THE AIR ESTIMATES

HL Deb 07 May 1958 vol 209 cc32-98

2.57 p.m.

LORD BALFOUR OF INCHRYE rose to call attention to the Memorandum of the Secretary of State for Air Accompanying the Air Estimates for 1958–59 (Cmnd. 373); and to move for Papers. The noble Lord said: My Lords, I would submit that there is general agreement that the Royal Air Force is a well-administered Service, and that it is resilient to modern needs and methods. The Estimates this year show welcome reductions in headquarters formations, welcome reductions in the size of the Air Ministry itself, and a welcome reduction of an overall 10,000 in the number of civilian staffs, in spite of a substitution of 3,000 civilian posts for Service personnel. The Royal Air Force is searching constantly for organisational economies. I think it leads in accepting what one may term the "New Deal" for Servicemen—and certainly that has paid, as recruiting figures show—and, furthermore, the Air Ministry is not afraid to go outside the Service for consultation and advice from the world of commerce.

But far beyond administration, the big question, I submit, in relation to these Air Estimates is on the issue of the possession of the deterrent V-bomber force. There is a charge made that we are spending too great a proportion of defence expenditure upon the V-bomber force and its protection. That charge has come from two different flanks. The charge is made by those who say that this deterrent is maintained at an unwise cost to the build-up of conventional weapons, and there are those who say that this deterrent is out of date—what I would term the "advancement of the pushbutton warfare" school.

In examining the charge that we are spending too great a proportion of our defence expenditure, it is worth while to look for a moment at the figures. Out of some £1,500 million defence expenditure we are spending about 7½ per cent. on the deterrent and another 7½ per cent. on the protection of the deterrent. That is to say, out of a total of some £1,500 million about £250 million is spent on the deterrent and its protection in the form of Fighter Command, radar chains and other protective measures For that investment we have a force of V-bombers—Vulcans, Victors and still the Valiants —the equal in performance and armament of any air fleet of comparable purpose owned by any nation in the world, not excluding those concerning which we have the gravest suspicions.

Some critics argue that while admitting the need for this deterrent by the Western Powers we cannot afford it and at the same time provide adequate conventional forces. My Lords, I would submit that we should support the concept that we retain the independent deterrent in this country, and that we should reject absolutely the school that says, "Leave it to the United States". There is always the possibility that the United States and ourselves will not see eye to eye on dangers which confront us in Western Europe, and we all know that once in every four years in the United States they have a vacuum in policy decisions. It is a well-known fact that for some months before a Presidential election it is virtually impossible to get any positive decision of importance out of the American Administration. That, indeed, would be a time of danger for the democracies if we were not self-sufficient as regards deterrent force. Therefore, I would submit this conclusion to your Lordships in considering these Air Estimates: that it is worth while to have the deterrent which, by careful planning, can be obtained without crippling our defence effort.

I believe it cannot be too widely known, both inside and outside the Royal Air Force, that for an indefinite number of years stretching ahead the large requirement for manned aircraft, both bombers and fighters, will continue. Indeed, I see in the Press to-day that the Chief of Air Staff was only yesterday reporting to that effect. If we consider for a moment we must admit that the manned fighter is going to have an important rôle for many years ahead. Imagine the approach to these shores of an unidentified aircraft. You cannot send a guided missile after that; you send up a fighter to investigate—a manned fighter because it may be one of our own aircraft. And if it is an enemy reconnaissance aircraft, you still cannot send a guided missile up against it; you send a manned fighter.

If the arguments are there for the manned fighter, they are there even stronger for the manned bomber against the inter-continental ballistic missile. Any examination of the problem must lead to the conclusion that, at any rate for the next ten years, probably longer, the manned bomber is going to play a vital rôle in the defence of this country. I would submit four reasons in support of that argument. The first is that the V-bomber force has a degree of flexibility which allows its use in conventional war, carrying what I would term "U" rather than "Non-U" weapons—the ordinary weapons which are considered quite nice weapons, quite acceptable in modern war, as against those which are considered not quite nice. Secondly, the V-bomber force allows time for consideration of the political position in the hour of crisis, which the inter-continental ballistic missile does not allow. With the missile the Government has the terrible decision of saying "Fire it" or "Do not fire it." The V-bomber force can be sent up and can patrol up and down what is termed the "loiter line" while the high-powered statesmen of the world communicate with each other and endeavour at the last moment to avert some disaster.

Thirdly, until mid-1960, when the Thor missile is likely to become independent of the United States, we shall be virtually in the hands of the United States as regards control of the warhead. Fourthly, and I think one of the most powerful reasons (I hope the Minister who replies may be able to confirm this fact), while Russia may talk of the inter-continental missile, and may publish propaganda photographs of sites and these missiles with their heads peering up into the heavens, is it not a fact that all reports show that at the present time production of manned bombers by Russia is being stepped up, as also is production of manned fighters? So my conclusion is that the manned bomber will remain the main threat to these shores for many years ahead.

My Lords, if we are to afford the independent deterrent without crippling our defence effort in our cold war outbreaks, such as we see around Aden at the present time, we must be efficient and effective in the use of both air and land power. The concept is that we should have military "fire brigades" capable of being flown to any part of the world to put out a local conflagration. For these forces to be available and effective anywhere, and at any time, depends not only on the size of our air lift but also on the selective use of such available lift as Transport Command can give. With these modern aircraft, Britannias costing £1 million each, we cannot afford to have them lying about half used; it is too expensive altogether. Your Lordships have often debated in past years the question of the inadequacy of Transport Command, but it is of interest to note that the ton-mile lift of Transport Command has been doubled in five years. I like to think that that is partly due to your Lordships' pressure; but certainly it is a remarkable achievement. It is a remarkable achievement that the fleet of independent aircraft has grown to 55 fourengined aircraft, and that Transport Command are to have in the first line some 30 Beverleys, 20 Britannias and, I think, 11 Comets. For the first time for many years, however, I personally see a halt in the growth of Transport Command, because I do not believe that much more can be done than is being done without the loss of something more important.

If we say that the growth of Transport Command can, for the first time, be slowed, down, we should turn for a moment to the utilisation of Transport Command, in order to see that its resources are not wasted and that things which are better dealt with otherwise are not carried by air. Here, I think, in debating the Air Force Estimates we can ask for the Army to look to its own self. It is the Army's duty to stockpile heavy weapons and equipment at strategic points in the world, ready for airborne personnel to pick them up. It is no good thinking the air lift can carry heavy equipment. Even the American Transport Command, which is bigger than the rest of the world's air transport fleets combined, cannot carry equipment for an army. There is an example of an Army request, which I understand was made in the last few weeks, to fly out jeeps to Aden. If the cost of flying out jeeps to Aden was gone into, if the operation was costed out, I submit that it would be found to be cheaper to have had a gold-plated jeep sitting in Aden doing nothing for many years past than to fly out the jeep as we have been doing. It would be much cheaper to leave a jeep in Aden doing nothing, rusting, falling to bits, and to have it replaced by another one, than flying out at the last moment equipment which should already have been there, or near there.

So, my Lords, I would summarise my Motion drawing attention to the Air Estimates by saying that we have a fine Force, manned by the best, able to be an insurance of safety against aggression, making it clear to any aggressors that their efforts would be checked, in part, by defence and met in full by massive retaliation with our Allies, or even, if necessary, without our Allies. May I continue this summary with a warning. Let us be careful that wishful thinking for welcome economies in expenditure does not allow us to take risks with what we know is actual in air fleets and their power, simply in the hope that future and as yet largely unproven weapons may lighten this burden. Surely such would be a false economy and a quite unacceptable risk for any British Government to take. Our Government have not taken it so far. I hope that they never will, and that no succeeding Government will ever take such risks with our defences. My Lords, I beg to move for Papers.

3.12 p.m.

LORD OGMORE

My Lords, I think that this debate on the Motion of the noble Lord, Lord Balfour of Inchrye, comes at a most opportune moment, because, quite frankly, to most of us the picture of our defences as envisaged by the Government is confused and incomplete. We see it through a haze, and we do not much like what we see—in fact, it seems to us that the Government are gambling on the hydrogen bomb and that without it we should be naked and defenceless. That is a most dangerous position for the country to be in. It may be that the circumstances will not call for the use of such a weapon—and we sincerely hope that it will never be used; but in that case, we shall have no other weapons with which to meet a possible contingency. Therefore I agree largely with what the noble Lord, Lord Balfour of Inchrye, said on that point. I would say, however, that the picture he has given to the House differs completely from the Government's picture, and is more like the picture painted yesterday by the Chiefs of Air Staff. This is an example of the sort of confusion in the defence picture at the moment.

What are the constituents of the Government's declared air policy—because, after all, we must take the declared policy of the Government as published by them in the White Paper, and not as given to us by Generals in after-dinner speeches or by Air Marshals or Marshals of the Royal Air Force in Press conferences, and in other places where people are gathered and sojourn. One must take the White Paper as setting out the Government's policy and intention. It is the intention of the Government, as I have been able to ascertain it from the White Paper and from the statements of Ministers—not, I add once more, from statements of Generals or Air Marshals—first of all to have a strategic bomber force carrying megaton bombs, this force to disappear as guided missiles become more plentiful and accurate. Secondly, the intention is to have a fighter force to protect the bomber bases—these will be chiefly of the English Electric P1B. How long this fighter force will be available, and how many English Electric P1B fighters are being ordered, we do not know, because there was a curious silence by the Minister of Supply in another place last week when he was asked this question.

Do the Air Council agree with the Government, with the Minister of Supply and with the Minister of Defence that manned bombers and fighters are within sight of the end of their usefulness. If they do—and up to now they have maintained that proposition—no one else agrees with them. The Russians do not: the Americans do not; obviously the Germans do not. And the British Air Marshals do not, because yesterday, according to a report in The Times, and the Daily Telegraph this morning, Marshal of the Royal Air Force, Sir Dermot Boyle, Chief of the Air Staff, said at a meeting that the Air Council were convinced that, as far as they could see, manned bombers and fighters would be needed to supplement guided missiles. He then went on to explain in detail the necessity for manned bombers and fighters.

Obviously, the Germans, who have a good deal of experience in this field, do not feel that the day of the manned bomber and fighter has gone, because they are getting the loan of 100 pilots from the Royal Air Force in order to train the Luftwaffe. Presumably, these pilots are to sign on with the Luftwaffe. It seems a most extraordinary situation, only ten years after the end of the last war, that British Royal Air Force pilots are signing on for three to five years, presumably as members of the Luftwaffe. I think the House and the country will want to know a little more about the signing on in this way by British Royal Air Force pilots. What are the conditions under which this is being done? Will they remain officers of the Royal Air Force? If so, on what Reserve will they appear? What happens if we disagree with West Germany? We have already heard to-day from the noble Viscount on the Liberal Benches, who, having fired his gun, has now disappeared, a Question in regard to Herr Krupp, and what Herr Krupp said. That is the sort of thing that might develop into a disagreement. What happens then? Can we withdraw these officers at any moment? I think that is the sort of question that Parliament should ask and on which a full explanation should be given. Can we recall them at any time?

The third weapon, so to speak, or arrow, in the quiver of the Government, is Transport Command. Here, as the noble Lord, Lord Balfour of Inchrye, has said, for long-distance lifts they are de- pending upon Hastings, Comets and Britannias; and for lifts within the theatre of operations, on Beverleys. Twenty Britannias and 46 Beverleys—rather more than the noble Lord mentioned—are on order, according to the Ministry of Supply. This statement that Transport Command have now reached their peak, as Lord Balfour of Inchrye indicated, does not take into account the fact that these aircraft are only on order: that they have not yet arrived at Transport Command and will not arrive for some considerable time. Therefore, I would say that we need a good deal more aircraft, not only "in the pipeline", so to speak, but also in the more distant future. I will say a little more about air transport in a moment.

The declared policy of the Government, in my view, omits sufficient mention of three other parts of the Air Force which are needed. First of all, there is the tactical support of ground forces. In my reading, such as it is, of history I have always found that throughout the ages in military matters, wherever there is a failure to prepare for war, wherever there is parsimony on the part of those who are responsible for paying for the preparation, in the end one person suffers. That person is not the one who has been parsimonious or lacking in preparation; it is the soldier who has to carry out the wars.

Let us take the Peninsula War. The lack of equipment for reducing fortresses, and the lack of engineering services meant that our men had to take heavily defended towns, great fortresses like Badajoz, with their bare hands. Before the First World War the lack of appreciation of the effect of modern weapons such as the machine gun and the effect of barbed wire, also meant that men had to pay with their lives. In the last war, the lack of appreciation of air power, the failure to realise that troops without air cover were helpless in face of strong and constant enemy air attack, meant that we lost very many valuable lives. Even after the start of the war, that was not clearly recognised. At sea the authorities failed to appreciate the same lesson and failed to provide both adequate fighter cover for naval operations and sufficient anti-aircraft armament for warships—all this in spite of constant and frequent warnings on the subject to those responsible for naval preparation before the last war. What I want to know is: have all these grim lessons been learnt yet, even on the one issue of air cover, quite apart from the other lessons which ought to be learnt in preparation for any future war that there may be? Obviously the Russians are aware of them. In the Defence and Army debates I gave your Lordships the views of the Russians in this connection.

N.A.T.O. also is aware of this need for air support of ground troops, and last Autumn they conducted technical trials of five aircraft at Brétigny, near Paris. The object was to test the aircraft so as to standardise a design for production in large numbers, for tactical support of N.A.T.O. armies in Europe; and it is odd and very interesting to know that of the five aircraft tested for this close support purpose three were powered by Bristol Orpheus engines and the other two have since been offered with those engines. So here we have an international body testing aircraft, all of which are, or can be, engined with British engines; and yet, so far as I am aware, there are no aircraft being tested now for a similar purpose—to protect British forces.

I am glad that, if the Ministry of Defence are not aware of this, the Air Staff are. I was invited to a conference which was held yesterday, but unfortunately I had duties in your Lordships' House and elsewhere and could not go. According to the Daily Telegraph, Air Vice-Marshal Kyle, who is a member of the Air Staff: revealed that trials concerning the possible provision of a new ground attack, defence and tactical reconnaissance aircraft for overseas theatres are to be made in Aden. Modern high-performance fighters are becoming less suitable for this general purpose rôle. That is a very heartening statement because it means, I think, that they have at last realised that the Army must have co-operation from aircraft and that we must have aircraft which can operate with the Army in a tactical rôle and give close support. The Army, I suppose tired of the fact that it has not had much co-operation in this field, or perhaps being frightened by the policy of the Ministry of Defence, has started its own air force—the Army Air Corps—which provides for both reconnaissance and liaison. I believe that that was started in 1957.

THE FIRST LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY (THE EARL OF SELKIRK)

My Lords, I believe it was in April of this year.

LORD OGMORE

My Lords, the organisation came into being on September 1, 1957. Perhaps the Admiralty had not heard of it before this year, but in fact it started then. I feel that it is a very heartening sign and shows initiative on the part of the Army that they are prepared themselves to take the necessary steps to provide the kind of cooperation and liaison which has not been provided for them by another Service and by Her Majesty's Government as a whole. In addition to the need for more transport aircraft there is the need for close support aircraft for use with civil defence—the need for the Air Force to take more seriously their duties of civil defence; because in war, in these days, especially with atomic weapons, one cannot envisage road and rail communication being long available in a country with a dense population such as this, and it may well be that in war the only link for civil defence will be by air. One would have thought, therefore, that this function, the necessity to act in the civil defence field, would have been mentioned by the Royal Air Force and by Her Majesty's Government in its memorandum. But there has been no mention of it whatsoever.

The third and last failure to deal in the memorandum with the picture as a whole is in relation to helicopters and their successors, vertical take-off aircraft. With the Forces and in civil defence the helicopter is an absolutely essential machine in these days; yet there is no doubt that it has not received from Her Majesty's Government the support that it should. Little interest has been taken in its development. The Bristol 192 is a large Forces helicopter which is having some encouragement, but the Army Air Corps which I have mentioned is having to go to France for a suitable helicopter. For liaison purposes, for which a larger helicopter is used, and as a spotter aircraft helicopter, they are trying out the French Alouette, a gas-turbine propelled helicopter. One would have thought that, with British aircraft manufacturers in the serious position in which they now are, we might have been able to get something from British manufacturers, rather than have to go to France for this purpose. I do not agree with the noble Lord, Lord Balfour of Inchrye, that we have reached the limit of our demands on the aircraft industry for supply aircraft. I myself believe that it is dangerous to rely on charter firms for aircraft for lifting either troops or materiel, and I would ask Her Majesty's Government to develop our Transport Command to a much greater extent than they have done so far.

I would ask them also to look at a new aircraft which is now just coming into production, the Fairey Rotodyne, which is the first vertical take-off liner, which will carry forty-eight passengers or 4½ tons of freight, and which will land almost anywhere—certainly in places where no aircraft not having the helicopter principle could possibly land. We are still deficient in this field and I believe that that is a very disheartening feature of our preparations. In column 5330 of General Keightley's dispatch on Suez, he pointed out, in his account of that unfortunate transaction, that: We had a limited airborne effort, but in particular our air supply lift and air supply resources were very restricted. I would suggest that in this modern age, to go into a military campaign, such as Suez was, with an aircraft situation of that kind was a very dangerous proceeding.

There is one other point I should like to make in this field: the question of corrosion in the Comets. As your Lordships probably know, several Comets have been grounded owing to the fact that there was corrosion in the fabric of which they were made, and this caused considerable concern because these Comets were a large part of the lift which we have available in case of urgent need. The allegation made by the Daily Telegraph—rightly or wrongly; I do not know—is that this was due not to any inherent defect in the metal, but to an inherent disability on the part of the Treasury to pay the necessary money to have them properly treated. If that is so, I think it is a matter which is cause for great concern, not only because the cost is very much greater now in treating these various machines than it would have been originally if they had been protected in the way the Air Ministry wanted them to be protected, but also because they were and have been out of commission. That is a very serious matter for the country as a whole. I think that that allegation, made in the Daily Telegraph, about the responsibility of the Treasury, should either be denied by the Minister who is going to reply (and I have given him a note of this point), or else he should explain what happened and give us an indication and a promise that it will never happen again.

As to the effect of the Government's indecision, and this confusion through various voices speaking on behalf of the Government and aircraft manufacturers on production of British aircraft, I am not going to speak, because that subject is going to be dealt with by Lord Shepherd. It is a serious point and he will deal with it, I am sure, very fully. There are one or two further points which I should like to make, quite briefly. The first is about the blunder, as I think it to be, of disbanding the Royal Auxiliary Air Force. I think it was a blunder for four reasons: first, because in war we should need a large number of pilots for purely transport purposes—they would not have to fly P.IBs. or anything of that kind, but there would have to be a large number to fly ordinary transport aircraft; secondly, because if we know anything of the anti-submarine warfare that is likely to take place we know that a large number of aircraft will be needed in that field; thirdly, because of the civil defence need, of which I have already spoken, and the call upon the Royal Air Force for that purpose; and fourthly—and in some ways this is equally important although it may not seem to be so at first sight—because the Royal Auxiliary Air Force afforded a considerable link with the public.

I think it is a psychological blunder to have disbanded the Royal Auxiliary Air Force. I can speak as one who was for many years in the Territorial Army—in fact, I came out of it a year or two ago only because of the age limit—and I know that in my own part of the country it is thought by those well qualified to judge that this was a great blunder which the Air Force will rue. It is said, perhaps wrongly, that many of the Generals understood the Territorial Army much better than the Air Marshals understood the Royal Auxiliary Air Force, and that it is because they did not fully appreciate the worth of the Royal Auxiliary Air Force and the strength of its tie between the various parts of the United Kingdom and the Royal Air Force that they allowed it to be disbanded, at the behest of the Minister of Defence. That may, or may not, be true, but that is what is felt in informed quarters in parts of the United Kingdom.

I should like to say just a word on the question of guided missiles so far as the two Services and the employment of them is concerned. There are at present two Services dealing with guided missiles: the Royal Artillery and the Royal Air Force. The Royal Artillery deal with ground-to-ground missiles, and the Royal Air Force with all other missiles. Is this a good practice? Will it not lead to unnecessary expense, to confusion and, possibly, to failure to develop these weapons to the best possible advantage? How does it fit in with the Minister of Defence's declared policy that, where possible, we should integrate services and co-ordinate commands? How can there be integration of services when you are giving this one weapon to two different Services? I should have thought that either you regard the missile as a non-piloted aircraft and give it to the Royal Air Force, or you regard it as a shell from a gun and you give it to the Royal Artillery. But it cannot be both, and I think the idea that two Services are handling it may lead to confusion. I should like to have the Minister's view on that point.

Finally, there is the question of recruiting. The future of the Royal Air Force depends not only on guided missiles and machines but also on men. In the Defence debate, I think it was, I called to your Lordships' attention a very interesting declaration on this point by the Russians, who said that in the era of the push-button war the man was more important than ever; and where are men coming from and in what numbers so far as the Royal Air Force is concerned? The latest figures which I have, and so far as I know the latest figures in the Printed Paper Office, are for January and February. The recruitment of the Regular Royal Air Force in January, 1957, was 2,688, and in January of this year 1,823. There is a very considerable drop there. In February, 1957, the figure was 2,338, and in February, 1958, it was 1,777—a very considerable drop in January and February. It is only fair to say, and I am certain that the Minister will say, that there has been a slight increase in the long-term entries, for nine years' service and over. The figures went up from 215 in February, 1957, to 298 in February, 1958, so there is a slight and welcome increase there; but on the whole there is a considerable decrease in recruiting this year as against last year. That, I feel, is a serious feature, and it is no good blinking these things.

The Government have attacked us on several occasions on recruiting, because they say, "You raise these points; and if you raise the point that there are not many recruits you will prevent people from coming into the Forces." We do not do it for that reason, nor do I believe that that is the effect, but we are concerned with the picture when National Service ends that the Forces may be too reduced to carry out their duties. We want to make the Government realise the seriousness of the situation as it has been unfolding over the last year or so. That is all I want to say. I welcome Lord Balfour of Inchrye's Motion, and, of course, we on this side shall listen with much interest to the many experienced, powerful speakers who are to follow.

3.38 p.m.

VISCOUNT DE L'ISLE

My Lords, in an Air debate I think it suitable that our sorties should be fairly short, and the two earlier speakers have stuck to that principle. May I begin by saying that I cannot find myself in agreement with the noble Lord, Lord Ogmore, on one point raised by him. From my own experience I can say definitely and categorically that the Air Marshals did not neglect the Royal Auxiliary Air Force. They did not regard it as unwanted, and the whole Air Council and all others responsible were for some time in agonies of indecision, because they saw in one direction where their duty lay and in the other where their sentiments led them. The fact is that the part-time pilot in the present organisation of the Air Force cannot fulfil the function which he fulfilled before the war. He cannot, for various administrative reasons with which I need not detain the House, form part of aircrew. The fighter rôle is the one in which he excelled and when it became apparent that that rôle could not be fulfilled in the modern context, the Air Council, I think quite rightly, decided—with infinite regret and agony of soul, I know, although I was not responsible at the time—that the end of the Royal Auxiliary Air Force must come.

I should like to begin by saying what I find most agreeable to me in the Memorandum attached to the Air Estimates. First of all, I am delighted that at last the Government have decided to place the Arabian Peninsula with the Persian Gulf and British Somaliland under one headquarters and under one Air Commander. I think it ought to have been done before, but it is a very wise and prudent step. I hope that there will not he any compartmentalisation—I hope I may be forgiven for using this awful word—between the Colonial Office and the Foreign Office, one Department being responsible for the Persian Gulf and the other for the Aden Protectorate and the Aden Colony. I hope that the Ministers will see that there is no division of policy there.

Turning to paragraph 47, I hope that I shall not be thought guilty of excessive self-congratulation when I say that I am glad to see that plans for a staging post in the Indian Ocean are now coming to fruition, because it was when I was at the Air Ministry that the R.A.F. first reconnoitred this area, before the difficulty actually arose, as it did later, in transport facilities in India and Ceylon. I am glad to see that an airfield is now under construction.

The third point which I was glad to note was the intensive pursuit of work study, another subject which I have close to my heart. I have never seen why any Armed Service of the Crown, or any other public department, for that matter, should not be as careful with the nation's precious stock of skilled man-hours as is private industry. I have never believed since I first had experience of this, that a crude cut in manpower was the answer to the need for manpower economy. Of course, the answer is to see that there is a properly balanced arrangement by which manpower is used in the most economic way under proper supervision. It is right that the most modern and, I hope and believe, the most progressive of our Services should lead the field in this way.

Finally, I am glad to see that requisitioned land has now been reduced to 7,000 acres and that 9,000 acres of Air Ministry-held land were sold during the last financial year. I confess that I am particularly sensitive to any extravagant and wasteful use of the land of these islands. I found it agonizing when, at the Air Ministry, I had to requisition or buy large acreages of good agricultural land though it was necessary to do so at that time because the front line was expanding rapidly. There is no reason why any public department should hold on to land whether held under requisition—which, after all, is odious to our tradition—or even in its own ownership, any longer than is necessary for its immediate purposes. There should be no hoarding of land and Ministers should continue to bring the fullest pressure on their Departments to disgorge all land which is not in actual use.

It seems to me much more than six years since I first had experience of this and kindred matters. It was six years ago when I first answered a debate for the Air Ministry in your Lordships' House. At that time there were still some Spitfires in squadron service; it was still permissible to doubt whether the Russians had even the secret of the atom bomb with which we were arming, if the truth be told, for warfare of the type which we experienced at the end of the 1939–45 war. Yet at that time, as we now know, the Russians had made considerable progress in their nuclear experiments. In February, 1952, the United States took that fateful decision to construct the hydrogen bomb; and we now can speak without any reserve on speeds of up to 3,000 and 4,000 miles an hour. We can talk of "the control of outer space" and of flying to the moon. The expression, "The sky's the limit" is becoming as dated as "post-haste."

In these circumstances, it is extremely difficult for any Administration in these islands to reach a properly balanced view of the present and future. We ought never to underestimate the difficulties or fail to commend the courage of some of the decisions that have recently been taken. But I find that Parliament perhaps, the newspapers certainly, seem mesmerised by words. One particular expression which seems to be mesmeric is "conventional weapons". The "conventional weapons" of the day, whether we like it or not, are the long-range rocket and hydrogen bomb and the long-range bomber, and the weapons which are called conventional, whether they are artillery or tanks or even possibly—though I say this with great respect in the presence of the First Lord—aircaft carriers, are on the way out. Your Lordships will remember that the aspidistra descended from Park Lane through the suburbs until it has found a home in the folk museum. The aspidistra used to be a very strong convention.

Now we cannot avoid the fact that we are in the nuclear age. If the noble Earl Lord Attlee had not taken what I believe to be the courageous and seminal decision to set about making the atom bomb, and if, in his turn, Sir Winston Churchill had not decided to initiate the manufacture of the nuclear fusion weapon, we should have been miles behind, both industrially and militarily. I know that it can be said by economists and others who have the advantage of hindsight that if we had not spent the money which we have spent on bombers and weapons, we could have led the field perhaps in civil aviation or in the development of atomic power, but that is quite an unrealistic point of view. We were led on by the military pressure of defence. No Chancellor of the Exchequer and no Minister of Defence could have squeezed a tithe of the funds out of the Treasury that were squeezed out. Any funds going on capital development would have been poured down obsolete coalmines and obsolete railways. The fact is that military necessity forced us into the nuclear age and to the construction of long-range aircraft. Without such military pressures we should not have had them at all. We owe our whole position in the world to-day, which is very fine, in these fields of power and air transport to the compulsions of defence.

I cannot think that the critics can be so pessimistic as to believe that scientists of the calibre of Sir William Penney, Sir John Cockcroft, and their colleagues and successors, are now so deficient of ideas that their magnificent, almost miraculous achievements will not again be repeated in another context if we give them the chance. If we look at it dispassionately, not only in nucleonics, in electronics and metallurgy, but in all the most advanced fields and in discoveries such as of jet propellants, military requirements have led the field. If the age had been happier and less turbulent, we might have reached our present position in a longer time; but since our competitors are going ahead with military experimentation, if we do not want to lose our place as the leading industrial and scientific nation we must not lag behind.

Although grave doubts have been cast by many critics on the so-called prestige value of the hydrogen bomb, it really is not sensible to suppose that scientists can work in a vacuum, that they can make these immense discoveries in laboratories and not see them translated into hard ware. When they are translated, they earn the respect and interest of their fellow scientists in the United States. That is the difference between inter-dependence and dependence. I have seen it work. I know, for instance, how much the American military scientists respect our knowledge of radar and how much information and how much hope we have given that country in the Far Northern Chain. This is one example of co-operation. Though I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Balfour of Inchrye, that we have a powerful nuclear deterrent force, it is not only its own power but the fact that it is part of a much larger force closely associated with us that is so important, politically and militarily. I hope that we shall hear much less in the future about "keeping up with the Joneses". After all, we must "keep up with the Joneses" if we are to survive. I hope that we shall hear less about the term "conventional weapons". I remember what the railway interests used to say about road transport twenty or thirty years ago. They had a simple recipe for dealing with road competition which was to strangle it. But to-day we live in the nuclear age, and we must lead in that field of nuclear development.

I hope I am not detaining your Lordships for too long, but there is one other matter to which I should like to refer. I do not believe that the Air Force will continue to retain its enthusiasm and to flourish if all initiatives and all policy decisions are to be taken in the Ministry of Defence. I have only read the newspapers and know nothing about what is going on behind the walls of Storey's Gate. But it is an odd illusion of our age that power is much better when it is concentrated. I am convinced, looking at the history of the last ten years, that if decisions to govern all the details of the Services were taken from Storey's Gate, the effective power in the whole defence Services would rest with the Permanent Secretary to the Minister of Defence. It would not be his wish that he should have it, but it would inevitably be thrust upon him, because Ministers come and Ministers go in all Administrations, and he is the only one who would be the permanent figure, the overlord over the Board of Admiralty, the Army Council and the Air Council. I can imagine nothing more frustrating to Service enthusiasm and initiative, particularly in the Air Force, where it matters so much, than the knowledge that every decision was ad referendum to the Ministry of Defence and every administrative change had to be referred.

I hope that the Minister of Defence, whose powers of administration I greatly admire, will not believe that because he himself is a great worker and concen- trates on his job, he and his successors in title will improve the administration of the Service by assuming too much power over those Services. I ask the Government speakers who are to address us to-day, although they may not be able to tell us much about it, to make some reference to this point and to see that what I have said, if it finds favour in this House, is reported to the Ministers responsible.

3.54 p.m.

THE EARL OF GOSFORD

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Balfour of Inchrye, and the noble Lord, Lord Ogmore, consider that the proportions as between the conventional and deterrent forces—"U" and "non-U", as the noble Lord, Lord Balfour of Inchrye, has it—are wrong. Here I must say that I have some sympathy with what the noble and gallant Viscount, Lord De L'Isle, has just said about the comparison between these two and their relation to the nuclear age. My right honourable friend the Minister of Defence, in his White Paper, deals with the argument that we are spending too much on the nuclear deterrent. On this aspect I should like to make two points. The first is that, even allowing for research and development on aircraft, bombs and ballistic missiles, less than one-tenth of the Defence Estimates this year is being devoted to the strategic nuclear deterrent—that is, the V-bomber force and the ballistic missiles with which it will be supplemented. The second point is that much of this expenditure fulfils a double purpose. The V-bomber force is fully capable of being used in the conventional rôle with high-explosive bombs. The same is true of the reconnaissance squadrons of the V-bomber force. Therefore, to say that this force is entirely for deterrent purposes only is not strictly accurate.

LORD OGMORE

Surely that is not the argument. The argument that I was trying to put forward was that, as things are going to-day, in a few years time there will not be any more of these manned bombers and so on—in fact, the Minister has said so. For instance, all research on the supersonic bomber has ended. Yet the supersonic bomber and fighter are the aeroplanes of the future. That is the point. It is not a question of whether they are deterrent, or anything else, but that, on present plans, they will not exist at all.

THE EARL OF GOSFORD

I am coming to that point later. I was dealing with the financial side, rather than with policy.

As to the argument that an insufficient proportion of the Air Force is suited for conventional warfare, it seems to me that the noble Lord, Lord Ogmore, is making the mistake of fighting the next war with last-war methods. As we see it, war in the future will either be—the unlikely event—nuclear war, in which case conventional forces will not have much chance to compete, or it will be a limited or local war, in which the massive air cover in Europe in the last war will not be needed. The Tactical Air Force in Germany is properly equipped and trained to carry out conventional warfare, and the other sections of the Air Force in various overseas theatres are designed for the waging of local wars.

As I have already said, our deterrent force is ready to supplement these forces throughout the world in either the conventional or the nuclear rôle. The last few years have, however, provided many examples of developing the techniques and tactics of air support for our ground forces. I have only to quote Kenya and Malaya, and most recently Aden, which has, I think, provided a striking example of small scale tactical co-operation. Then, too, there is the need to practise and develop the technique of the mobility of our forces in the United Kingdom, which has been exemplified by the rapid movement of the strategic reserve. There are innumerable examples which I could quote, but the noble Lord, Lord Ogmore, can rest assured that a great deal is going on in this field. This activity applies not only in practice, but also in theory where the School of Land/Air Warfare is still very much alive.

While on the subject of air support, the noble Lord, Lord Ogmore, has asked me about the Army Air Corps; and in so far as the dates are concerned, I am afraid that both he and the noble Earl. Lord Selkirk, are right: the Air Corps was, in fact, inaugurated in September last year, and the Corps itself took over full operational responsibility on April 1 of this year. Their responsibility is for light aircraft, up to a maximum all-up weight of 4,000 lb., used exclusively by the Army on reconnaissance, aerial observation and liaison work. The Army will purchase, man, maintain and operate these aircraft, but the Air Ministry will continue to give assistance from the resources provided by the Royal Air Force.

Now a word about manned aircraft. I fully agree with the noble Lord, Lord Balfour of Inchrye, that there will be a necessity for many years to come for the manned aircraft. In his Memorandum my right honourable friend the Secretary of State says: The future threat to the United Kingdom will be from manned aircraft and ballistic missiles. Plans are being framed accordingly. The fundamental fact is that the development of our defence system must be related to this dual threat. Aircraft, so long as they are up against aircraft, will obviously be needed. In fact, in many roles aircraft will always be needed, since their flexibility and capability are things which unmanned missiles cannot provide. I would draw your Lordships' attention to the announcement a few days ago that additional orders for P1 fighters and the P1 trainer have been authorised.

THE EARL OF SWINTON

My Lords, before the noble Earl leaves the specific question of the manned aircraft, may I say this? He has said, as we know, that orders have been placed for more P1's and a P1 trainer, but what is the position with regard to research and development in fighters and bombers? It is one thing to place an order for a few more of an existing type of fighter, but (I do not want to anticipate my speech) I think it is important for the rest of the debate that he should let us know this. Have research and development on new types of fighter and bomber stopped, or, since it is common ground that both fighter and bomber will be needed for much longer than was expected in the Defence White Paper of last year, is that research and development going to be resumed?

THE EARL OF GOSFORD

If the noble Earl will allow me, I will refer to that point a little later in my speech.

THE EARL OF SWINTON

I beg the noble Earl's pardon; I thought he was leaving it.

THE EARL OF GOSFORD

The noble Lord, Lord Ogmore, asked about the division of responsibility between the Royal Air Force and the Army with guided weapons. The position is not quite as he put it. I think it is simple enough. The Royal Air Force is responsible for surface-to-air guided weapons as part of established air defences at home and overseas. The Army is responsible for weapons maintained on a mobile basis—that is, in forward areas. In this way the Royal Air Force controls the whole pattern of air defence. But when it comes to defending armies in the field, the Army, through the Royal Artillery, has its own weapons.

LORD OGMORE

I think that is exactly what I said. I hope the noble Earl is not going to ride off on that. He has not answered any of the important questions I ask him as to whether, in fact, this division in the responsibility of these weapons is going to lead to added expense, confusion, inefficiency and so on. That is the point.

THE EARL OF GOSFORD

I cannot see that there is any confusion or inefficiency. There are two completely different sets of circumstances.

LORD OGMORE

It is the same weapon.

THE EARL OF GOSFORD

The same weapon, may be. After all, the Army, the Air Force and the Navy have rifles. All Services, to a certain extent, have the same weapons, but that does not mean that one Service is responsible for one weapon only, and that all the other Services have to depend on that Service for it. I think the division here could not be more clear-cut. Air defence at home is on what I call a static basis, and is an Air Force responsibility; and air defence of armies in the field, as it always has been in the past, is the Army's responsibility, so far as Anti-Aircraft is concerned.

LORD OGMORE

Why not allow them to be organised and equipped by the Royal Artillery? They were always responsible for air defence in the war, so what is the difference now? Why cannot the Royal Artillery do the whole lot?

THE EARL OF GOSFORD

We are going over past history. The decision was made many years ago that the Air Force was responsible for the static air defence of the country, and that the Army was responsible for the defence of its own air space, so far as Anti-Aircraft is concerned. The noble Lord has said that the Royal Artillery should be responsible overall, but that would mean two Services in this country responsible for air defence. Surely, that would mean even more duplication.

While on the subject of missiles, I think the noble Lord, Lord Balfour of Inchrye, mentioned that they would be entirely under American control. That is not true. The decision to launch the missiles is a matter for joint decision.

LORD BALFOUR of INCHRYE

I do not want to interrupt the noble Earl, but he is developing an argument on a false basis. I did not say that it depended entirely on America. What I said was that it would not be entirely free for us. There is a difference.

THE EARL OF GOSFORD

I apologise. I was not in the Chamber when the noble Lord made his speech, and that is what I understood he had said. However (if I may finish the point, as I have now started) it is a joint decision, as we all know, by Her Majesty's Government and the United States Government.

Before saying a few words about the Home Commands, I should like to answer one more question which the noble Lord, Lord Ogmore, posed to me, and it concerned the disbandment of the Royal Auxiliary Air Force. The noble Lord suggested, I think, that the reason why the Auxiliary Air Force squadrons had been disbanded was that the Air Marshals were against them and do not understand Territorial Auxiliary units. I am grateful for the support from the noble Viscount, Lord De L'Isle, on this subject.

LORD OGMORE

I am sorry to interrupt the noble Earl again. He must get his quotations right. He is constantly putting into our mouths—as in the case of the noble Lord, Lord Balfour of Inchrye—things we did not say. I said that it was a psychological failure on the part of the Government, and that it was said in my part of the country—I have no knowledge whether it is right or not—that one of the contributory factors was the failure of the Air Marshals to understand the Royal Auxiliary Air Force. To clear that up, I asked whether that was so or not. It was a question, not a statement.

THE EARL OF GOSFORD

I do not see that that is any different from what I said. I understood the noble Lord to say that the Air Marshals did not understand the Territorial Auxiliary units. I think that is the same thing. I feel that I should supplement the answer which the noble Viscount, Lord De L'Isle, has already given to the noble Lord. Whatever our views may be on the issues which faced us on this question, I do not think it should go out from your Lordships' House that the decision was taken because the Government underestimated the part that the auxiliaries should play. Certainly no officer who served throughout the war could be other than very deeply conscious of all that the auxiliary flying squadrons contributed. I had the honour to command one myself for a period of eighteen months, and I can say that no finer and nobler body of men should I ever be likely to come across again.

The noble Lord should perhaps know that three of the Service members of the Air Council, at the time the decision was taken, had served with auxiliary squadrons as adjutants or assistant adjutants or flying instructors. They had trained these men and worked with them, and therefore were not likely to underestimate their enthusiasm and skill. In point of fact, every possible alternative was considered before the decision to disband the units was taken. It was forced on the Government only by the inescapable logic of events. I do not propose to go into any detail other than this, since your Lordships have already discussed this subject many times in the past; but I should like to add that no decision has ever been taken more reluctantly than the decision to disband the flying squadrons of the Royal Auxiliary Air Force, and if their conversion to alternative roles had offered a way out we should have been only too glad to take it.

My Lords, there are other questions which noble Lords have asked, but it is not for me to answer all of them, as my noble friend Lord Selkirk will be taking up many of the points. Perhaps I may now turn to the operational Commands themselves. First of all, I will take Transport Command. Ideally, of course, one can never have enough air transport; and in this sense I agree with the noble Lords who have gone before. We must, however, consider this problem in relation to the many other demands on the money and manpower available for defence purposes. Even so, I think that the picture is an encouraging one, particularly when we remember that the aircraft now available, and those which will enter service shortly, will permit the movement of men and material in numbers and at speeds far greater than was possible even two or three years ago. The facts are that the air lift potential of Transport Command has increased very substantially over the past three years and is now nearly double what it was in 1955. The introduction of the Britannia into squadron service will mean a further substantial improvement in Transport Command's capability. Similar increases have taken place in the air lift potential of the air transport forces in the Middle East and Far East. For an emergency the intensity of operations can be stepped up to an extent nearly twice that which would be regarded as reasonable for routine purposes. In addition we can, of course, call, if necessary, on the very substantial capacity available from civil aircraft on charter. I do not propose to go into more detail now, as my noble friend Lord Selkirk will be dealing with this aspect when he winds up the debate. But I think it may be fairly claimed that the size of Transport Command, as it is today, and as it will be when the present expansion programme is complete, is reasonable and adequate, even if it is necessarily smaller than the ideal; and I am indeed glad to have the support of the noble Lord, Lord Balfour of Inchrye, on this matter.

If I may say a word or two about Bomber Command, the past year has seen a further increase in the hitting power of the V-bomber force, making the deterrent effort, I hope, even more effective as a deterrent. The proportion of Vulcans has steadily increased. Deliveries of the Victor have begun, and the build-up of the bomber force itself has been accompanied by the build-up of its stockpile of weapons. The growing stock of kiloton weapons is now beginning to be supplemented by megaton bombs. The range of the Valiant, which continues to provide a very powerful element in our V-Bomber force, will be increased by refuelling in flight. This is important, not only 'because it will expose new targets but also because it will allow the aircraft a wider choice of routes and so increase the task of the enemy defences. We are now planning refuelling trials with the Vulcan and the Victor in the receiver rôle.

Later Marks of the Vulcan and Victor now on order will have still greater range and will carry the stand-off bomb. They will also fly higher than the existing marks. All three factors will tend to lessen their vulnerability to enemy defences. Canberras continue to provide valuable support in the tactical rôle. Various Marks in service, both in Bomber Command and in the Second Tactical Air Force now have a nuclear capability. Whatever the progress on guided missiles, we shall continue to need a strike and reconnaissance aircraft in overseas theatres, and we have already invited the industry to submit proposals for a successor to the Canberra for this purpose. The V-Bomber force will now be supplemented by American intermediate range ballistic missiles, of which I have already spoken. This not only allows us to make a further powerful addition to the deterrent before our own missiles are ready, but will also give us useful experience in deploying and maintaining these missiles. The two weapons systems together, manned bomber and intermediate-range ballistic missiles, will present a much more solid deterrent than would either in isolation.

I have already mentioned the cost of the deterrent. It remains, I think, to emphasise that we are getting remarkable value for money. It is no straightforward addition to the conventional arms bill. The V-bomber is available to carry high explosive just as it is to carry nuclear bombs. It is a powerful instrument for limited war as well as a contribution to the deterrent. Moreover, were we to have no nuclear weapons, the V-bombers would still be required, but they would have to be numbered in thousands and not, as they are now, in hundreds.

I will now turn to Fighter Command. As I have already said, for some years to come the main threat to this country will be from the manned bomber. Although our fighter strength is being reduced, the standard of equipment will continue to be raised. Almost all the day fighter squadrons are now equipped with the latest Mark of Hunter with an improved performance. Later Marks of the Javelin are now being introduced into the all-weather force. These later Marks will have reheat to give a further increase in performance and will carry the. Fire-streak air-to-air guided missile with infrared homing. The P1, which I have already mentioned, will eventually follow, and these will also be equipped with the Firestreak.

Meanwhile, the fighter aircraft will be supplemented by surface-to-air guided weapons. Firing trials of the first such weapon—Bloodhound—have been going ahead well, and service trials to establish the handling and maintenance procedures, as well as to test the operational system, will begin shortly at the first Royal Air Force guided-weapon station at North Coates. Thereafter guided weapons will be progressively deployed. Trials of Thunderbird will follow during the year. The reorganisation of the control and reporting system has almost been completed. The use of new equipments and techniques has made possible not only improved radar cover but also quicker transmission of the information obtained from the radar screen. It has also been possible to reduce the number of radar stations and intermediate reporting centres. Thus the system is not only quicker and more efficient in operation but has produced substantial savings in manpower and running costs. Further improvements will be introduced to provide an effective system to co-ordinate control of supersonic aircraft and surface-to-air guided missiles. This will involve the development of electronic computation equipment, both on the ground and in the air. The future problems of air defence are complex and formidable. They are being closely studied and will no doubt be finally mastered, as all such problems have been in the past. I must emphasise again that the manned fighter must form part of the selection for many years to come. I will not myself deal with Coastal Command, as my noble friend will do so far more appropriately than I.

My Lords, until comprehensive disarmament is a fact the Royal Air Force must continue to be properly equipped to carry out its various tasks.

LORD OGMORE

Is the noble Earl coming to the end of his peroration, because, if he is, I think he ought to answer the very important question put to him by the noble Earl, Lord Swinton —he has not answered it so far, though he promised to do so. It is most important for this debate that we should know the answer.

THE EARL OF GOSFORD

I was going to leave it to the end, but I will certainly answer it now.

THE EARL OF SWINTON

I am quite happy that the noble Earl should answer it at any convenient point in his speech, so long as he does answer it.

THE EARL OF GOSFORD

I regret that I cannot add anything further to what the Minister of Defence said in another place. I have already said that design studies have been called for for a Canberra replacement, and that is now going ahead.

THE EARL OF SWINTON

I am sorry, but this matter is tremendously important. What the Minister of Defence said in another place was based on the assumption that the guided missiles would be available both to supplant the P1 as a manned fighter and also, as I understood it, to supersede the bombers as a means of carrying the deterrent into the enemy's country; that because of that situation he had decided to suspend all further research into, and development of, either a new type of fighter to succeed the P1 or a new type of bomber, supersonic or otherwise, to follow the Vulcan. What has been said since he made that statement is that the guided missile is going to be a great deal later, if it comes at all, than had been supposed, and that, as a result, more P1's are being ordered. The Canberra has nothing whatever to do with it, of course. The Canberra is a most admirable, old-fashioned weapon which is used in places like Aden and so on. What we really want to know is, does the statement of the Minister of Defence stand, that there is not going to be any research into and development of fighters and bombers, or has that been changed?

THE EARL OF GOSFORD

I think it might be wiser, as I am not in a position to say any more, if the noble Earl, who I understand is to speak later in the debate, would wait for an answer from my noble friend later on in the debate.

THE EARL OF SWINTON

Certainly:

THE EARL OF GOSFORD

I cannot guarantee that he will get one.

My Lords, I am now coming to the end. I was saying that until comprehensive disarmament is a fact, the Royal Air Force must continue to be properly equipped to carry out its various tasks. As Sir Winston Churchill said at Boston in 1949: Air mastery is to-day the supreme expression of military power; and fleets and armies, however vital and important, must accept a subordinate rank. I think that the House, and the nation, can feel confident that the Royal An Force will continue to give first-rate value for money; and, in furtherance of the great traditions it has built up during its forty years of life, will make a contribution unsurpassed in spirit and in quality to the protection of British and Commonwealth interests and to the maintenance of world peace.

4.27 p.m.

LORD TEDDER

My Lords, a few moments ago I was almost hoping that the noble Earl. Lord Swinton, in his question was going to save me from having to say anything. However, I should like just to follow up one aspect of the point which he and the noble Viscount, Lord De L'Isle raised, because I feel that it is of immense importance at times of disarmament or lowering of defence quotas. I think we are apt to take for granted the fantastic development in science and technology over the past thirty years. Yet when one goes into these things—I have been into them a good deal recently—one finds that there is scarcely a single aspect of science or technology where there has been a big advance and where one cannot say that it was directly due to some defence contract or another. It goes right through. Now, when we are cutting down, I do not say wrongly, that is a factor to watch, because otherwise our civil development is going to suffer terribly. Take two particular cases—obvious ones. It is the search for bigger and better bombs that has put us aheard in the civil development of atomic power. It was the demand for better and faster fighters which brought the jet, with all the metallurgical problems that that involved. If it had not been for that, we should not now have jet airliners on the air routes of the world.

I do not want to get involved with the Minister of Defence and the White Paper, because that subject is most complicated; but there is talk about a Victor and Vulcan force. I see it is described as the: build up of the Victor and Vulcan force". In other words, these aircraft are in service now, and their continued effect will be assured by Mark II Victors and Vulcans. Unless things have changed greatly since I was connected with the business, the Mark II means getting a little more horse-power out of the engine people, so that the aircraft will last a few months longer. That is all that meant. There was, I believe, talk in another place about supersonic bombers. From what I know of performance, I should have thought that if there were to be a follow-up of the present Victors and Vulcans it could be nothing else but a supersonic bomber.

Now if there is to be no supersonic bomber, it is clear to my mind that within quite a short period there is going to be no future bomber. Within quite a short time we shall have no bomber except an obsolescent one; and obsolescence cannot pay in these days; it never has. So we shall have no bomber; and, what is more, and the point I really want to make, there will be an immediate effect on civil development. The reason why the Americans have been able to get away so well with civil aviation is because all their civil transport aircraft (I believe I am right in saying without exception) were originally designed for use by the military and have been "flogged" by the military for months and years before being adapted for civil purposes. Whether that is because the military and civil people have got together when the military have been preparing their requirements I do not know, but I should think that probably that is the case. It would seem the sensible thing to do, as making the changeover from military to civil transport easy.

The new American jet transport aircraft—I believe it is No. 702—has been in service as a tanker in the United States Air Force for years, so they have not to face the teething troubles which the Britannia and the Comet had to face. It is a basic design which has been thoroughly tested, because the civil and military are working together. If we have not done that before—and I do not think we have—I would suggest that now is the time to make sure that our military requirements are fitted as closely as possible to civil requirements or that the civilian authorities adapt their requirements to the military, so that there can be a changeover. That is all I have to say, although I could follow that up.

There has been a lot of talk about conventional and non-conventional weapons. I suggest that it is the non-conventional weapon of which we should be afraid, especially when it is defined as I heard it very simply defined yesterday: "The non-conventional weapon is the one you have not got".

4.32 p.m.

LORD WINSTER

My Lords, my noble friend Lord Ogmore raised some points which are well deserving of an answer as regards the British pilots who are engaged in training Luftwaffe pilots. I hope we may have a few words on that matter from the Minister. I am in hearty agreement with what my noble friend said about helicopters. When I had something to do with these matters a long time ago I endeavoured, to the best of my ability, to push forward with the helicopter, but I am afraid not with any success; and I believe we have lagged in that direction since. I hope we may hear something about that subject and I feel we ought also to hear something about corrosion in an aircraft being due to Treasury parsimony, for I believe that that point certainly merits a reply.

I am not entirely in agreement with what my noble friend said about Transport Command, but I shall be coming to that later when he will have the opportunity of correcting me if he feels I am wrong. I noted what was said by the noble Viscount, Lord De L'Isle, about conventional weapons. The unconventional weapon of to-day is, of course, the conventional weapon of to-morrow, and I believe I am right in saying that the bomb which was dropped on Hiroshima is now regarded as a tactical, conventional weapon. I would not quite agree with the noble Viscount in what he said about the Ministry of Defence and that, as Ministers come and go, too much—I will not say power, but too much responsibility, might become vested in the Permanent Secretary at the Ministry of Defence. I believe that that overlooks the fact that there is a Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee who, I understand, also acts as Chief of Staff to the Minister of Defence; and I should have thought that continuity at the Ministry, especially in the realm of responsibility, would fall more upon his shoulders than upon the shoulders of the Permanent Secretary at the Ministry. But the Minister who is to reply will know more about that than I do.

I had the privilege of being invited to the Air Ministry Conference, held yesterday, to which one or two previous speakers have referred, and I should like to convey through the Minister my thanks to the Secretary of State for his great kindness in inviting me. I must say at once that I was immensely impressed. All that we heard there bore witness to the great intelligence, the deep thought and hard work which is being given to the extremely difficult and tremendously complicated problems which confront all Service Ministers to-day. I think we had yesterday the evidence that, even if there have been mistakes or omissions in what is being done, at any rate that is not due to any lack of hard thought and great intelligence on the part of those who are dealing with them.

The last thing I wish in any way to do is to divert this debate from its main concern with military aviation, but there is, of course, a point at which military and civil aviation impinge upon and vitally concern each other. Both military and civil aviation alike depend upon the aircraft industry and upon research upon aeronautical and scientific engineering; and I am not sure that the joint needs of civil and military aviation in these respects are always as fully co-ordinated as they should be. The new defence policy which was announced last year is likely to bring about a reduction, large or small, in orders for military aircraft—as announced last year it looked like being large, though it may not be immediately as big as was thought when the White Paper appeared. But the reduction, when it comes, is likely to be permanent and not temporary. I believe that in the long run the demand for manned aircraft is bound to diminish. This is all the more serious because a reduction in orders for manned aircraft will affect the engineering industry generally.

Perhaps it is not always realised that all developments in engineering generally to-day spring from aeronautical engineering. That is generally the basis of the advances which are made in engineering. To-day a country's position in the world depends upon the prestige enjoyed by its engineering industry. If our aircraft industry suffers a setback due to diminution of military orders, our national engineering industry will also be set back in progress, in development and in new techniques; and in that event our world status will be increasingly diminished. The noble Earl, Lord Swinton, has already most forcibly called attention to the matter in his intervention.

But what is to happen about research and development when military orders diminish? I feel sure that the noble Earl will deal with that point, because it has been stressed by other speakers to-day. I have always felt it reasonable that research and development, as in the United States, should be largely financed from military funds, from Government funds; although, of course, the aircraft industry should shoulder its fair share of the burden. One justification for subsidy is that the Minister of Defence wants his soldiers and equipment flown about the world as swiftly, as safely and as cheaply as possible, and on that account he should certainly press the causes of research and development and see that they are adequately financed. I understand that there is an inter-departmental committee at present investigating these problems. I hope, and I feel sure, that it is manned by men able and willing to give the Government independent, well-balanced advice. But it is essential to progress that the Government should, as soon as possible, give an estimate of future military aircraft requirements and also of future missile requirements, and state what they are prepared to do about research and development in order that those requirements may be fulfilled.

It is over a year now since the Minister of Defence presented his very striking White Paper, with so many novel proposals. That White Paper promised that the Ministry of Supply would issue a statement on the effect of the new policy on the aircraft industry. Aircraft contracts have been heavily cut already, but no statement, so far as I know, has yet been forthcoming. I do not want to say that I think it is unfair to the aircraft industry, but that it is, shall I say, rather hard on the aircraft industry, when they have to face the reality of the cuts without getting fulfilled the promise which was made to them concerning what is to be done in the future. There are no signs yet of those specifications of military aircraft which were to replace some of the cuts, no estimates of future missile and manned-aircraft requirements, and nothing about Government co-operation in research. And meanwhile, so far as I can gather from a layman's study of these things, the technicians seem to be not quite as optimistic as the Minister about the existing state of perfection of guided missiles; nor are they quite so pessimistic as he is about the impossibility of defence against nuclear attack.

It is very easy to over-rate the possibilities of electronics and of electronic computers. Man is still the most adaptable computer that there is. He has the advantage of being the only computer that can think; and he has other advantages. He is relatively easy to produce. He may be a little slow in coming off the production line—nine months—but he is not so slow as an aircraft, which requires about eight to ten years. The difference, of course, which I admit at once, is that when the aircraft does, at the end of eieht or ten years, come off the production line it can become operational practically at once, whereas a man when he comes off the production line still requires about eighteen years of training before he can play any very useful part in our affairs. Nevertheless, he is cheap and adaptable, and no elaborate equipment and no elaborate training are required for his production; so he has some advantages.

But many experts here, and in the United States especially, think that the manned fighter will be required for many years yet to bring missiles into contact with the enemy. The essential point is that the implications of the policy of the Minister of Defence on the aircraft industry require, to my mind, much more thought than they appear to have been given. I am told that Dr. Cockburn, who is reputed to have been one of the Minister's advisers in preparing the last White Paper, recently read a paper before the Royal Aeronautical Society, in which he stated that he did not believe it correct to say that military-manned aircraft had no longer a vital contribution to make to air power; they were, in his opinion, still needed for transport, for surveyance and for tactical support. Those statements of Dr. Cockburn did not appear to be in line with the White Paper, in the preparation of which he is reputed to have assisted. His statements imply that the Services will require manned aircraft for a decade or more, so that research on a large scale will continue to be essential; and we must also provide for the qualified engineers required in the aeronautical field over that decade for which, as I have said, we may have to contemplate that manned aircraft will still be a primary necessity.

Then in addition to Dr. Cockburn's evidence, for what it is worth, I gather that the Air Council on this point are not entirely in agreement—I do not want to put it higher than that—with the Minister of Defence, but also believe that manned bombers and fighters, as well as guided missiles, will be necessary for some time to come. I do not wish to give rise to any rumour or supposition that is not well founded, but if indeed it is the case that the Air Council are not entirely in sympathy with the Minister of Defence on this White Paper, it is really a very serious matter. Such a serious matter on such an important question really cannot be laughed off or disregarded in high places; it is a matter of the first importance. If the country has to decide whether it is to support the Minister of Defence or the Air Council on an issue of that sort, of course the civil authority must be supreme; but it would give rise to considerable uneasiness on the part of the public if indeed there were such a difference of opinion and the Air Council were overruled.

I feel myself, as a layman—it is an opinion perhaps worth little—that the Air Council have at any rate a great deal on their side in such an argument. The human brain, as I have already said, is still wanted; it cannot be entirely replaced; and I feel sure that the task of the enemy will be facilitated if he has not the human brain to contend against. And, as has been said already, it seems clear that the P1 fighter and the V-bomber will not be the last of their race the Russians are not discarding such aircraft— and successors will be required, as also will be successors to the current range of missiles. All three—bombers, fighters and missiles—are likely to he required, working in harness. The bomber has the advantage of flexibility and mobility and the long-range fighter might well be found necessary to operate beyond the range of surface and air missiles. These problems and unresolved questions should receive great attention, and I am sure that they are receiving it. They should be probed and definite policies should be laid down so that everyone concerned, especially those in the aircraft industry, should know what they have to do in the future. At present they do not know what their future tasks are likely to be. They are in the dark and, in consequence, there is often waste and inefficiency in their work. There is bound to be waste and inefficiency when there is uncertainty about the nature of future tasks and requirements. That the aircraft industry becomes a balanced whole is essential for military requirements, and the information I have mentioned is essential to that end. At the moment it seems to me that a thorough survey of fundamental requirements is required.

I would now turn for two or three minutes to the question of Transport Command, to which I told my noble friend I was going to refer. Air Transport Command have done their jobs in the past and I think that, considering the instruments at their disposal, it is highly creditable that they have done so well; but I do not think that they have always done their jobs as effectively as they would have liked to do them. Suez certainly showed up some weaknesses and deficiencies, and it must have been very mortifying to Transport Command to feel that what was amiss was a result of policy and not of maladministration on the part of the officers concerned. In any case, we know that it is admitted that as things are today Transport Command cannot do their job on their own. They have to rely on charter companies and possibly also on Coastal Command to carry out all the jobs which are allocated to them. It is admitted that they have to rely on charter companies; but what sort of aircraft have the charter companies to enable them to carry out the responsibilities which Transport Command are under the necessity of putting upon them? I understand that the fleets of many of these companies are ageing and that they are not in a position to replace their obsolete and obsolescent aircraft. As things are, they have not the funds to enable them to do that. If that is so, is it not the case that Transport Command are relying upon assistance which will diminish in value as the years go on, if the aircraft of the charter companies become less and less efficient for their work? It seems to me that the Air Ministry are relying upon a wasting factor. If we are to rely on charter aircraft for this all-important work, the charter companies should be enabled to keep their fleets up to date.

I think it would be too much a counsel of perfection to say that the Air Council should maintain a Transport Command able to meet all requirements without calling in any outside assistance. That would cost far too much money. The noble Lord, Lord Balfour of Inchrye, correctly and pertinently said that we cannot afford to keep Britannias, costing a million apiece, kicking about unemployed for half the year. The Government do not provide the Merchant Navy with their ships. But I feel that if there is to be this reliance on the charter companies, they should be enabled at least to keep their fleets up to date. In that connection, I should hope that the Air Council would press the Government to give the charter companies longer contracts than they get at the present moment. That seems to me to be a fair thing for the Air Ministry to say to the Government: if we have to rely on these charter companies, it is only fair to give them contracts of such a length as would enable them to keep their fleets up to date. I think that this is a thoroughly practical and fair way of assisting the charter companies so that they may be able to meet the requirements of the Air Ministry when they are called upon to do so.

In closing, I have only one further short remark to make about Transport Command and that is as regards what has been said about flying out equipment needed all over the world. I think that that is a fallacious idea. It may be theoretically ideal, but economically it would represent a huge waste. I think that the proper answer is stockpiling. I have ventured to bring these points to the attention of the noble Earl and I hope that he may feel that one or two of them deserve a word in reply.

4.58 p.m.

LORD GIFFORD

My Lords, in the autumn of last year I was fortunate to be one of those who were guests of the Royal Air Force on an interesting visit to Gibraltar and Malta, and one of my main reasons for intervening in this debate is to express my thanks and appreciation to the R.A.F. for showing us so much in a short time and making our visit such an impressive one. One regrets that Malta, the island that we saw in peaceful guise only a few months ago, should now be in the throes of political struggle. I am sure that the R.A.F. personnel whom we met there will behave with tact and dignity in any situation that they may have to face.

I think that we were all impressed by the general keenness and enthusiasm of all ranks, in spite of the fact that certain squadrons and units had to put up with obsolescent equipment. I was particularly impressed by the great attention given to welfare. It seemed to me that the R.A.F. was way ahead in the thought that had been given to the furnishing of messes, the preparation of food and the provision of barrack blocks—although I think that that is a term we ought to do away with: we should speak of airmen's hostels or flats, because to-day their accommodation is much more akin to these than to the old barrack blocks. The new married quarters are excellent. The wives of the various N.C.O.s and airmen who showed us round did so with obvious pride. I came away with the impression that nearly everyone I met was of the opinion that life in the Royal Air Force was a good one and a happy one, and that it was a Service in which these officers and airmen were proud to be serving.

I think the proof of the pudding is in the eating, and we can see from the White Paper the satisfactory state of long-term recruiting. The noble Lord, Lord Ogmore, has left his place but I think he painted much too gloomy a picture. We can say arithmetically that a man who signs on for twelve years is worth four three-year men; but in fact I would say that the value to the Royal Air Force of such a man is more in the region of six or seven to one. It is in the numbers of men who sign on for over nine years, the apprentices and boy entrants, that the figures are so encouraging. It seems that young men are at last beginning to appre- ciate the Royal Air Force as providing an interesting, lucrative and attractive career, and one in which they will get first-class technical training in many trades which they can follow later in civil life.

One paragraph in the White Paper that I was particularly pleased to read was the statement that the major accident rate is the lowest on record. This is something which, to my mind, cannot be too widely publicised. There is still, I think, a feeling among parents of young men that flying a fast modern aircraft is a terribly dangerous thing; and perhaps this impression is enhanced by the photographs of flying personnel in clothing which, to the popular mind, conveys a spaceman's suit. These modern aircraft are highly complicated, but the accident figures show that when properly used they are not more, and possibly even less, dangerous than the older and slower aircraft. I had the opportunity of flying in a Comet II of Transport Command from Gibraltar to Malta in the amazing time of two hours flat. I spoke to the squadron commander, and he believes—I think rightly—that the Comet is one of the finest transport or civil aircraft in the world.

That leads me to say a little (it will be quite brief, because my noble friend Lord Balfour of Inchrye has covered most of what I wanted to say) about Transport Command. One problem which is not perhaps generally appreciated is the conflicting one of maximum utilisation and concentration. When running an airline, obviously one's aim is to keep the aircraft in the air for as many hours as possible; otherwise the airline would face serious losses. This is not possible with Transport Command, because transport aircraft have to be concentrated from time to time in certain places for exercises, and they have to be ready to move large numbers of personnel from one place to another at short notice. Sometimes, as a result, the unthinking may get the impression that there is a waste of aircraft in Transport Command, which of course is not the case.

I feel that the noble Lord, Lord Winster, was a little too critical of charter companies, which are such a valuable adjunct and reserve to Transport Command. He rather gave the impression that they were nearly all using obsolete aircraft. This is not the case. I think there are no fewer than 55 four-engined aircraft in transport companies to-day. I myself flew in a Viscount of Transair with a full load of officers and airmen from London to Gibraltar, and I could not help comparing the lot of the young airmen on board, who a few years ago would have been waiting for their meals in a long queue on a smelly troop-deck. One could see them nudging each other with pleasure when the beautiful blonde air hostess handed them their lunches on a tray. The standard of service, with all due respect to my noble friend Lord Balfour of Inchrye, was as good as that of B.E.A.

A number of speakers have commented on the fact that the day of the manned aircraft will not be over in the foreseeable future. I am sure this is the right view. Many more knowledgeable people than myself have given various reasons for this, but one point has not been made. If we to-day abandoned all manned aircraft, it would greatly simplify the problems of the enemy, in that he would be able to concentrate all his resources on missiles; and this is a field in which, as we know, the U.S.S.R. has made tremendous progress.

The noble Lord, Lord Ogmore, and the noble Earl, Lord Swinton, mentioned these 100 R.A.F. officers who are being seconded to the Luftwaffe. I thought they rather gave the impression that there was something sinister about this. I believe it was something of which we should be proud: that these young officers should have been selected from our nation to train this new Air Force. Surely, it is all in the best traditions of N.A.T.O., and I should have thought that nothing but good could come of it.

The noble and gallant Lord, Lord Tedder, mentioned the enormous amount which the Americans spend on research and the many hours that civil aircraft are able to do in Transport Command before they go on to the airlines. That, of course, is perfectly true. The noble Lord, Lord Balfour of Inchrye, mentioned a figure which astounded me when he said that the number of aircraft in N.A.T.S.—that is the American air transport organisation—was greater than all the airlines in the world. That is a staggering figure, and obviously we cannot compete with it. It is unfortunate that teething troubles in our own British aircraft seem to receive an inordinate amount of publicity, whereas we who book with all these airlines know that these things happen also to American aircraft. There was the trouble with the Qantas aircraft recently, on a Royal flight, which showed that it was not only the Britannia which gets delayed from time to time. This can also happen to a Super-Constellation.

There is one field in which I feel the Government ought to do rather more in helping research, and that is with the helicopter. There are signs that great progress is just round the corner with this useful aircraft, and the chairman of B.E.A. made a statement only the other day that he felt that very soon, if research could be carried out, it would be possible to produce a really economical helicopter for the shorter flights in Europe, and possibly also for internal services.

I think all of us who have served at any time in the Royal Air Force will sympathise with, and feel the greatest admiration for, those senior officers who occupy high positions in the Service to-day They have a tremendously difficult problem—ten times more difficult than any of us had to face in the old days. It is not a question now of a slightly faster, longer-range aircraft replacing another: we are in the stage of going over to something entirely different. Obviously, the personnel who control and look after guided missiles are quite different from the air crew. I wonder whether, in the cadet colleges and the training establishments, we are not keeping the two groups of people, the air personnel and technical people, too far apart. I know that finance is difficult, but at some time in the future I should like to see the Henlow Technical College and the cadet college alongside each other, operating as one great Royal Air Force College at Cranwell. That is all I have to say, except to repeat that, from what I have seen of the Royal Air Force of to-day, there is very little wrong with it.

5.13 p.m.

LORD MERRIVALE

My Lords, we are all indebted to the noble Lord, Lord Balfour of Inchrye, for initiating this debate this afternoon, for we look to the Royal Air Force for the transport of our troops and their equipment, the close support of the Army, the operation of our deterrent force, whether it be V-bombers or ballistic missiles, and the manning of our air defence by fighters and surface-to-air guided weapons No doubt in due course a further rôle in area defence will have to be assigned to the Royal Air Force by the deployment of an anti-missile weapons system That would seem to be a logical development. I feel, however, that the tendency to believe that any future war in the air would be a "press-button" missile war is waning—that, indeed, has been echoed by many noble Lords this afternoon.

A few years ago in the United States the emphasis was mainly on missile development. Even last year in this country the end of the manned aircraft seemed very near. To-day, the advent of the stand-off bomb, higher energy fuels, greater heat resistant steels, and possibly mainly the realisation that the human brain is not subject to decoys or jamming, as well as the recent additional order for the English Electric P1B supersonic fighter, herald, I hope, the introduction of a new approach to the question of our defence in the air. What do we see in the United States with regard to bombers? We see that they are pressing on with their plans to provide the Strategic Air Command with the Mach 2 B.58 Hustler bomber and developing the Mach 3 110A weapons system.

Your Lordships are well aware of the vast numbers of aircraft which the Russians possess. The noble Lord, Lord Maneroft, during a recent defence debate in this House, quoted a figure of 20,000 military aircraft. I would also remind your Lordships of the words of the Under-Secretary of State for air in another place, that even if the Russians assigned to Britain only a part of their bomber force they could easily send against us more bombers than the Luftwaffe did on any single night during the last war "— and the capacity of these bombers would to-day, of course, be much greater. We must realise, therefore, that considerable damage could be inflicted on this country by bombers which could remain out of range of our Bloodhound missiles, for there is no reason to doubt that the Russians already have, or are developing, long-range stand-off bombs. It is therefore indispensable, in my opinion, that our fighters should be available in sufficient quantity and able to intercept the enemy at maximum range in keeping with the extended radar detection capacity we now possess. This should also be in agreement with the statement in Article 34 of the Memorandum—namely: Electronic computing equipment is being developed to enable further improvements to he made in the ground equipment needed for an effective system of co-ordinated control for the supersonic P.1 and surface-to-air guided weapons. The important words, I think, are: … co-ordinated control for the supersonic P.1 and surface-to-air guided weapons "— that is, the missiles with their medium range, and the fighters with their long range. We should not forget that any missile system that has to rely on the missile receiving external guidance to steer it to the target is liable to interference from enemy sources.

I should also like to say that I welcome the recent directive of the United States Defence Department assigning to the United States Air Force once more the responsibility for the development of the Wizard anti-missile weapons system, and I hope that full information on this counter-measure weapon is being readily made available to Her Majesty's Government. In other words, as I see it there is a need for maintaining research and development in supersonic high altitude aircraft (and I am extremely gratified that noble Lords of the calibre of the noble Earl, Lord Swinton, and the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Tedder, should have voiced that opinion) and for full co- operation with the United States on anti-missiles weapons system developments.

Having referred briefly to the question of our deterrent and its defence, I should now like to say a few words on two matters concerning air support and high energy fuels. With regard to the former I was pleased to learn of the satisfactory work done by the Pioneer aircraft in Malaya in conjunction with operations against the terrorists. Such an aircraft, with its ability to take off and land on a restricted air strip, should, together with the helicopter, prove very useful for the purposes of tactical mobility. I agree with what noble Lords have said on the question of helicopters. I think they have an increasingly important part to play as "cold-war aircraft", to quote three words of the Under-Secretary of State for Air in another place. Bristol Sycamores and Westland Whirlwinds are in service, and, as mentioned in the Memorandum, have during the past year done excellent work in Cyprus and Malaya. The latter, the Whirlwinds, would no doubt prove equally satisfactory in local wars for troop and equipment ferrying and weapon hauling, as well as casualty clearance. The latest type, I am told, is now standard equipment in the Royal Navy for antisubmarine duties. It can also be fitted, I understand, with a homing torpedo.

In view of the versatility of the helicopter, I should like to ask Her Majesty's Government whether trials could be undertaken, for instance, by the Army/R.A.F. joint experimental helicopter units with such a guided weapon as the Vickers type 891 missile, assuming its performance to be comparable to that of the French Nord S.S.10 surface-to-surface or air-to-surface guided weapon system. The helicopter has the advantage of not being as vulnerable or such a "sitting duck" as is generally considered, for its unique flying characteristics enable it to take confusing evasive action, to fly below enemy radar coverage and to take advantage of such cover as provided by trees or hills. Lastly on this question of helicopters, I should like to ask Her Majesty's Government whether any consideration is being given for military purposes to a helicopter which was mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Ogmore, the Fairey Rotodyne, with a view to parallel production, as I believe it could be used by B.E.A., for instance, and possibly by the Services.

With your Lordships' permission, I should like to say a few words on the question of high energy or boron fuels. Two concepts would appear to exist on the question of greater speed and higher altitude: one based on the mixed-unit propulsion—that is, turbo-jet and rocket—and the other on the principle of higher heat values producing higher thrust. I believe I am right in saying that in 1947 a survey was made in this country, including a study of boron materials for use as ram-jet fuels. This fact I particularly mention as the R.A.F. Bloodhound is propelled by two ram-jet units. In certain quarters, using kerosene fuel, its speed has been given as Mach. 2.5, its range as 200 miles and its operational ceiling as between 60,000 and 80,000 feet. Since this survey was made eleven years have elapsed. There have been few, if any, statements by Her Majesty's Government on what they intend on this question of high energy fuels, either in the form of a slurry—that is, as an additive to normal aviation fuel—or as a chemical fuel for use in the afterburners of aircraft or rockets or ram-jets. I believe that the noble Viscount, Lord De L'Isle mentioned the question of new propellants; I do not know whether he had this in mind when he did so.

It is interesting to note that two American groups, the Olin Mathieson Chemical Corporation and the Callery Chemical Company, are planning to be in full production of these boron fuels next year, in their 36 million dollar and 38 million dollar plants. In fact, there is a 5½ million dollar plant already in production. These plants will be supplying these high energy fuels to the United States Air Force and the United States Navy. I believe, five factories are planned. To mention to your Lordships the advantages of higher speeds or increased range would be superfluous, but I should like to stress the advantages of having at one's fingertips a control which would enable one to reach a greatly increased speed for a reasonably prolonged duration.

In the early stages of my speech I referred to the American B.58 Hustler bomber and the 110A weapons system, and according to the New York Herald Tribune of July 28, 1957, For military purposes boron fuel is on a high priority list. One can assume, therefore, that the B.58 Hustler is to use these chemical fuels, and with regard to the W.S.110A project we are told that it is planned to use an "advanced" fuel. In this country the engines of the Vulcan and Victor (the Olympus, Sapphire and Conway engines) can be fitted with afterburners which would take these high energy fuels, and the Javelin, Marks VII and VIII are to be fitted with afterburners. In view of what I have just said on this question of high energy fuels, I do hope that the noble Earl who will be replying for the Government—and I am particularly glad that he should be replying for the Government because I believe that he was in East Africa at the time when I was R.A.F. liaison officer attached to 20 Military Mission—will be able to tell us something as to what the views and intentions of the Government are on this question of high energy fuels.

5.30 p.m.

THE EARL OF SWINTON

My Lords, I think it is very useful that we should have these debates, following the Defence debate, in which we consider the Services separately; but, as has been evident from the discussion, it is getting increasingly impracticable to consider any one single Service except in the general context and picture of the international situation, of defence policy as a whole and of inter-Service relations. For a very few moments I should like to try to relate some of these considerations to the problems of the Royal Air Force. Happily, it seems that total war today is less probable bat as the total war recedes, the cold war or (that really is becoming a misnomer) the partial war and the local attacks are being intensified. When those attacks occur they must be promptly and effectively countered, otherwise the local fighting spreads and attempts elsewhere are encouraged. Of course, there are always a lot of doubtful people standing on the sidelines whose only object is to get on to the right bandwagon and join the winning side. Therefore, the quicker we can prove that we are the winning side and that it pays to be on our bandwagon, the shorter will be these contests and the less risk there is of their being repeated.

Aden is certainly a typical example. I think the House would wish to express appreciation of the Royal Air Force, the Army, the local levies and the Colonial administration for the admirable teamwork which has been done in the operations in Aden, and to send them a message of encouragement, gratitude and firm support. That is one of the reasons why I am glad that in his opening speech—an admirable speech in content, if I may say so—my noble friend Lord Balfour of Inchrye stressed the importance of our having supplies on the spot. That, of course, is much easier when you are dealing with—I hesitate to use the words—older conventional weapons, such as tanks, armoured cars, lorries, mortars and so on. With those things it is perfectly simple. We have a number of dumps all over the country and it would be desirable that these weapons should be dumped in any quarter where we have a responsibility and where trouble may occur. I am sure that pre-vision and provision of that kind are vital in the time factor to which I have referred, of getting rapidly on top of an insurrection or a disorder, and also would be a great economy in itself.

There is one other question I should like particularly to ask my noble friend the First Lord who is going to reply—namely, whether, in view of developments and troubles of this kind, the Government have considered an increase in their plans for the airborne commando forces. I know that one is to be stationed in Singapore. It seemed to me to be one of the best things in the Defence White Paper. It is a force which can be made rapidly available anywhere; it carries its supplies with it, and that may be not only a most efficient but an economic manner to deal with these attacks.

That leads me to ask this further question—namely, what are the Government's plans for overall commands in the Services at home and overseas? In future, every operation, whether it is large or small, will be a combined operation, and co-operation, integration of the Services, in training, in planning and in action, will develop increasingly. Therefore, should not the practice be applied of having an overall commander in every theatre and area? This is working well in Aden. Here we see a typical example in action. They have an admirable commander, in this case an airman, and all the Services and indeed the civilian Administration seem to be working in excellent co-operation.

Apart from being strategically and tactically sound, would not this system encourage the spirit and the practice of co-operation and integration in the Services? I have never believed in, and I do not see in the foreseeable future the chance of, amalgamating all the Services into one—putting them all, as my old friend Lord Cork and Orrery said, into the same overalls. If you do that you lose a lot. There is a family tradition which has led men to go into the Army or the Navy and now, I am glad to say, into the Air Force. The battle of co-operation against self-sufficiency has been won over and over again and it does not really exist to-day. What we now want, however, is the most complete co-operation, and if you had that system of overall command in which perhaps a sailor or a soldier or an airman commanded, the officers of each Service would, I believe, feel that they had an increased opportunity in the combined team.

LORD WINSTER

My Lords, might I interrupt the noble Earl to say that America has in the past played with the idea of the one Service and has finally discarded it?

THE EARL OF SWINTON

Yes; I am sure that that is quite wrong. As the noble Lord knows, nobody has fought harder for this co-operation. Five-and twenty years ago I started the battle for co-operation against self-sufficiency. But that battle was practically won before the war started, and certainly it was most completely won in the war. We do not want the one Service. A blessed Trinity can be a perfect Unity and, I would humbly say, a good precedent to follow.

Finally, I want to come back to this question which my noble friend the First Lord is so kindly going to answer and which has turned out to be almost the staple of this debate. I am not surprised that it has, because it is a vital matter. The delay in the development of guided missiles has led to the placing of increased orders for P.1 fighters and, of course, for an equivalent number of trainers. I am not in the least surprised at that, nor, provided the right steps are taken, am I unduly alarmed. I do not want always to be saying "I told you so", but the House will remember that in the Defence debate, and I think in an Air Force debate last year, both Lord Tedder and I prophesied that the development of guided missiles would be a good deal slower than was anticipated or hoped for in that rather optimistic White Paper on Defence in 1957, and that it was most likely that both the bomber and the fighter would have a considerably longer life than was to be gathered from that publication. I am glad that we have the P.1 fighter to fill the gap for the moment. But is this enough? Shall we not want another prototype, both of the bomber and of the fighter? As my noble and gallant friend Lord Tedder said, it is no good saying "We shall get another Mark", as if that were an entirely new type of animal; for of course it is not. It is a very useful development and an improvement, but it is not a "new suit".

I would venture to recall to your Lordships the words of the White Paper, Defence Outline of Future Policy, Command (124), paragraph 61 of which says this: Having regard to the high performance and potentialities of the Vulcan and Victor medium bombers and the likely progress of ballistic rockets and missile defence, the Government have decided not to go on with the development of a supersonic manned bomber, which could not be brought into service in much under ten years. I do not know, but it may be wanted within ten years. Then, paragraph 62 says: Work will proceed on the development of a ground-to-air missile defence system, which will in due course replace the manned aircraft of Fighter Command. In view of the good progress already made, the Government have come to the conclusion that the R.A.F. are unlikely to have a requirement for fighter aircraft of types more advanced than the supersonic P.1, and work on such projects will stop. I do not want to ask Her Majesty's Government to disclose any secret information, but we ought to be told as much as is possible. We were told of the decisions to have no new research in either bombers or fighters, and we were told that the reason was that we should be depending upon missiles for carrying the attack into the enemy's country, and upon guided missiles for the defence which otherwise would be provided by the fighter.

We now know that, in the case of the defensive missile (that is, the weapon which is to take the place of the fighter) progress has not been what it was hoped it would be. What I should also like to know is whether it is true that progress with what I might call the "aggressive missile", the counter, has not been what was hoped in the 1957 White Paper. If that is so, then surely a wholly new situation has arisen in which new thought should be given and new decisions taken; and I hope Her Majesty's Government will not hesitate to engage in this kind of research.

I know that we cannot do everything. The noble Earl, Lord Gosford, on the comment of the noble Lord, Lord Ogmore, suggested that he would fight the next war with the weapons of the last; but what I am a little anxious about is that we may be going to fight the next war without any weapons at all. I hope that we shall not have to fight, but the more ready we are to do so the less likely we are to have to fight. But if we find that at a critical moment we have nearly obsolescent weapons, and that we have fallen between two stools, we shall be in a dangerous position. I know, as I have said, that we cannot afford everything, but that is a situation which, in our own interests and in the interests of the Grand Alliance, we cannot afford to permit; and therefore I would ask the Minister to tell us the position in regard to these missiles, and to say whether it is not now time to decide that there should be research into a further fighter and into a supersonic bomber.

Not for the first time, and as in the days when we were together in the Air Minstry, I find that the mind of my noble and gallant friend Lord Tedder and my own mind move very much alike. We both said last year that one could not separate the military and the civilian; that the supersonic airliner and the supersonic bomber would all stem from the same research and that one would fortify the other. In very interesting and graphic language to-day my noble and gallant friend Lord De L'Isle has described to us how, of the great developments which are making our fame and our export trade, so many of them in the fields of power and engineering have stemmed from these experiments in defence; and it might be very good business to put in hand research on a supersonic bomber.

There are many other reasons why that should be done, apart from this new one which has cropped up. I do not at all underrate the value of the ballistic missile, provided, of course, that we can control it, in every sense; but it has a vulnerable base and it may be (as certainly both the Russians and the Americans would seem to think) that given a great many missiles, there may be a valuable case to be made for aircraft to go on. An aircraft can take off from the ground and land anywhere. All the arguments that were used in the old days as between the aircraft and the aircraft carrier come to mind—for example that the aircraft carrier was extremely vulnerable, because if it was found then the aircraft had nothing to which to return, whereas an aircraft could land on any improvised airfield on any shore. There was a great deal of truth in that argument but just the same argument applies in favour of having a few aircraft which can deliver, or be in a position to deliver, the necessary deterrent without being static and in the same place. I hope that these decisions will be taken. I believe that they must be taken by the Minister of Defence, the Air Ministry and the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Perhaps that is the only thing on which my noble friend Lord De L'Isle and I are not in agreement, but that is how I believe these decisions should be taken; and when they are taken it is important that they issue rapidly in action.

Although I do not suppose I shall get an answer to it, I come back again to a question I have asked more than once. We used to be asked "Is your journey really necessary?" I ask, is the Ministry of Supply really necessary? I have only one other question, and Her Majesty's Government will like this, because it is a much smaller one, a matter of detail. We were told in the White Paper dealing with the Royal Air Force of the numbers of personnel that would be required. The total is down considerably. Some remarkable economies have been made. We now know that we must have an increased number of fighters and trainers, and I would ask: Does that affect the manpower estimates which were given?

THE EARL OF SELKIRK

May I ask the noble Earl to repeat his question?

THE EARL OF SWINTON

My question was whether the increased number of machines will affect the manpower required. Paragraphs 10 to 21 of the White Paper on the Air Estimates (Command 373) deal with this matter, and in paragraph 12 the run-down is shown as 193,000 at April, 1958, compared with 228,000 in April, 1957; and it is said that by April, 1959, the figure ought to be down to 174,000; and the figure is projected on a diminishing scale through the future years. I appreciate that it is impossible to say to a man, but if we are to have an increased number of fighters and trainers, will not that have some effect on the numbers, and will it not be necessary to increase them? I hope that the noble Earl. Lord Selkirk, will be able to say something about the unity of command in the different theatres—at any rate, it is as well to have raised that point. I think the general feeling in the House was that it was a sound idea and not a bad thing, even if you cannot get an answer on the spot, that the responsible Minister should be considering it. After all, there is a great deal of experienced opinion in this House. The question of research on and development of the fighter and bomber is, I feel, a really vital question. I hope that the First Lord will be able to answer it now; but if he cannot do that, then I think it is a matter on which the Government should make a statement at the earliest possible moment.

5.52 p.m.

LORD SHEPHERD

My Lords, of all the debates we have had recently on defence matters, possibly this is the most important; for air power, whether it is military or civil, is now what sea power meant to this country for many centuries. We are, therefore, grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Balfour of Inchrye, for initiating this debate this afternoon. If I may say so, with respect, I thought he set us all a very great example in the shortness and conciseness of his speech, yet it contained a tremendous amount of matter for all of us to think about. I must say, however, that I felt there was a hint of criticism of Her Majesty's Government's policy going through his speech, although he perhaps felt that by sitting so close to the Government Front Bench he had better hold his criticism in hand. I think the other part of the debate which was notable was the last speech, that of the noble Earl, Lord Swinton. I thought he made a very powerful point on the question of research. I think that this is one of the few opportunities on which noble Lords on this side of the House can feel that they agree with him; and I thought that it was a very important point.

I do not believe that I shall exaggerate the position if I say that there is serious concern in your Lordships' House and throughout the country at the defence position of this country. But what causes us greater anxiety is what is going to be the position in ten or fifteen years' time. If Her Majesty's Government's policy continues, whether it be good or bad, it is not likely to make a great deal of difference on the defence position to-day, but it will have a very great effect on the defence position of this country in ten or fifteen years' time. Without doubt the economic difficulties that have be-devilled this country since 1951 have some effect upon the defence programme. It is understandable that Her Majesty's Government, who have to face a General Election within the next eighteen months, wish to present to the electorate an economic picture a good deal better than it is to-day. But I do not believe that the Government will be rendering real service to this country if financial and economic measures which may be expedient to-day are made at the expense of long-term defence.

The Estimates for 1956–57 called for a sum of £524,950,010, and for the current year for a sum of £474,550,000. These are formidable reductions to a Service which is the cornerstone of all our defence. The Government, I believe, could be entitled to congratulations if we felt that these reductions had been brought about by true economies and without any loss of efficiency or striking power, and that our existing air power was capable of meeting our obligations both in Europe and throughout the world; and further, and most important, if we felt that these economies had not been made at the expense of research and development of aircraft and equipment which may be urgently required in ten or fifteen years' time.

My Lords, I called these "formidable reductions". The reduction in the last three years is approximately 10 per cent. But during those years we have had rampant inflation; services cost more; wages are higher; and therefore, in real terms, the country is receiving less for its money than it did in 1956–57. Only the Government and senior officers are aware of the true position of our air power to-day, and I must say that when one reads reports in the Press one wonders whether it is not the senior officers who know more about our air power than do Her Majesty's Government. It is very difficult for members of the Opposition fully to appreciate the effectiveness of ballistic missiles, nuclear warheads, the V-bomber and supersonic fighters in providing the defence of this country, in that much of the information is highly secret. It is for this reason that I do not propose to say anything on this subject, except a few words later on as to how Government policy affects the aircraft industry.

Before proceeding on the question of the Royal Air Force, I should like, on behalf of my noble friends on this side of the House, to offer our sincere congratulations to the Royal Air Force on its fortieth anniversary. I think we shall always remember with great pride names of fighter and bomber pilots, names and numbers of squadrons, and the aircraft they flew. This young Service has provided officers of character and ability, many of whom achieved high rank in the Supreme Headquarters of the Allied Forces in the last war. It is obvious that equipment and operations will change in the years to come, but I believe there is one thing that is certain: that the spirit of the Royal Air Force will not change, and that it will always set a great example to the rest of us in the country.

A major part of the White Paper is devoted to the subject of manpower and recruiting. It would appear that recruiting is more satisfactory than it was in the Army, which we debated recently. In spite of that, however, I would ask the Government not to be complacent in this matter, and I hope that later on this evening the Minister can give us the latest details of recruiting. I think it is particularly pleasing to see the increase in recruitment of apprentices and boy entrants, and our sincere congratulations should go to the Air Training Corps, who have provided so many recruits.

There is one paragraph of the Memorandum, however, that gives us concern, and that is paragraph 35, in regard to the Royal Observer Corps. The Royal Observer Corps, you will note from the White Paper, performs a vital service to this country in time of war, but it is in urgent need of recruits. I have not seen a great deal of publicity, either in the Press or on the radio or television, for recruits for the Royal Observer Corps. I should have thought that if there were publicity, many ex-members of the R.A.F. would be only too pleased to volunteer. I do not believe that we shall get recruits for the Air Force or the Army unless there is an air of greater urgency in the recruiting campaign. On the Army Estimates the other day I mentioned the drabness of recruiting offices. I would recommend to the Government that they combine the recruiting offices and bring them up to 20th century efficiency.

Before leaving the subject of recruiting, may I make a personal statement in correction of a statement I made on the Army Estimates the other day? Noble Lords who attended that debate may recall that I described a poster I had seen in Bradford: "Conscription—Labour started it; Conservatives will end it." Two days after making that statement, I received an indignant letter from the City of Bradford Conservative and National Liberal Association, stating that my information was incorrect and would I withdraw it. I am very pleased to withdraw it. But to make certain that my eyes and memory had not played me false, I made inquiries and found out that this poster had been displayed in Shipley, which noble Lords will be aware is only three and a half miles from the centre of Bradford. Therefore, I was not too far wrong. I should like to leave Bradford, hoping that I have left those concerned satisfied, and devote the rest of my remarks to the Royal Air Force and the aircraft industry.

I must state frankly that I am not certain what the Government's policy is, and after listening to the noble Earl, Lord Gosford, this afternoon, I am not a great deal clearer. I hope that the winding-up speech of the noble Earl, Lord Selkirk, will give us a clearer impression. The impression created by the White Paper on Defence and by the Army and Air Force Estimates is that the Government's view is that the greatest danger to this country is from attack by Russia across Europe. If this is the Government's view, I think they are fundamentally wrong. I would not belittle the danger of attack by Russia, but I believe that by far the greater danger is limited wars in the Middle East and Far East. We are bound to be involved in these limited wars in view of our commitments and our lines of communication. We have the case of Aden, described by the noble Earl, Lord Swinton. It is small to-day, but it has potentials of great danger to our lines of communication.

It is because, I hold this view that frankly I am unhappy about the Government's defence policy. I believe that these dangers will grow in the years to come. It is true that the aircraft we possess to-day, if they were in sufficient number, would be capable of giving support to our land forces, but the decisions which are now being made appear to be on our present needs and not on our possible requirements. The Government have stated that they do not propose to order aircraft further in advance than the present V-bombers and P1 fighters. They have made serious cuts in research and development. This has had grave effects on the aircraft industry and it is possible that unless matters are not quickly rectified, in ten or fifteen years' time we may have to go overseas for our aircraft.

The aircraft industry operates on a commercial basis and cannot be expected to spend vast sums of money on design and research in aircraft which they understand the Government will not purchase. In December last the Government set up an inter-departmental committee to consider the whole question of military and civil requirements and the aircraft industry itself. In replying to the debate on civil aviation, the noble Lord, Lord Mancroft, stated that we should have this report in the Spring. I should like to know from the noble Earl whether we can expect that report shortly. Possibly we shall also want to know what financial assistance the Government propose to give to the aircraft industry. Your Lordships may have seen an article by the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Douglas of Kirtleside, in which he described what he had seen at the Bristol works and stated that he was not happy about the financial position, and that the Government would have to come in and provide money for development.

In closing, I should like to raise a point regarding the Maldive Islands. Your Lordships will be aware that the R.A.F. are building a staging post on those islands. There has been difficulty with the local Government and work on the airfield has stopped. Could we have some information from the noble Earl as to the position in the islands?

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS (THE EARL OF HOME)

My Lords, perhaps my noble friend is not in a position to answer that, and I can give the noble Lord the information at once, because I have been partly responsible. Negotiations are going on in the normal way.

LORD SHEPHERD

Has work recommenced?

THE EARL OF HOME

Work is going on at the airfield.

THE EARL OF SELKIRK

My Lords, as my noble friend Lord Swinton says, your Lordships' House is well supplied with informed opinion on the Air Estimates; and with a number of former Secretaries of State and Ministers of Civil Aviation present, I enter the final stages of the debate with some anxiety. I think that to some extent your Lordships have underestimated the Government's present position in regard to defence. We are endeavouring, I think with the approval of Parliament, to reduce our expenditure on defence because we are carrying a heavier burden than we are able to do, in circumstances which my noble friend Lord De L'Isle has so well outlined, circumstances of very real difficulty.

First of all, the cost of individual items has gone up considerably. I am informed that items of equipment today cost something like ten times what they cost ten years ago, in 1948. That is due not to the fall in the value of money but rather to increased complexity. I would give your Lordships one example of that. To-clay there are 400 trades and sub-trades in the R.A.F. where there were some 40 before the war. In the second place, the element of time comes in. By and large, no weapon of consequence, whether it be a torpedo, aircraft or missile is likely to be developed in under ten years. Therefore, every step in research and development has to be taken with the utmost care, to be sure that mistakes are not made.

The third point I should like to make is this. We are facing a time when the variety of weapons required has never been wider. To take an extreme example—it may seem absurd, but it is true—in Cyprus some of our troops are carrying shields. Yet we are in a world which extends right across to thermonuclear weapons. The answer is that there is in between a wide flexible field which must be filled. We can be quite certain that we shall never have an ideal weapon for every feasible contingency. It is in those circumstances, I think, that there is great difficulty in making decisions of the type we have been discussing to-day. One thing I would emphasise is that these aircraft of the Royal Air Force, particularly bombers, are not exclusively concerned with a thermonuclear rôle. They are quite competent to operate in the conventional rôle. I do not like the word "conventional", but what else can one say? For the noble Lord, Lord Tedder, to say the "non-conventional rôle" merely confuses the issue.

The noble Lord, Lord Ogmore, raised a question in regard to the Comets. Of the ten Comet aircraft in the service of the Royal Air Force Command, seven have shown signs of blistering in the paint on the pressurised portion of the under-fuselage. A modification to put this right is in hand, and the aircraft will be attended to when they can be spared. In the meantime, they will operate normally. The cause of the blistering is being investigated by the Ministry of Transport, in conjunction with the manufacturers of the paint used; but until the cause has been established it is impossible to say how it might have been prevented or at what cost. I think that is a slightly different story from the one the noble Lord got hold of, and for that reason I have made a somewhat fuller statement than I should otherwise have done. I mention it because the Comets form part of Transport Command, and this is an example of the variety of tasks the Air Force is undertaking.

Then, the noble Lord, Lord Ogmore, mentioned helicopters. I would remind him of what my honourable friend the Under-Secretary of State for Air said on this matter [OFFICIAL REPORT, Commons, Vol. 584, col. 189]: For example, the fact that in a typical case we have found that helicopters are roughly 20 per cent. more expensive, both in capital and running costs must be borne in mind. We prefer to use helicopters only when it is absolutely essential to have vertical lift … It is for that reason that other aircraft, like the Pembrokes and Pioneers, are being fairly extensively used at the present time. May I give an example of the troop movement which your Lordships may remember was carried out to Aden in the middle of last month? On that occasion instructions were issued on April 11—that was a Friday evening—to move a battalion from this country to Kenya. The move was started, as planned, four days later, and was completed within four days. Full use was made of Comet aircraft to set up temporary staging posts, with a mobile operations centre in Kenya. The move itself was carried through with Hastings and Beverleys. The first troops actually arrived fifteen minutes ahead of schedule, and the whole movement was completed within the planned time. I think that reflects great credit on Transport Command, and it shows how closely the R.A.F. and the Army can work together at short notice.

Dealing with another side of the versatility of the Air Force, I feel that I should mention Coastal Command. In some ways, of course, the title is an anachronism, because these aircraft fly a long way from the coasts of this country and, indeed, of other countries. The name Maritime Air Force is coming into more general use. The Shackleton Mark III, with which it is equipped, is used primarily as an antisubmarine aircraft, but it is capable of a wider rôle. Not only can it carry a considerable passenger load and freight over long distances, but it can also be used for various other purposes, and it is equipped for reconnaissance. I think it has done valuable work in this last rôle in the Aden area.

The noble Lord, Lord Winster, asked that further assistance should be given to the companies operating with Transport Command because they were not replacing their aircraft as well as might be the case. I think the noble Lord is aware that the matter is fully before the Government and that steps are being taken to see whether some assistance can be given in that direction. I recognize that it is of great importance that the aircraft should be up to date. On the other hand, taken by and large, these companies have provided a fine service in trooping for the Services as a whole. The noble Earl, Lord Swinton, spoke in some praise of the new Aden Command, and I entirely agree with what he said. It is quite new—it started only on the 1st of last month—but we have every reason to believe that it is working well up to the present time. I am bound to say that it is not always easy to maintain a single command. I once went to a unified command and found not one staff, but four; that is, one for each Service and one over the whole lot. All I say is that one must be careful to see that that kind of thing does not arise.

I should now like to say a word or two on the question of personnel, which was raised by the noble Lord, Lord Ogmore. On the whole, I think it is fair to say that the Air Force position is sound, subject to certain points of difficulty. Cranwell is attracting nearly all the recruits, both in number and quality, that are required. The Technical College at Henlow is attracting more recruits than it has done in recent years; and nearly one half of these go on to university and take an honours degree. The scholarship scheme is popular and is working well. There is, how-ever, a shortage of navigators. This is an important task in a modern aircraft which demands high qualities of alertness and intelligence. The R.A.F. would welcome more recruits to this fascinating branch. So far as other ranks are concerned, what is required is about 11,000 recruits a year, mainly on the longer engagements. We did in fact take into the Royal Air Force last year about 17,000 recruits. That is good enough for the short-term engagement but not enough for the long-term engagement, because there is a substantial proportion of R.A.F. personnel in the three and four year categories, and these must be replaced in the immediate future. Strictly speaking, to meet the requirements of the next four or five years, an additional 50 per cent. of recruits is required. But looking at it from the long term, the number of recruits seems about adequate to meet the target at the present time. I should mention also that the R.A.F. would welcome additional recruits for the Women's Royal Air Force.

The noble Lord, Lord Ogmore, talked about the German mission, and my noble friend Lord Gifford, I think rightly said that it was a proper step to take. As we see it, the R.A.F. personnel are going out there in the form of a mission. The exact terms and conditions are now under discussion, but I do not think the noble Lord need worry that these men will lose their identity or at any time become non-available to this country.

LORD OGMORE

Is the noble Earl now giving an assurance that they will retain their R.A.F. commissions; that they will not have Luftwaffe commissions and will be available for recall whenever required?

THE EARL OF SELKIRK

I said that the exact terms and conditions are now under discussion. I do not want to make a dogmatic statement which might marginally vary in the event. However, there is no question of these men holding a German Air Force commission; I have no doubt that in some form they will remain Royal Air Force officers.

LORD WINSTER

My Lords, the noble Earl will recollect that for many years we had a naval training mission in Greece, and the officers who composed that mission retained all their rights and positions in the Royal Navy. The scheme worked perfectly smoothly and happily. You have a good precedent there.

THE EARL OF SELKIRK

I did not want to be too dogmatic, because I did not know.

LORD OGMORE

My Lords, I think the position of Greece and our late enemy Germany is rather different.

THE EARL OF SELKIRK

We certainly bear in mind the need for tactical support for ground forces, and I think the noble Lord can rest assured that with the development of improved mobile wireless sets that is going fairly well, certainly in the Aden area. The noble Lord, Lord Ogmore, asked also about Transport Command and civil defence. Most of the transport aircraft are much too big for civil defence, and the small ones like the Pioneer and the helicopter are mostly abroad. In any circumstances that should arise, I have no doubt that Transport Command could supply the sort of assistance which the noble Lord has in mind.

The noble Lord, Lord Merrivale, raised an interesting point with regard to fuel boron. This is perhaps not the best forum in which to discuss that matter. We have looked at that point, but I am afraid we cannot hold out any hope that it would be advantageous to produce it here on a very large scale. There has been a good deal of discussion on the major issue of the future of manned aircraft. The noble Lord, Lord Winster, endeavoured to make out that there was a sharp difference of view between the Air Council and the Minister of Defence. But if he will recall yesterday's demonstration I think he will remember that it included reliance on missiles besides the manned bomber. If I may take a lesson from that, it is that the importance of the manned bomber was emphasised, but the importance of missiles was not played down. So I think it would be quite wrong to say that there is any friction at all on those lines. If questions of finance arise there may be a difficult choice to be made.

In regard to the P.1, to which the noble Earl, Lord Swinton, referred, there is nothing new about this position. This is really the logical point when the order was necessary. It was not a new policy, and therefore it does not involve any change at all in matters of personnel. It does not in any way depend on the supply of surface-to-air guided missiles. The position was that the P.1 had been developed to the point when an order could and should be placed.

THE EARL OF SWINTON

My Lords, this is most interesting, and it is a great pity that it could not have been said earlier in the debate. The debate has hitherto proceeded on the unchallenged assumption—certainly the statement which we all read in the Press—that because the development of the guided missile had fallen short of expectations as set out in the Defence White Paper of 1957, it had been necessary to order more P1s. Now, if I understand the First Lord aright, he says that the development of the guided missile has gone according to expectation, and that we always wanted to order these P.1s. Is that really the position?

THE EARL OF SELKIRK

I think that that is correct. When I say "always intended", I mean provided that they faced up to the acceptance tests, and that kind of thing. It has always been the intention to do so. I cannot say that the Government will deny all statements in the Press which are not necessarily accurate, because there have been wild speculations day after day. As the noble Earl knows, a denial itself is informative. Many of these statements are made for the purpose of eliciting denials. The position is this. I do not think there is any question that another fighter was required. The only question was whether the P.1 was the fighter, and when it reached the stage when it could be ordered, it was ordered. That is my understanding of the situation.

LORD OGMORE

The situation, quite clearly, was that it was the last fighter which was going to be ordered. That came out time after time—there was not going to be another fighter.

THE EARL OF SELKIRK

I am coming to this point. The noble Lord is going a long way ahead. Let us be quite frank. We have not got the P.1 yet, and it is obviously an aircraft in which there is a great deal of development for the future. One must face this position.

LORD OGMORE

It is a position which the Government have taken up; it is not a position we have taken up. The Government have said that this is the last supersonic fighter; that there are to be no more supersonic fighters. It is not we who are taking up the position; it is the Government.

THE EARL OF SELKIRK

I am not casting my mind as far ahead as that, and I will not attempt to do so. All I am saying is that there are new aircraft coming into the Royal Air Force now. The Vulcan has hardly come in; and, with great respect to Lord Tedder, I am given to believe that the Vulcan II is a considerable development on the Vulcan I.

VISCOUNT DE L'ISLE

Will it be supersonic?

THE EARL OF SELKIRK

No, it will not. But it will be a considerable development on the Vulcan I. I see no reason to believe that the P.1, of which we are expecting there w ill be a considerable development in due course, will not last us a long time; and the same applies to the successor to the Canberra. I do not think we can wipe off the successor to the Canberra as simply as has been suggested.

What I should like to say on the research and development side is that there has been no change in Government policy. The Minister of Supply will be making a statement shortly in another place on the aircraft industry generally. There is no specific development project designed to succeed either the P.1 or the V-bombers. As I have said, both these aircraft have a great deal of development in them at the present time. Because guided missiles are coining, there are at present no successors in prospect; but I am riot going to say that there will never be. That is the position to-day. Those who attended the Royal Air Force Conference yesterday were, of course, looking at possibilities about a dozen years ahead in defence policy. The successor to the Canberra might well be a supersonic aircraft: I am not saying that it is or is not.

VISCOUNT DE L'ISLE

I am sorry to join in pressing the noble Earl, but I get more and more puzzled as the debate goes on. He opened his remarks by saying that new weapons took ten years to develop. We know that the Americans already have a supersonic fighter—not a prototype, but at least a development aircraft—which will be supersonic. So we are not looking ten years ahead, and probably no more than five or six. What disturbs noble Lords on both sides of the House is the statement in last year's Defence White Paper that there would be no successors, and the knowledge that other countries in the world, whether Russia or America, are developing supersonic aircraft, both in the fighter and bomber field, while the noble Earl is unable to tell us that there is anything planned on the drawing board or any contract for them so far.

THE EARL OF SELKIRK

I can tell the noble Viscount that there is no contract at all. I will give the noble Viscount the answer in a very simple figure. The United States Air Force bill for one year is 13 billion dollars—that is to say, roughly three times our total defence estimates. That is the simple answer to that.

VISCOUNT DE L'ISLE

It is not.

THE EARL OF SELKIRK

But it is. At the present time we are spending on research and development about £190 million a year—that is the Ministry of Supply's total expenditure—of which the greater part is, of course, on the Air Force, or at least research and development in which the Air Ministry is interested.

LORD BALFOUR OF INCHRYE

I am very confused, because the White Paper last year, as we all agree, said that there was to be no supersonic bomber. I will not read the relevant paragraphs. The noble Earl now says, in general terms, that we are spending a great deal, £190 million, on research and development, mainly on aircraft. He gave some figures of which I could not quite grasp the relevance, of the American comparison. We know that their effort is much greater in money terms. I think that that was rather dragging a red herring across the argument. What I want to know is this: if we are spending £190 million on aircraft research and development, why is not some of that £190 million spent in research and development on a supersonic bomber, which it now seems to be admitted will be necessary owing to the lag in development of missiles, particularly when both America and Russia have grasped that position and are themselves doing the thing we are asking the Government to do?

THE EARL OF SELKIRK

My Lords, I do not think that what I said was a red herring. The figure I gave was 13 billion dollars, indicating the immense amount of resources required. I can only express this view: that within the Ministry of Supply's £190 million there would not be sufficient funds to pay for the development costs of a supersonic bomber. What I am trying to emphasise is simply this: I agree that we have to look well ahead, but it would be wrong to suppose that the aircraft we now know are coming along will not continue for a very long time.

The noble Viscount, Lord De L'Isle asked about Service organisation—his words will, I am sure, be noted, because he speaks with experience. I will only say this to him. I have certainly been struck with the easy and close co-operation which exists between the Services at the present time. I am sure that it would be an act of supererogation to tell the noble Viscount that he need not believe every word he reads in the daily Press from time to time.

My Lords, I have tried to answer most of the questions—although I do not say that I have done so entirely to the House's satisfaction. May I just, in my own words, add this? In this fortieth anniversary year of the Royal Air Force I think it right that we, as a House, should express our appreciation of a really great Service. Those who remember 1918, when it came to birth, saw it supreme on the Western Front. After a varied experience between the wars, it was again there to hold back Hitler—for the first time he was checked. Subsequently, at the end of the war, it was pretty well supreme from Singapore to the Rhine. It is a Service we honour. I regret that the noble and gallant Viscount. Lord Trenchard, is not here to speak to us to-day, as he has done, to our great enjoyment, on so many occasions. This Service is now part and parcel of the very texture of this country; it is one of the pillars of society as it stands. People no longer stumble over Air Force ranks as they did at one time. I am sure that we are right to express our appreciation of, and gratitude to, a Service which has been built up in a very hard way and which has produced so many men of such high calibre, men who have rendered great service to this country.

6.35 p.m.

LORD BALFOUR OF INCHRYE

My Lords, in asking your Lordships' permission to withdraw my Motion, I should like to thank those noble Lords who have taken part in the debate on both sides of the House. I should like to thank the Ministers for their replies, which were perhaps not as full in some directions as we had hoped they might be; nevertheless we are grateful to them for those replies. I would apologise to the House for one omission in my speech, which was to be allowed to associate myself, in all humility, with the congratulations which have been expressed from all quarters of the House on the Royal Air Force's fortieth anniversary. It is a splendid Force of splendid men. Parliament, it is true, is supreme, but I feel that we are their servants in the way of trying to do anything we can to strengthen them in their efforts.

There is one point to which I must return. The noble Earl, the First Lord of the Admiralty, was not able to tell us whether the guided missile programme is going according to the expectations which were in the Government's mind when the White Paper of 1957 was published. We have reasons to think that such is not the case, and that therefore the emphasis is more and more upon the retention of manned aircraft for a longer period than was expected then. I must confess that he has left me disturbed about the vital necessity for this country not, as it were, to miss the bus in regard to the supersonic bomber, when the guided missile programme is such that we cannot rely upon that for all our defence and offence requirements. He has told us, in general terms, of this £190 million, which he says would not cover the cost of supersonic research. What one would like to know is whether that £190 million is not covering the cost of research upon aims and objects which really are secondary now, and whether we should not interpose the supersonic bomber in the programme for the next ten or fifteen years. We will come back to that matter later, but I think it is only right, in asking leave to withdraw the Motion, that I should express what I think is felt by noble Lords on all sides of the House. There is a feeling of misgiving at the generalities which have been expressed, instead of there being precision on something on which our very livelihood and the lives of our citizens may depend in the future.

THE EARL OF SELKIRK

My Lords, I have no reason to suppose that the missile programme has been going worse than was expected last year. I say that with this qualification only: I do not know that the expectation last year was very precise in how it would develop. I do not see any reason to suppose, in this sense, that it has been put back during that period.

LORD BALFOUR OF INCHRYE

My Lords, it is this lack of precision which has worried us—"So and so is in general terms; this is not precise, that is not precise". But the need and danger are precise. I beg leave to withdraw my Motion.

Motion for Papers, by leave, withdrawn.

House adjourned at twenty-two minutes before seven o'clock.