Lords Sitting of 21 November 1957

Preamble
The House met at three of the clock, The EARL OF BUCKINGHAMSHIRE on the Woolsack.
Prayers

  ARMS FOR TUNISIA
  3.5 p.m.
  LORD WINDLESHAM: My Lords, I beg to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
  [The Question was as follows:
  To ask Her Majesty's Government whether, in view of the possible danger of French withdrawal from N.A.T.O., they have anything to add to their statement on November 18 with regard to deliveries of arms to Tunisia.]
  THE JOINT PARLIAMENTARY UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (THE EARL OF GOSFORD): My Lords, I would ask the noble Lord if he would be good enough to await the statement to be made later this afternoon by the noble Earl the Leader of the House.
  LORD WINDLESHAM: I am very relieved, as I am sure your Lordships will be, to hear that a statement is to be made this afternoon on this most urgent and important matter, but in supplementation of the Question I have put to the noble Earl I should like to ask him whether the Government is aware that this matter is not one of a few thousand rifles but may well be a deliberate attempt on the part of the Tunisian Government to impair French prestige, already at a somewhat low ebb for one reason or another, and thus to undermine the solidarity of N.A.T.O.
  THE EARL OF GOSFORD: My Lords, Her Majesty's Government are no doubt aware of almost every possibility in this particular case.

  WINDSCALE ATOMIC PLANT ACCIDENT
  LORD LAWSON LORD LAWSON rose to call attention to the Report on the Accident at Wind-scale on October 10, 1957 (Cmnd. 302); and to move for Papers. The noble Lord said: My Lords, I placed this Motion on the Order Paper, frankly, because for the last week or two I have taken the view that it was time we took a proper measure of the problem with which we are dealing, that we noted its lessons, and got on with the job. Your Lordships will remember that when Calder Hall was opened, and then Windscale, people were cheered by the fact that a great industry was about to be established, based upon a new form of power which was being used for other ends by various countries. Your Lordships will recall how proud our people were on that day when Her Majesty opened Calder Hall, to begin with.
  Of course, we give our sympathy to the people in the area over what has happened, but the first accident there has caused in the minds of the people a feeling of depression about this peace-time energy which is out of all proportion to what has occurred—at least, I think so. Yesterday, we had in this House an announcement about great loss of life in a very bad accident in another part of the country. These establishments, Windscale and Calder Hall, are almost within sight of collieries; in one colliery I know three explosions have happened with disastrous effects, and in another, two explosions. While giving our sympathy to everybody concerned in this area, I think that this matter has been treated in a manner out of all proportion with what happened.
  Now, fortunately, we have the Report—it is really a series of reports. Those concerned reported to the Prime Minister in such a way that, as he says in his Memorandum, he could not give us the full details. The Prime Minister says in his Memorandum:
  "The report of the Committee of Inquiry is a report made to the Authority to assist them in discharging their statutory responsibility for managing the Windscale establishment. It is a technical document dealing with the design and operation of a defence installation. It also presupposes considerable knowledge of the technology of this particular pile. It would not be in the national interest to publish the report."

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  I almost wish that the Prime Minister had stopped there, because he repeats here what is said in the further stages of the Report of the Committee of Inquiry. He says:
  "In a memorandum which the Chairman of the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority has submitted to me regarding the accident, the Authority state that the accident was due partly to inadequacies in the instrumentation provided at Windscale for the maintenance operation that was being performed at the time of the accident, and partly to faults of judgment by the operating staff, these faults of judgment being themselves attributable to weaknesses of organisation."
  That is one of the matters which is causing a good deal of perturbation in the minds of the workmen and skilled men in that area.
  I do not propose to deal with it to-day as I do not know the rights and wrongs about it, but this I do know: that I was privileged, as were many of your Lordships, to go to Windscale and go through the establishment, and to see some of the work they were doing. As one who has often been in an area where men have to take great care (my noble friend Lord Hall will understand particularly what I mean: wherever there was an outbreak of gas or anything like that, we had to be especially careful; and in these matters we, as miners, have a kind of second sense), I noticed how meticulous the workmen and officials in Windscale were about their dress and their covering generally, as well as about their shoes. I noticed their bearing, and I must tell your Lordships what I have already told a number of other people: that I thought, from the whole bearing of the people in that establishment, the whole atmosphere was charged with a sense of the responsibility which they all obviously carried themselves.
  That is all I am going to say about this matter, because it is something that has to be dealt with later on by other Committees. All I would say is that, if I were one of those concerned, I should not spend too much time on the deficiencies of the workmen, or whoever has been blamed. What struck me at the time of the accident—I do not blame those concerned in it—was why the Authority had not made arrangements to deal with any accident that might happen? All great industries do that. There has just been published, this week I believe, a Report
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  upon the subject of how industries make arrangements to meet the effects of accidents. The Report names the industries—I will come back to that matter later. All I am going to say about it is that I was very much struck by the fact that arrangements had not been made to meet accidents. It would be easy (I do not want to do more than underline this) for the workmen charged with having made the mistakes to point out to those responsible for running these factories that they, too, have probably made a mistake, in that when the accident happened there was hardly any covering for the people in the area.
  That is all I am going to say about that aspect. I know that there is feeling about it, but it lies upon the surface. What I want to do is to tell your Lordships to-day enough, and no more. I believe that those concerned should make up their minds to leave behind a great many of the things that have been said and written about this matter, so that they may create a new spirit as compared with the feeling at the present time. The people in the area, and I think the country generally, were shocked, because our nerves are being tested in regard to this business of radiation. That has been so ever since the atom bomb was used in the last war, and that feeling is increased by what is taking place in the other parts of the world. People are easily upset over these tests because of the prospects of the effects of radiation. It is a pity that that should be so. I think we were all pleased to find that the fears that were prevailing throughout the country, and particularly in the area concerned, about the possible effects upon the population, young and old, have not been realised, and that things have not been so bad as at first they appeared upon the surface.
  I was glad to hear that the restrictions upon milk generally in Cumberland have been lifted. Within the space of about six weeks after the accident it was felt that milk supplies there were fit for consumption. Some people, however, have suffered very much. I believe that the milk restrictions were extended until they covered an area of some 200 square miles. That meant, of course, that a great number of farmers had to destroy their milk, with the result that they suffered a good

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  deal. I do not know whether or not there was any destruction of cattle.
  THE LORD PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL (VISCOUNT HAILSHAM): No; there was no destruction of cattle.
  LORD LAWSON: But in a great farming county like Cumberland these restrictions created devastating effects upon some of the people's business, upon their trade, and in many other ways. One thing I want to say is this: I think we should make up our minds to be fairly generous to the people concerned so as not to leave any "bad tastes" about this matter. Windscale has got to go on, I dare say, just as Calder Hall has got to continue doing its job. And such work cannot be done in an area where people have any feeling of grievance against those who are operating the factories concerned. I see that, according to the Atomic Energy Authority, there is provision for people to go to the courts or to make claims direct to the Authority. I should like to ask whether the noble Lord, Lord Mills, can tell us anything about that today. I think the House and the country would be reassured if they felt that those concerned in farming in the area were getting a fair deal and that they were something like satisfied with the arrangements being made.
  I do not wish to speak for too long, but I want to make this point. I hope that proper arrangements will be made to ensure, so far as possible, that such an accident will not be repeated. I believe that three Committees are sitting in connection with this accident and I do not know whether it will be necessary to withhold action until they have reported, which may take some time, even when businessmen such as Sir Alexander Fleck are concerned. Sir Alexander Fleck is, if I may say so, a man of the right calibre for the job he is doing. But it does appear as if more time is going to be wasted in settling some of the questions involved.
  One matter to be settled concerns the steps that will have to be taken to prevent, so far as possible, a repetition of this accident and to ensure that, if anything of this kind does happen in the future, proper arrangements will have been made to meet the contingency and the needs of the people in the area. I am not one of those who is going to blame the
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  Authority because it did not do something. I can understand the occurrence. This "scientific gadget," as I shall call it, has been emphasised to such an extent that people are apt to forget that the production of atomic energy is now an industry, and that it is governed by industrial circumstances and conditions; and, of course, an outstanding feature about great industries is that one always has to expect the unexpected. Such an accident may occur again. On this occasion the results have been comparatively light. Some of the people in the area probably do not think that, but in regard to what happens in industry generally the results have not been too bad, and that will be particularly so if adequate compensation is paid in respect of the losses of the farmers concerned.
  Practically every great industry in the country has its own method of dealing with accidents. In my own industry, the mining industry, it took nearly 200 years before an effective way was found of preparing in advance for and dealing with possible disasters in mines. I can tell your Lordships this: that one of the striking things about disasters in mining is not merely that the men are ready and highly trained to deal with the job, but also that they are a means of pulling the people together, almost automatically, in the area. The mining authorities have a centre at Buxton, and others in other parts of the country, at which men are trained. The men deal with mock explosions as part of their training, and every man concerned is taught his job thoroughly. Immediately a disaster occurs the men turn up on the spot. There is no drill on the square, but the training of these men, who may have to go beneath the ground in terrible circumstances, as they are doing at the present time in Scotland, is carried out with precision and deliberation.
  I want to emphasise what I said just now: that the production of atomic energy is now, for good or ill, an industry in this country. It may employ the most highly-placed scientists in the world—as it does, I am glad to say—and, as I have also said, in great industries unexpected accidents do occur. It is possible, however, to forestall their effects, to some extent, and to make adequate and well-developed arrangements to meet possible needs. The men who are trained to deal

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  with such accidents, when they arrive on the spot, can often do the kind of thing that was so necessary to be done in the Windscale area recently: that is, to act as a tonic to the people and to give them that assurance which makes them feel that things are not so bad as long as there are such men on the job.
  That covers almost everything I have to say to your Lordships upon this matter. I have not referred in any detail to radiation and the more scientific matters, because that is not my job; I have dealt with the industrial side which affects the people in the particular area concerned and such places generally. I come back now to the point with which I began. I think this matter has affected our feelings and our outlook to a disproportionate extent having regard to what actually happened in the area. It has had a bad effect on the country generally, just at a time when we needed a tonic. We are very proud of the operations of the Atomic Energy Authority in this area. I am sure that the people of this country were cheered when they learned (I believe that my noble friend Lord Attlee had something to do with this matter) that this terrific force of which the world was so afraid could be turned to beneficent and peaceful uses.
  While I have been a critic sometimes of the way in which the Authority has operated, and probably shall be again, I say that it is going to be a mighty force in the life of the people of this country and in the life of the world. It will be necessary for those who are active in these matters to say things that are, perhaps, a little biting; but, for all that, I would ally, myself with those who are proud of this great undertaking, and I hope that the Minister and the Government will use the best possible influences they can and will not attempt to thwart or direct any Committee which is given responsibility. I hope that they will use their influence to see that the people who have suffered, not only from the point of view of farming but in other ways also in the area, receive proper consideration, and that, so far as possible, no workman and no one who has been in command of the machinery will suffer as the result of what has happened. I say let bygones be bygones and use every endeavour to make this a successful undertaking without fear of difficulties in the future.
  3.33 p.m.
  VISCOUNT STONEHAVEN: My Lords, I join in to-day's discussion for a short period because I wish to pay a humble tribute to the staff of Windscale for the way in which they have behaved throughout this arduous and anxious time. I think they displayed initiative, courage and leadership of the very highest order, and I have felt strongly that I should like to say so in your Lordships' House. Another matter on which I wish briefly to dwell is the really exemplary White Paper which discusses this accident in a frank and definite manner and explains what occurred at Windscale. There is no attempt at "whitewashing" or anything of that kind. I have only one slight criticism to make—and even here I feel perfectly sure that I am wrong. Nevertheless, I should like the Minister to reassure me. I am therefore saying this purely so that he may be able to point out later on that I am wrong and to tell us exactly what is correct.
  In paragraph 21 of the Report we are told how it was found that the scanning gear was jammed and could not be moved. It is possible to read that paragraph in such a way as to believe that it said that the gear had been jammed at the time of the previous Wigner releases, and had not been working properly until the day before these Wigner releases were carried out. It would be possible to infer that the gear had been jammed and not maintained in between these periods. I am not saying that that is so, but merely that it is possible to read the paragraph in that way, and I simply put that forward as a criticism. If this passage appears to me to be capable of bearing that interpretation, it may so appear to someone else. I repeat, however, that I feel sure I am wrong.
  I have reached a few conclusions from reading this White Paper. I think it is important that any conclusions to which one comes in this connection should be right, and therefore, with your Lordships' permission, I will go very quickly into a few matters, and if I am wrong I hope that I shall be corrected. The first conclusion that I have reached from studying the White Paper is that even had the scanning gear been working during the period of the Wigner releases, the scanning gear during that period could not in any case have been used, because the scanning gear depends on the flow of

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  air through the pile and the Wigner releases depend on there being no flow of air during that time. Therefore I am forced to the conclusion that the control of the Wigner releases must depend upon two instruments: the thermocoupler in the pile, graphite and fuel, and the power meter which registers the power of the pile. That is a matter upon which I should like to be clear, and if I am wrong to be put right. It also appears to me that with the two types of instruments, correctly placed—or, if it is impossible to place them correctly by a calculated calibration of the instruments—complete control of the Wiener releases is possible with the instruments as they stand.
  The next thing that occurs to me is that if an ordinary hand periscope were available it would never be necessary for anyone to look direct into the pile if such an emergency should arise again. Periscopes may have been available, but that is not apparent from the White Paper. Later in the White Paper there are conclusions about the hazards to which the staff were subjected through looking into the pile, but that is a small point. There is another question of meteorology. The two paragraphs on meteorology are very vague, it seems to me, and as we are dealing with fallout it is very vital to know the conditions of air currents. It should be possible to fly a barrage balloon at a height of 5,000 feet and that would provide information, if one wished to take it, about the direction of the wind and the speed of the wind. It would also be possible to arrange for the taking of air samples at, say, every 200 feet right up to 5,000 feet. There would then be no question of saying, that an inversion appears to have taken place. One would know whether it had taken place or not. That is merely an idea of mine; I do not know whether it holds water or not.
  But when one considers future procedure I think that this matter must be got into perspective; and the perspective, as I see it, is that these piles are likely to have a life of ten years. The period may be extended—whether that is so or not I do not know. They have already been in existence for seven years, and the total number of Wigner releases that will be necessary for No. 2 Pile (I do not know what is going to happen to No. 1)
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  in the future is very limited. It appears that Wigner releases are necessary in the order of once a year, or perhaps once in a period of something like nine months. If there now remain a further three years for No. 2 Pile to run, one has only to cater for a limited set of circumstances.
  On that basis, I should like humbly to suggest that any local committee of liaison should include among its number the local secretary of the National Farmers' Union or other appropriate official, having regard to the fact that the chief danger which has been brought out in this accident occurs through milk: it occurs through cows eating grass which is contaminated by fall-out. I should like to point out that if the Wigner release could be carried out in winter, when cows are inside and being fed on hay concentrates and silage, the risk would not apply. If the Wigner release could be carried out at a, time and date about which everybody could be told beforehand, cows could be definitely kept inside, and any accident which might or might not happen would be under control because the milk would not be contaminated. I think that is a point worth looking into.
  The other matter I should like the Atomic Energy Authority to consider is the question of contamination of pastures. If pastures are ploughed up and reseeded periodically, as is done in Scotland, obviously the danger of a build-up of these fission products—strontium and caesium—would be lessened, because they would be put underground every so often, and the pastures would be renewed. It seems to me that that is another point worth considering. These points lend a little weight to the rather extraordinary suggestion that an agricultural body should be brought into this atomic energy liaison, but I feel that there is a possibility there of avoiding trouble and giving comfort in future, and of course it is to the future that we must look. That is my excuse for mentioning these things to your Lordships.
  What ought to be widely publicised, in my view, is that future atomic energy plants, as opposed to Windscale, are being built on a totally different principle. This kind of accident could not occur in the closed cycle, carbon-dioxide cooling system which is now being used for all electricity-generating plants. There

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  is a complete difference between the plant where air, which is an oxidising agent, is being blown through a pile into the atmosphere—a necessary design feature at the time Windscale was constructed, before people knew much about these things; and of course I am not criticising that in the slightest—and the use of the closed cycle where, apart from leakage, the gas circulates round and round the hot pile and there is no discharge into the atmosphere. Another point is that carbon-dioxide used in these piles is a fire extinguisher and not an oxidising agent like air. I feel that these points, no matter how technical they may seem, should be emphasised, and that an effort should be made to draw a distinction between the technical set-up of Windscale and the new plants. This is not an unforeseen accident which has overtaken British initiative and British production of atomic power, though that, I am afraid, is what is being inferred by many people overseas, who are saying that our new power stations are not so "hot." In fact, such an accident has never happened to any power station, but that has not been sufficiently emphasised.

  THE PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO PARIS
  3.43 p.m.
  VISCOUNT ALEXANDER OF HILLSBOROUGH: My Lords, may I ask whether we are to have the expected Statement now?
  THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS (THE EARL OF HOME): My Lords, I seem to be making a timely arrival. I beg the pardon of the noble Viscount the Leader of the Opposition; I was unable to be here before because of a meeting. I should like to repeat here the statement that my right honourable friend the Prime Minister is making in another place because I think that your Lordships would like to have it. It is as follows:
  "In the light of recent developments in North Africa and the coming N.A.T.O. meeting, I have accepted"—
  this is the Prime Minister speaking in another place—
  "an invitation to visit Paris on November 25 to discuss with the French Prime Minister matters of common interest to our two Gov-
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  ernments. I will be accompanied by my right honourable and learned friend the Foreign Secretary."
  VISCOUNT ALEXANDER OF HILLSBOROUGH: My Lords, I am obliged to the noble Earl for giving us a repetition of the statement. I am sure that all noble Lords will be pleased that there is to be direct conversation between the Prime Minister and the French Prime Minister before the N.A.T.O. ministerial meeting. But I am puzzled by the opening words of the statement, "In the light of recent developments." Which recent developments? Are these the developments which have taken place since the upsurge of public opinion in France or before?
  THE EARL OF HOME: My Lords, of course, I am not responsible for the words. My right honourable friend the Prime Minister chooses his own words. But since these matters have arisen, there has been a difference of opinion between the French Government and ourselves on the question of the sending of arms to Tunisia, and obviously that will be one of the subjects of conversation between the two Prime Ministers.
  VISCOUNT ALEXANDER OF HILLSBOROUGH: My Lords, I am much obliged to the noble Earl. I think that the beginning of the statement might have been worded, "In view of the consequences of recent events in North Africa." I hope that something better will come out of this than we have had yet in this unfortunate incident.
  THE EARL OF HOME: My Lords, as I say, my right honourable friend chooses his own words, but perhaps it is too limiting to say, "In view of the consequences of recent events." I think that the conversations will obviously cover many things that happened before these more recent events.
  LORD WINDLESHAM: My Lords, as I was a member of last. week's Parliamentary delegation to the Paris meeting of N.A.T.O., I can only refer to what has already been said in the Press: that the volume of opinion in Paris when the French delegation walked out—and this was not only the atmosphere in the Palais de Chaillot but also the atmosphere outside—was one of great criticism and tremendous tension. It is a great relief to many of us to hear that

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  the Prime Minister is leaving so soon as next Monday to go to Paris to talk about this matter with the French Prime Minister. Let us not underestimate the situation which has arisen. How it has arisen is a matter about which no doubt the Foreign Secretary is much better informed than somebody like myself. But to the general public, to the man in the street, it looks like an unsatisfactory state of affairs, the sort of thing which should not happen. N.A.T.O., to use the somewhat theatrical language of N.A.T.O. itself, is the "shield and sword" of the Western World, and any attempt to make a dent in it is most strongly to be deplored. We are very glad to hear that the Prime Minister has been so quick to take action.

  WINDSCALE ATOMIC PLANT ACCIDENT
  3.49 p.m.
  Debate resumed.
  LORD GLYN: My Lords, if I may now continue the debate, I should like to say in regard to the Windscale affair that it is of the utmost importance to have a sense of proportion. The House owes a debt of gratitude to the noble Lord, Lord Lawson, for having raised the matter. I think that Parliament has not recognised the astonishing record of the Atomic Energy Authority over the last twelve years, in carrying through all these experiments without a single accident of any sort. It would be quite wrong to allow this small accident—because it is a small accident—at Windscale to pass without emphasising the wonderful achievement of the Atomic Energy Authority in carrying through all these developments, basing their work purely on theory and not on past practice, without any accident. I do not believe that such a thing has ever happened in the history of any scientific development in any country. And I think that Sir John Cockcroft and all those who work with him at Harwell ought to be pleased at the record so far, and not discouraged by this small accident at Windscale. Not a single person or animal was affected; no damage was done to anybody. I think that ought to be emphasised.
  The Report that has been produced is of great benefit, because it is very frank
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  and goes into great detail. Noble Lords will be able to read and appreciate it without being confused by any explanation of the technical details given by somebody not technical like myself; it is far better to leave it to noble Lords to learn from the White Paper all the evidence that is there displayed. However, there is one point that I think is of tremendous importance, and it is one to which the noble Lord, Lord Lawson, referred. I am not sure that it is right to set up an organisation against accident parallel to what is done in the mining industry.
  LORD LAWSON: My Lords, I am glad the noble Lord has mentioned that. I did not mean that we should have a parallel organisation. I know that all the great scientific industries have their own particular organisations to meet the circumstances; and I.C.I., of which Sir Alexander Fleck is the chairman, have a peculiar organisation of their own. The only thing I want to be sure of is that there is an organisation to meet the circumstances.
  LORD GLYN: I believe the position is this. The real danger from this accident is not what has occurred to anybody in the neighbourhood, but that it may affect public opinion throughout the country. It must be emphasised that there is no reason to believe that any of the new establishments that are being set up by the Atomic Energy Authority, with outside organisations, embodies any danger whatever to the public of this country. I am quite satisfied that, with the protection that is provided in carrying on these developments, it would be a great disaster if people got the idea that there was a danger wherever any new authority was set up. I happen to live within two or three miles of Harwell; I know everybody there fairly well, and already I have people coming to me and saying: "Are we going to have a repetition at Harwell of what has happened at Windscale?" The whole thing is totally different; there is no question of any parallel.
  However, I think it is most important that whenever we discuss this question there should be some reassurance to the public that everything in the way of giving protection has been done. That is proved by this accident, where no real damage was done to man or beast. It shows, I think, that Sir John Cockcroft

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  and others at Harwell, who have carried out the preliminary research work and have the chief responsibility for the development of atomic energy, have been more than justified in all that they have done. I think it would be a bad thing if the wonderful work that has been done by those comparatively few people were in any way brought into question in the public mind by this one accident, which, after all, has been absolutely free from any serious, permanent disaster.
  I think this country stands now in the position of contributing probably more to the happiness and welfare of the world through atomic energy than any other country; and we must still lead in this direction. One of the things that might do more harm than anything else would be for any fear to arise in the public mind that there was danger in encouraging the development of atomic energy under the authority created by Parliament. I believe that this work has been carried out with the idea of developing the benefits of atomic energy but at the same time protecting the public in every possible way. Therefore, when the noble Lord, Lord Lawson, raised this matter I felt that it was necessary for somebody to pay a tribute to the original workers for atomic energy who have carried out all this development without any serious accident. I believe the results of this accident will be beneficial and will help the Atomic Energy Authority to provide safeguards in the future even more than they have in the past.
  3.55 p.m.
  VISCOUNT ALEXANDER OF HILLSBOROUGH: My Lords, before the Minister replies, in view of what has been said I should like to put one or two short points to him. First, I would say that I appreciate the manner in which my noble friend Lord Lawson has introduced the Motion this afternoon. I do not need to comment on its contents. My noble friend has intervened in the hope of giving any assistance possible in securing that the right result is obtained from the investigations which have gone on and which in some cases arc still continuing. I was most interested in the speech of the noble Viscount, Lord Stonehaven, who obviously has approached the study of this matter with some of the technical knowledge he has acquired in various spheres. I was particularly interested, too, in the appeal made by the noble
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  Lord, Lord Glyn, a great friend of many of us in this House who knew him in the other place. I appreciate the spirit in which he has spoken, after his continuous contacts with people at Harwell.
  As I have said, there are one or two points that I think are of great importance and to which I think the Minister might reply. The first is that, whatever lack of harm there has been to man or beast, as suggested by the noble Lord, Lord Glyn, there is the point mentioned in the conclusions (paragraph 29 (3)) which obviously the noble Viscount, Lord Stonehaven, had in mind when he spoke and which seems to suggest that it is still quite possible that some long-period effect has been made upon the grass by the out-fall of strontium 90. Is that so, or not?
  The second point I want to put is this. While, of course, the particular type of production of nuclear energy at Wind-scale may be different from that produced by another kind of system, either at Harwell, in its particular industrial products, or in the growing chain of atomic power stations for the production of electric power, little bits of gossip and rumour going about seem to indicate that, although there is not so much risk in these particular stations as there has been proved to be at Windscale, nevertheless no scientist can guarantee that there will be no effect at all from the outfall of strontium 90 from those other types of stations, particularly in its possible effect upon farm land, farm crops, forage and the like. In view of the experience of farmers in the North of England around the Windscale area, it is important that all those who live on farms in the neighbourhood of newly developing stations—and I am one of them—should have complete and sincere answers and information upon that second point. I am sure the Minister will do his best to give those answers.
  As regards the conduct of the staff at Windscale in all the circumstances which arose there, like my noble friend Lord Lawson, I wish to raise no criticism of their action; they seem to have done a lot of good work in dealing with the situation. But the point which does arise is that, not merely in the Department of the Minister of Power, but in the Department of the Minister of Agriculture, there was no real, set plan to deal with the situation if such an accident as did occur arose. It was not there. With such a

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  plan, if animals had been sold in Carlisle market and despatched to the scene of their new home in Devonshire, immediate action would have been taken by the authorities down there to avoid the risk of strontium 90 in those animals.
  VISCOUNT HAILSHAM: It has nothing to do with strontium 90.
  VISCOUNT ALEXANDER OF HILLSBOROUGH: I do not care. That was the fear.
  VISCOUNT HAILSHAM: My Lords, if the noble Viscount will forgive me, as this did come within my ministerial province, may I say that it is very important indeed to know what the danger was and why this action was taken. The danger was from a radioactive iodine in the milk, and it persisted for only twenty-four hours after the last moment at which the cow might have eaten contaminated grass. It decays so quickly, and the danger persists for such a short time, that the mere destruction of the milk for twenty-four hours in that case was perfectly adequate to deal with any danger at all. I mention that—and I know the noble Viscount will forgive me for having done so—not to correct him, but in order to allay some apprehensions which undoubtedly existed amongst farmers that there was something wrong with these cows. There was nothing wrong at all with the cows. The danger was solely due to the danger of iodine in the milk.
  VISCOUNT ALEXANDER OF HILLSBOROUGH: My Lords, I am quite prepared to accept that statement, but I was going on to say that I should have thought that, if there were anything like a permanent basis of consultation between the atomic nuclear energy projects and industry or farming, then those particular animals would never have been sold in Carlisle market on the day they were. The marketing organisation would have entered into operation in the same way as it operates in taking immediate marketing steps to prevent such dangers when it is a case of foot and mouth disease. In that instance there is a permanent emergency operation which can be followed as a result of long experience.
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  Therefore I think the question of my noble friend Lord Lawson is one to which the Minister should give his attention. It is: in the light of the experience of other industries which are subject to the possibility of dangerous emergencies arising, what steps are to be taken to form a permanent organisation to deal with similar emergencies in this industry? It is an exceedingly good thing that the Minister has put Sir Alexander Fleming. at the head of the principal committees dealing with this matter, because I know the organisation of the I.C.I. pretty well and I know that they have factories manufacturing explosives, and the like, in which urgent risks arise. They have their own knowledge, also, of the sort of operations that can be put in hand at once when there is an explosion in a mine—as the I.C.I. control mines, or at least have had experience of them in the past, and they know all about the subject. If we can have an assurance that the Minister's intention is to establish a permanent emergency organisation, he will have gone a long way to meet the point raised by my noble friend Lord Lawson. At any rate, I should like to have an assurance on my question as to what are the risks in the case of other types of stations.
  House adjourned during pleasure, and resumed by the Lord Chancellor.
  4.5 p.m.
  LORD REA: My Lords, may I apologise to your Lordships for intervening in this discussion when I had not intended to do so? I should also apologise to your Lordships and to the noble Lord. Lord Lawson, for not being present at the beginning of this debate. I hope that in my few remarks I shall not traverse again ground which has been covered. I have something in common with the noble Lord, Lord Glyn, and the noble Viscount, Lord Alexander of Hillsborough, who live near one of these stations where an accident might occur, in that I live very near where this accident did occur. It might be called the closest agricultural area to it. I should like to pay my tribute to the very active and efficient staffs for the good work they did as soon as this alarm arose. I should also like—and I think your Lordships would also—to pay a

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  tribute to the stoicism of the Cumberland farmers who did not panic or take fright. There was a certain amount of Press excitement about it, and that is perfectly natural. One does not blame the Press for making a good story about it. But these good people were not in the slightest alarmed. They had had this immense factory among them for some years.
  But although there was no panic, there was inconvenience. I had a letter from an old age pensioner who said, "It is a nuisance that I dare not cut a cabbage in my garden". That position went on for some days when in fact it was unnecessary. I should like to come to the point of over-security—out-of-date security. I shall ask the Minister and the Government to take the public a little more into their confidence about matters of this nature, particularly where they are common knowledge in London and other places where they talk, but which are not always known in the remoter parts of the country. Many of your Lordships will remember that in the First World War, 1914–18, a matter which was classified as a security matter in 1914 came out at the- end of the war still classified as "Security" and "Top Secret" although everybody knew all about it. Very much the same thing happened in the last war. "Top Secret" documents, enclosed in double cover, and, I am told, some Government messages, were marked "Burn before reading". Even at the end of the war these security measures were taken concerning matters which were often common knowledge and about which there was no need to have all this secrecy. I think that that continues even now.
  I asked one of the Minister's predecessors some time ago whether it was wise to go on with this vast programme and whether he was sure that obsolescence would not overtake his building programme because invention was going on at such a pace. I suggested that in a few years we should not need a tremendous factory costing millions, and that a "backroom boy" with a black box might do the same thing. The Minister's predecessor said that as soon as Stephenson invented the steam engine it became obsolete. I found that neither helpful nor illuminating. At a later date, I asked
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  the present Minister if he would say categorically whether this thing was dangerous at either Windscale or elsewhere, but he did not answer. The noble Lord, Lord Lucas of Chilworth, pursued it, and asked the Minister to give a specific answer. He gave—if I may say this in no offensive spirit—a rather evasive answer. He said, "It is not that it is dangerous; it is that people think that it is dangerous." From that I could not gather whether it—whatever "it" was—was or was not dangerous. I think that there might be some little loosening-up on these security matters.
  There is a place called Windscale of which I believe your Lordships have heard. It is nowhere near where the accident took place; it is a day's journey away on foot. But I am told that, at the beginning of the war, for security reasons. it was decided that it would be rather a good trick to fool the enemy by calling this other place Windscale. It might just as well be called Putney Bridge or Brighton. It is said that the Windscale difficulties will not he repeated; that they will not affect places like Harwell, Sella-field and Calder Bridge. I do not know whether your Lordships know the exact distance between Windscale and Calder Hall, and Calder Hall and Sella-field. They are one and the same area and, so far as I know, in the same fence; there is no distance whatever between them. They are merely put in as the schoolboy said about his riddle: "to make it more difficult".
  I have one more point; I have not been asked to make it, and I am speaking for nobody. I was greatly impressed, as I am sure your Lordships were, by the tremendous efficiency, keenness and understanding of those who are working there. Because of what I can only call the red tape of the Civil Service, it seems to me worthy of question that a man, or two or three men, who are in charge of 3,000 or 4,000 workers, of plant worth perhaps £10 million, of the risk to a population of perhaps 100,000 people, should be paid on a Civil Service scale which is roughly approximate to what a more successful coal miner might get. With those few words, I hope the Minister will not think I have criticised unduly what has been done, which is, I am sure, appreciated by us all.
  4.10 p.m.
  THE MINISTER OF POWER (LORD MILLS): My Lords, I am sure we are all grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Lawson, for the helpful and constructive way in which he introduced his Motion on this very important matter. I can fully appreciate his anxiety that this accident at Windscale should in no way impair the lead which this country has gained, thanks to its scientists and engineers. I was greatly fortified, too, by the support given by noble Lords, in particular, Lord Glyn, that we should not look upon this accident as any setback to the important work we are doing. At the same time, I think the noble Lord, Lord Lawson, may have left an impression on your Lordships' minds that no arrangements were made to deal with accidents. That is far from the case. Perhaps I can develop that aspect later.
  I would, if I may, at the risk of wearying your Lordships, try to explain as simply as I can what happened at Wind-scale. I propose to be rather full about it. At Windscale, the Atomic Energy Authority have, besides other installations which do not come into this story at all, two piles in which uranium metal is irradiated with the object of producing the element plutonium for the military programme. Design started in 1947 and the piles were completed in 1950. The speed at which the neutron bombardment of the uranium takes place is moderated by having the uranium fuel elements surrounded by graphite. And the piles are cooled by having ordinary air pumped through them. This air goes up the 400-foot tall and often-photographed Wind-scale chimneys and out through filters into the atmosphere.
  The graphite slows down the neutrons upon which the chain reaction depends. In the Windscale pile some of the energy which the neutrons lose as they are slowed down remains stored in the graphite. This stored energy—known as Wigner energy—tends to distort the graphite and is released by a periodic maintenance operation. The operation consists, in essence, of allowing the pile to diverge at low power (that is, of allowing the chain reaction to start, and thus heat the pile) without cooling air being pumped through it. When the temperature of the pile has risen sufficiently the
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  chain reaction is stopped. The release of energy from the graphite continues in the warm pile. It is, in fact, an annealing process. It takes several days to complete it.
  On several previous occasions it has been found that to obtain the release of all the stored energy it was necessary to heat the pile a second time—again by allowing the chain reaction to start. A second nuclear heating of this kind was applied during the release of Wigner energy that was taking place in No. 1 pile in early October this year. And it was this second nuclear heating that the Committee of Inquiry found to be the primary cause of the accident. The Committee of Inquiry, after full study of the technical aspects and records, came to the conclusion that this second nuclear heating was applied too soon and at too rapid a rate. It caused the failure of one or more cartridges whose contents then oxidised slowly and, eventually, led to the fire. The fact that there was a fire in the pile was discovered in the afternoon of October 10. It was fought by various means throughout the night and was brought under control on the following morning by the use of water. I am sure that all noble Lords will join with me, as those who took part in the debate did, in paying tribute to the devotion to duty which was shown by all concerned in dealing with the accident.
  The accident was a serious one. It did much damage to an installation which, though old by atomic energy standards, was valuable. The restrictions which, for reasons that I will explain later, had to be placed on the distribution of milk caused considerable anxiety and concern. This was extremely regrettable. But I think it is, as I am sure noble Lords realise, of the utmost importance that this matter should be considered in perspective. In twelve years, having started, as has been said, with nothing but grey matter and green fields, British scientists and engineers, and the people who have built and operated our atomic generating plants, have indeed developed a new major industry. The nuclear power programme which I was proud to be able to announce to your Lordships in March is the only programme of its kind in the world.
  Here, I should just like to answer the noble Lord, Lord Rea, by saying that

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  I believe we have done the right thing in going forward with an ambitious nuclear power programme. I am quite aware that science is progressing and will progress very rapidly. But it is only by knowledge of the construction and operation of these nuclear power stations that we can hope to maintain the lead that we have established, as well as give ourselves meantime very much-needed energy for our factories. We have in Calder Hall the only industrial-scale nuclear power station that is actually working anywhere in the world. On the military side we have made ourselves one of the three countries in the world to possess nuclear weapons.
  Until the accident at Windscale this had all been done without a single serious accident. What is of more importance to us in this debate is that, even taking the Winclscale accident into account, the Authority can still say that no one has ever been hurt, let alone killed, by radiation from one of their plants. This background of swift progress, of safety and of success must not be forgotten when we consider the Windscale accident. But, of course, this does not diminish the need to determine where the fault lay, how it can be remedied and what can be learned from what has taken place.
  The Authority themselves, in the memorandum which you will find as Annex IV of the White Paper, addressed themselves to the question of responsibility, and stated that they had given overriding priority to the task of learning from the accident all that could be learned for the improvement of their organisation and civil techniques. As regards responsibility, they said that the cause of the accident lay partly in inadequacies of the instrumentation provided at Windscale for the maintenance operation that was being performed at the time of the accident, and partly in faults of judgment by the operating staff, these faults of judgment being themselves attributable by the Authority to weaknesses of their organisation. I can assure the noble Lord that there is no question of finding fault with any individual. Every man did his utmost, and did his duty with the instruments and the information with which he was provided. I should perhaps mention, in passing, that the Committee of Inquiry found that the accident was not caused by any
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  experimentation which was going on in the pile, either for civil or for military purposes.
  As noble Lords are aware, steps have been taken to deal with organisational weaknesses. The Authority recommended that an independent person of standing who has had much experience of processes involving the use and control of hazardous materials should evaluate the lessons of the accident and recommend improvements as necessary. As has been mentioned in your Lordships' House this afternoon, that task has been undertaken, at the Prime Minister's request, by Sir Alexander Fleck. No one who has the welfare of atomic energy at heart—as I feel we all have—could fail to be gratified by Sir Alexander's generous and ready acceptance of this task. I understand that his three committees—their terms of reference are set out in Annex VI of the White Paper—are already engaged on their task.
  There have been suggestions to the effect that the Authority should have done more to inform and advise the local population. This is not a matter which was overlooked by those who were in charge at Windscale, even at the height of the incident. As soon as it was known that there was trouble, vans were sent out to carry out monitoring for radio-activity in the district, and these surveys were maintained continuously throughout the time of danger. I would break off here to say that I have noted with interest the suggestion of the noble Viscount, Lord Stonehaven, that we might have barrage balloons. I am sure that that suggestion will be given careful consideration.
  Reverting to the accident early on the Friday morning, I would inform your Lordships that the chief constable of Cumberland was warned that there might be an emergency. The chief constable immediately set up a liaison office in the factory and had plans ready for bringing in buses to the area to remove people if this should be necessary. In fact this was not necessary; and, on the basis of the measurements which were being made continually in the district, it was clear to the factory management that the levels of radioactivity in the district were not such as to justify any special warning to local people.

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  The Authority are not, however, satisfied that their arrangements for local liaison, as revealed in the case of this incident, are entirely satisfactory. The relations between the Windscale management and all local organisations in Cumberland are excellent, and this is due very largely to the work of the general works manager, over a number of years. Nevertheless, a certain amount of improvisation was necessary after the accident had happened. The Authority have therefore decided that in the case of all their works relations with all the local interests which might be affected by an accident should be put on a more comprehensive basis. Liaison committees are now in process of formation (one is already established at Windscale), and on these committees the steps which should be taken in an emergency will be fully studied with all the local interests which might be concerned.
  My Lords, I want now to step back somewhat from the actual account of what happened and to consider some of the broader implications of the accident—on health, on the Authority's responsibility to anybody whose property is damaged by their activities, and on the power programme. The Medical Research Council, at the Prime Minister's request, appointed an independent committee to report on the health and safety aspects of the accident, and to comment on the findings with regard to health and safety in the report by Sir William Penney's Committee. The Report of the Medical Research Council Committee was published as Annex III in the White Paper. The Committee reported that, after examining various possibilities, they were satisfied that it was
  "in the highest degree unlikely that any harm had been done to the health of anybody, whether a worker in the Windscale plant or a member of the general public".
  Similarly, the Agricultural Research Council are satisfied that there has been no harm to livestock, land or crops.
  At this point I might make it clear to your Lordships that the Agricultural Research Council and the Ministry of Agriculture have been conducting very intensive research into the effect of radio-active fall-out on grass and crops, and I am sure that they will have full regard to the points made by the noble Viscount, Lord Alexander of Hillsborough. The
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  Committee reported that the nature of the fall-out was such that there was no danger from forms of radiation which enter the body through the skin—so-called "external radiation". In the early stages of the incident, however, neither the nature of the contamination nor the extent to which it might increase could be known. The Windscale management therefore thought it a prudent precaution to order the wearing of face masks for nearly an hour during the first night of the accident; though in the event this precaution proved an unnecessary one. The Committee agreed that the danger of genetic damage has similarly been negligible.
  In this particular incident, any possible hazard to health would arise entirely from eating food or drinking water contaminated with radioactive substances—so-called "internal radiation". The Committee were satisfied that there has been no danger front drinking water or any food, other than milk and dairy products. The total effect of radioactivity from drinking water and all foods other than milk was completely negligible. The only substance that really mattered was the radioactive iodine concentrated in milk, although strontium levels also rose, to a lesser degree. The Committee endorsed the Authority's decision to stop the sale of affected milk. However, radio-iodine loses half its radioactivity every eight days, so the fall-off in the radioactivity of milk within the area of restriction was rapid.
  As your Lordships will know, derestriction of the area is rapidly proceeding and an announcement has been made to-day that the last restrictions will be lifted at the end of this week on Saturday, November 23. The Committee observed that the highest levels of radio-strontium in locally produced milk were well below those at which an appreciable hazard would arise. Your Lordships will have been glad to note the Committee's conclusion that the measures adopted by those responsible for the health and safety of the population in and around Wind-scale were, despite certain organisational shortcomings, essentially right, and that, once they had been brought fully into play, they were applied decisively and were adequate to prevent ill effects.
  From what I have said about the health aspects of the accident it will be clear to your Lordships that although no one

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  was hurt a good deal of milk did not reach its normal destinations. The farmers concerned were paid for this milk in the normal way by the Milk Marketing Board. The Board will be reimbursed by the Atomic Energy Authority. Under Section 5 (3) of the Atomic Energy Authority Act, 1954, the Authority have an absolute duty to secure that no ionising radiations from anything on any premises occupied by them cause any hurt to any person or any damage to any property. They are liable if they fail on any occasion to discharge this absolute duty. They have announced that they will consider claims from persons who produce evidence that they have sustained hurt or damage.
  As Minister of Power, I am naturally most closely concerned by anything which might prejudice the continued success of our nuclear power programme, and I would draw your Lordships' attention to the following points. First of all, there is the question of whether this accident could occur in the sort of reactors that will be used in power stations. The matter is, in fact, dealt with in Annex V of the White Paper. Some of the argument is technical but the conclusion is clear, and is this:
  "… the accident which happened at Windscale could not happen with the Calder Hall reactors or with the reactors being built for the electricity authorities".
  The Authority explain that even if a fuel cartridge failed in the Calder Hall type of reactor, and fission products were released into the coolant, the incident could nevertheless quickly be brought under control by the use of the main fans to reduce the temperature. The amount of radioactivity in the coolant circuit, which is closed, would be small, and the amount which could escape into the atmosphere from leakages would be too small to constitute any hazard.
  Secondly, there is the question of what implications the Windscale mishap holds for siting policy. The answer is that it reinforces the view of Her Majesty's Government that the policy announced in 1955, and still in force, is the correct one. It does not cause us to believe that alterations are necessary. The policy we pursue was set out in the White Paper called A Programme of Nuclear Power (Command Paper 9389) in 1955. It was there stated that:
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  "the reactors that will be built for the commercial production of electricity will present no more danger to people living nearby than many existing industrial works that are sited within built-up areas. Nevertheless, the first stations, even though they will be of inherently safe design, will not be built in heavily built-up areas".
  There is nothing in the Windscale accident to cause us to make our policy for the siting of nuclear power stations more restrictive. At the same time I should not like noble Lords to think for one minute that proper arrangements to come into force in the event of an accident will not be available for all these stations. Of course they will. I am grateful to noble Lords for stressing that point, for it is of the greatest importance. There is also the question of the siting of the Atomic Energy Authority's own establishments. These, in the nature of the case, differ from one another, and no general rule (except that of erring on the safe side) has been, or can be, applied. The cases (which are far from numerous) will, of course, continue to be considered on their individual merits and with the fullest realisation of the tremendous importance of protecting both public and workers.
  My Lords, there are one or two further points with which I should like to deal. The noble Viscount, Lord Stonehaven, asked me questions about scanning gear and instrumentation. The scanning gear cannot be used without a flow of air through the pile. There it is not used as part of the Wigner operation; but if a burst cartridge is suspected an air flow can be started as a preliminary to the use of the scanning gear. This was done, but, as explained in the White Paper, the scanning equipment jammed and therefore failed to give the indications required. The noble Viscount, Lord Stonehaven, is quite right in what he suspected: that the White Paper, in the passage dealing with this subject, meant that immediately preceding this maintenance operation the engineers had examined the scanning gear and were satisfied that it was working properly, and it was only the result of the accident which caused it to jam. I think that the question of the contamination of pastures and the question of the renewal of pastures are covered by my remarks on the work of the Agricultural Research Council.

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  Listening to the speeches which have been made on both sides of the House I have been struck by the very clear evidence of the confidence which your Lordships have in Britain's atomic future. That confidence is fully justified. An accident remains an accident when all is said and done. I hope that I have made it clear that there is no tendency on this occasion to blink that fact. But mistakes, analysed dispassionately and remedied resolutely, can be turned to good. Those responsible for atomic energy in this country are determined to treat the Windscale incident in that way. The lessons to be learned from the occurrence, and any recommendations which may result from the studies of the Fleck Committees will, I can assure your Lordships, be carefully applied to the nuclear power stations to be erected and operated by the Electricity Authorities. I think we have had a most useful debate this afternoon, and I am indeed grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Lawson, for initiating it.
  LORD LAWSON: My Lords, I think your Lordships will all be grateful to Lord
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  Mills for the full statement which he has made upon this matter. I therefore beg leave to withdraw my Motion.
  Motion for Papers, by leave, withdrawn.

  LIFE PEERAGES BILL [H.L.]
  4.48 p.m.
  THE EARL OF HOME: My Lords, I beg leave to introduce a Bill to make provision for the creation of life peerages carrying the right to sit and vote in the House of Lords; and to move that the Bill be now read a first time.
  Moved, that the Bill be now read 1a.—(The Earl of Home.)
  On Question, Bill read 1a; and to be printed.

  NATIONAL INSURANCE BILL
  Brought from the Commons; read 1a, and to be printed.
  House adjourned at ten minutes before five o'clock.