations in the field? We have recently had the operation "Exercise Starlight", which has revealed some serious gaps. The Air Force has no medium-range helicopters from the point of view of availability to the Army. I hope the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Harding of Petherton, who is to speak later, may throw some light on this subject. If the First Lord believes that the Air Force have enough helicopters to make the Array satisfied or even remotely content, I think he is wrong. There is a need for a build-up of all types of aircraft, both the helicopter and the short- 738 range aircraft. There was a time when there was talk about building the Prestwick 1 and 2. I do not know what has happened. I believe the Government have dropped the idea.
§ There is further the need in these operations to get much closer integration between the Air Force and the Army. While the Air Force lack the aeroplanes the Army will not be pleased or satisfied, and we shall not get the smooth inter-Service relationship that is essential. Here again, while I believe that the unity of air power must be maintained, the responsibility is on the Air Ministry and the Royal Air Force to see that they meet the needs of the other Services. I would again ask the Government to produce some long-term guidance on this matter. Is it intended that troops will be moved in future much more by air? The day will come, I think, almost certainly—although it may not arrive for quite a while—when there will be such a thing as an individual man-lift. Interesting experiments have been going on in manpowered aircraft, perhaps with a small booster. But the time will come when the individual soldier will be able, so to speak, to hop from trench to trench, except that he will not in those circumstances be going into trenches. I think we ought to hear some view on this matter, instead of these rather dreary repetitions about new helicopters and new aircraft being developed, when we know that none of them is going to be available in the near future.
§ I would also ask the Government whether they ought not now to consider Transport Command as a main carrier for the Services in peace time. There was an interesting article in The Times quite recently from which we learnt that the Transport Command utilisation of aircraft was enormously lower than that of the civil air services. That, of course, is to be expected. But the bill that we pay for movement of personnel is extraordinarily high. The Air Force figures are high enough, and the Army figures are somewhere around £7 million a year. Without going into the question of equipment, surely this is a rôle that Transport Command can increasingly undertake. After all, its rôle is transport, and whereas the other operational commands will not 739 be able to be switched to a useful peacetime rôle, there is no doubt that Transport Command can. In that way we might get some of our money back.
§ There are other aspects of the work of Transport Command with which I should like to deal, but would now turn quickly to the question of my own old command: that is, Coastal Command. First, I should like to say how gratified I am—and I am sure that other noble Lords, and particularly the noble Earl, Lord Swinton, will be gratified—that the takeover bid by the Royal Navy for Coastal Command has been frustrated. This is the thirteenth attempt which has been made to take over Coastal Command, and it has done no good at all to inter-Service relations. I hope that this unfortunate episode will be the last.
§ I have on a number of occasions said that there is a need for much greater integration of the Services. I hope that one day their uniforms, certainly among the Staff, may be interchangeable. But the type of operation that was recently conducted in regard to Coastal Command I think has been a bad one, and I hope now that the Navy and the Air Force will settle down to good, workable relations. Equally, the Royal Air Force must supply the Navy with their needs and with the development of new detection equipment, particularly sonic equipment, there are some valuable advances in their primary rôle, which is the antisubmarine rôle. They will also need a replacement far their existing aircraft, the Shackleton, which has been in service for a long time now. It is admirable for its purpose, although I think the Canadians have a better one. When we take into account the long and dreary wait for the development of a replacement, I hope that the Government and the Air Ministry will move on as rapidly as they can, and that by doing so they will not over-emphasise the importance of the ground operational commitments, and will not forget either Coastal Command or, for that matter, Transport Command, which so often have been the Cinderellas in the past.
§ I have only a few remarks to make with regard to the other important aspects of Service activity. No doubt other noble Lords will refer to them. In the discussions on the Air Force we have heard 740 very little about reserves, and we know that with the disappearance of the old auxiliary squadrons—a disappearance which was so greatly regretted, although I believed it to be inevitable—the need for reserves for the Royal Air Force is not as great as it has been. None the less, there is a need for building up certain specialised units, and for a number of years we were pressing that there should be the equivalent of air defence units for the different Commands. I am glad that, nearly ten years after it was first proposed, Coastal Command are now in process of recruiting their first operational control unit which will be able to man the operation rooms. There is some reference in the Memorandum to work-study, organisation and methods. It is worth recognising that the Royal Air Force have given a lead in this field and that they have to their credit the great advance that has been made in the use of operational research techniques, organisation, methods and so on.
§ I should like to put forward quite seriously the suggestion which I have heard mooted within Service circles that within the Command structure there should be funds available for the Commanders-in-Chief to carry out limited organisation and methods work of their own. Most of them have their own operational research officers, but frequently it is possible to carry out the major studies, provided you have the resources and a little elbow room to carry out the necessary research and investigation. I would urge that a little more leeway be given to Commanders-in-Chief to carry out work of that sort.
§ There is not time to refer to the great improvement in pay and conditions. I should like to congratulate the Government on the rapid way in which they have moved following the Grigg Report. Your Lordships will agree that to-day all the four Services, and certainly the Royal Air Force, are well remunerated by civilian standards. Some interesting comparisons can be made, because we now have that invaluable Report, the Report on Doctors' Pay, which has provided us for the first time with a real study of comparative pay rates throughout the professions. It is satisfactory that the Air Force and the Army emerge pretty well. I hope that there will also continue to be inducements for women to join the Air Force. I 741 notice that the old Service reports all referred to the high marriage rate among their women officers, but the Memorandum on the Air Estimates makes no reference to this.
§ I hope the Government spokesman will be able to reassure us that the prospects are every bit as good in the Royal Air Force, and if they are not I can again emphasise that these officers have a very high value when subsequently they return to civilian life. It so happens that I, in my work, have to employ quite a number of women in personnel work, and we have found that women from all the Services, including the Women's Royal Air Force, make excellent personnel officers. The qualities which they bring are those which are particularly valuable; they bring a very high sense of responsibility, a good understanding of human values and a very great deal of integrity. I hope it will be recognised what excellent material there is, whether it be for industry or for husbands.
§ My Lords, most of my remarks have been related to what might be called the main operational rôle of the Royal Air Force in its deterrent rôle. But before I sit down I would again raise the question, which is being increasingly raised, whether we have not lost quite seriously by the decision, which I am prepared to defend, none the less, to build up our own deterrent. It is apparent from recent exercises and it is apparent from the trouble that is brewing in the world to-day that as the deterrent becomes perhaps less credible as the ultimate weapon so shall we need to strengthen our conventional forces. This, I think, has been made particularly clear by the recent tragic events in Africa.
§ I am not suggesting for one moment that the time will come in the near future when British forces may have to intervene in Africa. Wherever trouble arises—it has happened in the Caribbean and it has happened in many areas—the need will be to get the fire brigade there as quickly as possible. It will mainly be, I think, as a transporter of troops, indeed of the fire brigade of police, as the fire engine in fact, that the Royal Air Force will plays its particular rôle. I believe it will become much more the key to mobility than it has been in the past. Indeed, as the Secretary of State said in another place, in the long run the deterrent may be carried by aircraft which 742 are essentially transporting aircraft and are no longer attack bombers. I believe that the R.A.F. continue to uphold the standards that we have always expected them to do, and I am sure that your Lordships would again agree with me, as I sit down, in sending our best wishes to the Royal Air Force and our complete confidence in their officers and men. I beg to move for Papers.