THE NAVY ESTIMATES

HL Deb 03 July 1957 vol 204 cc595-647

2.43 p.m.

LORD TEYNHAM rose to call attention to the Explanatory Statement of the First Lord of the Admiralty relating to the Navy Estimates; and to move for Papers. The noble Lord said: My Lords, in moving this Motion I should, in the first place, like to express my thanks to the First Lord of the Admiralty and the Board of Admiralty as a whole for the facilities given to me to attend the recent Commonwealth Naval Conference at Greenwich. It was certainly a great experience and I am sure it was very much appreciated by all the Members of your Lordships' House who were able to visit it. I must say that up to that time I had been rather pessimistic as to the future of the Royal Navy, but I came away from the Conference greatly heartened. I have no doubt that the Royal Navy knows where it is going and what it wants, if it is allowed to have it.

I think it was Marshal Zhukov at the Twentieth Communist Party Congress in February of last year who used these words: In a future war the struggle at sea will be of immeasurably greater importance than it was in the last war. I suggest that, in the light of this very frank statement, we should study the Naval Estimates and Explanatory Statement to see whether we are in fact building up the right kind of Navy to meet the Russian threat at sea.

In a recent debate in another place on the Naval Estimates, a most astonishing statement was made by a member of the Opposition, who said that we should forget about the submarine menace because it was as dead as the dodo; it simply did not exist. I have little doubt that few of your Lordships would subscribe to that idea. On the contrary, of course, the menace is a very real one indeed. In the event of war, the Russian submarine fleets would, I suggest, be at sea long before hostilities commenced and ready to prey on our merchant fleet, whether the war started with a nuclear bomb or not. We know that the Russians are building a large number of fleet oilers and submarine depôt ships to look after their underwater craft at sea. What does this really mean? It means that the submarine menace cannot be effectively dealt with either by the destruction of their bases by bombing or by blockading the exits from the narrow seas. It is clear that the Russian submarine fleet, with their attendant supply ships, would be widely dispersed throughout the oceans of the world, with little need to return to their home ports for many months, and during that period they might well starve us into submission by the destruction of our lifelines and merchant ships.

We all know that there are two schools of thought about a global war: one thinks it may be a short war and the other thinks that it may be protracted. I suggest that we cannot possibly gamble on a short war; and the Russian submarine fleet might very well be able to paralyse our sea communications without any nuclear bomb having been dropped. I should like to ask the First Lord of the Admiralty whether he is satisfied that we have sufficient escort vessels, either afloat or laid down, to control this submarine menace. It may well be that the whole aspect of anti-submarine warfare is changing and that it is moving in the direction of the Fleet Air Arm and the use of helicopters. The helicopter can, of course, use the greatly improved sonobuoy and discharge a depth charge at a submarine which itself, I believe, has some difficulty in locating a helicopter. I should like to ask the First Lord of the Admiralty what steps are being taken to provide the necessary specialised helicopters, if they are to be used for anti-submarine warfare, and, what is very important, what vessels are to be provided to carry them. It may be that a specially fitted carrier is the answer. Perhaps the First Lord of the Admiralty will be able to enlarge on this point.

I should now like to deal for a few moments with the proposed guided missile ships. I understand that four such ships of some 5,000 tons gross will be laid down and that for the present no guided missile cruiser is contemplated, owing to the heavy cost involved and the consideration, of course, that it is better to have two small ships for the price of one large one. There is something in that consideration; but I suggest that we must be sure what it really means. As I understand it—and I am certainly ready to be corrected—the small-type guided missile ship of 5,000 tons will be mounted only with a ship-to-air weapon, presumably what is known as the "Sea Slug". With the larger cruiser type vessel of some 18,000 tons to 20,000 tons, however, it would be possible to mount not only the ship-to-air guided missile but also the ship-to-ship guided missile. It is this class of ship, the guided missile cruiser, which could effectively deal with the Russian cruisers and should replace our old cruisers

No doubt the "Tiger" class cruisers now nearing completion will help to fill the gap between the old and the new, but I suggest that this gap will be far too wide and we must be careful not to scrap our old ships before we get some new ones. We all realise that economy in the Service Estimates is essential. But are we wise in putting off the laying down of the larger-type guided missile cruisers, which would be a most powerful striking unit and might well one day challenge the supremacy of the aircraft carrier when pilotless weapons are further developed?

Surely it is time we began to get experience of this type of vessel. One or two ships would take a great deal of time to build and their cost would be spread over quite a number of years. I think it is essential that naval dockyards and private yards should not lose their skill and experience in the construction of these larger-type vessels In America they are convening quite a number of cruisers to guided missile ships. I believe that the latest one to be converted is the light cruiser "Galveston". She is to be fitted with a new type of guided missile called the "Talos" which has only a small diameter, about thirty inches. Surely we might be able to convert some of our cruisers—or is it that our cruisers are so old that it is not possible to do so?

My Lords, during the defence debate a great deal was said about the building up of a strong mobile force ready for deployment in any part of the world by air transport, but such a force is of little value without artillery and their vehicles, which for many years to come must, of course, be transported by sea and cannot be transported by air. It should not be forgotten that the cruiser is the smallest ship that can transport a striking force at short notice, complete with artillery and other heavy war material, and I maintain that we must keep a certain number of our old cruisers for this purpose until the newer vessels come along. I understand that the development of the reactor and propelling machinery for a nuclear-powered submarine is well advanced, but I should like to ask the First Lord whether he can say what arrangements have been made for the exchange of information with the United States in the design and construction of nuclear submarines, and when such a vessel is likely to be laid down in this country.

A large number of people in this country seem to be under the illusion that press-button warfare is just round the corner, and that unmanned aircraft and other forms of guided missiles will be much cheaper than conventional weapons. The contrary, of course, is the case; and if we are going to provide an efficient defence by guided missiles a great deal of development has yet to take place and the cost will inevitably be very high. Perhaps the First Lord will be able to tell us to-day something about the research into and development of these guided missiles. I should also like to ask him whether he can tell us of any proposals for replacing our out-of-date landing craft, which are supremely important little ships for local wars. We know of course, that there was a grave shortage of these small and useful vessels at the time of the Suez crisis. I hope that they have not been forgotten, and that the necessity for improvements in their development is fully realised by the First Lord.

May I now for a few moments deal with personnel? I think it was the First Sea Lord who said recently that a young man could not join the Navy at a better and more exciting time. I agree. I am sure that this is true, and before long we shall witness the growing up of a new-type Navy which will fit into the pattern of atomic warfare. I gather that there are some people who have said that the Navy is finished. On the contrary, I am quite convinced that it will have an increasingly important part to play, not only in local warfare but also in the event of a global war. I think we shall witness a mighty mobile battle group, formed round aircraft carriers, and I hope before long, supported by their guided missile cruiser, appearing off the enemy coasts ready to strike with nuclear weapons deep into hostile country. Of course, in addition this group will maintain and protect our sea communications, a duty which for many years to come will always be the primary responsibility of the Royal Navy.

As your Lordships know, we are losing a number of our naval bases abroad, such as Simonstown, Trincomalee and so on, and that fact makes a mobile naval force more necessary than ever before. I would say to the Government: if you do not want a war, spend more money on the Navy—it will undoubtedly be a great deterrent when armed with nuclear weapons and available at short notice in any part of the world to strike deep into the heart of an enemy country. I trust that Her Majesty's Government will do all they can to bring home to the people the real importance of the Navy, and how important it is that it should be maintained at the highest state of efficiency and not cramped for lack of money. My Lords, I beg to move for Papers.

2.55 p.m.

VISCOUNT HALL

My Lords, I am sure your Lordships will join me in thanking the noble Lord, Lord Teynham, for putting this Motion on the Order Paper, and opening the debate with a speech which indicates his own practical knowledge in connection with the Royal Navy. I should like also to welcome the present First Lord to his important post. I trust that he will have a most happy time, although with the changes which are contemplated it has not been too easy a task for him. The first thing he had to do was to prepare his Estimates and to present them. He had to do this against a background of the great difficulties which confront this country, and particularly the defence services at the present time. There is no doubt that we are moving into a new era in relation to defence. The change is brought about by the rapid and costly use of atomic and hydrogen power as the principal weapons and for other war-like purposes. All this must mean that great changes will have to take place to secure the kind of armaments which will provide this country's defence by enabling us to make our joint contribution to N.A.T.O., which everyone wants to do, and to build up adequate defences for this country and other Commonwealth countries, which is, of course, our joint responsibility.

My Lords, with these Estimates we can consider the Defence White Paper and the Explanatory Statement of the First Lord, both of which give the intentions of Her Majesty's Government on the initial changes which we are told are to take place. After his recent appointment, the Minister of Defence has certainly been most active—I should describe the job which he has undertaken as "Exercise Retrenchment". Few noble Lords will complain about that activity, provided that the result of his research and his proposals provide an adequate defence for this country. So far as the Navy is concerned, cuts have been introduced. We are, indeed, warned by the Minister of Defence that Her Majesty's Government will have to announce before long some difficult and awkward decisions. He watered down that statement a little by saying that his task was to reshape the forces, and not to mutilate them.

This debate on Naval Estimates provides a very suitable occasion to ascertain how the proposed changes will be effected. The reshaping of the Royal Navy is referred to very briefly in the Defence White Paper. It is dealt with much more clearly and at greater length in the First Lord's Explanatory Statement. Both agree about the need for the greater mobility of the Fleet. The Minister describes the rôle of naval forces in total war as being uncertain, but he still thinks that there is the possibility that the nuclear battle will not prove immediately decisive. He went on to say that it was therefore necessary for N.A.T.O. to maintain substantial naval forces, and that Britain must make her contribution, but on a somewhat reduced scale. Then the Minister of Defence in his statement went on to say: It is proposed to base the main elements … upon a small number of carrier groups, each composed of one aircraft carrier and a number of supporting ships. Apart from carriers, the number of large ships will be restricted to the minimum. The cruisers and the active fleet will be reduced and, replaced by the new ships of the 'Tiger' class, now under construction. Similarly, in the various categories of smaller vessels, the policy will be to rely on a reduced number of more modern ships, some of which will be equipped with guided missiles. A considerable number of ships now in reserve, including battleships, will be disposed of or scrapped. The number of reductions contained in that one paragraph is rather frightening.

The First Lord, in his statement, is much more cautious. He does refer to substantially smaller armed forces and to a reduced Navy. As to the rôle of the Navy, he says: The course of total war is necessarily speculative, but this uncertainty does not interfere with planning and shaping the Navy, since there is no question of having to provide a separate kind of Navy specialised in the tasks of total war. The Navy must, in these days, be one which can meet threats, from all the most modern weapons, in the air, and on and under the sea. It will also, therefore, to a large extent be the kind of Navy which could provide the most useful contribution to N.A.T.O. in total war. But if the war drags on, he said, protection will have to be given to merchant ships, and lines of communication will have to be defended. There are few who could disagree with that remark of the First Lord in his Explanatory Statement.

Then we are told that task groups have to be formed. I have little to say about the forming of task groups; with the cutting down of land bases there was no alternative, and I have no doubt that the matter must have received much careful consideration by the Board of Admiralty. I think it has been carried out very successfully by the United States Navy. The only difference is that with their huge naval resources they can butter their bread very thickly. With us, of course, it will be very thinly spread. I should like the First Lord, if he will, to give us some information about these groups—the number of groups proposed, with the number of supporting ships and where they are likely to operate; and, in the absence of bases, how long they will remain at sea. The Minister of Defence has mentioned in his statement that naval strength East of Suez is to remain at about its present level. If that is so, is it to be in one or two groups or in what might be regarded as the conventional style?

The Navy Estimates now before us show a reduction on last year's expenditure, and I suppose greater reductions will follow. A reduction of £32 million is shown—a fairly substantial amount. But what I, and I believe others, are mostly concerned about is that, instead of spreading the reduction over many of the vessels, five-sixths of the reduction, or £26 million out of £32 million, is on Votes 8 and 9, which deal with Shipbuilding, Aircraft, Repairs, Maintenance and Naval Armaments. In the last three years, including the present year, these two Votes have been reduced by no less than £62 million. These reductions must have considerably delayed the delivery of new ships.

One instance has recently come to my notice: and here I believe I should declare an interest, because in the last Naval Estimates which I was privileged to present to Parliament, in 1951–52, the programme then submitted provided for the building of 24 frigates, 22 of which were ordered during that year. In the debate on the Estimates in another place the Civil Lord was asked to state how many of those 22 frigates which were ordered in 1951–52 had been received in service. His reply was: Nine of them will be completed by the end of March of this year. Eleven will be completed by the end of the year 1957–58 and two will be completed at the end of 1958–59. We recognise, of course, that the order books of the shipbuilders are very full with mercantile marine vessels, but I am definitely of the opinion that had pressure been brought to bear, these ships would have been completed long before now. The noble and learned Viscount, Lord Hailsham, during the short period that he was First Lord, quickly saw the need for the placement of naval construction. He is reported to have said at a function which he attended—I think it was with the Navy League—that our naval strength to-day is not the first or the second in the world. It is less than a quarter of the Navy of our greatest Ally, the United Stales of America, and it is well to remember, also, that we have a smaller Navy, in many respects, than that of the Soviet Union. We have delayed for various reasons, which in themselves were laudable enough, but the consequences of which may be serious, in modernising our Fleet. Even the new "Tigers" were first conceived years ago, and the ships which are now in service have hulls which in the ordinary course of events will be worn out by 1965 or at the latest, in some cases, soon after 1970. He was therefore faced with the necessity for a programme of new construction at a time when public opinion was visibly clamouring for a reduction in the Estimates for our Fighting Services.

That was the statement of the then First Lord. I am sure that the present First Lord has given this matter his attention. Certainly we have commenced to order some new ships. I have referred to orders for vessels to be armed with guided missiles. It would be interesting to know if the First Lord can give us some idea when these new ships will be completed. I gather that a statement was made by someone to the effect that they are not likely to be completed until 1965. I hope that that is quite untrue. We are rather backward in providing guided-missile ships. I noted that in the last edition of Jane's Fighting Ships it was stated that already in the United States Navy there are fourteen warships which handle various guided missiles; two aircraft carriers, four cruisers and two submarines which have surface-to-surface missiles; and a battleship, three cruisers and a destroyer which have surface-to-air weapons. Other weapons have been fitted in a seaplane carrier. Three of the latest United States guided-missile cruisers, each of a tonnage of some 13,600, were present at the Naval Review at Norfolk, Virginia.

We have but one guided-missile weapon trial ship—plus, of course, the orders to which I have referred for the four destroyer-type guided missile ships which were described by the Parliamentary Secretary as sophisticated, complicated and highly expensive vessels with many disadvantages as against the cruiser type, for they can stow fewer guided missiles and their endurance is considerably less. Nor can they be so self-reliant and self-contained as a cruiser. Nevertheless, they are a very effective weapon. I think the disadvantages of the small ship are brought out very forcibly in that statement. It is all very well to have a small effective weapon, but it is very much better to have a bigger and much more effective weapon. Would it not be possible for some of the cruisers in reserve to be adapted—or, better still, one or more of the "Tiger" Class cruisers now being completed—for use as guided missile ships, or, indeed, double-purpose ships; that is to say, handling guided missiles in addition to conventional equipment which they have at the present time. The completion of these cruisers was held up for some time by myself, and, indeed, by my predecessor, for the very purpose of dealing with a situation such as that which has arisen. And the four battleships which we are now told are to be scrapped were retained just because it was thought that they could be put to some use.

Another branch of the Royal Navy concerning which we are given very little information in the Estimates is that of the submarines. As one newspaper put it, There is a striking neglect of the submarine both as a weapon that might threaten our trade and as a weapon which might threaten an enemy's territory". We have two fast submarines about which we have little information—I am referring to the two high test peroxide submarines, both of which, I understand, are able to move under water at about 20 to 25 knots for several hours. These are being used to train forces in the latest tactics against fast submarines. I should like to ask, first, whether they can be used for any other purpose and, second, if any more of these submarines are to be built. I am afraid that I am burdening the First Lord with a number of questions to-day, but I think that is inevitable.

We should like to ask the First Lord to give the country more authentic information about the progress in the development of nuclear power for ship propulsion. There is no doubt that in this matter other countries are forging well ahead of us. There is no need for me to remind your Lordships of what has been done by the "Nautilus", the first American atomic-powered submarine, other than to say that we are told she has a record of cruising some 60,000 miles. Other submarines are in the course of construction in America; also surface ships of all kinds. A similar statement has been made about such developments in Russia, and much research, we are told, is being carried on in other European countries. The British achievement in atomic development to date deserves very high praise, and the decision to concentrate in the first place on the production of nuclear power for peaceful purposes was quite right. But we should not be left too far behind in taking a very high place in this new and revolutionary era in ship propulsion, which will mean much to the Royal Navy and also very much to the Mercantile Marine. We all have every confidence in the Atomic Energy Authority, and also in the new appointment given to Admiral Wilson, who is to take full responsibility at the Admiralty for nuclear propulsion. I am sure your Lordships will all agree with me when I say: "Please let us have some practical results quickly." It is refreshing to see that the production programme of the new aircraft is up to date, and that the twin-engined fighter, N.113, is so far advanced that deliveries are expected during the current financial year, and that the new all-weather fighter, the D.H.111, has done satisfactory trials. Good reports are also given of the new naval strike aircraft, the N.39, which is under development. It should be a great addition to the striking power of the Navy. When are deliveries expected?

I want to touch briefly on the question of the scrapping of ships. We are told that four battleships are to be scrapped—"King George V", "Duke of York", "Anson" and "Howe". I had some difficulty in making the decision to scrap even more battleships than the four I have mentioned. It is not an easy task. It is very hard for those who have worked in these ships, who have gone through serious strain and have done brave acts, to think that these ships, which have done a magnificent job of work, should be scrapped. But I am afraid that there is no alternative if there is no work for them to do. It is a pity that they have to go. As to the scrapping of other ships, I would ask the First Lord this question. When it is said that the number of large ships will be reduced to a minimum, and that cruisers in the active fleet will be reduced and replaced by "Tiger" class ships, what have the Admiralty in mind about the number of cruisers which should be retained? There is no reference to this reduction in the Statement on Defence. Not a single figure is given of the requirements of the future. I hope that the First Lord will be able to allay the apprehension felt by many people and give us an idea of how many ships are necessary, in the opinion of the Admiralty, to maintain a strong enough fleet to carry out the work which is laid out in the First Lord's Explanatory Statement.

Much anxiety exists among naval personnel about the results of the announcement by the Minister of Defence and the First Lord of the heavy reductions proposed in Vote A. Following a reduction of 11,000 men in the past two years, another reduction of 7,000 is to be applied this year. We are told that this reduction is the first step towards implementing the Government's policy set out in the Statement on Defence—to aim at stabilising the Armed Forces on an all Regular footing at a strength of some 375,000 United Kingdom males by the end of 1962—a reduction of some 315,000, including the proposed cut of 65,000 this year. Certain qualifications are made, for account will have to be taken of the current international situation and its effect on the military requirements of N.A.T.O. and other Regional Alliances, on which there will be close consultations with Allied Governments. Should this cut be imposed, it must be assumed that it will be applied proportionately over the three Services. I should like to know how this will affect the Royal Navy.

In dealing with this matter in his speech on the Navy Estimates in another place, the Parliamentary Secretary to the Admiralty said that the Navy's share within the total given has not been exactly decided upon. The only figure of adult United Kingdom males for the Navy which has been quoted to date is that given by the Minister of Defence, who said that it would be one-fifth of the total in all three Services. One-fifth of the total of 375,000 would mean that Vote A would be reduced to 75,000 plus—

THE FIRST LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY (THE EARL OF SELKIRK)

My Lords, the figure of United Kingdom adult males is not Vote A. It is very important that the distinction should be made. There are two figures, because the total includes "Wrens", young persons and locally entered personnel.

VISCOUNT HALL

My Lords, I was going to say 75,000 plus juniors and members of the Women's Royal Naval Service, who would number about 9,000. In the juniors the First Lord is fortunate, because there has been an increase of 2,000 in the recruitment of juniors arising from the reduction of age to sixteen and a half. I do not think that there are any locally entered persons in the Navy at the present time. Perhaps the First Lord would correct me, but I have looked at the Estimates and could not find any reference to any, so that would mean a Vote A strength of somewhere around 84,000.

But it must be remembered that the number given will include those serving in the Royal Navy, in the Royal Naval Air Service and in the Royal Marines. Should the suggested reduction take place, the total cut in naval personnel by the date given will be something like 37,000, inclusive of the 7,000 for this year. That means that the Navy will be reduced by one-third of the personnel which it had last year. Let the figure be 75,000 or 80,000, the British Navy, with such Vote A figures, will look very small indeed against a navy like that of the United States, which has no fewer than 662,000 men, including 200,000 marines. I take that figure as a reference to indicate the smallness of the personnel of the Navy if the programme which is set out in the Statement on Defence is carried through.

Unlike the other two Services, with their large proportion of National Service-men, where reductions can be made much more easily, in the Royal Navy, whose proportion of National Servicemen is small, it is the Regulars who have to be retired. I can assure the First Lord that much anxiety exists among naval officers and men whose careers in the Service will be cut short. The suggestion has been made that Her Majesty's Government were somewhat precipitate in presenting that part of the defence policy programme which dealt mainly with reductions in the forces without announcing what compensation would be paid to the redundant forces. Redundancy has occurred on many previous occasions, and compensation has been paid. So there are many precedents for such payment, and there should be very short delay in fixing conditions under which these retirements should take place. The Minister of Defence also stated that plans for the detailed implementation of the defence policy are proceeding and that certain other decisions will be ready for an announcement shortly. Would it not have been much better to wait a few more months to announce the complete scheme, instead of announcing a partial scheme such as the present one? Reduced Estimates could be applied without the announcement which was made.

Another reason why I think the announcement should have been delayed is that it is unfortunate that this new defence policy could not have been discussed or endorsed in advance by N.A.T.O., of which we are one of the most important member countries. Whatever imagination and drive one of these member countries may have, any such policy should not be rushed through without some regard for the feelings of the other member countries. The power of N.A.T.O. should be strengthened, not weakened. The Minister of Defence has asserted that it is necessary for N.A.T.O. to maintain substantial forces, and particularly naval forces and maritime air units. Britain must make her contribution, although it will have to be on a reduced scale.

It is interesting to see how N.A.T.O. has received the publication of this defence programme. The Economist of May 25 says: Seasoned diplomats here"— that is, at N.A.T.O., in France— admit frankly that the White Paper came as as a shock. Even in the recent discussions on the cutting of Britain's forces in Germany, its allies were not led to expect a long-term defence programme policy with such profound implications. They feel they have had their hands forced on issues which have never been discussed. Then the paper goes on to say: Many other countries can insist on the overriding need for economy—above all, France, where the foreign trade crisis is already encouraging thoughts of big defence cuts… Later it says that experts … are particularly astonished at the British ruthlessness in reducing the Navy. But if Britain has tackled problems European countries must sooner or later face, this only makes it more regrettable that decisions should have been taken with so little consultation…. The allies also have political complaints. The cuts have been so made that it is impossible to use them in bargaining with Russia on disarmament. Why do we do these things without consultation and discussion with Allies with whom we are so closely associated? It is impossible to get the best out of a group of nations serving together if one suddenly breaks away and does something without consultation with the other members. There is no doubt that what is required is the strengthening, and not the weakening, of N.A.T.O. The defence policy of the Government is taken by many people as a recognition that, apart from the two major naval Powers, few, if any, of the other nations are now in a financial position to enable them to carry alone the burden of both atomic and conventional arms. This makes absolutely imperative the case for strengthening the relationship between the N.A.T.O. countries.

In conclusion, I am sure your Lordships will wish that, whatever changes take place as the result of any new policy, the Royal Navy will, in size and quality of personnel, be sufficient to serve this nation and the Commonwealth as it always has done. In the near future, of course, it will have to go through a difficult period. We should all do our best to see a great tradition maintained and strengthened, and to give to those who serve in the Royal Navy that kind of career which will make them proud of a great Service.

3.37 p.m.

THE EARL OF CORK AND ORRERY

My Lords, I feel somewhat shy of speaking on Naval matters, being an old "shellback", and there are others in the House who can do it so much better than myself. I feel some difficulty in making many remarks upon the statement of the First Lord, because obviously the whole policy has been pressed on the Admiralty, who have made a loyal attempt to produce a good Paper and to make it as attractive as possible. Whether they have succeeded or not is a matter of opinion. I have no doubt that a great deal of hard thinking has gone on in Whitehall to make the bricks without straw, and I only hope that the "straw" will not be curtailed any more. I was out of the country when the Statement on Defence was debated, and I should like to take this opportunity of ranging myself alongside those who hold the view that a reduction in the fighting qualities of the forces at the present time is thoroughly bad policy. We know that there are many economies which can be made in the Fighting Services, but they ought not to be made now in the fighting part. In the conditions of to-day, I think it is almost unbelievable that we should suddenly start cutting the Navy and the Air Force. We are discussing the Navy Estimates and I intend in the few remarks I make to deal with them; but do not let it be thought that I do not realise what a tremendous part the air will have to play in oceanic warfare of the future.

I think we might liken the Government at the present time to some individual who has got into financial difficulties, who sells his insurance policies, and hands all round to people, to have a good time, the cash he thereby raises. I have not been in touch with naval details for several years, so that I cannot go into details of armaments, although I am not altogether inexperienced in naval changes. I was appointed to my first ship, an ironclad, heavily rigged, single-screw ship, with muzzle-loading guns, using black powder, in 1888; and my last service afloat was in the battleship "Nelson", in 1937. So that I have seen many and great changes, and many new devices introduced. Some of them have been for the better, but the majority have not realised the expectations of those who introduced them; and some have failed altogether.

There seems to me at the present time to be a danger of being "off with the old love" before you are "on with the new". I think the advice should be not to be "off with the old love" until you are "on with the new". The wisdom of that saying has been borne in upon me on many occasions—and quite recently. I am sure that the Admiralty are fully alive to the necessity of not being too quick with the new changes, but they may not be able to withstand the pressure from above—the Government insisting on hurrying up the economies so that a statement may perhaps be made in the next White Paper, or on the eve of a by-election. I regard the sentence in the White Paper: The steps contemplated will appreciably reduce the burden on the economy. as very ominous.

What is surprising is that the Government do not appear to understand what the rôle of the Navy is. In fact, the White Paper says so, and it was quoted by my noble friend Lord Hall. It says: The rôle of naval forces in total war is somewhat uncertain. It goes on to say: Nuclear bombardment and counter bombardment might bring the war to an end within a few weeks or days, in which naval operations would not play a significant part. So far as these Islands are concerned, I quite understand that we shall not be able to take an active part if we have our hands full in trying to defend what remains of them. We are an advanced base for the United States and our own air operations, and we must draw enemy fire. But we are not contemplating, I take it, giving up after that happens. I would remind your Lordships that even if all our factories were out of action, our harbours closed and our cities destroyed, and we had lost 500,000 people during the bombardment, there will still be 50 million people to feed in these Islands, and that can be done only by sea. I should have thought that the rôle of the Navy is quite evident. It is fundamentally as always—to keep open our sea communications.

Unfortunately, the Admiralty seem to agree that the rôle of the Navy is somewhat uncertain, for we find this quotation—I think this is by the First Lord: The rôle of the Navy will be decided after war has broken out, for a global war might be brought to a quick end by the use of nuclear missiles. On the other hand it might drag on, and in that event the Navy would be needed to protect our merchant ships. Not until then? Are we not going to protect our merchant ships from the word "Go"?

Let us consider for a moment the situation which might easily arise at sea. Russia has built—and we have been reminded of it—a considerable fleet of heavy cruisers and a large fleet of submarines and they have not built them for the fun of doing so. Every day there are literally hundreds of British, Dominion and allied ships on the oceans of the world. The principal ocean routes are well known, and the focal points where they converge are common property and are free to everybody. Germany has shown what can be done by a submarine attack on British shipping, and Russia has provided herself with double the number of submarines Germany ever had. Russia has, or probably will have, the initiative in declaring war. It is hard to think of U.N.O. making a declaration of war. Russia has the initiative when she will make that declaration. You may be sure that she will take full advantage of that opportunity and have her submarines in the area where they are wanted, so that when the flag falls they will be able to make a flying start. I think we ought to forestall that and have plenty of ships to do it. Our ships ought to be away long before we decide there is going to be a nuclear war; they ought not to be in the harbour at that time.

There is another point I should like to make, and that is with regard to the protection not only of merchant ships but of the officers and men who man them. I do not think it is fair to the Merchant Navy to exhort them to go to sea and show their patriotism in unarmed ships or, at any rate, ships with sketchy armament which were not built for war. The Merchant Navy ought to feel that whenever they go to sea they will be properly escorted by the Navy. They will go all right, but those who send them are taking a heavy responsibility. I cannot believe that anybody who really has an understanding of what things are required can go through the Naval Estimates and consult the numbers there, making all allowance for our N.A.T.O. obligations, and say that we have enough cruisers and other small craft.

As to convoys, I should like to ask the First Lord what the idea is now. Can we have big convoys as in previous wars, or shall we have, on account of these nuclear weapons, much smaller convoys? If they are much smaller, which I think will be the answer, then it means more escorts. I know that people may be saying, "We are not going to fight this war alone; we shall have somebody with us." Are we quite sure? In 1939 we did not expect to be alone in 1940, but we were. Naturally, every Government has its duty to the people of the country. In the last war Australia, threatened or alarmed by the sudden advance of the Japanese to the South, recalled her Divisions. Canada also placed some restrictions on the use of her troops. Many leading Americans regarded the Pacific as more important than the Atlantic, and it is just possible that they will do so again. Is it not possible that they will consider the needs of the British Isles are not quite so important as we do? Surely, we have our own responsibilities, and one of the greatest is to keep our people fed.

I put it to your Lordships. However sound you consider this White Paper on Defence and the policy enunciated in it, may be it would be a great mistake to press on with it in the interests of economy. It would be most unsound to reduce our fighting force. It would be most unsound to do anything which will reduce what naval strength we have left. As regards bases abroad, much has been said. It will, of course, be more difficult to get ships repaired. It is all very well to have floating repair ships; but if a ship gets its watertight compartments flooded very little can be done by a floating repair ship. That means that more ships will be needed in every area, because it will not be possible to repair them. They will also have to be supplied with air support from any shore-based aircraft.

The Statement talks about ships being sold and got rid of as if they were of no use. If they are of no use now, what about the money we have spent in keeping them in existence all this time? The Statement tells of fifteen sales to other Governments. I do not include Canada, Australia or New Zealand because they are in safe hands, but there are some "doubtful starters" buying our ships. Presumably they are fit for action, or can be made so in a short time. We learn that orders are to be placed for four guided missile ships. That is good news, but they will not be ready until the early 1960s. We hear that the completion of the "Tiger" class cruiser is to be hastened. Eleven years have been spent on that already. They are to be ready for preliminary trials in 1959. Of that one can only say, "Better late than never". But that is four, five, or six years away, which is a long time, and plenty of time for a third world war to start and for us to lose it. There is no hint of a steady building programme so that gradually the old can be replaced by the new.

In a world which is so close to war as we are to-day and which is prevented only by the most savage deterrents, is it not madness to reduce our fighting forces and fighting efficiency? If it was not wrong to bet in the House of Lords, I would lay a heavy bet that in five years' time we shall be screaming for all the ships we can get. Every ship has a use if she has a gun and can steam. Raiders and submarines do not like gun action. They do not seek it as a rule.

In a recent debate in this House, the noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury, expressed the opinion that, if the country as a whole had been consulted it would have been found that people would infinitely prefer to pull in their belts rather than submit to what they regarded as a bitter humiliation at the hands of Nasser. That may or may not be so—I do not know. But it is certain that it would be true if it were represented to the people that it was a question of whether or not everything should be done to maintain our position in the world and to protect our population from the danger of being Starved out, whether through lack of food or lack of oil or lack of raw materials, or lack of all three combined. In conclusion, I desire to record my sympathy with all the officers, petty officers, non-commissioned officers and men who are going to have their careers ruthlessly cut off in the middle at a most inconvenient age. Also, I sympathise with the senior officers of all three Services who have to carry through this security policy.

VISCOUNT HALL

My Lords, may I ask the House to bear with me briefly? I want to put to the First Lord of the Admiralty one very important question which slipped my memory in relation to a report of the leakage of information at Bath. I saw a report in one of the daily papers that that had happened quite recently. If it has, it is a very strange occurrence.

THE EARL OF SELKIRK

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Viscount for raising that point. I can say that there is no truth whatsoever in that allegation. No inquiry is being undertaken at the present time, and, so far as I am concerned, there is no leakage of information of any sort or kind. I am grateful to the noble Viscount for the opportunity of making that point.

3.52 p.m.

LORD ASHBOURNE

My Lords, I am in a position this afternoon which for me is novel. Not many years ago it was my duty to draft certain paragraphs for inclusion in the Explanatory Statement. That was in the days when the noble Viscounts, Lord Alexander of Hillsborough and, later, Lord Hall, held the great post of First Lord of the Admiralty. Now to-day I find myself in the position of being able to praise or criticise the contents of this White Paper. Let me say at once that I generally agree with most of what is set out in the Explanatory Statement. In particular, under the headings "The Port Said Operation" and "Suez Canal Clearance", we read of the skill and enterprise with which those operations were carried out. I am sure your Lordships would wish to join with me in saying how much we appreciate and admire the skill and enterprise which was so conspicuously shown by all concerned. If I may pick out one name in particular, I would mention that of Captain Fell, who was our Principal Salvage Officer. He must be one of the most skilled and experienced salvage officers in the country and the most experienced in the Royal Navy. Certainly at Port Said he did a very remarkable job.

Under the heading "Cadet Entry" in the White Paper, it is very encouraging to read of the competition there has been, in the scholarship scheme, in which in the last year there have been no fewer than 830 applicants for 90 places; and also in the new entry scheme which is now in its second year, in which there has been an average of five candidates for every vacancy. From my own point of view, it is certainly fortunate that the competition was not so keen when I myself joined the Royal Navy at the beginning of the First World War. At that time I managed to scrape in when there were 126 applicants for, I believe, 127 places. Where the ratings are concerned, it is very satisfactory to note that the numbers re-engaging to complete time for pension are at a good level, and also that over the last year recruiting has been improving.

On the material side, I am sure it is right that increased emphasis should be placed on afloat support so that the Fleet may operate more freely and more independently of shore bases. In the nuclear age that is certainly a very important requirement. I see in the Explanatory Statement that the afloat support ships are still manned by officers and men of the Merchant Navy. Now, of course, I have no complaint about this—indeed, I have nothing but praise and admiration for their courage and skill—but I believe it would make for firmer control, and, therefore, for more continuous and consistent training, and, as a result, for a more efficient force, if a gradual changeover could be made to the manning of this force by officers and men of the Royal Navy. This is a practice that has been followed generally for some time, with success, by the United States.

I am glad to read in paragraphs 118 and 119 of the White Paper that Fleet Air Arm aircraft have carried out a large number of exercises with the Fleet. In war time, of course, the task of the Fleet would be critically handicapped if it were not for the consistent continuous and efficient support and co-operation of Coastal Command. The two Services have to fight the maritime war shoulder to shoulder, and I believe that in anti-submarine operations this is more important than in any other operation. The more they can work together in peace-time, therefore, the more likely are they to be successful in this close and harmonious co-operation that is so essential in war.

Now I come to the reason for my intervention in this debate this afternoon. It concerns anti-submarine escorts, a subject which was very ably referred to by several noble Lords in the debate on the Defence White Paper two or three months ago. They put it very clearly and, with your Lordships' permission, I should like in a few words simply to emphasise what was said then. The Defence White Paper states that in total war the rôle of the Navy is somewhat uncertain. Broadly speaking, I agree with that statement, although one can, of course, see distinct possibilities of Her Majesty's ships being used as launching platforms for nuclear weapons; but in a total war where the nuclear exchange proves indecisive or in a war which commences with the use of conventional weapons only, then surely the rôle of the Navy is crystal clear. It is the same as it has always been—to protect our merchant ships; to see, in fact, that our food, our fuel, our aviation spirit and our thousand-and-one other things continue to come into this country. It is as simple as that.

But what we have to remember this time is that the Russians are starting off with somewhere between 500 and 700 submarines and not just fifty-seven, which is what the Germans started with in the last war. I have no doubt that your Lordships will agree that one of the reasons for which those submarines have been built is to attack and destroy our seaborne communications. I do not wish to be an alarmist over this matter. We have to look at this problem in a balanced and rational way. I spent many years of my life in that great branch of the Royal Navy, the submarine service, and I believe that as a result I am still familiar with the many limitations as well as the great potentialities of submarines. In trying to assess the degree of menace of those 500 Russian submarines, we have to take into account the information we have been given about them, which unfortunately is very meagre. We have also to take into account the information we have been given about our anti-submarine forces, both ships and aircraft, their detecting devices and their weapons.

On the credit side, perhaps the most important information we have is that we have been building a number of new and most satisfactory escort vessels, and we are building more. Considerable numbers of "Whirlwind" anti-submarine helicopters are being delivered to the Fleet Air Arm. We have converted a number of war-time destroyers into fast anti-submarine escorts and frigates, which are now well able to compete with the modern fast submarine. We have been told that we now have an Asdic with greatly increased range, and we now also have an Asdic that can be operated from a helicopter. We have some most efficient new weapons which are far more effective than the depth charge ever was, and—I believe this is more important than anything else—I am sure that these Russian submarine crews are not as effective or as efficient as their German counterpart. That is all on the credit side.

Against this, on the debit side, we have to remember that submarines go much faster and much further than they ever did before; they can dive much deeper and remain submerged for much longer; and now, with the Russians starting off with ten times the number that the Germans started with at the beginning of the last war, I cannot believe that we can safely or sensibly plan to start the next war with an anti-submarine escort force on a "somewhat reduced scale", which is what has been indicated in Paragraph 24 of the Defence White Paper. The Navy's job will be to fight our merchant ships through those 500 to 700 Russian submarines, and we shall want every escort, both surface and air, that we can lay our hands on.

Of course, it is true that we do not plan to fight a next war singlehanded—we are a member of the N.A.T.O. team. But when deciding on our policy, we must not forget that in two world wars we had to wait something like two and a half years before we got any substantial help from across the Atlantic, and last autumn at Suez we got none at all—rather the reverse. I am not complaining about this. I am simply saying that we should look at these things and we must take them into account when framing out future policy. I know that circumstances have changed since the last war. I know that we must make the H-bomb and that we must build up a stack of them. I agree with this policy and I know that if we follow it we cannot have everything else we want at the same time. But twice before we have started off wars with too few escorts, and twice before we have very nearly lost them on that account. Let us not on any account make this same mistake a third time.

4.5 p.m.

EARL HOWE

My Lords, it is difficult for anybody like myself to have to follow such a brilliant speech as that which has fallen from my noble friend behind me: it was a pleasure to all of us to hear. I should not have intervened in the debate this afternoon had it not been for the deep anxiety which I feel as the result of reading, first of all, the White Paper on Defence and, secondly, though to a lesser extent, the First Lord's Statement. In the White Paper on Defence there is the surprising remark that has already been referred to by nearly everybody who has spoken: The rôle of the Naval forces in total war is somewhat uncertain. I agree entirely with what the noble Earl, Admiral of the Fleet Lord Cork and Orrery, said on this subject. How can a responsible Minister write such a paragraph into a Defence White Paper? It was stated, when this Paper appeared, that the Minister accepted full responsibility for it; that in fact he drafted it all himself. Therefore it was written by our Minister of Defence, we may presume.

Surely the rôle of the Navy in any war—no matter what sort of war it may be: global, nuclear or any other sort of war—will be the same as it has been through all our history. The Navy has to try to safeguard the trade routes. It could not have been better put than by the noble Earl, Lord Cork and Orrery; it is simply that and nothing else. If the Navy is unable to do that, if it fails in its job, it does not matter what may be the gallantry of the other Services or what they do, Britain will have "had it." We have got to keep the trade routes open. The Air Force cannot fly unless it gets its petrol; the Army can do but little unless we can get them across the sea or prevent others coming across the sea at them. I suggest that the Navy is absolutely fundamental. If we have a Minister who does not understand the job, well then let him turn it over to somebody who does. I am perfectly certain that the Admiralty will be able to advise him a little on such a subject.

My Lords, the Russian submarine menace has been referred to by everybody. The Russians have upwards of 500 submarines, increasing at a rate of between sixty and eighty a year; and they are all kept in full commission. The noble Lord behind me, speaking as an ex-submarine officer, said that he did not think that the Russian submarine was likely to be as good as the German submarine or as well handled. I hope he is right, but I should not like to bank on it. After all, there is not the slightest doubt that there will be quite a number of Germans in the Russian submarine setup, and when the crews are in permanent and full commission, surely the noble Lord would agree that there is likely to be a considerable gain in efficiency. I believe this is an appalling menace. A number of us were invited to a certain occasion at Greenwich some little time ago—one of the most interesting occasions that I have ever been to in my life. There is no doubt whatever, from what I grasped while I was there, that the Russian submarine menace is most seriously considered by the powers-that-be at the Admiralty. Can we be quite sure that we are doing right in realising the ambitions of a Minister of Defence, who does not know what the Navy is for, in cutting it down? I wish that I could feel a little more confident about all this.

It may be that the Russian Navy is to be our opponent in another war. I hope that nothing I have said, or will say, will encourage them to think that I am anxious to "go for" Russia, or anything like that. That is the last thing in the world I want. I want to live with them and have co-existence. But if the Russian Navy should be our enemy in another war, consider their cruiser strength. In another two years they will have twenty-two "Sverdlov" Class cruisers. We saw what this type of cruiser was like when she came to Portsmouth. They have nine or ten more quite worth-while cruisers, but my information is that they have building also a cruiser of, roughly, 26,000 tons. It may well be that that cruiser is the latest form of ship using guided missiles; and a ship like that, the size of a pre-war battle cruiser, might exercise a very great power potential in any action between surface-borne vessels.

Then we go on to their other ships—their very large number of destroyers. Exactly how many is uncertain, but most of them are bigger than any of our ships, and some of them are almost twice the size of our "Daring" class, and therefore able to stay at sea for longer periods. I mention these things because here, in the First Lord's statement, we are proposing to cut down the Navy. I think it is a most dangerous policy, though it may be that it has been forced upon the Board of Admiralty. We have nothing to put in its place. Allusion has been made to helicopters. We all sincerely hope that in helicopters we have the answer to a good many problems, but one knows that the helicopter is not distinguished for being able to operate over the sea in very bad weather or in conditions of very bad visibility. Under those conditions, helicopters are not at their best, I understand, though I do not fly them or know anything about them except what I am told.

One cannot fight a war with blueprints or with rhetoric, and therefore we ought to be doing our utmost to develop the strength of our Forces. Paragraph 31 of the First Lord's Statement, which has already been quoted this afternoon, says that vessels: not required in the Royal Navy are either sold to friendly navies or scrapped, if not sold by the end of their useful lives. If your Lordships will then turn to paragraph 102, you will see The destroyers ' Kempenfelt ' and ' Wager ' have been sold to Yugoslavia. Our destroyer position is that we are not building, and have not built since the war, one single destroyer. If we take all the destroyers mentioned in this White Paper, they amount to fifty-seven. We did not go into either World War I or World War II with only fifty-seven destroyers; and I believe that I shall probably be supported by those who know the facts when I say that at those times commanders at sea were always more than anxious to get more and yet more destroyers. It is true that we have frigates and that in some ways they are very powerful ships, well adapted for the job they have to do; but we have not the destroyer force that was required in either of the last two wars. I cannot help feeling, therefore, that it might be asked, in regard to parting with a couple of destroyers to Yugoslavia: Was it really necessary? Could we not have found a good job for those ships to carry out?

I cannot find anything very much, either in the Defence White Paper or in the actions of the Minister of Defence, to show that there is any appreciation of the desperate position which I believe is developing for this country at sea—rather, the reverse. So I earnestly hope that the present Board of Admiralty will not allow themselves to be browbeaten by the Minister of Defence. For years gone by, when the question of having a Minister of Defence has been raised in Parliament, many of us suggested that a Minister of Defence would be able to browbeat the Board of Admiralty or the High Commands of other Services. I hope that the Board of Admiralty will not allow themselves to be browbeaten. It is said that we are going to save money—and we all understand the urge to try to save money on the Forces and spend it on the Welfare State. But cheaper defence is one thing, and adequate defence is another. I therefore beg the First Lord, if he can, to give us a forecast of what the Navy is likely to be in five or ten years' time.

4.17 p.m.

LORD GIFFORD

My Lords, as another among noble Lords present to-day who were fortunate enough to be present at Greenwich a few weeks ago when that most impressive "Operation Fairlead" was demonstrated, I should like to say that I believe that the Board of Admiralty have their plans for the future crystallised. They know what is wanted. They know the menace which faces them. But I question whether Her Majesty's Government and the Minister of Defence are giving them sufficient tools to do the job. The main theme of nearly all who have spoken in your Lordships' House this afternoon has been the submarine menace, and I, too, regard it as being so important that I make no apology for speaking on the same lines.

Numerous warnings have been given by men of great knowledge—Admiral Wright of the United States Navy, the Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic, General Norstadt, the noble and gallant Field Marshal, Lord Montgomery, and others. The tremendous activity of the U.S.S.R. in the submarine field has been mentioned by nearly every speaker, and that activity was emphasised only a week or two ago by the so-called "sale" of Russian submarines to Colonel Nasser. I venture to put forward a theory which I put forward before—that a major war might well start with a world-wide submarine attack, the submarines having gone to their war stations many weeks before. Such an attack would be difficult to combat and might well put us in a particularly difficult position, because it might happen without any use at all of nuclear weapons in the early stages. This might well put us in the position of having to take the initiative in that regard. I entirely disagree with the statement in the White Paper that the Navy might not be needed until after the nuclear exchange. On that matter I agree with the noble and gallant Earl, Lord Cork and Orrery, and others.

I do not believe that we are giving the Navy adequate anti-submarine forces to cope with this vast number of submarines. A figure of 500 has been quoted by many noble Lords, speaking of the forces of the U.S.S.R. I think it is pretty accurate. And they have the capacity to increase that number by something like 80 to 100 a year. Those are frightening figures when one considers that the Germans had only 56 submarines in 1939 and built up to a peak figure of only 240 during the War. Besides, the modern submarine is far more effective. The atomic-powered submarine could probably maintain itself away from its base for as long as two years. We all hope and pray that no major war will occur, but with the noble and gallant Earl, Lord Cork and Orrery, and the noble Earl, Lord Howe, I feel that if a war does occur the pattern will be the same as it was in 1939—and even as it was in 1914—as far as the Navy is concerned. The Navy's task will include escorting our convoys and seeing that supplies reach this country to prevent our perishing from starvation.

Let us consider for a moment what forces are available to carry out these duties. Lord Teynham and other speakers have dealt with the surface forces. I do not propose to mention them, but I should like to say a few words about the air component. First of all, there is Coastal Command, with eleven squadrons of Shackletons. They, I am sure, will do a most magnificent job. But that number of squadrons would certainly not be adequate to cover all the waters, even just around these Islands. In the last war, Coastal Command was able to obtain fairly quickly reinforcements from Bomber Command. That would not now be possible, because the modern bomber is not in any way suitable for anti-submarine work.

In addition to Coastal Command we have the Naval Air Squadrons, some of them carrier-borne and others shore-based. These naval squadrons have recently suffered a great loss through the policy of disbandment of all R.N.V.R. air squadrons. It seems to me that this was part of a sort of general policy, carried out without much detailed thought. I am not criticising the policy of disbanding the Royal Air Force Auxiliary squadrons or the R.N.V.R. fighter squadrons, because I think it was probably impossible for them to be supplied with modern fighters. And, indeed, it is difficult for officers and men flying only part-time to maintain such a state of fitness and efficiency as is needed for a fighter pilot.

But, to my mind, anti-submarine squadrons are a completely different matter. The officers of these squadrons do not have to fly very fast machines, and the air crews can carry on a great deal longer and to a much greater age than can fighter pilots. Nearly all the inshore anti-submarine work in the Channel, the Clyde, and Western Approaches was being carried out by these very keen R.N.V.R. squadrons. Among these fine squadrons there was much specialised knowledge which had been accumulated over a number of years. I think it is almost criminal to sacrifice all that knowledge at a time when we so badly need people with experience of anti-submarine warfare. I should like to put in a special plea for these squadrons this afternoon. I may be told that it is not possible to re-form them—though I do not see why not. They could be re-formed, I think, with a less elaborate set-up at extremely small cost. The whole of the R.N.V.R. squadrons cost only about £1 million, and I think that these anti-submarine squadrons could be re-formed for much less than that. If that cannot be done I think there is an alternative. They could remain in the R.N.V.R. and be given opportunities of flying with Regular squadrons of the Fleet Air Arm. I am told that the Commander-in-Chief, Portsmouth, used to rely on two Gannet squadrons based on Ford for the anti-submarine work near at hand. They knew the waters over which they operated like the backs of their hands.

My Lords, I have little more to say, except that I very much welcome the decision to make the fast carrier task force the pattern of the Navy, at any rate for peace time and for limited warfare. That policy has been proved up to the hilt by Korea and, again, by Suez. I am sure that these task forces, ready to operate in any part of the world, are the right weapons in the circumstances indicated. Finally, I should like to remind your Lordships of that quotation which the noble Lord, Lord Teynham, made in his speech to the effect that Marshal Zhukov had stated that the struggle at sea would be more important than ever in any war of the future. That remark can have only one interpretation—that is, that the U.S.S.R. intend to make full use of their already vast submarine fleet. The Government must take more effective steps in conjunction with N.A.T.O. to combat this menace, otherwise we may well be faced with disaster and starvation.

4.30 p.m.

VISCOUNT BRIDGEMAN

My Lords. I feel that it is somewhat foolhardy for anyone who is an old soldier to intervene in this particular debate, and I do so for only a few minutes in order to follow the last remarks of my noble friend Lord Gilford, when he was about to deal, as I thought, with the importance of this White Paper and of the Navy Estimates in the inter-Service scene as opposed to the strictly naval scene. I feel that this White Paper gives more of an indication of the importance of that side of the Navy's work than any White Paper I can remember having seen before. If one looks at the concluding pages of the White Paper, from page 20 onwards, one sees that four and a half pages are devoted to "Relations with Commonwealth, N.A.T.O., and other friendly Navies" and to "Exercises and visits by H.M. Ships." I very much welcome these pages, and I am sure that they are developments in the Navy White Paper which should be welcomed and continued in future years.

From the point of view of anyone who is not a sailor. I do not think that one can resist the conclusion that, apart from submarine warfare on a gigantic scale (which my noble friend Lord Gifford had in mind, and which Marshal Zukhov mentioned in his speech), more and more of the naval effort is going to be devoted in future not so much to purely naval occasions as to inter-Service occasions of one sort or another. One can put that in another way and say that, owing to the financial structure under which we work, no warlike provision for combined operations and for inter-Service work can be made unless it is parcelled out between the three Service Estimates. Therefore, one should remember that the Navy Estimates will have to carry such things as the proper provision for landing craft and combined operations. If one were to make a slight criticism of the White Paper, it might be that little is said in it about the Royal Marines and their part in combined operations. I should welcome a paragraph or two—perhaps I have overlooked them—stressing that side of the matter.

Then we come to paragraph 56, on page 16, on "The Port Said operation". The naval operations might have been a striking reminder of the versatility of sea/air power … and all the rest of it, but whether one could go on to say that it was more of a reminder than a satisfactory way of demonstrating that power is quite another matter. I do not want to-day to disinter the bones of Suez, but as my noble friend in front of me has thought fit—and rightly, I think—to refer to the Port Said operation, I think that it would do no harm to say once again, as I have said before in your Lordships' House, that the Operations produced a great number of lessons. I do not mean political lessons; I mean technical lessons and lessons in all-in Service co-operation, which I have no doubt are being actively followed up now by those whose business it is to do so. I mention these things because the financial structure under which we work is one that would seem to offer the greatest inducement to any Service Department to put inter-Service matters down at the bottom of the priority list.

For a long time, some of us thought (I hope that I am not out of order in saying this) that the transport aircraft was the Cinderella or Ugly Duckling of the Air Ministry. The naval contribution to combined operations and to inter-Service work is so important, from the point of view both of the Forces as a whole and of the nation as a whole, that I am sure we should all want to feel that it has its proper place in naval thought. If it has not, then a great deal of the Navy's effort and of our expenditure on the Navy will not be brought to fruition. For my part, I am certain that these matters are well in the mind of my noble friend Lord Selkirk, but I think that, even in what might be a purely naval debate, that sort of outlook is worth mentioning and should not entirely be forgotten.

4.35 p.m.

VISCOUNT ALEXANDER OF HILLSBOROUGH

My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords who have taken part in this debate, but I must say that it has been disappointing from many angles. Attendance is not good, though this is perhaps the most crucial debate on naval policy that we have had for a great many years. The range and variety of matters dealt with by my noble friend Lord Hall went a long way to stress that. I should have been grateful if the noble Earl the First Lord of the Admiralty had been willing to do as I suggested to the Admiralty while he was on foreign duty—namely, to open his mind to your Lordships on the future of naval policy at this critical stage in history, so that your Lordships might have had some material for debate apart from what has been said in another place.

THE EARL OF SELKIRK

My Lords, what the noble Viscount has just said is completely new to me. So far as I know, no-one has ever suggested that I should speak at an earlier date. I have always spoken when I have been asked to at any time.

VISCOUNT ALEXANDER OF HILLSBOROUGH

My Lords, I am sorry if the message I left with the Admiralty while the noble earl was in Malta did not reach him. I understand that full well.

THE EARL OF SELKIRK

I am sorry, too.

VISCOUNT ALEXANDER OF HILLSBOROUGH

When there is a responsible Minister, of Cabinet status, for a Department of such importance, and its policy is to be debated, it is of great advantage to your Lordships to have an early statement of policy—all the more so when questions of Supply are so connected with the policy and the first debate is held in another place. Often we are dissatisfied with the replies given in another place by junior Ministers. That was why I was anxious that, if possible, the First Lord should have spoken earlier, but I quite understand if he did not receive my message.

We have had a debate on the Defence White Paper, and no doubt with regard to naval policy we shall be helped a good deal by the reply from the noble Earl, who I am sure will try to give us detailed answers to the questions submitted to him during the debate. But I feel a great deal of sympathy with the noble Earl, Lord Cork and Orrery, in his appreciation of the matter. My reading of the White Paper from paragraph 24 to paragraph 37 is that it would seem to show that the future of the Royal Navy is exceedingly doubtful. It would seem that there was nothing in the mind of the Minister of Defence except peace time, and emergency in peace time duties. Nobobdy seems to know what is going to happen if there should be any wider conflict—a conflict of a global or nuclear nature.

I also had a great deal of sympathy with my honourable friend in another place who opened the debate for the Opposition on May 13—I hope that the noble Earl will not take this wrongly: I thought that it was rather good. My honourable friend Mr. Tom Steele said that the Minister of Defence did not know what the policy ought to be in a global war, but obviously the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty did know and the results had yet to emerge. I have a great deal of sympathy with that view.

From experience in the last Great War, in which I spent five years at the Admiralty, starting from the hottest period of the conflict, in May, 1940. I can understand what the noble Viscount, Lord Bridgeman, has just been saying about the importance of co-operation between the Services, the combined operations. That was already patent to us even then; and the magnificent co-operation which took place, not always because it was properly organised in peace time, and often under duress, led to such successes, as Dunkirk onwards proved, as would have been almost unbelievable if one had not lived through them.

It is perfectly reasonable that any one of our great Fighting Services should, in the kind of economic circumstances in which we find ourselves to-day, be willing to submit to proper (shall I say?) audit examination as to whether, first, they are spending the money they get properly; and secondly, the results of the policy, with the spending of the money, will lead to the security of our country; and if not, for some change to be made. But I think it is also fundamental that, in coming to results from that audit examination, we should be quite sure of two things: first, that we are making a proper contribution to our general national security; and secondly, and vastly more important to-day, that, having initiated in this country all the motions for bringing out the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, which has spread in numbers and influence since, we should take great care that what we do in reverse during such an audit examination should be only after reasonable and proper consultation with the Allies on whom we shall have to depend in any great conflict. Dependence upon Allies is most important.

While listening to one or two of the speeches this afternoon, I was thinking of a debate in another place directly after the incident which is now usually referred to as "Munich," in 1938. I ventured then to say that we ought to be warned by our history: that is, that although for great and long periods we have been powerful in peace time, with sea power, we have never in our history won a major war of a wide character without Allies, and powerful Allies at that; and that if we pursued the course we were pursuing then, in 1938, we should almost inevitably, if war broke out, find ourselves alone. That is virtually what happened to us in May, 1940. Whatever we do by way of filling up the policy which has been out-lined in the Defence White Paper, and now in the Explanatory Statement to the Navy Estimates, I think it is fundamental to bear in mind the two points I have made.

I am sure that the leading and probing questions which my noble friend Lord Hall has put this afternoon will elicit answers and will help us to come to a judgment as to whether or not we are going in the right direction. First of all, I must say that I support my noble friend in his general view of the last six years: that we have not made the progress we should have made with the new construction which was then already passed as a programme. It was certainly very sad to see the long time taken over the programme of frigates. But I, myself, have been most disappointed that we are still two years off the completion of the first of the "Tiger" class cruisers; and, reading between the lines of the White Paper, it seems to me that we are now finally going to lose the opportunity of having really sizable, self-contained units, such as cruiser ships can provide, without the guided missiles being available in those ships, because there have been so many changes in policy in the meantime with regard to the requirements of those ships.

Instead, we are going to have a number of ships of the larger destroyer type; and I see it is argued in the White Paper that five of those would perhaps, in the long run, be better than two of the others. That is always a nice point. I must say that there is some substance in the argument. I remember the days when we were arguing as between the 6,000-ton and 8,000-ton armoured cruiser, with six inch guns, compared to the larger cruiser, with larger guns and less armour. We found, and proved it in the war, that numbers of units do really count in sea warfare. Therefore I can see that side of it. But I should be much happier if the "Tiger" class cruisers had been so treated in their gradual development, with their original legend on the drawing board, as to be capable of carrying effective guided missiles, and carrying them for long distances, if necessary, for the purpose of discharge. I am sorry that that is not now to be the case.

What I think has been one of the most unsatisfactory features about the debates, both here and in another place, is the comparative lack of reference, and particularly by way of explanation, in regard to the problem of ability to prepare for, or to conduct, naval warfare without adequate land bases, in face of the new type of warfare which is threatened. What is to be the alternative? I should say that you will never be able wholly to do without proper fixed bases. We could have a very bad time in this country with regard to both our construction and repair programme in our home bases, and the necessary co-ordination and assembly and despatch of our Fleet stores all over the world. If there is not to be reasonable security for those bases, then we must think hard, and think rapidly, about what will take their place.

One disturbing thought is that in those circumstances we are in certain places losing out actual ownership and control of foreign naval bases. But I think the noble Viscount, Lord Bridgeman, is right when he draws attention to the various matters which are in the last few paragraphs of the First Lord's Paper: namely, the extending of co-operation in one form and another with Dominions and friendly Powers. That is a most valuable factor in this connection. It does not, of course, excuse us from undertaking effectively the duty of devising—perhaps something more extensive, and with new and effective provisions—Fleet training of the type we had to adopt in 1944 in the Eastern naval warfare. But certainly we have had little information as to what the Admiralty really think is possible in that connection as anything like a substitute for the fixed base which is now under such threat from the new form of nuclear warfare. I hope that we may be able to get a little more information from the First Lord this afternoon.

As regards the submarine threat, which has been raised by a number of speakers to-day, I was interested to hear the remark of the noble Lord, Lord Teynham, who introduced the debate this afternoon. It was said, or implied, in another place that there is now no submarine menace. I have not had a chance of reading carefully the passage referred to, but I think it must have intended to indicate that the submarine menace was not the only menace; that one must not forget other and greater menaces. I should like to look at it again, and if I think it needs a little correction I should not be above dropping a note to the honourable Member of another place to make sure that we are quite clear on the matter. The need for dealing with the submarine menace is, I think, outstanding. It has been in my mind, and I know in the mind of my noble friend Lord Hall, for years.

When we come to what I call this audit examination of the state of the Forces. I hope that we shall be exceedingly careful not to scrap or sell what is essential to us in our Reserve Fleet and reserve provisions. I think that is vastly important. I wish that some of the people who talk as they do now about these reserve provisions had had to go through the time some of us went through in May, June and July, 1940. Whether the request came from the Air Force or the Army, the Navy were always willing to accede to it. It was wonderful that, whenever requests came from the other Services, so far as it could the Navy responded. What was taken out of naval stores in 1940 which some people would have scrapped years before, gave confidence to the country and made possible the setting up of defence artillery all round the coasts of our country in face of invasion. If the Navy had been subject to the kind of suggestions now made with regard to reserve fleets and stores, we could never have been in that position and able to meet what was a most serious situation after the withdrawal of the Belgians and the French from the fight, and our own loss of equipment in France. I do not want this country to be without something upon which we can depend in our reserve equipment and ships. I hope that the First Lord and the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty will take great care that, whilst meeting any reasonable demands during the course of what I call this audit examination, they do not let anything 20 which might be of use in face of the kind of emergencies which always arise when war comes.

I am exceedingly disappointed, as was my noble friend who spoke earlier, at the comparative lack of progress in the development of our nuclear power submarine project. It has been talked about for so lone, and we have lagged behind the United States so much in following up this project that it makes us feel a little sorry about our own position. I do not think, for example, that many of the British public realise that not only is the "Nautilus" in commission, as my noble friend mentioned, but that the United States have also in commission two nuclear-propelled modern submarines continuing with experiments as well as making voyages. Moreover, there are seven more under construction and three more projected, which will give them within a comparatively short time something like twelve submarines, all propelled by nuclear power. We have not even reached the stage of being able to lay the keel of our first submarine of this type—which is a great pity.

All this, of course, must have a great bearing upon our general shipbuilding—at least the power part of our shipbuilding—in the future, because the more they are able to develop this nuclear power propulsion in the American Fleet, the more quickly will their civil dockyards be able to translate that into their ordinary shipping. In view of the undoubted contribution this country has made in the development and use of nuclear power, I should not like us to be behind, either in efficiency or in date, in providing nuclear propulsion in our merchant shipping. As so often happens, the Fighting Services' research in this matter can be of enormous advantage to the actual application of the discoveries of that research for civil purposes and civil needs. I hope that we shall make much more rapid and effective progress in this project than we have made up to date.

Nothing has been said to-day about what is, I am bound to say, in the modern type of warfare that we shall have to face, almost as dangerous as the actual submarine itself—that is, the mines laid by submarines as well as by aircraft. We had a programme of minesweepers, and I am bound to say, in fairness, that in the First Lord's Paper there is some indication of the strength of the mine-sweeping fleet in commission and in reserve. But I am still of opinion that, when the time comes, we shall find that we certainly shall not have too many, and probably, indeed, not enough. We all pray that in the meantime we may get such progress in negotiations on disarmament, or in the direction of banning certain classes of weapons about which we have been talking this afternoon, that some of these things may not ultimately become necessary.

Whatever is said by way of Party speeches anywhere in the country, I feel that we must be exceedingly careful that we do not let up in making proper provision for dealing with what, quite clearly, is the principal menace to our ordinary economic maintenance of life—the final and complete severance of our sea communications. I take the view that, come what may in the way of weapons, the life of this country will, in the long run, always depend upon our sea communications. I believe that we shall in future have much more assistance than we have had already from our aviation forces in helping to maintain our sea communications, and I am glad to see that we are developing in the Navy itself a scheme of task forces gathered round the carrier.

All of us who have been described as "navally minded" on these matters welcome all the help that other aviationists can give us from the Royal Air Force and the like. In the sense that our life depends upon the maintenance of these sea communications, I submit that the Royal Navy will always be necessary. It will have to be altered from time to time in regard to the new problems that it has to meet, but it will have continuously in peace time to safeguard our communications (there are still seas in which it is dangerous to sail unless we can from time to time have patrols there) and to deal with all those troubles which arise and which call for relief, both in this country and in other countries. That is one of the best bases that we can use on which to form good will amongst nations. Therefore, I say that the Royal Navy will always be necessary, and that, when you come to consider the problem of a global war, you cannot possibly improvise something for it. If you have not the real, strong, well-trained nucleus of the various departments of sea forces to fight a global war, you will surely head for disaster from which there will be no return. I hope we shall, therefore, pay attention to that aspect.

My last word this afternoon is with regard to personnel questions which have been raised. The noble Lord, Lord Ashbourne, spoke feelingly about his entry into the Royal Navy, which interested and amused your Lordships, but I gather from the reports which are now coming to hand that there is a far larger number of entries for the much smaller number of places in the field of cadetships for ultimate entry into the Royal Naval officer service.

Talking of personnel, I am very concerned about the fears that are being expressed, according to information which comes to me, in the Fleet itself with regard to possible redundancies. That fear has crept into men's minds as a result of the debates on the Defence White Paper. I hope it will be made as clear as possible and as soon as possible—because no statement has yet been made, so far as I know, like the statement that was asked for on May 13 in another place—what are the final plans of the Admiralty, and, indeed, of the other Services, for dealing wisely, justly and fairly with those who will become redundant under this new Defence policy outlined in the White Paper. I feel very much indeed for the men in the Fleet who, for example, have signed on, first for their twenty-two years, and then for their next five years. Could everyone who has signed on for those last five years be told that he will not be redundant? Could those who have signed on for the twenty-two years be assured that they will not be redundant?

There is a general feeling amongst them that the pledges which have been given apply specifically to officers and not so much to other ranks. That is probably a fear which may not be well based; but I think it is necessary at the present time, when we are aiming in the Services to go over as far as possible to voluntary recruiting, that those fears should be put out of the way, and that, as has already been mentioned in the debate to-day, we should make it clear to the volunteers of the future that there is still a career to be had in the Royal Navy and in the other fighting Services, and that they will not be let down by any breaches of faith on the ground of redundancy. May I ask that the statement that was asked for on this point on May 13 and which has not yet been given may be made this afternoon, or, if not, that the First Lord of the Admiralty should give us some indication when the finalisation of these plans for dealing with redundancy will be made?

5.4 p.m.

THE EARL OF SELKIRK

My Lords, up to six months ago I could, I think, say with truth that I had spoken for every Government Department except the Admiralty. I therefore address myself to this task with perhaps an unusually fresh mind on the subject. May I say straight away, as one who has come fresh to the Service, how deeply impressed I am with the quality of the officers and men of which it is composed. It is something in which this country can take a very real pride indeed. I have, however, a feeling that there is in some people's minds an idea that the Navy is of greater historic interest than of future importance. I hope that the course of this debate has done something to allay that suspicion. Very powerful speeches of a robust character have been made from both sides of the House, and I am sure they will do a great deal of good.

I intend just to comment on two aspects which have not been mentioned this afternoon. They are important. The first is this. The Navy—I believe the noble Viscount, Lord Bridgeman, mentioned this—provides a strong, cohesive element within the Commonwealth. Indeed, I would say that, after the Crown, along with the influence of the sterling area it is probably the strongest unifying element within the Commonwealth itself. That, of course, is borne out not only by our co-operation in the provision of training and equipment but by the fact that we have a large number of Commonwealth officers and ratings training in this country and Royal Navy officers who are with Commonwealth Navies. Those of your Lordships who attended "Exercise Fairlead" (and I am grateful for what has been said about that) may be interested to know that three of the members of the Commonwealth—Australia, New Zealand and Canada—actually formed a part of the directing staff itself.

The second point is this. I have been tremendously impressed with the quality of the training establishments. They are of a very high order and, in my opinion, are playing an important part in the general education of the country, not only in academic subjects but also in character, habits, self-discipline and physical health. That applies equally to the apprentice training schools. I have been interested to find various schemes for training in leadership, such as exploring expeditions, one of which is going up to Iceland from Dartmouth and Manadon during this summer.

The central theme of this debate—I am glad to refer to this because some doubt has been raised—was referred to first of all by the noble Lord, Lord Teynham, and afterwards by the noble Viscount, Lord Hall: that is, the statement in the White Paper that the rôle of naval forces in total war is somewhat uncertain. I think it is a good thing that that point should be raised, because it is probably true that those words are capable of gross misinterpretation. No one can predict the course of global war. Indeed, we are striving to do ail we can to prevent it from happening. It is to-day our major concern. We are exercising our scientists, our energies and our ideas with the object of preventing it from happening. A great deal of time, energy and ability is devoted to that very end. If there are a few who venture to guess that if any such war should unfortunately take place it would be fought exclusively by air forces and air weapons—these views are, I know, controversial—it is common knowledge that there are other leading strategists on both sides of the Iron Curtain who do not accept that view. It is also common knowledge that the Russians have a very substantial fleet and one does not think it is there purely for fun. Nor does the size of the Chinese Navy, for that matter, which is currently increasing, suggest that they will be exclusively concerned with using their power on land.

The policy of Her Majesty's Government is really quite clear. The possibility that the nuclear battle may not prove immediately decisive is accepted in the Defence White Paper, together with the fact that in that event naval warfare, and in particular anti-submarine warfare, would be of the greatest importance. It is for that reason that Britain must make her contribution to enable N.A.T.O., and other alliances, as they build up, to maintain substantial naval forces. I think that really puts the case quite simply and shortly. I will mention one other point so that there should not be any doubt about it. Perhaps the most important aspect of: he Navy is that it is equipped to meet the danger of war in almost any form, whether cold, local or global. Its equipment and mobility are of great value in all these spheres, and to a great extent could be used in any kind of war.

I think one has to recognise that the Service is going through a very extensive period of change, of a technical and structural character. The new officer structure which came into operation early this year has as its purpose, broadly, to give an even greater sense of unity and common purpose and responsibility among officers, while at the same time retaining the high degree of specialisation. Of course, these qualities have to be of a very high order indeed. The new structure will also improve the general career in the Navy. I think it is fair to say now that an officer of any specialisation can be a member of the Board of Admiralty, with, I think, the exception of two posts, those of First Sea Lord and Vice-Chief of the Naval Staff, which must continue to be held by officers who have held command at sea. But the other posts are open to officers of every specialisation.

I think I can say to my noble friend Lord Cilcennin, who really introduced these reforms, that they are being introduced with remarkably few strains and stresses. All the appointments will, of course, not be made separately but will be made by a single appointing authority. Much the same changes are taking place among ratings. I will not say much about this aspect, except that ratings are becoming more technical and there are fewer of the general category of "seamen." But where we are somewhat in difficulties is that the high standard of training which is required might mean that we should have to expand our training establishments considerably. We do not want to have to do that. We are therefore constantly considering how far training can be completed whilst at sea.

If I may now turn for a moment to the material side, the changes here are most striking. If I may put it a little dramatically, we have just seen the complete termination of the era of the Dreadnought. That started in about 1905, and I suppose may be said to be completely finished now. It is to mark that change that we are now calling the new nuclear submarine "Dreadnought", to indicate the inception of a completely new period. In future, it will be rare for a surface ship to fight a surface ship, except perhaps on isolated occasions. Ships on the surface will now normally fight aircraft or submarines, or support amphibious landings of some character or another.

It is for that reason that the carrier has become the centre of the Fleet. I think that is really the central message to be drawn from the concept of the new carrier task group. The precise disposition of these groups will necessarily depend on different circumstances. We are all aware that, for various reasons, which are well known to those who have studied the matter, two carriers operating together are much more efficient than one. That does not mean that we can always have two carriers in any one place. The carrier itself is going through a period of intense evolution. Various ideas have been introduced. The angled deck, the latest arrestor gear, the steam catapult and the mirror landing sight, are gradually being introduced into all carriers throughout the world. They are big modifications and it will take a little time to bring them fully into all our carriers.

The noble Viscount, Lord Hall, asked about the strength of our Forces East of Suez. There were various questions that he asked: where they would be based, and how they would be organised. Of course, the new plan implies to some extent that the forces available at any one spot will necessarily be less at certain times throughout the year. On the other hand, they will be more formidably reinforced from time to time, when visits take place or when necessity prescribes. The actual force in the Indian Ocean will be about the same, but we must recognise that the Indian Ocean—which, in this sense, may be said to extend from the Arabian Sea and even to the edges of the Pacific—is a pretty considerable area; and no doubt from time to time the force will have to be broken up. I am fully aware that one of the requirements in this connection will be additional Fleet support. That is a matter that we have to consider in its full implications.

As has already been said, a much more powerful and new aircraft, the Scimitar, is to be introduced into the Service next month. It will then be submitted to an intensive period of training, and I hope that the first squadron will be formed in the New Year. This aircraft is a single-seater, twin-engined fighter, of a high performance. It is able to operate in a strike rôle and can, if necessary, carry an atomic weapon. I mention these points to show the developments which have taken place and which seem to me to be important. One of the developments, of course, is the immensely increased use of various detecting devices, whether Asdic or radar, which is steadily taking place and I know is making rapid advance. The effect of this is that for almost every ship, however small, there is an action centre which may be called an information room, through which the information can be fed in at a very early stage. This new radar and Asdic equipment has this disadvantage, that it nearly always takes up a great deal of room and demands additional people to operate it. This, of course, does not make it any easier for our naval constructors to comply with the directions which they have always had from the Board of Admiralty to raise the standard of amenity for the mess decks; but I am confident that, with great ingenuity, the new designs will, as they come into operation, provide a considerable improvement.

Then I should like to turn to guided weapons. With the increased height at which aircraft will be flying shortly, if not already, it is essential that our present anti-aircraft defences should be replaced by guided weapons. I think that has been generally recognised during the course of the debate; and the only criticism has been that we are not introducing them more quickly. But I should like to give voice to this thought: that it is more important that we should get the right weapons, if we can, than that we should try to push ahead with a weapon quickly, before it has been properly checked in operation. We are satisfied that in "Sea Slug" we have made the best selection and we certainly have no reason to think that the tests which have been carried out will not be successful and satisfactory. The noble Lord, Lord Teynham, and also, I think, the noble Viscount, Lord Alexander of Hillsborough, asked whether we could not have put this into one of our cruisers. The answer is that it would not have been possible—or, rather, because I suppose that everything is possible, it would have meant enormous delay and expensive modification. It is for that reason that we have thought it best—I am sure this is right—to put these things into new ships, where accommodation will be correctly and properly provided for them from an early time.

I am extremely glad that both noble Viscounts, Lord Hall and Lord Alexander of Hillsborough, emphasised the importance of nuclear propulsion, because it is of great importance not only to the Royal Navy but, as they so properly said, to our whole shipbuilding industry that we should develop this form of propulsion, and so retain the leadership in shipbuilding which we have held for so long. I am extremely glad that they have pressed the point. I am sorry that I am not going to tell them much more than they know at the present time, because it is not a matter which, frankly, one can deal with quickly. I can assure them that progress is being made in this matter and, as I think the noble Viscount is aware, we have recently reached agreement with the United States on the exchange of information.

VISCOUNT HALL

May I ask whether there is a complete exchange of information regarding nuclear propulsion?

THE EARL OF SELKIRK

As to the word "complete", I cannot at the moment answer; but I can say that it is a full exchange, and I have no reason to think that I may not be able to give the full affirmative. It is a very full exchange. The agreement was put into effect at the end of May, when representatives of the authorities concerned—the Atomic Energy Commission and the Royal Navy, on the one side, and the United States team, on the other—exchanged visits. They came to this country and we went to their country; and we very much hope that the effects of that will be of great importance, though at present it is much too early to make any statement.

The noble Viscount, Lord Bridgeman, mentioned the Royal Marines and I am extremely glad that he did so, for I entirely agree with what he said. We have this fine body of men, with their great tradition. As it happens, I had the pleasure of visiting one Royal Marine Commando at Malta the other week; and a finer body of men one could not hope to meet anywhere. They are in the curious position of being amphibious in character, being just as much at home on sea as on land, and their mobile and versatile character is of special value to-day. In these times, when close association between the Services and the complementary character of the three Services requires to be emphasised, the Royal Marines have a very special rôle to play.

If I may pass from thoughts of the Royal Marines to the point of the noble Lord, Lord Teynham, on landing craft, I may say that we have designs for a new vessel to replace the L.C.T.8. It is part of the naval construction programme, and though we have not yet started its construction I should not wish to underestimate its importance. A number of noble Lords have asked about new construction. The noble Lord, Lord Teynham, asked whether I was satisfied that it was sufficient. I doubt whether any First Lord has ever stood at this Box and said he was satisfied that the production programme was sufficient, and I am certainly not going to say so at the moment. But it would be wrong to give the impression that a great deal has not been done. We are to a large extent using ships built during the last war and even some built before that war, though many, of course, have had to be modernised to a fairly extensive degree. But, since the war, we have completed five carriers, eight "Daring" class vessels, twenty-three frigates and seventeen submarines. I can tell the noble Viscount, Lord Alexander of Hillsborough, that we have also completed quite a large number of minesweepers—over 150 of one kind and another. A number of these ships, including all the carriers, were laid down in war time, and, therefore, though they will be greatly modernised, are not in quite the same category in some respects as ships laid down since the war.

It is therefore true to say that the number of modern ships is low; and certainly if we allow the shipbuilding programme to lag behind we may find ourselves in a difficult position in five or ten years' time. I accept what the noble Earl, Lord Howe, said, that we must try to push forward a good deal faster; but I think it is fair to say that my figures do not entirely agree with his. By the end of this year we shall have completed twenty-three post-war frigates in a space of a little over two years and I believe that the tempo at which they are now coming out is speeding up considerably. In the next two years the "Victorious" and the "Hermes", both carriers, should be out. These will be fitted with the most modern equipment. We also have under construction four large guided missile destroyers, as the noble Lord, Lord Teynham, has said. I very much hope that they will be out a good deal earlier than the dates which he gave.

I do not for a moment pretend that the forces against us are not considerable, and your Lordships may think that in some sense the programme is not adequate to meet them; but, as has been emphasised by the noble Viscount, Lord Alexander of Hillsborough, and others, we are part of a vast alliance, a great team of integrated and active commands in N.A.T.O., a fact which puts a completely different complexion on the picture as compared with what it would be were we in isolation.

The noble Viscount, Lord Hall, asked about the H.T.P. submarines. These are for training purposes only, of course, and we are not proceeding with them but are going straight on to the nuclear type which we consider a more profitable line of development. There is also a certain number of "Porpoise" class submarines being built now, which are coming out year by year. The noble Lord, Lord Teynham, is perfectly correct in emphasising the importance of anti-submarine warfare and of the helicopter. We are hoping to use helicopters from carriers and subsequently from other types of ships, though at present we have not settled exactly how this will work. This aircraft is also a very versatile instrument for air-sea rescue and for co-operation with land-based or maritime aircraft.

VISCOUNT ALEXANDER OF HILLSBOROUGH

My Lords, we cannot yet have found a satisfactory answer to the argument against helicopters for anti-submarine work—that they cannot be other than "sitting birds", because anti-aircraft guns are powerful and ocean-going submarines will make short work of helicopters unless those aircraft have changed very much in the last five years.

THE EARL OF SELKIRK

My Lords, my impression is that the Schnorkel will mean that submarines will rarely come to the surface but will remain completely under water for considerable periods. While on the surface they can, of course, be tackled by fixed-wing aircraft; when at Schnorkel depth the advantage in some ways lies with the helicopter over fixed-wing aircraft.

The noble Lord, Lord Gilford, took me to task again about the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve Air Arm. The Board of Admiralty viewed with extreme regret the decision, which they reached with the greatest reluctance, to disband these squadrons. We have never suggested that there was no operational rôle for the Air Branch of the R.N.V.R., or that the officers would not be fully capable of carrying out their duties. It was really a very hard question of priority, and we had to give priority to Regular forces. We had to achieve such saving of money and such release for other duties of Regular personnel as was possible.

LORD GIFFORD

My Lords, if the noble Earl will forgive my worrying him further, may I say that I have tried to differentiate between the fighter squadrons and the anti-submarine squadrons, because I believe that is important.

THE EARL OF SELKIRK

My Lords, the noble Lord is perfectly correct about that, but it does not alter the fact that it would have cost a great deal of money, although the arguments for the anti-submarine rôle are much more powerful than those for a fighter force, because the latter would have required, relatively soon, to be fully re-equipped. That would have cost quite a lot of money. It was a hard and very difficult question of priority.

LORD GIFFORD

My Lords, is there any possibility of any alternative, of allowing them to fly with Regular squadrons or anything of that kind?

THE EARL OF SELKIRK

My Lords, I will certainly consider that point, but I think the difficulty is that Regular squadrons would have no spare flying time and would not normally work a week-end routine, as do R.N.V.R. squadrons. Those are problems not very easy to resolve.

The noble Lord, Lord Ashbourne, who made a very interesting and welcome speech in our debate this afternoon, asked about replenishment ships in general, or supply ships for the Navy. These are manned by civilian officers and men of the Royal Fleet Auxiliary Service, as your Lordships very well know. It is to some extent unfortunate that their crews change from time to time. On the other hand, I think it would be more costly to have naval crews, for the sailor, after all, is a very highly specialised man, trained for working and carrying out tasks in a fighting ship. I think it would be a pity to use him extensively for something else. Moreover he would, inevitably, come out of our Vote A. It would mean that people would be taken away from manning fighting ships. On the whole, therefore, I think that the present system, which works well, is the most satisfactory. As the noble Lord probably knows, some replenishment ships such as tankers are often, and profitably, used on commercial work, but I do not think it would be right for White Ensign ships to be used for that purpose.

I should like now to turn to the question of recruiting which is the basis of our White Paper. Perhaps I might just mention, in passing, that my remarks about the importance of recruiting apply equally to the W.R.N.S. which is playing, and has for some time played, such an important part in the Navy. Members of this Service are engaged in a great variety of tasks. We have secretarial and communications W.R.N.S. officers serving overseas in Malta and Oslo, many of them employed in the N.A.T.O. headquarters there. Other members of the Service fill a variety of rôles, including a number of a technical character such as those of air mechanics and inspectors of wireless and radar equipment.

On the whole, we have had a fairly good year—that is to say, up to the end of the financial year—as regards recruiling. The entry standards for ratings in all branches were raised in February of last year, and in spite of this we entered 800 or 900 more during the ensuing year than in the year before. Recruiting has not been quite so good recently. Frankly. I think there is some doubt in the minds of parents and young men as to the future of the Services—they question whether there is a really worth while career in them. It is my object to set that doubt at rest and to make it quite clear that this is a Service which is going to continue to provide a really worth while career.

As has been stated, with the planned reduction of Service manpower, a certain number of personnel will be retired. I very much hope that the terms on which this is to be done will be announced shortly, and that nominal rolls will thereafter be prepared partly from volunteers We should like to have them prepared as far as possible from volunteers, though the Admiralty will have the final decision as to who will be accepted for retirement and who will not. I want to emphasise that it is our firm intention that those who remain will have just as good a career as they have now—and I hope better. It is tremendously important that this should be realised, so that young men may know that they are corning into a worth while Service Someone has slightly altered a well-known quotation in this connection, and I would borrow it and say, "Now is the time to come in with certainty that the career structure will be there".

The noble Earl, Lord Howe, and I think the noble Viscount, Lord Hall, raised the question of the ships we are scrapping. They realise that, to those who live in them, ships have, in a way, a very personal significance—both noble Lords, I am sure, appreciate that. But we are continuing, and indeed accentuating, a policy already adopted—that is, to keep fewer ships in Reserve and to keep them in a higher state of readiness. I think this policy is right. Constantly to bring ships in Reserve fully into line with modern requirements is a very expensive thing to do. In so far as our resources permit, I am certain that it is wise to devote a large percentage to the Fleet at sea. So we are continuing substantially to go on with the same policy and to accentuate it still further.

My Lords, I have tried to answer most of the questions that have been raised, and I am afraid that I have kept your Lordships for a considerable time. I should like finally to say this. In our naval tradition we have something that is very precious, something which has been superbly maintained up to the present time. If there are two spheres in which the rest of the world respects and is prepared to take guidance from this country, they are the spheres of parliamentary government and naval affairs. I think there is no part of the free world which would not willingly take a lead from us in both those spheres. It is a unique position and it depends essentially on the quality of the personnel which we have had. Let us never forget that the freedom of the seas which we enjoy was a gift granted by the Royal Navy to the trading communities of the world. Like all freedoms, that freedom can be maintained only by perpetual vigilance.

5.35 p.m.

LORD TEYNHAM

My Lords, I am grateful for the support which I have received from all quarters of the House in this debate. I am sure the First Lord will take heed of the various points that have been raised, especially as regards the comparative shortage of anti-submarine vessels. I am sorry that he has not been able to deal with the subject of the guided-missile cruiser, and to tell us about the prospect of converting some of our older ships into anti-aircraft guided-missile ships. I am almost tempted, in this connection, to use an old phrase: "We want eight, and we won't wait!" Who knows? It may go round the country again one day. I am glad that the First Lord has reaffirmed the primary rôle of the Navy, which was in danger of being lost sight of in the welter of words in the Defence White Paper. He said that alliance with N.A.T.O. puts a completely different picture on things. That is perfectly true, but it has been pointed out that we might find ourselves entering the next war without any Allies; then I think the picture would be one in which we should be without a friend at all. My Lords, I certainly do not wish to press my Motion, and I now beg leave to withdraw it.

Motion for Papers, by leave, withdrawn.