Lords Sitting of 20 May 1958

Preamble
The House met at half past two of the clock, The LORD MERTHYR On the Woolsack.
Prayers
The Viscount Waverley—Sat first in Parliament after the death of his father.
ROYAL SCHOOL FOR DEAF CHILDREN MARGATE BILL
Read 2a, and referred to the Committee on Unopposed Bills.

KING JAMES II STATUE
2.36 p.m.
LORD AMULREE: My Lords, I beg to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
[The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government, whether they have any statement to make on the future of the statue of King James II.]
THE MINISTER OF STATE FOR COLONIAL AFFAIRS (THE EARL OF PERTH): My Lords, my right honourable friend the Minister of Works has given further consideration to this matter, in the light of the views expressed in your Lordships' House when the noble Lord asked a Question about it on March 25. In view of the strong desire of the Royal Fine Art Commission and of the Trustees of the National Gallery that the statue of James II by Grinling Gibbons should not now be removed from its site in front of the National Gallery, my right honourable friend has decided to retain this statute in its present position.
As your Lordships will recall, Her Majesty's Government had undertaken to find a suitable site in London for the statue of Sir Walter Raleigh by Mr. William McMillan. My right honourable friend has now decided that the statute should be placed in the garden which is to be laid out on the Whitehall frontage of the Government offices now nearing completion in Whitehall Gardens. This site has been accepted as a most suitable one by the donors of the statue,
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a group of generous individuals and Companies who wished to commemorate the early links between the British Commonwealth and the United States of America. The Royal Fine Art Commission, who have been consulted by my right honourable friend on the new proposal, have written to express their gratitude to him for finding a solution to the problem which meets their views.
LORD AMULREE: My Lords, I should like to thank the noble Earl very much for his reply, which gives me great satisfaction, and I am sure will give great satisfaction to many other people in the country who, like myself, were rather worried about this proposed move.

HOSPITAL MEDICAL STAFF SALARIES
LORD DOUGLAS OF BARLOCH: My Lords, I beg to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
[The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government to state what is the present scale of remuneration of (a) registrars, (b) senior registrars, (c) junior hospital medical officers, (d) senior hospital medical officers and (e) consultants (full time) employed in the national hospital services, and what are the corresponding figures recommended by the Spens Committee, increased proportionately to the increase in the cost of living.]
THE MINISTER OF STATE, SCOTTISH OFFICE (LORD STRATHCLYDE): My Lords, the present scales, including the interim increases given last year, pending, and without prejudice to, the Report of the Royal Commission on Doctors' and Dentists' Remuneration, are as follows: registrar, £935 to £1,061 a year; senior registrar, £1,210 to £1,540 a year; junior hospital medical officer, £852 to £1,182 a year; senior hospital medical officer, £1,653 to £2,126 a year; consultant, full-time main scale, £2,205 to £3,255 a year. Consultants may also receive distinction awards, varying from £500 a year to £2,500 a year. It would be impracticable to give the figures recommended by the Spens Committee adjusted by the increase in the cost of living, because no official cost-of-living index appropriate to persons in these

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salary groups is available; and in any case the Spens Committee considered that regard should be had not only to the change in the value of money but to the increases which have in fact taken place since 1939 in incomes, both in the medical and in other professions. May I remind your Lordships that the general question of the remuneration of doctors in the National Health Service is under consideration by the Royal Commission.
LORD DOUGLAS OF BARLOCH: My Lords, in thanking the noble Lord for that Answer, I should like to ask him whether it is not the case that a comparison with the recommendations of the Spens Committee, adjusted in the most moderate fashion to take account of the factors which they mentioned, would produce a most unfavourable comparison with the rates that are being paid.
LORD STRATHCLYDE: My Lords, that may be; I should not like to express any opinion, one way or the other. But I do not think it would be appropriate for me, at a time when the Royal Commission is sitting, to go into a matter which raises the general question of remuneration for doctors.
VISCOUNT ALEXANDER OF HILLSBOROUGH: My Lords, is it not a new principle enunciated this afternoon, that general tribunals, inquiries and the like should not be guided by a general cost of living and its relation to the purchasing value of the pound in particular professions? What is the particular difference in dealing with persons that leads the Government to adopt such an idea as that?
LORD STRATHCLYDE: My Lords, I think that is somewhat far removed from the Question which I was invited to answer.
VISCOUNT ALEXANDER OF HILLSBOROUGH: My Lords, I think it is a pertinent question arising out of the verbal Answer given by the noble Lord. He has given that principle to the House this afternoon, and I should like to have an explanation of it.
VISCOUNT STANSGATE: My Lords, is it not a fact that if the noble Lord, a Minister, enlarges the scope of a Question by stating a general principle, then members of the Opposition have the right to cross-question him about it?
LORD STRATHCLYDE: My Lords, I did not give any such indication as to what were the Government's views. What I quoted was the Spens Committee, and the words I used were:
"in any case the Spens Committee considered that regard should be had not only to the change in the value of money, but to the increases which have in fact taken place since 1939 in incomes both in the medical and other professions."
I made no statement of Government policy whatsoever.
LORD DOUGLAS OF BARLOCH: My Lords, I give the noble Lord notice that I will return to this matter to-morrow afternoon.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS (IMMUNITIES AND PRIVILEGES OF THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE) (AMENDMENT) ORDER IN COUNCIL, 1958
2.45 p.m.
THE JOINT PARLIAMENTARY UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (THE EARL OF GOSFORD)THE JOINT PARLIAMENTARY UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (THE EARL OF GOSFORD) rose to move, That an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty praying that the International Organisations (Immunities and Privileges of the Council of Europe) (Amendment) Order in Council, 1958, be made in the form of the draft laid before this House on the 15th of April last. The noble Earl said: My Lords, I beg to move the Motion for an humble Address to Her Majesty standing in my name on the Order Paper. This Order was considered by the Special Orders Committee of your Lordships' House on April 30.
The purpose of this draft Order is to confer upon the members of the European Commission of Human Rights, an organ of the Council of Europe, certain immunities in connection with their official duties. I would point out to your Lordships that these immunities are very similar to those already accorded to representatives of member Governments to the Committee of Ministers under Article 7 (ii) of the International Organisations (Immunities and Privileges of the Council of Europe) Order, 1950 (as subsequently amended), which is already in force. Furthermore, there is nothing in the present draft Order which exempts the members of the Commission from the ordinary processes of

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the law except in respect of matters relating to the performance of their official functions or during the period when they are exercising those functions. In according such immunities there is no question of exceeding the immunities previously granted in respect of representatives to or members of certain organs and committees of other major international organisations.
Your Lordships no doubt realise that we have an obligation to confer these immunities under Article 59 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, which lays down that the members of the Commission shall, during the discharge of their functions, be entitled to the privileges and immunities provided for in Article 40 of the Statute of the Council of Europe and in the Agreements made thereunder. The Convention was ratified by Her Majesty's Government on March 8, 1951. The privileges and immunities to be accorded to the European Commission of Human Rights were subsequently specified in the Second Protocol to the General Agreement on Privileges and Immunities of the Council of Europe which was signed on behalf of Her Majesty's Government and entered into force on December 15, 1956. The draft Order now submitted will enable Her Majesty's Government to ratify the Second Protocol.
2.47 p.m.
LORD HENDERSON: My Lords, we on this side are prepared to support the Motion which the noble Earl has just submitted. As he and noble Lords will remember, on many occasions from this side of the House, and particularly when the Opposition was led by the late Lord Jowitt, we questioned the extension from time to time of these diplomatic privileges and immunities. But, as I understand the noble Earl's statement, what is really happening here is a slight extension of an existing Order which applies to the Council of Europe: it is to be extended to members of the Human Rights Commission but will not confer any privileges at all on the staff of members of the Human Rights Commission. It is one of those extensions of which we approve. We think it perfectly right that the Order should be extended to include the Human Rights Commission, and we are glad to support the noble Earl's Motion.
THE EARL OF SWINTON: My Lords, I am glad that the noble Lord, Lord Henderson, has given only a qualified blessing to this proposal. I agree that we have to do it, because, apparently, we are bound by Convention to do so, and I suppose it is too late to take any exception to this particular proposal. But every time we assent to these new diplomatic immunities we are driving a coach-and-four through what has hitherto, for generations, been the practice with regard to diplomatic immunity. Diplomatic immunity used only to extend to ambassadors, who in those days were a limited class. Many of us have gone abroad to international conferences and conventions. We never enjoyed, nor sought, diplomatic immunity. The Postal Convention went on for a century. Ministers of different countries and the senior civil servants, too, used to go to other countries and come here. They never sought or enjoyed diplomatic immunity.
It is said that this immunity will apply only when these people are in this country discharging their functions. Of course it will not apply at any other time: it does not give them diplomatic immunity anywhere and everywhere for life. But I feel that we ought to see whether we cannot limit these privileges because it is when these people are in residence in a particular country, in the discharge of their duties, that they are granted. I am told that this Order relates to human rights. But one of the elementary human rights that used to exist under the law and comity of nations, and certainly in this country, was that it was the human right of the citizen to be free to go to the courts if he was damnified by anybody. Although I should not have liked this Order to pass sub silentio, I suppose we have to agree to it. But I feel that some protest should be made, whenever we have to do this, in order to see whether we can dam the flow of this ever-increasing flood of immunities to all sorts and conditions of people who come on the oddest possible occasions.
LORD CONESFORD: My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Henderson, rightly reminded the House of the opposition to the indefinite extension of these rights expressed by the late noble and learned Earl, Lord Jowitt. I should also like to remind the House of the very strenuous

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opposition raised by members of my own Party, when they were in Opposition in another place, throughout the Parliament of 1945 to 1950, when most of these unwarranted extensions of privilege were granted. At that time we did not get much support from the Party now so ably represented by the noble Lord, Lord Henderson; but, having said that, I would agree with Her Majesty's Government that there is no great objection to the particular Order for which to-day they are seeking support.
LORD TEVIOT: My Lords, in view of what my noble friend Lord Swinton has said on this subject, I would ask: is there any information as to the exact treatment that we have in other countries in the circumstances of this Motion?—because I believe that this is really a question on which there should be tit-for-tat: what other people do to us, we should do to them. If possible, I should like to know at some time, when the information is available.
THE EARL OF GOSFORD: My Lords, I would assure the noble Lord, Lord Teviot, that he is perfectly right, and that this is a question of tit-for-tat.
On Question, Motion agreed to: the said Address to be presented to Her Majesty by the Lords with White Staves.

RIVERS (PREVENTION OF POLLUTION) ACT, 1951
2.53 p.m.
THE MINISTER WITHOUT PORTFOLIO (LORD MANCROFT)THE MINISTER WITHOUT PORTFOLIO (LORD MANCROFT) rose to move, That an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty under subsection (3) of section eight of the Rivers (Prevention of Pollution) Act, 1951, praying that the period of seven years ending on the thirty-first day of July, nineteen hundred and fifty-eight, during which river boards are, under subsection (2) of the said section, prohibited from taking action without the consent of the Minister of Housing and Local Government in respect of certain contraventions or apprehended contraventions of section two of that Act, be extended for a further period of three years so as to expire on the thirty-first day of July, nineteen hundred and sixty-one.
The noble Lord said: My Lords, Section 2 of the Rivers (Prevention of
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Pollution) Act, 1951, makes it an offence for any person to cause or knowingly to permit polluting matter to enter a stream. The enforcement of this provision, whether by prosecution or by preventive proceedings under the Act, was left in the main to river boards. The Act provides that proceedings for contravention in respect of any trade effluent or any effluent from a local authority's sewage disposal works shall not be instituted by a river board, during the first seven years after the passing of the Act, without the consent of my right honourable friend the Minister of Housing and Local Government. The Act further provides that the seven year period (which would otherwise expire on the 31st July next) may be extended by Order in Council.
There was nothing new about making pollution of rivers an offence. That dates back to the Rivers Pollution Prevention Act, 1876. Nor was there anything new about the need for obtaining the Minister's consent to the institution of proceedings, because under the 1876 Act consent was necessary before proceedings could be taken in respect of trade discharges. What was new was the widening of the field to include the necessity for obtaining the Minister's consent before a local authority could be prosecuted and the restriction of the need for that consent to a limited period.
The provision with which this Motion is concerned was introduced only during the Committee proceedings on the Bill that eventually became the Act of 1951. There seem to have been a number of reasons for it. Among them was the feeling that the river boards, which had been set up only in 1948 with wide powers of river control over large catchment areas, needed time to develop before they were in a position to deal adequately with the complex problem of river pollution. There was the hope, too, that general standards for rivers could be devised within a few years and that their application through by-laws would be the most powerful instrument in improving the regrettable state of some of our rivers. At the same time it was expected that all properly treated sewage works effluents and trade effluents could reasonably comply with the by-laws and that the authorities and industries discharging them, would be free from danger of prosecution under the Act, so long as they so complied.
Perhaps most important, however, was the need for careful control over capital investment. Unless there was some hold over legal proceedings, there might well have been a disproportionate slice of the capital available for investment going into construction of sewage works as a likely consequence of successful court proceedings. As events have turned out, the capital investment problem is still with us and certain technical difficulties have stood in the way of devising by-laws prescribing river standards. It is clearly going to be very difficult to devise workable by-laws under the Act. There are so many variables to complicate the problem. Not only do streams vary greatly in their flow from time to time, but also at any given time from- reach to reach. Similarly, effluents vary tremendously both in quality and quantity, even from any one given discharge. There are also speed of flow, effluent and stream temperature, dilution, air temperature, flora and fauna and many other factors to be considered.
In these circumstances, my right honourable friend felt the need for a thorough review of the situation. This he asked his Central Advisory Water Committee to carry out, and to advise him whether the seven year period should be extended. For this purpose and the wider purpose of examining the law affecting trade effluents, they appointed a sub-committee, under the chairmanship of Sir Frederick Armer; it has on it members belonging to river boards and to local authorities, as well as industrialists and technical specialists. The sub-committee took evidence from all the interests involved, and in their report, which was recently published, they unanimously recommended the extension of the seven year period by a further three years. The Central Advisory Water Commitee adopted this report and my right honourable friend decided to accept their advice; and accordingly we have put down the present Motion.
I hope your Lordships will not think from what I have said that Her Majesty's Government are not interested in the state of our rivers—that I appear at this Dispatch Box as some sort of "polluter's friend," content to shelter behind the Armer Committee. Nothing is further from the truth and my right honourable
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friend has made this plain in answer to Parliamentary Questions in another place and, only on Friday last, in a speech he made to the River Boards' Association. Nevertheless, we must face facts. Many of our rivers are in a bad state. There has been neglect for a century, and it would be unprofitable to try to assess the blame.
To get them back into a wholesome state can only be done gradually. It needs a vast amount of money and a great deal more research. There are many conflicting interests involved. They have all to be met. Clearly, also, the money cannot be found all at once, and, indeed, even if it could, it certainly could not be spent—for one thing, it would be beyond the capacity of the engineering industry. It was in all these circumstances that the Minister felt he had to have advice from those most closely in contact with the problem as to whether it would be better to let the period of consent expire or to extend it, and if so for how long? The advice my right honourable friend has received is unanimous—that is something of importance on a question like this. The Government believe, my Lords, that that advice is sound, and I feel that the present interest of the rivers and all their users will best be met by accepting it. My Lords, I beg to move.
Moved, That an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty under subsection (3) of section eight of the Rivers (Prevention of Pollution) Act, 1951, praying that the period of seven years ending on the thirty-first day of July, nineteen hundred and fifty-eight, during which river boards are, under subsection (2) of the said section, prohibited from taking action without the consent of the Minister of Housing and Local Government in respect of certain contraventions or apprehended contraventions of section two of that Act, be extended for a further period of three years so as to expire on the thirty-first day of July, nineteen hundred and sixty-one.—(Lord Mancroft.)
3.1 p.m.
VISCOUNT ALEXANDER OF HILLSBOROUGH: My Lords, as always the noble Lord, Lord Mancroft, speaks in a very persuasive way on such a matter as this. We are not concerned this afternoon whether he is briefed as the polluters' friend or not, because we have

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to deal with the problem as it stands. I am concerned in my own mind to find rather more definite reasons, if I can, as to why a statutory period of seven years is to be extended by three. What is the actual position?—apart from that overriding point which the noble Lord made, that probably it is difficult to find the capital investment that would be necessary in order to clean out some of the rivers which are subject to this effluence and nuisance? On the other hand, it seemed to me that possibly the powers concerned had been interested also in what would be the effect in certain waters of the effluence from the new atomic power stations. That question did not happen to be mentioned by the noble Lord—I am sure it has been in his mind.
When it comes to a question as to what are the powers of the river board, this measure is to enable them to initiate inquiries or proceedings. At present, they are limited by the restrictions contained in the Statute of 1951. I have to declare a local interest, although not a financial one. The Government are getting on rapidly with the completion of the atomic power station at the River Blackwater.
The view of those on the river board side, at least, and certainly, of the people who feel that they are in danger of losing a most profitable oyster industry, is that if there is to be here an effluence which, as some people say, will very nearly destroy the oysters in the region. If we give consent to this Order to-day, I hope that there will be no question of preventing the river board's (because they act very strongly for the oyster fisheries), from putting their case to the authorities concerned and doing what they can to protect a localised, yet very important industry.
Of course, the general question still remains to be solved—that is, how, with the development of modern effluence into our waterways, the rivers are to be properly cleaned out. The question of the general state of our water supply has been raised on a number of occasions by the noble Lord opposite. That works in with this matter and raises other questions of capital investment, such as proper capacity for storage and the like, when the water has been properly treated and prepared for the particular functions for which it is required. I do not pro-
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pose for a moment to oppose the Motion the noble Lord has put before the House, but I feel that on the particular localised question I have raised it is essential that we should safeguard the rights of the river board in this matter. If the station is to be completed and actually discharging its effluence before the three-year extension period has expired, I should like some assurance on that matter.
LORD LUCAS OF CHILWORTH: My Lords, before the noble Lord replies I should like to ask a question. Further to what my noble Leader has said, would not the noble Lord, Lord Mancroft, agree that, with the development of atomic power stations and the development and the use of detergents—fostered, in my view, by a totally uneconomic scheme of national advertising—we are losing ground in this country in our battle against the pollution of our waterways and rivers? May I ask the noble Lord whether the Government are fully alive to this problem? Every day we read of still greater pollution; we read also that a vast majority of our sewerage outlets from the countryside are being made ineffective by the continual use of these detergents. Would he give the House an assurance that the Government are really alive to the danger to the amenities of the countryside, as my noble friend has said, and also to the purity of the water which we have to consume?
LORD PETHICK-LAWRENCE: My Lords, may I ask one question on this matter? I am not very clear whether this is an English Act, or whether it applies also to Scotland. I say that because when, as a Member of the other place, I sat for a Scottish seat in East Edinburgh, we had a river there which had been polluted and difficulties had been going on for over a hundred years without any conclusion being reached. I should like to know whether the Act applies to Scotland as well as to England.
LORD DOUGLAS OF BARLOCH: My Lords, I should like to ask the noble Lord whether any consents have been given by the Minister for prosecutions to be taken, and whether any applications for consent have been refused. It is very difficult to discuss this matter without more complete information, but if it is the case that it has proved

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impossible to formulate by-laws to deal with the problem it would appear to be all the more necessary that there should be some prosecutions in the grosser cases of pollution; and there are undoubtedly a very large number of them.
It is also difficult, without any figures being put before this House, to form an opinion upon the question of the capital expenditure that might be involved. But I should like to point out that, indirectly, capital expenditure is being incurred because of the failure to purify our rivers, which is making it necessary to find sources of water for public supplies from greater and greater distances, at very high cost indeed. I am under the impression that the Metropolitan Water Board, for instance, have been obliged recently to construct a line of pipes from its intakes in the Thames reaches for about twenty miles across the North-eastern part of the Metropolis in order to replace the River Lee as a source of water supply for East London, because that river has become so polluted—especially with detergents, which are, of course, a very undesirable constituent of drinking water. So there are a great many considerations to be taken into account in this matter, and it is most desirable that some efforts should be made and that the Minister should give some consents to the taking of proceedings.
THE EARL OF ALBEMARLE: My Lords, if I may make a few observations on this matter I would say that, while of course we abide by the Minister's decision, for the reasons given in bringing in this Order, yet the river board world must express the strong hope that this extension of three years will be the final of the three links in the ten-years chain by which river boards have been held back—rather at times straining at the leash—from contemplating proceedings against offenders under the Act. Since the 1948 Act was passed, river boards have had ample time to get down to their duties and we are glad that the Government eventually have come to the view that the river boards are responsible authorities. Of course we are grateful that that fact was recognised a fortnight ago in your Lordships' House, when the noble Lord, Lord Mancroft, conceded our point requesting that river boards should be consulted and notified before
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orders are made for taking water from sources necessary under drought emergency.
3.11 p.m.
LORD MANCROFT: My Lords, let me deal first with the question of detergents, which several noble Lords have raised. That problem is being studied by the Standing Technical Committee on Detergents, which was set up last year, and is also being examined by the manufacturers, who, I may add, have given the fullest and most helpful cooperation in this matter. I understand that they are now hopeful of producing a detergent which will eliminate the elements not now capable of being broken down at the point of sewage treatment. I have not the technical knowledge to make any comment on this question now, but those who advise me tell me that the prospect of the problem being overcome in the near future is bright.
The noble Viscount, Lord Alexander of Hillsborough, mentioned the difficult question of atomic waste. That is a subject of separate legislation and is under the control of the Minister of Housing and Local Government and the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food. I can assure the noble Viscount that the Government share his apprehensions and agree with him on the need to keep the most careful watch on this particular problem.
LORD LUCAS OF CHILWORTH: Before the noble Lord leaves that point, is he giving the House an assurance that this Committee of experts who are examining this problem are hopeful of finding an answer to bringing back into proper use the septic tank drainage used in the major part of the countryside?
LORD MANCROFT: My Lords, I cannot go quite so far as that, but the Committee are very hopeful of making considerable progress in the matter of detergents. The noble Lord, Lord Lucas of Chilworth, talked about greater pollution. I would not quite agree with him there: greater possible pollution, or greater potential pollution would be better. Those who use the rivers are becoming much more pollution-minded (this is an unhappy expression), much more aware of their duties and conscious of the evils that flow from an indiscriminate use of rivers for drainage

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purposes. If the noble Lord looks at the figures, I think that he will be convinced that a great deal of progress has been made in the last ten years. Much more money has been spent by local authorities on works and a great deal more activity has been displayed by this Government than was displayed by Governments in the past. The country is becoming definitely more aware of its responsibilities in this matter.
The noble Lord, Lord Douglas of Barloch, asked me about prosecutions. I understand that twenty-five applications have been made; that in seven cases consent has been given; five are still pending and the rest have been withdrawn. Perhaps your Lordships will he interested in the results. The fines were quite considerable: 130 guineas, 120 guineas, £600—for a second offence. These are considerable fines, showing that people are taking this matter seriously. I think it fair to add that in only one case was consent to prosecution refused.
The noble Lord, Lord Pethick-Lawrence, asked about Scotland. I should like to take further advice before answering him definitely, but from a quick look through the Bill it appears to me to apply to Scotland. However, I will make certain. The noble Earl, Lord Albemarle, and the noble Viscount, Lord Alexander of Hillsborough, asked whether it was necessary to have this extension; and the noble Earl expressed the hope that this would be the last. I share his hope. Let me sum up for the noble Viscount why we are doing this. There are two reasons: first, because of the unanimous recommendation that we should have this extension, and secondly, because we need time for more research and to give more study to the by-law question. I think (and I hope that I carry the noble Viscount with me on this point), that in order to get the best results we should not rush into less satisfactory methods. I believe that by this extension we shall be able to put matters right, although I am sorry that we have had to have it. It would have been nice to have the matter
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finished now, but I believe that this is the best way of doing it.
VISCOUNT ALEXANDER OF HILLSBOROUGH: My Lords, I am much obliged to the noble Lord, Lord Mancroft, for the detail and clarity of his reply. I should like to have his assurance on this point, because at present I am not quite clear—namely, whether atomic power station projects are excluded from this extension of time. Are they not legally included within the general restriction under the 1951 Act? Otherwise, I cannot quite understand the noble Lord's reply. Is it quite clear from his reply that, for example, if the river board in the Blackwater area should raise objection to the effluents from the atomic station there, they can do so without going through the procedure laid down in the 1951 Act.
LORD REA: My Lords, before the noble Lord replies, may I ask whether it also applies to effluents going straight to the sea from such stations as Calder Hall, where there is no river travel between the station and the open sea, and where similar trouble may take place?
LORD MANCROFT: My Lords. I do not think that it applies, but I will check this point because it is important. I do not think that in this case river board authority runs, and therefore it does not apply. It applies, I should like to repeat, only to proceedings in respect of any trade effluent or local authority sewage effluent. If the particular atomic disposal which the noble Viscount has in mind comes within those two heads, then, of course, it would be covered by the extension. If the noble Viscount would let me have the name of any particular stations he has in mind—he mentioned that at Blackwater—I will check the position there; but that is the general principle which governs the matter and I think that it covers his point. Nevertheless, I should like to check and make certain.
On Question, Motion agreed to: the said Address to be presented to Her Majesty by the Lords with White Staves.

DRAINAGE RATES BILL
Brought from the Commons; read 1a and to be printed.
LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND MISCELLANEOUS FINANCIAL PROVISIONS (SCOTLAND) BILL
Brought from the Commons; read 1a, and to be printed.
MATRIMONIAL CAUSES (PROPERTY AND MAINTENANCE) BILL
Brought from the Commons; read 1a, and to be printed.
MERCHANT SHIPPING (LIABILITY OF SHIPOWNERS AND OTHERS) BILL
Brought from the Commons; read 1a, and to be printed.
METROPOLITAN POLICE ACT, 1839 (AMENDMENT) BILL
Brought from the Commons; read 1a, and to be printed.
PHYSICAL TRAINING AND RECREATION BILL
Brought from the Commons; read 1a, and to be printed.
SOLICITORS (SCOTLAND) BILL [H.L.]
Returned from the Commons, agreed to with Amendments: the said Amendments to be printed.

DIVORCE (INSANITY AND DESERTION) BILL
3.20 p.m.
Order of the Day for the Second Reading read.
LORD MESTON: My Lords, I beg to move that the Bill known as the Divorce (Insanity and Desertion) Bill be now read a second time. Allow me to say at the outset that this Bill does not create any new grounds for divorce nor does it extend any of the existing grounds for divorce. The primary object of the Bill is to give effect to the recommendations
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of the Royal Commission on Marriage and Divorce presided over by the noble Lord, Lord Morton of Henryton, first, by extending the types of treatment which enable a husband or wife to obtain a divorce on the ground of the other's insanity; and secondly, by preventing the supervening insanity of a deserting spouse from interrupting a period of desertion.
As your Lordships know, Section 1 (1) (d) of the Matrimonial Causes Act provides that a husband or wife can obtain a decree of divorce on the ground that the other party to the marriage is of incurably unsound mind and has been continuously under care and treatment for a period of at least five years immediately preceding the presentation of the petition. Section 1 (2) of the Act goes on to provide that a person shall be deemed to be under care and treatment only under four conditions. The first of these conditions starts by providing that a person shall be taken to be under care and control only while he is detained in pursuance of any order or inquisition under the Lunacy and Mental Treatment Acts, 1890 to 1930. There is no point in going through the four conditions in detail, but the principal feature of each condition is that it lays emphasis on the certification of the respondent as a person of unsound mind.
The Royal Commission, in paragraphs 177 and 178 of their Report, pointed out that, while it is desirable to avoid certification as far as possible, this may result in considerable hardship for the patient's spouse. The patient may have spent some years in a mental hospital before he is certified. By that time it may be clear that his insanity is incurable, yet the spouse has to wait until the full period of five years' care and treatment as a certified patient has elapsed before taking divorce proceedings. And relief will be completely denied in a case where the patient, although incurably insane, continues to keep his voluntary status, because the need for certification never arises. The Royal Commission therefore thought that treatment as a voluntary patient should be recognised as constituting care and treatment whether under the Mental Treatment Acts or in an institution outside those Acts. In a word, certification is no longer to be the criterion.
Accordingly, Clause 1 (1) (a) of the Bill provides that care and treatment in

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any hospital or other institution in England, Scotland, Northern Ireland, the Isle of Man or the Channel Islands shall be deemed to be care and treatment for the purpose of divorce proceedings on the grounds of insanity. I wish to emphasise the fact that this provision alludes only to treatment for mental illness. Where, for example, a man is admitted to hospital for treatment for a physical ailment, then later develops mental trouble, he should be deemed to be under care and treatment for the purpose of divorce proceedings only from the date when he began to receive treatment in the hospital for mental illness. Furthermore, the above provision covers treatment only in hospitals and institutions in any sense recognised by public authorities. It does not cover treatment as a single patient in the charge of a doctor, matron or other person.
Hardship may well arise in the case of a person whose spouse had to receive care and treatment overseas. Again following the recommendations of the Royal Commission, it is provided by Clause 1 (1) (b) of the Bill that care and treatment of a person in a hospital or institution in any other country in which his treatment is comparable with the treatment in this country shall be sufficient. That is to say, it is sufficient for the petitioning spouse to show that the treatment which the respondent spouse has actually been receiving in the foreign hospital or institution is comparable with the treatment provided in any recognised hospital or institution in the United Kingdom, the Isle of Man or the Channel Islands. Again following the recommendations of the Royal Commission, Clause 1 (3) of the Bill provides that a break of twenty-eight days or less shall not be regarded as interrupting a continuous period of care and treatment.
There is another matter which requires rather special consideration. Under the existing law, the spouse of a person serving in Her Majesty's Forces is at a disadvantage compared with the spouse of a civilian. Detention in pursuance of any order or warrant under, for example, the Army Act qualifies as care or treatment for the purpose of divorce proceedings on the grounds of the soldier's insanity, but in point of fact, by Section 16 (1) of the Army Act, 1955, an order is issued under that Act only when the object is to enable the soldier to be received in a civilian mental hos-
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pital on his discharge from the Army. The wife of a soldier who has become of unsound mind, therefore, cannot in practice rely for the purpose of divorce proceedings on any period during which he has been undergoing treatment in a military hospital, even though his condition is such that if he had been a civilian he would almost certainly have been the subject of an order under the Lunacy Acts.
To remedy this state of affairs, Clause 1 (2) of the Bill provides that a certificate by the appropriate Service authority that a person was receiving treatment for mental illness during any period as a resident in a Service hospital shall be conclusive evidence of the facts certified. Therefore, the wife of a soldier who has become of unsound mind will, by producing a certificate of the Army Council, be able to prove for the purpose of divorce proceedings that her husband was under care and treatment while in a Service hospital. I should like to make the comment that the respondent spouse at all times must be shown to be of incurably unsound mind. This Bill does not make the slightest difference one way or the other to that essential feature in our law.
I should now like to refer to a different matter altogether. Under the present law a husband or wife may petition for divorce on the ground that the other party to the marriage has deserted the petitioner without cause for a period of at least three years immediately preceding the presentation of the petition. A similar provision is made in the case of judicial separation. To establish desertion the petitioner must prove not only that the respondent has deserted for at least three years before the presentation of the petition, but also that he has during the whole of that time retained an intention to desert her. The fact that a spouse who is alleged to be in desertion has been certified as insane subsequent to the initial act of desertion raises a doubt whether he has been capable of a continuing intention to desert. Accordingly, following the recommendation of the Royal Commission, Clause 2 of the Bill provides in terms that desertion shall be deemed not to have been interrupted by the insanity of the deserting spouse if it appears to the court that the desertion would probably have continued if he had not become insane.

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Clause 3 (1) gives the short title of the Bill. As your Lordships know, this Bill extends to Scotland as well as England. In Scotland, not only have they their own law but they speak Scots. The words "matrimonial causes" appear to be unknown in Scotland, and therefore the Bill is called Divorce (Insanity and Desertion) Bill. Clause 3 (2) provides that the Bill shall not apply to Northern Ireland. Clause 3 (3) repeals certain words in both English and Scottish Statutes which make voluntary treatment eligible for divorce proceedings only where it follows detention under an order. The effect of the repeals will be that the spouse of a voluntary patient will be able for the purpose of divorce to rely on the provisions of the Act if the patient is in private care or if he is receiving treatment in a recognised hospital or other institution.
That, my Lords, is the Bill. I am not suggesting for a moment that it will cover a large number of cases—in fact, I am glad that it will not. But I think it will have the effect of avoiding hardship in a large number of cases. With that modest exposition of the Bill, I have no hesitation whatsoever in recommending it to your Lordships for a Second Reading.
Moved, That the Bill be now read 2a.— (Lord Meston.)
3.30 p.m.
LORD MERRIMAN: My Lords, this is another Bill which we owe to the willingness of Private Members in another place to use their luck in the ballot—in this case it was the honourable Member for Ashford, Mr. Deedes—to help to implement those recommendations of the Royal Commission, presided over by my noble and learned friend Lord Morton of Henryton, which require legislation. The noble Lord, Lord Meston, has explained the terms of this Bill in great detail. He has made it clear that the Bill deals with two distinct points. They are distinct, but in a sense they are related. The first relates to the conditions for obtaining divorce on the ground of insanity, and the other to the interruption of desertion by the intervention of a period of insanity. In the absence of the Lord Chancellor, it may be of some help if I tell your Lordships how this Bill will affect and be treated by the courts.
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As regards Clause 1, it is necessary to remember, as the noble Lord has already pointed out, that there are two ingredients in the petition for divorce on the ground of insanity. The first is that the insanity shall be incurable—that is a matter, of course, of medical evidence—and the other is purely factual, and is that the patient has been under care and treatment for a period of five years. The Royal Commission of the noble Lord, Lord Morton of Henryton, definitely recommended the upholding of the period, but they recommended a marked change in the definition of "care and treatment." As your Lordships have already heard from the noble Lord, Lord Meston, in the Herbert Act of 1937, which was, of course, consolidated in the Act of 1950, the test of the period is detention under one form of order or another—in a word, certification. For that there is now to be substituted residence for treatment in hospital or any other prescribed institution.
The Bill recognises—and this is the important point—the modern opinion that certification, so far from being the first, should be the last resort in a case of mental illness, and deals in the main, though not exclusively, with the case of the voluntary patient. It also eliminates a certain number of arbitrary and harsh results which had arisen from the closeness of that definition. When, at the end of the period of care and treatment, the two tests coincide (that is to say, the period of five years has elapsed and medical opinion is that the insanity is incurable), surely it is just that the whole of the time from the start of treatment in the early stages—when there was still hope, it may be, that a cure would be effected, even though that hope turned out not to be fulfilled—should be counted in the period, instead of having the period begin with certification, which should be the last resort and, indeed, which may never be resorted to at all. I do not think it is necessary to say any more on that part of the Bill, because I feel certain that it will commend itself to your Lordships.
I now turn to Clause 2 and here I merely premise that the key to the whole question raised by Clause 2 is that the desertion must last for a period of three years immediately preceding the presentation of the petition and, shortly, that

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desertion involves both the fact of separation for that period ending with the petition, and also the intention to bring the cohabitation to an end. As the noble Lord, Lord Meston, has already pointed out, the question is: what is to be the effect of insanity intervening during that period? To illustrate how that arises, may I refer briefly to the facts of three typical cases which have actually arisen? The first of them—not strictly the first in chronological order, but the first for my purposes—is the case of Bennett, which was decided soon after the Herbert Act had been passed. There the desertion had lasted for no less than thirty-five years before, exactly half way through the last period of three years immediately preceding the presentation of the petition, the respondent was certified—thirty-five years of desert ion and eighteen months of certification. That, reluctantly, as is quite apparent from the Report, was held by the judge not to satisfy the requirements of the Act because of the intervention of this period during which it was held that the patient had no mind with which to decide whether or not to return to cohabitation.
The other case, which eventually went to the Court of Appeal, was not dissimilar in principle, except for one point. Seven years before the petition, the desertion had begun, and about four years after the desertion had begun the wife had obtained a magistrates' order against the husband on the ground of desertion. That older was not appealed from, and up to that point one would suppose that it was about as clearly established as it could be that the desertion was permanent, and likely to remain so. But shortly after that the husband was certified, and in this case (this is the difference between that and the other case) the whole of the period of the three years immediately preceding the petition was occupied by the detention of the husband on that order for certification.
I should like, if I may, to refer to one passage in one of the judgments where one of the Lords Justices quite plainly did not like the decision to which they came, that the certification was irrebuttable evidence of the fact that the man was insane and could not have a mind with which to intend to desert. He referred back to the first case I mentioned, and he said this:
"In that case from the wife's obstinate desertion for thirty-five years it would not be diffi-
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cult to infer that she would not have repented in the last few months."
And then he made this significant addition:
"So also if the respondent had been insane for a short period at the beginning of the three years and after recovery had persisted in desertion for the rest of the three years."
Oddly enough, although the Court held, as had been previously held, that the certification was final and conclusive, and there was no more to be said about it, the very point raised by that Lord Justice, Lord Justice Mackinnon, cropped up again in your Lordships' House about seven years ago—and this is the last case to which I intend to refer.
In that case a period of three years of desertion, three years before the presentation of the petition, was complete, but at the beginning of the third year the man was certified for two months, whereupon he was discharged as fit. He had deserted; it was understood and proved that he had deserted before the period began to run. It had been running for two years while he was perfectly sane; then it was interrupted by this two months at the beginning of the third year, and then there was the nine months during which exactly that which had been foreseen by Lord Justice Mackinnon many years before occurred: the man was released; he was at large in the world and did absolutely nothing toward bringing the state of desertion to an end. Your Lordships' House, when the appeal came before it—because both the trial judge and the Court of Appeal had followed the earlier cases and held that the certification raised an irrebuttable presumption of interruption of the desertion —held that there was no such irrebuttable presumption, and that it was open to the petitioner to prove, if she could, that, notwithstanding the certification, the husband had a mind with which she could intend to desert.
My Lords, I pause to observe that having regard to the changes which we have already been discussing under Clause 1, which makes the situation regarding care and treatment so much more flexible than it was under the old days of certification, the right established by your Lordships' House, and not interfered with, of course, by this Bill—the right to prove that, notwithstanding care and treatment, the intention to desert can still persist—applies a fortiori. I regret to have

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to tell your Lordships, however, that though your Lordships' House ordered a new trial in order that this fact might be established, if it could be, we shall never know what the answer would have been because, unfortunately, the man died and therefore the whole proceedings fell to the ground.
It may seem odd that, when it is postulated of a man, as it is postulated in the second clause which we are now discussing, that the party was incapable of continuing the necessary intention, it should yet be possible for the court to find that all the while the intention was continuous. But I think it is not really quite so odd as it may appear, because after all there is the parallel presumption which governs the conception of desertion as it is treated in the courts—namely, that when once it is proved that desertion has started, unless it has been interrupted by some attempt to resume co-habitation, it is presumed to continue. I would only add this, my Lords. At the end of it all, what better evidence could there be for a court to draw the inference that the desertion still continued, notwithstanding the period of care and treatment, whether it is long or short, than the sort of case which was involved in two of the cases I have mentioned, desertion for a long period before the care and treatment, a short period of care and treatment and then a resumption, after the end of the care and treatment, of the separation, with no indication whatever of an intention to return? I recommend Clause 2 to your Lordships for your approval.
3.47 p.m.
LORD MORTON OF HENRYTON: My Lords, as this Bill seeks to give effect to certain recommendations of the Royal Commission on Marriage and Divorce, of which I was the Chairman, it is perhaps appropriate that I should say something about it from the standpoint of that Royal Commission. The nature of the Bill, its details and the reasons for it have been so fully and clearly expounded by the noble and learned Lords who have preceded me that there is little that I can usefully add, but I thought perhaps I might make merely a few observations as to the general nature of the Bill.
When we were hearing evidence before the Royal Commission suggestions were made that this ground for divorce should
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be abolished altogether. One witness, in particular, pressed this on the Commission emphasising the wording of the Marriage Service,
"In sickness and in health, as lone as you both shall live,"
and pointing out that the person of unsound mind had committed no matrimonial offence and could not help it. The Commission respected the views of that witness but did not agree with them. They thought that this ground for divorce should be retained, with the two essential safeguards which appear in the existing legislation; that is to say, that there must be sound evidence that the man in question (or, of course, the woman in question), is incurably of unsound mind; and secondly, in order that his state of mind should be investigated under skilled hands for a long period, that there should be a period of at least five years continuous mental treatment immediately preceding the presentation of the petition.
The object of this Bill, stating it very briefly—your Lordships have had it expounded to you—is to remove certain hardships which arise under the second of these requirements. The institutions under which and the manner in which the mental treatment has to be carried on is very limited under the present legislation, and we thought that certain modifications would commend themselves, would be right and fair and would remove hardship. Then again, as the noble and learned Lord the President of the Probate, Divorce and Admiralty Division has so fully expounded, there is the position where a man or woman, undoubtedly in desertion, becomes of unsound mind, and the question is: does that put an end entirely to the proof of desertion? Clause 2, which has already been dealt with, deals with that unfortunate position of any petitioner.
My Lords, I would add only two observations. I have heard it said that when a really troublesome question arises the best way of dealing with it is to bury it in a Royal Commission. I am glad to say that the matters with which we had to deal have not been pigeon-holed, and I know that all those who served with me on the Royal Commission for four years are glad that so much has been done, by legislation, by rules and by orders of court, to carry our recommendations into effect. We are

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grateful for that. I would only say that the summary of our recommendations as to England occupied 149 paragraphs of the Report. It would no doubt take a considerable time to implement all of them. But, speaking quite judicially, and impartially of course, I think that they are all good recommendations, with the possible exception of two or three which were recommended by the majority and where I was a member of the minority.
3.52 p.m.
LORD DENNING: My Lords, I, too, would welcome this Bill as a small but significant step in the right direction. I say "in the right direction" because there have been two principles in our law of divorce striving for mastery. One principle is to regard divorce as a punishment for wrongdoing: there has to be an offence—adultery, cruelty or desertion for three years—and then you have to prove it. Like a criminal offence, it has to be proved beyond reasonable doubt. Then, if you prove it beyond reasonable doubt, you get your divorce. The other principle, on the other hand, is not to treat it as a piece of criminal wrongdoing, but to treat it as a relief from an intolerable situation. The law up to now has treated the one question we are considering to-day, where there is desertion for three years, as if it were a criminal offence; because if within the last sir months of the three years the man was in an asylum as insane, then the wife could not prove her desertion. It was said that he had no deserting mind, he was incapable of forming a deserting intent, and therefore he was not guilty of the offence. Surely, the right principle is the contrary one: she ought to be relieved from the intolerable situation. He had deserted her. The fact that he was insane in the last six months is only a stronger reason for giving her a divorce. That, I submit, is the principle which underlies Clause 2.
But what I wish is that this Bill would go one stage further. We have been dealing with desertion and saying that insanity should not be a defence to desertion. But what about cruelty? Ought insanity to be a defence to cruelty? The Commission which sat under my noble and learned friend Lord Morton of Henryton said it ought not to be. Let me give your Lordships some illustrations.
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I was concerned in a case where a man—he was a vicious sort of man, but no one thought he was insane at the time—assaulted his wife from time to time. He attempted to strangle her. Three weeks later he actually strangled and killed the baby. She brought her proceedings for divorce on the ground of cruelty. He was convicted at the Old Bailey, evidence of insanity was given, and he was found guilty but insane; and according to the law as now stated, because he was not guilty of a criminal offence she could not get her divorce.
Then, a little later there was a case tried by Mr. Justice Pearce. This was a case where a wife had left her child with the husband, who was apparently well, while she went out for the evening. When she came back the husband had strangled the baby, their only child, and had put his head in the gas oven. He, too, was tried at the Old Bailey. He was found guilty but insane, on the ground that though he knew what he was doing he did not know it was wrong. It was said that he thought he had creeping paralysis, that it might be a hereditary illness, and therfore he decided to dispose of the little girl. He was found guilty but insane. According to the law as now stated, the wife could not get a divorce on the ground of cruelty because insanity was a defence. Just as insanity is a defence in the criminal courts, so insanity is a defence in the divorce court.
My noble and learned friend's Commission recommended that insanity should not be a defence in the case of cruelty. Surely that is right. The injury to the wife is just the same. She needs protection from a court. Is it right to go on the old principle of proving wrong? Surely the right principle should be that she should have relief from a situation which had become quite intolerable, irrespective of actual criminal wrong on the part of the husband. These two principles run all through our divorce law.
Theoretically, in effect you have to prove a criminal offence. But what in practice happens? Everybody in the divorce court knows that you cannot tell who is in the right and who is in the wrong. The man who goes off with a woman wants to get a divorce. How does he do it? If his wife will not divorce him he brings a petition, charging her with nagging, or something

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like that, saying that she complained of his jealousy or some such thing, and so gets the case before the court. The wife may not resist it but say, "Well, if he wants a divorce, let him have it", or she may be provoked to a counter charge. At all events, he gets his divorce although he is really the guilty party. Nowadays you cannot tell in a divorce case who is the guilty party. Relief is given because there is an intolerable situation. I suggest to your Lordships that it would be a good thing if there were yet another clause added to the Bill, similar to Clause 2 yet not dealing only with desertion as Clause 2 does, but dealing with cruelty, and asserting that insanity should not be a defence to cruelty any more than it is to desertion. That is what the Commission under my noble and learned friend Lord Morton of Henryton recommended. I think it would be a good thing if that provision were included in this Bill.
3.59 p.m.
LORD SILKIN: My Lords, the House will be grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Meston, not only for having introduced this measure but for having given us the opportunity of hearing three noble Law Lords each expressing his own point of view from a different angle. I think this is the first time since I have been in this House that I have heard three noble Law Lords speaking on the same subject on the same day, and if anyone had any doubt about what course they should take on this Bill I am sure that, with the Law Lords unanimous, there cannot really be any doubt at all. Indeed, there is so little doubt that one wonders why it has taken twenty-one years to put right this defect in the law. And it would not have been put right now but for the fortuitous fact, as the noble and learned Lord the President of the Probate, Divorce and Admiralty Division explained to us—that somebody was successful in a ballot and chose to introduce this Bill. If the noble and learned Lord, Lord Denning, wants to put right this other matter, he must see to it that someone else who is successful in the ballot in another place in future is willing to introduce an amending Divorce Bill; or perhaps alternatively he would himself introduce one here.
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But surely these various amending Bills ought not to depend upon Private Members. Her Majesty's Government know what is wrong. They have had the Report of the Commission of the noble Lord, Lord Morton of Henryton, and surely it is the business of Her Majesty's Government, and not of a Private Member, to amend the law on such an important matter as divorce. I hope that Her Majesty's Government, if they have time—for the sands may be running out—will give some attention to the Report of the Commission and see whether it is not possible to correct those defects in the law which have been clearly established. This Bill is a step, and a very good step, in the right direction; and therefore I hope it will get the support of the House. But it is only a step and I feel that it is a very belated one, coming twenty-one years after the 1937 Act. I hope that it will be possible to get a comprehensive reform of the divorce laws before very long.
4.1 p.m.
LORD SALTER: My Lords, may I interpose just one word? It is now a very long time since Sir Alan Herbert, who was for many years a colleague of mine in another place, introduced his Bill. He was an Independent Private Member and as the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, has said, it is, I imagine, quite possible, without the hazards of the ballot, for a noble Lord—the noble and learned Lord, Lord Denning, for example—to introduce a measure in this House with at any rate a reasonable chance of its proceeding from this House to another place. In this connection, perhaps I might remind your Lordships that Sir Alan Herbert has recently written a book which, while it is accompanied with his customary wit, also includes his very serious and long-considered belief that in some respects, in addition to those which have been referred to to-day, his earlier Bill has proved to be insufficient. Perhaps if the noble Lord introduces a Bill in this House he will consider whether some of the suggestions in Sir Alan Herbert's book are worthy of inclusion in it.
4.3 p.m.
LORD CHESHAM: My Lords, perhaps the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, will not expect me to have much to say in answer to what he has said to-day. I can only tell him that I believe Her

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Majesty's Government are aware of these facts, and take issue with him on the subject of sands running out. I must point out to him that sands will run in any direction in which they are given proper impetus.
LORD SILKIN: Hear, hear!
LORD CHESHAM: My Lords, after the very satisfactory and detailed support given to this Bill by the three noble and learned Lords, I feel that it is really superfluous for me to say more than a word or two. It is the view of Her Majesty's Government that this Bill will make some useful and timely reforms in the divorce law dealing with cases where one of the parties to a marriage has had the great misfortune to become mentally ill. There has been a tendency, which has been fully described, to regard certification as the last step to be taken in the course of treatment of the mentally ill; and except where it is necessary in the patient's own interest that he should be certified, every effort is made to encourage him to become a voluntary patient. It is clearly desirable, therefore, that our divorce laws should take into account this new outlook on mental illness and I would commend to your Lordships those provisions of the Bill which have this object in view.
Not the least of the recommendations of the Commission that sat under the noble and learned Lord, Lord Morton of Henryton, which have the support of Her Majesty's Government, are those related to divorce where one of the parties has become of unsound mind. In such cases our sympathy with the insane person is naturally attended by concern for the other party who, through no fault of himself or herself, suddenly finds married life is impossible. I believe the noble Lord who introduced this Bill will deserve and receive the gratitude of the many people who find themselves in that unfortunate position. Finally, on behalf of Her Majesty's Government I welcome the Bill. I hope that it will commend itself to your Lordships and will have a speedy passage into law.
4.7 p.m.
LORD MESTON: My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Chesham, for having given the blessing of Her Majesty's Government to this Bill. I believe that we should be grateful to
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Her Majesty's Government for their attitude in this matter. I should also like, if it is in order to do so at this late stage, to pay tribute to the honourable Member, Mr. Deedes, who introduced the Bill in another place. I only hope that he will not sue me for infringement of copyright in making use of many of the observations that he made, but I understand that there is no copyright in Hansard, so perhaps that is a good defence, even in a Bill which deals with insanity. I should also like to thank those noble Lords who have spoken on behalf of this Bill. It is very seldom that one is supported by all the stars in the front rank.
Perhaps I may say a few words in reply to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Denning, who raised the question of whether insanity is a defence to cruelty. The "secret service" told me beforehand that he was to raise this matter, and therefore I have not come on the scene entirely unprepared. This is a very important question, but unfortunately it is controversial. It has been considered by Her Majesty's Government (I must not try to deceive the noble and learned Lord: it would be useless to try to do so, for he would soon find me out), but I cannot at the moment give any assurance as to whether or not his suggestions will find any place in the Bill at a later stage. Nothing now remains, therefore, but for me to thank your Lordships very much for the great assistance you have given me in explaining the purpose of the Bill.
On Question, Bill read 2a, and committed to a Committee of the Whole House.

INDUSTRIAL ASSURANCE AND FRIENDLY SOCIETIES ACT, 1948 (AMENDMENT) BILL
4.9 p.m.
House in Committee (according to Order): Bill reported without amendment.

CHILDREN BILL [H.L.]
4.10 p.m
Order of the Day for the Third Reading read.
LORD CHESHAM: My Lords, on behalf of my noble and learned friend

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the Lord Chancellor, who, as your Lordships know, is abroad, I beg to move that this Bill be now read a third time.
Moved, That the Bill be now read 3a.—(Lord Chesham.)
On Question, Bill read 3a; an Amendment (privilege) made: Bill passed and sent to the Commons.

TRIBUNALS AND INQUIRIES BILL [H.L.]
Order of the Day for the Third Reading read.
LORD CFIESHAM: My Lords, again on behalf of my noble and learned friend, I beg to move that this Bill be now read a third time.
Moved, That the Bill be now read 3a.—(Lord Chesham.)
On Question, Bill read 3a; Amendments (privilege) made: Bill passed and sent to the Commons.

MARRIAGE ACTS AMENDMENT BILL
Order of the Day for the Second Reading read.
LORD MILNER OF LEEDS: My Lords, this Bill, which was originally introduced in another place by Dr. Somerville Hastings, the honourable Member for Barking, seeks to remedy a rather curious but in some respects serious disability regarding newly-erected Nonconformist and Roman Catholic chapels. The law is that before they may be used for the solemnisation of marriages application to the Superintendent Registrar has to be made, and a statement has to be signed by twenty householders to the effect that they have used the church as their usual place of worship for not less than twelve months. The principal object of this Bill is to do away with that period of delay of twelve months, which seems to have no very good purpose. The remaining contents of it are consequential. I beg to move that the Bill be read a second time.
Moved, That the Bill be now read 2a.—(Lord Milner of Leeds.)
LORD CHESHAM: My Lords, in view of the fact that this Bill very suitably achieves the desirable object of removing an inconvenience in the way of newly established Free Church congregations, while at the same time retaining proper legal safeguards in the public interest, I am glad to indicate to your Lordships that it is acceptable to Her Majesty's Government, and to commend it to your Lordships' approval.
On Question, Bill read 2a, and Committed to a Committee of the Whole House.

INSURANCE COMPANIES BILL [H.L.]
Order of the Day for the Second Reading read.
LORD CHESHAM: My Lords, this is purely a Consolidation Bill. I beg to move that it be read a second time.
Moved that the Bill be now read 2a.—(Lord Chesham.)
On Question, Bill read 2a, and referred to the Joint Committee on Consolidation Bills.

FIRST OFFENDERS BILL
Amendments reported (according to Order).
ASHTON-UNDER-LYNE, STALY- BRIDGE AND DUKINFIELD (DISTRICT) WATERWORKS BILL [H.L.]
Reported from the Select Committee, with Amendments.
ROYAL SOCIETY FOR THE PRE- VENTION OF CRUELTY TO ANIMALS BILL
Reported, with Amendments.

HOLY TRINITY HOUNSLOW BILL
Reported, without amendment.
House adjourned at a quarter past four o'clock.