HL Deb 21 July 1958 vol 211 cc29-61

3.49 p.m.

Order of the Day read for the Bill to be considered on Report.

EARL WALDEGRAVE

My Lords, I beg to move that this Report be now received.

Moved, That the Report be now received.—(Earl Waldegrave.)

On Question, Motion agreed to.

Clause 1:

Repeal of powers of supervision, direction and dispossession under Part II of Agriculture Act, 1947, and Part II of Agriculture (Scotland) Act, 1948

1.—(1) So much of Part II of the Agriculture Act, 1947 (in this Act referred to as "the Act of 1947") as provides for supervision orders, and for the giving of directions to and the dispossession of owners or occupiers on grounds of bad estate management or bad husbandry, that is to say sections twelve to twenty of that Act, shall cease to have effect, and all entries in the register of local land charges relating to supervision orders shall, as soon as may be after the passing of this Act, he deleted.

(2) So much of Part II of the Agriculture (Scotland) Act, 1948 (in this Act referred to as "the Scottish Act of 1948") as provides for warning notices and for the giving of directions to and the dispossession of owners or occupiers on grounds of bad estate management or bad husbandry, that is to say sections twenty-seven to thirty-four of that Act, shall cease to have effect.

LORD SILKIN moved to omit Clause 1. The noble Lord said: My Lords in the absence of my noble friend Lord Alexander of Hillsborough, who is engaged on public business in another part of the building, I beg to move the first Amendment. I am in some difficulty because I did not realise until a moment ago that he was leaving the Chamber. This is really a repetition of the discussion was had on the Committee stage. The Amendment is intended to express the disagreement on this side of the House with the abandonment of Part II of the Agriculture Act, 1947. I believe that on the occasion of both the Second Reading and the debate during the Committee stage we on this side put forward our arguments as fully and as strongly as we could. I feel that I can add nothing to those arguments.

I remain entirely convinced that the Government are making a great mistake in repealing Part II of the 1947 Act. I do not think that it is called for by any section of the farming community; I do not think it is going to produce any advantages to the industry; and I do not even think that in the name of so-called freedom it is necessary. Having said that, I can only express the wish that, even at this late hour, the Government may have second thoughts in this matter. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Leave out Clause 1.—(Lord silkin.)

LORD WISE

My Lords, I should like to support my noble friend in moving this Amendment. As he says, we do not want to go over the old ground, but I think that from this side of the House we condemn the action of the Government in this matter. It has been said that the alteration is not wanted, and certainly my own view is that this is a retrograde step. The 1947 Act was carried out in a very satisfactory manner. It has been said that there were not many supervision orders, and that may be true. Nevertheless, there was a good deal of encouragement in regard to agriculture from the agricultural executive committees, and I think that by taking their power away, as this particular clause does, a step is made in the wrong direction. I cannot find anything in this Bill which will either improve the prosperity of the farming industry or increase food production. The removal of Part II of the original Act will definitely encourage irresponsible and casual methods of farming to appertain once again in the industry, as we know they did in the years gone by, before the passing of the 1947 Act. It seems to us on this side of the House that it releases the owner-occupiers from their obligation to the State to make the best possible use of their land in the interests of food production and good husbandry.

I believe that the Government would have been far better advised not to play about with Part II of the Act of 1947 but to take steps to continue guaranteed prices and assured markets, which come under Part I, as a reality. At the moment, in my opinion, they are illusory because, so far as I can see, in agriculture there is no stable guaranteed price and no secure market. For this reason the Government would have been far better advised, from the point of view of prosperity of the industry, to take steps to assure to the industry a fair price for all its commodities and good stable markets. This particular Bill does not in any way help us; and I hope, with my noble friend, that the Government, even at this late hour, in view of the distrust (I think that is the right word) which the industry feels in regard to this Bill, will take steps to reintroduce into the Bill a continuation of the whole of Part II of the Agriculture Act, 1947.

EARL WALDEGRAVE

My Lords, I am afraid that I must ask the House to reject this Amendment. I have studied in detail the debates on this Bill in another place, and I have read carefully the speeches that were made here on previous occasions. Running right through all these speeches and all this opposition to the repeal of this clause there has been the question: "Why are the Government doing this?" Very strange reasons have been put forward, but there is only one reason for the Government's action in repealing Part II: we are doing it because we think it is right. This is certainly not a vote-catching provision.

Noble Lords opposite have not failed at each stage in the debates to call attention to the unfavourable views expressed by the National Farmers' Union. We should naturally prefer to have the National Farmers' Union with us on these matters; but in the last resort the Government must do what they consider to be right, and they will have been fortified in their decision by the waning in recent months of any interest, for or against, in farming circles generally in the continuance of these powers. The argument which I think short-sightedly appealed to many N.F.U. branches and farmers (it is only an opinion, but I have the impression it was their argument) was "Let sleeping dogs lie." The Opposition argument, as I understand it, goes further and says, "Stir up the sleeping dogs. Use the powers"—though I must admit that their recently published statement on agricultural policy is slightly vague on this point. But do they think that if they use that argument and go to the N.F.U. they are going to get much support for it?

The Opposition have sought to conjure up a picture of the Government being determined to betray agriculture—that was the term used by the noble Viscount, Lord Alexander of Hillsborough—and to abandon price support for the industry; the repeal of these disciplinary measures has been treated as a first step, as a sort of straw in the wind, for these ulterior and dreadful purposes. There is no foundation for these charges. Price support for the industry must be justified on its own merits. That is how the Government look at this matter, and the evidence is there for all to see in Part I of the Agriculture Act, 1957. All we are doing here and now is to get rid of the power of eviction of freehold occupiers; and that, apparently, is what the noble Lords opposite want us to retain.

It has been argued that the general public will not tolerate price support without disciplinary powers. What evidence is there of that? Do the public demand similar disciplinary powers against any other industry? Agriculture is not the only industry which enjoys Government support. In fact, it is the general public who have been most critical of the use of disciplinary powers, against individual owners and occupiers. The man in the street is not demanding their retention. The evidence is that the townsman and the man in the street are disgusted with the whole business. What was the reaction to the eviction of the owner in one of the worst cases of farming we ever had to deal with? It was a petition to the Queen.

So we say that the provisions of Part II must be looked at on their merits, and we come back to the question: what is right in the present situation? We say the farmer in need of help and advice will go more regularly to a Ministry which has no power to place him under supervision and endorse his licence, as it were, by making an entry against his farm in the land charges register. There can be no doubt in our mind that, whatever the original intentions may have been, the Franks Committee found that supervision was regarded as penal. We cannot in the same breath claim that Part II is a friendly measure and that it is a deterrent. One cannot have it as a carrot and as a spur. In an atmosphere free from the threat of disciplinary powers, I believe that the advisory services will be able to work more easily and efficiently in helping the less efficient farmers to raise their standards.

LORD SILKIN

Is not the noble Earl misconstruing the effect of the Franks Committee Report? They expressed no opinion about the merits of this matter at all. I thought it was agreed that all they expressed was criticism of the way in which it was being done. That is not the language which the noble Earl has used. He referred to their view that it was "penal."

EARL, WALDEGRAVE

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, and I have discussed this matter before, of course, and I absolutely agree, as I said on Second Reading, that the Franks Report expressed no opinion on whether or not Part II should be repealed. But they did say—and I am sure the noble Lord must remember it, because he was a member of that Committee—that this question of supervision orders had come to be regarded as penal. It is indeed a fact that if you have a mark against you on the land register it is marked up exactly like an endorsement of your licence: and it is, in effect, penal.

We feel that the poorest farmers are in need of persuasion and help, and not of compulsion. Our view of the whole matter is expressed in the 1957 Act, in which we have enlarged and extended the guarantees and buttressed them, not with penal powers but with grants for the improvement of farms. If I may quote my right honourable friend in another place, he said that rather than harry and bully the bottom 1 per cent. of farmers we want to release the energies of the top 99 per cent. In present circumstances, moral arguments apart, the disciplinary powers are useless and probably positively harmful.

Now, those are the arguments on merits. But to come back to the Franks Report, the procedures by which the powers were operated under the 1947 Act by the Minister could no longer be maintained in the face of the conclusions of the Franks Committee. That Committee laid down that judicial functions should not be exercised by Ministers of the Crown who also exercised executive functions. We could not exclude agriculture from this general principle, which we accept and which the country accepts. In the face of that, the procedures of the 1947 Act would have had to be drastically altered if the powers were to be retained. This raised the question—which, with respect, I say the Opposition have never faced—whether the powers, on their merits, justified quite extensive legislation to create an entirely new machinery to ensure their continuance. This is the issue the Government had to decide, and it could not just let matters slide for the sake of a quiet life. We felt that there could be only one decision, and that was that the disciplinary powers of the 1947 Act had patently outlived their usefulness and that public opinion was against them. They were operating as a deterrent to efficiency and not as a help. The powers could not be left on the Statute Book as they were, and not operated. In our judgment, it would have been quite wrong to set up new judicial tribunals, leaving with agricultural executive committees the task of acting as detective to bring cases to light and prosecutors of cases before the new tribunals. And we know from our contacts with the committees that they would have been very unhappy with such an arrangement. The only course open to the Government was to face the facts and repeal these powers.

We have been told that this means an end of the usefulness of agricultural executive committees. I can well believe that it would have been the end if we had left them simply with the rôle of detective and prosecutor before the Tribunal, but we have made no such mistake. There is a real, positive and productive task ahead of agricultural executive committees in many fields of activity including, in particular, the field of technical development and advice. Finally—it may be a small point, but I should like to make it—I suggest that the policy we propose represents a far better use of the Ministry's staff. Formerly they had to play a part in the administration of Part II of the 1947 Act. To-day, surely, they will be more profitably employed on the administration of Part II of the 1957 Act, advising on and administering farm improvement schemes. My Lords, the Government are repealing Part II of the 1947 Act on its merits, for we are perfectly sure that in modern circumstances this is the right course to take.

4.6 p.m.

VISCOUNT ALEXANDER OF HILLSBOROUGH

My Lords, I must say that we like listening to the noble Earl. During the last twelve months or so, since he became very active here, he has become quite popular in the House. He is what is called "a good fellow", and we like him. He has made the best case he can for this extraordinary piece of legislation, which is now reaching its final stages. But, however nicely he puts the case, and however much he tries to woo us on this side of the House, may I say to him that the repeal of this Part of the 1947 Act is one of the grossest pieces of landlord legislation that we have ever come across. I do not care how he argues—that will continue to be our view from the facts.

He says that as a result of the Report of the Franks Committee the position raised by the continuation of Part II of the Act would have been very awkward to deal with. He says that it was thought that in the future it would have a penal operation, and that, because of the cases that had gone before, in the opinion of the Franks Committee there had grown up a view that dispossession or supervision in such cases was penal. But is that kind of action which is now described as "penal" confined to the interpretation of Part II of the Agriculture Act? Almost every Government control on agriculture to-day is subject to action in cases of default which is penal. For example, we are to-day facing a vast improvement in the standard of the product in the milk industry. In this matter there have been the different stages. First of all we had the milk that was bad. Then we had milk that was a bit better—"accredited" I think was the term—and if a producer did not reach a certain standard and was not accredited he soon found himself without a licence. They took it away. Then, to-day, if you become registered for tuberculin-tested milk and you do not reach a certain standard, you are in danger of having your licence taken away. That is penal—very penal. Why should the Ministry suddenly become—

LORD HAWKE

Is that not precisely the same as the Factory Acts?

VISCOUNT ALEXANDER OF HILLSBOROUGH

Exactly.

LORD HAWKE

Then why is it such a terrible thing to have something called penal under Part II of the Agriculture Act?

LORD SALTOUN

The noble Lord has only to keep a cow giving a low enough quality milk, and he can appeal to her.

VISCOUNT ALEXANDER OF HILLSBOROUGH

I am afraid that that interjection does not take me any further in my argument one way or the other, although no doubt it is very humorous. But I must say that I cannot possibly see the difference. What has been the operation of Part II of the Act? The operation in the past has been that where certain standards were not being reached then it was possible for the local executive committee to have the judgment of farmers themselves and to put a farm under supervision.

There seems to have been one public case, which the noble Earl himself described as a case of really bad farming, but there is no apparent complaint on his part that the action taken in that case was wrong. Somebody worked up a sort of agitation about that case. If, in the same way, you took away a licence from a farmer because his milk was not reaching the standard, nobody would grumble—but it would be penal. Then, because of the Franks Report, you say that you do not know what to do; that you cannot go on with this system because of the opinion of the Franks Committee. Well, it was not the opinion of the Franks Committee. They simply said that the view that this was penal had grown up, and they expressed no view on it themselves. You have made this Bill more than ever a landlords' measure, because what you have put in this Bill in place of that system makes the landlord almost the only judge of whether two-thirds of the farmers in the country are efficient or not.

EARL WALDEGRAVE

May I interrupt the noble Viscount before he leaves the point about this being penal? I do not want him to misunderstand me, because I used the point rather differently. I said that we were anxious for farmers to come to the agricultural executive committees and the Ministry's officials for advice because they have great work to do, but we felt that if the committees had these penal powers the farmers would not come to them. I used the comment of the Franks Committee only to underline the point, to show that it was not only my own view but that the Committee also held that these powers were penal.

VISCOUNT ALEXANDER OF HILLSBOROUGH

Still I am not moved. I meet farmers as well as do a bit of farming myself, and I must say that that view of it does not run at all in this matter. Farmers, with few exceptions, have been very anxious to take advantage of the excellent work which is done by the Ministry's advisory officers. They have helped me again and again when difficulties have arisen, especially when I have to give so much time to Parliamentary and other duties. The Ministry of Agriculture officers deserve every praise and I have not the slightest complaint to make about them; nor can I imagine for one moment that there would be any difference if the agricultural executive committees were kept in existence—the same good results would be obtained.

The Government run away from the fact that in the early years of the administration of the 1947 Act some thousands of farms were supervised, with on the whole excellent results. The number of people who were deprived of the control of their holdings compared with the thousands which were supervised is evidence that the work of the Ministry of Agriculture, its officers and the executive committees, was completely successful. That is the fact. But what has happened in the last few years? Ever since the storm over a case which the noble Earl himself described as one of bad farming, everything has been quietened down. The number of cases considered has fallen lower and lower. There is not the same amount of statistical evidence, and because of this falling off, you now abolish it.

Is there not another side to the Bill? You talk about the difficult task of providing bodies to take the place of the agricultural executive committees. You have not hesitated to set up a new set of tribunals to deal with appeals from farmers who in future are going to be judged mainly by the landlords as to their efficiency. I have not heard one single argument to-day which would make me go hack on my own view that this is a Bill in favour of the landlords.

EARL WALDEGRAVE

I think I must really interrupt the noble Viscount, if he will allow me. He used the words "mainly judged by the landlords"; but the tribunals will be composed of a legal chairman, a landlord and a farmer. Why that is "mainly landlord", I fail to understand.

VISCOUNT ALEXANDER OF HILLSBOROUGH

The Government would not face the task of finding a legal tribunal for the general application of Part II; nevertheless they are going to the trouble of setting up a tribunal to which the farmer brings his appeal, but the accuser is the landlord. The decision on whether the case ought to be brought or not is not left to the judgment of the agricultural executive committees, as it was before. That apparently does not run.

I think I have proved my case. Of course, the noble Earl would not dream of thinking that the Government he represents have made "kissing go by favour" (if I may use an old saying), but we think that they have. The Government have done this largely for their friends the landlords. But this is not the only thing they have done which has no popular appeal. I do not think that there is any popular appeal in repealing such portions of taxation as would save the surtax payer £30 million in one year; but the Government did it and, I say, did it for their friends. I am sure that there may be other cases in which, for other reasons, they might take actions which would not have a popular vote.

But we also have to deal with the results of this action. I say that one-third of the farmers, who are owner-occupiers, will be free from practically any check whatsoever on their standards of farming, while the other two-thirds, who are tenant farmers, will have to face this unfair position. If we are going to be able to continue the steady progress which has been made in the last few years under the administration of this Act, we shall be doing an ill service to the agricultural industry as a whole if we pass this Bill and administer it in anything but the highest sense of justice. I do not suppose that all we may say to-day is going to stop the Government from passing it. After the speech of the noble Earl, I can see that he is quite determined, and the Government behind him. But we shall watch the effect of this new Statute with the greatest keenness. I am sure that before the Bill has gone far, in the next year or two, when another Government occupies those Benches, you will find different provisions made for the promotion of the success of the agricultural industry than this Bill seems to involve.

4.20 p.m.

LORD SALTOUN

My Lords, noble Lords opposite have taken a very high moral tone. We have fallen away from grace. This is "a landlords' Bill." I want to tell your Lordships an experience of my own. Before the 1947 Act, at the commencement of the last war, similar powers were given to agricultural executive committees. At the beginning of the war I was in a position in which there came under my observation a large number of smallholders who had been registered by officialdom as carters, and had been called to the Colours and left their wives and families to carry on the cultivation of the holdings. There were complaints by these men and their officers of bitter hardship and wrong exercised on these humble, poor people by the use or the misuse of these powers. When I saw them continued in the 1947 Act, to me it was quite horrible, and after that experience I shall always be grateful to any Government that takes them away. But not only am I grateful; I am sure that throughout Scotland there is a large number of people in humble, poor homes who will be grateful to the Government for taking away these powers, because while they exist these people can never be easy for fear of some similar sort of thing happening.

VISCOUNT ALEXANDER OF HILLSBOROUGH

My Lords, I really must protest if that is the way it is going to be left. Apparently the cases to which the noble Lord, Lord Saltoun, refers were cases of hardship arising from military service before the 1947 Act.

LORD SALTOUN

The hardship did not arise from the military service, but from the use of powers similar to those which are now being taken away.

VISCOUNT ALEXANDER OF HILLSBOROUGH

The noble Lord means that they were not adequately staffed because the men on the croft had been called to the Colours?

LORD SALTOUN

It would be a long story to tell the noble Viscount; I will tell him outside, if he does not mind.

VISCOUNT ALEXANDER of HILLSBOROUGH

We will leave it to the record of Hansard. Certainly if you want the agricultural industry to go on expanding and developing, and not let the workers on the land fall back into the dreadful state of 1924, after the repeal of the Corn Production Act, you will have to produce something better than this.

On Question, Amendment negatived.

Clause 3:

Amendments as to notices to quit agricultural holdings

(2) The following subsection shall be substituted for subsection (1) of section twenty-five of the Act of 1948 (which requires the Minister to withhold his consent to the operation of a notice to quit an agricultural holding unless he is satisfied as to certain matters)— (1) The Agricultural Land Tribunal shall consent under the last foregoing section to the operation of a notice to quit an agricultural holding or part of an agricultural holding if, but only if, they are satisfied as to one or more of the following matters, being a matter or matters specified by the landlord in his application for their consent, that is to say— (b) that the carrying out thereof is desirable in the interests of sound management of the estate of which the land to which the notice relates forms part or which that land constitutes; or (d) that greater hardship would be caused by withholding than by giving consent to the operation of the notice; or (e) that the landlord proposes to terminate the tenancy for the purpose of the land's being used for a use, other than for agriculture, not falling within paragraph (b) of subsection (2) of the last foregoing section: Provided that, notwithstanding that they are satisfied as aforesaid, the Tribunal shall withhold consent to the operation of the novice to quit if in all the circumstances it appears to them that a fair and reasonable landlord would not insist on possession.

4.24 p.m.

LORD SILKIN moved, in subsection (2), to omit the proposed new paragraph (b). The noble Lord said: My Lords, this is the provision which provides for notices to quit. There are certain circumstances in which under paragraphs (a) to (e) it is possible for a landlord to get possession. In the case of the one that is the subject of this Amendment, the landlord can get possession if he satisfies the tribunal that it is desirable in the interests of sound management of the estate of which the land to which the notice relates forms part or which that land constitutes". This again is an Amendment that we discussed on the Committee stage. I then criticised it on the ground that a landlord will get possession on the vague terms that it is "desirable in the interests of sound management". It is difficult for a tenant, knowing nothing of the circumstances, to meet a case of that kind. He may be occupying a relatively small part of a large estate, and there may be no complaint about the way in which he is farming; yet he can be dispossessed on the vague ground that it is "desirable in the interests of sound management of the estate". It does not say that it is essential, or even that it is desirable in the interests of agriculture that possession should be given.

"Sound management of the estate" may involve all sorts of considerations, other than agriculture, which may not necessarily be in the public interest. Sound management of the estate, from the point of view of the landowner, may be a very different thing from sound management of the estate from the point of view of the public interest; and there may even be a conflict. Nevertheless, a landlord has only to go before the tribunal and satisfy them that he could make more money, if he had possession of this small farm, by a more efficient and profitable management of the estate, and he can get possession. We think that that is quite wrong, and it is in order to delete this particular power that I move this Amendment. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 2, line 45, leave out paragraph (b).—(Lord Silkin.)

EARL WALDEGRAVE

My Lords, we have already debated this matter in Committee and I do not want to go over all the same ground again. Perhaps I can make two points and then illustrate the sort of situation with which paragraph (b) is designed to deal. First, there is nothing new in a provision enabling a landlord to obtain possession on estate management grounds. It is laid down in the 1948 Act. Therefore, I find it somewhat difficult to believe that those who move this Amendment wish to delete the provision entirely. If they do, it seems wholly inconsistent with their general attitude, which seems to be that the 1947 and 1948 Acts were so good that they should not be touched at all; and this provision, or a similar one, is included in the 1948 Act. The second point is that the National Farmers' Union and the Country Landowners' Association accepted that the provision in the 1948 Act relating to estate management was not working satisfactorily. They had much discussion together and this new provision was agreed. In a matter affecting so closely relations between landlords and tenants that is of first importance; and the two sides, through their organisations, were agreed. Is it really suggested that we should disregard this agreement?

The landlord and tenant system will not work unless estates are well managed and divided into satisfactory and well-equipped holdings. We are giving our grants under Part II of the 1957 Act for this purpose. But often we find that there are unsatisfactory holdings where the landlord could not be advised to spend capital on new or improved equipment. Nor could the Government pay grant in respect of capital expenditure. The only long-term course, on grounds of sound management, will be to run such a holding together with a neigh-houring holding on the estate. Then capital can properly be spent on equipping the two holdings as a single unit with a single homestead. Paragraph (b) enables a fair and reasonable landlord to obtain possession in these circumstances. It is in the public interest that he should be enabled to do so; and, therefore, I cannot accept the proposed deletion of this paragraph.

On Question, Amendment negatived.

4.30 p.m.

LORD WISE moved, in subsection (2), to omit the proposed new paragraph (d). The noble Lord said: My Lords, I hope that at long last the Government will meet us on this Amendment. It will be within the memory of noble Lords that at the Committee stage of the Bill we discussed the question of hardship in relation to the tenant, and the Government were not able to accept the proposed Amendment to that clause. This Amendment is on a somewhat different footing. We have heard on many occasions that in regard to the agricultural industry there are three partners—the landlord, the tenant and the agricultural worker. There seems to be nothing in this Bill in so far as the agricultural worker is concerned; it deals mainly with the landlord and the tenant. It has been said—and I think quite rightly—that it is in the nature of a landlords' Bill. Certainly Clause 3 favours the landlord and mainly safeguards his interests. It gives him the right of approach to the agricultural land tribunal on very favourable terms indeed for the tribunal's consent to the operation of a notice to quit. The terms are set out in Clause 3. The first is in the interests of good husbandry. We have just dealt with the second. The third is in regard to research, education and smallholdings, and the fourth is the one with which I am dealing at the moment.

Under previous Acts the landlord has certain protection in regard to notices to quit. Under those Acts he is helped in obtaining possession of his farm, and the tenant has to be on his best behaviour in many respects lest he be subject to notice to quit: he has to pay his rent on time, he has to carry out his obligations under his tenancy, he has to farm according to good husbandry, and in many other ways. I think that this particular clause rather loads the dice once again against the tenant. The Parliamentary Secretary may argue that there is a proviso in this clause which is of help to the tenant. But let us look at the clause in relation to the proviso. The particular subsection with which I am dealing is a purely personal one. It is not of the same description as the other subsections in Clause 3 but is a personal one, and it calls upon the landlord to establish a fact before the agricultural land tribunal. That fact is that the withholding of consent to the operation of the notice to quit, which he has already served upon his tenant, will create hardship to himself.

The Parliamentary Secretary will argue that the tenant has the same right to come before the tribunal and try to establish hardship. But in a dispute between the tenant and the landlord with regard to hardship, the position is quite impossible for the tenant. He can prove his own hardship, but he cannot refute the landlord's hardship. The landlord can state his case, and the tenant has no means of refuting it. Once the landlord has proved that it would be a hardship for the tribunal to withhold consent to the notice to quit, then it is obvious that, in that particular case, the proviso will not operate, because the tribunal, having once decided that it is reasonable and having accepted the hardship case, cannot possibly go back on their decision and suggest that the landlord is not a fair and reasonable person and that consent should be withheld. Having once decided that the landlord is correct and that hardship will be entailed by withholding the notice to quit, the tribunal, I suggest, cannot then decide that the consent should not be given if they consider that "the landlord is a fair and reasonable person".

The tenant is put in a difficult position. In many cases he suffers undue hardship by notice to quit. He may be an excellent farmer, and in this I call to mind the words of the noble Lord at the last stage that the landlord might not be able to get rid of an unsatisfactory farmer. In this particular case the landlord may be able to get rid of an excellent farmer, because if he proves to the tribunal that he would suffer hardship, then the tenant, whether he is a good or a bad farmer, would have to leave. The Government all along have been trying to persuade us that they wish for fair treatment both for the landlord and tenant. I suggest that if that is the case, then the only thing they can possibly do is to take out paragraph (d) from the Bill, and allow the tenant to come into the Bill on the same terms as the landlord, and not on adverse terms.

I have a feeling that the landlords will not do so badly out of this Bill. I also feel that the time is coming when the landlords may have a far better time than they have had in the past. I am prepared to admit of bad times in regard to owners of farms, but with rents provided for under the Bill, and with improvements catered for under various other Bills which we have recently passed, the agricultural landlords should be in a far better position than they have been for perhaps many generations. I hope the Government will give way on this Amendment and delete paragraph (d) from the Bill and, in the words of my noble Leader, leave the tenant in a fair and square position. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 3, line 6, leave out paragraph (d).—(Lord Wise.)

LORD SILKIN

On the Committee stage I had an Amendment down under which it would not have been open to the tribunal to make an order for possession if it would involve greater hardship on the tenant. That Amendment was defeated. So we are left with the provision that the tribunal can make an order for possession if there is hardship on the landlord, but cannot refuse to make an order for possession if there is hardship on the tenant. I hoped that the Government would be able to agree that there should be the same criterion in both cases.

LORD SALTOUN

My Lords, I beg the noble Lord's pardon. Would he elaborate that a little? As I read it, it is the same for both—"that greater hardship would be caused by withholding than by giving consent. …" It seems to me they are exactly balanced. Would the noble Lord elaborate it?

LORD SILKIN

As I read this provision, it is that the tribunal have got to make an order for possession if there would be greater hardship on the land-lord—

LORD SALTOUN

On either.

LORD SILKIN

It is only the landlord gets the benefit of this provision: the tenant does not. The landlord is seeking possession of the holding, and if there is greater hardship on him he gets possession. The hardship of the tenant is not taken into consideration at all. It is not open to the tenant to come along and say to the Tribunal: "There is hardship on me and therefore you ought not to mike the order for possession."

LORD SALTOUN

I beg the noble Lord's pardon. Surely the greater hardship is not on the landlord; it is on the tenant. If the lesser hardship is on the landlord and the greater hardship is on the tenant, then the landlord does not get his order. Is not that right'?

LORD SILKIN

I do not read it that way. I read it as a one-sided provision under which the landlord can get possession if he would suffer the greater hardship; but it does not protect the tenant in any way. However, that is the case for the Amendment. I admit that it is not an easy provision to understand. If it provided that the tenant could come along and say that there would be great hardship on him if the tribunal made the order for possession, and the tribunal could accept that and refuse the order, I should be prepared to agree that there is no point in the Amendment. But I do not read the Bill that way. I would be very grateful if we could have a clear statement as to what this provision really means.

4.45 p.m.

EARL WALDEGRAVE

My Lords, perhaps it would be convenient if I replied straight away to these points that have been raised. I hope that I can help the noble Lord, Lord Wise, on this matter, because what is running in both his mind and Lord Silkin's mind is this supposed loading of the dice, this unfairness, this landlord's privilege, and so on. I want to assure your Lordships that I believe that this provision is fair and that the dice are not loaded. I want to deploy this argument as carefully as I can and try to make this point. The Amendment as we have it makes it impossible for a landlord to obtain possession on hardship grounds. That is quite clear. Under this Amendment, he would not have even the limited right which he has now under Section 25 (1) (c) and (d) of the 1948 Act to seek consent on grounds of hardship if he wants the land for a purpose specified in the contract of tenancy or if both the landlord and the tenancy are still the same as in August, 1947.

There is, clearly, some misunderstanding here, which has been brought out in the exchanges between the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, and the noble Lord, Lord Saltoun, a moment ago, about the effect of the "hardship" provision in the Bill as it is now drawn under this paragraph (d). Let us get this point quite clear. Hardship cannot be argued by the tenant as an overriding defence against any other grounds. That was the point which the noble Lord, Lord Silkin made before. The hardship defence is used when hardship is raised. One of the grounds that a landlord can use is hardship. If he raises that ground the tenant can defend himself by pleading greater hardship. It will be for the Tribunal to decide on balance which hardship is the greater.

The noble Lord, Lord Silkin, on Committee stage was asking that the tenant could plead hardship, as I understand it, as an overriding defence against any other grounds—good husbandry or good estate management or anything else. I tried to explain then, and your Lordships agreed because you rejected the Amendment, that we could not do that in the interests of agriculture or anything else. That is where the confusion has arisen and this question of "dice-loading" comes in. As I said, a landlord who wants to plead hardship must specify this in his application, and the tenant will therefore know that point is going to be raised. He will then be able to prepare his answer and plead his own greater hardship. The landlord must prove that greater hardship will be caused if the tribunal refuse the order than if they give it. This deals with the point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Wise. It is the tribunal who has to decide which is the greater hardship when the point is raised. The onus of proof is clearly on the landlord, and it is not easy to prove.

I do not think this is a "landlord's charter" at all. Let us consider the tenant first. There has been so much misunderstanding that I want to go through it carefully. Consent to the notice might take away the tenant's livelihood, and deprive him and his family of their home. His hardship is obviously grave. Even where an alternative holding is readily available, he will have the hardship of moving. Now let us consider the landlord's case. He is going to put up the ground of hardship. Refusal to consent will not deprive him of something he already has: at best it will disappoint him in an expectation. I think your Lordships will agree that it is not going to be easy for a landlord to prove that greater hardship will be caused by refusing consent than by giving it. Even if the landlord does establish this point—and I will come in a moment to the sort of case where I think he may be able to establish it—the tribunal are still required to refuse consent if, in all the circumstances it appears to them that a fair and reasonable landlord would not insist on possession. If, for example, the landlord had only recently bought the farm and the tenant was one of long standing who had done the farm well, it seems to me that even if the landlord established greater hardship the tribunal might hold that a fair and reasonable landlord would not in the circumstances turn out that tenant. Again, if the prospective occupier was a bad farmer—the landlord's son, perhaps—and the tenant was a good one, one was experienced and the other inexperienced, a "reasonable landlord", in spite of considerations of hardship, might decide to let the tenant stay. The tribunal would have to decide that. The cases where consent is given on grounds of hardship will, I think, be limited. I should like to say a word on the sort of case where I think hardship might justify consent. It will depend on the opinion of the tribunal, and it will be for them to weigh up and judge.

Let us take the case for a moment of an owner-occupier with a medium-sized farm, a hundred acres or so. Suppose that that owner-occupier falls ill, and finds that he cannot manage this farm himself any longer, but he wants to retain the house because he lives in it together with his wife and children: he does not want to get out of it altogether. It may be that the best his wife and his young son, shall we say, can properly do is to tackle about half the farm. He would like to let the rest of his farm to a neighbour while he is sick and while his son is young. That neighbour may be an excellent farmer with several farms, who could well tackle this land in addition to his own organisation. But under the present law the owner-occupier cannot let his farm on a lease for a term. He has to consider whether it would be wise for him to let the farm go while he is sick. This will almost certainly be a risky thing to do, because he will have no ground whatever for getting it back. Under the law as it stands to-day he will not dare let some of this land, so he will retain it, and no doubt he, or, rather, his wife and young son, will farm it as best they can; and I doubt if this is in the best interests of agriculture.

How much better it would be if he let off a portion of the land to this other farmer! Circumstances change; the man gets better; his son goes to a farm institute, and becomes qualified. He would like to have his farm back again. There will be no hardship to the tenant, who is a big farmer and has plenty of land. Under paragraph (d) he could plead that there would be greater hardship to him if he did not get his holding back again. Would your Lordships wish to deprive that type of man in such circumstances of the only grounds on which it was open to him to make that kind of arrangement? He is not a Duke, just a small man. It is by no means a foregone conclusion. We are not bringing in any lease "through the back door," because this has to go to the tribunal and the tribunal has to judge of the greater hardship within the terms of the proviso. There it is.

As if have said, Clause 3 has the agreement of both sides of the industry. We have, indeed, specifically asked both the Country Landowners' Association and the National Farmers' Union whether they were satisfied with the present wording of this provision, and we have been assured that it meets their wishes. That seems to me a very good reason for retaining the wording in the Bill, and I ant not convinced by any of the arguments that I have heard for the Amendment, cogently as they were put. I know that it may be said that hard cases make bad law. But I think it is a mark of a good law to make equitable provision for human hardship. In my view, this clause of the Bill makes that provision and I must recommend your Lordships to reject the Amendment.

LORD WISE

My Lords, the noble Earl has given us a hypothetical case which surely would have been covered quite properly by the "hardship" clause in the 1948 Act, in regard to a contract made between the landlord and the tenant. It seems to me that this Bill takes the contract part of it out of the hardship case. Would it not be possible, in view of the great difference of opinion as to the interpretation of this subsection, and if the Government are determined that it should still remain in the Bill, for the Government to have a look at the wording to see that there is no ambiguity as to the interpretation?

EARL WALDEGRAVE

My Lords, if I may by leave of the House speak again, I would say that if it is a question of looking again at the words I do not think that would be helpful. These words have been looked at carefully by both sides of the industry. There is absolute agreement on both sides, the landlords' organisation and the farmers' organisation, on the wording, and I really do not see what would be the point of considering them again.

LORD WISE

There seems to be a difference of opinion on the two sides of the House.

On Question, Amendment negatived.

4.55 p.m.

LORD SILKIN moved, in subsection (2), to omit the proposed new paragraph (e). The noble Lord said: My Lords, I beg to move the Amendment standing in my name. This is to leave out paragraph (e), that the landlord proposes to terminate the tenancy for the purpose of the land's being used for a use, other than for agriculture". The landlord can thereby get possession. I would draw attention to the operative words of the clause—namely, that the tribunal shall consent to an order for possession. They are under an obligation to do so, subject, of course, to the proviso. I am well aware of the proviso which the noble Earl has quoted on many occasions, but they must make an order for possession if the landlord proposes to terminate the tenancy for the purpose of the land's being used for a use other than for agriculture. Hardship does not arise here. Even if the hardship of a tenant is very great, it does not arise; this is one of the grounds on which the tribunal must make an order for possession.

I would ask the noble Earl to consider the kind of use that a landlord could make of the land. First of all, it will be something other than agriculture. It must, I presume, be something for which planning permission has been given—I accept that. Therefore, it may well be that in the opinion of the planning authority, it will be a proper use of the land. I would not deny that. Nevertheless, it need not necessarily be in the national interest that the land should be used for that other purpose. This is taking away an agricultural use. It might be for the purpose of starting up a factory; it might be for the purpose of starting up a race-course—after all, racecourses have been started with planning permission and on agricultural land. The dominating factor will be that the landlord can do better, that he can make a greater profit.

Whatever the alternative use may be, tribunals are under the obligation to make an order for possession. I agree that if they are satisfied that a fair and reasonable landlord would not insist on possession, they have a discretion not to make the order. But the test of what a fair and reasonable landlord would do is a subjective one; the noble Earl and myself, for instance, might have very different views as to what a fair and reasonable landlord would do. It is not a thing you can appeal about. I imagine that if you took 100 people and got their views as to what a fair and reasonable landlord would do, you might get a large number of conflicting ideas about it. It is not a matter on which a tenant can rely. I admit that in a glaring case such as the noble Earl mentioned, where a person buys a piece of land one day and the next day gives notice to quit and goes to the tribunal because he proposes to use the land for some purposes other than agriculture and for which, if you like, he has obtained planning permission, the tribunal obviously would say that no fair and reasonable landlord would jump in like that; and one can imagine other cases.

There are, however, many other cases where they would be in great difficulty, and I can well imagine their saying, "After all, this is a borderline case and it is the man's land. He is entitled to do what he likes with it, and if he can make a bigger profit by getting possession, then why should he not do so?" A great deal will depend on the sympathies, on the personal attitude, of the tribunal. That is something one cannot avoid. It is not as if they were interpreting a fixed law which is there before them and on which they have to give a judicial decision. It might well seem to them fair and reasonable that they should give a decision in favour of the landlord. I feel that it would be far better to delete this provision altogether in cases where the land- lord wants to use the land for some other purpose—not necessarily for some purpose beneficial to the public interest. If those words "beneficial to the public interest", were inserted and if he had to establish that it was in the public interest that he should get possession even though he might wish to use the land for another purpose, I should find a great deal of difficulty in arguing. But where the position is simply that he wants to change from agricultural use to some other use I believe he should not be entitled to do so. Therefore, I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 3, line 9, leave out paragraph (e).—(Lord Silkin.)

EARL WALDEGRAVE

My Lords, naturally I have some nervousness in arguing on planning law with the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, for he has forgotten more on that subject than I shall ever know. This is really a matter which deals with planning law versus this agricultural law. I am a little puzzled to know why the noble Lord wants to have this paragraph out, because, as your Lordships know, it was in the 1948 Act and apparently has worked satisfactorily in the past though it has been very little used. It is a type of case which is very rare.

LORD SILKIN

My Lords, will the noble Earl forgive my interrupting? He says that this is in the 1948 Act but he does not hesitate to amend that Act. He has amended it all through whenever it has suited him.

EARL WALDEGRAVE

My Lords, certainly I am amending it. We have been scolded for amending the Act and I think that that is a perfectly fair point to make. We have been told in this place and elsewhere that the 1947 and 1948 Acts were very good and should be left alone; but we have felt that they needed amendment. I think it is fair to say that the noble Lord is now seeking to alter the Act where we are leaving parts of it alone.

LORD SILKIN

My Lords, we have never objected to amending the Act to improve it. The noble Earl is saying things which we have never said from this side of the House. We have never said these Acts are sacrosanct and must not be amended in any way. The noble Earl is putting words into our mouth.

EARL WALDEGRAVE

My Lords, I beg the noble Lord's pardon, for I should not wish to do that. But if we may continue the argument, under this Amendment a landlord who wanted to use his land for non-agricultural purpose for which planning permission is not required, such as forestry (that is probably the normal use for which this provision would be applied) would be unable to put that forward as a ground for consent for a notice to quit; but I think it is agreed generally that the tribunal should be able to consider the case where a landlord puts his position forward on those grounds, and should be able to give consent if they are satisfied that the case of the landlord is genuine and that a fair and reasonable landlord would in fact insist on possession in all the circumstances. Again I must say that this clause has the agreement of both sides of the industry—the Landowners' Association and the National Farmers' Union.

It may be helpful if I try to explain something which will closely follow the argument put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Silkin—the relationship of paragraph (e) of this clause to the other provision about notice to quit for non-agricultural use, at present in Section 24 (2)(b) of the 1948 Act. Under that provision, which is not affected by this Bill, a landlord who has planning permission to put his land to a non-agricultural use can serve a notice to quit on the grounds that he requires the land for that use, and need not then obtain consent to the notice. In these cases, where a planning authority has already decided that there is no objection to the land's going out of agriculture, it would, in our view, be unreasonable to require the landlord to obtain consent from some other body which in effect would have to reconsider the decision of the planning authority. We do not think that that would be at all desirable. It was not in the legislation that has existed up to now and we do not think it should be. The Bill will not alter this position in any way.

Paragraph (e) of Clause 3 of the Bill, however, covers uses such as private forestry for which Town and Country Planning consent is not required. I need not remind your Lordships that the proviso requiring the tribunal to decide the application by the standards of a fair and reasonable landlord will apply to this paragraph just as it applies to all the others. It seems to us, therefore, that a tenant is fully safeguarded against any unfair or unreasonable use of this ground for consent and that this clause should stand. I must, therefore, ask your Lordships to reject the Amendment.

On Question, Amendment negatived.

First Schedule.

[Minor and consequential Amendments]:

EARL WALDEGRAVE

May I, with your Lordships' permission, take Amendments 5 and 6 together? These are purely technical Amendments and I do not think I need speak long on them. They will enable the noble and learned Viscount the Lord Chancellor to deal with the period prescribed under Section 50 (3) by order, so that it can be included in the omnibus order he will be making to regulate the establishment, constitution and procedure of agricultural land tribunals. As the Bill is at present drafted he would otherwise have to make a separate regulation, and we consider that that is undesirable. I beg to move.

Amendment moved—

Page 17, line 29, at end insert— ("15. In section fifty, in subsection (3), the following paragraph shall be inserted at the end— In this subsection" the prescribed period "means the period prescribed by the Lord Chancellor by order made by statutory instrument (which shall be subject to annulment in pursuance of a resolution of either House of Parliament); and the power to make orders under this subsection shall include a power, exercisable in the like manner, to revoke or vary any order made thereunder.'").—(Earl Waldegrave.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

EARL WALDEGRAVE

My Lords, I beg to move this Amendment.

Amendment moved— Page 18, line 1, leave out from beginning to end of line 4.—(Earl Waldegrave.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

EARL WALDEGRAVE

My Lords, this is a somewhat technical Amendment and is designed to remedy a defect which has recently come to light in the Sixth Schedule to the Agriculture Holding Act, 1948, which provides for the conduct of arbitrations. The Amendment provides the machinery whereby an arbitrator can obtain a ruling from the courts where there is a dispute as to whether he has jurisdiction to hear and decide a case referred to him. It would also enable him to award costs, and to have his remuneration fixed, whether or not he has jurisdiction. I think it will interest your Lordships to know that this point has been discussed with the Royal Institute of Chartered Surveyors, who agree that there is in the 1948 procedure a defect which needs to be put right; and they consider that the terms of this Amendment provide the appropriate remedy. I beg to move.

Amendment moved—

Page 18, line 7, at end insert— ("21.—(1) The provisions of paragraph 24 of the Sixth Schedule (under which a special case may be stated for the opinion of the county court where any question of law arises in the course of an arbitration under the Act of 1948) shall apply in relation to a question as to the jurisdiction of an arbitrator as they apply in relation to a question of law arising in the course of an arbitration. (2) The provisions of the Sixth Schedule relating to the fixing and recovery of the remuneration of an arbitrator and the making and enforcement of an award as to costs together with any other provision thereof applicable for the purposes of or in connection with those provisions shall apply where the arbitrator has no jurisdiction to decide the question referred to him as they apply Where the arbitrator has jurisdiction to decide that question.").—(Earl Waldegrave.)

LORD WISE

My Lords, if the Royal Institute of Chartered Surveyors agree, then I, as a member, also agree.

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

EARL WALDEGRAVE

My Lords, this Amendment is a drafting one only. Paragraph 10 of the Schedule sets out the amended Section 26 of the Agricultural Holdings Act and enables the Lord Chancellor to provide certain things by order. In Section 21 of the Reserve and Auxiliary Forces (Protection of Civil Interests) Act, 1951, there is a reference to Section 26 of the 1948 Act as authorising the making of regulations. This Amendment substitutes "orders" for "regulations" to bring the reference in Section 21 of the 1951 Act into line with paragraph 10 of this Schedule. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 18, line 25, after ("Lord Chancellor") insert ("and for the reference to regulations there shall be substituted a reference to orders,")—(Earl Waldegrave.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

5.11 p.m.

LORD SALTOUN moved, after paragraph 30, to insert: 31. Paragraph (b) of subsection (2) of section seven which relates to variation of rent) shall cease to have effect.

The noble Lord said: My Lords, the purpose of the Amendment is to take out Section 7 (2) (b) of the 1949 Act, which provides that in a rent arbitration the arbiter must not take into account the relief in respect of rates to occupiers of agricultural holdings affected by the Local Government (Scotland) Act, 1929, nor the amounts recoverable by occupiers from owners under Section 47 of that Act nor any benefit that may accrue to the tenant from the operation of the Agricultural Marketing Act, 1931.

So far as the rates are concerned, now that there is to be a statutory direction to arbiters to fix rents on the basis of open-market value, the reference to de-rating relief of occupiers and owners is hardly relevant any longer. The arbiter has to put himself in the position of a prospective offerer for a farm and decide what he will offer for that farm, and he has to take the rates and everything else into account, including fixed equipment and such things. Every prospective tenant must be assumed to know what his liability for rates is to be. In 1961 when the revaluation of all heritable subjects is completed and the new valuation lists come into force, agricultural land will cease to be rated altogether and the houses and cottages will be separately valued and rated, the rates being paid by the occupier of the holding, as in England.

The reference to amounts recoverable by occupiers from owners under Section 47 of the Local Government (Scotland) Act, 1929, is now probably completely out of date. There are probably very few people affected by that to-day. Then there is a reference to the Agricultural Marketing Act, and I suggest that it is not applicable to the present position, because the profitability of agriculture is now dependent upon the system of guaranteed prices deficiency payments and grants. To retain this reference is only confusing to the arbiter. In any case, a farmer or an offerer for a farm to rent is aware of the profit trends in farming, quite irrespective of the Agricultural Marketing Act. One would like to know what is meant by the reference to the Agricultural Marketing Act, 1931, and in what way the arbiter is intended to apply it.

That is what interested parties think, and I should like to add a further argument. Parliament is very fond (and I have protested about it on more than one occasion) of deciding hypothetical conditions under which an arbiter is required to value a property. When I was a professional Associate of the Surveyors' Institution (having taken the Intermediate Examination, as the noble Lord, Lord Wise, will appreciate), I would, as a valuer, have valued a building lot anywhere—in heaven, hell, or anywhere else. I thought I knew all about valuation and I was perfectly prepared to value anything under any conditions laid down by Parliament in any Act. Fortunately for the world, one goes through a further stage. A valuer who really is a competent valuer realises that valuation is a very fine art and, as in the case of those engaged in other arts, a valuer improves by experience. A valuer must be extremely sensitive to current trends.

A valuer never feels really happy unless he is dealing with a commodity in a market—I think that is a fair way to put it as the noble Lord, Lord Wise, will probably agree. Therefore, if we have an Act of Parliament which directs how a valuer is to do his work, the fewer conditions by which we bind him the better. With any commodity and any market his "feel" of the price is always formed by his knowledge of the law affecting that commodity and every other consideration affecting it in the market. We shall get very much better results if we do not hamper valuers too much by hypothetical considerations, which every good valuer hates to see embodied in Acts of Parliament. For that reason I am rather anxious that the Government should accede to this Amendment.

Amendment moved—

Page 19, line 23, at end insert— ("31. Paragraph (b) of subsection (2) of section seven (which relates to variation of rent) shall cease to have effect.")—(Lord Saltoun.)

LORD STRATHCLYDE

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Saltoun, has explained the purpose of this Amendment, but I should like to view the matter a little more carefully than he has done. He wishes to delete Section 7 (2) (b) of the 1949 Act. That section provides that in a rent arbitration the arbiter must not take into account the relief in respect of rates given to occupiers of agricultural holdings by the de-rating provisions of the Local Government (Scotland) Act, 1929, nor the amounts which occupiers could recover from owners in consequence of these provisions (that is, Section 47 of the Act), nor any benefit that may accrue to the tenant from the operation of the Agricultural Marketing Act, 1931.

The basic issue raised by this Amendment is whether the benefit of relief from rates should accrue to the tenant or to the owner. The whole purpose of the de-rating provisions of the Act, or one of the main purposes of the Act of 1929, was to relieve occupiers, not owners, of the burden of rates; and that remains the policy of Her Majesty's Government to-day. The Act of 1949 prevents the arbiter from nullifying the relief which the tenant obtains as a result of de-rating. If I understood the noble Lord aright, he commented also that the meaning of the provision of the 1949 Act, which he wishes to repeal, is not quite clear. I would say that if a form of words can be advised which will remedy the doubt, if it exists, it will certainly be taken into account when a comprehensive review of the Agricultural Holdings Acts is under-taken.

As regards any benefits that might accrue from the Agricultural Marketing Act, 1931, a farmer might, for example, get better returns as a result of improved marketing. Clearly that is not a matter which should be taken into account in determining rent. I am grateful to the noble Lord for raising this matter. I am sorry that I am quite unable to accept his Amendment, but I can assure the noble Lord that we will give further consideration to the matter when there is any prospect of legislation to amend the Agricultural Holdings Acts. I hope that with that assurance he may be, prepared to withdraw his Amendment.

LORD SALTOUN

My Lords, I am grateful for the trouble that my noble friend has taken, but I am still a little worried, because, speaking as a valuer, it seems to me that I have to carry two contrary things in my head at the same time. I think that if my noble friend Lord Strathclyde will consider it logically for a little while he will probably come to the same conclusion that I have come to. I have not the smallest wish to embarrass Her Majesty's Government, and if they will not accept the Amendment I certainly shall not press it, but if he examines it logically he will find that it is rather difficult to accept the position that he has now.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Second Schedule [Enactments repealed in consequence of the provisions of this Act]:

5.21 p.m.

EARL WALDEGRAVE

My Lords, we now come to the Second Schedule. In paragraph 3 of the First Schedule, which amends Section 73 of the 1947 Act, it is provided that paragraph (c) of subsection (3) of the section shall be omitted. This Amendment is merely a drafting one to include this paragraph in the list of enactments that will be repealed in consequence of the provisions of the Bill. I beg to move.

Amendment moved—

Page 23, line 39 (column 3), at end insert— ("In section seventy-three, in subsection (3), paragraph (c).")—(Earl Waldegrave.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

EARL WALDEGRAVE

My Lords, during the Committee stage in another place paragraph 10 of the First Schedule was redrafted so that it now sets out the whole of the new Section 26. As paragraph 10 provides for the new Section 26 to be substituted in full for the present Section 26, the partial repeal of the present provision is not required, and this Amendment accordingly omits it from the list of provisions to be repealed. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 25, line 10, leave out from beginning to end of line 18.—(Earl Waldegrave.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Fourth Schedule [Transitional provisions]:

EARL WALDEGRAVE

My Lords, with your permission I will take Amendments No. 12 and No. 13 together, These two Amendments seek merely to tidy up part of the Fourth Schedule which contains the transitional provisions. The Bill provides for certain functions to be transferred from the Minister to arbitrators, the Agricultural Land Tribunal or the Lord Chancellor. The Fourth Schedule at present contains a number of paragraphs which preserve the validity of action taken by the Minister under powers which are now being transferred from him. We have been advised that these paragraphs may not provide a complete saving, and the two Amendments seek to substitute a general saving in the place of the specific ones. I beg to move.

Amendment moved—

Page 27, line 31, at end insert— ("1. Where, by virtue of any provision of the First Schedule to this Act, any functions of the Minister under an enactment referred to in that provision fall to he exercised after the coming into operation thereof by the Lord Chancellor, the Agricultural Land Tribunal or an arbitrator, anything done in the exercise of those functions, in so far as it has effect immediately before the coming into operation of that provision shall, subject to the provisions of this Schedule, continue to have effect thereafter as if done by the Lord Chancellor, the Agricultural Land Tribunal or an arbitrator, as the case may be, under the said enactment as amended by this Act.").—(Earl Waldegrave.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

EARL WALDEGRAVE

My Lords, I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 29, line 8, leave out from beginning to end of line 13.—(Earl Waldegrave.)

On Question. Amendment agreed to.

EARL WALDEGRAVE

My Lords, this is purely a drafting Amendment, and I do not think that it needs exposition at all. I beg to move.

Amendment moved—

Page 29, line 44, leave out from beginning to end of line 4 on page 30, and insert— ("10. Without prejudice to the generality of paragraph 1 of this Schedule, regulations made by the (Minister under section twenty-six or section fifty of the Act of 1948 in force immediately before the passing of this Act shall continue in force thereafter and shall be treated as orders made by the Lord Chancellor under the said section twenty-six, or, as the case may be, the said section fifty, as amended by this Act.").—(Earl Waldegrave.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

LORD STRATHCLYDE

My Lords, it may be convenient for the House to take Amendments Nos. 15, 16 and 17 together. These Amendments provide merely for the application to Scotland of the Amendments to the Fourth Schedule which have just been moved by the noble Earl, Lord Waldegrave, and which have been accepted by your Lordships. The first Amendment is purely drafting. The second Amendment provides in the new paragraph 1 that, so far as Scotland is concerned, the Lord Chancellor does not come into the picture at all. The Secretary of State, the Land Court and an arbiter take the place of the Lord Chancellor, the Agricultural Land Tribunal and an arbitrator respectively. The third Amendment is consequential. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 30, line 25, leave out ("Paragraph 1") and insert ("Paragraphs 1 and 2").—(Lord Strathclyde.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

LORD STRATHCLYDE

My Lords, I beg to move.

Amendment moved—

Page 30, line 27, at end insert— 1("(a) in paragraph 1 for references to the Minister and to the Lord Chancellor, the Agricultural Land Tribunal or an arbitrator there shall be substituted respectively references to the Secretary of State and to the Land Court or an arbiter;").—(Lord Strathclyde.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

LORD STRATHCLYDE

My Lords, I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 30, line 42, leave out from beginning to end of line 48.—(Lord Strathclyde.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

LORD STRATHCLYDE

My Lords, this Amendment is the Scottish counter-part of the Amendment which your Lordships have just made to page 29, line 44. It provides that in any case before the appointed day in which a tenant objects to a notice to quit the proceedings will be governed by the regulations made by the Secretary of State in 1950. In cases arising after the appointed day the provisions of paragraph 36 of the First Schedule to the Bill will have effect. I beg to move.

Amendment moved—

Page 31, line 12, at end insert— ("15. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 36 of the First Schedule to this Act, the regulations made by the Secretary of State under section twenty-seven of the Scottish Act of 1949 in force immediately before the day appointed for the coming into operation of section three of this Act shall continue to have effect for the purposes of any proceedings consequent upon a notice to quit in a case where the tenant served on the landlord a counter-notice under subsection (1) of section twenty-five of that Act before that day.")—(Lord Strathclyde.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.