HL Deb 16 May 1956 vol 197 cc454-71

2.40 p.m.

LORD BALFOUR OF INCHRYE rose to call attention to the Memorandum of the Secretary of State for Air relating to the Air Estimates, 1956–57; and to move for Papers. The noble Lord said: My Lords, in moving Motion the first thought in my mind is one which I am sure is shared by your Lordships in all quarters of the House: this is the first debate we have had for many years without the wisdom, guidance and counsel of that architect of the Royal Air Force, the late Lord Trenchard, and the debate is for all of us sadder and poorer for the loss of that contribution.

My Lords, the consideration of the Air Estimates cannot be divorced from the general defence picture, and the general defence picture, as portrayed in the White Paper, is, in turn, related to foreign policy, because arms must he the servants, and not the shapers or controllers, of foreign policy. Within and without N.A.T.O. the main task of the Royal Air Force is to defend and to countermaul enemy centres of operation and production in the event of the outbreak of war; and for those tasks our Royal Air Force fighters and our V-bomber force must operate from static prepared bases.

The first consideration that I would submit to Her Majesty's Government is this. In the preoccupation with the preparation for an all-out nuclear weapon war, are we neglecting the needs of the far more likely war, which, I submit, is the local war—the small war on the pattern of the war in Korea? For that small war the Royal Air Force needs flexibility and mobility, and I rather doubt at the present time whether it has those two requirements to a sufficient degree. As the Service complicates itself, technically and administratively, it takes longer and longer, as it were, to lift itself off the concrete from these prepared bases and to get going in the rough-and-tumble of localised combined Services land-air warfare. We all read a great deal about exercises in home defence, of the exercises in the main theatres of N.A.T.O. commands, but we read nothing of the three-Service combined exercises under field conditions in distant theatres. I believe this is because of the hitherto meagre resources of what I would term the "poor relation" of operation commands—Transport Command.

The study of the more likely lesser war at once brings up the question of Transport Command, and the Royal Air Force need, first for strategic and swift mobility, and second, for the carrying out of routine movements in peace and in war. In another place the Secretary of State for Air, when questioned upon this matter of Transport Command, defined the functions of Transport Command as being "strategic mobility, emergency moves and work for paratroopers". He made it clear that it was not the duty of Transport Command to carry out those regular movements of Service men from one theatre to another which must be executed both in peace and in war. I believe that your Lordships would agree with this definition of the functions of Transport Command, because it would be wrong irrevocably to tie up highly specialised aircraft and highly trained crews in what I would call the routine, humdrum job of going up and down the world, transporting troops and their families.

The Air Ministry must, therefore, rely on other sources. I believe that they must rely on civil aviation fleets. In war, the equipment of the nationalised Corporations will not be available to the Royal Air Force. The main job of the nationalised Corporations will be to keep open world communications. Some of your Lordships may remember that the Air Ministry took over some of the equipment of B.O.A.C., the flying boats; and never have we lost flying boats more quickly than we did in Norway, aircraft which we would have given a great deal to have at our disposal for communication purposes later in the war.

I have to be very careful here if I talk about the mercantile fleet because I am a director of B.E.A., and I know that for that reason I am skating on very thin ice. But if the ice is thin for me it is thinner still for the noble Lord, Lord Douglas of Kirtleside, the Chairman, who is to follow me. He weighs more a mean in words, of course) and therefore has to be even more careful than I do. I hope I may be allowed to say that for years before the war the Royal Navy supported the mercantile marine financially and in other ways so as to ensure adequate use of transport in emergency. I believe that the Royal Air Force must do something along these lines, and if the Air Ministry alone cannot do it, it behoves Her Majesty's Government to create a contract position which will give independent operators a chance to acquire, on commercial terms, suitable equipment for air transportation and to write off the cost over a reasonable period of time. I do not say that those independent operators must have the very latest type of aircraft, but they must have something very much better than the York which I am glad to say has now been grounded so far as this particular duty is concerned.

It is not for me to say how this contract position can be created. There are several Departments concerned—the Treasury, the Air Ministry, the War Office and the Admiralty. At the moment, the policy is to buy transportation in the cheapest market: the lowest tender gets the contract. I submit that it is never clever to buy anything at a price below the cost of production of a good article. One may win temporarily, and think for a few moments that one is clever; but finally one either drives a good man into bankruptcy or gets a bad article—and that applies to air transportation as much as in any other direction of commerce. Troops and their families are not fare-paying passengers. They do not have any option as to whether they should or should not travel by air. It is part of their Service life that they should do so, and I submit that they are entitled to a degree of comfort and safety of operational equipment.

Let me here interpose that I know that no aircraft that is not safe is allowed to fly, for each aircraft must have a certificate of airworthiness. But something more is needed. Operational safely can be increased by the use of the most modern techniques; and I feel that these people who are not fare-paying passengers are entitled to ask for something comparable to that which fare-paying passengers enjoy. What is needed is a high-policy decision flowing from the Cabinet of Her Majesty's Government, in the form of a general direction that there should be an independent air mercantile marine, and that to provide it the Department concerned must, consistent with the regard for the public purse, create a position whereby that fleet can be obtained so that those willing to operate it may be in a position to purchase suitable equipment.

I now come to the second point on which I wish to detain your Lordships this afternoon: the supply, position and the system which at present operates for obtaining aircraft. This is a highly complex system in its detailed working, but in broad terms it is as follows. The Ministry of Supply controls research and development. It is the Department responsible for agreeing to, and satisfying, the Air Staff operational requirements. The Ministry of Supply is interposed between the customer and those responsible for manufacture; it is responsible for seeing that production is satisfactory, both in quantity and in quality. I submit to your Lordships that it is impossible for us here, without all the information available (which no one outside the circles of Her Majesty's Government can possess), to debate in detail the merits and demerits of the present system and its working. But I believe that Her Majesty's Government have to face up to-day to two main facts. The first is that the supply of aircraft has not fulfilled expectations and promises, either in performance or in delivery. Secondly, the system, as at present operated, is the subject of widespread criticism.

On the first point I should like to make clear that I am not criticising the aircraft industry and its great achievements—the obtaining of the world speed record for Great Britain; the splendid display when the R ussian visitors were here recently; the Valiant bombers' wonderful display; the display by a squadron of Hunters, known as the "Fighting Cocks"—No. 43 Squadron—which staggered our Russian visitors, a squadron which was commanded with great distinction during World War I by Lord Douglas of Kirileside and in which I had the honour of being a flight-commander. Then, there is the great export contribution which the industry is making.

All these things are on the plus side, but the Ministry of Supply cannot claim the word "Success" as the hallmark of the results which it has presented to this country. There are the Hunter, the Swift and the Javelin, and theirs is not exactly a happy story. The Hunter was supposed to be a four-gun fighter, but it has restrictions still upon its ability to use its full armament. The Swift was withdrawn and is now, I believe, coming forward in some new form. The Javelin is having troubles. There are three V-bombers and some fourteen different fighters under design or construction at the present time. Bomber and fighter delivery and production are behind schedule. A wonderful new phrase is being coined in Whitehall—if your Lordships read the Defence Paper you will see it: it is "re-phasing of deliveries." As most of us know, it really means that things are late for some reason or another. As I say, the Ministry of Supply cannot claim great success when we look at the difficult position of our fighters. There is far too widespread development of new types; and even now we have the grounding of the well-tried Canberra.

On the second question—that of widespread criticism—within the Air Ministry there is a powerful school of thought which says that the war-time system of a Ministry of Supply responsible for the supply of aircraft should be ended, and that the development and supply of aircraft should go back to the Air Ministry. There is also a powerful school of thought at the Admiralty which says the same. I need only remind your Lordships of the debate in your Lordships' House last week when that view was put forward. I cannot say, and I do not believe that any of your Lordships can say, whether that view is right or wrong, but there do exist within the aircraft industry complaints of the technical work of the Ministry of Supply, of hold-ups, of modifications, of lack of decision and of barriers set up between manufacturer and user. Again, I am not in a position to judge the fairness or the merits of those complaints, or, indeed, whether the industry itself has things to remedy within its own structure. But the complaints do exist; the Press and public learn of failure and delays, and uneasiness grows because of the contrast between expenditure and the rather meagre results which are shown.

It is no good for the Minister of Supply to say that he is a fair target for the grousers. He said recently that the Ministry of Supply is fair game to the Opposition, retired Air Marshals, air correspondents and everyone else. It is no good for the Minister of Supply to say that and suggest that all is well in the best of Departments, and that any major faults lie outside. It is not good enough. Misgivings are cumulative, and they exist increasingly at a time when we are emerging into the guided missile and ballistic era and when, I believe, public confidence is more essential than ever to Government success.

Like others of your Lordships, I have tried to give a good deal of thought to this problem. I believe that to restore confidence within the Service Departments and with the public, this present supply system should be examined and reported upon, not within the Government by the Minister of Defence—because there is no one from the Minister of Defence and all his colleagues downwards in the Government who is not in some way or other an interested party—but by some authori- tative outside body appointed for this particular purpose. I would appeal with all the weight I can to the Government, to the Prime Minister, to take serious note of the misgivings that exist in the public mind and to take steps to have such a body set up to examine and report, first, as to whether or not the present system is recommended to continue, and, secondly, if it is recommended as the best system, how its working on behalf of the Air Ministry and the Admiralty and the aircraft industry could be improved.

If all is well, as the Minister of Supply says, and faults lie elsewhere, there should be no resistance by the Ministry of Supply to such a proposal. They ought to welcome it. If all is not well, then the sooner we know it and the country knows it the better. If the system is basically right but needs amendment, then the sooner the amendments are made the better. It might be well to look at the United States system when we are examining our own. There are men in the industrial world who have experience and knowledge of Government, who have held high positions in the Government and whose wide knowledge of industry and whose record of public service would command great public confidence. Let the Government remit this supply problem to such men and in this way restore what I would call technical as well as public confidence.

No doubt the army of "No" men will mobilise their forces of objection, as always, directly any suggestions such as I have put forward are considered, because anything that looks like putting a Minister or his Department on the defensive is always objected to. But I hope and believe that the Prime Minister, the Minister of Defence and his colleagues will sweep aside such "little thinking" in considering the very disturbing and grave misgivings that exist on the aircraft supply position and the system that operates at the present time. Past achievements and the present and future tasks of the Royal Air Force warrant in aircraft all and only the best for those upon whom our very existence depends. My Lords, I beg to move for Papers.

2.58 p.m.

LORD DOUGLAS OF KIRTLESIDE

My Lords, I must say that I feel myself in substantial agreement with the noble Lord who has just sat down, in spite of his somewhat unkind reference to my present figure. He is thinking back to the days—as he himself indicated—when I was commanding a fighter squadron on the Western Front in France and he was one of my flight-commanders—and a very good one, too! Since then we have grown up in aviation together, though in different spheres, and perhaps it is not so extraordinary that our ideas, at any rate on the subject of aviation, are apt to coincide. As the noble Lord said—and I will not elaborate upon this point because he put it very well—there is a general feeling of uneasiness now about the equipment of the Royal Air Force. There has been some improvement, perhaps, over the last year—I would admit that. But public opinion is still unhappy. As I go about the aviation world in which I move, I hear a lot of talk—some of which, perhaps, could be classed as rumours, which I cannot confirm or otherwise—that all is not well with the supply of the aircraft to the Royal Air Force.

It is surprising how quickly ore gets out of touch once one leaves a Service, even though, as in my case, one is still in that world. As I say, one is surrounded by a cloud of rumours, which make the public, and me, unhappy, so I should like to put this part of my speech in the form of queries to the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, who is going to reply. I do not want it to be thought that I necessarily believe in or support everything I am putting forward, but "There's no smoke without fire," and I think we are entitled to some reassurance from the responsible Minister.

Let me take fighters first. As the noble Lord, Lord Balfour of Inchrye, has said, there seems to be something not entirely right with the fighters we have now. I am told that the Hunter's engine is still inclined to stop with the fire of the guns. The javelin is in trouble with handling characteristics at high speeds, and there is some mystery about the Swift, because that was rejected some time ago and I now read in the Press that it is coming back in the form of a carrier of guided missiles. One would like to know a little more about that particular story. One thing that worries me, as it does the noble Lord, Lord Balfour of Inchrye, is the number of different types of fighter now under development or actually in production. He mentioned the figure of fourteen; I have heard the figure of thirteen: but there is no doubt that the aircraft industry is stretched. There has been much talk about cutting dawn its commitments and concentrating on things that really matter. It seems to me that to have that number of fighters either under development or in production is more than the aircraft industry can cope with.

Then I come to bombers. We still have three types of V-bomber, a point to which I referred when I spoke in your Lordships' House two years ago. I am glad to see, from the Memorandum accompanying the Air Estimates, that the orders for Valiants have been reduced with a view to the greater employment of more advanced types (as it is put) like the Victor and the Vulcan. I think that is to the good, because undoubtedly we cannot afford to have three medium V-bombers in full production. I have heard—and on this again I should like some information—that of these two V-bombers, the Victor is showing a certain degree of superiority in performance. If that is so, I would suggest to the Government that it might be advisable to concentrate on the better of the two types. If the Victor is the better, let us concentrate on that and, if necessary, gradually scrap the Vulcan. I may be told that my information is wrong, but if it is right, flat is how I suggest we should proceed.

As regards Coastal Command, the noble Lord, Lord Balfour of Inchrye, said that Transport Command was the Cinderella of the Royal Air Force, but I sometimes think that Coastal Command can claim that title. Undoubtedly the Shackleton is a good aeroplane and has done good service, but I am glad to see that a new and in proved type, with a tricycle undercarriage and more powerful engines, is coming forward. On the other hand, this is a piston-engined aircraft and we have moved into the jet age. Surely a type of jet aircraft for Coastal Command ought to be under development now, presumably a propeller-turbine, on account of the need for long range in aircraft that have to operate over the sea. Whether such an aircraft is under development or not I do not know, but I certainly think that it should be.

Incidentally, in previous debates in your Lordships' House on this same Motion, flying boat enthusiasts, including myself, have asked that the Air Ministry and the Ministry of Supply should do something about developing a new and improved type of flying boat. I believe that I have lent my voice to that plea in past years, but I am afraid that I have changed my view over the last few years. The development of aviation, the speed of aircraft and the new techniques of design have advanced so far that I cannot feel that a flying boat has much future in the Royal Air Force. I cannot imagine, for instance, a supersonic flying boat: it does not seem to me to be possible or to make sense. It is true, of course, that the flying boat still has a limited tactical use in areas where there is no landing ground, but it seems to me to be a luxury that we cannot afford, to develop a brand-new type or types for this limited use. If we had unlimited resources, that might be justified, but, as I have said, it is universally agreed that our resources as regards design and development are strained rather than otherwise. Therefore, it seems to me hardly justifiable to strain these resources still further to develop this rather difficult type of aircraft, the flying boat. I believe that the Americans are still going on with flying boat development, but their resources are much greater than ours and no doubt in their case it is justified.

That brings me to Transport Command. Perhaps I am treading on rather delicate ground here, but I think that a great effort should be made to co-ordinate the design and development of R.A.F. and civil transport aircraft. It is true that there is a committee called the Transport Aircraft Requirements Committee, of which I am a member, but I am afraid that this committee rarely meets and many decisions are taken by the Air Ministry and the Ministry of Supply without consultation with the committee. The aircraft that Transport Command employ and the aircraft that civil transport corporations and companies employ have much the same jobs to do, and I feel that R.A.F. Transport Command should make do as far as possible with the types of aircraft that are developed by civil aviation. It does not seem worth while to try to develop entirely new types just for a few "fancy-waistcoat" items. The noble Lord may say that what I have suggested largely exists to-day. We have the Hermes, for instance, which is the development of a civil type, and I am glad to see that the Air Ministry have ordered a number of Britannias, which is all to the good. Again perhaps I am treading on delicate ground, but at this moment Vickers are developing, to B.E.A. specifications, a turbo-prop aircraft called the Vanguard, with a large freight capacity and carrying nearly 100 passengers, which I should have thought would be of interest to Transport Command. So far as I know, Transport Command—or rather the Air Ministry—have evinced no interest in this aircraft.

This brings me to the question of the higher organisation for the design and development of R.A.F. aircraft which has already been eloquently discussed by the noble Lord, Lord Balfour of Inchrye. As he said, this is now primarily the responsibility of the Ministry of Supply, but there is no doubt about it that the machine is not working smoothly, whatever anyone says, and there is a good deal of dissatisfaction in various quarters. Some of that dissatisfaction perhaps is unjustified, but I think I may say that "There's no smoke without fire." Is it a good thing for the design and development of R.A.F. aircraft that it should be in the hands of a Department other than the Air Ministry? Before the war, this was the responsibility of the Air Ministry. There was a separate member on the Air Council who was responsible for seeing that the aircraft were designed and developed; and that situation obtained until the formation of the Ministry of Aircraft Production, which was no doubt justified in the preparation for a coming war and in the stress of war itself. I cannot help thinking that the Air Ministry requirements were more speedily and effectively met then, under that system, than they are under the present system. At that time, if your Lordships remember, the Hurricane and the Spitfire were designed and produced, and they made a great difference to us in the Battle of Britain.

It seems to me that there are two principles that have to be satisfied in this question. The first is that engineers, as well as officers with operational experience, must sit together and co-operate in drawing up the operational requirements for new type aircraft, and, later, in drawing up the more precise specifications. There is a tendency—and there was in my day at the Air Ministry, when I had the Director of Operational Requirements under me—for that Department to be staffed entirely by operational flying personnel. Nowadays I do not think that is right. We must have engineers sitting in right from the beginning in the drawing up of operational requirements and specifications. The second principle, and perhaps the more important, is that there must be direct and continuous contact between the user and the aircraft manufacturer. At present this is not so, for in between the two there is the Ministry of Supply. I cannot think that makes for smooth working.

I was much impressed by a speech that was made in another place by Mr. Lucas, the Member for Brentford and Chiswick, in which he recommended that the Government should make a close study of the American system of the development of military aircraft. It seems to me that in America they have perhaps produced a better solution to this problem titan we have done here. They have devised a system by which the user—that is, the U.S. Air Force—is brought into much closer contact with the U.S. manufacturers. They have established within the U.S. Air Force what is called an Air Research and Development Command, the purpose of which, I understand, is to act as a direct link between the aircraft industry, the Air Staff and the user Commands. I should have thought that that system was well worthy of study, and that possibly some such system might, with advantage, be introduced into this country. Therefore, I sincerely support the proposal made by the noble Lord, Lord Balfour of Inchrye, that there should be an independent inquiry into this whole business to see whether some better system cannot be devised.

Finally—and here again perhaps I am treading on slightly delicate ground—I want to talk about a question that is really close to my heart at the present time namely, the question of air traffic control over this country. This closely concerns the R.A.F., as well as civil transport and my own Corporation. As Chairman of B.E.A. I have far too many instances brought to my notice or near-misses between civil aircraft and R.A.F. aircraft. Only the other day, your Lordships will remember, there was a case of a collision being narrowly averted between an R.A.F. Vampire and an Elizabethan of B.E.A. The Air Ministry organised an inquiry, and I have seen the summary of the report, which is very good. In the end, it was found that neither pilot was to blame, and I agree with that view. That seems a rather sinister conclusion to me, however, because, if neither pilot was to blame, then clearly the corollary is that the rules or the procedure must he to blame. If the pilots were guiltless, then under the present rules the same thing may happen again, possibly with more disastrous consequences.

As the House knows, there is a network of air corridors established over the United Kingdom in which civil aircraft fly, under certain precise rules and under control from the ground; and there are rules, also, for R.A.F. aircraft flying in these airways, But these were drawn up, I understand, back in 1938, since when circumstances have changed considerably. In particular, aircraft are very much faster, and the speed of approach is much greater. The two aircraft that nearly collided the other day were approaching at a speed of over 600 m.p.h., and your Lordships can imagine what a brief space of time the pilots of these aircraft had in which to make up their minds to take avoiding action. I am glad to see, from a statement made by the Secretary of State for Air in another place, that he and the Minister of Transport and Civil Aviation have—and I quote: decided to institute a review of procedures governing flight in controlled air spaces to see whether the rules now in existence shall be altered with the object of further reducing chances of incident. Surely this is all to the good, although I am not sure that, in the long run, even that will be sufficient. I feel that, sooner or later, we shall have to devise a more positive system of control for all aircraft, including R.A.F. aircraft operating in civil airways. As I say, the problem will get worse rather than better as the speed of aircraft increases, and as more and more fast jet aircraft get into the air. I think the visual methods of avoidance will probably become outdated and some more positive control will become necessary.

I sympathise very much with the R.A.F. in their dislike of more controls and more restrictions on R.A.F. flying over the United Kingdom. This is a small island, and the amount of air space is limited. The R.A.F. must obviously have air space in which to carry out their training—I know that better than anyone else, because at one time I was responsible for operational training in the R.A.F. The fewer restrictions that have to be placed on that training the better. It is a difficult problem, but it is one that must be tackled, or we may have tragic consequences. I do not pretend to know what the answer is, but I feel that probably ground radar and airborne radar come into the picture. All I am saying is that it is a problem that we must take seriously.

I have just come back from a meeting of the Technical Committee of the International Transport Association, held in San Remo last week. There the No. 1 item on the agenda was, "The problems of air traffic control." This was a high-level conference of senior technical executives from every airline in the world. There were representatives there from the International Civil Aviation Organisation, and from the air traffic control organisations of practically every country in the world. What struck me was that the U.S. Air Force sent a team of six officers, under a Brigadier-General, including a Colonel with the title of "Civil Liaison Officer," to take part in these discussions. I am sorry to say—indeed, I was rather embarrassed—that the R.A.F. did not have a representative at the conference, although the Air Ministry had been invited to send one. There is no doubt that if the U.S. Air Force is represented in strength, the R.A.F. ought to be there, too.

To end on a more cheerful note, through my contacts with the R.A.F., and in particular with the younger flying personnel, it is my real conviction that the spirit and morale of the R.A.F. are as high as ever. The old flying skill is there, too. As the noble Lord, Lord Balfour of Inchrye, said, we can see that in the magnificent displays which have been put up recently by Bomber Command and, in particular, by the Hunters of Fighter Command. As the noble Lord said, the squadron that has hit the public eye most is our old squadron in which we served; and naturally we are delighted. But it is quite obvious that it is essential that we should back up and enhance this high spirit and morale by giving the R.A.F. the best possible aircraft and equipment.

3.22 p.m.

THE EARL OF SWINTON

My Lords, the debate, quite rightly and properly, has covered a number of topics. I propose in a few minutes to refer to only one subject which has figured in both the speeches that have been delivered and which cropped up in the Naval debate last week. In paragraph 5 of the White Paper accompanying the Estimates, we read that the production programme will be seriously underspent in 1955–56. We read of the further cancellation of orders, and finally that the development of advanced types of aircraft and equipment has continued to meet with many difficulties in the year. That is not very informative; unfortunately, neither is it very new.

As the other speakers have said, things are not right. There is the long unhappy story of the Swift; there was the controversy about the Vickers 1000, and certainly a good deal of misunderstanding, if not of muddle—I think the Admirals know more about this—over the Fleet Air Arm machines. Of course, one knows that modern aircraft are very complex, but cumulative experience leads one to ask, and ask anxiously, whether the present system of supply is the right one. I do not say that I am against an inquiry, although I am rather in favour, where vital things are concerned and where time is important, of a Government not hesitating to take decisions themselves. I should have thought that there was enough knowledge for us to debate the matter fully in this House, and for the Government to take the decision themselves. After all, though the question has many ramifications, the principles involved are fairly simple and straightforward, and the present system is a direct contradiction of the elementary principle that the user should order what he is going to use.

There is nothing very novel in that. It has never been contended that the Admiralty should not order warships for the Fleet; nor has anybody ever suggested that shipowners should not order the liners and the cargo boats which they are going to use. After all, in the field of the aircraft industry we follow that principle, and always have done in the case of the airlines. B.O.A.C. and B.E.A. place the orders for their aircraft. The Ministry of Supply do not place those orders, although the Government are the sole shareholders in the nationalised undertakings. I must say that the results in that case of the user placing the orders appear to have been very satisfactory, and an agreeable contrast to what we find in the other field. B.E.A. throughout worked in the closest touch with Vickers, and I have no doubt that that close cooperation from the earliest stages had not a little to do with the successful emergence of the Viscount.

I understand that there is now another machine on the stocks which is being planned with the same close consultation between the noble Lord who has just spoken and the great firm who are making it and, I have no doubt, the engine makers as well. The same, I think, is true of B.O.A C. and the Britannia. The Britannia is now being ordered extensively in America. There certainly was the closest co-operation between B.O.A.C. and the Bristol company. The Comet is no exception. It is true that it encountered tragic misfortune; but in the inception of the venture and in the determination to get everything right when the Comet had met with its disaster, there was again the closest cooperation between B.O.A.C. and the makers, de Havilland's.

If I may speak from my own experience, I may say that the whole of my experience entirely supports this thesis. The noble Lord and I, and also the noble Viscount, Lord Portal of Hungerford, were together. I know that in my day aircraft were much simpler; but we were ordering in enormous quantities off the drawing board entirely new types of aircraft which no maker had made. Not only were we ordering those new types of aircraft, but we developed radar and wireless telephony, which was the necessary concomitant of radar. We had the whole of the plans ready for the new engines and, indeed, the new weapons—the cannon gun and, later, the rocket—to fit in not a "re-phasing" but a phasing of the aircraft as they carne forward. Of course, we had our setbacks and delays, and we had to make modifications, but I am absolutely certain that we could never have got the aircraft in the time—and time was then vital—if my colleagues and I in the Air Ministry had had a third Department through which we had to go, proceeding as if we were using a solicitor in a divorce case. We simply could not have done the job if we had not had the sole responsibility.

May I tell the House why that was so—and I am sure all noble Lords who were parties to this will agree? At every stage, even before the provisional operational requirements emerged as a specification, we had the closest cooperation between the General Staff, the Development and Production Department in which Sir Wilfred Freeman did such wonderful work, and the makers. That went on the whole time, and that cooperation enabled each to appreciate the problems of the other, to understand the requirements, and to appraise the possibilities and the limitations. Necessary modifications—and there were a great many—were quickly agreed and incorporated, and unnecessary modifications were eliminated. I am sure that anybody who shared that experience would agree that it was that direct co-operation between the user and the maker, and the spirit of mutual confidence which it engendered, which gave us our results. I suggest that it is now time to revert to that system. I do not believe that we shall get the necessary co-operation, the necessary confidence and the full sense of responsibility, if the responsibility is divided between two Ministries. I believe, too—in fact, I am sure of it—that what I have suggested would make for economy as well as for efficiency.

I should be greatly interested if the Minister who is going to reply could tell us how many members of the Royal Air Force and of the Air Ministry are to-day bedded out in the Ministry of Supply. I would hazard a guess that it runs into hundreds. But it is not only that. The greatest cost and the greatest loss come in delay, in a failure to take decisions in time, in the lack of mutual understanding and in cancelled contracts. If we revert to the old practice, there will still remain a vast amount of work for the Ministry of Supply to do. One has only to look in Vacher to see the enormous number of departments and sub-departments it contains—and, I am sure, quite rightly. There will be a vast field, quite enough for one Ministry to engage in, with the great amount of material which they would still order and purvey. I hope that I shall not be told that I am exhibiting an old man's failing of living in the past. What I have said is realistic. I would ask, not that we should live in the past but that we should not hesitate to learn from the past and from the present, too. I believe that past experience and present experience both teach the same lesson—that is, to revert to the old practice which served us pretty well before the Battle of Britain.