HL Deb 08 May 1957 vol 203 cc427-48

2.51 p.m.

THE PARLIAMENTARY SECRETARY. MINISTRY OF DEFENCE (LORD MANCROFT) rose to move to resolve, That this House approves of the Outline of Future Policy of Defence (Cmd. 124). The noble Lord said: My Lords, the outline of our country's future defence policy, published four weeks ago, in which your Lordships' concurrence is now sought, is one of the most important statements of Government policy ever put before Parliament. Since its publication, and the publication of the Service Estimates, there has been an unusually wide discussion on the principles involved—a worldwide discussion, indeed, and one that reflects the far-reaching significance of the policy that Her Majesty's Government had advanced. That discussion is welcome; but, after all, this document is no more than an outline of future defence policy, a statement of the main principles which are to be translated into specific decisions, as part of a single comprehensive pattern for the next five years.

There have, however, been some comments which I think have pulled particular pieces of the pattern out of their setting and have slightly distorted the perspective. For example, some critics have suggested that we intend to rely too much on the use of nuclear weapons, to the virtual exclusion of that always underestimated but always invaluable character—the man with the rifle on his shoulder. The Government's policy has been represented by some simply as a political plan to end National Service; or as a questionable gamble which will give us missiles instead of men; or as a unilateral decision bounced upon our Allies and aimed at reducing the taxpayer's burden whilst side-stepping the consequences to the Western Alliance. None of this is true. This debate will, I hope, do something to restore the perspective and to clear people's minds, at home and abroad, on what our future policy really involves.

Let me briefly restate our intentions. There are three main factors which have governed the evolution of our policy: the recent spectacular advances in military technology; the fact that the prevention of war and the defence of the free world depend primarily on collective defence— this, of course, is the basis of the North Atlantic Alliance; the South East Asia Alliance and the Baghdad Alliance; and thirdly, the fact that this country has for some years been contributing more than its fair share to the system of collective defence and must imperatively evolve a defence programme which eases the strain on its solvency.

Our new policy is based upon these three factors together; not upon any one of them alone. One pre-eminent point, however. I must make at once. If we could reduce the risk of war, through a genuine international disarmament, matters would be vastly different. We are trying to achieve this in the discussions going on at the moment, but it would not be sensible to consider, say, the problems of our own nuclear tests in isolation, as if they were a totally separate matter.

Your Lordships will have noted the important new proposals put forward by the Government last Monday. We continue to believe that the overriding aim in all our military planning must be to prevent war. We continue to believe that at present upon the fear of immediate nuclear retaliation, on a massive scale, with all its attendant and inconceivable horrors, depends the prospect of avoiding global war. We propose to continue our contribution to the nuclear deterrent power of the free world. This is our major protection against the outbreak of that third global war.

Next, we must make a fair and adequate contribution to the balanced pattern of armed forces which the Western Alliance as a whole maintains in order to prevent that war. Right away we find ourselves considering the concept of collectively balanced forces. This is, in turn, part of the concept of collective defence. We recognise that we have been trying to do too much. We must now consider what is the best contribution we can fairly, honestly and usefully make, which will not so endanger our economy that we dishearten our friends and cheer our foes by arming ourselves into bankruptcy, but which still enables us to meet our world-wide responsibilities.

N.A.T.O. strategy is based on the principle that the security of the North Atlantic area is founded not only on the possession by the Alliance of nuclear weapons but also on the possession of sufficient: forces on the ground to demonstrate that all attempts at aggression will be firmly resisted. Our contribution to the Alliance has always been potent. It will remain so. But when we cut the total size of our Forces almost by half, as we plan to do for the reasons I have just explained, our contribution to the Alliance in land, sea and tactical air forces obviously cannot remain unchanged.

When we come to our contribution to the defence of other areas of the world against possible Russian aggression, we must again remember that our membership of the Baghdad Pact and S.E.A.T.O. means that we contribute to the security of the other members of these Alliances by the very fact of our possession of nuclear deterrent forces, which could intervene with great effect in those areas. Our next task is to defend our fellow-citizens in our own Colonies and the people of the protected territories against local attack. In the Middle East, we shall continue to maintain a force strong enough to defend Aden Colony and the Protectorates and those territories on the Persian Gulf for whose safety we are responsible. There will be substantial garrisons in Cyprus and Hong Kong.

In general, our policy is to depend more and more on the increasing strength and efficiency of Colonial forces and our growing capacity to reinforce rapidly. We are entitled also to note the increasing ability of the independent members of the Commonwealth to play their part. We shall, therefore, be reducing overseas garrisons which are too small to be effective yet too large to be economical. But we are, of course, maintaining a Central Reserve in the United Kingdom. We shall be providing the means of rapid mobility for this Central Reserve, primarily with a fleet of transport aircraft, under Royal Air Force control. These transport resources under Royal Air Force control will be supplemented, where necessary, by suitable civil aircraft and, of course, by naval and mercantile vessels. Two new troopships, incidentally, have recently gone into commission. The rapid mobility of our Central Reserve is now a major feature of our defence planning.

There seems to have been some doubt about the future rôle of the Royal Navy. Perhaps this is because the White Paper suggests that the rôle of naval forces in total war cannot be precisely forecast. Of course, it cannot. But surely that is true of all the forces in a global war. There are, however, two points which are made in the White Paper and which I should like to emphasise. In the first place, it is the strategy of the North Atlantic Alliance to maintain substantial naval forces and maritime air units against the possibility that we may have to defend Atlantic communications and our own lifeline against a formidable Russian submarine attack if the initial nuclear exchanges in a global war do riot prove decisive. What we are saying, however, is that the contribution which this country had made to that strategy will have to be reduced, on the grounds that we have been trying to do too much, all over the world. Nevertheless, we shall continue to make a very substantial contribution to N.A.T.O.'s naval forces. The second point I should like to reiterate is that it is the Government's policy that the Royal Navy, though smaller, should be fully modern and effective. It will thus, with its inherent mobility, provide the means of bringing power rapidly to bear in times of sudden upheaval and emergency. It is with this in mind that we now base the main fighting strength of the Royal Navy on a number of aircraft-carrier groups.

Your Lordships of course appreciate that there is a continuing and vital rôle for the Royal Air Force to play. Fighter Command will continue to play its part in the defence of the home-based deterrent force. Transport Command, as I have explained, will be an all-important element in the mobility of our reserves. The medium V-bomber force will make a major contribution to the deterrent; so will the light Canberra bombers, which can also carry the nuclear bomb.

All this leads the Government to the conclusion that we should be able to discharge our responsibilities to ourselves and to our Allies with Armed Forces considerably smaller than at present. This means that we shall be able to dispense with the hitherto essential—but inherently uneconomic—contribution which National Service men have made since the War to the Active Forces. May I stress the importance of this contribution? National Service men have served very stoutly in Korea, in Malaya (where I saw them for myself), in Kenya and elsewhere, side by side with their Regular comrades. We are, however, now planning on the basis that there will be no further call-up under the National Service Acts after the end of 1960.

This now presents us with the task of obtaining sufficient Regulars to man the reduced forces. We must convince the potential Regular recruit that service in the Armed Forces is a wholly honourable and rewarding career, and we hope to have the good will of the nation behind us in so doing. But we shall succeed in attracting enough Regular Service men only if we can show that their conditions of service compare well, in the context of Service requirements, with those in civil life. We are overhauling the whole range of conditions in the Services, and intend to make improvements in no niggardly fashion.

I turn from men to missiles. To what extent shall we be relying upon nuclear weapons? May I review for a moment the actual nuclear weapons with which the West is equipped or is equipping itself? The means of delivery at long ranges of kiloton and megaton bombs will be the V-bombers of the Royal Air Forces. There will also be a variety of tactical nuclear weapons operated by the three Services. The Royal Navy will have strike aircraft with kiloton bombs; the Army will have the Corporal now, and several other nuclear weapons in the future; and the Royal Air Force will have Canberras carrying kiloton bombs. This contribution to the major deterrent against global war will also be supplemented by ballistic rockets. The United States have agreed in principle to supply us with medium-range missiles of this type.

It is wrong however to suggest that it is the nature of the weapons used that would determine whether a conflict developed into an all-out struggle. The truth is the other way round. The scale of military effort the contestants put out would depend on the extent to which the conflict became a matter of life and death to them. The doctrine of economy of force still remains valid. No Government and no commander would use more resources than they thought was essential to carry out the task effectively.

One certainly cannot rule out the possibility of a situation in which the Allies reacted to aggression by using nuclear weapons but without full-scale thermonuclear retaliation. As I say, it is the nature of the situation that would determine the type of action called for. Unquestionably any serious act of aggression would create an exceedingly dangerous situation, which might lead rapidly to all-out war. But that would not depend primarily on the nature of the weapons used.

It is absurd to suppose that a bitterly contested struggle involving, say, fifty divisions could be fought without risk of its developing into total war, simply because the explosives used were let off in artillery barrages of very large numbers of small explosions rather than small numbers of large explosions. And, incidentally, it must not be thought that all nuclear explosions need be at least as big as the Hiroshima explosion. They could range all the way down to something less than the equivalent of, say, one thousand tons of T.N.T. In the sustained artillery barrage of the sort put up on the eve of the major battles that ended twelve years ago to-day the Royal Artillery used something in the neighbourhood of 1,600 tons of T.N.T. To do this, a commander would have deployed about 150 batteries of the Royal Regiment involving something like 30,000 men, without counting the second line and beyond. The same amount of fire power can now be directed against enemy forces by nuclear weapons without, on the one hand, producing in a single explosion the devastating effect of Nagasaki and Hiroshima, and, furthermore, without employing anything like 30,000 men.

But it seems to me that there are two mistakes into which the Allies must on no account fall. First, we should not attempt to maintain conventional forces on a scale designed to enable us to engage in a life-and-death struggle with Russia with these forces alone. We should bankrupt ourselves in the ensuing arms race, and we should lose it. It would certainly mean keeping National Service in the United Kingdom. Secondly, we should not define in advance precisely what form our reaction to particular threats would take. To do so, even if it were practicable, would, to my way of thinking, not diminish but increase the risks, because it would invite an aggressor to plan his aggression, carefully designed to leave him in a state of advantage. The point that we must make clear in advance is that the freedom of the free world will be preserved by the use of whatever measures are needed.

In some quarters the Government's determination to continue tests of our own hydrogen bomb (and to build up a stock when the tests are completed) has been vehemently attacked. Attacks upon the Russians for doing precisely the same are, oddly enough, less often heard. We believe, however, that the policy of placing reliance on large conventional forces, armed solely with non-nuclear weapons, is just another way of preparing to fight a war and lose it. I myself believe—and one has one's views—that the advent of the hydrogen bomb and the realisation of its immeasurably destructive power has edged the danger of global war a little into the background. That danger will remain in the background only so long as we maintain and make abundantly clear our determination to resist aggression.

It is no use having a policy which permits us to reduce the manpower of the Services to a small Regular force unless we stiffen the power of those Regular forces with nuclear weapons. And if we are going to have this terrible H-bomb, we must obviously test it. To call a halt ourselves, but still to shelter under the protection of the American bomb, strikes me as frankly immoral. Testing is, of course, a necessary part of the development and manufacture of weapons of any kind. Those who suggest that we should abandon our nuclear tests are, in effect, asking us to throw over our long-prepared and costly nuclear weapons programme and surrender our participation in the deterrent. This would mean not only that we should be in a far weaker position to make our political contribution to the affairs of the world but also that we should, in effect, be relying almost entirely for the defence of our own country on America. In present circumstances, our defence consists fundamentally in the power to hit back. In other words our defence consists in ensuring that we shall not be attacked.

There have been complaints that there was inadequate consultation with our Allies about our new policy. There have been some sensational and. I think, rather silly suggestions that our new policy amounts to a partial withdrawal from N.A.T.O. Nothing could be further from the truth. The facts are that since the end of 1955 we have been urging on our partners in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation the imperative necessity of re-thinking a defence policy that will reflect the development of the hydrogen bomb and the swelling economic power of Russia.

We told our Allies at the end of 1955 that we were trying to work out a basic new approach to our own defence policy, and that we should place the results before them when we were in a position to do so. This we have done punctiliously. There should therefore be no grounds for the suggestion that this re-examination came as a surprise to our Allies, though the realism of our conclusions may possibly have shocked them. We have also observed scrupulously the requirement to consult fully with our N.A.T.O. Allies about that part of our new policy which affects our contribution to the forces placed under the N.A.T.O. Supreme Commanders.

The proposal which we put before our partners in N.A.T.O. was that, as part of the streamlining of our forces throughout the world, we should, then and there, reduce the British Army of the Rhine by 27,000 men and our 2nd Tactical Air Force of the Royal Air Force by about half, both processes to be completed by March 31, 1958. Our Allies requested us to limit the withdrawal of men from the British Army of the Rhine of 13,500 in the period up to March 31, 1958. This we have agreed to do, on the understanding that in the autumn of this year the Allies, in their turn, will give further consideration to our outstanding proposals. This fact is striking evidence of the reality of the consultation which goes on between the partners in Western European Union and in N.A.T.O. Our Allies recognise that we are pulling more than our fair weight. We recognise, on our part, that the speed with which we had felt it necessary to reduce the Army in Germany would not give the Allies adequate time to re-set the field. But the Germans themselves cannot escape blame for the slowness of their build-up.

Although we are making a numerical reduction in the size of the British Army in Germany, the reduction in fighting capacity is by no means proportionate to the number of men pulled back. Quite apart from the increased strength which the possession of tactical nuclear weapons will give both the Army and the R.A.F., our Army will be reorganised so as to increase the proportion of fighting troops to administrative troops—the proportion between "teeth" and "tail."

There is a great deal of public concern, both inside the Services and out, not only with the measures which we must take to make the career of the regular Service man sufficiently attractive to ensure that we shall get the men we want, but also with the more immediate problem of providing real compensation for those officers and men whose chosen careers may have to be prematurely and unhappily ended as the Forces are run down to their permanent all-Regular level. We are acutely aware of the anxieties and uncertainties which must now be troubling the minds of many Regular officers and men, and their wives. The sooner these anxieties and uncertainties can be resolved the better. I can assure your Lordships that the task of working out a fair scheme of compensation, and one which is regarded as fair by the men themselves and by the country which they have honourably served, is recognised by the Government as of paramount importance. What is more, disgruntled ex-Service men make poor recruiting officers.

Before we can put an end to the uncertainties and anxieties, we have a formidable planning operation to carry out. The Defence White Paper was an outline of future policy for some years ahead. It did not pretend to be a nicely calculated exercise. The outline came first: the calculations are now in train. We want to ensure some finality. We and our potential recruits want as little chopping and changing as possible—the Army has a word for that. The Service Departments are engaged on working out in detail the new Order of Battle and the administrative arrangements for putting the plan into effect. The evolution of the plan will be detailed and immensely complicated, and it will not. I am afraid, be ready to-morrow.

Two things, above all—I hope I can obtain your Lordships' agreement for this—must be achieved: a new, full and attractive career, with good prospects for the right men and as little trespass as possible upon those old and proud traditions of ship, regiment and squadron in which the loyalty and morale of the Armed Forces of the Crown are so deeply rooted. There are few more attractive intellectual exercises than that of armchair strategy. It is an exercise, however, in which a Government which intends to govern can seldom indulge, because, unlike the armchair strategist, a Government must eventually make up its mind, stir its stumps, get out of its chair, take a decision, and carry it out.

This, my Lords, is what the Government has done. I do not maintain that every "t" in our plans has yet been correctly crossed and every "i" dotted, to the satisfaction of every armchair strategist. Military progress (if that be the right word) is nowadays too rapid and the ensuing complications of defence too imponderable for that. I believe, however, that we have fairly and squarely acknowledged our obligations. I believe that we have correctly estimated our assets, and realistically accepted our limitations. I believe that we have dealt honourably with our allies; I believe, too, that we are fully and properly discharging our responsibilities towards the country for whose safety Her Majesty's Government must always inescapably answer, and I ask for your Lordships' approval of the manner in which we are doing it. I beg to move.

Moved to resolve, That this House approves of the Outline of Future Policy of Defence (Cmd. 124).—(Lord Mancroft.)

3.17 p.m.

VISCOUNT ALEXANDER OF HILLSBOROUGH

My Lords. I must say that in all the addresses we have had on Defence from the Government Benches in the last five or six years, I doubt whether we have ever had a speech so rapid and so full of apparent confidence as we have had to-day. If those two qualities are especially deserving of congratulation on this vastly important subject, then the noble Lord certainly has my congratulations. I wish that there were in the country at large anything approaching the type of confidence in the policy indicated to us by the noble Lord, Lord Mancroft. Of course, he was perfectly right, at the opening of his speech, when he drew attention to the importance of these defence debates this year. Nor is he wrong in suggesting that they have become of world-wide interest, and that they have been widely commented upon by different forms of world opinion. But when we consider what has made these debates so important, perhaps we shall get some further guidance.

The Government's decision in this White Paper, primarily on weapons (because it has been made clear to us in another place that it is the decision upon weapons which is at the base of the new general defence policy and which guides and governs the whole of our future strategy and defence organisation) was. I think, correctly described by the Prime Minister the other day in another place as "a terrible decision." It is a terrible decision. By whatever events we have arrived at this point of departure, it means, if closely followed and leading to its logical belligerent result, that should strife occur, there will be no return. That is a matter of very great seriousness to the nation. In this matter of adopting the nuclear weapon as the basis of our strategy, perhaps the point of greatest importance to the people of this country to consider at present—because, if the White Paper is right (and I think it is) there is no known adequate defence in this country to the weapon—is that, whilst other countries possessing the nuclear weapon have certain reserves in depth, we in this country have no reserves in depth. That is what makes it so vital a question for the population as a whole. That is what is wrapped up in the "terrible decision" which the Prime Minister says the Government have had to make.

But that does not mean, surely, that, because it is a terrible decision, we cannot have some sympathy with the Government in the position in which they find themselves in having to come to this decision. All political considerations apart, I have never been—and I think your Lordships will grant me this—among those who have at any time on matters of defence sought to lay principal blames upon my own countrymen, without considering the contribution to world chaos in these questions which has come from other countries, very often deliberately and wilfully. We cannot in such matters be unaware of the terrible risks which are being placed upon us, not merely by our mistakes and omissions but by the actual, active opposition to disarmament, and therefore to agreed peace, which has come from other countries.

But, whatever our sympathy with the Government in finding themselves in that position in having to make their decision, it does not and must not mean that citizens with any sense of responsibility to their country and to their families in this matter are not entitled to criticise past errors. Nor is there any doubt as to the sharp and painful division that has been created in the country, throughout the nation, on the recent decision of the Government set out in the White Paper. That division exists in Parties—because by no means is there unanimity in the Conservative Party. There is certainly not unanimity in the Labour Party about it, and we shall no doubt hear later in the debate whether there is unanimity in the Liberal Party.

If we look to outside religious opinion, we find that there is a sharp division in the Churches. It was only last week that the denomination to which I am proud to belong, the Baptist denomination, had in their General Assembly a motion on this matter, a motion which was, from my point of view, quite a right sort of one in regard to the use of nuclear power. They took a vote on an amendment to the motion, the amendment being in favour of immediate suspension of all tests. With nearly 700 votes in the Assembly, there was a majority against the amendment of only 5. That is the measure of the sharpness of the division in organisations like the national Churches, and right throughout the nation. Therefore it is quite clear that the decision that the Government have portrayed in this White Paper is of very great, indeed vast, importance.

How have we come to this actual position to-day? If we look at paragraphs 2 and 5 of the White Paper, we have a little guide. Paragraph 2, a little way down, says this: It was clear that the plan for a short intensive rearmament spurt "— that is, speaking of the period immediately after the Korean war— no longer fitted the needs of the situation, and that for it must be substituted the conception of the 'long haul'. It also became evident that a military effort on the scale planned in 1950. which envisaged expenditure amounting to £4,700 million over three years, was beyond the country's capacity. That was immediately after the Korean war which was very nearly four years ago. Then if we look at paragraph 5, we see that it says: But it is only now that the future picture is becoming sufficiently clear to enable a comprehensive reshaping of policy to be undertaken with any degree of confidence. My own view upon that is that, however difficult it may have been, we have been singularly slow in coming to a decision on these matters, whether this decision is right or wrong. In this House, for more than five years now we have requested that there should be a real inquiry into these matters, not forgetting that that inquiry should include something which is now portrayed by the Government in their statement of policy as being factual—that is, that the economic position of our country is a very important part of our capacity for defence. That fact has been mentioned again and again in the requests we have made for economy, for until we had a new Minister of Defence a few months ago, and until he had been to the United States of America for consultation, no decision was made, no presentation of a Paper of this importance could be made ready or presented to Parliament. That is a great pity.

No doubt, to some considerable degree that state of affairs stems from the fact that in this vastly important Department, the Ministry of Defence, there has been very little in the nature of continuity of ministerial control of policy. Of all the Departments that need such continuity, so that a Minister is given time to formulate and control policy, surely the Defence Department is one of the most special. Yet during the period of office of the present Government we have had, including the present Minister, six Ministers of Defence, five of them in rather less than two and a half years. How on earth it is thought to be possible to have real work with Chiefs of Staff, and to ensure continuity of policy, with so rapid a change of Ministers as that. I do not know. It seems to me a most extraordinary state of affairs. It is one of the factors which has forced this kind of decision upon us, so late that we have reached the position of having to build a policy in which we are pushed into the cul-de-sac of having to rely now upon the ultimate deterrent from which we shall have considerable difficulty in extricating ourselves.

One of the contributory factors, perhaps, to the policy set out in this White Paper has been the general result of the Suez policy, the Suez adventure. I think that must be said. I am making no complaint at all about the Minister of Defence and what he has had to do in the present circumstances, whether his decision has been right or wrong; but I do say that the effects of the Suez policy have been a profound factor in the general make-up of the policy now adumbrated in the White Paper. The Government must get back on to an economic level keel. They must try to restore the country's economic capacity to be able to conduct an adequate defence. There must be a looking back at all angles by the Minister of Defence. No doubt he would be quite right in doing so, but when we consider the cost of (a) the actual operations in Suez, and (b) the economic effect upon our situation as a whole, then the Government have seriously impaired the nation's capacity to maintain anything like the present and past rate of expenditure since 1950 upon armaments. There is another special pointer showing how and why this White Paper has been produced. That is a very great pity.

Before I go on to another point, let me say this on the economic issue, and know it will be resented by some because it is no doubt a political point. I think we took grave risks and went a long way in adopting the triennial programme which was desired by our Allies in 1950–51, and pushed up our defence programme to £4,700 millions for the three years, but I believe that our country is not so bereft of capacity to deal with these matters if, in face of great problems like that we work upon planned economy and, if necessary, physical control. But in fact we have apparently never been able to keep up with the actual plan of the triennial programme, because since 1951 we have been pursuing very largely a "free-for-all" in our economy; therefore we have not been getting anything like the reserves of material equipment that we should have had if the triennial programme had been carried through.

Now I would say one or two further words upon the White Paper itself. I am very glad indeed to note in paragraph 10 of the White Paper the emphasis upon the fact that no country can any longer protect itself in isolation. The defence of Britain is possible only as part of the collective defence of the free world. That is by no means a new statement; it has been made by many people of different military authority and different political outlook in the past. But it is essential that it should be emphasised; and if it is adhered to surely we should not engage in any more military adventures of the Suez type, because that was made, it seems to me, without due consultation with our Allies. That alliance was carefully and painfully built up over the years from the first Brussels Treaty until it now has a very wide spread. In my view it is essential in the defence of the free world that that alliance should be maintained and strengthened wherever it possibly can be. But you do not do that by going off on operations before there has been due consultation with our Allies.

Now I come to paragraph 12 of the White Paper on the nuclear deterrent. It says: It must be frankly recognised that there is at present no means of providing adequate protection for the people of this country against the consequences of attack with nuclear weapons. I think that in our case that is absolutely true, because we have not the depth. When people begin to talk about civil defence in relation to nuclear attack, and about wholesale evacuation, they at last begin to ask how far the people can be evacuated in the event of nuclear attack. It is obvious that even if only a very few of the major weapons of nuclear power were used in attack upon us we should be disorganised throughout the country, and every section of the country would be in immediate and appalling danger. If you take the Government's own statement in this Paper as being the fact, that is what we have to face.

What is happening in view of that position? First of all, let me make it clear that we cannot overlook the two paragraphs on civil defence in the White Paper. We did not hear much in explanation of them from the Minister who introduced the White Paper this afternoon. First of all the White Paper says here is at present no means of providing adequate protection. The other paragraph says that civil defence must accordingly play an essential part in the defence plan. I happen to be amongst those who believe that to have at least a framework organisation for civil defence is necessary in any case. But there is a school of thought which believes that civil defence at any great cost of preparation to-day is quite unwarranted, in view of the fact that, as the Government say here, there is no adequate protection against nuclear attack. I think it is worth while to mention that some countries, such as France, have no civil defence organisation—none at all. There may be other countries in the N.A.T.O, alliance who are in the same category. At any rate, during the course of the debate perhaps we may have a better exposition of the Government's real ideas regarding civil defence in view of their statement about nuclear deterrent in paragraph 12. If they can obtain the information in the time, in the course of the two days' debate, I hope they will let us know which of the other Allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation have arrangements for civil defence and which have not, so that we may make our own studies and comparisons in the matter.

Now in view of that statement let the country face up to this also. In paragraph 14 and paragraph 15 we get a clear indication of what the Government's immediate policy on nuclear weapons is. They say in paragraph 14 that the only existing safeguard against major aggression is the power to threaten retaliation with nuclear weapons. It does not say that the major aggression is necessarily a very high-powered nuclear attack against us or our Allies; just "a major aggression". They go on in paragraph 15 to say that they are pursuing a policy of making the megaton bomb (on top of the kiloton bomb and stocks of kiloton bombs), which will shortly be tested; and thereafter a stock will be manufactured. I just want to put these facts into the minds of the House so that we may have fully before us what we are actually considering.

The Prime Minister complained in another place that the Amendment of the Labour Party to the Government Resolution to approve the White Paper said that the Government were relying unduly upon the power of nuclear deterrent. It was greatly criticised. I am not complaining of anything that was said, but that Amendment was highly criticised. Is it not really creating a dangerous position for us if we cut both manpower and expenditure on our defence by relying upon something which, if it is ever put in use, will most likely destroy ourselves almost before anybody else? It seems to me to be wrong to put our sole reliance on that. At any rate, it might be useful in the course of the debate to have an answer upon that point. I say that we in Great Britain and Northern Ireland have no depth of defence in this regard. Are you right, therefore, in putting your reliance upon what some may, as the Minister did, describe as a gamble, or what perhaps in more Parliamentary language one should describe as a very grave risk indeed?

Strangely enough, in the midst of all that comes paragraph 13, which is a paragraph with which we can all agree. This makes it more than ever clear that the overriding consideration in our military planning must be to prevent war rather than to prepare for it. So far in the history of man's use of constantly developing and increasingly powerful weapons there have been prophecies at almost every stage that the weapons would be such a deterrent that there would be no future major war. It was a proposition that was put widely round the world on the discovery of what we now regard as a simple explosive—dynamite. People argued then that there would be no further war. Then, at various stages, as we moved on to heavy armour-piercing shells, then to torpedoes, then to the use of gas, always it was said that if only we would rely upon this particular weapon as the main deterrent then there was little likelihood of a major war in future.

Who can say that this weapon is going to be a reasonably reliable deterrent to war in the future? It may well have been a great deterrent so long as the free nations in the world alone possessed nuclear power. That view might then have been forcefully argued. But that is no longer the position. Nor is it apparently likely to be the case that the present members of the free world who own nuclear power will remain the only nations in the free world who are to possess it. Nor is it likely, in those circumstances, that the Russians, who are now admitted by the free world to have both the kiloton and the megaton bomb, will be content to rely only upon their great depth in the use of these weapons. It seems likely that if the use of these weapons is spread through the alliance of N.A.T.O., or of S.E.A.T.O. or of the Baghdad Pact, there will be the same spread among those who are within the orbit of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. So in that argument there is no real reliance upon safety at all.

What, to me, is certain from the policy now published, and from the statement which was emphasised, is what came out quietly two years ago: that we intended to use tactical atomic weapons. We have since heard by way of further explanation that we, as members of the free world, have determined to use for tactical warfare, as apart from major warfare, weapons of atomic power. As to when it will become necessary to use the ultimate deterrent, we have to wait and see. But what sort of power is involved? I thought that the remarks of the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry were singularly insufficient this afternoon in dealing with this matter. He said that, of course, one could not say directly that the atomic tactical weapon was likely to be the heaviest of the kiloton type, or that it would not be a much lighter weapon; nor could one say effectively that we should not be able to settle some of these minor conflagrations without recourse at all to atomic weapons. But it is, in fact, quite clear, if you look at the reply given by the Minister of Defence in the debate in another place on February 13 last, that atomic weapons of the power of the Hiroshima bomb are now regarded as primarily suitable for tactical use by troops in the field.

I ask your Lordships: what sort of tactical warfare is that? I suppose it means the kind of warfare which is foreshadowed in the White Paper, which says that there is to be firm ground defence of the frontiers of the free world; therefore we should be quite entitled, I suggest, on the statement of the Minister of Defence in another place, to use an atomic bomb of the Hiroshima strength in tactical warfare in ground defence of our frontiers. I hope it will be made perfectly clear whether or not I am stating what is the correct understanding. Certainly the Minister of Defence himself, in his cross-examination in the House regarding the White Paper, failed to give any effective answer upon that point, except to show, as I think it must be shown to us all, that once you have gone into a conflict that you think is of such frontier importance that you use atomic tactical weapons of strength up to the Hiroshima type, you can hardly expect one side or the other in that conflict not to have recourse to the ultimate deterrent.

That is the position into which we have gradually been led. I have complained bitterly, year after year, that gradually we have been drawn into that position by declarations of military policy from high officers of S.H.A.P.E., the military headquarters of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, which have led to the adoption of this kind of policy. We have never had in their proper order, at the right time, declarations of policy by Ministers on this matter—never, until we got the real thing, that some atomic weapons were being produced two years ago. The way in which this powerful hierarchy of military officers in S.H.A.P.E. has been allowed not only to shape policy in the staff room and in the planning room but to publish a policy which should have been announced by Ministers, is to me quite shocking in a modern state of things.

Now I come to the last two points—all that I have time for—out of the many ether matters that I wanted to deal with to-day. The first is this. I am wondering how the Government, on the basis of their finance defence plan—the plans affected by manpower, by equipment and the like—are adequately to carry out the defence of the Commonwealth. In one breath you are cutting down your manpower considerably; in another breath you are saying, "We must maintain adequate forces and troops, say, east of Suez; we must maintain adequate forces in Cyprus, Hong Kong and Singapore; we must have reserves in this country "—as is stated, in the White Paper "which can be thrown expeditiously to any point of the Commonwealth requiring reinforcement: or strength." Apparently you are trying to do all that with a very reduced number of personnel.

I know that in putting points like this I speak only for myself. I know that there have been from my own Party as big, if not bigger, requests for a reduction in the number of personnel as there have been from any other quarter of public opinion in the country. But because I have always been exceedingly keen about the defence of the Commonwealth I must say that from my experience I am sure it will be found that, with the extent to which reliance is to be placed upon a great deal of new and highly technical equipment, it will not be possible to save as many personnel as the Government expect and still be able to cover the duties of the ground force personnel and all the other commitments which have been mentioned. At any rate, I feel that that is arguable, and that we should have from Her Majesty's Government a much more detailed estimate than anyone has yet had showing the number of personnel to be employed in the technical weapons and allied services in that connection, and how many people are to be freed for the normal duties of the Royal Navy, the Royal Air Force and the ordinary ground forces of the Army.

Certainly there will not be voluntary reserves available to the extent that there have been before, because the Government are interfering with the existing forces of the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve and the Royal Auxiliary Air Force, both of which have been disbanded, thereby leaving only very limited resources available.

THE FIRST LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY (THE EARL OF SELKIRK)

My Lords, only the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve Air Wing has been disbanded—not the Volunteer Reserve itself.

VISCOUNT ALEXANDER OF HILLSBOROUGH

I am glad to have that fact pointed out to me, but there will certainly be far fewer reserves available for the Royal Naval Air Wing and the Royal Auxiliary Air Force—that is certain. That fact must be taken into account when one considers the commitments outlined in the White Paper as requiring to be fulfilled. Anybody who studies this question and appreciates the length and breadth of our Commonwealth commitments must never forget that we are not in the position that we were in in 1939. With India gone, and no Indian Army, the position in regard to military personnel is entirely changed. We ought therefore to have from the Government Benches some greater explanation of how these figures of projected personnel are to be divided between the nuclear sections, with their technical and maintenance services, and the other three main Services to which I have referred.

As my noble friend Lord Lucan is rather indisposed and has lost a great deal of his speaking power, I want this afternoon to take up a point which he himself had intended to raise, one already dealt with by the Minister: the treatment to be given to men displaced from the Services by reason of the projected cuts. The Minister made very large and wide promises, and I have no doubt that if they are fulfilled to the satisfaction of the men a great deal of satisfaction will be felt generally. On the other hand, the more those men are given (and I do not want that to be in any way cut down), the more provision must be made for civilian employees to be displaced from Government and State institutions, ordnance factories and the like. I hope that that fact will not be forgotten.

The treatment of displaced officers and N.C.Os., as mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Mancroft, will depend to a great extent on their recruiting value. I am greatly in favour of a voluntary force, if we can get it. I have never been an addict of the principle of National Service and, speaking entirely for myself, I have never been able to find any answer to the post-war problem without National Service. When we have gone out specially to get large additions to our Regular forces, we have tried to do so, stage by stage, by giving substantial increases in their emoluments; and in every case there has been a spurt of enlistment which has subsequently fallen away. There has been another spurt with the next injection of a little more encouragement, and then that, too, has fallen away. And so it will go on.

I have no confidence that we shall be able, in the age in which we live to-day, in view of the kind of demand for, and opportunities offered to, people in the industrial and commercial spheres, to get, by Regular enlistment, the full number of people that we hope to get to form an entirely Regular force. I hope that we may hear something more about that, and may be told how Her Majesty's Govern- ment believe that is going to be done. I am quite certain that everybody in the country will wish Her Majesty's Government well in their plan to give adequate compensation to displaced officers and N.C.Os. Some of the N.C.Os. are worthy of great consideration. They have done very fine service, not only in training themselves and those under them, but sometimes in training officers as well; and I hope they get adequate compensation. I hope that Her Majesty's Government will succeed in all these matters, for I want to see success here. I am bound to say, however, that I am very doubtful. I admit that the White Paper says that unless the required numbers are obtained, there will have to be further recourse to National Service. But let us have the estimated figures for the branches of the Services in this nuclear age and know how Her Majesty's Government hope to be able to manage the defence of the Commonwealth with the limited number of troops available.

I am quite sure that the House will see that I have been trying to state the case from both sides; and I have, I hope, tried to be reasonably fair. In my own personal and public life I have taken the line of trying to see that we get adequate defences for our country, but in our discussion of national defence we have now largely come to making a decision on a point of departure from which there is grave danger that there can be no return. I was gravely concerned to hear from the noble Lord, Lord Mancroft, who introduced it as his own personal opinion, that those people who thought there might usefully be a postponement of tests and things of that kind held a view which was almost immoral, in that they expected to get nuclear assistance that was wanted from some country other than their own. If your Lordships will look at Hansard you will see exactly what was said. I hope the noble Lord does not mean that, if the Baptist Union, or the Churches, pass a resolution to that effect, they are, in the view of the Minister, to be classified as immoral in doing so; because, on the contrary, there are in this country at present people who believe that in the country's present fortunes, and in view of the threat of grave danger to the whole world, it is time that the whole nation was thinking not merely more in moral terms but also in the spiritual terms required, and seeking the help of Divine Providence in order that we may see a way through and do something for agreement, disarmament and peace.