TOWN AND COUNTRY PLANNING BILL

HL Deb 27 April 1959 vol 215 cc993-1049

2.57 p.m.

Order of the Day for the House to be again in Committee read.

Moved, That the House do now resolve itself into Committee.—(The Lord Chancellor.)

On Question, Motion agreed to.

House in Committee accordingly.

[The LORD MERTHYR in the Chair.]

Clause 17 [Additional compensation for new planning permission in respect of land acquired]:

LORD SILKIN moved to leave out Clause 17. The noble Lord said: We come to what I certainly, and I think my noble friends on this side, regard as the most doubtful and controversial clause in the whole Bill. As the Committee will remember, this clause permits the vendor, in a case where further permission for development has been granted within a period of five years, to go back to the acquiring authority and claim additional compensation. In the debate on Second Reading I dealt with this clause fairly fully, and I think it will be sufficient on this occasion if I summarise the case against it without dealing with it at the length. I did before.

To be quite short, the amount of compensation to be paid is agreed between the parties or settled by the Lands Tribunal on the basis of the use to which the land is certified to be put by the local planning authority, subject to appeal to the Ministry if either party to the acquisition is not satisfied with the terms of the certificate; so that if a prospective vendor of the land feels that the land is capable of a more beneficial use than the one which the planning authority have certified as the proper use, he can appeal to the Ministry, and the Ministry make their decision.

I want to emphasise that in many cases the local planning authority is not the same body as the acquiring authority. The local planning authority would be the county council, who would not normally —but might in some circumstances—be the acquiring authority. The acquiring authority would be the district council. Therefore, it is not the case that the planning authority has a direct interest in certifying a use which is less beneficial than the ordinary use, apart altogether from the opportunity of appeal which is open to a prospective vendor. It might be—I suppose that, strictly, it would be—the case that where a county borough is acquiring the land the planning committee of that county borough is, of course, part of the same body as is acquiring: but even in such a case there is the safeguard that an owner can appeal against the decision of the county borough as the planning authority.

When I made my case on the Second Reading, the noble Lord, Lord Hylton —who has arrived just in time for me to refer to him—suggested, I think, that local authorities might conceivably be guilty of some kind of trickery in acquiring land by false pretences: they might give a certificate that the land was capable of a less beneficial use than it might be, and thereafter might use it for a more beneficial use. I think he did not press that particular charge, and I do not want to pursue it except to say that if it should happen that a local authority did behave in that way, and it could he established, then there are normal opportunities open to a vendor of land to reopen the transaction, just as there are in any other case where a sale is effected by false pretences. But we must deal with this problem—I am sure the noble Lord, Lord Hylton, will agree; and I know that the noble and learned Viscount the Lord Chancellor will agree—on the basis that all parties are acting in good faith. There may be a mistake, and that mistake is capable of being remedied on appeal; but, subject to that, the local authority and the owner are giving the best assessment they can at the time of the use to which the land is capable of being put.

The object of this Bill is to establish that such transactions take place on the basis of market price; and I suggest that the procedure that is followed as between a local authority and a vendor is exactly the same as would be followed in the case of a private transaction in order to arrive at what is the market price. In the case of a private transaction, each party to the transaction would try to ascertain what is the anticipated use of the land. In many cases, as I know from my own professional experience, before a purchaser buys the land he approaches the local planning authority and finds out from them what use of that land would he permitted; and it is on the basis of what he is informed by the local planning authority that he makes his offer and the price is eventually negotiated. Now that is exactly what would happen in the case of a sale by compulsory purchase. Either the purchaser—that is, the local authority—or the owner of the land would find out what is the use that would be permitted, and the sale would take place on that basis. I repeat that I can see no material difference in what would take place as between the way in which the market price is ascertained in the case of an ordinary private buyer and seller and the way in which the market price is ascertained under this Bill under the previous clause.

In the case of a private sale and purchase, however, once the parties have made the best inquiries open to them as to what use can be made of the land, and the sale has been completed. the matter is disposed of and cannot be reopened. It may turn out thereafter that the purchaser finds that he can make a more profitable use of the land than the use upon the basis of which he bought it; or he may be unfortunate and find that he cannot. In either case he cannot reopen the transaction. But under Clause 17, if, within a period of five years, it should turn out that the acquiring authority is able to make a more profitable use of the land than the one upon the basis of which the acquisition had taken place, then the vendor can reopen the matter and get the benefit of the more profitable use. If, however, it should turn out that the acquiring authority is not able to make use of the land upon the basis of which it had bought, and that it could use it only less profitably, then it is not open to the acquiring authority to reopen the transaction and recover from the vendor the additional price paid for the land.

I think, therefore, that this clause creates two very undesirable principles. One is this idea of reopening a transaction once it has been completed, with every opportunity for both parties to effect the transaction on the best possible information available at the time; and the other is the one-sidedness, if it is decided to reopen it. of the basis upon which it can be reopened—that is, that it can be reopened only by one party to the transaction and not by the other. I think this is grossly unfair. It is wrong in principle. It is giving to owners of land, in addition to the benefits of the Bill, about which I am not complaining—namely, the opportunity of selling at market value—an additional benefit which is quite without justification. Further, it will create a state of unsettlement and sterilisation of land for five years, because no local authority, realising the possibility that another use of the land may be available, will be inclined to rush into that and accept that principle within the period of five years. So, whilst this provision will not, in practice, inure very much to the benefit of owners, because of this natural tendency on the part of local authorities to wait for the five year period before making any change of user, it will have the great disadvantage that it may hold up development for that period of five years. It is for these reasons that I attach so much importance to this Amendment, and I beg to move.

Amendment moved—

Leave out Clause 17.—(Lord Silkin.)

3.9 p.m.

LORD HYLTON

The noble Lord who has just sat down made reference to a remark which I made on Second Reading, and I think it will help, perhaps, if I clarify what was in my mind at the time. It is within the recollection of many of your Lordships that during the last ten years local authorities have bought land at existing use value under present legislation for a specific purpose, sometimes by compulsory powers, sometimes by agreement. They have then changed their minds, and the land has been sold by the local authority in the open market at open market prices. That is what I referred to on Second Reading. The owners felt themselves most unjustly treated, and not surprisingly. It was that aspect to which I was drawing attention on Second Reading. The only comment I wish to make on the noble Lord's Amendment is that, to my mind, local authorities acquiring land, either under compulsory powers or by agreement, should act much more in the fashion of trustees of the public than as private dealers in land, as the noble Lord phrased it. The two things are quite separate and, to my mind, not on the same footing. I do not see that it helps at all to suggest that local authorities are in the same position as ordinary commercial dealers.

LORD SALTOUN

I should like to traverse two statements that the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, made. First of all, I think I must declare an interest, because in the example I am going to put before your Lordships the position may actually affect me financially, whether profitably or not. I and my family before me have been engaged in planning a town for the past 400 years. On one occasion I produced in your Lordships' House the first Ordnance Survey of that burgh, to show how we had discharged our duty. It is a public document of which I am extremely proud, but I remember the concentrated lack of interest indicated by the youthful hacks on the Treasury Bench in front of me when I produced it.

A few years ago, all our responsibility for the planning, of the burgh was taken away from us and vested in the county council. A whole lot of land which was ripe for development had been scheduled by the county. We were not consulted in any way when the categories of that land were affixed. I do not mind telling you that the original plan—which, thank Heaven! we managed to kill, after a great deal of money had been spent on another plan—proceeded on the idea that the drainage went to the south-east instead of to the north-west. But there is now a new plan on which we have not been consulted and which we now learn will include a public open space entirely surrounded by dwelling-houses except for one small entrance. I said on Second Reading that that is contrary to good public policy and to good planning and likely to lead to unpleasant occurrences which ought to be avoided, so many examples of which we have to deplore to-day.

Supposing that we can get the plan altered from that of a public open space to housing development, which it ought to be, I do not see why, if the land had to be acquired under one condition, the planning authority should not pay a sum adequate to the new condition. The noble Lord, Lord Silkin, said that this is a perfectly free bargain entered into by everybody with full knowledge. That is not so. The planning authority have powers which prevent its being a perfectly free bargain on all sides. As I have shown, there are examples where one of the parties affected may know nothing about the bargain to which he is being compelled until it is too late to object. That invalidates the noble Lord's argument. I entirely agree with what he said at the end about the local authority waiting for five years. I said that on Second Reading. I very much hope that the Government will riot accept the Amendment which has been so eloquently put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Silkin.

LORD LATHAM

This clause and the associated clauses, Nos. 18 and 19, in my submission, are really iniquitous. The members of the Barlow. Scott and Uthwatt Committees must have turned in their graves at the proposal to penalise the acquisition of land for public purposes in the way it is proposed to do in these clauses. In the debate on Second Reading it was suggested, I think with veracity, that we are going back to 1919 as regards the compensation to be paid for land acquired by public authorities. In point of fact, in the provisions of Clause 17 we are going back much farther. We are going right back to the Lands Clauses Act of last century, and not even that Act provided that the acquiring authority should pay an additional sum of compensation if the land acquired was used for a more beneficial purpose.

I should like to refer to the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Hylton, on what my noble friend Lord Silkin said. He stated that there had been cases of local authorities buying land at the then existing use price and later selling it. That may be so; but, of course, this clause applies not only to cases where the local authority may sell the land but also to cases where they may use the land for a more beneficial public purpose. I would remind the noble Lord that the transactions to which he refers were done on the existing basis of ascertainment of compensation—the existing use plus development at 1947. But under this Bill that basis of ascertainment of market value goes. The market value is to take account of the several conditions set out in the Bill and the purpose of this Bill is to establish a market price which is common and as applicable when the owner sells to a public authority as it would be when he sells to a private purchaser.

Moreover, in the past if a local authority bought land on the basis of existing user and then sold it, they were bound to sell it at the then current price, fixed or approved by the district valuer, or the local authority would have been in trouble with the district auditor. The whole purpose of this Bill is to discontinue treating a local authority who are buying land differently from an ordinary private person; it is the whole ostensible purpose of this Bill to abolish the two-price system. The White Paper, in paragraph 1, says: This part of the Bill has as its main object the return to market value compensation for land. The market value of land, in our submission, does not include the right to reopen the transaction during a period of five years.

At the present time the owner is in, and will be in under this Bill, a preferential position as regards price, because the market price must be ascertained by reference to the permitted use of the land. If there has been no indicated permissible use, under the development plans or otherwise, then the use is to be assumed; if there are alternative uses the vendor can select that one which is most valuable; if then he is not satisfied, he can go back to the Third Schedule to the Act of 1947; and if he is still unsatisfied, there is, as my noble friend Lord Silkin said, appeal to the Lands Tribunal. No vendor to a private purchaser has those advantages and those alternatives. Yet he is given the added right, under Clause 17 and the related Clauses 18 and 19, if the land acquired by the local authority is developed for a more profitable and valuable purpose, to claim additional development compensation over a period of five years. How this compensation will be ascertained, and how this provision will operate, it is a little difficult to discern, except on the footing that the market price will be divided into two elements: one that is unaffected by the development which may take place, and the other related to the development which was assumed at the time the purchase price was fixed; and if, as a result of different development, that element is assessed at a larger figure than it was as a part of the original sale price, then the local authority is under obligation to pay that additional sum.

This proposal in operation cannot, in my submission, fail to hamper, and to a large extent seriously impair, the power which it is proposed under the Bill to give to local authorities to purchase land in advance of requirements. If they purchase land in advance of requirements, it is because at that time they have not decided the purposes for which they will use the land. That power which it is proposed to give to local authorities is a power not only to enable them to get the land in advance of requirements, but also to avoid their having to pay for the increase in the value of the land which results from their own activities and from the efforts of the community, as was said by the present Prime Minister when he was Minister of Housing and Local Government. In discussing the Bill of 1952, he said that it must be remembered that in many oases the increased value was created by the efforts and expenditure of the community.

So we take the view that this proposal is one at variance with social justice. It will penalise local authorities. It cannot fail to have a hampering and frustrating effect upon good planning, because if a local authority find at the end of a period within the five years that a different kind of development would be to the public interest, they will have to take into account that if they carry out that desirable development it will cost them more money. Moreover, accounts for projects in respect of which local authorities have purchased land will have to remain open for five years; claims for grant, if the land is bought for a grant-earning service, 'will have to be left open until the five years has expired; and, as my noble friend Lord Silkin said, there is no recovery by the local authority if subsequent development or user of the land should result in its being of a less value than has been paid at the time of acquisition.

It is a strange and ironical situation that we should in the year 1959 be considering a proposal of this kind, when one remembers the enthusiasm with which the proposals of the Uthwatt Committee were received in this House in 1942, and when, indeed, it was almost a blasphemy to question the Uthwatt Report and the principles which it laid down. There the guiding principle was that the public should have the benefit of the values which the public efforts and expenditure created. Now we are proposing to say to a vendor to a public authority that he can have it both ways: that if, for any reasons whatsoever—few of which will be connected with him as vendor—within five years the land which he sells should go up in value, then he will get a better price; but if the land should go down in value, then the local authority will bear the loss. It seems difficult to discern how on the principle of equity and justice to the public weal such a proposal can be justified.

3.30 p.m.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR (VISCOUNT KILMUIR)

There is no doubt that on this Amendment there is a deep cleavage between the attitudes of mind on the respective sides of the Committee—that one must accept. I shall try to do justice to the sincerity with which noble Lords opposite hold their views, although I say at once that I cannot share them Perhaps I may just say one word on the point made by my noble friend Lord Saltoun, because, if I interpreted him, and have correctly identified the borough of which he was speaking, it is one of which I have very happy recollections. It is, moreover, one of the few places in which I have made a political speech, and thereafter, on an appeal for questions, the audience were so satisfied that not a single questioner responded. But apart from that, I told my noble friend Lord Saltoun during the Second Reading debate that I would convey, as I have conveyed, to my right honourable friend the Secretary of State the particular problem which he had in mind. I was interested and impressed by the way in which my noble friend used that problem as an example in support of the view for which we are now contending.

But the cleavage between us, I think, is shown very clearly—and I make no imputations in anything I say—by the difference of view between my noble friend Lord Hylton and the noble Lord, Lord Latham. Lord Hylton felt that it was a real embarrassment for the working of local authorities that up to the present moment they should have been able to acquire land for a particular purpose, at the reduced price of existing use value plus the share in the general sum, and then not use the land for that purpose and, instead, sell it at market value—because otherwise, as the noble Lord, Lord Latham, said, they would get into trouble with the district valuer or the auditors. I want to assure your Lordships that the view of my noble friend Lord Hylton and the embarrassment he felt about local authorities being placed in that position is widely shared and has been constantly brought to my attention over the last years. Therefore, I ask noble Lords to consider the position a little more closely than I think they have done at present.

The clauses in question give an owner a right to claim additional compensation where land which is bought at a price settled under the Bill for one purpose is within five years sold or used for a more profitable purpose. As I pointed out in the debate on Second Reading, under the Bill the compensation payable when land is acquired depends in large measure on the planning permissions which exist, or are assumed to exist, at the time, and which include permission for development for the purpose for which the land is being acquired. An acquiring authority may change their mind and say, quite legitimately—I am dealing with the matter on the basis adopted by Lord Silkin, and there is no question in my argument at all of bad faith—that, having obtained a fresh planning permission. they can use or sell the land for another purpose. There is not only the change of mind, but the fact that they have obtained a fresh planning permission, and I repeat that such a change need not—and in the infinity of cases does not—involve bad faith on the part of the authority.

Nevertheless, the effect on value can be so great that a change of purpose involving a new permission, if it occurs within a fairly short time of acquisition ought, in fairness, I believe, to reopen the compensation question. In most cases where there is a change of intention by the acquiring authority the land will not have been used since its acquisition, and might well have been left in the hands of the owner. I think that this is really the answer to the point the noble Lord, Lord Latham, urged. But for the compulsory purchase or the purchase with compulsory powers in the background. the owner would have been free to hold on to his land until the most advantageous moment to sell it. It would be manifestly unfair—and this is clear from the comments which have been made on the Bill, and also from those which arose before the Bill, that this is indeed public opinion—that an owner should receive a lower value for his land because an acquiring authority bought it too early at a time when they did not in fact need it for the purpose to which it is afterwards put.

I was careful to say that I am arguing this matter on the basis that the change of intention does not imply bad faith. But I ask noble Lords to face this point: is it really a proper use of compulsory powers? I thought that we were getting to an agreement with regard to the use of compulsory powers in the modern State. As I have said more than once to your Lordships, we all accept their necessity; we accept that if the modern State is to function well, if it is to do its job to provide a good life for free people, then it must on the one hand use compulsory powers for schools, factories, nuclear power stations and a great number of other benefits. But if it is to function properly, equally it must be fair to the individual.

The noble Lord, Lord Latham, put this on the proper basis—I entirely agree with his basis—of social justice. But social justice does not imply automatically coming down on the side of the State or the local authority or the big battalions against the individual. Social justice means that the individual must also get a fair deal. Conceding as I do the need for compulsory powers in the modern State, I urge the equal need for being fair to the individual citizen. If you use compulsory powers to get that individual's land for one purpose, and then you get planning permission or are in a position to use it for a more profitable purpose, why —I put it rhetorically—should that individual be sacrificed to the big battalion of the local authority? It is not the issue that he should not lose his land; he is going to lose his land and surrender it for the public purpose. That we are not disputing. All we are saying is that when he does lose his land then is it not right that he should get a fair price—a price co-related to the purpose for which the land is used and not a price related to an entirely different purpose?

That is the way we see it; and although one cannot put it an technical grounds I think one can say generally that compulsory powers are only given by Statute for a use that is not only a proper one, but also one that is an example. That is the standard of conduct which we in this country demand from public bodies, and I believe that when noble Lords have considered it they will see that it is not really a fair or proper use to exploit the individual in order that local authorities should get land at a cheaper price unrelated to their purpose. That is the way we see it. There will always be a difference, and it is one which on the wide view of politics, looking down the vista, is a healthy difference, between those who attach a greater importance to the community acting as a State or the local community acting through a local authority and the individual. All I can say—and I do not believe I am being old fashioned; I believe that I am looking properly to the future—is that you will never have a healthy or a happy State unless you deliberately seek a proper balance of fairness between the community and the individual. That is what we are trying to do here, and it is on that basis that I ask your Lordships not to accept the Amendment.

LORD SILKIN

The noble and learned Viscount has been, with respect, guilty of a very common fallacy in debate. He has assumed what he has to prove. He has assumed that this is an unfair basis to start with—that the present basis contains the possibility of exploiting individuals and that therefore this further provision is necessary. I deny that entirely. The basis laid down in this Bill is that on the day when the compulsory purchase takes place both parties do their best to assess what is the fair price. Elaborate machinery is contained in the Bill to ascertain the fair price on that day. It may be that within five years the value of the land has gone up. Will the noble and learned Viscount say that if within five years the value of that land has gone up, not because of any change in the use but because land all round has increased in value, it would be right for the vendor to come back and say "I sold that land at £1,000 an acre. To-day it is worth £3,000 an acre. I want the extra £2,000 an acre?" If he does not get that, is he being exploited?

Clause 17 agreed to.

Clause 18 [Supplementary provisions as to compensation under s. 17]:

3.54 p.m.

EARL BATHURST moved, in subsection (2), to leave out paragraph (b). The noble Earl said: This Amendment is introductory to the new clause that my noble and learned friend the Lord Chancellor will move. I bee to move.

Amendment moved— Page 25, line 6, leave out from ("mentioned") to end of line 15.—(Earl Bathurst)

That is the real difference between us. We say that once the deal has been done on the day on the basis of proper price on that day, that should be the end of the transaction, whether for better or for worse. It may go in favour of the local authority; it may go against them. I thought I would just say that. I do not think it is much good pursuing the argument, because whatever we say I know that the noble and learned Viscount is not in a position to agree with us. Therefore in the interests of getting on with the business. I suggest that we record our disagreement with this clause in the usual way.

On Question, Whether the said Amendment shall be agreed to?

Their Lordships divided: Contents, 19; Not-Contents, 38.

CONTENTS
Alexander of Hillsborough, V.	Lawson, L.	Silkin, L.
Amwell, L.	Lucan, E. [Teller.]	Stansgate, V.
Chorley, L.	Morris of Kenwood, L.	Stonham, L.
Crook, L.	Ogmore, L.	Uvedale of North End, L.
Granville-West, L.	Pethick-Lawrence, L.	Williams, L.
Greenhill, L.	Shepherd, L. [Teller.]	Wise, L.
Latham, L.
NOT-CONTENTS
Ailwyn, L.	Dundee, E	Meston, L.
Airedale, L.	Elliot of Harwood, Baroness Gage, V	Mills, L.
Amherst of Hackney, L.		Onslow, E. [Teller.]
Baden-Powell, L.	Goschen, V.	St. Aldwyn, E. [Teller.]
Bathurst, E.	Hampton, L.	Saltoun, L.
Boston, L.	Hawke, L.	Saye and Sele, L.
Buckinghamshire, E.	Howe, E	Sinha, L.
Carlisle, E.	Hylton, L.	Soulbury, V.
Chesham, L.	Jessel, L.	Strathalmond, L.
Coleraine, L.	Kilmuir, V. (L. Chancellor.)	Strathclyde, L.
Crookshank, V.	Lansdowne, M.	Waleran, L.
Devonport, V.	Margesson, V.	Woolton, E.
Dovercourt, L.	Merrivale, L.

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

EARL BATHURST

This Amendment is consequential on Clause 14. That clause refers to the special case of a change of occupier. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 25, line 25, after ("other") insert ("act or").—(Earl Bathurst.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

EARL BATHURST moved in subsection (4). This Amendment and Amendment No. 26, which takes effect in Scotland, might well be considered together, if the Committee approve. The Amendment arises because the word "dispose" in this clause and in the Amendments has such a wide application. It should be necessary to bring in a local planning authority only where the acquiring authority cease to hold any interest. This Amendment therefore provides that the obligation to notify the planning authority shall arise only where the acquiring authority cease to hold a freehold interest or a tenancy in the land. Obviously, it would be quite unnecessary—to give an example—that the Coal Board or British Railways should notify a planning authority every time they dispose of land to the telegraph or postal department. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 25, line 46, leave out from ("section") to ("they") in page 26, line 1, and insert ("cease to be entitled to an interest in the whole or part of the land comprised in the acquisition or sale, without remaining or becoming entitled to a freehold interest in, or tenancy of, that land or that part thereof, as the case may be").—(Earl Bathurst.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

EARL BATHURST

This Amendment makes possible the application of Amendment No. 25 to Scotland. The reason is that dominium utile in that land means freehold interest in the land. I beg to move.

Amendment moved⁁ Page 26, line 25, after ("1947") insert ("and for any reference to a freehold interest in any land there shall be substituted a reference to the dominium utile in that land").—(Earl Bathurst.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

EARL BATHURST

This Amendment is consequential on Amendment No. 21, and applies to Scotland and to special cases where property ownership has been transferred. I beg to move.

Amendment moved—

Page 26, line 36, at end insert—

1. "(b) for any reference to compensation under the last preceding section, of a reference to additional consideration as aforesaid, and
2. (c) for any reference to subsection (5) of the last preceding section, of a reference to paragraph (d) of subsection (9) of that section." —(Earl Bathurst.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Clause 18, as amended, agreed to.

3.58 p.m.

THE LORD CHANCELLQR moved after Clause 18 to insert the following new clause:

Extension of ss. 17 and 18 to planning permission where no planning decision made

"(1) The provisions of sections seventeen and eighteen of this Act (except subsection (2) of the said section eighteen) shall have effect in relation to any planning permission which, in accordance with any direction or provision given or made by or under an enactment, is deemed to be granted for any development, as if a planning decision granting that permission had been made at the time when, in accordance with the enactment in question, the permission is deemed to be granted:

Provided that, in the case of a direction given under an enactment which contains no provision as to the time when the permission is deemed to be granted, those provisions shall have effect as if such a planning decision had been made at the time when the direction is given.

(2) The provisions of sections seventeen and eighteen of this Act (except subsection (2) of the said section eighteen) shall have effect in relation to any planning permission which is granted for any development by virtue of a development order, as if—

1. (a) a planning decision granting that permission had been made at the time of the occurrence of the event in consequence of which (in accordance with the provisions of the order) the development is deemed to be sanctioned by a government department, or
2. (b) in a case not falling within the preceding paragraph, such a planning decision had been made at the time when the development is initiated.

(3) Where the provisions of section seventeen of this Act have effect as applied by subsection (1) or subsection (2) of this section, then if—

1. (a) before the time of the planning decision which is to be assumed in accordance with those provisions as so applied, a person who (in accordance with the provisions of subsection (1) of section eighteen of this Act as so applied) is entitled to give an address for service under that section has given such an address to the acquiring authority, and
2. (b) the development is proposed to be carried out by the acquiring authority, or, if it is proposed to be carried out by a person other than the acquiring authority, notice of that proposal is given to the acquiring authority by the person proposing to carry out the development,

it shall (subject to the next following subsection) be the duty of the acquiring authority to give notice of that proposal in the prescribed form to the first-mentioned person at the address given by him to the authority.

(4) An acquiring authority shall not be required by virtue of the last preceding subsection to give notice of proposed development to the person mentioned in paragraph (a) of subsection (1) of section eighteen of this Act at a time after an address for service has been given to them by such a person as is mentioned in paragraph (b) of the said subsection (1), if they have reasonable grounds for believing that the former person is dead or that any other act or event has occurred such as is mentioned in subsection (5) of section seventeen of this Act.

(5) Any reference in this section to subsection (1) of section eighteen of this Act shall include a reference to that subsection as extended by subsection (7) of that section."

The noble and learned Viscount said: This new clause is the centre of a series of Amendments. They are numbered 18, 23, then there is this new clause; and then Amendments Nos. 30, 31, 32, 33, and finally Amendment No. 124. They all belong to the same collection. As your Lordships are aware, the right to claim additional compensation arises where a planning decision giving permission for additional development is taken within five years from the acquisition of land. Clause 17 (7) was intended to cover all the relevant ways in which planning permission might be granted, and to define the date of the planning decision in all these circumstances. It does not, however, cover a planning permission which is granted by a development order, and in some cases there may be doubt about the date of a planning permission where a planning permission is deemed to be granted. The Amendments therefore delete the part of subsection (7) dealing with planning permissions that are deemed to be granted, and insert a new clause after Clause 18, which I am now moving, which extends the provisions of Clauses 17 and 18 to all the relevant special types of planning permission, and specifics in each case the date which is to be deemed as the date of the planning decision.

May I briefly indicate what the various parts of the clause do? Subsection (1) of the new clause deals with cases in which planning permission is deemed to be granted. I do not think I need trouble your Lordships with examples, but I can if they are wanted. Subsection (2) of the new clause, in paragraph (a), deals with a permission which is automatically granted when a Government sanction is given—and that covers certain cases under the Scottish General Development Order. Paragraph (b) covers the cases where no specific sanction is necessary. In such a case the date when the additional development is initiated is taken as the date of planning permission. Under subsection (3) the obligation to notify any person who has left an address for service arises only where the development is proposed to be carried out by the acquiring authority or where they are notified by the person proposing to carry out the development; and the remaining subsections of the new clause are concerned with supplementary provisions corresponding to the provisions in Clause 18. The other Amendments do the necessary tidying-up.

Amendment No. 23 deletes paragraph (b) of subsection (2) of Clause 18; Amendment No. 30 is entirely drafting and Amendment No. 31 removes words which were inserted to correspond to the words now deleted from Clause 18 (2) (b). Amendment No. 32 provides that the arrangements for notifications of parsons who have left addresses where the additional development falls under this clause shall be similar to those of the new clause; that is, the obligation to notify arises only where the development is to be carried out by the acquiring authority or where the acquiring authority have been notified by the person (in this case the Crown or a Duchy) carrying out the development.

I know that the drafting of Amendment No. 32 has caused difficulty to some of your Lordships because that has been communicated to me, but I would point out that all it does is to insert an additional subsection to provide that the provisions for notifications of previous owners contained in subsections (3) and (4) of the new clause after Clause 18 are to apply instead of the provisions of subsection (2) of Clause 18. The new provisions are appropriate to all cases where no application for planning permission is required. Subsection (4) of Clause 19 defines the time when additional development is to be taken to be initiated. A similar definition is required for the new clause. Amendments Nos. 33 and 124 therefore transfer the substance of subsection (4) of Clause 19 to the Interpretation Clause where it serves both Clause 19 and the new clause.

I am afraid that I have taken this Amendment rather quickly, but I thought it would be useful for your Lordships to have on paper what the clause does. If there are any points on which your Lordships may care to write to me, or which you may wish to raise on the Report stage, I shall be happy to do my best to deal with them. I beg to move.

Amendment moved—

After Clause 18, insert the said new clause.—(The Lord Chancellor.)

LORD MESTON

I wonder whether the noble and learned Viscount can kindly remind me of when permission is deemed to be granted.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

Permission may be deemed to be granted under Section 35 of the 1947 Act when a Minister who is authorising development under an enactment may direct that planning permission for such development shall be deemed to be granted. Another example of a deemed permission is development by local planning authorities in England and Wales for which permission is deemed to have been granted when the authority resolve to carry it out; and in such cases the time of the planning decision is the date of the direction or resolution, or else a date specified in the direction. I believe my noble friend will recall that I mentioned that there are certainly cases under the Scottish General Development Order, and where planning permission is granted by development order or deemed to be granted, where the original acquiring authority will have no means of knowing that such permission exists unless the development is to be carried out by them or they have been notified by the person proposing to carry out the development. That is the reason for subsection (3). I apologise to my noble friend Lord Meston if I took that matter rather quickly, but I wanted to give only an outline and not to detain the House. If there is any other point in his mind I hope that he will not hesitate to ask about it.

LORD MESTON

I am grateful to the noble and learned Viscount.

LORD LATHAM

I feel that it is an understatement to say that this is simple, but I should like the assurance of the noble and learned Viscount that the provisions of Clause 18 and the related Amendments to which he referred do not extend the operation of this principle beyond what was intended, to judge from the Explanatory Memorandum—namely, there is exempt from the provisions as regards additional compensation, as I understand it, land acquired under the provisions of the Housing Act, 1957, comprehensive development, land acquired in relation to a new town and also land in relation to town development under the Town Development Act. I gather that, notwithstanding the side-note regarding subsections (17) and (18), where no planning permission is given they do not extend the operation of this Bill any more than do the words of the clause.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

The noble Lord, Lord Latham, is quite right. This is merely procedural and does not extend the substantive rights.

LORD LATHAM

I thank the noble and learned Viscount.

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Clause 19 [Extension of s. 17 to Crown development]:

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

This Amendment is consequential. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 27, leave out lines 2 and 3 and insert ("sections seventeen and eighteen of this Act (except subsection (2) of the said section eighteen) shall apply").—(The Lord Chancellor.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

This Amendment also is consequential. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 27, line 6, leave out from first ("initiated") to end of line 8.—(The Lord Chancellor.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

This is another consequential Amendment. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 27, line 15, leave out from beginning to ("it") in line 17 and insert— ("( ) Subject to the next following subsection, subsections (3) and (4) of section (Extension of ss. 17 and 18 to Planning permission where no planning decision made) of this Act shall apply where the provisions of section seventeen of this Act have effect as applied by subsection (1) of this section as they apply where those provisions have effect as applied by subsection (1) or subsection (2) of the said section (Extension of ss. 17 and 18 to planning permission where no Planning decision made). ( ) Where by virtue of the last preceding subsection.")—(The Lord Chancellor.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

This Amendment again is consequential. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 27, line 26, leave out subsection (4).—(The Lord Chancellor.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Clause 19, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 20 [Exercise of powers of acquisition by agreement]:

4.9 p.m.

EARL BATHURST

With your Lordships' approval, this Amendment and Nos. 36, 42, 52 and 53 may well be considered together. This Amendment makes plain that the need for ministerial consent will be removed only from authorities mentioned in the Fourth Schedule, at page 77 of the Bill. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 28, line 20, after ("agreement") insert ("by an authority to whom this Part of this Act applies").—(Earl Bathurst.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Clause 20, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 21 [Exercise of powers of appropriation]:

EARL BATHURST

This Amendment is consequential. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 29, line 23, after ("Act") insert ("by an, authority to whom this Part of this Act applies").—(Earl Bathurst.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

EARL BATHURST

This Amendment allows the Minister of Agriculture to retain his power to adjust contributions to local authorities with regard to any smallholdings or cottage plots when these are disposed of by the local authority. I beg to move that this Amendment be agreed to.

Amendment moved— Page 30, line 11, leave out from ("and") to ("shall") in line 13.—(Earl Bathurst.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

EARL BATHURST

This Amendment is consequential. I beg to move.

Amendment moved—

Page 30, line 15, at end insert—

1. ("(i) under subsection (7) of section two of the Small Holdings and Allotments Act, 1926, as applied by section twelve of the Agricultural Land (Utilisation) Act, 1931 (whereby the consent of that Minister is required in certain cases in respect of transactions relating to cottage holdings), or
1014
2. (ii) in respect of any appropriation of land which, immediately before the appropriation, is land held for use as allotments;

but, in relation to any appropriation of land by an authority to whom this Part of this Act applies, where the consent of that Minister is required under section eight of the Allotments Act, 1925, so much of that section as requires consultation with the Minister of Housing and Local Government shall not apply").—(Earl Bathurst.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

EARL BATHURST

With the Committee's approval, Amendments 39, 40 and 41, with their Scottish equivalents, Nos. 49 and 50, can be considered together. They enable adjustment of amounts where land has received the grant and is to be disposed of. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 30, line 27, leave out ("such").—(Earl Bathurst.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

EARL BATHURST

This Amendment is consequential. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 30, line 27, leave out from ("appropriation") to ("shall") in line 28 and insert ("in relation to which subsection (1) of this section has effect").—(Earl Bathurst.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

EARL BATHURST

This Amendment is consequential. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 31, line 1, leave out from ("section") to ("shall") in line 2.—(Earl Bathurst.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Clause 21, as amended, agreed to.

Clauses 22 and 23 agreed to.

Clause 24 [Exercise of powers of disposing of land]:

EARL BATHURST

This Amendment is consequential on Amendment 35. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 32, line 8, after ("Act") insert ("by an authority to whom this Part of this Act applies").—(Earl Bathurst.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

4.13 p.m.

LORD COLERAINE

The purpose of this Amendment is to ensure that if land is compulsorily acquired in a shopping area, and is subsequently restored to its original use, then the trader occupying such land shall have the first refusal, either by way of purchase or by entering into a new tenancy, on reasonable terms, at a reasonable price. The arguments in favour of this Amendment can be stated very briefly. First of all, it would seem, on the face of it, that if traders have built up a shopping area they should not be deprived unnecessarily of the fruits of their labour by those who are coming into the area for the first time. It seems to me that unless there is some such provision as this in the Bill the multiple trader will be given a great advantage at the expense of the small private independent trader. I have nothing against the multiple trader; on the contrary—I am sure that he can sometimes serve a useful economic purpose and can give a better service to the consumer than the private trader. But I hope the Committee will agree that a Bill of this kind is not the proper way to advance the interests of the multiple trader at the expense of the private trader.

Amendment moved—

Page 32, line 20, at end insert— ("(b) land which consisted or formed part of a hereditament comprising premises partly or wholly used for trade or business purposes shall not be disposed of until the individual occupying such premises at the time of compulsory purchase has been granted the option of purchasing or leasing such land at a reasonable price if available for the purposes of trade or business.")—(Lord Coleraine.)

EARL BATHURST

I have much sympathy with my noble friend Lord Coleraine in his Amendment. Nevertheless, I am sure that in fact his fears are unfounded, because there is already a provision in Section 19 (b) of the Town and Country Planning Act, 1944, which is kept alive in the Eleventh Schedule to the 1947 Act, and which is specifically kept alive by paragraph (b) of subsection (3) of Clause 24 of this present Bill. This clause provides that the local authority shall secure, so far as may be practicable, to persons who are living or carrying on business or other activities in the area, whose land has been acquired and who desire to obtain accommodation in the area, an opportunity to obtain accommodation suitable for their reasonable requirements on terms settled with due regard to the price at which any such land has been acquired from them. I understand that that should meet the fears which the noble Lord has and which he submitted in his Amendment. I hope that my explanation will satisfy him.

LORD COLERAINE

I am much obliged for the assurance of the noble Earl, and of course I accept it, for his knowledge of these matters is far deeper than my own. In the light of that assurance, I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

EARL BATHURST

I beg to move this Amendment, which stands in the name of my noble and learned friend the Lord Chancellor. The Amendment requires that the "best price" requirement cannot be evaded by a local authority when they propose to dispose of land. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 32, line 38, after ("conditions") insert ("(including conditions as to payment or the giving of security for payment)").—(Earl Bathurst.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

EARL BATHURST

This, again, is dependent upon Amendment 43, and has regard to Section 47 of the Housing Act of 1957; and it is necessary due to Amendments in another place in order that the "best price" requirement should not be evaded. This Amendment, therefore, deletes the reference under that 1957 Act.

Amendment moved— Page 32, line 40, leave out from ("that") to end of line 43.—(Earl Bathurst.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

EARL BATHURST

This Amendment has been found necessary because the present wording was found to be incomplete. The Amendment covers all types of Exchequer payment in respect of houses. It is a technical Amendment, and covers the intention to keep control over grant-aided houses, as at present.

Amendment moved— Page 33, line 6, leave out from first ("of") to end of line 10 and insert ("that house any payment has been made (whether before or after the commencement of this Act) to a local authority under any of the enactments mentioned in subsection (2) of section fifty-eight of the Housing (Financial Provisions) Act, 1958, or under any enactment repealed by that Act or any earlier Act and re-enacted (with or without modifications) by any of the provisions mentioned in the said subsection (2)").—(Earl Bathurst.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

EARL BATHURST

This Amendment is consequential on Amendment No. 37 dealing with smallholdings and cottage plots. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 33, line 28, leave out from ("and") to ("shall") in line 30 and insert ("subsection (1) of this section").—(Earl Bathurst.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

EARL BATHURST

This Amendment also is consequential on Amendment No. 37. I beg to move.

Amendment moved—

Page 33, line 32, at end insert—

1. ("(i) under subsection (7) of section two of the Small Holdings and Allotments Act, 1926, as applied by section twelve of the Agricultural Land (Utilisation) Act, 1931, or under subsection (1) of section six of the said Act of 1926, or
2. (ii) in respect of any disposal of land which, immediately before the disposal, is land held for use as allotments;

but in relation to any disposal of land by an authority to whom this Part of this Act applies, where the consent of that Minister is required under section eight of the Allotments Act, 1925, so much of that section as requires consultation with the Minister of Housing and Local Government shall not apply.").—(Earl Bathurst.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

4.20 p.m.

EARL BATHURST

This Amendment protects a purchaser who may subsequently purchase from a local authority land which has originally been compulsorily acquired. Nevertheless, it does not absolve the local authority who is selling the land from the need to obtain consent from the Minister in cases where this is necessary. In subsection (2), paragraphs (a), (b) and (c), of Clause 24, the cases where it is necessary for a consent to be obtained from the Minister by the local authority are stated. I beg to move.

Amendment moved—

Page 33, line 32, at end insert— ("(4) In favour of any person claiming under an authority to whom this Part of this Act applies, a disposal of land purporting to be made by that authority shall not be invalid by reason that any consent required by subsection (2) of this section has not been given; and a person dealing with such an authority, or with a person claiming under such an authority, shall not be concerned to see or inquire whether any such consent has been given.")—(Earl Bathurst.)

LORD SILKIN moved, as an Amendment to the Amendment, after "subsection (2)" to insert "or subsection (3)".

The noble Lord said: I beg to move an Amendment to the Amendment which has just been moved. On an earlier occasion I moved an Amendment which I explained had been suggested by the Royal Institute of British Architects, and the noble and learned Viscount the Lord Chancellor, while speaking in very commendatory terms about that Institute, did not think it was a particularly appropriate body to suggest Amendments to this Bill. I hope I now come along with more respectable auspices from the noble and learned Viscount's point of view—namely, the Law Society. They are very concerned about this particular clause.

As the Committee will have in mind, the clause deals with cases where the consents of various Government Departments are necessary for the disposal of land. That is a very embarrassing position from the point of view of private purchasers of land. It is not always easy, in all cases, to ascertain whether consents are necessary, and whether those consents have been given: and from a purely conveyancing point of view it creates great difficulties. That has been recognised in part by the Amendment which has just been moved by the noble Earl, because that provides that in certain cases —in cases dealt with under subsection (2) of the clause a person dealing with such an authority… shall not be concerned to see or inquire whether any such consent has been given. The purpose of my Amendment is that this provision should apply not only to the cases dealt with in subsection (2) but also to the cases dealt with in subsection (3) of the clause. Subsection (3) provides for cases where the consent of the Ministry of Town and Country Planning is necessary, for cases of common land, and so on. It seems to me that it would very much simplify procedure if a prospective purchaser was not concerned to inquire whether the necessary consent had been obtained, and have to run the risk that the transaction might be invalidated if, in fact, a necessary consent had not been obtained. As I say, this is already provided for in a number of cases—namely, those dealt with in subsection (2) of the clause—and my Amendment would seek to extend that to matters dealt with in subsection (3).

I may say, in passing, that I think my Amendment is possibly defective in drafting, because it might necessitate some amendment of subsection (3) itself; but I hope the noble and learned Viscount the Lord Chancellor will not take advantage of that point, and that he will be able to accept my Amendment in principle and deal with the thing with the necessary amendments at the next stage. I beg to move.

Amendment to Amendment moved— After ("subsection (2)") insert ("or subsection (3)").—(Lord Silkin.)

EARL BATHURST

I am more than pleased to be able to tell the noble Lord opposite that my noble and learned friend finds himself able to accept all the principles which the noble Lord has embodied in his Amendment. He is right: apparently his Amendment is defective in certain wordings, as to which I am not surprised; but my noble and learned friend undertakes to embody all his meaning in a further Amendment at another stage.

LORD SILKIN

In expressing my gratitude, may I say that I wish he had told me that at the outset of my remarks. It would have saved my making a speech.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

May I say that my noble friend suggested that, but I was anxious that on this occasion, when we were accepting what the noble Lord said, we should have the full advantage of such a joyous event; but I am sorry to have given him the trouble. I take it that the noble Lord is not pressing his Amendment to my Amendment.

LORD SILKIN

I do not want to delay the Committee, but, as a matter of fact, is not the original Amendment incorrect? Will it not need an amendment of subsection (3)?

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

I should like to consider that.

LORD SILKIN

I will withdraw my Amendment, and perhaps it can be replaced if necessary.

Amendment to Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

EARL BATHURST

This Amendment —and, with your Lordships' permission, Amendments Nos. 50 and 51 might also be considered—is consequential on Amendment No. 39, which makes sure that provisions in Scotland are the same as those in England. They provide for the adjustment of accounts with regard to grant-aided property. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 33, line 38, leave out ("such").—(Earl Bathurst.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

EARL BATHURST

This Amendment is consequential. I beg to move. Page 33, line 38, leave out from ("land") to ("shall") in line 39 and insert ("in relation to which subsection (1) of this section has effect").—(Earl Bathurst.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

EARL BATHURST

This Amendment is also consequential. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 34, leave out lines 11 to 15.—(Earl Bathurst.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Clause 24, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 25 [Application of capital money on disposal of land]:

EARL BATHURST

This is consequential on Amendment No. 35, and might be considered in conjunction with No. 53. It is with regard to the removal of Ministerial consent only from the authorities listed in the Fourth Schedule. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 35, line 22, after ("money") insert ("by an authority to whom this Part of this Act applies")—(Earl Bathurst.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Clause 25, as amended, agreed to.

4.30 p.m.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR moved, after Clause 25, to insert the following new Clause—

Appropriation of land by parish councils and parish meetings

"—(1) Any land belonging to a parish council which is not required for the purposes for which it was acquired or has since been appropriated may, subject to the following provisions of this section, be appropriated by the council for any other purpose approved by the Minister of Housing and Local Government and the parish meeting.

(2) In the case of a rural parish not having a separate parish council, any land belonging to the parish meeting which is not required for the purposes for which it was acquired or has since been appropriated may, subject to the following provisions of this section, be appropriated by the parish meeting for any other purpose approved by the Minister of Housing and Local Government.

(3) A parish council or parish meeting shall not create or permit any nuisance on land appropriated by them under this section.

(4) The appropriation of land by a parish council or parish meeting under this section shall be without prejudice to any covenant or restriction affecting the use of the land in their hands.

(5) In the case of an appropriation under this section of land acquired under any enactment or order incorporating the Lands Clauses Acts, any work executed on the land after the appropriation has been effected shall, for the purposes of section sixty-eight of the Lands Clauses Consolidation Act, 1845, be deemed to have been authorised by the enactment or order under which the land was acquired.

(6) Where, by virtue of any enactment other than this section, a parish council have power, with or without the consent of a Minister, or may he authorised, to appropriate land for any purpose, the power conferred by subsection (1) of this section shall not be exercisable by the council for that purpose in relation to that land.

(7) The power conferred by subsection (2) of this section shall not be exercisable by a parish meeting in relation to any land for any purpose for which the parish meeting are or could be empowered (subject to the requisite consents) to appropriate that land under section twenty-two of the Land Settlement (Facilities) Act, 1919, or for which they may be authorised to appropriate that land under section forty-two of the Act of 1947.

(8) Subsections (1) and (2) of section twenty-two of this Act shall apply in relation to an appropriation of land by virtue of this section, as if parish councils and parish meetings were authorities to whom this Part of this Act applies.

(9) This section shall not apply to Scotland."

The noble and learned Viscount said: I rise to move this new clause, which might be considered with Amendment 121A, to Clause 46, page 62, line 36.

This new clause gives to parish councils, and to parish meetings where there is no parish council, a general power to appropriate land, which is not required for the purpose for which it is held, to another purpose approved by the Minister of Housing and Local Government and the parish meeting. The clause follows the pattern of the general power in Section 163 of the Local Government Act. 1933, which is available to local authorities other than parish councils. Parish councils have some limited powers of appropriation at present but are sometimes embarrassed by the absence of a general power, and this new clause is moved in response to a request from the National Association of Parish Councils.

The clause gives powers in addition to, but not in place of, the existing powers of parish councils, and this is made clear by subsection (6). In the case of parish meetings, however, the clause will provide a method of appropriation which is exercisable directly—that is, without an order from the county council under Section 273 of the Local Government Act, 1933; but appropriations of allotment land, and of commons, open spaces and the like must still follow the existing procedure. That is the effect of subsection (7). The other Amendment to which I referred is a drafting Amendment rendered necessary because of the application of subsections (1) and (2) of Clause 22 which is contained in subsection (8) of this clause. The expression "grant aided functions" occurs in Clause 22 (2) (a). I hope that I have indicated where the powers of the Minister are retained and that your Lordships will agree that this is a fair method of dealing with the parish councils' point. I beg to move.

Amendment moved—

After Clause 25 insert the said new clause.—(The Lord Chancellor.)

LORD JESSEL

I had thought of moving an Amendment to the noble and learned Viscount's Amendment, with the object of striking out from the new clause, in subsection (1), the words "the Minister of Housing and Local Government." In cases of re-appropriation, is it really necessary for parish councils to go to the Minister? Parish councils remain in possession of the same lands as they have held before, and the only issue is whether the inhabitants approve of their land being put to a different statutory use. Cannot they be trusted to do that on their own? I would ask the noble and learned Viscount to consider this point carefully and see whether he can do anything about it on Report stage. I submit that it is a different story in subsection (2). In that case there is no parish council and Ministerial supervision may be necessary.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

I sympathise with my noble friend's anxiety to help parish councils and I recognise the admirable work they are doing. I have happy recollections of having addressed the annual meeting of their Association a year or two ago. On the other hand, I think my noble friend will agree that we cannot claim that parish councils must necessarily be treated in exactly the same way as larger local authorities. They do not normally have expert advice available to them from qualified officers, and this is recognised in the Bill, which does not remove the need for Ministerial consent for other land transactions of parish councils. I think that it would be inconsistent with the rest of Part II of the Bill to give to parish councils power of appropriation which is free from the need for consent. That is the view with which I came into the Chamber. I will consider what my noble friend Lord Jessel has said, but I am sure that he will not want me to do more than consider. I cannot go further than that. I hope that on that undertaking he will not find it necessary to put an Amendment.

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Clause 26 [General provisions relating to Part II]:

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

This Amendment is consequential. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 38, line 9, leave out from beginning to ("may") in line 15 and insert "Any reference in this Part of this Act to an enactment whereby a power is conferred on an authority to whom this Part of this Act applies, or on a class of such authorities—

1. (a) shall be taken to include any enactment whereby the power in question is conferred on local authorities generally, or on a class of local authorities which includes a class of authorities to whom this Part of this Act applies, or is conferred on a class of authorities to whom this Part of this Act applies together with any other class of local authorities, but
2. (b) shall not be taken to include any enactment whereby (without particular reference to local authorities, or to bodies of any description specified in the Fourth Schedule to this Act) a power is conferred generally on persons of a description specified in the enactment, notwithstanding that one or more authorities to whom this Part of this Act applies".—(The Lord Chancellor.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Clause 26, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 27 [Proceedings for challenging validity of certain orders and decisions]:

4.34 p.m.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR moved, after subsection (1) to insert: Without prejudice to the preceding subsection, if—

1. (a) the authority directly concerned with any order to which this section applies desire to question the validity of that order on any of the grounds mentioned in paragraph (a) of the preceding subsection, or
2. (b) the authority directly concerned with any action on the part of the Minister to which this section applies desire to question the validity of that action on any of the grounds mentioned in paragraph (b) of the preceding subsection,

the authority may, within six weeks from the date on which the order is confirmed or the action is taken, as the case may be, make an application to the High Court under this section.

The noble and learned Viscount said: This Amendment and No. 59 can go together. Rights of appeal under this clause are at present given to "persons aggrieved", which apparently would include planning authorities only where they are financially affected. This is as a result of the decision in a recent case in the High Court, Ealing Borough Council v. Jones, reported in the Law Times of February 6, 1959, at p. 80. This Amendment, therefore, extends the rights of appeal to authorities directly concerned which are defined by Amendment No. 59. These authorities are: first, a local authority other than the local planning authority, where it made the order or the original planning decision which has led to the appeal under the clause; second, the local authority or statutory undertakers in whose name a purchase notice has been confirmed under Section 19 of the 1947 Act, and third, in any other case, the local planning authority. However, under the proviso, where the first type of authority was acting under powers delegated by the local planning authority, the right of appeal may by agreement between the two authorities be transferred to the local planning authority. This will enable the local planning authority to appeal at their own expense, if the delegate authority are disinclined to do so. I beg to move.

Amendment moved—

Page 39, line 31, at end insert the said subsection.—(The Lord Chancellor.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

This Amendment and Nos. 57 and 64 can conveniently be taken together. Clauses 27 and 28, relating to appeals to the High Court, make the new remedy available at the commencement of the Act and remove existing remedies from that date. This may cause confusion in relation to orders or actions made or taken before that date. The first two Amendments, therefore, provide that Clause 27 shall apply to orders made or to action on the part of the Minister taken after the commencement of the Act, and the third provides that Clause 28 shall apply to decisions of the Minister under Section 17 of the 1947 Act taken after the same date. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 39, line 32, after "orders" insert "made after the commencement of this Act". —(The Lord Chancellor.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

This Amendment may be considered with No. 58. These two Amendments make good omissions in the list of orders and actions to which the clause applies. The first adds to paragraph (a) of subsection (2) orders made under Section 21 of the 1947 Act, as applied by or under other provisions of that Act—for example, under tree or building preservation orders or in relation to advertisements. The second adds to paragraph (c) of subsection (3) decisions by the Minister on purchase notices served under Section 19 of the 1947 Act as applied by Section 59 of the 1954 Act. This section deals with cases where an application for permission for industrial development is made without a certificate from the Board of Trade that the development would be consistent with the proper distribution of industry and empowers the local planning authority to refuse such an application so as to found a claim for compensation or purchase. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 39, line 36, at end insert "or under the provisions of that section as applied by or under any other provisions of that Act."—(The Lord Chancellor.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

This is a consequential Amendment. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 40, line 10, at end insert ("taken after the commencement of this Act").—(The Lord Chancellor.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

This, too, is a consequential Amendment. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 40, line 23, after ("Act") insert ("or of the Act of 1954").—(The Lord Chancellor.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

This Amendment is consequential on No. 54. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 42, line 28, at end insert ("and any reference to the authority directly concerned with any order or action to which this section applies—

1. (a) in relation to an order made by a local authority other than the local planning authority, and in relation to any decision of the Minister on appeal from a decision made by such a local authority, is a reference to that local authority;
2. (b) in relation to any such decision as is mentioned in paragraph (c) of subsection (3) of this section, is a reference to the council on whom the notice in question was served, and, in a case where the Minister has modified such a notice, wholly or in part, by substituting another local authority or statutory undertakers for that council, includes a reference to that local authority or those statutory undertakers;
3. (c) in any other case, is a reference to the local planning authority:

Provided that if, in a case falling within paragraph (a) of this subsection, the order or decision in question was made in the exercise of functions delegated to the other local authority by the local planning authority, and it is agreed between the two authorities that the local planning authority shall act in the matter, the reference shall be construed as a reference to the local planning authority").—(The Lord Chancellor.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

This is a further consequential Amendment. I beg to move.

Amendment moved—

Page 43, line 2, leave out ("and").—(The Lord Chancellor.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

EARL BATHURST

This Amendment is consequential on Amendment No. 54, and is the Scottish equivalent whereby an aggrieved local planning authority in Scotland will have a right of appeal. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 43, line 9, at end insert ("and (e) notwithstanding anything in subsection (10) any reference to the authority directly concerned with any order or action to which this section applies shall be construed as a reference to the local planning authority, and in relation to any such decision as is mentioned in paragraph (c) of subsection (3) of this section, being a decision confirming the notice in question subject to the substitution of another local authority or statutory undertakers for the local planning authority, shall be construed as including a reference to that other local authority or those statutory undertakers.")—(Ear Bathurst.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Clause 27, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 28 [Appeals from certain decisions under Town and Country Planning Acts]:

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

This Amendment may be considered with Amendment No. 63. These Amendments give to the local planning authority (in addition to the person who applied for a determination, as at present) a right to appeal to the High Court on a point of law against the Minister's decision under Section 17 of the 1947 Act. The right of appeal is given only to the local planning authority and not to other local authorities because a decision under Section 17 is a decision of law and not of planning merits. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 43, line 16, after ("to") insert ("either of the following, that is to say".—(The Lord Chancellor.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

This is a consequential Amendment. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 43, line 17, at end insert ("and the local planning authority").—(The Lord Chancellor.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

This, too, is consequential. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 43, line 18, at end insert ("made after the commencement of this Act").(The Lord Chancellor.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

Subsection (1) of Section 17 of the 1947 Act provides that an application for a determination under that section may be made as part of an application for planning permission. This Amendment ensures that the clause shall apply to a decision following such an application. I beg to move.

Amendment moved—

Page 43, line 28, at end insert— ("(3) Where an application under section seventeen of the Act of 1947 is made as part of an application for planning permission, the preceding provisions of this section shall have effect in relation to that application in so far as it is an application under the said section seventeen, hut not in so far as it is an application for planning permission").—(The Lord Chancellor.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Clause 28, as amended, agreed to.

Clause s 29 to 31 agreed to.

Clause 32:

Publication of notice of applications for planning permission

(3) Provision may be made by a development order for designating the classes of development to which this section applies, and this section shall apply accordingly to any class of development which is for the time being so designated.

4.47 p.m.

LORD SILKIN moved, in subsection (3) after the second word "development" to insert: "and the type of application". The noble Lord said: This is a simple Amendment and, I hope, quite unobjectionable. This clause introduces an innovation in planning, and a welcome one, inasmuch as it provides an opportunity for people who have not been informed of a planning application, who are sometimes the owners of the property themselves, to receive notice of such an application and to make representations. Subsection (3) of the clause provides that provision may be made for informing such persons of the classes of development to which the clause applies. "Classes of development" has become a term of art. There is the use classes order, and all uses are divided into something like (I think it is) twelve classes, which are very wide; and the purposes for which development can take place within a class itself can be extremely wide.

I feel that a person who is likely to be affected by a planning application, and particularly the owner, is entitled to know not merely the class of development in the way I have defined it, but the actual type of development for which application is being made. I do not know whether the words "type of application" are the best that can be used, but I am anxious that a person affected should have the fullest information possible as to what is being proposed by the applicant. If other words would be more suitable, I should be perfectly willing to accept them. But I do want rather more particulars and more certainty than is covered by the term "classes of development". It is for that reason that I move this Amendment. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 47, line 30, after ("development") insert the said words.—(Lord Silkin.)

VISCOUNT GAGE

If the words suggested by the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, mean, as he says, that the clause covers the whole use class, I should agree that these additional words might be useful. Often when people are confronted with something of which they have not been previously warned there is a good deal of feeling, and I should have thought that full information was a good thing to put before the public.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

I sympathise with what the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, has said, although, frankly, before I heard his speech I was not clear what he had in mind. There is difficulty about "the type of application" as in the context of Part III of the 1947 Act, as it might be construed as enabling a distinction to be drawn between types of applicant, which would be undesirable. Therefore I would ask the noble Lord to allow me to have another look at it, and I will report to him before the Report stage how we are getting on in trying to find some words to suit his purpose.

LORD SILKIN

In those circumstances, I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 32 agreed to.

Clause 33 [Rights of owners where application made for planning permissin]:

4.50 p.m.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

As the clause stands, any person who wishes to apply for planning permission must notify owners unless he is the sole owner of all the land to which the application relates. Thus, for example, the tenant of a shop wishing to change his shop front would have to notify the freeholder under the provisions of the clause. This has been criticised as making the clause unduly onerous. The Amendment provides that a person is not obliged to notify other owners if he holds an interest in the whole of the land concerned as a freeholder or as a tenant. Notification between persons holding interests in the same land is thus left to any obligations that may exist under the contract between them. The clause will apply only to true "third parties". It will be recalled—the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, especially may have it in mind—that the Franks Committee recommendation on this point referred to third party applications only. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 48, line 6, leave out from ("that") to end of line 7 and insert ("in respect of every part of the land to which the application relates, the applicant is either the estate owner in respect of the fee simple or is entitled to a tenancy thereof").—(The Lord Chancellor.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR moved, in subsection (1), to leave out all words after the first "certificate" in paragraph (c), and insert: stating that the applicant is unable to issue a certificate in accordance with either of the preceding paragraphs, that he has given the requisite notice of the application to such one or more of the persons mentioned in the last preceding paragraph as are specified in the certificate (setting out their names, the addresses at which the notice of the application was given to them respectively, and the date of the service of each such notice) and that he does not know the names and addresses of the remainder of those persons; (d) a certificate stating that the applicant is unable to issue a certificate in accordance with paragraph (a) of this subsection, and that he does not know the names and addresses of any of the persons mentioned in paragraph (b) of this subsection. (2) Any such certificate as is mentioned in paragraph (c) or paragraph (d) of the preceding subsection shall also contain a statement that the requisite notice of the application, as set out in the certificate, has on a date specified in the certificate (being a date not earlier than the beginning of the period mentioned in paragraph (b) of the preceding subsection) been published in a local newspaper circulating in the locality in which the land in question is situated. (3) In addition to any other matters required to be contained in a certicate issued for the purposes of this section, every such certificate shall contain one or other of the following statements, that is to say,—

1. (a) a statement that none of the land to which the application relates constitutes or forms part of an agricultural holding;
2. (b) a statement that the applicant has given the requisite notice of the application to every person who, at the beginning of the period of twenty-one days ending with the date of the application, was a tenant of any agricultural hoisting any part of which was comprised in the land to which the application relates, and setting out the name of each such person, the address at which notice of the applicant was given to him, and the date of service of that notice."

The noble and learned Viscount said: This Amendment can be considered with Amendments Nos. 70, 71, 73 and 74. These Amendments do two things. First they prevent the advertisement system from being used too freely as a means of avoiding the notification of individual owners. An advertisement will suffice only where the applicant certifies that he does not know the names and addresses of some of the owners, and even so he must serve a notice on those he does know. Secondly, the provisions for the notification of an agricultural tenant are redrafted to provide that every certificate must contain a statement either that the application does not affect an agricultural holding or that the tenant of the holding has been notified. This removes from the local planning authority any obligation to satisfy itself whether or not the application relates to an agricultural holding. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 48, line 17, leave out from ("certificate") to end of line 43 and insert the said words.—(The Lord Chancellor.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

This Amendment is consequential. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 48, line 45, leave out from ("(b)") to end of line 46 and insert ("paragraph (c) or paragraph (d) of subsection (1) of this section, or by a certificate containing statement in accordance with paragraph (b) of the last preceding subsection").—(The Lord Chancellor.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

This Amendment is also consequential. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 49, line 11, at end insert ("or that he is the tenant of an agricultural holding any part of which is comprised in that land").—(The Lord Chancellor.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

LORD SILKIN moved, after subsection (3) to insert: (4) Any person who has made representations pursuant to subsection (4) of the preceding section or under subsection (2) (b) of this section or to the Minister under section fifteen of the Act of 1947, and who is aggrieved by the decision of the local planning authority or of the Minister, as the case may be, shall have the same right of appeal as if he were the applicant for planning permission in respect of which he is aggrieved as aforesaid.

The noble Lord said: We have now provided that people who may be affected by planning application shall have proper notice and the opportunity of making representations to the local planning authority. Subsection (4) of Clause 32 provides that the local planning authority shall take into account any representations relating to that application which are received by them … and that is all. It makes no provision for the hearing of those who have representations to make. It makes no provision for stating how those representations should be made, and still less does it provide any person who is dissatisfied with the decision of the local planning authority with a right to appeal.

The whole justification for Clauses 32 and 33 is that people may make application and obtain planning permission in respect of land in which they had no interest but in which they may hope to acquire an interest, and such a decision of the local authority on such an application may be prejudicial to the owner of the land. It may affect his opportunities of selling, or it may be that a decision has been refused by the planning authority which, if it had been put by the owner himself, might have been accepted. I suppose we must accept the general idea of anybody being allowed to make application for land in which he has no interest, but generally it is not a very desirable thing. But at least the person or persons who are affected by a planning decision ought, it seems to me, to have an opportunity of appealing to the Minister against such a decision in the same way as the person who has no rights over the land at all.

As it stands at present, you can have this extraordinary position. Somebody who has no rights at all over the land makes an application for planning permission and he is refused. He can appeal to the Minister, but the person who is the actual owner, and who is affected by any decision, has no right of appeal. This is something which ought to be remedied. It is not sufficient merely to say, as the previous clause says, that the persons affected should be entitled to make representations and any representation should be considered by the local authority. As I say, I think their rights ought to extend to their being able to appeal if they are dissatisfied with the decision of the planning authority. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 49, line 25, at end insert the said new subsection.—(Lord Silkin.)

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

If I may say so, I think the noble Lord has raised a most interesting point, and I should like him to consider, if I may put it that way, the reverse side of the shield. As he told us, his Amendment would give any person who had made representations under Clauses 32 or 33 and who was aggrieved by the decision of the local planning authority or the Minister, the same right of appeal as if he were the applicant for planning permission. My first point is not a debating one and I should like the noble Lord to consider it. He will remember that the question of appeals against the grant of planning permission was considered by the Franks Committee, and in paragraph 387 of their Report they recommended that no such right of appeal should be given to third parties. While I am not suggesting that the Franks Report is sacrosanct, nor am I putting it as a debating point that the noble Lord was a signatory of the Report, it is a Report which has earned general support from all Parties in both Houses and, therefore, one departs from it with hesitation.

The other point is the general one, that of course the basis of planning control, if I may say so to such an expert and master of it as the noble Lord, is to interfere with the freedom of an owner to do what he wishes on his own land only where that is contrary to the public interest; in other words, the governing factor is public interest. Of course, it is not the responsibilty of a planning authority or the Minister to act as an arbitrator between a man and his neighbour, and although Clause 32 will give a statutory opportunity, which as a matter of fact sometimes local planning authorities give of their own volition to-day, to third parties to make representations on applications for planning permission, to extend this to a right of appeal would be an infringement of the principle that I have just tried to state: that the planning authority are acting in the public interest and not as arbitrators between affected parties. I should have thought that there would be a similar objection to granting a right of appeal to owners against a decision taken on the application of a third party. The Amendment also suggests that a person who made representations should have the same right of appeal against the decision taken by the Minister as if he were an applicant for planning permission. As the noble Lord appreciates, there is no appeal on merits from the Minister's decision on a planning application. That is the other side of the question.

I see the noble Lord's point of view. He says, "If you go thus far, why cannot you logically carry through and develop your position?"? I think there is something in my point, namely, that the governing principle must be public interest; it must not be a question of arbitration between parties. After hearing the noble Lord I will willingly have another look at the matter. I know he will not hold me to anything. I always like to consider what he has said. This is, I think, an entirely objective point in which one is trying to get at what is best. If the noble Lord will leave it like that, I will have another look at it before Report stage.

VISCOUNT GAGE

I am glad to hear that my noble and learned friend is going to take this course. I feel that if this clause were widened to allow anybody objecting to a fried-fish shop to make an appeal to the Minister it would reduce the whole thing to absurdity. But I am very much impressed by what the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, said about owners' rights; and as the system of applying for planning consent on land without the owner's consent and without notifying the owner has been going on for some time and causing a considerable amount of trouble, this further point in regard to the owner's position might well be considered.

LORD SILKIN

I am much obliged to the noble Viscount for his illustration. If somebody wants to open a fried-fish shop next to my Georgian house which I am enjoying, and I make representations but eventually planning permission is given, I shall know nothing about the considerations which have prompted the local planning authority to give permission. They are not obliged to give any reason for giving permission. I am just informed—I am not sure whether I am informed, but I get to know—that planning permission has been given. I have no remedy whatever. Therefore I certainly think that this question is worthy of further consideration. May I just say this: that I refuse to be consistent. I see no reason why, having signed a Report two years ago, I should adhere to every single word of that Report, and why, when circumstances arise which make me think differently, as they do on this particular clause, I should not move an Amendment. The noble and learned Viscount did not really take me to task for being inconsistent. I am rather proud of it. I accept his offer to consider the question again and, in those circumstances, I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

This Amendment is consequential. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 49, line 41, leave out from ("land") to ("means") in line 42.—(The Lord Chancellor.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

This Amendment is also consequential. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 49, line 46, leave out from ("unexpired") to end of line 5 on page 50.—(The Lord Chancellor.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

EARL BATHURST

I beg to move this Amendment which stands in my noble friend's name. It is consequential on Amendment No. 68, which translates dominium directum under the Scottish Act. This phrase is merely to be construed as a reference to the owner of any land which is not held on feudal tenure. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 50, line 11, after ("1947") insert ("for paragraph (a) of subsection (1) there shall be substituted the following paragraph, that is to say— (a) a certificate stating that in respect of every part of the land to which the application relates the applicant is the proprietor of the dominium utile or is the lessee under a lease thereof'").—(Earl Bathurst.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

EARL BATHURST

This Amendment is consequential. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 50, line 13, leave out from ("land") to ("means") in line 14.—(Earl Bathurst.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

This Amendment is consequential. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 50, line 19, leave out from ("years") to end of line 23.—(The Lord Chancellor.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Clause 33, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 34:

Obligation to purchase resident owner-occupier's interest affected by planning proposals

(2) Subject to the following provisions of this section, any person who is a resident owner-occupier of such a hereditament as is mentioned in the preceding subsection and claims that—

1. (a) since the relevant date he has made reasonable endeavours to sell his interest in the hereditament, and
2. (b) he has been unable to sell it except at a price substantially lower than that for which it might reasonably have been expected to sell if no part of the hereditament were comprised in land of any of the descriptions mentioned in paragraphs (a) to (f) of the preceding subsection,

may serve on the appropriate authority a notice in the prescribed form requiring that authority to purchase his interest in the hereditament in accordance with the following provisions of this section.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

This Amendment and Amendments Nos. 96 and 144 can be considered together. They are drafting Amendments which are necessary because the paragraph dealing with trunk road and special road orders and schemes is at present drawn as though such orders and schemes defined areas of land, whereas in fact they define only the line of a road. The Amendment to Clause 34 at page 53, line 27, which is Amendment No. 96, removes a definition which becomes redundant with the disappearance from subsection (1) (e) of any reference to the Minister of Transport and Civil Aviation. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— >Page 51, line 1, leave out paragraph (e) and insert— ("(e) is land on or adjacent to the line of a road proposed to be constructed, improved or altered, as indicated in an order or scheme which has come into operation under the Trunk Roads Act, 1946, or the Special Roads Act, 1949, being land in relation to which a power of compulsory acquisition conferred by an enactment as applied by either of those Acts may become exercisable, as being land required for purposes of construction, improvement or alteration as indicated in the order or scheme, or").—(The Lord Chancellor.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

5.9 p.m.

LORD SILKIN

had given Notice of several Amendments to Clause 34, the first being, in subsection (2), to leave out "a resident" and to insert instead, "an" [owner-occupier]. The noble Lord said: I wonder whether I am right in supposing that if the Lord Chancellor's new clause following Clause 34 is accepted, as no doubt it will be, Clause 34 will become redundant.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

Very largely.

LORD SILKIN

In that event, perhaps it would be convenient to discuss together all these Amendments to Clause 34 and his new clause (Amendment No. 99). I suggest that we might have a general discussion on the policy to be adopted in the cases where land has been designated for compulsory acquisition and what should be the rights of owners to require the acquiring authority to purchase in anticipation.

On that basis I beg to move my first Amendment to this clause. It provides simply that the class of person concerned, instead of being a "resident owner-occupier"—that is, a person who is the owner of a house and is living in it—should be "an owner-occupier", but not necessarily in residence. It would widen the scope of this provision so that it would include persons carrying on business by way of a shop. It would not often apply to a person running a factory, because normally he would not be resident; it might, however, apply to the case of a person carrying on a small business in a workshop at the back of his house, or something of that kind.

I contend that a person who is living over a shop, for instance, who is threatimed with compulsory acquisition and who satisfies the conditions of Clause 34 (2), which, as the Committee will see, are pretty stringent conditions—namely, that (a) Since the relevant date he has made reasonable endeavours to sell his interest … and (b) he has been unable to sell it except at a price substantially lower than that for which it might reasonably have been expected to sell … if there had been no designation, or the equivalent—should have the same right as a resident owner-occupier. I believe that the noble and learned Viscount, in his Amendment, goes a long way, if not the whole way, to accepting that principle, and he would limit it to persons coming within the prescribed limit. If we are to have a general discussion I would suggest that would rather limit the scope of my Amendment. I do not necessarily object to a prescribed limit, although I should like to know what is in the mind of the Government —what sort of prescribed limit they have in mind. Is it by way of rateable value or type of premises, or what other kind of prescription have they in mind? I do not think it necessary to argue the case for my Amendment at any further length. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 51, line 16, leave out ("a resident") and insert ("an").—(Lord Siling.)

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

I do not know whether it would be convenient for your Lordships that I should make a general speech before my noble friends Lord Hylton and Lord Gage move their Amendments. The last thing I want to do is to stop my noble friend Lord Hylton making his speech, but if he thinks that what I suggest would be more convenient, I should be glad. If not, I will give way to him.

LORD HYLTON

I am sure that I should like to hear the noble and learned Viscount on this point. Then perhaps I may be allowed to reply.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

If that suits your Lordships, I shall be delighted to do it. I entirely agree with the noble Lord, Lord Silkin: I think that a general discussion would be most helpful and we could consider, if necessary, and if my noble friend the Deputy Chairman would allow it, adjourning the discussion, if that he the convenient course. As the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, says, this discussion really covers all the Amendments up to Amendment No. 100. Those Amendments really fall into three groups. The first group, in the name of my noble friend Lord Hylton, would extend the scope of Clause 34 and the Fifth Schedule to apply to all owners without limit—that is, if I may put it in my own words, investment owners as well as occupying owners. The second group, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, would extend the clause to all owner-occupiers. The third group, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Meston, would be a limited form of Lord Silkin's group. That, as I understand it, is the position.

May I first consider the proposition of my noble friend Lord Hylton? As I said, his Amendments would bring within the scope of the clause people who own property for investment purposes. The first point that occurs to me is that there is no fundamental difference between holding land and property for investment purposes and holding shares, and the income which one receives from the property takes account of the risks involved. Of course one must remember, as noble Lords have pointed out for their own reasons in regard to previous Amendments, that, with the change in the basis of compensation when land is ultimately bought by a public authority under the Bill, the full market value will be paid and therefore any capital is well secured. Moreover, the lack of security of tenure, which is the real cause of the blight with which the clause is concerned to deal, should not materially affect the marketability of the investment.

The real difficulty of bringing in investment owners, however, is that the value of an investment is affected by many factors. It would be wellnigh impossible to determine whether the value of an investment property had changed because of some blighting effect of local authority proposals or because of some change in the market. Local authorities might therefore find themselves forced to buy an interest in property which had not really been blighted by their proposals. Moreover, the time when the interest in property was off-loaded upon the local authority would be likely to depend not upon any genuine need to realise capital, in order to enable a man to find a new roof for his head, as in the other case, but merely because at that particular date the changes in the market were such that the money might be more profitably invested in something else. So to bring in investment property on the lines proposed would make public authorities liable to have to buy many interests in land long in advance of requirements, not in order to relieve hardship, but purely in order to enable the owners to make higher profits.

Lord Silkin's Amendment is, as he has said, on similar lines to, but goes further than, the Government's proposals. it would bring in all owner-occupiers of property, whereas the Government propose to place a limit on the property which is brought within the scope of the clause. I think that here, though to a lesser extent, the same argument applies: that it must be realised, especially with regard to business and commercial property as opposed to houses, that there are many factors affecting the value of the land, and without some limit very substantial property might be off-loaded upon a local authority when there was no real justification for that.

LORD SILKIN

I am very willing to accept a reasonable limit.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

I will come to that point. I wanted just to put the general argument. I will certainly deal with what we have in mind. Obviously, from what the noble Lord says, he sees the difficulty which we have been facing in considering this matter, but it is the aim of Her Majesty's Government to maintain and improve planning; and to place an unlimited liability of this nature on local authorities would mean that they would avoid disclosing any of their future projects and thus make a mockery of development plans.

I come for a moment to the two Amendments of the noble Lord, Lord Meston. They are intended to extend the clause to owner-occupiers of all types of property and not only to owner-occupiers of dwellings, but to limit its application to small businesses by the requirement that the section: shall not apply to a limited liability company unless the management thereof is in the hands of a person or persons who together, if more than one, are beneficially entitled to a minimum of two-thirds of the paid up share capital of such company. I have many memories of the days when I was a Law Officer and that kind of test had to be considered with regard to various forms of taxation. But I do not think it would limit the clause only to small companies. The condition would apply to some very substantial organisations. It is because a definition of this nature is difficult that Her Majesty's Government in their Amendment rely upon a financial limitation.

There is one point that I want to make because I know it has been very much in the minds of local authorities—that local authorities and other public authorities have ample discretion to buy in advance and, as responsible authorities, can be relied upon to exercise that discretion wherever they are satisfied that there is a genuine need for them to buy land in advance in order to avoid hardships. In the view of Her Majesty's Government the provisions they have made in Clause 34 and which they are proposing to make in the extension of that clause in the new clause, will meet practically all the really genuine cases of hardship with which the Government have set out to deal. We do not want to put extra burdens on local authorities for purely financial reasons.

May I come to the provisions of our own clause, which looks forward to Amendments Nos. 117 to 120? The new clause and the new Schedule follow the pattern of Clause 34 and the Fifth Schedule and provide corresponding rights which will be available for owner-occupiers of small shops and other businesses. They also give redress to owner-occupiers of farms. The rights are given first to owner-occupiers of hereditaments of which the net annual value, as it appears in the valuation list at the date of service of a notice under the clause, does not exceed a limit which is to be prescribed by Order, and the figure which my right honourable friend, the Minister, has in mind to prescribe initially is £250. That should cover the small working proprietor whom the Minister undertook to try to help, without bringing in very large business organisations. Noble Lords will observe that sporting and advertising rights are excluded by paragraph 8 of the Fifth Schedule.

Rights are also given to owner-occupiers of farms. These rights apply to those agricultural units which are units in the occupation of one person, who will be entitled to serve a notice under the clause if he holds an interest as an owner of which at least three years remain unexpired in a whole or part of a unit. In the case of a farm, the obligation to buy extends only to the affected area: that is, to so much of the farm as consists of land falling within any of the paragraphs (a) to (f) of subsection (1) of Clause 34; but by paragraph 6 of the new Schedule, compensation for severance will be payable where only part of an agricultural unit is required. In respect of an agricultural unit an additional grant for counter notice is provided—that the appropriate authority require part only of the affected area.

In these provisions which (unlike those in Clause 34 and the Fifth Schedule) are not limited to individuals but include firms and companies, special arrangements are made in paragraph 7 of the Fifth Schedule to deal with partnership firms. The noble Lord asked me about the inter-relation of the two sections. There will be a considerable degree of overlapping between the new clause and Schedule and Clause 34 and the Fifth Schedule. Clause 34 applies to houses with net annual value above the prescribed limit and these are likely to be few. The new clause has been put down quickly to give time for discussion and, if necessary, the possibility of merging the clause and Schedule will be considered before the Report stage.

I am sorry to say that there is a drafting error in subsection (3) (b) of the new clause. The words: and (in the case of an agricultural unit) is so upheld otherwise than on grounds relating only to part of the affected area, are not apt to deal with our purpose. In fact, it might look as if we do not intend to deal with our purpose. I want to assure your Lordships that that will be put right before the Report stage; but on second thoughts I felt it was valuable that on the Committee stage I should apprise your Lordships of the way our minds were working, and therefore I put this down. That is the view of Her Majesty's Government on the matter at the moment. I should be delighted to hear what the Committee think of it. If your Lordships agree, we might discuss this subject until about six o'clock and your Lordships might then consider it before the next part of the Committee stage. I am entirely in the hands of the Committee.

Loan SILKIN

I did not quite follow what was the prescribed limit. I wonder whether the noble and learned Viscount could repeat in a sentence what that limit is?

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

The figure which my right honourable friend, the Minister, has in mind to prescribe initially, is about £250.

LORD SILKIN

That is the value?

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

Yes, the annual value.

LORD MESTON

I am unable to understand why the Minister should be given power to prescribe any figure at all. Why cannot the figure of £250, or whatever figure is chosen, appear in the Bill?

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

I feel very strongly on that point as a general matter, but I have always been brought up to consider that when one is dealing with an experimental matter in legislation one ought to allow oneself flexibility; and therefore one ought to deal with that by subsidiary legislation. Though I am speaking from memory, I believe that that was what was said by the Donoughmore Committee, and that is the justification. I hope the noble Lord, Lord Meston, will understand that I have always felt very strongly that one should not use subsidiary legislation to take the place of legislation in your Lordships' House, but that is one of the admitted exceptions; and the limit is the net annual value of £250. I hope that that satisfies the noble Lord, Lord Meston.

5.30 p.m.

LORD HYLTON

If it is convenient now, perhaps I ought to move the Amendment standing in my name.

THE DEPUTY CHAIRMAN OF COMMITTEES (LORD AILWYN)

May I interrupt the noble Lord? There is an Amendment before the House in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, which should be taken.

LORD SILKIN

It would be quite in order for the noble Lord to speak to his Amendment, provided he does not move it.

LORD HYLTON

I think I had better speak to this Amendment. It deals entirely with blight owing to planning proposals, and this subject is almost as intangible as floating value, but we can all recognise it when we see it. The County Councils Association have asked me to move the Amendment dealing with ownership—ownership of "blight" properties as opposed to the position of the resident owner-occupier. The noble Lord, Lord Silkin, takes the matter halfway and, I think, deals with the owner-occupier, which would include owner-occupiers of shops and factories. I go further to the position of the owner of the property.

The County Councils Association, through both their highways committee and their town and country planning committee (and, of course, your Lordships will realise that they represent all the county councils in England and Wales and are a very formidable body), advocate that the Government's proposals should be enlarged to cover ownership. Without any more ado, they say that dealing only with resident owner-occupiership will lead to more anomalies; and, of course, this Bill fundamentally is a Bill to remove the anomalous position of two prices for land. Now, when we get to blight, we find we are back to the stage of two sorts of people who will be compensated to a varying degree in regard to blight. So, having cured—or we hope to cure—one set of anomalies on market value, we are setting up a system which will bear very harshly on different types of occupiers and owners.

It is only too easy to produce examples of what this can mean. There may be two houses standing side by side in a small street, one occupied by a lady suffering as regards blight, and compensation will be received; the house next door is owned by her sister, who does not occupy it, perhaps for some personal reason—she may be in bad health and have been told by her doctors to live at the seaside—and she will not receive any compensation for blight because she is not resident. We can all quote hundreds of examples of this nature; and it seems that we are creating conditions under which anomalies will flourish and multiply. That is a bad thing for planning and for the local authorities who have to carry it out.

I am sorry that the noble Lord, Lord Chorley, is not in his seat to-day, because when he was speaking the other day he seemed to think that planning could be carried out without the consent of the planned. He thought that so long as somebody had universal and totalitarian powers for purchasing and planning, his plan should be carried out and everything would be for the best. But that is not true. Planning does not work in this country on those lines. One cannot get complicated development plans agreed by consent unless one uses much more judgment and tact than the noble Lord, Lord Chorley, seemed to think was necessary. In this country planning can take place only by consent of the planned, because unless their consent is obtained so many obstructions and difficulties could be put in the way of the planners that the process would be so slowed down that nothing would happen. That is what actually occurs.

This differentiation between the resident owner-occupier, dealt with by the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, on the one hand, and the owner, on the other hand, is going to lead to just this feeling of unfairness. The two problems are similar except for the residential qualification. That is going to lead, I believe, to much ill feeling among those concerned. We are doing our best now to remove this feeling of Injustice regarding the price of land. Everybody is going to be put on openmarket price. But with these proposals in Clause 34, we are going back to a limited form of compensation which I am afraid will have some serious repercussions.

That is the view of the County Councils Association; and, I understand, the Association of Municipal Corporations do not object to that view. I do not know whether the noble Lord, Lord Milner of Leeds, can say anything on this point, but I believe that to be true. If it is true, that is a formidable weight of opinion in favour of widening the clause. One of the arguments put forward by the county councils is that they will have to carry the burden of the hardship compensation and hardship purchases, which the Minister is not very anxious to shoulder himself. I think that if one reads the proceedings of another place one will find that the Minister was reluctant to have to deal with more hardship cases, while on the other hand he did not seem to mind the local authorities having to deal with hardship cases and to make advance purchases.

I think there is some weight in the point that is made about the investment side of property-owning, and a good deal of support can well be given to the planning authorities when they make this sort of statement as one of principle. After all, they have to carry out the proposals of the development plans. Blight has been caused and will be caused by the proposals of development plans; and if it is their considered opinion that great difficulties will be encountered in the administration of the principle of making resident owner-occupation the qualification, then I hope the Government will give considerable thought to their recommendation. I will not move my Amendment at this stage, because I understand that nobody can quite move anything further at present.

LORD COLERAINE

I wonder whether my noble and learned friend can give me some guidance as to the effect of the statement which he has just made upon Amendment No. 88A, which I have down to be moved at a later stage. That Amendment tries to do two things. First, it tries to bring the small trader into the ambit of the clause—and I gather from my noble and learned friend that that is effectively being done by his new proposals. Secondly, it proposes that the definition of "owner-occupier" should be extended to cover not only someone who occupies a hereditament in right of a tenancy granted for a term of years certain but somebody who occupies it on a shorter tenancy provided that he has carried on a trade or business for not less than three calendar years prior to the date of serving notice under the subsection. As I argued on an earlier Amendment (I think an Amendment to Clause 13), there are a large number of small traders who do not have any tenancy agreement at all extending beyond, at the outside, a few months, but who have carried on trade in those premises under that agreement for many years and who might expect, in the ordinary course of events, to go on for many years to come. I should be grateful to my noble and learned friend if he could say whether any consideration has been given, or could be given, to that point.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

Perhaps I might deal with the point which my noble friend Lord Coleraine raises in his Amendment No. 88A. As I construe that Amendment it purports to add to the categories of resident owner-occupiers covered by Clause 34 the resident owner-occupier who occupies all or part of the hereditament as a private dwelling and who is carrying on a trade or business in part or the whole of that hereditament. That is logically right: I worked it out last night, with great difficulty. But, of course, it is possible to occupy a hereditament as a dwelling and carry on a business in the whole of it at the same time; so I think my remark was right.

I believe that this type of case is already covered by paragraph (a) of subsection (6), which brings in the whole of the hereditament where part is occupied as a private dwelling, no matter what use is made of the rest of it; and the clause already covers premises which are used partly as a dwelling and partly as business premises. Moreover, the Government's Amendment to insert the new clause after Clause 34 will bring in, subject to a limit of rateable value, hereditaments which are used wholly for trade or business purposes. I therefore think that both points are covered, and that in view of the Amendment which we have put down, my noble friend's Amendment is unnecessary.

LORD COLERAINE

I am very much obliged to my noble and learned friend.

LORD MESTON

May I invite the noble and learned Viscount's attention to Amendment No. 89, in respect of which I am in the same position? While on the subject of companies, we remember that under the Rent Restrictions Acts there was a valid question, which continued for years, as to whether or not a company could be in occupation of a dwellinghouse. I wonder whether the noble and learned Viscount the Lord Chancellor would kindly tell me whether a company comes within Clause 34 of the Bill.

5.47 p.m.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

I do not know what would suit the Committee best. We have opened our fire on this matter; and I have tried to put fully before the Committee the Government's proposals and to deal with our objections to Lord Hylton's case—that was, of course, before I had heard what he had to say. I want only to be the servant of the Committee in this matter. It might be con- venient if we adjourned now, and then noble Lords could make up their minds what Amendments they wished to move the next time: or, if necessary, I could reply now. I do not know whether the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, wishes to keep this matter alive, in view of what I have said.

LORD SILKIN

So far as I personally am concerned, I am satisfied with the new clause which the noble and learned Viscount the Lord Chancellor is to move after Clause 34. In those circumstances, I should be prepared not only to withdraw my Amendment No. 79, but not to move a number of others which are on the Paper and which are consequential. That would leave still on the Paper Amendment No. 80, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Hylton. I think that if the noble Lord, Lord Hylton, wants to pursue the matter, it would be better to postpone further consideration.

LORD HYLTON

I should like to look at what the noble and learned Viscount has said to-day. I see that we have two days before our next Committee meeting, and I shall by then be able to judge what best to do with Amendment No. 80 and the consequential Amendments arising from it.

VISCOUNT GAGE

I do not know whether it would simplify matters if I say this with regard to my Amendment, which I put down almost at the invitation of the Minister in another place and the noble and learned Viscount the Lord Chancellor here. I was disturbed about the position of agriculturists, and that is the reason for my Amendment No. 95: but that point has been met completely by one of the Government's new clauses. These new clauses are almost like a little Bill in themselves. The new clauses and Schedules are pretty comprehensive measures which have never been debated in another place, or on Second Reading here. Further, they have never really been considered by professional bodies. They are very important; and, therefore, in view of the general discussion we are now having, I think we should have an opportunity for complete freedom of discussion when the clauses are actually put forward.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

As I have said, I am perfectly willing to meet the wishes of the Committee. This is a difficult point. There are no Party politics in it; we are all trying to find out what is the fairest way of dealing with the problem. I should suggest that if my noble friend Lord Hylton wants to consider his action—I think that all noble Lords, after a few days for further consideration, would be ready to go on next time—I should move the adjournment of the consideration of this Amendment, if that meets with the general approval of your Lordships. I beg to move that the debate on this Amendment be now adjourned.

Moved, That the debate on the Amendment be now adjourned.—(The Lord Chancelor.)

On Question, Motion agreed to, and the debate adjourned accordingly.

House resumed.