HL Deb 21 November 1957 vol 206 cc448-57

LORD LAWSON rose to call attention to the Report on the Accident at Wind-scale on October 10, 1957 (Cmnd. 302); and to move for Papers. The noble Lord said: My Lords, I placed this Motion on the Order Paper, frankly, because for the last week or two I have taken the view that it was time we took a proper measure of the problem with which we are dealing, that we noted its lessons, and got on with the job. Your Lordships will remember that when Calder Hall was opened, and then Windscale, people were cheered by the fact that a great industry was about to be established, based upon a new form of power which was being used for other ends by various countries. Your Lordships will recall how proud our people were on that day when Her Majesty opened Calder Hall, to begin with.

Of course, we give our sympathy to the people in the area over what has happened, but the first accident there has caused in the minds of the people a feeling of depression about this peace-time energy which is out of all proportion to what has occurred—at least, I think so. Yesterday, we had in this House an announcement about great loss of life in a very bad accident in another part of the country. These establishments, Windscale and Calder Hall, are almost within sight of collieries; in one colliery I know three explosions have happened with disastrous effects, and in another, two explosions. While giving our sympathy to everybody concerned in this area, I think that this matter has been treated in a manner out of all proportion with what happened.

Now, fortunately, we have the Report—it is really a series of reports. Those concerned reported to the Prime Minister in such a way that, as he says in his Memorandum, he could not give us the full details. The Prime Minister says in his Memorandum: The report of the Committee of Inquiry is a report made to the Authority to assist them in discharging their statutory responsibility for managing the Windscale establishment. It is a technical document dealing with the design and operation of a defence installation. It also presupposes considerable knowledge of the technology of this particular pile. It would not be in the national interest to publish the report. I almost wish that the Prime Minister had stopped there, because he repeats here what is said in the further stages of the Report of the Committee of Inquiry. He says: In a memorandum which the Chairman of the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority has submitted to me regarding the accident, the Authority state that the accident was due partly to inadequacies in the instrumentation provided at Windscale for the maintenance operation that was being performed at the time of the accident, and partly to faults of judgment by the operating staff, these faults of judgment being themselves attributable to weaknesses of organisation. That is one of the matters which is causing a good deal of perturbation in the minds of the workmen and skilled men in that area.

I do not propose to deal with it to-day as I do not know the rights and wrongs about it, but this I do know: that I was privileged, as were many of your Lordships, to go to Windscale and go through the establishment, and to see some of the work they were doing. As one who has often been in an area where men have to take great care (my noble friend Lord Hall will understand particularly what I mean: wherever there was an outbreak of gas or anything like that, we had to be especially careful; and in these matters we, as miners, have a kind of second sense), I noticed how meticulous the workmen and officials in Windscale were about their dress and their covering generally, as well as about their shoes. I noticed their bearing, and I must tell your Lordships what I have already told a number of other people: that I thought, from the whole bearing of the people in that establishment, the whole atmosphere was charged with a sense of the responsibility which they all obviously carried themselves.

That is all I am going to say about this matter, because it is something that has to be dealt with later on by other Committees. All I would say is that, if I were one of those concerned, I should not spend too much time on the deficiencies of the workmen, or whoever has been blamed. What struck me at the time of the accident—I do not blame those concerned in it—was why the Authority had not made arrangements to deal with any accident that might happen? All great industries do that. There has just been published, this week I believe, a Report upon the subject of how industries make arrangements to meet the effects of accidents. The Report names the industries—I will come back to that matter later. All I am going to say about it is that I was very much struck by the fact that arrangements had not been made to meet accidents. It would be easy (I do not want to do more than underline this) for the workmen charged with having made the mistakes to point out to those responsible for running these factories that they, too, have probably made a mistake, in that when the accident happened there was hardly any covering for the people in the area.

That is all I am going to say about that aspect. I know that there is feeling about it, but it lies upon the surface. What I want to do is to tell your Lordships to-day enough, and no more. I believe that those concerned should make up their minds to leave behind a great many of the things that have been said and written about this matter, so that they may create a new spirit as compared with the feeling at the present time. The people in the area, and I think the country generally, were shocked, because our nerves are being tested in regard to this business of radiation. That has been so ever since the atom bomb was used in the last war, and that feeling is increased by what is taking place in the other parts of the world. People are easily upset over these tests because of the prospects of the effects of radiation. It is a pity that that should be so. I think we were all pleased to find that the fears that were prevailing throughout the country, and particularly in the area concerned, about the possible effects upon the population, young and old, have not been realised, and that things have not been so bad as at first they appeared upon the surface.

I was glad to hear that the restrictions upon milk generally in Cumberland have been lifted. Within the space of about six weeks after the accident it was felt that milk supplies there were fit for consumption. Some people, however, have suffered very much. I believe that the milk restrictions were extended until they covered an area of some 200 square miles. That meant, of course, that a great number of farmers had to destroy their milk, with the result that they suffered a good deal. I do not know whether or not there was any destruction of cattle.

THE LORD PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL (VISCOUNT HAILSHAM)

No; there was no destruction of cattle.

LORD LAWSON

But in a great farming county like Cumberland these restrictions created devastating effects upon some of the people's business, upon their trade, and in many other ways. One thing I want to say is this: I think we should make up our minds to be fairly generous to the people concerned so as not to leave any "bad tastes" about this matter. Windscale has got to go on, I dare say, just as Calder Hall has got to continue doing its job. And such work cannot be done in an area where people have any feeling of grievance against those who are operating the factories concerned. I see that, according to the Atomic Energy Authority, there is provision for people to go to the courts or to make claims direct to the Authority. I should like to ask whether the noble Lord, Lord Mills, can tell us anything about that today. I think the House and the country would be reassured if they felt that those concerned in farming in the area were getting a fair deal and that they were something like satisfied with the arrangements being made.

I do not wish to speak for too long, but I want to make this point. I hope that proper arrangements will be made to ensure, so far as possible, that such an accident will not be repeated. I believe that three Committees are sitting in connection with this accident and I do not know whether it will be necessary to withhold action until they have reported, which may take some time, even when businessmen such as Sir Alexander Fleck are concerned. Sir Alexander Fleck is, if I may say so, a man of the right calibre for the job he is doing. But it does appear as if more time is going to be wasted in settling some of the questions involved.

One matter to be settled concerns the steps that will have to be taken to prevent, so far as possible, a repetition of this accident and to ensure that, if anything of this kind does happen in the future, proper arrangements will have been made to meet the contingency and the needs of the people in the area. I am not one of those who is going to blame the Authority because it did not do something. I can understand the occurrence. This "scientific gadget," as I shall call it, has been emphasised to such an extent that people are apt to forget that the production of atomic energy is now an industry, and that it is governed by industrial circumstances and conditions; and, of course, an outstanding feature about great industries is that one always has to expect the unexpected. Such an accident may occur again. On this occasion the results have been comparatively light. Some of the people in the area probably do not think that, but in regard to what happens in industry generally the results have not been too bad, and that will be particularly so if adequate compensation is paid in respect of the losses of the farmers concerned.

Practically every great industry in the country has its own method of dealing with accidents. In my own industry, the mining industry, it took nearly 200 years before an effective way was found of preparing in advance for and dealing with possible disasters in mines. I can tell your Lordships this: that one of the striking things about disasters in mining is not merely that the men are ready and highly trained to deal with the job, but also that they are a means of pulling the people together, almost automatically, in the area. The mining authorities have a centre at Buxton, and others in other parts of the country, at which men are trained. The men deal with mock explosions as part of their training, and every man concerned is taught his job thoroughly. Immediately a disaster occurs the men turn up on the spot. There is no drill on the square, but the training of these men, who may have to go beneath the ground in terrible circumstances, as they are doing at the present time in Scotland, is carried out with precision and deliberation.

I want to emphasise what I said just now: that the production of atomic energy is now, for good or ill, an industry in this country. It may employ the most highly-placed scientists in the world—as it does, I am glad to say—and, as I have also said, in great industries unexpected accidents do occur. It is possible, however, to forestall their effects, to some extent, and to make adequate and well-developed arrangements to meet possible needs. The men who are trained to deal with such accidents, when they arrive on the spot, can often do the kind of thing that was so necessary to be done in the Windscale area recently: that is, to act as a tonic to the people and to give them that assurance which makes them feel that things are not so bad as long as there are such men on the job.

That covers almost everything I have to say to your Lordships upon this matter. I have not referred in any detail to radiation and the more scientific matters, because that is not my job; I have dealt with the industrial side which affects the people in the particular area concerned and such places generally. I come back now to the point with which I began. I think this matter has affected our feelings and our outlook to a disproportionate extent having regard to what actually happened in the area. It has had a bad effect on the country generally, just at a time when we needed a tonic. We are very proud of the operations of the Atomic Energy Authority in this area. I am sure that the people of this country were cheered when they learned (I believe that my noble friend Lord Attlee had something to do with this matter) that this terrific force of which the world was so afraid could be turned to beneficent and peaceful uses.

While I have been a critic sometimes of the way in which the Authority has operated, and probably shall be again, I say that it is going to be a mighty force in the life of the people of this country and in the life of the world. It will be necessary for those who are active in these matters to say things that are, perhaps, a little biting; but, for all that, I would ally, myself with those who are proud of this great undertaking, and I hope that the Minister and the Government will use the best possible influences they can and will not attempt to thwart or direct any Committee which is given responsibility. I hope that they will use their influence to see that the people who have suffered, not only from the point of view of farming but in other ways also in the area, receive proper consideration, and that, so far as possible, no workman and no one who has been in command of the machinery will suffer as the result of what has happened. I say let bygones be bygones and use every endeavour to make this a successful undertaking without fear of difficulties in the future.

3.33 p.m.

VISCOUNT STONEHAVEN

My Lords, I join in to-day's discussion for a short period because I wish to pay a humble tribute to the staff of Windscale for the way in which they have behaved throughout this arduous and anxious time. I think they displayed initiative, courage and leadership of the very highest order, and I have felt strongly that I should like to say so in your Lordships' House. Another matter on which I wish briefly to dwell is the really exemplary White Paper which discusses this accident in a frank and definite manner and explains what occurred at Windscale. There is no attempt at "whitewashing" or anything of that kind. I have only one slight criticism to make—and even here I feel perfectly sure that I am wrong. Nevertheless, I should like the Minister to reassure me. I am therefore saying this purely so that he may be able to point out later on that I am wrong and to tell us exactly what is correct.

In paragraph 21 of the Report we are told how it was found that the scanning gear was jammed and could not be moved. It is possible to read that paragraph in such a way as to believe that it said that the gear had been jammed at the time of the previous Wigner releases, and had not been working properly until the day before these Wigner releases were carried out. It would be possible to infer that the gear had been jammed and not maintained in between these periods. I am not saying that that is so, but merely that it is possible to read the paragraph in that way, and I simply put that forward as a criticism. If this passage appears to me to be capable of bearing that interpretation, it may so appear to someone else. I repeat, however, that I feel sure I am wrong.

I have reached a few conclusions from reading this White Paper. I think it is important that any conclusions to which one comes in this connection should be right, and therefore, with your Lordships' permission, I will go very quickly into a few matters, and if I am wrong I hope that I shall be corrected. The first conclusion that I have reached from studying the White Paper is that even had the scanning gear been working during the period of the Wigner releases, the scanning gear during that period could not in any case have been used, because the scanning gear depends on the flow of air through the pile and the Wigner releases depend on there being no flow of air during that time. Therefore I am forced to the conclusion that the control of the Wigner releases must depend upon two instruments: the thermocoupler in the pile, graphite and fuel, and the power meter which registers the power of the pile. That is a matter upon which I should like to be clear, and if I am wrong to be put right. It also appears to me that with the two types of instruments, correctly placed—or, if it is impossible to place them correctly by a calculated calibration of the instruments—complete control of the Wiener releases is possible with the instruments as they stand.

The next thing that occurs to me is that if an ordinary hand periscope were available it would never be necessary for anyone to look direct into the pile if such an emergency should arise again. Periscopes may have been available, but that is not apparent from the White Paper. Later in the White Paper there are conclusions about the hazards to which the staff were subjected through looking into the pile, but that is a small point. There is another question of meteorology. The two paragraphs on meteorology are very vague, it seems to me, and as we are dealing with fallout it is very vital to know the conditions of air currents. It should be possible to fly a barrage balloon at a height of 5,000 feet and that would provide information, if one wished to take it, about the direction of the wind and the speed of the wind. It would also be possible to arrange for the taking of air samples at, say, every 200 feet right up to 5,000 feet. There would then be no question of saying, that an inversion appears to have taken place. One would know whether it had taken place or not. That is merely an idea of mine; I do not know whether it holds water or not.

But when one considers future procedure I think that this matter must be got into perspective; and the perspective, as I see it, is that these piles are likely to have a life of ten years. The period may be extended—whether that is so or not I do not know. They have already been in existence for seven years, and the total number of Wigner releases that will be necessary for No. 2 Pile (I do not know what is going to happen to No. 1) in the future is very limited. It appears that Wigner releases are necessary in the order of once a year, or perhaps once in a period of something like nine months. If there now remain a further three years for No. 2 Pile to run, one has only to cater for a limited set of circumstances.

On that basis, I should like humbly to suggest that any local committee of liaison should include among its number the local secretary of the National Farmers' Union or other appropriate official, having regard to the fact that the chief danger which has been brought out in this accident occurs through milk: it occurs through cows eating grass which is contaminated by fall-out. I should like to point out that if the Wigner release could be carried out in winter, when cows are inside and being fed on hay concentrates and silage, the risk would not apply. If the Wigner release could be carried out at a, time and date about which everybody could be told beforehand, cows could be definitely kept inside, and any accident which might or might not happen would be under control because the milk would not be contaminated. I think that is a point worth looking into.

The other matter I should like the Atomic Energy Authority to consider is the question of contamination of pastures. If pastures are ploughed up and reseeded periodically, as is done in Scotland, obviously the danger of a build-up of these fission products—strontium and caesium—would be lessened, because they would be put underground every so often, and the pastures would be renewed. It seems to me that that is another point worth considering. These points lend a little weight to the rather extraordinary suggestion that an agricultural body should be brought into this atomic energy liaison, but I feel that there is a possibility there of avoiding trouble and giving comfort in future, and of course it is to the future that we must look. That is my excuse for mentioning these things to your Lordships.

What ought to be widely publicised, in my view, is that future atomic energy plants, as opposed to Windscale, are being built on a totally different principle. This kind of accident could not occur in the closed cycle, carbon-dioxide cooling system which is now being used for all electricity-generating plants. There is a complete difference between the plant where air, which is an oxidising agent, is being blown through a pile into the atmosphere—a necessary design feature at the time Windscale was constructed, before people knew much about these things; and of course I am not criticising that in the slightest—and the use of the closed cycle where, apart from leakage, the gas circulates round and round the hot pile and there is no discharge into the atmosphere. Another point is that carbon-dioxide used in these piles is a fire extinguisher and not an oxidising agent like air. I feel that these points, no matter how technical they may seem, should be emphasised, and that an effort should be made to draw a distinction between the technical set-up of Windscale and the new plants. This is not an unforeseen accident which has overtaken British initiative and British production of atomic power, though that, I am afraid, is what is being inferred by many people overseas, who are saying that our new power stations are not so "hot." In fact, such an accident has never happened to any power station, but that has not been sufficiently emphasised.