§ 3.23 p.m.
§ EARL DE LA WARR rose to draw attention to certain defects in the working of the United Nations Organisation and to ask Her Majesty's Government to open discussions with other nations at an early appropriate moment in order to remove these defects, and to move for Papers. The noble Earl said: My Lords, I feel that I owe your Lordships something of an apology for putting down a Motion on so important a question as this on a day when it could be preceded by legislation. However, I think I should inform your Lordships that I did it on, as I thought, a definite understanding that if I moved the Motion from a Wednesday to a Thursday the legislation would be dealt with on the Wednesday and that Thursday would be left clear.
§ Perhaps I should also apologise to your Lordships on another point—namely, that this Motion has been on the Paper for so long. The truth is that the moment never seemed to be quite appropriate to move it; and, looking back, I think most of us will agree that it is just as well that we did riot discuss this matter before. After all, a question of this character cannot usefully be discussed in a spirit of heat or anger, and I feel sure that many of us would feel that during the last few months of last year and the first few months of this year it was difficult for an Englishman always to survey quite dispassionately the activities of the United Nations. At that time we found ourselves on the defensive, virtually placed in the 122 dock, while we had the spectacle of the United Nations Organisation building up Colonel Nasser as the aggrieved party. There is no doubt that to-day many of those who are now speaking of the deficiencies and weakness of the United Nations Organisation were at that time seeing the "be all and end all" of foreign policy in those sacred words "United Nations Organisation."
§ To-day it is rather difficult to speak of the deficiencies of the United Nations without uttering a number of platitudes. However, at the outset of my remarks I want to be clear on one point—that anyone who thinks for a moment that the affairs of the modern world can be conducted without an organisation of this character is just not a realist. If Mr. Balfour was right many years ago in saying that, if there were not a League of Nations, then someone would have to invent such a body, he would certainly be doubly right to-day. The only question before us, therefore, as I see it, is how this organisation can be operated so that it may function more satisfactorily than it does at the moment; and the only value of criticism is to endeavour to uncover some of its weaknesses so that it may function better. I use the word "better" quite deliberately, and omit any reference I had in the first draft of my Motion to its being "ineffective".
§ If we give any serious thought to the problem we have to realise that ineffectiveness is not necessarily the only, or even the main, weakness of the United Nations. After all, as an organisation it was extremely effective in its attitude towards Britain and France during the Suez crisis; and it was extremely effective in ensuring that the Suez Canal was cleared only according to a strict timetable laid down by Colonel Nasser himself. The fact is that the United Nations knew perfectly well that in dealing with Britain, France and Israel it was dealing with fundamentally law-abiding countries, devoted to the cause of the United Nations, and that therefore it was safe to "talk tough" to us. In dealing in the past with Mossadeq over the question of Abadan, with Nehru over Kashmir, with Russia over Hungary, and with Egypt during assaults on the Israelis over a period of ten years and their robbery of the international highway, the picture was very different. I am afraid that the principle which seems to have 123 been operating in the mind of the United Nations is only too disastrously clear: that law-abiding nations can and must be disciplined, but law-breakers, on the other hand, are dangerous animals and must he treated with the utmost caution, if not respect.
§ That is really why I have felt it difficult to question very strongly the principle of the Veto on the Security Council. Without that Veto, the control of the Security Council over us, and the challenge to our sovereignty and the sovereignty of nations, would be so great that I believe few of us would care to contemplate it. The Security Council, protected by the power of the Veto, was originally devised on the assumption of basic unity of purpose between the Great Powers. That assumption, unfortunately, has proved to be wrong. Then, of course, there is an attempt made to by-pass that difficulty by transferring a number of activities and problems to the General Assembly. That body's influence is not limited by the power of Veto; it can act on a two-thirds majority—or rather (I am wrong in using the word "act"), it can pass resolutions on a two-thirds majority, but it has no executive power and no power of compulsion. If it had, the whole problem would, of course, be much intensified, and I think the position would be worse.
§ The United Nations is an organisation composed of eighty or eighty-one nations—I think the number is now eighty-one. Many of those nations have no responsibility for world affairs, and it is true to say that most of them would be utterly unable to carry any of the burdens consequent on the making of a wrong or unwise decision out of which serious conflict might arise. That problem is intensified very frequently, by our British policy of giving independence and self-government to more and more nations. It is further intensified, of course, by the principle that operates at the United Nations of "one nation, one vote". That means, for instance, that the new state of Ghana, which we all hope will be successful, has exactly the same power and influence in voting strength as, say, America or ourselves. Yet one may ask: Who bears the brunt of any world conflict that may arise as a result of an unwise decision of the United Nations?
§ I do not think that quite finishes the summary of the problems connected with 124 this issue, because the problem is not only one of numbers. There is another important point, and that is the nature of the challenges with which we have been lately faced, and which seem likely to lie ahead of us. For the time being. I think we can say, without undue optimism, that a major clash between major Powers seems almost to be ruled out by the fear of mutual destruction in a nuclear war. Therefore, the problem today is something different from that. It is the sort of problem that arises out of the Arab-Israeli dispute, out of Abadan and Suez, and which seems to be arising to-day in Oman. There we are faced with the type of potentate who is prepared to tear up any agreement or take over anybody else's property. whether national or international, and then rally behind him the Russian nine (or is it ten?) satellites, the Afro-Asian group, and sometimes, alas! even America, in a great and glorious cry of "anti-colonialism." Thus inspired, the United Nations appears to forget entirely the original crime and the nation which committed the original crime, and throws the whole of its moral and legal force against the victim of the theft or aggression who makes bold to attempt to defend himself or his interests or, in the case of Suez, an international interest.
§ How are we to try to meet this situation? One thing is quite clear: that there is no easy panacea. I think we shall all agree that we should be wrong to say, because there is no easy panacea, that there is nothing that can be done, albeit many of the things which I believe can be done have to be looked at on a long term basis. I do not know if your Lordships would agree with me, but I should think that the most important step to make the United Nations an effective body is that we and America should be able to understand one another and stand together. To that end, it is vitally important to do everything in our power, by propaganda, by action, and in every other way, to remove this fear of British colonialism which, I believe, poisons the attitude of so many Americans in dealing with these problems.
§ Speaking personally, from what I gathered during a speaking tour I have carried out lately in America, I would say that there are strong indications that some of what I would call the anti-colonial complex over there is definitely 125 weaker than it was. I believe that there are a great number of Americans who are beginning to understand something of what British colonialism has done, in terms of civilisation and freedom, for many hundreds of millions of people in the world. I raise this point with no fear of an accusation of irrelevance, because I believe it is a vital point in the problem we are discussing to-day.
§ I say, secondly, that it is important to bring to bear all our influence against a system that I am afraid has tended rather to grow up in the United Nations lately, and that is what I call a system of group politics. We should, I think, be optimistic to hope that we can persuade Russia and her satellites to give up acting as a group, though I should certainly say that if Russia is anxious to convince the rest of the world that the change she says is taking place in Russia has, in fact, taken place, she could probably take no better step than this. But I relieve there is room for effective action in dealing with what we may call the Afro-Asian groups. I think we can bring to their notice what, after all, are their own interests, and, I would say, their own vital interests. The United Nations is the great hope, especially of those who are not great Powers, living as we are to-day in times of great danger for the weaker nations. There is nothing more likely 10 weaken, if not actually destroy, the influence of the United Nations than these group politics, based on prejudice relating to geography, race or colour. Here, surely, we can say to our friends of the Afro-Asian group that they have a tremendous and magnificent opportunity to prove that they have achieved not only their independence but also a full adult attitude and status.
§ Thirdly, may I say a word on the question of our representation at the United Nations and, indeed, the representation of all countries? Britain has a fine record there. During the existence of the United Nations, we have had three representatives, every one of them of first-class calibre. But, for all that, should we not cast our minds back to the old League of Nations days when we had Ministers with national position (I need only mention two names: Lord Cecil of Chelwood and Mr. Anthony Eden, as he then was) operating as almost full-time League of Nations Ministers?—though I do not think that Lord Cecil 126 was actually so called. We know there is a great deal to be said against Ministers spending too much of their time abroad, but without in any way altering the diplomatic representation which we have been making to the United Nations, should we not think in terms also of Ministerial representation of that calibre?
§ Then, fourthly, have we not reached the stage where the United Nations might he prepared to tackle some of the challenges that I have mentioned, with greater courage, if they were in possession of an international police force? I particularly stress the word "police" rather than "army". It may be that in times to come an international army may become a practical proposition, but I do not think that many of your Lordships would feel that it is so to-day. A police force, whether permanent or ad hoc, is a practical proposition, and it is just the sort of force that is needed for dealing with the kind of challenge that I have ventured to mention to your Lordships. Its strength would lie not in its capacity to make war but primarily in the danger to any aggressor of attacking an international force.
§ Finally, may I remind your Lordships of the discussion last autumn on the Suez dispute, when there was a great disagreement between the Lord Chancellor and the noble and learned Lord, Lord McNair, on the interpretation of Article 51 of the Charter, which deals with self-defence. It is not for me, as a layman, to take any side in that matter, but if it is possible for as eminent a lawyer as the noble and learned Lord, Lord McNair, to cast doubt on or, as I think he did, assert positively that Article 51 ruled us out of court for acting in defence either of our own interests or of international interests, then all I can say is that the sooner that Article is redrafted the better. If the United Nations is prepared, by its organisation, to relieve individual nations of the need to defend their own interests, so much the better. We should all be delighted. But unless and until they are able to do that, we must be able to defend ourselves. The fact is that no sane man or sane nation is prepared to give up the right of self-defence unless it knows that there is a firm system of law and order that can be enforced by an effective force.
127§ The United Nations Organisation, my Lords, is on trial today. Let there be no doubt in our minds on that point. It has done splendid and most useful work, particularly in the field of the Specialised Agencies. Another instance is the occasion when, fortunately for the world, Russia was sulking and not taking part in the Security Council, and the United Nations was then able to act effectively in Korea, as Russia was not present to use her Veto. But the United Nations has failed in dealing with the ten years' dispute between the Arabs and the Israelis. It failed in dealing with Abadan. In the minds of many of us, it failed in dealing with Suez. It failed to clear the Canal in the time in which it could have been cleared, and it failed in its undertakings to Israel when Israel was persuaded to leave the Gaza Strip and had a definite undertaking that that Strip would not be allowed to be reoccupied by Egypt as a base for hostile action, and when Israel understood that she had an undertaking as regards the freedom of the Canal and the Gulf of Aqaba. I repeat, let us be very clear in our minds that the United Nations is on trial today.
§ I would venture to suggest to your Lordships that this debate is dealing with such a colossal problem that I do not think we can hope to come to any very definite conclusion. As I have said before, there is no easy panacea, but we can, at least, help by trying constructively to uncover at least the realities of the problem. We must have no fear of admitting its deficiencies, and no fear of admitting its faults. After all, the acceptance of one's limitations is often a part of growing up, and the premature efforts on the part of the United Nations or any other organisation in trying to take on responsibilities for which it is not ready can only do more harm than good. In the case of the United Nations, it only diverts attention from what it has already done and can do in the future.
§ It can, as I have said, provide a forum and a meeting place for the diplomats and statesmen of the world. It has done, and can do, immensely important and valuable work on the economic, social and humanitarian side, through its Specialised Agencies. It can build up the idea of an effective International police force. I do not think we ought to discount 128 the value even of one of its last pieces of work, its report on Hungary. We may consider it is ineffective. In many ways it is, but we are living in a day of cold rather than hot war, and I believe an open disclosure of what has happened is at least of some value in that cold war. I would venture to appeal to your Lordships that we should all agree to emphasise what the United Nations really can do, and can do now. I believe that that is the real hope of success and of further growth into a body that can ultimately free mankind from the fear of war, and from that type of international behaviour that so frequently in the past has led to war. My Lords, I beg to move for Papers.