Lords Sitting of 12 May 1958

Preamble
The House met at half past two of the clock, The LORD TERRINGTON on the Woolsack.
Prayers

  JUDGES' NON-JUDICIAL WORK
  2.35 p.m.
  LORD SILKIN: My Lords, I beg to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
  [The Question was as follows:
  To ask Her Majesty's Government (a) what statutes provide for the appointment of High Court Judges for non-judicial functions; (b) how many and which Judges are at present acting either under a statute or otherwise for the whole or part of their time.]
  LORD CHESHAM: My Lords, the answers to both parts of the noble Lord's question depend on what precisely he means by "non-judicial". I hope I am interpreting the noble Lord correctly in assuming that he does not wish me to refer to those Judges who serve on the various Rule Committees which make rules of procedure for the courts or on law reform committees. I shall also exclude the functions of my noble and learned friend, the Lord Chancellor, though he is a High Court Judge; on the other hand, I shall include the Lords of Appeal in Ordinary and the Judges of the Court of Appeal, though strictly speaking they are not all High Court Judges. With these limitations I shall do my best to answer.
  First, the relevant Statutes are: The Public Record Office Act, 1838, by virtue of which the Master of the Rolls exercises—but will shortly cease to exercise—supervision over the Public Record Office; the Solicitors Act, 1957, under which the Lord Chief Justice and the Master of the Rolls have certain responsibilities (some of which may be delegated to another Judge) for the rules governing the admission and remuneration of solicitors. I should also mention the Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1956, and the Representation of the People Act, 1949, which requires Election Petitions to be heard by two High Court Judges, though
  160
  the view of Her Majesty's Government is that the Judges who are members of the Courts set up under these Statutes act in a strictly judicial capacity.
  With regard to the second part of the Question, the Judges at present engaged on non-judicial work are the noble and learned Lords, Lord Radcliffe, Lord Tucker and Lord Cohen, who are sitting on the Monetary and Credit Policy Committee, the Committee on the Publication of Reports and Proceedings before Examining Justices, and the Council on Prices, Productivity and Incomes respectively. Mr. Justice Wynn-Parry is Chairman of the Prison Officers' Committee. I should like also to tell the noble Lord that my noble and learned friend the Lord Chancellor, hopes that High Court Judges will serve on the Committees on Artificial Insemination and the Administration of Justice at Assizes and Quarter Sessions which my right honourable friend, the Home Secretary, intends to set up. Although these Committees will not be confined to considering changes in the law or in legal procedure, the latter will of course form an important feature of their inquiries. If the noble Lord would like a fuller list of Committee work currently being undertaken by Judges, my noble and learned friend will certainly let him have one.
  LORD SILKIN: My Lords, I am much obliged for the information. The noble Lord has correctly interpreted what I had in mind.

  CORPORATION OF THE SONS OF THE CLERGY CHARITIES' SCHEME CONFIRMATION BILL
  2.40 p.m.
  Order of the Day for the Second Reading read.
  LORD AMULREE: My Lords, the Corporation of the Sons of the Clergy administer some twenty-four charities in all, some of which go back as far as 1670 though some are as recent as 1940. The purpose of these charities is to benefit widows and children of clergymen and, in some instances, the clergymen themselves. The founders of these charities, however, made their bequests so mixed that it is impossible to find any standard way of applying the benefits. Uniform administration methods have therefore been impossible. It was felt desirable that certain

  161
  specific funds should be allocated to the predominating objects—namely, for the widows and daughters, a reserve fund for widows and daughters, and for sons and clergy themselves. The terms of the new scheme have been published and have met with no opposition from any quarter, but it was felt advisable to embody them in a Bill before Parliament. I beg to move that the Bill be read a second time.
  Moved, That the Bill be now read 2a.—(Lord Amulree.)
  On Question, Bill read 2a; Committee negatived.

  READING ALMSHOUSE AND MUNICIPAL CHARITIES SCHEME CONFIRMATION BILL
  Order of the Day for the Second Reading read.
  LORD AMULREE: My Lords, there have for some time been two groups of almshouses in Reading which were originally administered by the Reading Corporation. The two groups consist of the municipal Church charities and the municipal general charities. The general charities are almost entirely for the poor and almshouses, whereas the Church charities include a certain amount of money for schools and various other purposes. Since 1866, there have been twenty-two general almshouses and ten Church almshouses built on a common site, but these have been now proved to be far below modern standards. Whereas, however, the general body of trustees have enough money to carry out modernisation work, most of the Church trustees have not enough to carry out this work. To avoid there being some good buildings and some bad buildings on the same site, therefore, it is proposed to amalgamate the two bodies under a single body of trustees, of which the Church trustees will continue to nominate three people. At the same time, some of the Church work is being safeguarded by the fact that ten of the people in the combined almshouses shall be members of the Church of England. The scheme has been published and has met with no opposition. I beg to move that the Bill be now read a second time.
  Moved. That the Bill be now read 2a.—(Lord Amulree.)
  On Question, Bill read 2a; Committee negatived.

  ROYAL INSTITUTION OF GREAT BRITAIN CHARITY SCHEME CONFIRMATION BILL
  Order of the Day for the Second Reading read.
  LORD AMULREE: My Lords, the Royal Institution of Great Britain was founded by George III in 1800, and the Bill before you contains provisions to modify certain provisions of the Act under which it was founded. The terms of the foundation were that the managers and visitors of the Institution should be elected annually from members who were neither managers nor visitors in the preceding year. There should be statutory meetings in January, on the first Monday of February, March, April, May, June, July, August, November and December, and the election of the various officers should take place at a meeting in May. The proposal at present before the House is that the managers and visitors should be elected, instead of for one year, for a term of three years, with one-third of them retiring each year, and for the members of the Institution, if they so wish, to make a by-law to the effect that the balloting shall be done by post. The Bill also provides that the meeting which normally had to be held in August shall be postponed to October, as most people do not wish to come to a meeting in London in August. The scheme which I propose has been advertised and given wide publicity in the Royal Institution, and has aroused no opposition. I beg to move that the Bill be read a second time.
  Moved, That the Bill be now read 2a;—(Lord Amulree.)
  On Question, Bill read 2a; Committee negatived.

  ST. JAMES'S DWELLINGS CHARITY SCHEME CONFIRMATION BILL
  Order of the Day for Second Reading read.
  LORD AMULREE: My Lords, I must apologise for rising to speak to you a fourth time. This Bill concerns a Charity which is administered by the Westminster City Council. It consists of buildings which were built during the 19th century in a tiny court in Soho called Silver Place. The buildings, which were intended for female piece workers and others of the

  163
  labouring classes, have now become dilapidated. They are in the form of tenements. The lease does not expire until 1963, when, we are informed, the people who have the freehold do not wish to extend the lease. The accumulated funds for rebuilding are not enough to carry out a proper scheme; so the Council wish to build new blocks of flats for the people who are living there. They have a site in mind, and they propose that the rooms on the ground floor should be let for commercial purposes, thus bringing some money into the Charity, whereas the beneficiaries should live on the first and possibly the second floor if such is built.
  There is some doubt in the Charity Commissioners' minds whether the funds of the Charity can be applied for letting, even though this would bring in more money for the Charity, and whether the preference given
  "to those who reside or have resided in the area of the Ancient Parish of St. James, Westminster"
  is a permissible variation; hence the Bill. The Bill has been published in the Parish of St. James and in the City of Westminster and there has been no opposition. I beg to move the Bill be read a second time.
  Moved, That the Bill be now read 2a.—(Lord Amulree.)
  On Question, Bill read 2a; Committee negatived.

  IMPORTED LIVESTOCK ORDER, 1958
  2.50 p.m.
  THE JOINT PARLIAMENTARY SECRETARY, MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE, FISHERIES AND FOOD (EARL ST. ALDWYN)THE JOINT PARLIAMENTARY SECRETARY, MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE, FISHERIES AND FOOD (EARL ST. ALDWYN) rose to move, That the Imported Livestock Order, 1958, be approved. The noble Earl said: My Lords, this is chiefly a consolidation Order dealing with the importation of livestock into the United Kingdom. It brings together the provisions of the Livestock (Import from Eire and the Isle of Man) Regulations, 1945, and the Imported Livestock (Marking) Order, 1954. It also ends our reliance on emergency legislation for this particular purpose. It has been the policy of successive Governments since before the war to give the livestock industry the
  164
  maximum help and encouragement. During the war and till 1954 we had the Government's purchase arrangements. Now we have the guarantee payments under the Agriculture Acts of 1947 and 1957.
  These support arrangements not only apply to stock fattened in the United Kingdom but give recognition to our traditional dependence upon the supply of store animals, especially cattle from the Irish Republic, imports of which last year accounted for nearly 25 per cent. of the beef produced in this country. The present fatstock guarantee arrangements specially provide for guarantees to be paid on cattle and sheep which are bred outside, but are fattened or finished within, the United Kingdom provided they are of the right kind and have been in the United Kingdom for at least three months. To ensure the proper payment of subsidy, such cattle and sheep are marked as they enter the country, and for this reason we have to prescribe the times and places at which they may come in. To support these import controls we also need powers of seizure and forfeiture.
  So much for the background. And now a few words about how the new Order differs from its predecessor. First, we have made provision for imports from the Channel Islands, which since 1954 have been covered by the provisions of the Defence Regulations Marking Order. Secondly, there has been a change in the definition of livestock, which now includes the carcases of pigs in Northern Ireland. This is to avoid the danger that they may be imported and entered for certification and payment of guarantee to which they are not entitled. Finally, there are the seizure and forfeiture arrangements. Previously these applied only to the animals themselves. The present Order applies them also to the vehicles and containers used to convey or conceal illegally imported livestock. The present high rates of subsidy are an increased incentive to illegal importation and we feel that more stringent measures are needed to deal with this situation. In general these preventive provisions will be used, as in the past, in Northern Ireland, where the land border with the Irish Republic presents special problems.
  There are one or two minor purely procedural changes, designed mainly to bring these procedures, as far as possible,

  165
  into line with those used by H.M. Customs and Excise in similar cases. I commend this measure to your Lordships therefore as being necessary for the continued well-being of our very important livestock industry and for the proper safeguarding of public money. My Lords, I beg to move.
  Moved, That the Imported Livestock Order, 1958, be approved.—(Earl St. Aldwyn.)
  2.55 p.m.
  LORD WISE: My Lords, there are one or two matters which I should like to raise in regard to this Order. I realise how important it is for the Order to come into operation and to ensure that money is not paid for guarantees, on cattle or other animals, to which the owners or the sellers are not entitled. The information which I should like the Minister to give to the House, if he can do so, is this. He mentioned previous legislation in regard to the importation of cattle from Ireland and elsewhere. I am wondering what has been the past experience as to the number of cattle that have crept through without being earmarked or recognised in any way. If great numbers have crept through illegally, then of course we, as a nation, have had to pay guarantees to which there was no entitlement. I should like to know, also, what difficulties have arisen in the past in regard to that particular matter, and whether any stock of any sort has crept into Britain under the guise of being pedigree stock or stock for breeding. It is specifically mentioned in the Order that that class of stock is not liable to be earmarked. I am wondering, therefore, whether in the past any stock which should not have come through as breeding or pedigree stock has come into this country.
  There is one rather interesting point which I think I should mention in regard to the particular procedure which has been adopted in carrying this Order through from the time it was made. On reference to the relevant dates I find that the Order was signed by the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food on March 27; it was also signed by the Secretary of State for Scotland on March 28, and was then signed by the Secretary of State for the Home Department on March 31, which was the date on which the Order was made. It was laid before another place on April 2 and
  166
  was not discussed by them for over a month. It was approved in another place on May 7, and came before the Special Orders Committee of this House on April 30. According to my information, which I think is correct. this Order should pass through both Houses of Parliament within forty days of being made. From March 31 forty days have now passed, and I am wondering whether we are out of order, or the Order is out of order, by reason of its not having been passed through this House within the statutory period of forty days. This may be a small point, but what I am concerned about is that the Order has been held up for such a long time. In fact it came into operation on April 14, long before it was discussed in another place or in this House. I am anxious that we should not be regarded merely as rubber stamps to approve these Orders, which have, in effect, become the law of the land before ever they are discussed, as they should be discussed, in another place or in your Lordships' House.
  2.58 p.m.
  EARL ST. ALDWYN: My Lords, I hasten to assure the noble Lord that there is no intention of making this House or another place into any form of a rubber stamp. If I may, I will deal first with the last point he mentioned, because until I have cleared this up I should almost be out of order in dealing with the others. The noble Lord says that this Order has in fact been laid for more than forty days. But Section 7 (1) of the Statutory Instruments Act, 1946, says that where the House stands adjourned for more than four days that period is not counted—in other words, in this case we do not count the Easter Recess. So I can assure the noble Lord that we are within the forty days.
  The noble Lord asked me how many cattle had been illegally imported. I am afraid I cannot tell him the number that have been illegally imported, because they have gone through. The only thing I can tell him is the number that we were successful in intercepting on their way through. I could give the noble Lord a great many figures, but those I will give him now are the figures of actual seizures. It does not necessarily mean that all the animals which I mention were in fact forfeited, as some of the stock was released when some of the cases came before the courts. The figures of

  167
  actual seizures in 1957 were: cattle, 359 cases involving 2,207 head of cattle; sheep, 78 cases, involving 1,873 sheep; pits, 80 cases, involving 1,499 pigs. The figures for pigs were considerably lower than in the year before because of swine fever restrictions.
  The noble Lord also asked me whether animals which were being imported as pedigree animals could secure the guarantee without being earmarked. The position is that unless, first, they are registered pedigree stock, and earmarked as such, and, secondly, they are being imported at prices which officials consider reasonable, they would not be allowed to come through as pedigree stock. So I do not think there is any serious danger in that direction.
  On Question, Motion agreed to.

  OPTICIANS BILL
  3.2 p.m.
  Order of the Day for the Second Reading read.
  LORD AMHERST OF HACKNEY: My Lords, I am pleased to move the Second Reading of this Bill which, I hope and believe, will serve a very useful purpose. It was piloted successfully through another place by Mr. Ronald Russell and was there supported on all sides. During its passage it was considerably amended, and I will mention later one or two of those Amendments which I believe were important. The object of the Bill is to provide recognised status for opticians by providing for their registration, to promote a high standard of professional education and conduct among opticians and, by doing so, to protect the public against untrained persons posing as opticians.
  Not all of your Lordships may know that anybody can call himself an optician, test eyes, prescribe or make spectacles, and that there is nothing that the law can do against anyone who does so. There have been numerous cases of this happening and especially of such people going round calling from door to door. I have here a great number of newspaper cuttings dealing with this matter, and though I do not propose to weary your Lordships with many of them, there are just one or two to which I should
  168
  like to refer. Here is one from the Star for Friday, November 15, 1957:
  "' Quacks ' dupe housewives. They ask fancy price for spectacles. Doorstep quacks are duping housewives into buying spectacles for much more than they are worth. A leading Chester ophthalmic optician told the Star: 'Several women have come into my shop saying they have paid seven or eight guineas for glasses. The spectacles have not been worth a fraction of that amount. It is just plain fraud, nothing else. I have been amazed at some of the rubbish these people have been turning out. It is time somebody did something about it'."
  Here is one other quotation, rather older, from the Daily Dispatch, dated October, 1954:
  "Spec spivs sell old folk £7 trash. An old couple in South Riding who paid £7 each for spectacles which were so bad that they could not wear them were only two victims of bogus eye specialists who are touring the Castleford and Pontefract districts."
  There are a great many other reports, with which I will not weary your Lordships this afternoon. And, as I have said, in posing as opticians these people at the moment commit no offence. There is one other practice which I believe this Bill may stop. There are certain stores where people can go and test their own eyes and buy spectacles. It is felt that that is a dangerous practice which should be stopped; and this Bill tries to do that.
  Although spectacles have been worn since the thirteenth century and the first Charter to the Worshipful Company of Spectacle Makers was given in 1629, it is only during the last sixty years that various examining bodies and protective organisations for controlling the optical profession have come into being. The first was the British Optical Association, established in 1895; and the first Bill introduced in Parliament to bring in registration for opticians was the Optical Practitioners' Registration Bill, which was brought in in 1927. But at that time, I am afraid, it did not get a Second Reading.
  In 1949 an Inter-departmental Committee was set up, under the chairmanship of the noble Lord, Lord Crook, composed of ophthalmic and dispensing opticians and members of the medical profession. Its task was to advise on a system of registration for opticians, on the assumption that this was in the national interest. The Committee reported unanimously in

  169
  1952 that it was. As the noble Lord, Lord Crook, is here and is to speak, I shall not say very much about that Report. Since then, there have been various discussions between the Ministry and the profession, and I believe the position at the moment is that the profession have gone as far as they can, without legislation, to put their own house in order. This Bill follows very closely the recommendations of the Crook Report. I shall not go into it in any great detail but will merely make one or two observations on some of its clauses.
  Clause 1 sets up a General Optical Council with the object of promoting high standards of professional education and conduct. The composition of that Council is set out in the Schedule. I will not go through that in any detail, because it follows the recommendations of the Crook Committee's Report, except that it provides for three additional members—making twenty-four in all—whereas the Report recommended that the Council should consist of twenty-one members. One extra has been added for education; there is one extra medical representative, and a further member to be appointed by the Governor of Northern Ireland. When the Crook Committee considered this matter they were not considering the inclusion of Northern Ireland.
  Clause 2 imposes on the General Optical Council a duty to establish three registers: two of ophthalmic opticians and one of dispensing opticians. The first register will comprise those who merely test sight; the second register those who test sight and dispense glasses, while the third register will be of dispensing opticians. This follows the recommendation made by the Report of the Crook Committee, but was not in the Bill as it was first introduced into another place. The Committee recommended that the General Optical Council should have the power to close one of these lists, because they felt that the people who both tested eyes and dispensed would gradually drop out, and that people would be either ophthalmic opticians or dispensing opticians. It was felt that this would not take place for a long time, and, obviously, if a list was closed too soon it would create hardship. It was felt that if any of these lists was to be closed it should be done by Act of Parliament.
  170
  Clause 3 deals with the qualifications for registration. I do not think I need go into that. Clause 4 deals with registration of firms. There are to be two lists: one, again, of firms who are ophthalmic opticians and one of those who are dispensing opticians. I think I am right in saying that the Crook Report foresaw that those firms of ophthalmic opticians who were already in existence would continue, but that there would be no new firms, or there should not be new firms, coming in, although there would continue to be firms of dispensing opticians. In this Bill we do not try to prevent new firms from being set up, provided that they comply with various provisions of the Bill—for instance, that a majority of directors are opticians, or, in the case of a firm which deals mainly in other things and has just one department dealing with optical business, that that department is under the management of a qualified optician.
  Clause 5 gives the General Optical Council power to authorise training institutions and to approve qualifications and to publish lists; and there are various forms of appeal. Clause 6 merely gives the power to inspect those institutions and to inspect examinations. Clauses 7 and 8 deal purely with the machinery of publishing the lists. Clauses 9 to 16 are disciplinary clauses, and they follow very closely the procedure laid down in the Medical Act, 1956, and the Dentists Act, 1957. I do not propose to deal in any detail with these clauses, but if any questions of detail are raised I will try to answer them at the end of the debate. Clauses 17 and 18 allow the General Optical Council to set up an education committee and a committee to deal with the special problems of firms. Clause 19 merely allows them to set up any other committees, provided that two-thirds of the members are members of the Council.
  Clause 20 is important. It was introduced in another place and makes it an offence, punishable summarily with a fine of £100, and on indictment with a fine of £250, for anybody who is unqualified to test anybody else's sight. The testing of sight is defined later in the Bill as:
  "Testing with a view to correcting any defects of vision by spectacles."
  It would not stop, say, a nurse testing the sight of children at school to ascertain whether they should go to an optician or to an oculist; or, in a business, the

  171
  testing of a person's sight to ascertain whether he was suitable to do a certain job. It prohibits only the testing of sight with a view to correcting it by spectacles. There are certain exceptions, into which I shall not go to-day.
  Clause 21 also is important. It prohibits the sale of optical appliances other than by a medical practitioner or a registered optician. This is the clause which should prohibit both people buying spectacles, where they have tested their own sight, at certain chain stores, and also the selling of spectacles by intinerant vendors. Optical appliances are later defined as:
  "Appliances to remedy defects of vision."
  So this clause would not prohibit the sale of such things as sun glasses or field glasses, or just a magnifying glass for reading; but if the glasses were tinted glasses, with a lens to correct vision, then they would be included. Here again, there are also various exceptions.
  Clause 23 allows for the carrying on of a business for a certain period after the death of a registered optician until a successor can be found, although the provisions relating to the testing of sight and the sale of glasses will, of course, still apply. Clause 25 enables the General Optical Council to make rules on matters affecting the profession, such as advertising. It enables the Council to prohibit advertising or to regulate advertising, though it cannot prevent a dispensing optician from having a shop window with some glasses in it. Otherwise, it can prohibit advertising and, judging from the many newspaper cuttings I have here, showing the most lurid and misleading advertisements which have been put in the Press to encourage people to go to the opticians, I think that this is certainly a sound provision. Clauses 27, 28 and 29 deal with machinery, and Clause 30 is the Interpretation Clause. I have already mentioned the most important definition, that of sight testing, and there is also the important definition of "optical appliances".
  My Lords, I have tried to run briefly through some of the main points of the Bill. It is a long Bill—it has thirty clauses—and obviously I should have wearied your Lordships even more had I gone through them in detail. I think that it is a Bill which is in the public interest and which would, if passed, give a status to
  172
  opticians and be a protection to the public. I very much hope that your Lordships will give the Bill a Second Reading. I beg to move that the Bill be now read a second time.
  Moved, That the Bill be now read 2a.—(Lord Amherst of Hackney.)
  3.23 p.m.
  LORD HADEN-GUEST: My Lords, may I say a word on this matter? As a doctor I had a good deal to do with eye testing, especially when I was a member of the London County Council staff. It is important that the scheme embodied in the Bill should go off without a hitch and that there should be a clear decision on what is to be done and what is not to be done. It should be made clear that in future no one who has not had a thorough training may dispense or prescribe spectacles, because there is nothing more dangerous than to allow these important adjuncts to health to be provided by people who do not understand optics and sold merely for the purpose of making a profit. That may be all right in its way, but it is not the medical way and it is not the right way to treat the public. I hope that we shall see this practice disappear altogether during the next few years.
  In my view, there should be no possibility of anyone who is not a trained specialist in eyesight, and in all the difficulties that beset eyesight, through different causes in different individuals, carrying out this work in the future, as has occurred in the past. Only to-day, as I came into your Lordships' House, I was talking to a Member of another place who had his own eyes seriously damaged by having wrong treatment given to him. This was not a case of lack of money or lack of opportunity of getting advice. I think we should lay down clearly and rigidly the means of protecting and controlling the prescribing, the dispensing and the issuing of glasses, to see that they are the right kind, since otherwise they may do more harm than good.
  3.25 p.m.
  LORD CROOK: My Lords, I rise to associate noble Lords on these Benches with the Bill which the noble Lord, Lord Amherst of Hackney, has moved so well. It is no easy task to move so complicated a Bill, with so many clauses, in such a way that your Lordships can have a clear picture of what we are discussing. May I

  173
  say how glad I am to associate these Benches with a Bill moved from the other side of the House, because this, of all things, is a matter which should engender no political thoughts? By that, I mean not only no Party political thoughts in your Lordships' House, but also no politics in the optical world between opticians and the medical profession.
  I confess that this Bill seems to me to be the end of a long period of disagreement. When, in 1948, at the time of my noble friend Lord Attlee's Government, I was asked to consider becoming the Chairman of this Committee, I asked to see some of the facts; and I found that there were a number of what the noble Earl, Lord Woolton, was subsequently to call in your Lordships' House, "historically warring factions". I found that for years the various groups of opticians had not agreed amongst themselves; they all, in turn, had not agreed with the doctors, and the doctors had not agreed with them; and it was not at all clear whether the educational people had agreed with any of them.
  As the noble Lord has said, twenty-five years ago there was a Bill in another place, which did not obtain the approval of that House, and there had been the appointment of a Select Committee, which again ended in disagreement. But in 1949 a Committee was appointed which contained in its membership representatives of the optical organisations and the medical profession, and professors, politicians; and others who contributed both the educational and the general public outlook to all the suggestions that came in front of the Committee. In 1952, after two and a half years' hard work in taking evidence, these gentlemen were able to sign a unanimous Report. And one of the reasons why I wish to speak on this Bill is to pay tribute to all of those, whose names are not even mentioned on an occasion such as this, who gave of their time voluntarily, at great discomfort in travelling and at great difficulty because of their own professions, so that the country could have the benefit of their knowledge and advice to try to help solve this problem. I think it would be wrong not to say something about it on this occasion.
  The Report of the Committee first of all gave the facts—facts which show, as the noble Lord said, that there was no legislation, no control and no provision
  174
  for even a minimum standard of training. From 1895 onwards, there had been established some five different organisations within the profession, every one doing its best to set up what legislation did not provide—standards of education and professional qualifications, and rules of ethics and professional conduct for those who practised to follow. Having reviewed the whole of the evidence, I think it only right to say that over the period of years they did a wonderful job of work, even though they disagreed among themselves as to the ways in which matters should go ahead. They did it at their own expense in time and money—it is true, aiming at something better for themselves, but in the main doing a job in the public interest which Governments and Government Departments had never done. They suffered from one of the things from which all of us who are connected with organisations suffer: that the very people who did not join the organisation, to be subjected to ethical standards and control, were the very people they were anxious to deal with. The whole time there has been this limited number of people who have made it easier for slack standards to be inflicted on the public.
  I cannot conceive that it is the right way for the eyes of the people of this country to be treated that a man who spends 90 per cent. of his time as a watchmaker or a radio technician can spend the other 10 per cent. of his time behind a red curtain at the back of his shop as an optician. Nor do I think the huckster who stands on a booth in a county square—and I have seen this myself—can be the man to whom to entrust God's precious gift of eyesight in these modern days. For all our legislation and all our desires to establish a modern National Health Service, we have never bothered ourselves, until this Bill, with anything dealing with the standard of our eyes.
  The Committee to which I have referred realised from the evidence given both by the medical and the optical organisations what was needed in the public interest. But I should not pretend that the Report presented in recommendations was what was 100 per cent. desired by any one of those who gave evidence; indeed it would not be true to say that every member of the Committee found in the report 100 per cent. of what he would like as an ideal. What

  175
  was found was the ability to produce in the public interest a Report which was workable and could form the basis of legislation such as the noble Lord has invited us to support to-day; and, more important than anything else, perhaps, the medical and optical professions were together, lined up on a common work.
  When the Report was received, in turn, it did not receive unanimous support, obviously because it did not go 100 per cent. this way or that way. But that did not deter the Government who looked at the Report. By this time it was not the Government of my noble friend Lord Attlee but the Conservative Government, and they proceeded to actuate work inside the appropriate Ministry to try to secure that something was done. The noble Earl, Lord Woolton, when he dealt with this matter in the debate on registration in 1954, was good enough to tell us something to which I think it is well worth while to pay regard in respect of many other Reports. He said [OFFICIAL REPORT, Vol. 188, col. 494]:
  "It rather alarms me sometimes to hear of the long period for which Committees, consisting of all sorts of people, sit on these problems, produce Reports; then, when they have been duly considered and forgotten, another Committee is appointed, with the advanced knowledge of the times, to go through the same process."
  The noble Earl was good enough to say that, perhaps in his lifetime—and that is in my own—there might be some form of legislation as a result of the work that had been done; and this Bill, I am glad to say, is well within the span of my lifetime. It means that we should pay tribute to those who have co-operated with the present Government to make this possible.
  The noble Earl, Lord Woolton, said on that occasion that, while the Government were anxious to advance with legislation, there was always the question of priorities and finding Parliamentary time in days of a heavy legislative programme. So the Bill was missing from Queen's Speeches until last November, in the ballot for Private Members' measures in another place, Mr. Ronald Russell found a place in the ballot and was good enough to put down this Bill. I think it would be wrong of me to stand here without saying how much I appreciate—as I know the noble Lord who moved the Second Reading of this Bill does but, from a
  176
  modesty point of view, would not say—what Mr. Russell has done in undertaking a complex Bill, of great length, as a Private Member's measure and piloting it through the other place, thus making it possible for the noble Lord to move it here this afternoon. I think it a tribute not only to other people, but to our Parliamentary traditions in general, that he was able to assemble around him a dozen people of all three Parties in the other place, including two ex-Ministers of Health, one from the Labour and one from the Conservative side, and with their hearty co-operation and much work to model the Bill into the form in which it is to-day.
  They did not spare themselves as a team in meeting those who had legitimate complaints about the original draft; and, as the noble Lord said, in three days of Standing Committee C in the other place they did not hesitate to accept agreed Amendments to put the Bill in front of this House as one which is in the public interest and one which has been agreed by those persons who ought to agree these things as facts before Parliament is asked to give too much time to them. Finally, after a long Report stage of nearly five hours the Third Reading was reached, and we have the Bill here; and I hope that this House will speed it in the next few weeks with that same thought for the public interest that has been in everybody's mind and everybody's action in the period from November to date in the other place. Some of us have said on many occasions that we are a wonderful people, in that we can have our violent and bitter political conflict but we can find it possible among ourselves all the time, without Party rancour, to do those things which are not in Party interest but are in the general interest of the public—those things which are necessary if the people of this country are to go on improving from time to time as we desire. I commend this Bill as one of those Bills which fits in with that highest tradition of the model of Parliaments to which we are proud to belong.
  3.39 p.m.
  LORD AMULREE: My Lords, on behalf of noble Lords on these Benches I should like to join the noble Lord, Lord Crook, in giving the Bill a warm welcome in your Lordships' House. I shall not take up a great deal of your Lordships' time, but there are one or two

  177
  points of importance to which I should like to refer. The first is that I am sure the value to the optical profession of the series of registers will be very great indeed. One has seen what good has come from that, first of all in the medical profession, and secondly, in the dental profession; and now, by this Bill, we shall see it in the optical profession.
  There are two clauses of the Bill to which I should like to refer briefly—Clause 20 and Clause 25. Clause 20 defines those people who should be allowed to test eyes and to prescribe. I should like to reinforce what was said by the noble Lord, Lord Haden-Guest, as to the great danger that occurs to people who get the wrong kind of treatment of their eyes and do not realise that a mistake may have been made. The point about Clause 25 is that there should be some control of advertising. We do not want to do away with it completely, but we do want control of some sort, and I think that this Bill gives it. I should like to express my pleasure that the long discussions which members of my profession and the promoters of this Bill have had about the membership of the General Optical Council should have been finally settled in a way which appears to be pleasing to both sides. That is a great thing, because I know that my profession tries to jump in rather firmly, whereas I think these optical people should be able to control their own personnel.
  I should like to mention one other point about which I am afraid I did not give the noble Lord notice. I must say that the noble Lord, Lord Crook, has been lucky to find a Private Member to introduce his Bill, because whereas Lord Crook's Committee reported in 1952, there is another Committee, the Cope Committee on Medical Auxiliaries (in which I have an interest as President of the Occupational Therapists) who reported in 1951, and there is no sign of a Bill coming along at all. Although I should have preferred the Opticians Bill to be a Government measure, the fact that the noble Lord, Lord Crook, has managed to find a Private Member to introduce it, and that the Bill has come along so quickly, is something that may cause the Cope Committee to think along similar lines. I associate myself wish other noble Lords in giving this Bill a warm welcome.
  THE MINISTER OF STATE, SCOTTISH OFFICE (LORD SCOTTISH OFFICE (LORD STRATHCLYDE): My Lords, it might be for the convenience of the House if I were to indicate at this stage the Government's attitude to the Bill. Since it is not a Government Bill it does not, of course, fall to me to justify it to your Lordships' House. Indeed, your Lordships might think it rather superfluous if I were to attempt to do so, in view of the very full and effective manner in which my noble friend Lord Amherst of Hackney has explained it to the House. The Government's interest in the Bill, and in any Bill of this nature, is that it should be in the general interest of the health and well-being of the people, and that it should at the same time safeguard the rights of practitioners who will be affected by it. I am able to inform your Lordships that the Government are satisfied with the provisions of the Bill on both these grounds. Moreover, it is a Bill which will maintain and raise the standards of what is a most vital profession; and, therefore, I have no hesitation whatsoever in commending it to your Lordships.
  Before I sit down, I wish to express the most sincere appreciation and gratitude to those who, under the chairmanship of the noble Lord, Lord Crook, devoted themselves for some two and a half years to examining the situation with which the Bill deals, and for producing that highly comprehensive and unanimous Report that has made the Bill possible. I am sure that all noble Lords would join with me in tendering thanks to the noble Lord and his Committee.
  LORD MILNER OF LEEDS: My Lords, having regard to all that has been said, I do not need to detain your Lordships for more than a moment or two. First, I should like to pay a tribute, as has been done so fully by the noble Lord, the Minister of State for Scotland, to my noble friend Lord Crook. We all know the responsibility which rests upon the Chairman of a Committee of this kind, and our thanks are due in great measure to him in addition to all those who have already been mentioned. We know that this Bill is a non-Party Bill. It has the support of all ophthalmic practitioners, if I may call them such, and will undoubtedly serve a useful purpose. I venture to express the hope that the

  179
  Optical Council which is to be set up under this Bill will have as its primary consideration the interests of the consumer or the patient. The noble Lord, Lord Amherst of Hackney, has given us instances where great harm has been done by unqualified practitioners, and I venture to hope that that is one of the principal matters to which the Council, when formed, will give attention. I cordially support the Bill.
  LORD AMHERST OF HACKNEY: My Lords, I should like to thank all noble Lords who have given the Bill such a warm welcome, and also to associate myself with the tributes the noble Lord, Lord Crook, paid to all those who have worked to make the Bill a possibility. I should also like to associate myself with the thanks to him for the amount of work that he has done over many years.
  On Question, Bill read 2a, and committed to a Committee of the Whole House.

  INDUSTRIAL ASSURANCE AND FRIENDLY SOCIETIES ACT, 1948 (AMENDMENT) BILL
  3.47 p.m.
  Order of the Day for the Second Reading read.
  LORD MILNER OF LEEDS: My Lords, this also is a Private Member's Bill, and it was introduced into another place by Mr. Mulley, the Member for the Park Division of Sheffield. It passed through all its stages in another place without opposition. It is a simple Bill, designed for a very limited purpose—namely, that of permitting a small increase to be made in the amount of insurance on the life of a parent or grandparent which can be effected through an industrial assurance company or a friendly society. As your Lordships will be aware, the present permitted maximum under the principal Act of 1948 is £20. The present Bill proposes to increase that maximum to £30. The increase is roughly equivalent to the increase in the cost of living between 1948 and the present time. It is also roughly equivalent, apparently, to the cost of dying, because the cost of funerals—and, of course, this insurance is intended primarily to enable provision to be made for the cost of funerals—has also considerably increased. The present average cost
  180
  of a funeral is between £50 and £60—that is including all the incidentals, if I may call them such, though in fairness to the Association of Funeral Directors I ought to say that they have an agreement with the Board of Trade for a minimum cost of £25, which I imagine is almost always exceeded.
  As your Lordships are also aware, the National Insurance Act originally provided a death benefit of £20, which is now £25; therefore £25 added to the permissible assurance under this Bill if, as I hope, your Lordships pass it, will enable a sum of £55 to be available to those who have to carry through the task of burying a loved one. Having regard to the limited purpose of the Bill and the advantages, which I think are obvious, I venture to hope that your Lordships will pass it through this House. I beg to move.
  Moved, That the Bill be now read 2a.—(Lord Milner of Leeds.)
  THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNE: My Lords, on the suggestion of the Treasury, this Bill was amended in another place. The increased limit of £35 proposed in the Bill originally presented there was reduced to £30 in Committee. In its present form the Bill is acceptable to Her Majesty's Government and is recommended to your Lordships' approval.
  On Question, Bill read 2a, and committed to a Committee of the Whole House.

  MATRIMONIAL PROCEEDINGS (CHILDREN) BILL
  3.50 p.m.
  Order of the Day for the Second Reading read.
  LORD OGMORE: My Lords, I rise to move the Second Reading of this Bill, which is one to which I feel sure your Lordships will give the most sympathetic consideration. It has been through another place where it was warmly welcomed on all sides of the House. Quite briefly, the object of the Bill is to give effect, with minor exceptions, to the recommendations in Part V of the Report of the Royal Commission on Marriage and Divorce with reference to the welfare of children in matrimonial proceedings in the High Court in England and Wales and the corresponding courts in Scotland.

  181
  The Bill will extend the jurisdiction of the court to further classes of children. It will require the court to be satisfied as to the arrangements proposed for the care and upbringing of children under sixteen before making absolute a decree nisi of divorce or nullity or pronouncing a decree of judicial separation. It will enable the court to require a local authority to receive a child into its care. It will enable the court to place a child under the supervision of a court welfare officer or officer of a local authority. And lastly it gives the court power to make an order for custody of children where it refuses a decree of divorce, nullity or judicial separation or makes an order for maintenance under proceedings brought for that purpose under Section 23 of the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1950.
  As your Lordships will remember, the Royal Commission on Marriage and Divorce was appointed in 1951 under the chairmanship of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Morton of Henryton. Its Report, published in 1956, contained 149 recommendations relating to England and Wales and 81 recommendations relating to Scotland. Many of those recommendations have already been put into operation by Rules of Court or by administrative action, but among those requiring legislation are the recommendations relating to children which the present Bill is designed to implement. The Royal Commission said, in paragraphs 360 and 362 of their Report:
  "Of the problems resulting from the dissolution of marriage none is more serious than that of trying to ensure the future welfare of the children … where divorce takes place it is therefore essential that everything which is possible in the circumstances should be done to mitigate the effects upon the child of the disruption of family life."
  The Royal Commission's recommendations were made with this object in view, and in the debate on the Commission's Report which took place in your Lordships' House on October 24, 1956, the then Archbishop of York said (col. 1001) that if paragraph 373 of the Report (which deals with the postponement of the decree absolute until the court is satisfied with the arrangements proposed for the children) were translated into legislation it would "be held to be a children's charter". The noble Lord, Lord Merthyr, who is now sitting on the Woolsack, said in the course of the debate that he and those who felt like him would harry the
  182
  noble Lord, Lord Mancroft, until something was done about it. Well, my Lords, here it is: something is being done about it.
  Whatever may be the effect of divorce on the parties, the impact on the children affected by the divorce must be extremely serious. The family group of a child, consisting as it does of father, mother and the other children, must be the bedrock of existence; and divorce which shatters this bedrock must destroy to some extent their foundations of security and confidence. Nothing, of course, can restore those foundations, but the provisions of this Bill go some way to avert some of the worst consequences.
  Clauses 1 and 2 are the most important clauses of the Bill. The object of Clause 1 is to extend the classes of children for whom the High Court may make provision in proceedings for divorce, nullity or judicial separation. The court's jurisdiction in such cases is confined by Section 26, subsection (1) of the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1950 to children
  "the marriage of whose parents is the subject of the proceedings."
  The Royal Commission recommended, in paragraph 393 of their Report, that the following additional classes of children should also be included: first, illegitimate children of the two spouses; secondly, children of either spouse (including a child adopted by either spouse), if living in family at the time when the home broke up; thirdly, illegitimate children of either spouse, if living in family at the time when the home broke up; and fourthly, other children—excluding, of course, boarded out children—who were living in family with the spouses and maintained by one or both of them at the time when the home broke up. The present clause brings children in categories two and three within the jurisdiction. It does not touch the children in category four; and children in category one were already held, by the decision in Galloway v. Galloway, to come within the jurisdiction of the Matrimonial Causes Act. So we can now say that, of the four classes of children who the Royal Commission recommended should be included, one is already included, two are included in this particular Bill, and there is still a fourth which, for various reasons, it is not proposed to include.
  Subsection (1) of Clause 1 extends Section 26 of the Matrimonial Causes Act to

  183
  any child (including an illegitimate or adopted child) of one party to the marriage who has been accepted as one of the family by the other party. The effect of this is that the children concerned will be brought within the ambit of Clause 2 of the Bill, so that the court will be required to satisfy itself about the arrangements for their care and upbringing before making a decree absolute or pronouncing a decree of judicial separation. The court will be able to make such provision as it thinks just with respect to the custody, maintenance and education of any such child, and will be able to make an order committing the child to the care of a local authority, under Clause 5 of the Bill, or to make a supervision order, under Clause 6. The test of jurisdiction under subsection (1) is whether the child has been accepted as one of the family, irrespective of whether the party who is not its parent has contributed to its maintenance. That is the first important provision. They are all important, but the first two clauses are the most important.
  The object of Clause 2 is to give effect to Recommendation 32, in the Summary of Recommendations, on page 314 of the Commission's Report, by requiring the High Court to satisfy itself as to the arrangements proposed for the children before making a final decree in matrimonial proceedings. The Commission thought that this requirement was necessary in order to ensure, first, that the parents themselves gave full consideration to the question of their children's welfare, and, secondly, to enable the court's control over the welfare of the children to be made more effective than it is under the existing procedure. Subsection (1) accordingly provides that the High Court shall not make absolute any decree for divorce or nullity of marriage, nor pronounce a decree of judicial separation, until the court is satisfied that arrangements have been made for the care and upbringing of every child under sixteen in respect of whom the court has jurisdiction and that those arrangements are satisfactory or the best that can be devised in the circumstances. Under Section 26(1) of the Matrimonial Causes Act the court has, in such proceedings, jurisdiction in respect of any child "the marriage of whose parents is the subject of proceedings." As I have said, Clause 1 of
  184
  the Bill extends the jurisdiction to the legitimate or illegitimate children of one of the spouses.
  My Lords, Clause 3 gives effect to the first part of Recommendation 39 of the Royal Commission by enabling the Divorce Court to make orders for the custody, maintenance and education of the children where a matrimonial petition is dismissed. Subsection (1) of this clause accordingly provides that where proceedings for divorce, nullity of marriage or judicial separation are dismissed, the court shall have the same power to make provision for the custody, maintenance and education of the children as it would have had if the proceedings were still before the court. Clause 4 carries out the second part of Recommendation 39 by enabling the Divorce Court to make provision for the custody of the children where it has made an order for maintenance under Section 23 of the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1950. An order for maintenance may be made under Section 23 where a husband has been guilty of wilful neglect to provide reasonable maintenance for his wife or the infant children of the marriage.
  Clause 5 implements Recommendation 37 of the Commission's Report by enabling the Divorce Court to require a local authority to receive a child into its care. In the framing of this clause the precedent of the Children Act, 1948, has been followed as closely as possible. Clause 6 gives effect to Recommendation 38 by enabling the Divorce Court, after making an order for the custody of a child, to place it under the supervision of a welfare officer or an officer of a local authority's children service.
  Then, my Lords, we come to the case of Scotland. Part II of the Bill deals with the Scottish law and the amendment of it in order to carry out the purposes of the Bill. Part II deals with the jurisdiction of the Scottish courts in the matters to which I have been referring and is intended to achieve broadly the same position as will be reached in England and Wales under Part 1. In this respect it follows the Morton Commission's recommendations for Scotland which, with a few exceptions and differences of detail, paralleled the English recommendations. With these reservations, and bearing in mind the drafting differences that are necessary because of

  185
  the differing powers, practice and language of the Scottish courts, it can be said that Clauses 7, 8, 9, 10 and 12 correspond in their intention to the English clauses in Part 1. Clauses 10 and 12, which among other things enable the court, in actions for divorce, nullity of marriage or separation, to place a child in the care or under the supervision of a local authority's children's committee, have been drafted after consultation with the associations of Scottish local authorities, and with due regard to their interests.
  Clause 11 has no counterpart among the English clauses. It provides for a system of reporting officer on whom the courts can call—though they are not obliged to—for a report on the circumstances of a child in an action of this kind and on the arrangements proposed for its future. In England, of course, the courts already have a court welfare officer on whom they can call for this purpose. This clause, too, has been drafted in the light of consultations with the associations of Scottish local authorities and also, in this case, after consultation with the representatives of the legal profession in Scotland. Clause 13 also has no counterpart among the English clauses. This clause gives the court power, on the application of either party, to grant an interim interdict prohibiting the removal of a child outside Scotland or out of the control of the person in whose custody the child is. This provision implements one of the recommendations of the Morton Commission. At present it is possible for one of the spouses—or indeed a third party—in an action for divorce, nullity of marriage or separation to remove the children concerned out of the jurisdiction of the court or the control of the person in whose charge they are so long as the court has not made an order for their custody; and the Morton Commission recommended that this should be remedied. The corresponding English recommendation has already been implemented by Rules of Court.
  Clause 14, which also has no English counterpart, contains general provisions which ensure that the Court of Session has a number of general powers as to the making, revoking and varying of orders for the custody, maintenance and education of children which are neces-
  186
  sary to implement the various recommendations of the Morton Commission. Clause 15 deals with the interpretation of the Scottish clauses; Clause 16 deals with the expenses of local authorities, and Clause 17 with the Short Title, extent and commencement of the Act. My Lords, I have every confidence that your Lordships will give this Bill a warm welcome, and I beg to move the Second Reading.
  Moved, That the Bill be now read 2a. (Lord Ogmore.)
  House adjourned during pleasure and resumed by the Lord Chancellor.
  4.6 p.m.
  LORD GLYN: My Lords, this is a most important Bill, and I think Parliament owes a debt to Mr. Arthur Moyle for having introduced this Bill under a Private Member's Motion. Not for the first time was he successful, and the Bill now comes to your Lordships' House. The noble Lord who has moved it has gone through the clauses, and it is not necessary for me to do more than try and fill in the background. For some time I had to do with Borstal institutions, and I believe that this Bill is going to do more than almost any other measure to help overcome the difficulties which the Borstal institutions have tried to meet.
  This sounds a dull Bill, when one goes through it clause by clause, but in fact it is a very human attempt to try to provide some alternative to the broken homes that result from this increase in divorce. Noble Lords probably know that there are 20,000 children a year who, as a result of divorce proceedings, find themselves without a home or without care. Surely it is obvious that child delinquency, the juvenile crimes with which we are confronted and which the reports of the chief constables indicate are on the increase, mean that we must tackle this problem at its source—that is, a broken home. If you have too many broken homes there is bound to be a great increase in juvenile crime.
  I believe that this Bill is unique in one way. Ever since the Act of Union there has always been a feeling that no legislation should be passed unless the intricacies of Scottish law were recognised. I speak as one who was once a Scottish Member. The sponsors of this Bill have taken infinite trouble to go

  187
  into that aspect and, as the noble Lord has explained, the Solicitor General for Scotland stated publicly, as did the Attorney General, that this Bill has Government support. Therefore, I believe it to be a measure of tremendous importance at this time, and I hope that your Lordships will not only give it a Second Reading but, if possible, will expedite its progress through the House. It has been delayed far too long. If you talk to the welfare officers appointed to the courts they will all tell you of the enormous scope that exists—and they are the people who come most in touch with the individuals concerned.
  I am sure that the system set up under the Act which the noble and learned Earl, Lord Jowitt, when he was Lord Chancellor (I think I am correct in saying that it was due to him that court welfare officers were appointed) did more than almost anybody else to press forward the work they have done. It has been of outstanding merit, and I believe that if this Bill goes through all its stages quickly it will encourage all those who work in the courts, or as probation officers, or in any other capacity to try to deal with the human problem which at the present moment is baffling; and which I believe is the disastrous inhuman consequence of divorce, whereby boys and girls are thrown on their own resources without sufficient help to guide and correct them. I believe judges in the courts feel that this Bill has been long required, and I hope that those who are interested in the welfare of youth, youth clubs and all the rest of it, will realise that although those things are of importance the most important thing is to get some control at the time when parents are divorcing, at a moment when a gap is left which nothing can fill. I hope, therefore, that this Bill may pass rapidly through this House and become the law of the land in order that we can deal effectively with this problem.
  4.11 p.m.
  LORD CHESHAM: My Lords, in welcoming this Bill on behalf of Her Majesty's Government I have little to do but to endorse what has already been said by noble Lords on both sides of the House. It is a most desirable measure which will ensure that in matrimonial
  188
  proceedings in the High Court the future welfare of the children of the parties is given the careful consideration that it deserves. I would go all the way with the noble Lord, Lord Ogmore, in his remarks on this aspect and I know that the achievement of this particular object—looking after the children—will be a great relief to many noble Lords on all sides.
  The noble Lord, Lord Ogmore, drew our attention to the fact that many of the recommendations which resulted from the valuable work of the Morton Commission have already been carried out by administrative action. In this connection I would stress particularly that the arrangements whereby judges in London are enabled to call for a report from a court welfare officer before deciding questions of custody have now been extended to the whole country. If the additional powers proposed by this Bill are conferred upon the judges it will enable them to secure that, so far as is humanly possible, proper arrangements are made for the care and upbringing of the children before the marriage of their parents is ended.
  The noble Lord explained how, again consistently with the recommendations, in addition to making orders in respect of the custody and maintenance of the children judges will be able, in appropriate cases, to place them under the supervision of a court welfare officer or commit them to the care of a local authority. Though it would seem that these powers would be used only in exceptional cases, they will undoubtedly form a valuable addition to the existing jurisdiction of the court and I believe will be welcomed by Her Majesty's judges.
  It is quite unnecessary for me to say anything more about the Bill. The noble Lord who introduced it did so ably, in lucid and detailed terms, and I am sure I am speaking for all of us when I express our appreciation of his having done so. The noble Lord also referred to the debate in which the most reverend Primate the then Archbishop of York referred to the recommendations as a "Children's Charter"; and the most reverend Primate at that time also hoped that Her Majesty's Government would be able to legislate on the recommendations as soon as possible. We have not been able to do so but we have done the next best thing, which was to give full facilities and all the assistance in our power in the preparation and

  189
  presentation of the Bill. I believe that it will go a long way towards improving the lot of unfortunate children who are so often the innocent victims of many divorce cases, and I too, hope that it will have a speedy passage into law.
  4.16 p.m.
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR (VISCOUNT KILMUIR): My Lords, I rise only for a moment, with the indulgence of the House, to ask the forgiveness of the noble Lord, Lord Ogmore, for my absence when he moved this Bill. As I believe he knows, I was sitting judicially and it was impossible for me to be here. May I say, therefore, that I agree with everything that has been said by my noble friend Lord Chesham, and I should like to underwrite the gratitude which he has expressed towards the noble Lord, Lord Ogmore, for taking charge of and introducing the Bill, and to wish it well.
  4.17 p.m.
  LORD MERRIMAN: My Lords, the noble Lords, Lord Glyn and Lord Chesham, have both said they believed that this Bill would be welcomed by Her Majesty's Judges. On their behalf I rise quite shortly to say that such is the case. We believe that this is a most admirable Bill and are very glad that it has succeeded in getting through another place and has been introduced in this House. I am not going to speak in detail about it, for the noble Lord, Lord Ogmore, has already explained its details fully and clearly.
  The real and essential point of the Bill is this. As your Lordships know, Her Majesty's Judges at present have jurisdiction to deal with custody and maintenance of children, but can do so, of course, only after those matters are introduced before us by the parties themselves. We Judges have no power to initiate proceedings either for custody or for the maintenance of children, and, in my opinion, it is a wholly good thing that, by being obliged to withhold the final decree in a suit, we should be given power of ensuring that proper arrangements are made for the custody, upbringing and maintenance of children.
  I should like to say a word on one other aspect on which the noble Lord, Lord Ogmore, did not enlarge although he mentioned it—the power given to Her Majesty's Judges under Clause 3 of the Bill. At present if a petition is dismissed
  190
  there is an end of our power to deal with the children; so as things stand at present we can make interim orders while a suit is in progress but if the suit is dismissed there is an end of the matter. Now, in the nature of things, if a suit is dismissed it is more than likely to have been dismissed after a fierce contest with both parties represented before the court; and it is just in those cases where the court has heard the whole story that it is so valuable for the court to be able to deal with the children.
  I know perfectly well that magistrates are in the same difficulty in this sense; and that it is only if the wife proves her complaint of the particular offence (whatever the offence may be) that they have power to make a custody order, and that, therefore, if the charge is not proved, their powers under the Married Women Act go. What actually happens in practice before the magistrates is that if the complaint fails a summons under the Guardianship of Infants Act is taken out then and there before the same court who have heard the whole story, and an order is made for one or other of the spouses, who is able, to look after the children, with arrangements for access and all the rest. Theoretically, of course, that is true of the High Court; but it is only theoretically, because when we have finished with a case in the Divorce Division we cannot take out a guardianship summons before us. The matter would have to go to the Chancellery Judge and begin all over again before a different judge who knows nothing about the circumstances. That, I think, in itself is a most valuable power. I only wish to add that we will do our best to ensure that the useful provisions of this Bill are fully implemented.
  4.21 p.m.
  LORD HAWKE: My Lords, divorce is always a tragedy. My noble friend Lord Glyn has stressed this aspect in regard to juvenile delinquency, but one meets instability in every walk of society. I meet it through being chairman of a child emigration society. But it is not only there; one meets it in the children who ought to be in the best homes in the country. One meets it in one's own home, from children in boarding school who speak of little children crying themselves to sleep because they have heard that their father or mother is contemplating divorce. Once the parents are set

  191
  on divorce the damage is done. The court can make arrangements, but they can never be the same as a home. A child wants a father and a mother, and I hope that by stressing the importance of the future of the children it may deter some of the parents from pushing their divorce suit through to the bitter end, because, after all, in more cases than not it is selfishness by one or both parties that creates divorce.
  4.23 p.m.
  LORD OGMORE: My Lords, with the leave of the House, I should like to say that I am grateful to all the noble Lords who have supported me in my recommendation that your Lordships should pass the Second Reading. I am particularly grateful to the Lord Chancellor and his Department for the assistance they have given me in preparing my speech for to-day. I join with the noble Lord, Lord Glyn, in congratulating Mr. Arthur Moyle, who has worked so hard to bring this Bill to the Statute Book. He has given of his time and of his trouble for years past over this matter, and it must be a great day for him that this Bill has completed yet another stage on its way to the Statute Book. I can assure noble Lords who asked the question that, so far as I am concerned, there will be no undue delay. I am sure we have all been very much impressed by the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Merriman, who was able to give us the views of the High Court Judges on this subject.
  On Question, Bill read 2a, and committed to a Committee of the Whole House.

  HOUSE OF COMMONS (REDISTRIBUTION OF SEATS) BILL
  4.25 p.m.
  Order of the Day for the House to be put into Committee read.
  Moved, That the House do now resolve itself into Committee.—(Lord Chesham.)
  On Question, Motion agreed to.
  House in Committee accordingly.
  [The LORD MERTHYR in the Chair]
  Clause 1 [Constitution of Boundary Commissions]:
  On Question, Whether Clause 1 shall stand part of the Bill?
  LORD SILKIN: I rise to continue the point that I made when the Bill was before your Lordships on the Second Reading and following the reply given to the Question which I put to the Government this afternoon. I still feel, having had the Answer to the Question I put, that on the whole we are a little misguided in making it essential that the Deputy Chairman of the Commission referred to in Clause 1 must always be a High Court Judge. The last thing I want to do is to make an attack on our Judiciary—that is not in my mind—but we are, it strikes me, making a rather excessive use of the Judiciary for lay purposes: purposes for which they were never appointed.
  The reply to my Question this afternoon was that there were something like ten Judges—it was not easy to follow the reply, but I think it was ten Judges—who were, in one capacity or another, being used for purposes which were not directly associated with their particular functions. If this Bill is passed into law there will be two more. I would not tie myself to the exact figure, but the number is quite substantial. This seems to me a grave practice. Of course, it is very understandable that we should want to make use of Judges for all sorts of purposes, because they are men of great wisdom and understanding, and no doubt can render great service to any Committee to which they are appointed or over which they preside. I had the privilege recently of serving with a Lord Justice of Appeal, and I can testify to the great value that he was to the work of the Franks Committee; and I would have said that that was a perfectly legitimate use of a judge, as judicial questions were very closely involved. But in other questions, in lay questions, I doubt whether it is desirable to employ Judges to the extent that they are being used.
  If we take this Bill, I wonder whether it is essential that a Judge of the High Court should be appointed as Deputy Chairman of a Boundary Commission. I realise the purpose of appointing a Judge—namely, his complete impartiality and the confidence he gives to all political Parties. I believe, as a matter of fact, that my own Party were somewhat instrumental in getting this provision into the Bill. Nevertheless, this is not a political question at all. We are all free to have different views about it, and I do not

  193
  suppose that my Party would be dogmatic about our having only Judges; at any rate, whether they are or not, I feel that it is a matter which ought to be ventilated. I could find for the noble and learned Viscount any number of people who could do this job with complete impartiality and ability, some of whom are in this House at this moment, and I wonder why it is really necessary to go outside the ordinary public and limit the appointments to Judges.
  I have not moved an Amendment, and I do not propose to do so, because I do not think it is a matter suitable for Amendment, but I wish the Government would reconsider this matter. I would not necessarily exclude Judges, but I feel that other people would be equally capable of carrying out the task. There might be special cases where it would be necessary to have a Judge, but I would not limit the appointment to Judges. If the Government were prepared to reconsider the matter, that would be a very satisfactory outcome indeed. I would not press them to do so, but I thought it right that this point should be ventilated because there is this grave practice. The noble and learned Viscount will know better than anyone else that to take nine, ten or twelve Judges from the Bench and divert them to other purposes is not helping our Judiciary to any great extent, and in the long run it means appointing more Judges.
  4.30 p.m.
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, has raised an important point on which I feel very strongly, but at the same time I am in great difficulty. I should like to deal first with the general situation which confronts the Government. As the noble Lord knows, it is necessary constantly to find for various bodies chairmen who will have the complete confidence of the public. That is essential, and it must be a confidence which transcends Party differences and differences of creed and outlook. It is my experience—I do not know whether the noble Lord would agree with it from his experience in his Ministerial time—that this is of particular difficulty to-day, because the men we are looking for if we want somebody to do a difficult job are men in their sixties, largely in their early sixties, and it is a sad fact—I say it with a very full heart—that we are still suffering from the gap
  194
  caused by the casualties of the First World War. The number of those men, irrespective of their position, who would command universal confidence is limited by a reason which is not at all a dishonourable one. I say no more.
  Therefore, we come to rely on those who command confidence from their position and status, and it is one of the features of our country, of which I am proud, that those who occupy high judicial office command that general confidence from the fact that they are Judges. That is why, when we are looking for someone who must be entirely impartial, there is a great demand for Judges. I do not think that it has anything to do with one Government more than another. I think that every one of my predecessors did his utmost, as I do my utmost, to prevent the demand from being too great. But that is the situation with which we are faced and I put it frankly before your Lordships.
  As to the immediate problem, in this case the Commission has to sift evidence and act impartially; so, although its function is not strictly that of a court, it has a certain judicial character, and undoubtedly the experience of a High Court Judge would be valuable. There is this one more cheerful aspect: that although on occasions when a general review is taking place the Deputy Chairman may have to spend a considerable time on the work of the Commission and may have to be temporarily relieved of his ordinary judicial duties, the Bill, as the noble Lord will have seen, by general consent considerably lengthens the intervals between these reviews to a minimum of ten years. Therefore the lost judicial time will not be so great.
  With that frankness which the House expects from him, the noble Lord has referred to the fact that his Party had been anxious that this step should be taken. That is so, and, of course, although it does not acquit Her Majesty's Government of responsibility, I think he would agree with me that, in electoral matters particularly, it is desirable to proceed by Party agreement where that can be done. That was an additional reason why I felt that I ought to accede to this request. The other reason, as I think the noble Lord is aware, is that in Scotland a Judge has discharged this duty since 1917 and that appears to have worked well.

  195
  Out of courtesy to the noble Lord, I wanted to answer his general and particular points, but I should not like him to think that because I have answered them and given him the reasons I am complacent about the withdrawal of judicial manpower. I am not. I am very anxious that it should be fully deployed on its proper work—which is deciding the differences between subject and subject and between subject and the State—and I shall take reinforcement from what the noble Lord has said to-day to stand even more firmly to my guns.
  On Question, Clause 1 agreed to.
  Remaining clauses and Schedule agreed to.
  House resumed: Bill reported without amendment.

  DRAMATIC AND MUSICAL PERFORMERS' PROTECTION BILL [H.L.]
  4.37 p.m.
  Read 3a (according to Order), and passed, and sent to the Commons.

  CHILDREN BILL [H.L.]
  4.38 p.m.
  Amendments reported (according to Order).
  Clause 2:
  Meaning of "foster child"
  (3) A child is not a foster child within the meaning of this Part of this Act while he is in the care of any person—
  (a) in premises in which any parent, relative or guardian of his is for the time being residing;,
  (6) For the purposes of this Part of this Act a person undertaking the care and maintenance of a child shall be deemed to do so for reward if he receives any payment or gift of money or money's worth or any promise of such a payment or gift in connection therewith irrespective of whether he makes a profit or intends to make a profit.
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, this Amendment is little more than drafting. It seeks to insert the word "adult" after the word "parent" and makes clear that a child, who is in the care of any person in premises in which a relative of his is residing, is excluded
  196
  from the definition of "foster child" only if that relative is an adult. Without this Amendment it would be possible for a child to be outside the definition and thus exempt from supervision by virtue of the residence in the same premises of a relative who was also a child. I think that this is obviously a sensible Amendment. I beg to move.
  Amendment moved—
  Page 2, line 3, after "parent" insert "adult".—(The Lord Chancellor.)
  LORD SILKIN: My Lords, I agree that this is a sensible Amendment but I am a little doubtful about the position in which the word "adult" is being inserted. As I read it originally it seemed to me that it was "parent, adult relative or guardian.…"I now understand it to mean a relative who is an adult. I think that, to avoid any doubt, it would be wiser to say so. It would read "adult relative", but it could equally mean, unless you rely on the comma, which I did not, an adult relative living by himself. Perhaps the noble and learned Viscount can look at it. I do not want to press the point, because I agree with what is intended.
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, I speak again only with the leave of the House. I had not appreciated the difficulty, but I will look at it and communicate with the noble Lord.
  On Question, Amendment agreed to.
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR THE LORD CHANCELLOR moved to add to subsection (6)
  ", but where two persons arrange for each to undertake the care and maintenance of a child normally cared for and maintained by the other the care and maintenance so undertaken shall be treated for the purposes of this subsection as not being a gift of money's worth."
  The noble and learned Viscount said: My Lords, this Amendment excludes au pair arrangements from the definition of undertaking "for reward". I am not going into this in detail. We discussed it thoroughly at the instance of my noble friend Lord Hawke and, as I understand it, there is no objection to the exclusion of au pair arrangements. Everyone agreed that there should be exchanges of children in various countries, and we have tried to meet my noble friend. I beg to move.
  Amendment moved—
  Page 3, line 3, at end insert the said words.—(The Lord Chancellor.)
  LORD HAWKE: My Lords, I am grateful to my noble and learned friend. Can he categorically assure me that, after the passage of this Bill with this Amendment, there will be no question of having to notify the local authority of au pair arrangements?
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, I can give my noble friend as categorical an assurance as this imperfect life allows.
  LORD HAWKE: My Lords, my noble friend has amply carried out the admirable sentiments he expressed on the Committee stage, when he said [OFFICIAL REPORT, Vol. 208 (No. 53), col. 638]:
  "One really must make the Bill not only fit the facts of life, but remove from people irritations and annoyances which appear unreasonable. If one does not do that, there are two dangers: one, that people will be annoyed unnecessarily; and the other, that they will become unwitting breakers of the law."
  I believe that at the moment they are unwitting breakers of the law.
  On Question, Amendment agreed to.
  Clause 3:
  Duty of persons maintaining foster children to notify local authority
  (5) A person maintaining or proposing to maintain a foster child is not required to give a notice—

  (a) under subsection (4) of this section in respect of the removal of the child from his care if the child ceases to be a foster child on the removal;

  (b) under subsection (1) of this section, if he has previously maintained the child as a foster child and the child last ceased to be a foster child while in his care or on removal from his care.

  (6) A local authority may exempt any person from the duty of giving notices under this section, and any such exemption may be granted as regards all or any such notices and for a specified period or indefinitely and may be revoked at any time by notice in writing served on that person.
  LORD LATHAM LORD LATHAM moved to leave out subsection (5). The noble Lord said: My Lords, this Amendment proposes to delete from the Bill the provision which in certain eases would grant foster parents exemption from the duty to give notice of the removal of foster children. It received a somewhat lengthy consideration on the Committee stage, a consideration which I think the importance of the matter justified. The Amendment was withdrawn on the undertaking that the noble and
  198
  learned Viscount on the Woolsack would consider the matter with a view to seeing whether the points made could be satisfactorily met. I am sure that we on this side, and indeed all your Lordships, are indebted to the Lord Chancellor for having so done, as is witnessed by the appearance on the Marshalled List of Amendments of an Amendment in his name. In point of fact, Amendments Nos. 3, 4 and 5 really deal with the same matter; and, with the permission of your Lordships, I think it may be convenient if I allow my remarks to range over those three Amendments.
  Frankly, I consider that the Amendment standing in the name of the Lord Chancellor is not satisfactory, and does not meet the situation which will exist, even under the provisions of his Amendment, as regards the local authorities and the absence of information as to the removal of a foster child. I do not say that, as I am sure the noble and learned Viscount will accept, in any sense of being unappreciative of his efforts or from any desire to be pernickety or obtuse. The local authorities are strongly pressing, for reasons which I think are sound and which I will do my best to indicate, that subsection (5) of Clause 3 should be deleted and that the present position should be allowed to remain. The Lord Chancellor's Amendment would not, in point of fact, meet the difficulties which local authorities, as those largely responsible for the administration of the provisions of this Bill have to face.
  The main defect in his Amendment is the wide gap which would exist by reason of the absence of notice. The Amendment, in short, would mean that foster parents would not need to give notice of removal if the child were no longer a foster child; that is to say, if a child goes home, or goes to hospital or goes to a relative. There are, the local authorities contend, many circumstances in which a local authority wants a reassurance that the child has in fact safely arrived at the new address to which it is said to have gone. It is the practice sometimes to check through officials, such as health visitors, school inquiry officers and the like, that the child has in fact arrived. This service, under the present arrangement, is a kind of alerted service as soon as notice of the child's removal is received. Under the Lord Chancellor's Amendment it

  199
  would not be possible to do this until the next time the official visitor happened to call at the foster house to see the child. She will then be told that he left x weeks ago; her inquiries about the missing child will, therefore, be x weeks late, and in some cases may be too late. Moreover, if the foster parents need not give any notice of removal of foster children, in certain circumstances it will be much more difficult for local authorities to keep a check on the numbers of foster children in any one house at any one time. Those are, generally, the objections to the Lord Chancellor's Amendment.
  I should like to stress to your Lordships that what the Government are proposing to do in subsection (5) of Clause 3 is to lessen the existing requirements. It is not that this Amendment would alter the existing law; it is the case that the proposal in subsection (5) of Clause 3 would alter the law, because at the present time there is upon the foster parents an obligation to give notice of removal even though the removal is of a temporary order. For instance, Section 207 (3) of the Public Health Act, 1936, provides as follows:
  "If a foster child dies, or is removed"—
  Or removes himself—
  "from the care of the person who has undertaken his nursing and maintenance, that person shall, within twenty-four hours thereof, give to the welfare authority and to the person from whom the child was received notice in writing of the death or removal and, in a case of removal, the notice shall also state the name and address of the person"—
  if any—
  "to whose care the child has been transferred."
  That is the present law. Under the proposals contained in this Bill that requirement will, in certain cases, go. I should like to point out this other difference, which is not unimportant: that whereas, as I have indicated, the notice under the present Public Health Act, 1936, must be given within twenty-four hours of the removal, under this Bill, Clause 3 (3), the notice can be not less than two weeks before the removal and not later than one week after. In any case the situation is likely, in the minds of the local authorities who are responsible, to be seriously altered, in a way which may prove to be detrimental and harmful to the foster children.
  I understand that the present arrangements work satisfactorily. Notices are not frivolously demanded, and, like the local authorities, I therefore find it difficult to understand why it is proposed to make the change. Why weaken, in a Children Bill, if you please, the powers and tie the hands of local authorities in the discharge of their duty of looking after these unfortunate children? What is the mischief against which these proposals are put forward and which they purport to cure? Is it not proper that local authorities, who have the responsibility for the care and protection of children in this field, as well as in many other important fields, should have notice and be kept informed? I cannot for the life of me understand why this change in the law is persisted in. I think there must be some persons who have an over-weaning consideration for the foster parents to the detriment of the foster children.
  The purpose of this Bill is to strengthen the means for care and protection of children—not to weaken it. as this clause does. After all, as I have said, the local authority carries a great responsibility for the welfare of children. Clause 1 of this very Bill reaffirms that duty and that responsibility; and yet in the same Bill it is proposed to impede and impair the local authority's ability to discharge those responsibilities. It cannot discharge its duties unless it knows without a break what happens to the foster child when it happens—at once, and not only when, adventitiously, by accident, the officer of the local authority on a visit finds out that the child has been removed to another place. Why should the local authorities have to search for cases of removal and never know definitely whether a foster child is where it is understood to be? Why, I ask, should this alteration be made in a Bill designed to strengthen the ability to provide care and protection for these children?
  At the Committee stage, I referred to three sets of circumstances where failure to give notice could, and would, work to the detriment of the child. Let me give your Lordships two types of cases which are illustrative of what can happen, and indeed does happen at the present time, even though notice is required. It happens because certain foster parents have acted in breach of the law and in

  201
  defiance of the requirements to give notice. This is one of the typical cases which I use to illustrate the position. A week-old baby was privately placed by a mother with a foster mother for reward. The baby's condition at first was not satisfactory, and a course of medical treatment was provided and was continued, via the midwife and the health officer, in the foster home, as part of the child's supervision. Without warning or notice the baby was transferred elsewhere for adoption. The foster mother and the mother would not say where the baby had gone. The fact of the baby's removal would not have been known quickly but for the fortuitous circumstance that an official visited the foster home.
  If Clause 3 (5) stands, the foster mother would be exempted from giving any notice at all; and whilst, of course, a number of cases happen now in breach of the law, as I have indicated, if there were no such requirement it is quite clear that the number of cases in which no notice would be given, or where things could happen to the detriment of the child within the period of notice as now proposed, would be greatly increased. If this requirement to give notice goes, then, in the view of the local authorities, the situation will be very serious. This is almost a gift of encouragement to those who would. for quite unworthy reasons—and there ore such—want to evade the requirements to give notice when children are removed from one place to another. I emphasise again, my Lords, that this is a children's Bill and not a foster parents' Bill, In this connection, the interests of the foster children should be paramount, and there is no real case for altering the present law, which requires that, even in cases of temporary removal, notice should be given to the local authority.
  It will be seen that in addition to the Amendment of the Lord Chancellor there is another Amendment, Amendment No. 5, which stands in the name of my noble friend Lord Silkin and myself. That is designed, as it were, to minimise the disadvantages, serious as they may be, which would flow from the rejection of Amendment No. 3. There it is suggested that a local authority may exempt any person from the duty of giving notices under the clause in accordance with the regulations to be made in that behalf by a local authority, provided that the regulations are approved by the Secretary of
  202
  State for the Home Department or the Secretary of State for Scotland. On further reflection, I think it is only fair that I should say this. If each local authority were to make regulations governing the terms upon which they would require notice from foster parents, it might result in a confusion of different regulations as between local authorities, who from time to time have to exchange children and have to be in co-operative activity, the one with the other, in connection with foster children. It might be better, and might serve the interests of administrative tidiness, if the regulations were not made by each local authority but were made by the Secretary of State for the Home Department, and as regards Scotland the Secretary of State for Scotland, in consultation, and I hope in agreement, with the local authorities. It might be provided that no notice should be required in respect of temporary absences of a duration of, say, not longer than seven days. I personally think that seven days should be the maximum.
  May I conclude by saying that the local authorities, the County Councils Association, the Association of Municipal Corporations, and the London County Council, all of whom are, or represent, welfare authorities charged with the care and protection of children, are strongly in support of the proposal in the first Amendment, namely, Amendment No. 3, that subsection (5) should be omitted from the Bill. I beg to move.
  Amendment moved—
  Page 4, line 4, leave out subsection (5).—(Lord Latham.)
  5.5 p.m.
  LORD SILKIN: My Lords, I beg to second the Amendment. I do not think, after the full explanation of the purpose of this Amendment, that there is much I can usefully add. But I should like to emphasise that this Bill is intended to implement the Hurst Committee's Report. That Committee was set up because it was thought necessary that children should have further protection. In this particular clause a form of protection, a very important form of protection, is being taken away—the protection that when a child is moved from a foster parent the authority should be informed of it at the earliest possible moment. That protection exists to-day, but Clause 3, subsection (5) takes it away. We fail

  203
  to understand why it should be so. What is the need for it? The local authorities themselves are unanimous—it is not often that we find them unanimous: the Association of Municipal Corporations, the County Councils Association and the London County Council—that this protection should remain and that subsection (5) of Clause 3 should be deleted.
  The Amendment of the noble and learned Viscount the Lord Chancellor, which is intended to go some way, does not go far enough, because it provides that the local authorities may request information as to the whereabouts of the child and all the information they are at present by law entitled to have. But very often the local authority does not know that the child is moved. The whole purpose of the existing law is that the local authority should be kept informed of the movements of the foster child. That requirement is being taken away, and it is said that they may request information. But they might never find out that the child has been moved. My noble friend says that inspectors may fortuitously discover that the child has been moved. But, of course, they may not; the inspector may not get round for months. In the meantime, the mischief has been done; the authority does not know the whereabouts of the child. He may have been removed to a wholly undesirable place, and the whole purpose of the existing legislation, and of this legislation which is designed to improve on it, has been frustrated.
  I do not know why the Government are so pig-headed about this matter: why they are so insistent that the existing protection should be taken away. I do hope—whether they like our form of wording, or prefer to do it in some other way—that they will have another try. Quite obviously, what we said on the Committee stage made some impression, because the Lord Chancellor undertook to look at the point again. He has looked at it again and he has produced another Amendment; but it does not really meet the point at all. I am sorry he is not here now, but I quite understand the reason, and I am sure the noble Lord, Lord Chesham, will make a very good deputy for him. But I think he ought to understand that his Amendment does not meet the point that was made, and which the Lord Chancellor undertook to look
  204
  into. I hope that the result of this discussion will be that further consideration will be given to the point so that the position of the foster child is at least not worsened under the Bill as compared with the position as it is to-day.
  5.10 p.m.
  LORD CHESHAM: My Lords, with due respect to the noble Lord, Lord Latham, before I begin to try to give the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, some of the explanation for which he asked I will, if I may, reply more or less only to Amendments Nos. 3 and 4, and to No. 5 only in so far as it may be covered by any generality on the other, because so far as Amendment No. 5 is concerned another matter arises which I think does not arise on the first two. It is perfectly right, as was pointed out by the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, that this Amendment was moved during the Committee stage and was withdrawn, if I remember correctly, after my noble and learned friend had invited the noble Lord, Lord Latham, to make some specific proposal, if he could, that would provide for exemptions from the need to give notice in respect of temporary absences, for example, at school or in hospital, and would at the same time avoid the real difficulties which, as was pointed out in the discussion, could arise from the subsection as drafted. My noble and learned friend also undertook to consider the matter himself, which he did.
  LORD LATHAM: May I interrupt the noble Lord? I have no recollection of having made the offer to which the noble Lord refers, that I would seek to devise a form of words. My memory may be at fault. The Lord Chancellor said that he would consider the matter.
  LORD CHESHAM: I did not accuse the noble Lord of having offered to do that. I thought I was correct, but naturally I apologise if I am wrong. I said that I thought that my noble and learned friend the Lord Chancellor had invited the noble Lord to make a specific proposal. But, be that as it may, nothing has happened in the meantime, and my noble and learned friend has done his best to find a suitable form of words, as he said he would, and has put it down by way of the Amendment standing in his name on the Marshalled List. This Amendment has two objects. It tries as far as possible to meet the criticism which was made of the existing sub-

  205
  section (5)—the criticism which was expressed on a previous occasion and has been expressed most eloquently by the noble Lord, Lord Latham, to-day—basically, that it permits abuse by an unscrupulous person who could evade supervision.
  LORD LATHAM: If I may say so, it permits of the absence of notice by the scrupulous, because there is no obligation to give the notice.
  LORD CHESHAM: I am coming to that—I may be a little slow, for which I apologise. It must be remembered, too, that it retains the exemption from the necessity to give notice when a child leaves the foster home for short temporary periods. This is, I think, where the noble Lord, Lord Latham, and I part company a little. He sees in this, as he has explained to us, a considerable possibility of detriment to the child. He mentioned such words as "weakening", "impeding" and "impairing" the protection which, without any question of Party or argument, I am certain it is true to say we are all anxious to provide. The exemption in Clause 3 (5) is there as much as anything to avoid putting people in the position of committing offences inadvertently. If I am going to be accused of saying that this is a foster parents' charter and not a children's charter, I would only say that I shall in a moment show how the matter applies to the child. Foster parents certainly would commit offences inadvertently if every short absence, to school, to hospital, for a week-end with their real parents or something like that, called for notice of removal and notice of return.
  LORD LATHAM: As it does at present.
  LORD CHESHAM: If that is so, I do not think it can be an answer to say that the local authority will not prosecute except when there is a bad case. I do not think the Bill should put people in peril unnecessarily, and I certainly do not consider that they should be dependent on the benevolence of local authorities to escape prosecution. This is the real point. I do not see how a high proportion of contraventions without prosecution will do anything but bring the law into disrepute; and if the law is brought into disrepute on this subject it cannot be for the welfare and protection of the children.
  LORD LATHAM: This is very important. May I ask the noble Lord whether the Department has any evidence at all that the law of the Public Health Act, 1936, has been brought into disrepute because it insisted on, and provides for, a notice within twenty-four hours of the removal of a foster child?
  LORD CHESHAM: I am unable to tell the noble Lord exactly what evidence is available.
  LORD LATHAM: Well, I can tell the noble Lord, The local authorities have no such information.
  LORD CHESHAM: I do not know in what position the noble Lord stands to have available evidence that I have not got; therefore I must accept what he says for what it is worth. In short, I should have thought that the noble Lord's argument was something of an exaggeration. I should have thought that if there was not some easing of these constant notices for no particular reason, it would be to the detriment of the child and would lead to a mass of unnecessary work.
  LORD SILKIN: I do not want to interrupt the noble Lord, because I appreciate that he is labouring under great difficulties. I am speaking to him, but really speaking at somebody else. Suppose the noble Lord is right that a lot of unnecessary notices for temporary absences and so on, are being given at the present time and that people are in danger of being prosecuted but are not being prosecuted because of the good sense of local authorities. Suppose that that is right—I would not dispute it. The answer to that is, not in all circumstances to exempt everybody from giving notice, whether the child is being removed temporarily or permanently. Surely the answer is to design an Amendment or a provision which would exempt people in regard to short absences but would not exempt them in regard to a permanent removal or for a long absence. This is not what is being done.
  LORD CHESHAM: I thought I had been trying to say—perhaps I did not say it very well—that that was the object of my noble friend's Amendment. I should have thought that that is what would have been achieved by the Amendment which is down in the name of my noble and learned friend. I must admit that I am in some difficulty in this matter, and if

  207
  noble Lords opposite will permit me to say so with the greatest friendliness, one of those difficulties is that I have as yet hardly completed a single point.
  I come now to the case cited by the noble Lord, Lord Latham, to show how badly it would work if the Amendment were adopted. The case which the noble Lord gave rather harrowingly, sounded terrible; but surely there the foster mother would have been required to notify the local authority under the provisions of the First Schedule to the Bill. A child which is placed in the care and possession of somebody not a parent by an agent becomes a protected child and therefore subject to the provisions which I have mentioned.
  If, on the other hand, the noble Lord's argument is that, no matter what provision is made, somebody is going to break the law, then I do not quite know what he expects me to do. We are trying merely to make these arrangements work as well as we can. The new subsection still exempts a person from the duty to give notice of the child's removal if on removal the child ceases to be a foster child; but, as the noble Lord rather critically pointed out, it requires the person who was maintaining the child to tell the local authority, when they require it, where the child has gone. Having regard to the provisions of the clause I cannot see how the "months and months" to which the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, has referred can arise.
  LORD SILKIN: Why not?
  LORD CHESHAM: My Lords, if the noble Lord will look at the second part of the proposed Amendment I believe he will see that it covers the matter. In addition, and while one may not like added penalties introduced into the law, there is a quite severe penalty involved here which I should have thought would deter even the most unscrupulous of people. Dealing with the point of absence of more than six months to which the Amendment refers, I should explain that that gives rise to a new transaction; the matter has to be started all over again, and that requirement puts a positive limit on the period involved.
  LORD LATHAM: My Lords, serious things can happen to a child in six months. Are we to regard that with complacency?
  LORD CHESHAM: My Lords, I thought it had been generally agreed during the debate at the Committee stage that some provision was necessary for exemption for temporary absence, and I and my noble and learned friend thought this Amendment a reasonable compromise. The noble Lord, Lord Latham, does not agree with me, but I hope I have said enough to persuade your Lordships that that is so.
  On Question, Amendment negatived.
  LORD CHESHAM: My Lords, after what has been said, I believe it is not necessary for me to go to great length in discussing this Amendment. I beg to move.
  Amendment moved—
  Page 4 line 4, leave out subsection (5) and Insert:
  "(5) Where a foster child ceases to be a foster child on his removal from the care of the person maintaining him, that person need not give a notice under subsection (4) of this section but shall at the request of the local authority give them the same particulars as would have been required to be stated in the notice; and a person who maintains or proposes to maintain a foster child need not give a notice under subsection (1) of this section if the child has within the last six months been maintained by him as a foster child but ceased to be a foster child while in his care or on removal from his care."—(Lord Chesham.)
  On Question, Amendment agreed to.
  5.26 p.m.
  LORD LATHAM LORD LATHAM moved to leave out subsection (6) and to insert:
  "() A local authority may exempt any person from the duty of giving notices under this section in accordance with regulations to be made in that behalf by a local authority:
  Provided always that such regulations shall first be approved by the Secretary of State for the Home Department (or, as regards Scotland, the Secretary of State for Scotland)."
  The noble Lord said: My Lords, I beg to move this Amendment. Subsection (6) purports to give a local authority power to exempt any person from the duty of giving notices. It will be recalled that at the Committee stage my noble friend Lord Silkin raised the question of whether it was altogether wise to give such carte blanche right and power of exemption to local authorities, most of whom no doubt would operate it properly and wisely, but some of whom, through lack of material or other circumstances, might do the contrary.
  It was therefore sought in this Amendment to link the power of a local authority

  209
  to give exemption with the matter of the foster parents being themselves exempt from giving notice on removal of a foster child. The proposal in the Amendment is that the local authority shall be able to give exemption as regards these notices in accordance with regulations to be made in that behalf by any local authority—subject, of course, and as is stated, to the regulations being first approved by the respective Secretaries of State. That is the Amendment on the Paper. I should like to answer in advance, as I have already done, the point that it would be better for regulations to be made by the respective Secretaries of State. With that view I entirely agree; but the other part of the Amendment meets in some measure the important point raised by the first Amendment that I have mentioned—Amendment No. 3. It is to be hoped that Her Majesty's Government may see their way to accept this Amendment with the modification concerning by whom regulations shall be made.
  Amendment moved—
  Page 4, line 13, leave out subsection (6) and insert the said new subsection.—(Lord Latham.)
  LORD SILKIN: My Lords, I beg to second this Amendment. Subsection (6) gives the local authority power to exempt persons from giving notices. It is completely at large. They are under no obligation to apply any particular principle. It can apply to individuals, to groups of individuals and to any kind of circumstances or conditions. There is no restriction whatever on the discretion of the local authority to exempt people from giving notices. We believe that that is wrong and not in the best interests of the child. We have therefore sought to restrict the matter by requiring the local authority to make regulations as to the class of cases to which they will give exemption.
  My noble friend who has moved this Amendment feels, as I do on reflection, that it should not be open to each local authority to make its own regulations, but that these regulations should be made by the Home Secretary. That is not stated in the Amendment—it is an afterthought; but I hope the noble Lord will not be embarrassed by my having second thoughts. If he would accept the principle, that would be good enough for our purposes.
  210
  At the same time it is rather an answer to the last speech that he made, because if these regulations were made they could be made to apply to temporary absences, and to all sorts of conditions which at the moment may be regarded as causing unnecessary annoyance to people who are foster parents. The requirements can be considered; and where it is thought to be unnecessary that notice should be given, that fact could be incorporated in the rules. We feel that, apart altogether from these frivolous cases, as I might call them, it is desirable that there should be regulations under which exemption can be given; and we also think that subsection (6) as it stands is much too wide and needs some restriction. It is for these reasons that I beg to support the Amendment.
  LORD CHESHAM: My Lords, at the outset I should like to make it absolutely clear—I tried to make it clear before, but I should like to say it again—that neither of the noble Lords opposite who have spoken should think that, if I resist their Amendments, I in any way think that their ideas of protecting children are not completely sincere. But, so far as this Amendment is concerned, the main anxiety might almost be said to have been expressed in the points made on the previous two Amendments; and it might almost be said that the children's interests could be completely—or if not completely, very greatly—affected by the wholesale use of this provision in subsection (6) and that regulations would help.
  However, if the Amendment were adopted, such regulations as proposed, while satisfying either of the Secretaries of State, might vary from authority to authority. There was also the suggestion that a local authority perhaps failing in its duty might seek to contract out of it, by means of subsection (6), to which the noble Lords object. But it must be remembered that Clause 1 of the present Bill imposes a duty on every local authority to ensure the wellbeing of foster children in their area. Clause 3 deals only with notices—that is to say, with part of the machinery that enables local authorities to carry out their duty. However they may decide to dispense with that machinery, they can in no way lawfully abdicate the duty imposed on them under Clause 1.

  211
  I think that a certain latitude must be permitted in this matter, because exemption surely must be either granted or withheld according to the particular merits of individual cases. There might well be a home which was regularly visited by officers of the local authority in which foster children were frequently arriving or leaving. If the local authority wanted notice in respect of each child, they could have it, but if, because of the frequent visits paid by their officer the local authority regarded separate notices as superfluous, it could grant an exemption. Regulations in this matter seem to me rather unnecessary and inappropriate. Regulations made by the local authority, even if approved by the Secretaries of State, would in no way add to the legal burden on the authority to do their duty, and therefore I think that the Amendment is unnecessary.
  On Question, Amendment negatived.
  Clause 5:
  Appeal to juvenile court against requirement or prohibition imposed under section four
  5.—(1) Any person aggrieved by any requirement or prohibition imposed under section four of this Act may, within fourteen days from the date on which he is notified of the requirement or prohibition, appeal to a juvenile court, and the requirement or prohibition shall not have effect while such an appeal is pending.
  LORD CHESHAM LORD CHESHAM moved in subsection (1), to leave out all words after "and", and to insert instead:
  "where the appeal is against such a requirement the requirement shall not have effect while the appeal is pending. "
  The noble Lord said: My Lords, this Amendment is a result of a partial acceptance by the Government of a suggestion by the noble Lord, Lord Latham, on the Committee stage, that a requirement or a prohibition imposed by a local authority under Clause 4 should take effect at once, even if the person concerned lodged an appeal. We accepted that suggestion in part, and this Amendment is the result. It leaves unchanged the provision that a requirement imposed under Clause 4 (2), for example to provide more accommodation or equipment, shall not have effect while an appeal against it is pending, but if the Amendment is made a prohibition against the keeping of a foster child, under subsection (3), it will have effect at once. I do not think we
  212
  could go very much further than that. I hope that the noble Lord will find this satisfactory and can accept this Amendment.
  Amendment moved—
  Page 5, line 28, leave out from ("and") to end of line 30 and insert "where the appeal is against such a requirement the requirement shall not have effect while the appeal is pending."—(Lord Chesham.)
  LORD LATHAM: My Lords, the Amendment is entirely satisfactory and, minimum though it may be, we are grateful for it.
  On Question, Amendment agreed to.
  Clause 18:
  Consents to adoption
  (3) If upon application for an adoption order the court is satisfied that any person whose consent is required under section two of the principal Act as parent or guardian of the infant has persistently failed without reasonable cause to discharge the obligations of a parent or guardian of the infant, and that the failure is likely to continue if the order is not made, the court may dispense with the consent of that person whether or not it is satisfied of the matters specified in paragraph (a) or paragraph (c) of subsection (1) of section three of the principal Act.
  5.39 p.m.
  LORD LATHAM LORD LATHAM moved, in subsection (3), to leave out "and that the failure is likely to continue if the order is not made,". The noble Lord said: My Lords, in the unavoidable absence of my noble friend Lord Silkin, who has another public engagement which he must keep, I rise to move Amendment No. 9, which stands in the name of my noble friend and myself. As I said in the debate on the Committee stage, this clause and this Amendment raise in its stark reality the fundamental issue as to whose interests shall prevail, the interests of the child or the interests of a neglectful, unnatural and often inhuman parent. On Committee stage we sought to leave out the words
  "and that the failure is likely to continue if the order is not made."
  Let us examine the situation. Here we have a parent who has admittedly persistently failed, without any reasonable cause, to discharge the obligations of a parent or of a guardian, and, notwithstanding that, as the Bill now stands the court cannot dispense with the consent of that person unless it is also satisfied that the failure is likely to

  213
  continue if the order is not made. The noble and learned Viscount was good enough to say that he would give the matter consideration between Committee stage and this stage and I am obliged to him for having done so, as is clear from the Amendment on the Marshalled List in his name; but here again I am sorry to say that I do not think that the noble and learned Viscount's Amendment meets the requirement of the case. It still introduces the word "likely". It still casts upon the court the responsibility of appraising and assessing what is likely to happen in future from a miscreant who has failed to discharge the ordinary duties of a decent, honest, upright man or woman.
  The present legal situation is that under two decisions of the High Court in 1952, when the court is considering the matter of dispensing with parental consent the main factor to be considered is not the welfare of the child but the parent's right as a parent to give or withhold consent. Frankly, we on this side say that that is wrong. A parent who has persistently neglected his own child for no reasonable cause is not a parent who possesses rights, is not a parent whose interests ought to be permitted to stand in the way of the care and protection of his own child. The future life and happiness of the child ought not to be in continuing jeopardy and prejudice merely to serve the interests of a notional parent who has stripped himself of all rights of parenthood by his complete neglect of the discharge of the duties of parenthood. It is under the influence of this rule of law, decided as recently as 1952, as I have said, that we have re-submitted this Amendment, I hope for the favourable consideration of the Government.
  Local authorities are disturbed at the wording of this clause and they are no less disturbed when they consider the wording of the clause as it would be if the noble and learned Viscount's Amendment were incorporated in it. It still leaves the bias of consideration in favour of the parent and not in favour of the child. I know that the noble and learned Viscount, who is not present for reasons we appreciate and understand, does not accept the proposition that in all cases the welfare of a child should be paramount. I take that view. But clearly, whatever the circumstances may be when
  214
  the paramountcy of the child ought not to prevail to the exclusion of proper consideration for the rights of the parents, it cannot be a case where the child has been persistently neglected and where the parent has persistently failed for no reasonable cause to discharge his or her duty as a parent. I hope, as do the local authorities, all of them, that the Government will see their way to accept this Amendment.
  With regard to the noble and learned Viscount's Amendment, I must say frankly, I assure the House without any disrespect to the learning and wisdom of the noble Viscount, that I think it is a distinction without a difference, whereas in the Amendment to the noble and learned Viscount's Amendment there is the added strength (if that is the proper phrase to use) that the court must go somewhat beyond the matter "appearing to be" and must be satisfied "having regard to the future welfare of the child," which words are to be introduced to-day in a manuscript Amendment which I gather is available. I shall be prepared to speak on that Amendment at a later stage. For the present, I beg to move.
  Amendment moved—
  Page 10, line 43, leave out "and that the failure is likely to continue if the order is not made,".—(Lord Latham.)
  LORD CHESHAM: My Lords, if I may, I will reply to Amendments Nos. 9 and 10 and we shall come to the manuscript Amendment to the Amendment printed on the Marshalled List afterwards. My noble and learned friend appreciated the force of what was put to him during the discussion on the Committee stage about the possible effect of the words "and that the failure is likely to continue if the order is not made" and he undertook to consider the matter again. The rather unexpectedly long gap between Committee stage and to-day has allowed time for him to do so fully, and the Amendment standing in his name is as far as we think it right to go.
  The effect of the Amendment put down by the noble Lords, Lord Silkin and Lord Latham, would be to enable the court to dispense with the consent of a parent who had been neglectful in the past but who had reformed at the time of the hearing and was likely to discharge his or her responsibilities in the future, if given the opportunity. To us it seems wrong in a

  215
  matter as final as legal adoption to provide that a mother—even a neglectful mother—may be deprived of her child without any regard for what she might be likely to do in the future if the order were not granted.
  The noble Lord, Lord Latham, made a considerable point of parents' having stripped themselves of the right to be considered, and of their rights to and over the child, and he referred to the child's welfare being in jeopardy. But when he says that the Amendment does not afford the required protection to the child, and is in favour of a parent who has no right to consideration, I think he has overlooked one thing. Section 5 (1) (b) of the principal Act requires the court, before making an adoption order, to be satisfied that the order, if made, will be for the welfare of the child. Therefore, I should have thought that the natural rights of even a neglectful parent should not be capable of being extinguished without regard to his probable future behaviour, which may be more important than his past deficiencies.
  It is by no means impossible—the possibility can seldom be ruled out—that a neglectful parent who may have refused consent to an adoption order may have come, belatedly may be, to a sense of responsibility, perhaps because of the realisation that he is in danger of losing his child permanently, or perhaps by a change in his circumstances. In all or almost all cases the child will have been for some time in the care and possession of someone other than the parent at the time when the application for adoption is made, and the parent may during this period have so conducted himself as to establish the likelihood that he will discharge his obligations in the future. Bearing in mind the fact that the duty is clearly laid on the court to be satisfied that the order, if made, will be for the welfare of the child, I do not think the wording of the Amendment standing in the name of my noble and learned friend can be improved upon. Therefore, I hope the noble Lord, Lord Latham, will accept that, and will not press his Amendment.
  On Question, Amendment negatived.
  5.56 p.m.
  LORD CHESHAM: My Lords, in view of what I have just said, I think any further discussion on this Amendment is unnecessary. I beg to move.
  Amendment moved—
  Page 10, line 43, leave out ("and that the failure is likely to continue if the order is not made") and insert ("then, unless it appears to the court likely that, if the order is not made, that person will discharge those obligations").—(Lord Chesham.)
  LORD LATHAM LORD LATHAM moved, as an Amendment to the Amendment to leave out "it appears to the court likely" and insert:
  "the court is satisfied having regard to the future welfare of the child."
  The noble Lord said: My Lords, in the absence of my noble friend Lord Silkin, I beg to move this Amendment to the Amendment. The noble Lord, Lord Chesham, entered a plea for the neglectful parent who had reformed, or who it was thought might have reformed, or (to use the word in the Lord Chancellor's Amendment, and the word originally in the Bill) who was "likely" to have reformed and repented, and to have come to the stool of repentance. The noble Lord admitted that that might he belated. I should certainly hesitate to rest the future of a child upon the belated penitence of a parent who had neglected his own child in the manner in which it is done, as the evidence in the possession of local authorities all too unhappily shows. But if there has been—as is possible—a miscarriage of justice, and if the court has given a wrong decision, then Clause 21 provides a right of appeal against the decision to make an adoption order without the consent of the parents. I should have thought that a parent who came within this subsection for persistent refusal to discharge his responsibilities was not entitled to any greater protection than that appeal provision.
  The noble Lord referred to Section 5 of the principal Act. I have not that Act with me, and I do not suppose I have ever seen it. But, taking as correct what the noble Lord said, Section 5 of that Act requires that if an order is made it shall be for the welfare of the child. No one disputes that; but it has no relevance to the point we are discussing. An order cannot be made until either the parent consents, or the court decides that his or her consent can be dispensed with. So whatever Section 5 says about the welfare of the child when an adoption

  217
  order is made is irrelevant to the question we are now considering, as to the conditions in which the court should be able to make an adoption order, notwithstanding the refusal of a parent or parents to consent. It is with that aspect of the matter that we are concerned, and it is to that aspect of the matter that this Amendment to the Amendment is put down.
  We see an appreciable difference between the effect on the court of the words, "unless it appears to the court likely" and that of the words, "unless the court is satisfied, having regard to the future welfare of the child." "To be satisfied", I think, is a stronger provision than merely "appears to the court likely." I cannot understand even our excellent draftsmen showing so much fondness in this connection for this word "likely." Nothing is more uncertain in the world of construction than the word "likely." What does it comprehend? What kind of appreciation must the court have? What kind of powers of prophecy and of determining the future are these lay magistrates who are administering the law expected to possess, in order that they may determine whether it is likely that the penitent will come to the stool of repentance and be a decent upright citizen as regards his own offspring? It seems to reduce the law to something—I almost said approaching a farce. So we submit, we hope for the favourable consideration of Her Majesty's Government, these words "the court is satisfied having regard to the future welfare of the child."
  Late as the alteration to this Amendment to the Amendment came along, for reasons which can if necessary be explained, we attach great importance to those words being in this subsection. They will be a guide, I do not say a direction—and it would be wrong that they should be a direction—but they will be a guide to the magistrates in determining whether they are prepared to dispense with the consent of the parents. It will be a guide that the dominant—and I use the word "dominant" advisedly and with intent—motive ought to be and, as I submit to your Lordships, must be, the future welfare, the future life and the future happiness of the child. The child has done nothing to deserve this persistent neglect. Why should we visit upon the child the possible lamentable
  218
  results of accepting the view that the neglectful parent of yesterday is the reformed parent of to-morrow, or is "likely" to be the reformed parent of to-morrow?
  It is for those reasons that we have put down this Amendment to the Amendment, and I hope most sincerely that the Government will be able to accept it. The local authorities are unanimous in their support, and I am quite sure that any person of good will and of heart who loves children would wish to see that, in such unworthy and discreditable circumstances as a parent disowning and neglecting his own child, when it came to the issue as between the interest of the child and the interest of the parent the interest of the child should, without peradventure or question, prevail. I beg to move.
  Amendment to Amendment moved—
  Line leave out ("it appears to the court likely") and insert ("the court is satisfied having regard to the future welfare of the child").—(Lord Latham.)
  6.6 p.m.
  LORD CONESFORD: My Lords, it is admittedly a very difficult question with which we are concerned in this clause, as appears from the debate on this occasion and, indeed, on previous occasions. There is the problem of the bad parent, but there is also the important legal effect of depriving a natural parent for ever of the parental relationship with her own child when she may, in fact, at the time the order is made, be intending to be a good parent. The problem is admittedly difficult. Some adverse criticism has been made about the draftsman. Let me say, using such legal knowledge as I possess, that I think I can construe without much difficulty the clause as it originally stood in the Bill. I think I can construe it, also, if my noble and learned friend's Amendment is adopted, as I think it should be. I think I can construe it if it is adopted as amended by the Amendment to the Amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Latham, as that Amendment stood on the Marshalled List. But I am wholly unable to construe it as it will stand if the noble Lord's Manuscript Amendment to the Amendment is adopted. That seems to me to introduce something that will completely muddle the court. The noble Lord said that the court must be satisfied, and satisfied on a question of fact. That question of

  219
  fact, on which, according to his own Amendment, they have to be satisfied, has nothing to do with the interests of the child. Simply introducing the words in his Manuscript Amendment at that point will, I think, make nonsense of the clause as it will then stand.
  I think that the Amendment of my noble and learned friend the Lord Chancellor, turning the emphasis of what is at present in the Bill, is a good Amendment, and meets points rightly raised in various quarters of the House at this and earlier stages. I think one can exaggerate the difference that the Amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Latham, would make (I am speaking now of his Amendment as it stands on the Marshalled List), but I am certain it would be impossible, if we wish this thing to be clear, to adopt his Amendment as it will exist if the wording of his Manuscript Amendment is added to it. This is not an unfamiliar thing in Acts of Parliament: the expression "if it appears to the court to be probable" or "it appears to the court to be likely". The court is not unaccustomed to dealing with the sort of problem those words pose. I quite agree that it may be rather stronger to say "is satisfied". But the degree of satisfaction raises difficult problems; the court is not dealing with certainties.
  I think the noble Lord, Lord Latham, whose detailed concern with this Bill I appreciate (he has drawn our attention to many valuable points in the course of our discussion), over-simplifies the problem when he suggests that this is a simple question of deciding between the interests of a parent and the interests of the child. It is not nearly as simple as that. As my noble and learned friend the Lord Chancellor said on an earlier occasion, when you are taking a step so tremendous as depriving a natural mother of future maternal relationship with her own child, it is not true that you should consider only the interests of the child; certainly you should consider the interests of the child, but not exclusively. I do not wish to weary the House. My own view is that the Amendment of my noble and learned friend the Lord Chancellor is a good one, that the Amendment to the Amendment as printed is, on the whole, not a good one, though it is a possible one, but that the Amendment to the
  220
  Amendment with the manuscript addition makes nonsense.
  LORD CHESHAM: I am obliged to the noble Lord, Lord Conesford, for what he has said, much of which he has saved me from saying. I am bound to agree with a good deal of it, and I will add only one or two further remarks. As for the Manuscript Amendment to the Amendment, which would add the words "having regard to the future welfare of the child", I must say that I had not thought very much about whether they made legal sense or not. But one thing I would say: the words are in any case superfluous, because, as I pointed out a few moments ago, the court will always have the welfare of the child in mind. It needs no further injunction to do so; it already has the duty that I mentioned laid upon it by the principal Act.
  LORD LATHAM: If I may say so, only with the consent of the parents. It has not an absolute right to make an adoption order, even though it be in the interests of the welfare of the child, except the parent consents; that is the crucial thing.
  LORD CHESHAM: The noble Lord objects to the use of the word "likely" in my noble and learned friend's Amendment. He says that for the court to decide that a natural parent might be likely or not to discharge his obligations is impossible; the court would have to be prophetic, to see into the future, and it would be very difficult for it to make up its mind. He said, very movingly, that bad parents have no rights; the child comes first. I would be disposed to agree with him, but I do not believe that every parent who withholds his consent is the brutal, low type that his moving descriptions have been calling to our minds. I believe we can think of other reasons why people may fall into the classification of "not very good parents".
  LORD LATHAM: My Lords, I really must interpose now. This subsection is concerned only with that type of person—not with the decent parents, but with the neglectful parents.
  LORD CHESHAM: This subsection is concerned with the question of when a court may make an order without the parent's consent. I submit it is perfectly

  221
  reasonable that the court can consider whether a hitherto neglectful parent is likely to make a good parent in future. I think the court is entitled to give that its consideration, bearing in mind the fact that it must have regard to the future welfare of the child as a primary consideration under the law as it is now.
  Finally, my noble and learned friend has already explained on a previous occasion that the court has to satisfy itself as to the likelihood of what will happen in fact and not what is the probable intention of what may be some feckless parent. With those words, I hope I have said enough to show that my noble and learned friend's Amendment is the one that should be accepted.
  On Question, Amendment to the Amendment negatived.
  On Question, Amendment agreed to.
  Clause 19:
  Other conditions of adoption
  (5) In determining for the purposes of paragraph (b) of subsection (1) of section five of the principal Act whether an adoption order if made will be for the welfare of the infant, the court shall have regard (among other things) to the health of the applicant.
  6.18 p.m.
  LORD LATHAM LORD LATHAM moved to add to subsection (5):
  "who if the court so decides shall undergo a medical examination by a doctor appointed by the court and remunerated from public funds."
  The noble Lord said: This Amendment relates to Clause 19. On the Committee stage I raised the question of requiring the medical examination of every applicant. The Amendment does not go as far as that; it goes only so far as those whom the court think should undergo a medical examination. The noble and learned Viscount the Lord Chancellor, in replying to the debate on the Committee stage on this proposal, said that the court would have a dossier, but, as the Hurst Committee said, the dossier, if it exists, would be based upon limited information, which the Hurst Committee went on to say was not satisfactory. Apart from the dossier, which, as I have said, is not exhaustive, the court must rely upon replies made no doubt to questions put to the applicant—and those replies will be based upon the memory of the applicant, and not all of us are very exact in our memories about our own illnesses
  222
  even—or by the appearance of the applicant in court when the application is being made.
  What is in issue here? The thing that is in issue is whether the applicant, from the point of view of his health, is such as should be entrusted with the child of another—a young child, very often a child which may be in not too good physical condition itself from prior neglect by its own parent. Surely it is the case that no insurance company would insure a life for more than about £100 without having a medical examination of the assured. Is this child's life and future and happiness any less important than a modest insurance policy? Is it not also the case that in an ever-enlarging field of employment—not very high employment, not very skilled or technical employment—a medical examination is required, and often recurrent medical examinations are required?
  The Hurst Committee recommended quite definitely, without any question, that the applicant should undergo a medical examination by a doctor appointed by the court, and that the cost of it should be defrayed out of public funds. This Amendment does not go quite so far as that; it limits the obligation to an applicant "who if the court so decides," and goes on to say that the doctor shall be appointed by the court and shall be remunerated from public funds. If an applicant sincerely wants to adopt a child I do not think that he would boggle or object to undergoing what is now a normal circumstance, a medical examination. Fifty years ago, when the health of this nation was much lower and different from what it is now, people hesitated to have a medical examination because they feared what might be disclosed by it. That is not the case in these days—medical examinations are common things, and I do not think that the applicant would decline. If he did decline for no more convincing reason than that he did not want to undergo a medical examination, it would, first, show that his desire to adopt a child was pretty slender, and secondly, put one on notice that there might be something wrong with his or her health, and that he or she was not a person to whom a child should be entrusted.
  May I give just two illustrations of the difficulties which can arise in connection with the absence of any sufficient

  223
  knowledge of the health of applicants? This was the case of a third party, a gynæcologist who knew the prospective adoptive mother and knew that she could not have a family. The statutory seven days' notice was received, and the first visit was paid before the baby arrived. The child welfare officer, at once anxious concerning the woman's health, began inquiries and asked that the baby should not be handed over until all these were completed. The hospital was anxious for the baby to be discharged, and the child went to the prospective adopters not in fact before the statutory seven days. Two weeks after the baby was placed the adoptive mother was removed to hospital with an incurable disease from which she has since died. In another case, an application made to the council for a child for adoption was turned down on the advice of a chest clinic. The prospective adoptive mother, still under supervision for a known tuberculosis condition, was advised by the tuberculosis officer to wait for another year. Three months later she took a baby for adoption direct from a woman whom she had met in the park. Those are illustrations of the difficulties which a medical examination would avoid, and the number of cases and evidence otherwise submitted to the Hurst Committee convinced that Committee that it was essential that the applicant should undergo a medical examination. I therefore beg to move the Amendment standing in my name.
  Amendment moved—
  Page 12, line 12, after ("applicant") insert the said words.—(Lord Latham.)
  LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, I should like to support the Amendment just moved by my noble friend Lord Latham. At the same time, I should like to express my admiration—I think the House would agree with me in this—of the tenacity with which Lord Latham has tried to improve this Bill on many occasions in spite of great disappointments. We have heard repeatedly that this Bill is for the protection of children. I should have thought that this Amendment would not have been necessary. I should have thought myself that it was essential that there should be provision in the Bill that foster parents would be healthy in all respects. I cannot see how any public authority or any court can
  224
  know that the parents are healthy unless there has been a medical examination. For that reason, I beg to support the Amendment.
  LORD MILNER OF LEEDS: My Lords, I, too, should like to support this Amendment. It seems to me that it is purely permissive and is entirely in the hands of the court, and that therefore the Government should see their way to accept it. I should have thought that it was quite impossible for a court to have regard to, or to know, the position regarding the health of an applicant unless there were a medical examination. How can the court decide whether a man or woman has consumption, perhaps, in the family, or something of that sort, unless there is a medical examination? It seems to me an essential concomitant to this clause, and that in order to make the clause work it is essential that the court should have a permissive power, which it can use when it is in doubt, in regard to the medical examination of any applicant. Therefore I hope the House will support my noble friend in his Amendment.
  LORD CONESFORD: My Lords, I think the position is that with the words as they stand, without the Amendment, the court has to have regard to the health of the applicant, and therefore might require evidence before it made an order. Naturally, I wish to hear what the Minister will say on this, but I think the House would like to avoid the implication that the evidence of a man's own doctor should never be considered sufficient. At present, I think, the court often concerns itself a good deal with the health of the applicant; in fact, I believe my noble and learned friend the Lord Chancellor assured us on a previous occasion that that was the case; and while I do not profess to have formed a concluded view on the merits of this Amendment, I do not think the House would wish by implication to suggest that there was necessarily anything insufficient about the evidence of the man's own doctor.
  LORD CHESHAM: My Lords. I think I find myself in agreement with the noble Lord. Lord Shepherd, when he said that he thought this Amendment was unnecessary. I, too, think it is.
  LORD SHEPHERD: Excuse me, but I said it was unnecessary only because I

  225
  thought it should have been included in the Bill in any case.
  LORD CHESHAM: My Lords, I was going on to say "for a different reason", but I still agree with the noble Lord that, so far as that goes, it is unnecessary. As Lord Latham explained, the Amendment would empower courts at their discretion to require an applicant to undergo a medical examination by a doctor appointed by the court. That is exactly the point. But the arguments of the noble Lord in favour of this Amendment can hardly be said to have supported it. Had his Amendment sought to provide that all applicants should be required to undergo a medical examination, I could have understood it; but, the noble Lord, having put forward those arguments, then says by his Amendment that this is to be at the discretion of the court—which would appear to defeat the whole object of his argument. In any case, it is already within the power of the court under the existing law to ask for a medical report in respect of an applicant and to refuse the application if the applicant does not provide the report.
  Clause 19 (5) of the Bill draws the attention of the court to the importance of the health of applicants for adoption orders and requires the court to consider this point on each occasion. That part of the Amendment which refers to medical examinations at a court's discretion would therefore seem unnecessary. That part, however, which provides for payment from public funds of the cost of a medical examination where that is required raises a point of substance. Under the existing arrangements an applicant for an adoption order must be prepared to meet some expense. Thus the law already provides, in the Rules of Court relating to adoption, that the court may order an applicant to pay first, out of pocket expenses incurred by the guardian ad litein, and also expenses incurred in attending court by any respondent or whatever part of those expenses the court thinks proper. The registered adoption societies are required by the Rules to consider the adopter's state of health before delivering a child into his care, and some societies discharge their obligation by requiring an applicant to undergo a special medical examination at his own expense. In many cases courts may well be satisfied if the report
  226
  of this examination is put before them; and in that event there would be no additional expenditure. I would only add this: if it had been found that the expenses which already fall on applicants had deterred prospective adopters from applying for adoption orders, Her Majesty's Government would certainly wish to consider the situation again but I have no evidence that they have been so deterred, and, therefore, there do not seem sufficient grounds for singling out the particular item with which the Amendment deals for payment from public funds.
  On Question, Amendment negatived.
  6.34 p.m.
  LORD LATHAM LORD LATHAM moved, after Clause 21, to insert the following new clause:
  Parties to applications for adoption orders.
  ("22. Rules made under section eight of the principal Act shall provide that on an application for an adoption order any person not being a parent or guardian of the child who takes part in the arrangements for the adoption shall be a respondent to the application.")
  The noble Lord said: My Lords, the purpose of this Amendment is to carry out another of the recommendations of the Hurst Committee. The continuing bane of local authorities, adoption societies and other bona fide bodies concerning themselves with foster children or adopted children is the third parties and the direct placings. Local authorities and the societies to which I have referred are very disturbed about the activities of these third parties.
  Nor is this a new trouble or anxiety, for the Curtis Committee, which was presided over by Dame Myra Curtis, reported, in paragraph 455 of their Report:
  "There is … nothing to prevent 'third parties' who are in a special position in relation to infant children—e.g., a matron of a nursing home—making a business of arranging adoptions without proper inquiry as to the home to which the child is sent and without any security that an adoption order will be applied for. There may be nominally no fee for the service but there appears sometimes to be a concealed fee—e.g., in the form of work by the mother of the child given before and after the birth or as a part of the overall payment made for the confinement. There may even be an illegal payment by the persons receiving the child which would be very difficult to discover."
  The Committee went on:
  "We think that private persons should be prohibited from arranging adoptions in the sense of inviting applications and handing over the children direct to the adopters."

  227
  As I have said, the Hurst Committee, which had some additional impressive evidence before it, did not go so far as the recommendation of the Curtis Committee. However, they did recommend that the third parties should be made respondents to the application.
  The measure of the problem dealt with in the Report of the Curtis Committee and facing local authorities and others acting bona fide and interested in this matter will be understood when I say that, according to the Hurst Committee, no less than one-third of the adoption orders made annually (that was in the year 1954) were in respect of children placed outside their own families, either directly or by third parties. It was because of the evidence submitted to the Hurst Committee that that Committee came to the conclusion and recommended that third parties should be made respondents to applications for adoption. The Committee went further and said that third parties
  "will then be served with notice of the application, and be interviewed by the guardian ad litem; they may also be required to attend the hearing. In order to assist the guardian ad litem in tracing any persons who may have acted as a third party, we recommend that the form of consent should include a statement by the parent of how he or she heard of the adopters".
  I am not suggesting in my Amendment that we should go as far as that, although I believe it has much to commend it; but I am asking your Lordships to approve the proposition that third parties should be made respondents.
  May I give your Lordships just two illustrations of the kind of case which local authorities meet from time to time? There was the case of a Mr. and Mrs. S., who received a child by means of a third party. The material conditions were found to be adequate, and the child was placed. It was subsequently discovered that the male applicant had been in prison, and the woman under police observation for entertaining foreign troops during her husband's absence in the Services. An adoption order was refused by the court, but at the mother's request the child remained in the care of the applicants. The other case is of Mr. and Mrs. M., aged over 50, and in poor health, who received a child through a third party, and who were quite unaware of the legal obligations to notify the local authority. The applicants lived in two
  228
  filthy, dark, airless basement rooms, with a male lodger. After much discussion the applicants allowed the child to be received into the care of the local authority, under the Children Act. He had been with the applicants some months and it was a great shock to him to have to be separated. I think, from the evidence tendered to the Curtis Committee and the recommendations which that Committee made, and the evidence tendered to the Hurst Committee and the definite recommendation which the Hurst Committee made, that I may hope your Lordships will accept the Amendment so that the parties may henceforth be respondent to applications for an adoption order. I beg to move.
  Amendment moved—
  After Clause 21 insert the said new clause.—(Lord Latham.)
  LORD CHESHAM: My Lords, I am sorry to keep appearing resistant to the noble Lord's eloquence.
  LORD LATHAM: I am getting used to it.
  LORD CHESHAM: So am I, my Lords. But on this occasion his Amendment proposes the making of Rules; and, while a provision in an empowering enactment requiring the making of Rules on a specified point is not without precedent, it is somewhat unusual. In this case, moreover, it seems a little unnecessary, apart from the merits, because the rule-making power is already wide enough to enable my noble and learned friend the Lord Chancellor to make Rules in the sense proposed.
  LORD LATHAM: My Lords, if the noble Lord will give an assurance that the Government will make a Rule to this effect I will withdraw the Amendment straight away.
  LORD CHESHAM: My Lords, perhaps it would be for noble Lords' convenience if I finished what I was going to say.
  LORD LATHAM: I do not want to let the offer go.
  LORD CHESHAM: My Lords, it is not going. It is true to say that the Amendment would implement a recommendation of the Hurst Committee, but it is a recommendation that we think goes rather too far. The Committee recommended that all third parties should be

  229
  made respondents so that they would be served with notice of the application and be interviewed by the guardian ad litem. If that is what they want, that agents are seen by the guardian ad litem, that can be made a direct provision without any necessity for joining them as respondents; and that is what it is proposed my noble and learned friend the Lord Chancellor should provide by Rules. The Rules already provide that anyone who has a legitimate interest in the outcome of an application can be made a respondent at the court's discretion. If the court requires the presence of any agent who is not a respondent, it can insist on his being called as a witness.
  It would appear that the noble Lord is putting forward the views of the Curtis Committee on discouraging agents from arranging adoptions by means of putting them to inconvenience. If that is the intention, I am afraid that I have to tell him that a provision with that object would he a misuse of the courts.
  LORD LATHAM: My Lords, of course, I cannot say what was the intention of the Curtis Committee, but it certainly was not my intention to use this evidence in the way suggested by the noble Lord.
  LORD CHESHAM: I am sorry if I have misunderstood the noble Lord. I understood him to say that he wanted it made difficult for agents to arrange adoptions, and that this method would discourage them from doing so. All I can say (I will not answer the point about whether agents are or are not desirable) is that this provision would be a misuse of the courts for that purpose, and therefore I hope he will not press his Amendment.
  LORD LATHAM: So there is no offer?
  6.44 p.m.
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, I would have replied, but I did not like replying when I had not heard the Mover's speech. However, I have had an opportunity to pick it up. My noble friend Lord Chesham made clear the position on the two real points of the Amendment. First, there is the endeavour to ensure that agents are seen by the guardian ad litem. That can be made a direct provision without any need for joining them as respondents, and it is proposed that I should so provide by Rules. That is what we intend to do. On
  230
  the other point, the Rules already provide that anyone who has a legitimate interest can be made respondent at the court's discretion; so that if the court requires the attendance of any agent who is not a respondent it can so insist. I do not think the noble Lord need be too despondent. We are meeting his points, but not in exactly the same way.
  LORD LATHAM: And, if I may say so to the noble and learned Viscount, not to the same extent. I thought there was a considerable margin between the point the noble and learned Viscount has been good enough to indicate and the recommendation of the Hurst Committee that all bodies should be respondent.
  LORD MILNER OF LEEDS: My Lords, may I ask how the court should ascertain, on an application for an adoption order, what person or persons, not being parent or guardian, take part in the arrangement? How do they ascertain that—by making an inquiry from the person or people concerned? It may be that the identity of many people who have an indirect arrangement of some kind might well not be ascertained unless there is some procedure for doing that.
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, if the House will allow me to say so, the idea is that the court makes full inquiries and that the background generally becomes apparent. But if that were not so, then the court would inquire into this point, because, as I have said, and as my noble friend Lord Chesham said, it is possible for the court to act. I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Latham, will not press his Amendment, in view of what has been said. I have tried very hard to treat this Bill as being, as I said, something in which we are trying to get at the best results; and I think that the noble Lord, Lord Latham, will agree—I do not want to throw bouquets at myself—that I have tried to help him all along by explaining exactly what we had in mind. In these circumstances, perhaps he might be content with what we are giving.
  LORD LATHAM: My Lords, for those reasons and also because for me not to withdraw the Amendment would, as it were, change the tune I have had to follow this afternoon, I agree to withdraw it.
  Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
  Clause 23 [Adoption by persons domiciled but not ordinarily resident in Great Britain]:
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, this Amendment removes an inconsistency in the provisions about joint applicants who are ordinarily resident abroad and those concerning a sole applicant who is resident abroad. The subsection as drafted provides that joint applicants must live together with the infant for a specified period, either in England or in Scotland, but if they cross the Border, a fresh start must be made in calculating the qualifying period. No such restriction applies to a sole applicant, nor do I think that there are sufficient grounds for imposing the restriction on the joint applicants. It is simply a matter of straightening out, and I hope your Lordships will agree to it. I beg to move.
  Amendment moved—
  Page 14, line 23, leave out "England or Scotland, as the case may be" and insert "Great Britain".—(The Lord Chancellor.)
  LORD LATHAM: My Lords, may I ask the noble and learned Viscount whether any significance is to be attached to the summary departure of the Minister of State for Scotland immediately the noble and learned Viscount commenced to move this Amendment?
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, after the noble Lord's long and wide experience of political life, I invite him to draw his own conclusions.
  On Question, Amendment agreed to.
  Clause 24 [Provisional adoption by persons domiciled outside Great Britain]:
  6.52 p.m.
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR THE LORD CHANCELLOR moved, after subsection (4) to insert:
  "(5) In relation to a provisional adoption order subsection (6) of section two of the principal Act shall have effect as if for the word 'three' both where it occurs in paragraph (a) and where it occurs in paragraph (b), there were substituted the word 'six'."
  The noble and learned Viscount said: My Lords, this Amendment provides that an applicant for a provisional adoption order (who will be a person not domiciled in England or Scotland), must have had the infant continuously in his care and possession for at least six consecutive months immediately preceding the date of the order and must have given the local authority notice of his intention to apply for an order at least six months
  232
  before the order is granted. The period in respect of applications for ordinary adoption orders is three months in each case. This change was suggested by the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, on the Committee stage, and your Lordships may remember that I said that I felt it was in accord with the general feeling of the House and promised to take action on it, and I have done so. I beg to move.
  Amendment moved—
  Page 15, line 12, at end insert the said subsection.—(The Lord Chancellor.)
  LORD LATHAM: My Lords, I should like to express the gratitude of my noble friend Lord Silkin and myself for the way in which the noble and learned Viscount has met us with regard to this matter of the extension of the period to six months. I am sure I have his assurance that in the rules which will have to be made appropriate insistence will be laid upon the court's having before it information about the conditions of life in the country to which the child is to be taken—such as labour laws, employment of children laws, educational facilities, adoption procedure and generally everything about the care and protection of the child once it gets to the country of its destination. In some respects it is a risky thing for a child to be taken as an adopted child to some countries, at least, and I am sure that the Secretary of State for the Home Department will see that the regulations are as tight and effective as can well be the case.
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, again with your Lordships' permission, I have sensed the feeling of the House and I shall convey to my right honourable friend the desirability that the fullest possible information be obtained.
  On Question, Amendment agreed to.
  First Schedule [Provisions as to children awaiting adoption or placed with strangers]:
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, your Lordships will be relieved to know that all I need say is that this Amendment is consequential. I beg to move.
  Amendment moved—
  Page 26, line 5, leave out from ("court") to end of line 6.—(The Lord Chancellor.)
  On Question, Amendment agreed to.
  House adjourned at five minutes before seven o'clock.