HL Deb 13 May 1958 vol 209 cc274-98

4.55 p.m.

Order of the Day read for the Bill to be considered on Report.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR (VISCOUNT KILMUIR)

My Lords, I beg to move that the Report be now received.

Moved, That the Report be now received.—(The Lord Chancellor.)

On Question, Motion agreed to.

Clause 1:

Council on Tribunals

1.—(1) There shall be a council, entitled the Council on Tribunals,—

  1. (a) to keep under review the constitution and working of the tribunals specified in the First Schedule to this Act (being the tribunals constituted under or for the purposes of the statutory provisions specified in that Schedule), and, from time to time, to report on their constitution and working;
  2. (b) to consider and report on such particular matters as may be referred to the Council under this Act with respect to tribunals other than the ordinary courts of law, whether or not specified in the First Schedule to this Act, or any such tribunal, or with respect to administrative procedures involving an inquiry or hearing.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR moved, in subsection (1) (b), to leave out all words after "tribunal", down to the end of the paragraph and to insert: (c) to consider and report on such particular matters as may be referred as aforesaid, or as the Council may determine to be of special importance, with respect to administrative procedures involving, or which may involve, the holding by or on behalf of a Minister of a statutory inquiry or any such procedure.

The noble and learned Viscount said: My Lords, I rise to move the first Amendment standing in my name. Your Lordships will appreciate that this Amendment is an endeavour to meet what appeared to be the general view of the House, and especially the views expressed by my noble friend Lord Swinton. The purpose of this Amendment is to enable the Council on Tribunals, on its own initiative, to consider and to report on any particular matter of special importance concerned with any administrative procedure involving, or which may involve, the holding of an inquiry or hearing in pursuance of a statutory provision.

Before the noble Lord, Lord Lucas of Chilworth, directed our attention to this matter by his Amendment on the Committee stage, under the existing Clause 1 the Council's initiative was confined to keeping under review the constitution and working of the tribunals listed in the First Schedule. As regards other tribunals and procedures involving an inquiry or hearing, the Council could consider and report only on such particular matters as might be referred to it by the Lord Chancellor or the Secretary of State. That was a limitation which I think the noble Lord, Lord Lucas of Chilworth, was anxious to clear away. I explained that the reasons why the Council was not given general supervision of inquiries were that the implications of doing so for a wide and undefined range of inquiries had not been examined, and that the Franks Committee itself recommended only that the Council should have "certain responsibilities" in relation to inquiries (the formulation of codes of procedure and the basis for the award of costs). Again, that limitation on the freedom of the Council to comment on inquiries drew criticism from the noble Lord, Lord Lucas of Chilworth, and from many of those who spoke on his Amendment.

Then, your Lordships will remember that my noble friend Lord Swinton appeared to be speaking for the majority of the House when he suggested that the Council ought to have competence [OFFICIAL REPORT, Vol. 208 (No. 57), col. 864]: … if they thought there was some shocking matter of a procedural kind which had not been referred to them by the Lord Chancellor or the Secretary of State for Scotland, and without keeping everything under continuous review, to consider and report to him as a Council on that particular matter. I promised to consider that suggestion, and this is the result. The noble Lord, Lord Lucas of Chilworth, was good enough to withdraw his Amendment on my assurance.

The Government's Amendment gives effect to that proposal and empowers the Council to report on any matter of special importance concerning a statutory inquiry. The noble Lord, Lord Lucas of Chilworth, will appreciate that the Franks Committee dealt only with those inquiries concerning land, and it was these with which the House was primarily concerned. The noble Lord's Amendment, however, extended to all kinds of inquiries, and the Government Amendment has not been restricted to those concerning land. I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Lucas of Chilworth, appreciates that I have tried to meet him in that way.

It is necessary to define with some degree of precision the scope of the initiative now conferred on the Council, and the Amendment limits this to procedures involving, or which may involve, a statutory inquiry. The purpose of this limitation is to confine the Council's initiative to hearings of a quasi-judicial nature. Your Lordships will appreciate that it is necessary to exclude the ordinary processes of administration, for example, an interview with an official, on which it would be inappropriate for the Council to comment. The noble Lord may have noticed that "statutory provision" includes subordinate legislation, so there is no difficulty there. Also, the Amendment is drafted to cover cases in which the holding of an inquiry is discretionary. I should like to say to the noble Lord, Lord Lucas of Chilworth, that although he has not got everything he wants I have gone a great way to meet his Amendment, and I have tried to interpret, as fairly and as fully as I can, what the noble Earl, Lord Swinton, put forward as a via media. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 1, line 17, leave out from (" tribunal") to end of line 19 and insert the said paragraph.—(The Lord Chancellor.)

5.0 p.m.

LORD LUCAS OF CHILWORTH

My Lords, before I make comment upon what the noble and learned Viscount has so kindly said, may I refer to something which he said in reply to the Amendment which I withdrew, and for which this is a substitute, on the Committee stage of the Bill? I refer to Column 861 of the OFFICIAL REPORT of April 22. The noble and learned Viscount said: The only slant of Lord Lucas of Chilworth's speech with which I should quarrel is the impression that he gave of arrogating to himself primarily the desire to see that the position of the individual is improved. If I was inadvertently guilty of conveying that impression, not only to the noble and learned Viscount but to any of your Lordships, I am deeply distressed, because it would exhibit a piece of impertinence of which I never thought I should be guilty. If I did that—and, as I say, it was quite inadvertent—I would offer, not only to the noble and learned Viscount, but to your Lordships, my humble apology. With all your Lordships I share a profound respect for the fairness of the Lord Chancellor and his invariable desire to protect the rights of the citizen and individual, and that is why I would thank him very much for the Amendment which he has put down.

Frankly, I cannot quite see the difference between his Amendment and mine. His goes almost all the way. There is only one thing I would say, and it gives me particular pleasure to say it—I do not like the drafting. As one who has suffered for years from having that said of my poor efforts, it gives me great satisfaction to say that I do not like the Parliamentary draftsman's drafting of this Amendment. But again I expect I am wrong, so if I have two questions to ask perhaps the noble and learned Viscount will forgive me. I hesitate to say I do not like the grammar, because again I may be wrong. The noble and learned Viscount's Amendment reads in this way: to consider and report on such particular matters as may be referred as aforesaid "— that is, those already mentioned in the words of the previous paragraph. Then it goes on: or as the Council may determine to be of special importance … Would it not be clearer if the words were: or other matters as the council may determine to be of special importance"? In my view it does not run smoothly to say: to consider and report on such particular matters as may be referred as aforesaid, or as the Council may determine to be of special importance … I should have thought that what we really want is for the Council to have jurisdiction on other matters as the Council may determine to be of special importance. That is my first point.

My next point is that the Amendment goes on—and I hope I am not displaying an unduly suspicious mind— or as the Council may determine to be of special importance, with respect to administrative procedures involving, or which may involve, the holding by or on behalf of a Minister of a statutory inquiry … What about the procedures following an inquiry that has been involved? If the noble and learned Viscount can follow me, I have in my mind that he is anxious about administrative procedures which may be carried out by the enactment of this Bill, by enactment of other legislation, or by other administrative procedure. I am anxious that the procedures that are put into force without enactment and done administratively shall also come before the Council. May I give the illustration of the circular issued by the Ministry of Housing and Local Government—the one I have quoted before? Here is a procedure which has been put into force administratively. Would such a procedure come under this paragraph which the Lord Chancellor now proposes your Lordships should agree to insert in the Bill?

One last point. The Amendment of the noble and learned Viscount says: the holding by or on behalf of a Minister of a statutory inquiry. … He omits the words, "or hearing". As the noble and learned Viscount knows, many of these things can be done by hearing privately, and need not he a statutory public inquiry. Is a hearing included? Will this tribunal have the right to make suggestions or bring to the Lord Chancellor's attention matters with which they do not agree in the procedure hearings; or am I to understand that "hearing" is included in the words "or any such procedure"? That is why I did not like the wording. The noble and learned Viscount may tell me that the wording is quite good; that it is grammatically correct. But would he then give me an assurance on the points I have just raised?

This is the Report stage, and I shall not have an opportunity of speaking on this Amendment again, so may I thank him very much for the trouble to which he has gone. I think that this Amendment to the Bill, in the sense the Lord Chancellor has described it to your Lordships, will do a great deal to take away the objection which was voiced in your Lordships' House to the position of the Council on Tribunals.

THE EARL OF SWINTON

My Lords, may I apologise to the noble and learned Viscount the Lord Chancellor? He knows that I had to he at another meeting when he moved this Amendment, but as I was able to get here before the debate concluded I should like to join the noble Lord opposite in thanking him most sincerely for accepting this Amendment and drafting it in this form. If I may, I would venture to congratulate him on the great trouble which he obviously took to produce so good a Bill as this on a very complicated subject, and for the constructive and conciliatory attitude he has adopted through the Committee stage and to-day in making it an even better Bill.

LORD SALTOUN

My Lords, one does try to understand Acts of Parliament. I have been looking at paragraphs (b) and (c) of subsection (1), and they seem to me to read, leaving out unnecessary words: to consider and report on such particular matters as may be referred to the Council … with respect to tribunals … and, in the new paragraph (c): to consider and report on such particular matters as may be referred as aforesaid, or as the Council may determine to be of special importance … I have been trying to make something of it. Should it not be "or which the Council may determine", if I have interpreted the rest of the paragraph correctly?

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

My Lords, if I may come back to Lord Saltoun's point in one moment, I should like first of all to thank the noble Lord, Lord Lucas of Chilworth, and my noble friend Lord Swinton for what they have said. It is a great pleasure when one can meet the opinion expressed in the House. I have sought so to do, and I am very grateful for what they have said. As regards Lord Lucas of Chilworth's first point, I should only like to say to him that of course I fully accept what he said, in the spirit in which he said it.

With regard to the drafting and the grammar, of course I will look at it, in view of what both noble Lords have said. But it is important to note (and this I think deals with Lord Saltoun's point) that the first line of the Amendment is to consider and report on such particular matters as may be referred as aforesaid". These are the particular matters which I, in regard to England and Wales, or my right honourable friend the Secretary of State for Scotland, in the case of Scotland, may refer. That is where we pick up the word "as" to which the noble Lord. Lord Saltoun, has drawn attention. Then we go on to say: or as importance Council may determine to be of special importance … I do not want to lose the particular, but I want to give the Council the full power which I said. Perhaps I may have another look at the wording. I am always pleased to receive suggestions; I think that we have done it, but I will look at it again and I would not for a moment grudge the noble Lord, Lord Lucas of Chilworth the riposte to-day, because, as he says, the Government has very often in the last few years made the same sort of point on Amendments of his, and riposte is always very proper.

With regard to what I think was the most substantial point made by the noble Lord, Lord Lucas of Chilworth, I am quite clear that the procedure is the whole process and there is no better way of involving an inquiry than to have it in the middle. I am quite satisfied that the noble Lord's point is met, and I do not think he need be in any fear as to that. The other point that he raised was about the extent of the hearing. I did say that I wanted to confine this—and I think this was the general view—to hearings of a quasi-judicial nature. What I do not want—I did mention this; I want to be quite frank about it—is that if a Minister sends a civil servant to see somebody that purely administrative procedure should be involved; and that is the line one has drawn. I think that would be an undue limit on administration. I do not think the noble Lord, Lord Lucas of Chilworth, need worry about the substance of his point, and with regard to the expression of that substance I will willingly have another look at it. I can only once again thank noble Lords who have spoken for what they have said on this Amendment, and ask the House to agree to it.

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Clause 2 [Reports of, and references to, Council and Scottish Committee]:

THE LORD CHANCELLOR moved, after subsection (3) to insert: (4) Where, without any reference having been made to them, the Council report on a particular matter, then—

  1. (a) if the matter relates only to England and Wales, subsection (2) of this section shall apply as if the matter had been referred to the Council by the Lord Chancellor,
  2. (b) if the matter relates only to Scotland, the two foregoing subsections shall apply as if the matter had been referred to them by the Secretary of State."

The noble and learned Viscount said: My Lords, Amendments Nos. 2 and 3 might with convenience be discussed together, because they are both consequential on the previous Amendment. They provide for any report made by the Council of its own motion on a particular matter relating to administrative procedures covered by Clause 1 (1) (c) to be made to me if it refers to England or Wales, or to my right honourable friend the Secretary of State for Scotland if the matter concerns only Scotland. These Amendments bring the Council's procedure arising from the previous Amendment into line with the procedure laid clown in the Bill for its other duties. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 3, line 12, at end insert the said subsection.—(The Lord Chancellor.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

My Lords, I beg to move this Amendment.

Amendment moved— Page 3, line 16, at end insert (" or with respect to any particular matter falling within paragraph (c) of subsection (1) of the foregoing section and relating only to Scotland.")—(The Lord Chancellor.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Clause 3 [Chairmen etc. of certain tribunals: appointment by Lord Chancellor or Lord President]:

5.18 p.m.

LORD LUCAS OF CHILWORTH moved, after subsection (1) to insert: (2) Where under any statute the appropriate authority is enabled to make or confirm any order or make any determination which interferes with or takes away the legal rights enjoyed by any person prior to such order and before making or confirming such order is empowered to appoint an inspector or other person or persons to inquire or hear representations and report upon the matter the inspector or person or, if more than one are so appointed the chairman, shall be selected by the appropriate authority from a panel of persons appointed by the Lord Chancellor.

The noble Lord said: My Lords, I put this Amendment down again in precisely the same form as I moved it on the Committee stage because, after the concerted pleadings of myself, the noble Earl, Lord Swinton. the noble Lord, Lord Balfour of Burleigh, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Denning, and the noble Marquess, Lord Reading, the noble and learned Viscount the Lord Chancellor said that he would take the whole matter back and would consider it. This is the essential point: should the inspectors who hold inquiries set up under administrative procedures be independent of the Departments, or should they remain, as they are to-day, the servants of the Departments? I am not going to weary your Lordships with the whole of the arguments again. You have heard them in this House upon many occasions. I do not alter my view. I think my view was held by all the speakers in your Lordships' House, with perhaps one exception, and I put the Amendment down to ask the noble and learned Viscount the Lord Chancellor whether or not he will meet, either here or when this Bill goes to another place, the expressed desire of your Lordships in the same generous manner as he has in Clause 1. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 3, line 34, at end insert the said subsection.—(Lord Lucas of Chilworth.)

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

My Lords, I am going to ask your Lordships indulgence to speak for a little longer on this Amendment in order to try to disembarrass your Lordships, because this is a most important subject and I promised the noble Lord, Lord Lucas of Chilworth, and others who spoke that I would give further consideration to the matter. I should like to deploy the reasons which have prevented my acceding to the Amendment, so that they are on record for consideration, and if they do not appeal to noble Lords I am sure they will be good enough to come and tell me the troubles they feel.

We remain convinced that the change to put the inspectors in the Ministry of Housing and Local Government under my control would be a mistake. It is important to remember the reasons that have been advanced in favour of such a change by the Franks Committee. It was to increase public confidence in the procedure by emphasising impartiality at an important stage of the adjudication. I quote those words from paragraph 303 of the Report. The Franks Committee recognise that such a change might seem to sonic to be a change in name only, but said that it is the appearance that matters. The Government say that such a change is not necessary and that it would give rise to great practical difficulties.

In considering the first question, whether a change is necessary, I invite your Lordships to look at what the problem really is. The inspectorate has grown up inside the Department over many decades, and it has established its present high reputation for impartiality and integrity from within the Department. Nobody has ever suggested, and the Franks Committee did not suggest, that the inspectors of the Ministry are subject to any influence in the recommendations they make, and, in fact, they are not. They are never given—nor would they accept—any advice about the conclusion that they should come to in any particular case. The noble Lord, Lord Silkin, confirmed this when he said—I quote his words from the OFFICIAL REPORT of April 22, Vol. 208, col. 886: I go further and express the belief that they are not even briefed. That also is true. I ask the noble Lord, Lord Lucas of Chilworth, to have this in mind. This is true, but it will be no less true now that their reports and recommendations are being published for all to see.

The impartiality at this stage of the adjudication needs no emphasis; it has never been in doubt. But what has been in doubt—I think this was what the noble Lord, Lord Lucas of Chilworth, had in mind—was what happens after the report is received. Publication of the inspector's recommendations, together with the giving of full reasons for the Minister's decision, whether in agreement with the recommendation of the inspector or otherwise, will, we believe, resolve any doubt. I repeat what I said on the previous occasion, that the Franks Committee did not suggest that a change was necessary. All they suggested was that it would look better.

Now I come to the other point, which is most important—namely, that to alter the responsibility for the control of the inspectorate would give rise to serious practical difficulties. Again, it must be faced that the Franks Committee agreed that the inspectorate should be kept in close contact with developments of policy in the Departments responsible for the subject matter of the inquiries; and, indeed, nothing else would make sense. In addition, the inspectors of the Ministry of Housing and Local Government must be in close physical contact with the Department. I ask your Lordships to appreciate this fact. With over 6,000 inquiries to arrange in a year, and over 100 inspectors travelling all over the country, the closest contact is needed between the Department who are receiving the appeals and the objections and the inspectors who are taking the inquiries, if intolerable delay and confusion are to be avoided. The process is—I am sure the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, would bear me out—that cases needing inquiry are streaming in the whole time and have to be fitted into the inspectors' tightly packed programmes. Dates for inquiries have to be settled with the parties, and it often happens, as those of us who are engaged in the law know from our own experience, that two or three dates have to be tried before an acceptable one can be found; then it may have to be altered to meet the convenience of one of the parties.

This departure was tried—I do not know whether it was in Lord Silkin's time or not. The operations room of the inspectors was in a different building from the headquarters of the Ministry. But the difficulties and delays were such that that had to be abandoned, and this fact the Franks Committee accepted. If this arrangement is to be altered, the process of reaching decision, already too long, will take a great deal longer and, as I have said, the Government could not really tolerate it because it would be a denial of justice in itself. That applies especially to the smaller applicants who are waiting to know what the result will be because it affects their own private lives and their future.

My right honourable friend is most anxious to shorten the time. This aim has been difficult to achieve because of the number of cases; but he is determined to achieve it. I would put to the noble Lord, Lord Lucas of Chilworth, not only as a former Minister and so experienced a Parliamentarian, but as a business man, the difficulty I am in. If I took this duty over, how could my Department exercise any genuine control over an inspectorate seated, as it must be seated, in the Ministry of Housing and Local Govenment, in daily contact with the Ministry, as the Franks Committee says they must be, and necessarily dependent on the Minister for arranging their programme? The management of such a business—that is, arranging the programme, the dates and the alterations, for 6,000 inquiries in a year—is not work for which my Department is, or could reasonably he, equipped. I would also say that it is work for which the Minister ought to answer.

Without any desire to catch up or catch out the noble Lord, Lord Lucas of Chilworth, I crave in aid what he said on the last Amendment. The noble Lord was anxious that it should not be an isolated part of the procedures but should be the whole of the procedures which should be subject to inquiry. The difficulty that I see here is that if the Minister is responsible for the whole procedure and of making a decision in the end—the noble Lord, I am sure, had to make many decisions in corresponding matters when he was at the Ministry of Transport—then he must have some responsibility at this point, by seeing that all the steps necessay to give him the chance of arriving at a right decision are properly taken. I would suggest, therefore, that the inquiry is part—and a very important part—of the process by which he reaches his decision. The inspector makes his recommendation but does not make a provisional decision. I do not want that point blurred, because the Minister must take responsibility for the decision after having the argument put before him, with all the necessary information, by the inspectorate. It seems to Her Majesty's Government that the Minister who is responsible for the decisions arrived at by that process ought to be responsible and answerable for the functioning of the process.

I hope the noble Lord, Lord Lucas of Chilworth, appreciates that there I have been dealing with the matter on the basis of the functioning of the process. As to the appointment of these gentlemen, they are, of course, to be appointed only with my consent, as I told the House on the last occasion. When they come up for appointment as inspectors I have to be consulted and to consent; and equally they cannot be removed without my consent. That is the argument.

There is just one other point that I should like the noble Lord, Lord Lucas of Chilworth to have in mind. Owing to the Amendment with which we have just been dealing we have now further agreed that the Council on Tribunals shall be entitled to report on any matters regarding administrative procedures involving an inquiry or hearing in the sense that I explained to the noble Lord, which they may consider to be of special importance. Should the Council consider that the position of the inspectorate ought to be looked at as a matter of special importance they will be free to do so; and equally I shall be free to do so should the noble Lord find some reason to put before me and ask me to take that course. So it may be some satisfaction to the noble Lord, Lord Lucas of Chilworth, to know that the Amendment which is in substitution for his Amendment has also produced a reaction on the position of the inspectorate and the possibility that that may be considered. I am extremely sorry to have taken up so much time but I feel that this is one of the matters which has most worried the House, and as I could not go further than I had gone I was most anxious to convince your Lordships that I had taken into consideration all the points which had been made.

5.34 p.m.

LORD LUCAS OF CHILWORTH

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble and learned Viscount for going to the trouble of stating the case he has. I say to him, with no disrespect, that, while I agree with the technical perfection of the case, I am not so much concerned with administrative convenience. I am concerned with the feeling of the people of this country; and I can only recall the words of the permanent head of his own Department before the Franks Committee. Sir George Coldstream then said that there was grave disquiet in this country upon the question of the impartiality of these public inquiries which are set up under administrative procedures.

When the Report of the Franks Committee was first debated in Parliament it was debated in another place a week or ten days before it was debated in your Lordships' House. The Lord Privy Seal spoke on behalf of Her Majesty's Government, and what he said was the first Government pronouncement upon this very thorny problem—I quote from the Commons OFFICIAL REPORT: The Government further recognise the importance of emphasising the independence of the inspectorate. I am not so concerned with inspectors who sit and hear inquiries on behalf of the Ministry of Housing and Local Government vis-à-vis that Department or vis-à-vis an individual and a local authority. Let us be frank about this. The disquiet of the public has been over inquiries into the acquisition of land for the erection of pylons on behalf of a nationalised industry, the Central Electricity Authority—inquiries presided over by an inspector of the Ministry of Power. That has been the prime criticism over these last two or three years. The criticism has had this basis: that practically 100 per cent. of the objections received have been on amenity grounds, and as the Ministry of Power inspector has no knowledge of or authority in amenity matters, which rest only with the Minister of Housing and Local Government, there have been two inspectors presiding, as I have said rather facetiously more than once in your Lordships' House—like Tweedledum and Tweedledee. With those two rather fictitious folk conducting inquiries the bulk of the people of this country who have had to go to these inquiries and prosecute their case have felt that they have fallen between two stools.

It would be impudence on my part to start to lecture the noble and learned Viscount on the Woolsack on the basis of British law and justice, but my elementary teaching was that not only must justice be done but that it must be quite apparent that it is being done; and that is the basis of the complaint of nearly everybody who goes to that type of inquiry. I know the difficulties, and I know that there is a good case to be made for the administrative convenience of a Department—and nobody could make that case better than the noble and learned Viscount. But as I have said, public administration is for the benefit of the public and not for the benefit of the Administration. What a Garden of Eden it would be for the bureaucracy of any country if they could ride roughshod over the rights of the common person! But they cannot; and the more difficulties that I can put in their way, the more I intend to put in their way. That is the drawback of their trade.

I would not quarrel with anything that has been said by the noble and learned Viscount, but nobody will convince the average Briton that there is any justice for him when he goes to what he believes is at least a quasi-judicial independent inquiry and finds it presided over by somebody who is really only interested in getting the policy of his master—in other words the Minister—through. However, I am not going to carry this matter any further. I am very glad that we have had this argument deployed, because this Bill goes to another place and we shall see what they think when they have to consider this point. I have read nearly every speech that has been made upon this subject, and in another place there was only one advocate for preserving the status quo. We shall see if they have changed their minds.

I, my Lords, seize on what the noble and learned Viscount said in his concluding remark. That is why I welcome so gladly the Amendment to Clause 1. This matter will now come before the Council on Tribunals, and I do not expect for one moment that that has escaped the notice of the noble and learned Viscount on the Woolsack. I know that he will set up the Council, as will be his responsibility; and he will see, I feel certain, that the personnel of that Council are men who will have wide experience and will not be—I say this because I cannot think offhand of a better word—the basis of a bureaucracy. That would defeat its whole object. I hope that the Council on Tribunals will be renowned for their independence of mind and not for their dependence on the patronage of any Government, whichever Government it may be. If that is the Council we are going to have, I am perfectly prepared to rest content on that. I am not going to argue for one moment that the balance of argument is all in my favour. There is an argument, but it ill becomes me to argue. I know that perhaps I may earn the rebuke of the noble and learned Viscount that I rather chided him before. I do not put myself up as the only spokesman on behalf of the freedom of the individual, but I confess that I am more concerned with the freedom of the individual and the rights of the individual than with the convenience of either Ministers or civil servants; and I always have been, even when I was in the Ministry.

I do not agree with the noble and learned Viscount that what I am pleading for would in any way delay justice. I think that in the cases I have cited it would speed justice, because it would mean a quicker decision than in many of these cases where there are two inspectors who have to reconcile their differences. My experience as a Minister has been that if a Department want to delay a decision they have the most wonderful technique for delaying it. The "In" and "Out" trays of a ministerial office provide the most efficient method of delaying decisions; not inspectors' reports. I have always had inspectors' reports in the Ministry of Transport with great expedition, and they have all been independent. I have a great admiration for the railway inspector, independent; the traffic commissioners, independent—although the Minister has the last word. I have never known anybody grumble about one of those decisions, because they have always felt that the inspector, at least, has been independent.

However, as I said, I am not going to ask your Lordships to vote upon this Amendment. I think it would be foolish in your Lordships' House to do that, because we hear the arguments. If Parliament in its wisdom wants to go on in this matter—that is, in another place—then we can only hope that this Council on Tribunals will watch the position very carefully. I take it—and perhaps the noble and learned Viscount the Lord Chancellor would be kind enough to answer this point, which I meant to ask on the First Amendment—that all these matters will be subject to a report to Parliament, as it was originally intended the Council should report to Parliament on its first procedure. I take it that, now that the noble and learned Viscount has, by his first Amendment, included the administrative procedures, they will be subject to a report to Parliament. I shall rest content if the noble and learned Viscount will give an assurance on that, and I will then withdraw my Amendment.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

My Lords, certainly I give the noble Lord that assurance. The intention is that matters that the Council raise proprio motu should be in the same position as those referred to me, and should finish with a report to Parliament.

LORD LUCAS OF CHILWORTH

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble and learned Viscount, and I ask leave to withdraw my Amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 8 [Appeals from certain tribunals]:

5.47 p.m.

LORD LUCAS OF CHILWORTH moved, after subsection (1) to insert: (2) If any party to any inquiry or hearing as specified in subsection (2) of section three of this Act is dissatisfied in point of law with the order of the appropriate authority made after consideration of the report of the inspector or other person conducting the inquiry or hearing thereof given an or after the appointed day he may according as rules of court may provide either appeal therefrom to the High Court or require the appropriate authority to state and sign a case for the opinion of the High Court.

The noble Lord said: My Lords, again this Amendment is put down because, owing to his regrettable absence through other and pressing business, the noble and learned Viscount could not be here when the matter was argued, and the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, replied for him. This is a simple point. I am hoping that the noble Viscount will accept the Amendment or, if he will not accept it in these words, that he will give it his consideration on its passage down to another place. If in any tribunal decision any appellant wishes to contest a point of law—I am putting it now in a layman's language—he has the right to go to a higher court. I desire to have precisely the same right given to the individual who is aggrieved on a point of law by a decision of the Minister after a local inquiry by an administrative procedure. I cannot, for the life of me, see why justice, as interpreted in this context, should be withheld from one individual and given to another.

The noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, in his reply did not contest this, but he said that it was really a matter that should be put in a planning Act. I do not know whether the noble and learned Viscount would like to tell your Lordships what chances there are of having another planning Act, but I should think that they are as remote as it is possible to conceive. All I do in this Amendment to Clause 8 of the Bill is to repeat precisely the words that are applicable to tribunals, as set out in the First Schedule, and apply them to administrative procedures. May I refresh your Lordships' memories? Clause 8 states:

" Appeals from certain tribunals

"If any party to proceedings before any such tribunal as is specified in paragraph 2, 3, 4 or 8"—

and other paragraphs which it sets out— of the First Schedule to this Act is dissatisfied in point of law with a decision of the tribunal given on or after the appointed day he may, according as rules of court may provide, either appeal therefrom to the High Court or require the tribunal to state and sign a case for the opinion of the High Court.

All I ask in this Amendment is that that shall be repeated in subsection (2)—the noble Viscount is covered by his first Amendment—for any party dissatisfied in point of law with the order of the appropriate authority made after consideration of the report of the inspector or other person conducting the inquiry … It is a point of simple justice. In my lay mind, there could be conceivably a point of law. May I make the suggestion that there might be lack of evidence upon which the Minister has come to a decision after the inspector has reported? If an appellant to a tribunal can go to a court of law on a point of law. I cannot see why an appellant to a local inquiry set up by a Ministry cannot do the same thing.

On Committee stage, when I moved this Amendment, I said that if my interpretation of the Franks Report was correct, it said this, in effect, from first to last: the courts in preference to tribunals and the tribunals in preference to administrative procedures. But as in this complex social system of ours we cannot go to the courts on every conceivable point of difference between the Executive and the individual, we must have tribunals and administrative procedures. Nevertheless, to my mind there is no need to deny the ordinary citizen the right to go to the courts on a point of law if he thinks the Minister or the tribunal or the appropriate authority have been wrong. So I hope that the noble and learned Viscount will either accept this Amendment or give it further consideration in the Bill's passage to another place. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 6, line 44, at end insert the said subsection.—(Lord Lucas of Chilworth.)

5.52 p.m.

LORD DENNING

My Lords, may I say a word on this Amendment? I could not be here on the earlier stage. It is important that there should be some recourse to the courts on points of law. In the Franks Committee Report there is a specific recommendation in regard to certain matters on planning appeals. Let me give an illustration which occurred in the courts recently in regard to the Malvern Hills. There was a question of whether planning permission was necessary or not for the extension of quarries on the Malvern Hills, and this depended on the technical point of whether or not they had been previously authorised by an Act of Parliament. That matter eventually came before the courts on a request for a declaration, and it was argued on behalf of the Minister that there was no recourse to that procedure. Now the Franks Committee have recommended that there should be an appeal to the courts of law on points of that kind.

Again, on questions from a Minister, a case arose from Bridgend, Glamorganshire, where a shoemaker claimed to be a mental health officer so as to get extra superannuation. Apparently he was engaged in giving mental patients occupational therapy and he could get a higher pension as a mental health officer. He wanted the question of law tested in the courts and brought proceedings for the purpose, but the court had to tell him that they could not help him. Therefore there should be recourse to the courts.

The only question is one of procedure. I find that the Franks Report recommends something in the nature of certiorari for it. If reasonable decisions are given and it is made clear that the old procedure of certiorari applies, then it might not be necessary to have all the complete and perhaps too encouraging procedure of appeals extended. If we have reasons, which I hope we shall have in due course, perhaps that would cover the grounds which the Amendment is suggesting.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

My Lords, I should like to say that I yield to no one in my wish that the citizen should have access to the courts. As I said to the House the other day, after the Question of my noble friend, Lord Elibank, on legal aid, I believe that the right of a citizen to establish his rights in court, either against another citizen or against the State, is one of the fundamental requirements of true democracy; and I want to make it quite clear that I could not feel more strongly than I do on the matter. But I want to deal with this point on the basis of what exists today and of what is the position with regard to planning, as my noble and learned friend Lord Denning has mentioned that point in particular.

The Franks Committee considered the need for such an appeal as is proposed here in cases of administrative decisions relating to land which involve the holding of inquiries, as set out in paragraph 359 of the Report. They noted that the right of appeal already existed in most of these cases: first of all, decisions on compulsory purchase orders made by local authorities under various powers, which is probably the most important group; secondly, decisions by the Minister of Transport and Civil Aviation under certain Acts relating to roads, which the noble Lord, Lord Lucas of Chilworth, will remember well; thirdly, decisions by any Minister vested with powers of compulsory acquisition by Section 37 of the Town and Country Planning Act, 1947; fourthly, clearance orders under the Housing Act, and fifthly, approval of a development plan by the Minister of Housing and Local Government. I have not troubled your Lordships with the actual citations of the Statutes, but your Lordships may take it that these are already covered by various Acts which I could name.

In these cases the appeal to the High Court lies on the ground that an order or decision is ultra vires or procedurally faulty, and it has to be made within six weeks of the publication of the decision or confirmation of the order. The High Court may suspend the operation of the order or decision or any part of it, pending their consideration of the matter. If satisfied that it is ultra vires or procedurally faulty, they can quash the order or decision or any part of it. The Franks Committee made no criticism of the adequacy of that form of appeal. I think that the substantial point is this—indeed, the noble Lord, Lord Lucas of Chilworth, presented it in this way—that they thought it should be applied to decisions on planning appeals in the same way as it applied to decisions in other cases relating to land. The Government accept this recommendation but, despite what the noble Lord, Lord Lucas of Chilworth, has said, they consider that the appropriate way to give effect to it is by amendment to the Town and Country Planning Act.

I must say that the noble Lord gave me a good thrust. He knows very well that no Minister of any Party can ever say in May what will appear in the next gracious Speech from the Throne. No doubt, if he chooses, he will go on describing the slaughter of the innocents and all the other Parliamentary terrorism which takes place with regard to future legislation. But what I want to put to the noble Lord is that there are certain other procedures under these Acts, besides the appeals, which should be considered in the same connection—for example, modification orders under Section 21, and orders relating to discontinuance of uses under Section 26. And therefore there is a case for saying that this could be better done in the context of the Planning Acts themselves. I cannot be specific, but I do not accept the suggestion of the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, that this would mean putting the matter off until the Greek Kalends.

There are a number of points relating to planning procedures on which the Franks Committee made observations, and the Government wish to take action as soon as they can find an opportunity. The sort of points I have in mind are those raised in Recommendations 90, 91 and 93 of the Report. There is also the point that power will need to be taken to make rules giving effect to whatever the Council on Tribunals may say on planning procedures. So there are a number of points which might he usefully legislated upon in that field. What I think will be more important for the noble Lord, Lord Lucas of Chilworth, however, is that, so far as I can see, it is not correct to speak as though the subject had no recourse to the courts in any of these cases. The noble Lord asked on April 29 [OFFICIAL REPORT, Vol. 208, col. 1105], and he has really asked again to-day: Why deny the citizen … recourse to the courts of this land? If anyone wishes to challenge a planning decision on a point of law he can apply to the High Court for an order of certiorari to quash the decision; or, in an appropriate case, he can seek a declaration. I think my noble and learned friend Lord Denning will bear me out that there are cases where the remedies of mandamus and prohibition are also open to him. Therefore I would say to the noble Lord, Lord Lucas of Chilworth, that we are not leaving it to the position in which an individual is barred from the courts. We are saying that we shall take an opportunity of bringing planning appeals into line and of tidying the matter up, but in the meantime I am glad to think that the individual is not barred from the courts.

My noble and learned friend Lord Denning drew anticipatory attention to the question of the giving of reasons. I do not think it would be a good thing to spoil whatever surprise I have for your Lordships at the time when that Amendment comes by saying any more now, but I have my noble and learned friend's point well in mind. For all these reasons I would ask the noble Lord, Lord Lucas of Chilworth, not to press the Amendment, on my assurance that there is that recourse to the High Court, which I hope will be better.

LORD LUCAS OF CHILWORTH

My Lords, I gladly accept that assurance of the noble and learned Viscount, and also his assurance that the Government have it clearly in mind to give attention to this when the tidying-up takes place on all the other things. I should hope that he will be able to redeem his promise, if I may put it that way, in the not too distant future, because I have an unhappy feeling—perhaps I should not say "unhappy"—that if he leaves it too long he will not have the opportunity. However, on that assurance I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 10 [Extension of supervisory powers of superior courts]:

6.6 p.m.

LORD LUCAS OF CHILWORTH moved to add to the clause: (3) Where any tribunal specified in the First Schedule to this Act is empowered to make any order or determination or where an appropriate authority is empowered by statute to make or confirm any order or determination which interferes with or takes away legal rights enjoyed by any person the tribunal or appropriate authority as the case may be shall state the grounds upon which the order or determination is made.

The noble Lord said: My Lords, this Amendment is put down only to enable the Lord Chancellor to tell your Lordships the result of his deliberations upon the Amendment that was so well moved by the noble Lord, Lord Balfour of Burleigh, on the Committee stage. This Amendment also was down on the Committee stage, and if the noble Lord, Lord Balfour of Burleigh, had repeated his Amendment to-day, I should not have put down this Amendment. As I say, it is moved only to allow the Lord Chancellor to tell your Lordships the result of his deliberations on this vital question of the giving of reasons I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 9, line 3, at end insert the said subsection.—(Lord Lucas of Chilworth.)

LORD BALFOUR OF BURLEIGH

My Lords, the noble Lord opposite has reminded your Lordships that at the Committee stage I had an Amendment down having the same effect as this Amendment. The Lord Chancellor was good enough to give me a certain assurance before the time had elapsed for putting down Amendments for this stage and, in confident anticipation of what he was going to tell your Lordships, I did not think it was necessary to repeat the Amendment.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

My Lords, I want to assure the noble Lord, Lord Lucas of Chilworth, that I have considered this point carefully. The way that my mind is moving (I do not want this to be held absolutely firmly against me; I only want to indicate it, because I should like your Lordships to know that I have been thinking the matter out) is that there should be inserted in the Bill a requirement to give reasons; that the requirement should come into force at a future date; that before that date I should have a chance of consulting the Council on Tribunals so as to get their views, and that, having consulted them, I should then have the power to exempt certain tribunals from giving reasons, but that that should be subject to Parliamentary approval, either affirmatively or negatively, so that anything I did in that regard would be subject to Parliamentary control.

At the moment, I think it would be a good thing for me to get the views on this point of the Council on Tribunals, as there are some matters that cause me great difficulty. I mentioned on Second Reading one kind of case where I could not find a point of law—the case of the Assessment Committees under the war pensions tribunals, where there is a tribunal which has a medical chairman and Service people sitting with him. The medical chairman examines a pensioner to decide whether he should be a 60 per cent. or 40 per cent. disability case. He goes through all the long records from the Ministry of Pensions, with which we are all familiar, and then examines the man himself; and having done so, he says that he thinks it is a 60 per cent. or 40 per cent. case. In many cases it is difficult to give reasons because it is a pure assessment. Or take the case to which the Franks Committee drew attention, that of the National Assistance committees. They say: "We think that Tom Smith earns £5 a week and should receive 38s. 6d." What he should receive is just an assessment of his need at that time and an assessment of his average earnings. It is very difficult to give detailed reasons.

I have quoted those examples because I want your Lordships to know that I am all for tribunals giving reasons, yet I do not want to make it too difficult for the many thousands of admirable people all over the country who give their services on these tribunals by requiring them to give reasons in cases where the giving of reasons has not the same importance that it has in others. That is why I am considering whether there should be an opportunity to exclude some of those where reasons cannot be so important. I have said that only because I was hopeful that I should be able to come before your Lordships with the actual Amendment. The matter, however, needs some further consideration, and I give your Lordships the firm undertaking that an Amendment on this point will be placed in the Bill when it comes to another place. I hope your Lordships will think I cannot do more at the moment. But that is a firm and solemn undertaking, and I gladly give it.

Lola LUCAS on CHILWORTH

My Lords, I am grateful, as I think both the noble Lord, Lord Balfour of Burleigh, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Denning, will be to the noble and learned Viscount for his assurance. We are perfectly prepared to leave ourselves in his hands, with thanks for the trouble he has taken. With that, I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 12 [Interpretation]:

6.13 p.m.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

My Lords, in rising to move this Amendment I need not detain your Lordships for long because, as your Lordships will see, it is to leave out certain words and to insert others. The first point deals with special bodies, and I do not think your Lordships would have any objection to the course taken with regard to them. It extends the definition of a Minister so as to include any Board presided over by a Minister, such as the Army Council or the Board of Admiralty. That is necessary because of the new paragraph (c) which was placed in the Bill by the first Amendment. I explained on a previous Amendment the importance of "statutory inquiry." The Amendment is really consequential, and I ask your Lordships to accept it. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 10, line 15, leave out from (" includes ") to (" and ") in line 16 and insert (" any Board presided over by a Minister, ' statutory inquiry ' means an inquiry or hearing held or to he held in pursuance of a statutory provision,").—(The Lord Chancellor.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.