Lords Sitting of 15 March 1956

Preamble
The House met at half past two of the clock, The LORD CHANCELLOR on the Woolsack.
Prayers
  CITY OF LONDON (VARIOUS POWERS) BILL [H.L.]
  Read 3a, and passed, and sent to the Commons.

  PRIVATE BILL STANDING ORDERS
  2.35 p.m.
  THE CHAIRMAN OF COMMITTEES (THE EARL OF DROGHEDA): My Lords, the Amendments proposed to be made are purely drafting Amendments, consequential upon the passing of the City of London (Loans) Act last year. I beg to move that the Amendments be agreed to.
  Moved, That the following Amendments be made to the Standing Orders relating to Private Bills, etc.:—
  Standing Order 175, page 72, line 5, lines 10 and 11 and lines 44 and 45, leave out ("(Finance Consolidation) Act, 1912") and insert ("(Loans) Act, 1955")—(The Earl of Drogheda.)
  On Question, Motion agreed to: the said Standing Order amended accordingly.

  BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE
  EARL FORTESCUE: My Lords, on behalf of the noble Marquess the Lord President of the Council, I beg to move the Motion standing in his name on the Order Paper.
  Moved, That Standing Order No. 41 be considered in order to its being dispensed with for the purpose of passing the Pakistan (Consequential Provision) Bill
  446
  through its remaining stages.—(Earl Fortescue.)
  On Question, Motion agreed to, and ordered accordingly.
  EARL FORTESCUE: My Lords, I have to inform your Lordships that it has been agreed, through the usual channels, that we shall not adjourn for dinner this evening but will sit right through.

  SUNDAY ENTERTAINMENTS ACT, 1932
  THE JOINT PARLIAMENTARY UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT (LORD MANCROFT): My Lords, the three Orders standing in my name on the Order Paper are in the usual form and of the usual content, and there is nothing to which I need draw your Lordships' attention. Accordingly, I beg to move the first Order standing in my name.
  Moved, That the Order made by the Secretary of State for the Home Department, for extending section one of the Sunday Entertainments Act, 1932, to the Borough of Hyde, be approved.—(Lord Mancroft.)
  On Question, Motion agreed to.
  LORD MANCROFT: My Lords, I beg to move that the second Order be approved.
  Moved, That the Order made by the Secretary of State for the Home Department, for extending section one of the Sunday Entertainments Act, 1932, to the Urban District of Mexborough, be approved.—(Lord Mancroft.)
  On Question, Motion agreed to.
  LORD MANCROFT: My Lords, I beg to move that the third Order be approved.
  Moved, That the Order made by the Secretary of State for the Home Department, for extending section one of the Sunday Entertainments Act, 1932, to the Rural District of West Lancashire, be approved.—(Lord Mancroft.)
  On Question, Motion agreed to.

  ARCHDEACON JOHNSON'S ALMSHOUSE CHARITY (OAKHAM AND UPPINGHAM) SCHEME CONFIRMATION BILL
  Order of the Day for the Second Reading read.
  LORD AMULREE: My Lords, in rising to move the Second Reading of this Bill, I only want to say briefly that it has already passed all stages in another place. The purpose of the Bill is to substitute a new board of trustees for the board established in the reign of Queen Elizabeth I. The new governing body, composed of trustees living in the locality will be better able to take an active part in the administration of the charity. It is the dissolution of this ancient corporation that requires the authority of Parliament. The Scheme has been published and no objection has been received.
  Moved, That the Bill be now read 2a.— (Lord Amulree.)
  On Question, Bill read 2a, and committed to a Committee of the Whole House.

  BAPTIST CHAPEL AND OTHER CHARITIES (TOTNES AND TUCKENHAY) SCHEME CONFIRMATION BILL
  Order of the Day for the Second Reading read.
  LORD AMULREE: My Lords, in rising to move the Second Reading of this Bill, which has already passed through another place without opposition, I should like to say, briefly, that the purpose of the Bill is to amalgamate the Totnes Baptist Church with the Totnes Congregational Church. To do this it is necessary to remove the dedication of buildings (manse, schools, et cetera) and money to purposes of the Baptist and Congregational causes respectively: and at the same time to provide, to meet the wishes of the respective bodies, that if the experiment fails and there is a parting, each shall get its property back with the old trusts attached. The amalgamation cannot proceed unless Parliament approves, and accordingly I beg to move that this Bill be read a second time.
  Moved, That the Bill be now read 2a.— (Lord Amulree.)
  On Question, Bill read 2a, and committed to a Committee of the Whole House.

  LEIGH ALMSHOUSE, STONELEIGH AND OTHER CHARITIES SCHEME CONFIRMATION BILL
  Order of the Day for the Second Reading read.
  LORD AMULREE: My Lords, this is a similar Bill to the first one of which I have moved the Second Reading and, like the first, it has already passed through another place without opposition. The purpose of the Bill is to appoint a new board of trustees for these Charities in Warwickshire. It is felt that the new trustees, being local people, will take more interest than a widely scattered body of trustees, and the amalgamation of the charities will make for the better use of the money. I beg to move that the Bill be now read a second time.
  Moved, That the Bill be now read 2a.— (Lord Amulree.)
  On Question, Bill read 2a; and committed to a Committee of the Whole House.

  SOLICITORS (AMENDMENT) BILL [H.L.]
  Amendments reported (according to Order).

  PAKISTAN (CONSEQUENTIAL PROVISION) BILL
  2.41 p.m.
  Order of the Day for the Second Reading read.
  THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS (THE EARL OF HOME): My Lords, the 2nd March of this year was a landmark of some significance in the history of the Commonwealth because it was on that day that the Governor-General of Pakistan consented to the Republican Constitution, and it was on that day, too, that the Constituent Assembly passed a resolution that Pakistan, although she was a Republic, wished to remain in the Commonwealth. So I am happy now to move this Bill, the object of which is quite simple: to secure that the rights and privileges which the people of Pakistan enjoy under the law of the United Kingdom shall be maintained in their new status. Without this Bill those rights and privileges would lapse. Clause 1 therefore provides that

  449
  the conditions which apply personally or to the goods and property of the people of Pakistan in this country to-day shall continue to apply. There are. too, what might be called certain minor attributes and advantages of the Commonwealth relationship which under this Bill will also be maintained.
  The people of Pakistan have given much thought to the form of her Constitution, and in this they have been wise. Our Constitution has been running for some hundreds of years, and even now from time to time it gives us a little trouble. Nevertheless, we think it is the best of its kind. It is based, in our opinion, on sound principles, but it is, nevertheless, flexible enough to meet the changing needs of the people who are its masters. It is therefore a matter of great satisfaction to us to-day that Pakistan has adopted die British model for her Parliamentary system, and we can hope and trust that it will bring unity and strength to the nation. I have myself lately, in other fields, had the opportunity to see how Pakistan is showing a new strength of purpose and vitality. It was not easy, after the partition of the subcontinent of India, for the people of Pakistan to set about the task of building up their administration or their industry and commerce. Yet in the last seven years the country has. I think, achieved marvels.
  In the economic field, Pakistan is making steady improvement, and more and more she is playing a constructive part in world affairs and shouldering the responsibilities of an independent and a great country. I should like to say now how much the United Kingdom values the association with Pakistan in these fields of activity, which lead, we hope, to the increased security, peace and prosperity of the world. If to-day we have any regrets that Pakistan should cease to be a Dominion, they are swallowed up in our hopes and aspirations for her future. There is no limit to the benefit which our varied Commonwealth of free and adult peoples can confer upon mankind if we act together with understanding and wisdom. I am sure that your Lordships, in giving a Second Reading to this
  450
  Bill, will send your good wishes to our friends as they set out on this great adventure with us to-Jay. I beg to move.
  Moved, That the Bill be now read 2a.— (The Earl of Home.)
  2.46 p.m.
  LORD PETHICK-LAWRENCE: My Lords, in rising to associate noble Lords on these Benches with the Motion before the House, I desire to say that we are glad that the great people of Pakistan, with whom we have had so many happy associations in the past, have created a Constitution to their liking, and, still more, that they have decided to remain with us in the Commonwealth. We are confident that from their so doing, both we and they will derive much mutual benefit. It is a particular pleasure to me on this occasion to be flanked by my noble friend Lord Attlee who, as Prime Minister, played a notable part in the birth of Pakistan, and on my right by the noble Viscount, who went with me to the Indian sub-continent in 1946 and who worked so hard to solve the intricate political problems of that country. They have desired me especially to associate them with my expression of welcome to the new Republic, and to wish to it many years of growing prosperity and fruitful contributions to the welfare of mankind.
  LORD REA: My Lords, it is hardly necessary for me to add that we on these Benches wish the best of luck to this Bill and all that it entails, and all that it will bring about the future. It is customary to refer to such a measure as non-controversial. In this instance, it seems to me that that is a gross understatement, and I would only add that we wish that it will achieve all it seeks to achieve. I endorse the remarks of the noble Lord on my left, that it is fortunate that this Bill should go through on the day that the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, who is about to address your Lordships' House, should be making a maiden speech here on a subject not unallied with this.
  On Question, Bill read 2a; Committee negatived. Then, Standing Order No. 41 having been dispensed with (pursuant to Resolution), Bill read 3a, and passed.

  THE MIDDLE EAST
  2.48 p.m.
  EARL ATTLEE EARL ATTLEE rose to call attention to the deterioration of the situation in the Middle East and in Cyprus; and to move for Papers. The noble Earl said: My Lords, I rise to move the Motion on the Paper in my name. I rise with some trepidation in your Lordships' House at making a maiden speech. If, after thirty-three years in another place, any rags of oratorical virginity still cling about me, I crave your Lordships' indulgence if I should make any mistakes or commit offences against correct procedure. I am the more disturbed by the fact that I know that on these Benches there are many noble Lords with a far greater and more intimate knowledge of the areas with which this Motion is concerned than I could possibly have. I understand that a maiden speech should be non-contentious. I may find some difficulty in observing that, but at least the substance of my Motion, that there is deterioration of the situation in these areas, will, I think, be generally approved.
  I read with great interest the debate that took place in this House in December on the subject of the Middle East, and I recall that the noble Marquess the Leader of the House then made a wide survey. He said that one must see incidents in their proper proportion—I take it that that means both in space and in time. I shall endeavour not to put too great a strain on your Lordships' attention by going too far, either geographically or historically, but it is necessary that we should see recent incidents in their proper proportion. Therefore I am not intending to take your Lordships a long way back. I thought that that was admirably done in the last debate in this House by my noble friend Lord Henderson.
  We have this problem of the Middle East area. I have never been able to find out who invented the term "Middle East" or what has become of the Near East, unless, indeed, the Near East is now those areas that have become satellites of the U.S.S.R. I should have preferred the old name of "the Levant" for this area. During our term of office, which was not an easy one in the international sphere, we were occupied with two major problems: one was the defence of the West after the Berlin blockade, and the building
  452
  up of N.A.T.O., and the other was support of the United Nations in Korea. We realised that, apart from those East and West preoccupations, there was this large area, and we were quite sure that sooner or later the rulers of Russia, who are the inheritors not only of Lenin but of Catherine the Great, would be likely to turn their attention to these places.
  To my mind, there has been taking place in Asia during these years a contest—not just a physical contest but a contest in the world of ideas—between the totalitarianism that runs right across the North from the Ural mountains to the Pacific, and the area in which we have the beginnings of democracy and freedom, the central point of which is India, Pakistan, Ceylon and Burma, which inherits our own tradition of freedom. That is an obvious field for trouble. During our lifetime, we have seen a wave of nationalism—I might almost say "Asianism"—spreading right across Asia in various manifestations, and it is quite clear that that reaches the Middle East, right through the Arab countries. There, there are areas with a low standard of life: there, there are rather insecure Governments: there, there is the centre of Islam. And in that area there are many difficulties which certainly could not be attributed to the present Government or even the Government of which I was a member.
  Not the least of the conflicting issues in that area results from the double promises given at the end of the First World War to the peoples of Israel and the Arab States. It has led to the rivalry of the dynasties of the Hashemites and the Saudis. Not to go into great detail, I realise, and always have realised, that while there is an Israel case, there is also an Arab case. I have never taken a view prejudiced in favour of one or the other. What we must obviously endeavour to do is to try to get peaceful co-existence as the beginning of a real friendship, if possible, in all that area.
  Since we left office, the difficulties have increased. Various new factors have come in. I think there are two major changes. First of all, there is the advent of the hydrogen bomb, with its wide implications in the sphere of strategy. We saw that notably in respect of Egypt. At one time the protection of the Canal was thought to be of vital interest; but we had

  453
  a declaration in another place from Sir Winston Churchill that the hydrogen bomb had changed all that. I think, too, it has changed the position of Cyprus—but of that a little later.
  Another major change has been the great development in oil production which has put money into the hands of States formerly much impoverished. We see various uses made of this wealth. At the top, I think, stands Iraq, where 70 per cent. of this wealth is being used for the benefit of the inhabitants. In other areas it has put into the hands of rulers the possibilities of intrigue and bribery, which are not uncommon there. But it is rather a sad thought that, in all these countries, from Greece right across Arabia, which really owe their freedom to Britain, we are not so popular as we could wish to be. It is deplorable that there should be so much ill-will. I am not minimising the difficulties. One of the great difficulties is that, in dealing with affairs in the East, one is apt to depend very much on single personalities. One of the great tragedies in the whole of this question was the assassination of King Abdullah, whom I personally regarded as the wisest statesman there. We also saw the death of the work of years of Ibn Saud.
  Now we come to the immediate matters which have given rise to this debate. I think there are two concerned particularly with the Middle East, and one concerned with Cyprus. We have in this Motion linked Cyprus and the Middle East because I do not think they are really severable in a broad survey of the whole field. We had the dismissal of Glubb Pasha. We must all deplore the method employed. To my mind, its importance is that Glubb Pasha, who did great work in building up the Arab Legion, was one of the great influences against rash breakings out of violence. The other has been the giving of arms from Communist countries to Egypt—modern weapons too, particularly aircraft. That makes the danger of another outbreak of war more imminent. Our interests there are, first of all, peace and the fulfilment of our obligations, both to Israel and to the Arab States. Secondly, there is the need to raise standards of life in order to remove the soil in which the seeds of Communism might sprout; and, thirdly, there are the interests of the West, both
  454
  strategically and economically, in oil—an interest which we share with the United States.
  I cannot think that we have been sufficiently clear in our policy. My Leader in another place set out, I felt, admirably and clearly, what should be our objectives. We need full talks with Jordan. I do not think that the sending of the Chief of the Imperial General Staff was a particularly happy thought. Then, I believe, we need to get an understanding with the United States. With all friendliness to our American friends, I sometimes feel that they are apt rather to stand on the sideline and leave us to carry on the fight. They are not participators in the Baghdad Pact, the shield intended to protect the whole of that area; yet they draw more oil from what might be called the soft underbelly of that region than we ourselves do. In my time, they were not always helpful when we had to deal wit difficulties in Persia and Egypt. I think it is partly due to an outdated anti-colonialism. I am not sure that there has always been a proper link-up between the State Departments and the commercial interests of the oil firms, but certainly we need a full understanding there. We are often put to considerable difficulty over Israel, for whom there is naturally much support in the United States of America. While one would welcome an interest, one would have liked a little more responsibility.
  The present position is that we see arms piling up—modern arms—in what is called the beginnings of an arms race. We all deprecate an arms race. I always think it is a little hard on the people who have not already got off the mark. We seem to allow an arms race, but then we deny any arms to the people who are far behind. No one has suggested that we need to pile up arms in Israel to create an equality in quantity with other States. What I think Israel requires is a certain amount of modern weapons, particularly aircraft, as a deterrent. I do not regard that as falling in with an arms race, any more than I regarded it as such when we formed N.A.T.O. We did not form N.A.T.O. to compete in conflict with the U.S.S.R., but in order to give adequate arms as a deterrent against a sudden attack. I feel that to-day there is great trepidation in Israel because of the piling up of these arms.
  It is not my purpose this afternoon to go into all these technical questions on Israel and the Arab world, or the serious question of the refugees, because the existence of a large refugee population anywhere always makes for a ready-made agitation for violent action. But I am sure we need positive action there. We formed the Baghdad Pact—an endeavour, so to speak, to put a hard skin around this soft area: a northern tier, purely defensive—as a defence against aggression. But that defence becomes hopelessly weak if there is turmoil and disturbance behind it.
  That brings me to the Cyprus question. It seems to me that when forming the Baghdad Pact, great consideration ought to have been given to the Cyprus question, because here was a possible bone of contention between two of the greatest participants in the Baghdad Pact—Greece and Turkey, both of whom were good friends of ours. In my view, the Cyprus question ought to have been faced then. To-day, we are faced with a tragic position. We must all be disturbed at the murders which are going on there, and at the terrible position of our troops. No one can condone for a moment a murder campaign, but we have seen that kind of thing result from certain causes. There is a particular danger of a campaign of this kind in any country that is seeking self-determination and self-government. It seems to me that a régime that is created by the bomb and the dagger finds it most difficult to shake them off afterwards. That should be a warning to the leaders in Cyprus. The Cypriots have for a long time demanded union with Greece. To begin with, I think that was rather a sentimental demand; it was put forward in a quite impossible form—a kind of union with Greece next day. There are all the difficulties which one inevitably gets in a matter of this kind. There are always minorities to be considered.
  There are, too, strategic interests. I should like here to say a word on the strategic interests, speaking with all due modesty in the presence of those with far greater experience. In the modern world we still are apt to attribute too great strategic importance to places like Cyprus. I am told, for instance, that if Cyprus were in the hands of some other country
  456
  the Turks would feel that it was a menace to them. I do not believe that in the hydrogen bomb age a hostile Power would attack Turkey by a landing or an air attack from Cyprus. In this modern age, if a Power is contemplating anything like a major war, it comes right home. If we were engaged in a major war, this, and not any outlying place, would be the place of danger and decision. We realised that in regard to Egypt; but old ideas die hard. We have to consider this area because undoubtedly we have strategic interests there. It was clear from the start that, with our friends the Greeks, they were perfectly willing that, whatever happened in Cyprus, we should have our bases, as, I understand, they are willing to provide bases themselves. If we were all in the Baghdad Pact together there seems to be no reason why there should be a quarrel over bases. I feel that there has been a rather slow acceptance of the validity of the Cypriot claim. The lesson to be learned in dealing with matters of this kind is that the Government should make up their mind early on how far they are going and not allow concessions to be dragged out gradually.
  In considering the concessions made by Archbishop Makarios it must be remembered that he is not only the spiritual leader but also the political leader of the Cypriots. The reason for that goes back a long way, to the old days under Turkish rule, and it is quite impossible in such a matter to say that it is all wrong for the Archbishop to be a politician. Probably nowadays we look back with some surprise to the activities of some of our own Archbishops in the past; but it is no good applying our present principles to the past, and Cyprus is not exactly in the same position as we are in to-day. We had the talks with the Archbishop. It may be said that the Archbishop has been connected with people who are dealing in terrorism. One has to make up one's mind whether one is to say: "This person is a person with whom we cannot deal, because he is mixed up in terrorism," or, alternatively, "Despite the fact that he is mixed up in terrorism we ought to talk to him." I believe Her Majesty's Government were very wise to go into these talks, because in the course of the year the Archbishop has gone a long way. When we were in office there was this demand practically

  457
  for Enosis next day; now there is in contemplation a period of constitutional government by the Cypriots over a period of years.
  I have a strong idea that if the Cypriots once got to manage their own affairs they might be less inclined to put themselves under a Government which no doubt has many virtues but, so far as I can make out, has even more parties. If I were a Cypriot I should hesitate about coming under the Greek Government at the present time. Talks took place and declarations were made. One must bear in mind what is the position of a popular leader. In any nationalist revolt there will always be people whom we regard as comparatively reasonable and there will always be the extremists. We even find that at home, in both Parties; and one has always to be prepared to stand up to these extremists. In negotiations it will always be our endeavour to give as much power as we can to the reasonable people, because if we do not give them the chance of standing out as leaders, then inevitably leadership passes to less responsible hands.
  We have had full discussions in another place, and we have had a White Paper showing the points on which negotiations finally broke down. I think they were very narrow ones. There was the question of whether there should be a majority for the Greeks. It was said that that would be left to a special Constitutional Commission which was coming over. In, my submission that is quite wrong. It is a political decision, not a decision to be left to a Commission; but it was a question of the Greeks having an overwhelming majority. In these matters it always pays for the majority to be generous in according representation to a minority. One must not, however, be over-generous. I can remember proposals being put forward some twenty years ago, when I was going round India, in which, by the time the claims of all the minorities were totted up, the majority had not a look in. I believe that there was certain need for clarification here. It was quite obvious that there was representation for a Turkish minority, but what was not so clear was whether there would be a nominating majority. I do not believe in this kind of limited responsibility.
  That goes also to the question of law and order. In setting up a new Government anywhere there is always the
  458
  temptation to say, "We will let you run things but we will retain law and order." I saw that done in India. I believe it is fatal, because it means that responsibility for law and order is then in the hands of what is considered to be an alien Power. I have always thought that one of the mistakes we made in the interim period in India, the period of diarchy, was that we gave the Indians all the pleasant things to do and retained all the unpleasant things for ourselves. If we are going to give self-government, it is better to give responsibility, for if they have responsibility, they will look after law and order in their own interests.
  Then there is the question of amnesty. We always display this feeling that "We will not shake hands with murderers," yet almost always it has to be done. Always, sooner or later, some kind of amnesty—a full amnesty may be the exception—ought to be given. I cannot think that we should have broken off negotiations on these points. The Prime Minister, speaking in another place, gave it as his opinion that, had we conceded these points, others would constantly have been raised. That was his intuition, but the intuitions of Prime Ministers are not always right. I noticed that The Times correspondent said that responsible opinion in the island took another view. I noticed that Mr. Francis Noel Baker, who did very good service in the negotiations and knew the Archbishop well, took another point of view. I cannot think that breaking off on that was at all wise.
  That brings me to the question of deportation. Deportation is a very serious matter. It may be justifiable. If, for instance, there is a place ruled by some absent ruler against the will of the people, it might be wise to remove him; but I do not believe it is ever wise to remove the leader of a nationalist movement. What happens? I recall what Parnell said when they put him in prison. Someone said to him: "Who will take over now?" He said: "Captain Moonlight." That is exactly what happens. History affords a number of instances where attempts have been made to shut up a constitutional leader and always, as a result, power has passed to the irresponsible. Then you have to consider, when you have deported him, what is to be done next. More often than not, after

  459
  a period of years or months the deportee has to be brought back.
  The question has been asked—and it was not answered in another place: "Where do we go from here?" It is possible to try repression, but it is extremely difficult to repress a movement of this kind. As everyone knows, the terrorists tend to become the heroes; they tend to become nationalist heroes—very often quite undeservedly—and they get the support of the population. It is possible to suppress movements of this kind. Hitler did it and Stalin did it, but Britain cannot do it. The last occasion when this was tried was under Mr. Lloyd George's Government, with the "Black and Tans." This country would not stand for it. The result of that sort of thing is a period in which there will be executions and murders of our troops—and it is not fair to expose our troops to this. And, in the end, you have to go back and negotiate somehow or other. By that time you will have discredited constitutional leaders, and you will find yourselves having to deal with far worse people than the Archbishop. One can trace the history of that sort of thing in many countries. Fortunately, in some countries we have stopped short of that course. I am sure that what I have indicated would have happened in Burma if we had not dealt with the Burmese as we did. Now, we have an admirable and courageous Prime Minister there—our good friend Mr. Nu. It would have happened in India. It happened in Ireland over and over again. I cannot think that deportation is wise.
  There is a further point. For our influence in the world we have to depend very much on public opinion. Times have gone by when, as Palmerston did in the past, we could send the British Fleet here and there if troubles should break out. We have not the greatest strength in the world; we have not the greatest wealth in the world. What we have is a great tradition for good will. And our role in the world, particularly in Asia—as we have exemplified in the British Commonwealth—is that we stand for freedom and democracy. As I see it to-day, in Asia particularly—as I said at the start—there is this test going on. We must not lose that position. I am afraid that events in Cyprus, as we know, have had bad echoes even in the United States
  460
  of America. We need to remember the lessons of the past. I realise all the difficulties. I hold no brief for the Archbishop, but I remember that the rebels of the past generally tend, sooner or later, to become Prime Ministers in the British Commonwealth. My Lords, I beg to move for Papers.
  3.24 p.m.
  LORD REA: My Lords, it falls to me—rather surprisingly to myself, even to my horror—to be the first to congratulate on his maiden speech in your Lordships' House one who is respected and admired in every Parliamentary Party in this country, one who has held the highest office in Parliamentary life, and whose name is, indeed, a household word in five continents—and probably something like 100 million households. I am glad to think that my faltering words will not have that publicity but I consider it a great privilege to be the first to congratulate the noble Earl on speaking in your Lordships' House for the first time and to say how much we have admired his speech for its statesmanlike quality and its moderation, and also to say how much we hope that we shall hear him speaking frequently here and that his habit of oratorical proximity to the Dispatch Box in another place will not leave him in this Chamber. There is no doubt that this House will gain considerably in authority and debating force from the presence of the noble Earl.
  I do not propose to break my own personal rule of speaking very briefly to your Lordships. The matters which are the subject of the debate to-day have, of course, been discussed in considerable detail—possibly too much detail—in the Press, and yesterday there was a full discussion of them in another place. It is interesting to me, and rather significant, that the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, has not thought fit to discharge his criticism of the Government—I think that is a fair word—separately from two completely different barrels, if I may put it in sporting terms. One barrel would normally be aimed at the Foreign Office and the other at the Colonial Office. But he has put up his gun and shot off both barrels at the noble Marquess who I understand is to wind up the debate for the Government. I think that is rather significant, because the difference between colonial affairs and foreign

  461
  affairs has become more and more indistinct as time has gone by. Not only the barriers of customs and of language, but the obstacles to fellow feeling and internationalism are becoming fainter as we progress and as different parts of the world get to know their neighbours, better than ever before.
  It is difficult to try to pinpoint to what that is principally due, but I would say that a very significant name in this connection would certainly be that of Signor Marconi. He has indirectly been responsible for the fact that the younger nations—what we used to call the backward nations or the submerged tenth—are no longer in the state in which they were before his great invention came into world-wide use. They have something of the equality and of the same civilization as older and greater nations, and clearly it will not be long before there will be almost complete equality. That rising resurgence in the younger nations of the world will mean that they will naturally go through teething troubles and growing pains. These teething troubles and growing pains are, in my submission, inseparable from the feeling of nationalism which has to be gone through, and it is a painful process which, as events have sometimes shown, affects other parts of the world. But it has to be faced.
  We in this country and the other countries of the civilised world have gone through it, and even though one could then hardly call it growing pains the point at which we showed these attributes most clearly was about 100 years ago when we were very insular and very national, and very proud of it. There is a residue of that feeling amongst the people of this country now—and quite naturally. It used to be called "jingoism." I think it will be admitted that those people who do have these feelings are apt to belong, in the main, rather to the Party on the opposite side of your Lordships' House than to either of the Parties on this side. For that reason Her Majesty's present Government have, I think, our sympathy in this sort of brake in the background which makes them w some extent drag their feet when looking toward internationalism.
  These international questions must be handled with international, and not with national, mentality, and such difficulties as those that we are now considering will
  462
  have to be overcome before the world will be a peaceful and prosperous place again. It is, therefore, I repeat, very significant that the noble Earl has bracketed colonial affairs with foreign affairs in speaking on this question.
  I am not going to keep your Lordships any longer than to say that we must recognise this spirit of internationalism much more than we have done in the past: and there are opportunities for this comparatively near home, in Europe. We on this side of the House feel rather strongly that the Government have frequently given lip service to the idea of joining in with our brothers and sisters in various European organisations, movements and ideals, and that when the time comes we are rather apt to drag our feet. I would say no more. I beg Her Majesty's Government not to allow the criticism which is going to be levelled at them this afternoon to influence them to dig in their toes too far. The political atmosphere of the new world—and by "the new world" I mean the newer nations which are now coming to maturity—is Radical rather than Tory, I can assure them; and if they bear that in mind, they will have the good wishes and good will of all.
  3.31 p.m.
  THE EARL OF SWINTON: My Lords, may I at once follow the noble Lord the Leader of the Liberal Party in equally sincere congratulations to the late Leader of the Labour Party on one of the best maiden speeches—in fact I think the best—I have ever heard in this House. I do not say I agree with all of it. He and I have been colleagues and opponents for a great many years, ever since we were at the same college together, but we have always been friends, and it is really delightful to have him here. I hope he is not going to declare his innings completely closed but will be up with a good bat very often, as he did on this occasion.
  I should have been very content to give my silent, but firm, support, and vote if necessary, to the Government on this occasion: but, having been directly concerned as Secretary of State for the Colonies in dealing with a somewhat similar situation five and twenty years ago, I may be able to offer something which is pertinent and, I hope, helpful in this debate. Incidentally, I see that I figure in the opening speech in another

  463
  place yesterday. The noble Earl spared me that.
  In October, 1931, there was a serious outbreak of violence in Cyprus. The Government House at Nicosia, the capital, was burnt down, and there were similar, but not so damaging, scenes in other places. I regret to say that on that occasion church leaders figured prominently in incitement to not. The Bishop of Kyrenia actually led the rioters in the town where his See lay. The Bishop of Kitium also was involved and the Bishop of Paphos, who was in this country, was engaged in giving help from the sidelines. Of course, the cry of "Enosis" was raised. The disorder was effectively suppressed. Ten of the ringleaders, including the two Bishops of Kyrenia and Kitium, were deported, and a number of others who had taken part in the riots were brought to trial and convicted. My noble friend the Secretary of State for the Colonies is quite correct in what he said in another place: the deportations were actually made by my predecessor, Mr. J. H. Thomas, but I had taken over the Colonial Office just after the ship sailed with these people on board and I had to deal with the situation in the House and with everything that ensued.
  In November, 1931, as soon as the House reassembled—I think it was after the General Election—I made a full statement to the House. I am not saying that history always repeats itself or repeats itself exactly, but it is interesting to notice that on that occasion the action which the National Government had taken in deporting the ringleaders, including the two Bishops, was universally accepted, certainly in another place and in this House. The noble Earl, Lord Attlee, was at that time either the Leader or the Deputy Leader of the Opposition. I have been careful to verify from the OFFICIAL REPORT every statement I made and every question that was asked from any quarter of the House. No debate was asked for. Cyprus never figured in the debate on the Address. No debate was asked for later. Indeed, when the Colonial Office debate took place a few months afterwards, I think only one speaker—and he was a Liberal—in a roundabout way referred to Cyprus. The action was fully approved.
  464
  I can recall that Colonel Wedgwood, who sat on the Front Opposition Bench and afterwards was a very welcome Member of this House, particularly endorsed the action which had been taken against the Bishops and urged that, as a great deal of damage had taken place and as not a little of this had been due to incitement by ecclesiastics, ecclesiastical property should bear some share of the compensation. I recall Mr. Venizelos, whom we all respected so much, telling me at that time that it was contrary to the canon law of the Orthodox Church for Orthodox clergy to take part in politics. When I put that to the aged Archbishop of Cyprus a little later, when I visited the Island, he did not at all challenge that statement. I do not know whether that canon law still holds or whether we should accept, as the noble Earl suggested, that Archbishops of the Orthodox Church should always be national political leaders. But I am sure that the whole House, irrespective of Party, would agree that condonation of violence and murder and incitement to violence are contrary to the Christian ethic of every Christian Church.
  At that time I had just taken over, and my first duty was to see that law and order was restored. Then I had to improve the conditions on the island and try and make it a happier and more prosperous place. We did a great deal. The moneylenders, who were the greatest curse of Cyprus, were suppressed entirely. We established a Land Bank and cooperative societies, which grew apace. The farmers, with the aid of Imperial Preference and free from their load of debt, were able to find a profitable market for all they produced for export—their tobacco, wine and citrus. We did a good deal to improve education—not enough, I think, but a good deal—and we did not forget the antiquities, in regard to which my noble friend Lord Mersey played so helpful and generous a part.
  I visited the island some eighteen months later and received a very cordial reception. I should like to say a word or two on the impressions which I then formed, because I do not believe that an ancient people, living much the same life going back, not merely for centuries, as the noble Lord, Lord Winster, knows, but for thousands of years, without changing fundamentally, would change so very

  465
  much in ten or twenty years. Incidentally, it is not without interest to note that, though Cyprus has belonged to many countries and has had many masters over its long history, in all its long history, Phoenician, Persian, Egyptian, Mace-, donian, Roman, Byzantine, Lusignan, Turkish and British, I am fairly sure I am right in saying that never in those thousands of years has it been a Greek possession. That is not uninteresting. Of course, it is not conclusive. I would give this impression of the people of Cyprus, as I found them: fairly easily roused (Enosis was a good battle cry and rallying cry then); inclined to flow or row with the flowing tide; subject a good deal to ecclesiastical direction and influence and not exclusively in matters of the spirit. But the lasting impression formed was that what the great mass of the population wanted above everything was to lead a peaceful, prosperous life. They were not much interested in Government, or political issues or "isms," except when politics or political Government action came down and touched their daily life.
  LORD WINSTER: Hear, hear!
  THE EARL OF SWINTON: I am greatly interested to find the noble Lord, Lord Winster, who has had a much longer and later practical experience as a Governor, agreeing with this impression. I greatly doubt whether a desire for peaceful existence and peaceful co-existence with their Turkish compatriots is not what, in their hearts, 90 or 95 per cent. of the people of Cyprus want to-day. I listened carefully to the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, and I think that we should be careful about national aspirations. It is always a little dangerous to generalise, and when you come to an island like Cyprus—and those who know it would, I believe, confirm this—you have to be particularly careful that you do not mistake terrorist coercion for genuine national aspirations.
  I also found at that time a large Turkish minority—loyal, contented, living peaceably with their neighbours and passionately anxious to remain within the British Commonwealth. The Turks were then a quarter of the population of the island. I understand that the Greek or Greek-speaking population, which was then three-quarters of the whole, is now nearer four-fifths. Do your Lordships know why? It is not, I think, that one
  466
  race breeds more rapidly than the other. I believe it is true—and the Minister of State will correct me if I am wrong—that in the course of the last ten or fifteen years something like 100,000 Greeks have come into Cyprus from the Greek Islands or the mainland, because there, on that enchanted island, they could find a mote prosperous living and a happier place to live. I believe that all those who have first-hand knowledge of Cyprus would agree that I have given a fair picture of the island as it was before the Second World War.
  I do not want to speak too long, and I am not going to traverse all the recent events; I think the facts have been fully stated in ministerial speeches and in Government papers. However, I should like to put to the House, and to the noble Earl who initiated the debate, this question: is it fair or reasonable to take such a very different attitude about the deportation of Archbishop Makarios from that which the noble Earl and his colleagues, and both Houses of Parliament, took twenty-five years ago on the deportation of the Bishop of Kyrenia? There is no doubt—and there cannot be any doubt in anybody's mind—that Archbishop Makarios was deeply and personally implicated in this campaign of violence. It is not really, if I may say so to the noble Earl, a case of contrasting a moderate leader with Captain Moonlight. It would be more true to say that Makarios had identified himself with Captain Moonlight and that there was not this antithesis at all. And, surely, there can be no question but that law and order must be reestablished. I do not think anybody can deny that the continued presence, complicity and influence of the Archbishop would gravely prejudice and retard the restoration of law and order. I am quite certain—and I do not say this because I am a supporter of Her Majesty's Government; it must be true of any Government—that, having entered into negotiations with a leader like Archbishop Makarios, nobody would want to bring those negotiations suddenly to a brusque conclusion, but would exhaust every effort before corning to the conclusion that it was necessary to act in this drastic manner.
  I would ask this question: are the security, the stability and the good order in Cyprus less important today to the

  467
  British Commonwealth, and indeed to the free world, than they were twenty-five years ago? Cyprus is a vital strategic place to-day, not just for Britain but for the whole Grand Alliance. It is more important than ever in the atomic age—I really must challenge the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, on that point. Anybody who has taken part in the Defence Committee and who has had dealings with the development of atomic strategy—as I know the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, did in his time, with the greatest interest—must realise and accept that to-day as a base, as a necessary means of communication, Cyprus has increased tremendously in importance. If that be true—and I am certain it is—surely, we and our Allies must know for certain that that base will be safe and secure so long as the risk to peace lasts! And who can predict when that twilight period will end?
  Let me assume for the moment that the majority of the people in Cyprus, if they had the opportunity, would vote, or be induced to vote, for union with Greece. Would that give the security which is vital to-day to the interests of the free world and the Grand Alliance? I am going to say something which perhaps I can say more easily than the noble Marquess, the Leader of the House, or the Minister of State, but which we all must know in our hearts is true. Greatly as we hope for a free and firm Greece, steadfast in its alliance with the free world, there can be no guarantee that Greece might not go Communist or, at best, neutral. Greece and the free world should remember that it was, as the Prime Minister said last night, I think with complete justification, British intervention and British troops which saved Greece from Communist domination and from falling within the Iron Curtain at the end of 1944. I am sure it is utterly wrong to argue or to suggest that weakness in suppressing violence, disorder and subversion does not play into the hands of the Communists. Exactly the opposite is true. Surely, that is what we have always maintained in U.N.O.—that aggression must be resisted, and subversion and violence are only the aggression of the cold war. It is quite untrue to suggest that you beat Communism by appeasing that kind of aggression.
  468
  Finally, what about Turkey? Are the position, the rights and the co-operation of Turkey less important to-day than they were ten or twenty years ago? Turkey is to-day the bastion of the Middle East and the pivot of the whole of the defence of the free world there. Not only that, but this is not a question, as is so often assumed, merely between the people of Cyprus and us, or Greece and us. Turkey has a right. Not only has it got a population there, but in international law Turkey is entitled to be heard, and we are not entitled to act without her. After all, Turkey and Greece were both signatories of the Treaties of Lausanne which confirmed the British sovereignty in Cyprus. For all those reasons, I am convinced that the Government have gone to the limit in negotiation and conciliation, and that, faced with the situation which they have clearly encountered, they could do no other than they have done.
  3.52 p.m.
  THE LORD ARCHBISHOP OF CANTER-BURY: My Lords, in what I have to say I, too, shall confine myself to Cyprus, and it is only with great reluctance that I add any more words to the too many words which have already been uttered in many quarters about the unhappy affairs of that island. But Archbishop Makarios is head of the Autokephalous Church of Cyprus. With that Church, as with the Greek Orthodox Church, the Church of England has long been on terms of close fellowship and friendship. Great perplexity and distress has been caused to Christian opinion, both in this country and elsewhere, by the arrest and removal of the head of one of the historic Churches of the world. I think it is only proper to stress the shock and uneasiness which Christians in many parts are feeling. But the Orthodox Churches regard this event with indignation as an act of sacrilege, persecution and barbarism. From the patriarchs of Alexandria and Antioch, from the Archbishop of Athens, from the Bishops of Cyprus and others, I have had urgent and emphatic telegrams of protest using those very terms. It would be resented throughout the Orthodox world if I said nothing in this debate; and the fact that my words will be scrutinised there as searchingly as those of the Government itself compels me to speak with a great sense of Christian responsibility.

  469
  Archbishop Makarios is the leading ecclesiastical and political figure of Cyprus. Whatever he does, he does simultaneously and equally as Churchman and as politician. The Eastern Churches find it hard to believe that the Archbishop of Canterbury is not also a political leader. They have not passed through that historical experience which has taught us that, while the concerns of Church and State are intimately related, and are equally involved in the issues of national well-being, yet under God the responsibilities and spheres of action of Churchmen and politician are different, and that when either tries to usurp the functions of the other disaster follows—whether it be the politician trying to stifle the free speech and free judgment of the Church, or the Church trying to operate by the methods of political power.
  Our friends in Greece and Cyprus must recognise that to us here it seems shocking that an Archbishop should take the lead in a political matter and involve himself in all the passionate partialities which political incitement always involves. I must ask our friends there to believe that, even though I am speaking in the House of Lords, I, as Archbishop, have had no share in these political matters and no previous knowledge of the actions taken. As a Churchman, I have one interest only, and that is in reconciliation: that hatred and division may be replaced by understanding, trust and co-operation. I trust that our Orthodox brethren will try, as I must try, to lay aside all political argument and, so far as possible, all national partialities and everything else which makes the way to reconciliation more difficult. We must all, as I would say, combine to seek an agreement which recognises not so much rights, on either side, as obligations, and which will hold together our responsibilities to one another and to the world—for it is a strategic issue—first in good order and then in peace.
  We must, however, recognise that in the Near East the kind of distinction I have just made between the functions of Churchman and politician hardly exists. In this country the Government naturally judges Archbishop Makarios on his political record since he has chosen to play the part of a politician: but in Cyprus he will be judged as a Churchman
  470
  doing what it is proper—whatever the Canon Law may say—for a Churchman to do. The British Government, therefore, must do a hard thing and recognise that, whatever his political activities, he remains the head of an independent Church, a religious and Christian leader, whose presence is indispensable to the proper functioning of that Church. There is bound to be uneasiness in any British mind when a political leader is arrested and removed without trial. It is even more alarming when such action has the effect of interfering with the functioning and the loyalties of a Christian community. It is important for the Government to realise that it is in terms of sacrilege that much foreign opinion is viewing their action.
  We must realise, too, as the noble Earl said, that the Greek Orthodox people have in the past survived centuries of terrible oppression and have won existence and freedom for nation and Church by violent strife and violent means. This is engrained in them from their history. Archbishop Makarios was continuing a tradition of the past when once again he identified leadership of his Church with a struggle for political freedom. But in all gentleness we must ask our Orthodox friends to understand our position. Taught by our own history as a nation, we believe that it is impossible to combine the two functions, and that if a man tries to do so he must be judged by the political aims and the political methods which he employs or allows, as other politicians are, and must take the consequences. My Lords, forgive me for taking so long to state what is obvious enough to us. If there is to be reconciliation, it must be patiently expounded here that it may be understood there in the East.
  So I come to the political field. Here, let me state frankly that in one matter of intense political and Christian concern, Archbishop Makarios has put himself very seriously in the wrong. To his own people and to others he has allowed himself to appear to condone violence (and the Government go further in saying that he connived at it) in a way which, wherever it occurs, Christian conscience must condemn. Archbishop Makarios has twice been a visitor in my own house. Last June I wrote a letter to him in

  471
  which, after referring to increasing evidences of violence, I went on:
  "I am somewhat worried lest the absence of any clear statement from the Church authorities and particularly from you as their undisputed leader may cause people to suppose that the Church is in fact supporting such outrages as have occurred."
  I asked him to give a lead in this matter. He said this in his reply:
  "I am profoundly grieved by the course events have taken in Cyprus in the last few days. Unfortunately the serious situation which has been created here cannot be remedied by suggestions or advisory circulars. I am sincerely afraid that an official condemnation of events by myself would not find at the present stage the necessary response, but would involve the risk of exposing me rather unprofitably."
  I fear that he spoke then not as a Churchman called on to uphold a religious principle but as a politician calculating risks and chances, and ready to allow an evil which he regretted in private but would not publicly condemn. So he exposed himself inevitably to contradictory judgments.
  I can fully sympathise with Mr. Noel Baker's estimate of the Archbishop's character. Indeed, there is good reason to suppose that Archbishop Makarios was a moderating influence on those extremists who were associated with him in the Ethnarchy Council. His moderating influence might have been utilised far more profitably to reach a solution had the Government, in the earlier stages of this quarrel, had a clearer imagination and foresight of where they would have to come in the end. At the same time, even if the Government have not established their case for the Archbishop's direct complicity in the policy of violence and outrage, the Archbishop has made it hard to doubt it; and his refusal to condemn has had the same public effect as complicity would have had.
  Our Greek and Orthodox friends must be ready to recognise that the British Government in their political action have an absolute duty to restore civil order, and that they cannot stand idly by when confronted with civil disorder and incitements to kill and destroy. If our friends there wish to criticise the actions of our Government—and there is plenty of room for criticism, as in most human situations, and plenty of critics—they should criticise them on the grounds, not of insincerity or barbarism or sacrilege but simply of
  472
  political unwisdom and misjudgments, especially perhaps in timing; and they should honestly recognise that such political unwisdom is to be found on both sides.
  All that I have said, if honestly accepted on both sides, must lead to reconciliation Recrimination does not help. Nothing will help except a readiness to begin again the search for agreement and good will. For whatever reasons—and it does not help, in my judgment, to try to settle which side made the most or the worst mistakes—negotiations broke down. All that remained was the political fact of organised disorder and violence. In that situation, Archbishop Makarios and his companions were arrested and removed. Was that right or wrong? If it has brought the issue back to the funda mental political and Christian reality that what cannot be got by patience must never be sought by methods of terrorism or murder, then it was right. If, on the other hand, it has blocked the way to reconciliation unnecessarily, it was wrong. If, for example, there is any truth in the report that Archbishop Makarios, in visiting Athens, was hoping to get advice by means of which he could have advanced nearer to agreement, then indeed his arrest and deportation were wrong. However, it has happened. Reconciliation begins not by asking any one party to a quarrel to change his tune and attitude at once but by devising some temporary next step on which they can all agree.
  I venture to suggest that the following three steps, taken quickly, should have the approval of all the Governments concerned—British, Greek and Turkish—and would have the support of all the Churches, including the Orthodox Church. The first is this. The correspondence between the Governor of Cyprus and the Archbishop shows a very large area of common agreement as to the future Constitution of increasing self-government. Let the Government appoint at once a competent person or persons to draft a Constitution along the lines of that correspondence, with freedom to consult whom they will and instructed to attach to it a suggested timetable for its application. This draft would bind nobody, except by its merits, but it would become the basis for discussion with Archbishop Makarios and others concerned. By this means, time would be

  473
  gained in which passions could be cooled. Everyone could feel that progress was contemplated and was being made; and when negotiations were resumed, they would be greatly assisted by being related to a draft Constitution so that they could deal with defined proposals and not, as when the negotiations broke down, merely with fears and distrusted intentions. That is the first step.
  The second is that the Greek and Turkish Governments should then join with our Government in an immediate appeal to the Cypriots to end terrorism. Thirdly, Archbishop Makarios should be informed that his exile was temporary and would end as soon as public order in Cyprus was restored; and he should be assured that when a draft Constitution was in being direct negotiations with him would at once be resumed. Along these three lines it would seem to me possible for all parties to leave the past behind and go forward to a peaceful, orderly and generous acceptance of the mutual responsibilities of Cyprus and Great Britain to one another and to the peace of the world. It is in that direction, and for that end, that I trust that the Christian Churches of this country may work closely together with the Orthodox Churches with undiminished trust and with an ever-increasing fellowship.
  4.11 p.m.
  LORD HORE-BELISHA: My Lords, the intervention of the most reverend Primate testifies to the importance and gravity of the subjects which we have to discuss. I can only hope that the most reverend Primate has used language which will be interpreted in Greek ecclesiastical quarters as a sufficiently strong reprobation of the refusal of Archbishop Makarios to denounce violence. It is something new among spiritual leaders, I think, to adopt the attitude that you do not do what is right, upon the ground that you cannot do so profitably to your own position. Since when has personal profit been an accepted doctrine of religious leaders? The feeling in country is deep and strong and, as I say, I can only hope that the most reverend Primate has adequately interpreted it in what was a most important speech in this debate.
  Before commenting, as I may venture to do, upon his constructive proposal, I feel that I ought to join with those who
  474
  have made reference to the maiden speech of Lord Attlee. I never dreamed that it would be my lot, as it is certainly my pleasure, to join in congratulations to the noble Earl on a maiden speech, but I do so with the warmest and most welcoming spirit, having regard to the fact, in particular, that we were elected to the House of Commons at just about the same time and that we were sworn of the Privy Council on the same day. On that occasion we wore frock-coats—a garment which has since been completely discarded. As with clothes, so with foreign policies, they have occasionally to be re-fashioned and to he brought up to date.
  Nothing could better illustrate the rapidity with which what remains of the old order in the Middle East is changing than the matter mentioned by the noble Earl at the operative outset of his remarks. He referred to the dismissal of Glubb Pasha. A long and loyal, indeed a lifetime of, devoted service to the Hashemite dynasty deserved a better end, and we must all feel that both General Glubb in his personal conduct and Her Majesty's Government acted with great restraint in provocative circumstances. In particular, when one casts one's mind back to the feeling of excitement which prevailed only a few days ago, it is just as well to praise Her Majesty's Government for not having entertained the proposals that we should try to reconstitute matters as they were by sending a parachute brigade and reinforcements to Jordan.
  The Arab Legion is a picturesque force, as any who saw it in the days of King Abdullah will testify, with its camels and its horses; but it is also an efficient force, perhaps the most efficient Arab force in the Middle East. None the less, how much longer could we have expected to prolong a system under which the national army of a sovereign State had a foreigner for the commander of its forces, and a Westerner at that? The question now arises, how much longer the other vestiges of this old system can remain. Here is an Arab Legion, an Arab national army, maintained, not out of the taxes of the Jordan Government, but by a direct subsidy from this county —a subsidy, moreover, paid not to the Jordan Government but to the commander of the Legion, to the authorities of the Legion itself. Thus, neither the

  475
  Jordan Government nor the Jordan Parliament have the administration of the funds dispensed upon their fighting forces. These forces are also the security forces of Jordan and are brought into play whenever there are internal troubles. My submission is that this is a very good opportunity definitely and finally to change that system; it is humiliating to Jordan.
  The noble Earl, Lord Attlee, spoke with eloquence about the rising tide of nationalism. We cannot resist it—we cannot stop it—and we do not, I am sure, with our great record, wish to appear to do so. One of the central themes of Russian propaganda in the Middle East and in the propaganda of the anti-Baghdad Powers who co-operate with Russia is that Jordan is not a free agent but is acting at the behest of Britain and that it does not even control its own troops. A national Army is the symbol of national independence. It is not fitting that we should allow any longer the gibe to be thrown at King Hussein that he is under the control, or that he can act only at the behest, of the British Government. This is the time to revise those arrangements. A military mission, if it were desired by Jordan, would stand upon an entirely different footing; but, in my submission, we should free our relationship with Jordan from any suggestion of suzerainty, we should free it from any tinge of justification for the taunt that the old principles of colonialism are applying. If we did that, I think we should clear the air in the Middle East. With regard to the actual sum of money, by all means let us give it, and more, and let it be used for fructifying purposes.
  My Lords, like the noble Earl who introduced the debate, I find it an easy transition to pass from Jordan to Cyprus, which is so interwoven with our Middle Eastern policy. I want to look entirely to the future. We went to Cyprus because it was a British Colony and we thought we should have a base there in which we could assure our own security —and, doubtless, we shall remain there and see our problems through. But we must have regard to the facts if we are thinking of how to direct our future policy. The utility of the base has been gravely compromised, as the Memorandum of the Secretary of State for War on
  476
  the Army Estimates shows. It says in that memorandum, at paragraph 30:
  "Throughout the past year, internal security conditions in Cyprus have progressively deteriorated as the murderous attacks on British Servicemen, on police and on civilians have increased. Whereas the Cyprus garrison in December, 1954, amounted to four major units who had to devote only a small part of their activities to internal security work, the garrison now amounts to fourteen major units, twelve of whom are devoting 90 per cent. of their time to the task of maintaining law and order in the Island."
  Consequently, the value of the base as a haven for a strategic reserve, is compromised.
  There is another factor. When we were looking for a base and eventually chose Cyprus, it was suggested that we should not repeat the situation from which we had extricated ourselves in Egypt; that we should not undertake as our sole, individual and exclusive responsibility the management of a base, but that we should do it on behalf of N.A.T.O. I myself spoke on those lines on more than one occasion in your Lordships' House. It is true that at that time there was no demand by N.A.T.O. to be interested in this matter. But the present circumstances are quite different: there is a dramatic change, of which I think we should wish to take account, and of which I am sure the Government will take account.
  To read the Press and the comments upon Britain's policy in the Press, one would think that the great controversy was not between the Free World and the Communist world, but that it was a controversy within the Free World. If there is one thing more dangerous than the abandonment of a bipartisan foreign policy—I was glad to gather from the speech of the noble Earl that he had no intention of abandoning it; he made a most public-spirited speech, fully in accord with the general lines of policy of the Government—it would be the breaking up of the Free World in dissension, for then Communism would be presented immediately with the break through that it desires and the triumph which it has been seeking. Only Russia and her friends can get any satisfaction from the dispute which is at present raging.
  But is there any substance in the case? President Eisenhower said yesterday—I am not taking the comments of Irresponsible Americans; I want to take the most

  477
  authoritative, and I think there is value in treating them with respect—that
  "there was no blinking the fact that American interests were very greatly jeopardised"
  by what was happening in Cyprus, and that
  "he would use every possible means to end the crisis in the Middle East."
  Mr. Hoover, the Under-Secretary, also said yesterday that
  "the Cyprus issue involves the direct interest of close friends and allies of the United States."
  The political aspect of this matter, with which the most reverend Primate properly concerned himself, is one thing. That political solution will be pursued by Her Majesty's Government, I hope with the good will of all Parties in the State, whether on the lines constructively put forward by the most reverend Primate or upon others. The conditions which the Government have laid down as qualifying the achievement of a free Constitution and of self-determination are, in themselves, highly proper qualifications. The House is well aware of these. We must secure our strategic interests; we must have regard to the Turkish minority and to Turkish feeling. All these conditions are, of course, proper, and Her Majesty's Government cannot give that position away. But they will pursue a political solution. That solution can be achieved only by patience. There is no ready-made specific by which it can be achieved. It may take a long time; it will require patience and magnanimity, and therefore we must wait for it. But the strategic solution cannot so well wait —the cold war is proceeding; the face of the world is altering. Russia and her friends are taking action every day. We must solve the strategic problem in a manner which has regard to the susceptibilities of our own Allies, and it is for that reason that I refer to these remarks of President Eisenhower and Mr. Hoover.
  It is possible to regard these comments by responsible Americans as interference; on the other hand, it is possible to regard them as an opportunity to consolidate our methods of consultation and common action. We are the first to complain when the Americans diverge from our policy or from what we conceive to be the general policy. The theme of almost every foreign debate and of many a speech by the Foreign Minister and the Prime Minister is that we cannot be expected to succeed unless the Americans
  478
  and ourselves act together. Here is a case in which America is saying, as a member of the Atlantic Alliance, that she considers her interests to be involved; and not only is America saying that, but Germany and Italy as well.
  Dr. Adenauer has been a constructive statesman who believes in co-operation. He offered France a federal solution of the European problem and would to goodness that offer had been seized! for France would have been very much strengthened. He has called for the expansion of the N.A.T.O. Alliance in
  "a political instrument for the free world capable of a uniform defence against Soviet manœuvres or, even better, of forestalling such manœuvres."
  He said:
  "You cannot call the Western policies in the Middle East a joint N A.T.O. policy."
  Italy's President Gronchi has been taking the same line in America, and the Italian Government are firmly of opinion that their interests in the Middle East are involved and that the problem should be tackled by all members of the Atlantic Pact together. France also has protested against divergences of policy and has said that she should not be expected to "go it alone" and that we should not do so. The Prime Minister had his conference with M. Mollet last week-end, and let us hope that it will put our relations on a uniform footing. These are very significant appeals by our Allies in N.A.T.O. and should not be ignored.
  What is the separate interest in the Middle East which Britain is claiming? What is the interest which we have, divergent from the interest of the other N.A.T.O. members? Is it oil? But the whole of 'Western Europe is dependent upon Middle Eastern oil; 75 per cent. of the consumption in Western Europe comes from the Middle East. America, also, is an importer of oil from the Middle East, and not only an importer but far and away the biggest producer. She was responsible for producing 87 million tons last year, whereas British and Dutch interests produced 47½ million tons. There is no exclusive British interest in oil. The industry of Western Europe would stop without Middle Eastern oil; and not only the industry of Western Europe, for there are 14 million tons of tankers being built to-day in the shipyards of the world, in every continent, to carry Middle Eastern

  479
  oil over the highways of the sea. We cannot claim that this is an exclusively British interest. Nor have we the military forces, nor the wealth, to assure the pursuit of an exclusive policy. We must have the association of our Allies.
  What is it that we fear about the oil? Do we fear that the Middle Eastern countries would sell it to Russia? Do we fear that they would close down their sales to the Western world and dispose of their oil to Russia? They would have to build very lengthy pipelines to do that —and, moreover build them through Baghdad Treaty countries, territories which they do not control. Do we think they are going to seize the oil by military means? President Eisenhower said recently that a global war is unthinkable. He said that
  "The world situation showed a world now awake to the fact that global war is well nigh unthinkable and in which the cold war was going to take a different direction entailing a great broadening of non-military programmes such as economic aid to our undeveloped countries."
  In those circumstances, we cannot expect the Middle East to bristle with bayonets in order to resist a Russian invasion. There is no sign of that. The danger is economic penetration by the Soviet Union and their undermining of the morale of the Middle Eastern peoples. It is the use of arguments, such as that Britain wishes to maintain a colonial system and the remnants of her colonial power in the Middle East, which advances their progress when they can produce any colourable instances in justification. Every expression of military thought on our part provokes a reaction of an economic kind. Russia is not employing military means or military arguments; she is not asking for bases. She is now sending trade and cultural missions, doing barter deals and generally trying to extend her influence. The danger from Russia comes in that she will assist the anti-Baghdad Powers in provoking, in the independent Sheikhdoms, discontent such as that of which we are now seeing evidence; that she will provoke the Arabs to put up their demands for royalties and otherwise compromise our position. That will not be done by military means.
  But in any event, whatever the form of resistance that we offer to Russia, it surely should be a combined resistance on behalf of the whole free world. That
  480
  seems to me to be the lesson to be derived from these events. Positions which we once regarded as positions of strength, relationships we once regarded as being essential to our defensive system, are no longer in that category. The free world as a whole must defend itself in common consultation and common action. For 100 years the British Fleet protected the integrity of America. It made possible the Monroe Doctrine. Why should we regard it as retrogressive or humiliating or in any way derogatory to our interests if, in entirely altered circumstances, we now have to rely for our security on the combined efforts of all the free peoples, most or many of whom owe to us either the establishment or the defence of their free institutions?

  THE AGRICULTURAL PRICE REVIEW
  4.39 p.m.
  THE JOINT PARLIAMENTARY SECRETARY, MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE, FISHERIES AND FOOD (EARL ST. ALDWYN): My Lords, with your permission I should like to make a statement similar to one made by my right honourable friend in another place in reply to a Question. The statutory Annual Review of the economic condition and prospects of the agricultural industry has been concluded. The Government have made their determinations on the guarantees to the industry in the light of the review. These are set out in a White Paper which is now available. The White Paper also sets out the results of the Special Review which was held concurrently with the Annual Review.
  The general production policy of the Government continues to be to foster the highest level of net output that can be achieved economically and efficiently, by encouraging, in particular, beef, mutton and lamb and the production and use of home-grown feeding-stuffs. Until markets can be extended or costs reduced, it is desirable to avoid stimulating further the production of milk, pigs or eggs.
  The net output of the industry in 1955–56 is forecast at 55 per cent. above pre-war as against 51 per cent. for last year. Falls in the tillage area and in pig production have been offset by record yields of cereal crops, a better hay harvest and more milk and eggs. I am sure the House will agree that this reflects credit

  481
  on everyone concerned during the past year, following the adverse conditions of the previous year. The actual not income of the industry, which is forecast for 1955–56 at £299 million, out a gross income of about £1,400 million, is recovering only slowly from the setback of 1954–55 when it fell to £285, million. There has also been a substantial further increase in costs of about £37 million in a full year for Review commodities. I am confident that the industry will help itself to meet these costs by continuing to increase its efficiency, mainly through improvements in husbandry and farm management. This will also help the nation by keeping down the total subsidy bill and the volume of feeding-stuffs imports.
  The Government's conclusion is that a further increase in the value of the price guarantees and production grants is necessary to ensure that the industry has the resources it needs in order to play its full part in meeting the requirements of the national economy. The determinations now made have the effect of increasing the total value of the guarantees in a full year by £25 million.
  It has been decided to increase the price guarantees for fat cattle, fat sheep, and milk for 1956–57 and for oats, barley, potatoes and sugar beet for the 1957 harvest; to leave, unchanged the price guarantee for hen eggs; and to reduce by small amounts the price guarantees for pigs and wool for 1956–57 and by a more substantial amount the price guarantees for wheat and rye of the 1957 harvest. We have also decided to increase the fertiliser subsidies, the marginal production grants and the subsidy on steer calves; and to make provision for grants for silos for the conservation of silage. The Government have had particularly in mind the position of the smaller farmers in reaching the decision to increase the price guarantees for milk by ½d. a gallon, and oats by 1s. 6d. a cwt., and in making additional provision for production grants.
  The Government have also given careful thought to the form of the fatstock guarantees. They have decided to discontinue the individual guarantees for all classes of fatstock. These were a feature of the Guarantee Scheme introduced in 1954 after the end of control, but the risks for individual producers in the restoration of the auction markets which these
  482
  arrangements were intended to meet no longer justify the complications and the elaborate machinery involved. This will not only enable the fatstock guarantee system to be simplified considerably but will also save about 300 staff. A single guarantee payment will be made in future for each group of fatstock. But to provide greater stability, this guarantee payment will be adjusted as and when necessary to ensure that the average total return to producers each week remains within a predetermined range on either side of the standard price.
  I regret that on this occasion agreement has not been reached with the farmers' unions. I understand that while, in the prevailing circumstances, they would not have wished to dissent from the total increase in the guarantees, they feel unable to agree to the price determinations or to the changes to be made in the fatstock guarantee system. The Government are, however, satisfied that their determinations are fair and just and take a full and balanced view of the needs of the agricultural industry and of the national economy.
  VISCOUNT ALEXANDER OF HILLSBOROUGH: My Lords, I am sure the House is grateful to the noble Earl for making the statement which has already been made in another place. I think the importance of the White Paper which has just come into my hands, as he promised, is such that I think the Leader of the House might consider giving us as early a day as possible to discuss it. It contains two outstanding features. The first is the point that brought regret from the noble Earl; that this statement was not an agreed statement between the Government and the industry. Secondly, I think that the removal of the individual guarantee is likely to be exceedingly harmful, at any rate to the small farmer. I therefore hope that we may have the earliest opportunity of a debate. This is the first time since the war, I think, that a statement of this kind has been made which has not been an agreed statement.
  THE LORD PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY): My Lords, in answer to the question by the noble Leader of the Opposition we shall, of course, be delighted to discuss through the usual channels the matter of a debate.

  THE MIDDLE EAST
  Debate resumed.
  4.47 p.m.
  THE MINISTER OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (THE MARQUESS OF READING): My Lords, being the first Government speaker on this Motion, I should like to say, even though in his absence, that it is not every day that the House is able to welcome a former Prime Minister. Nor has it always been the case in the past that the new arrival has gratified the House by taking part in—or, indeed, in this case by initiating—a debate after only so brief a delay. My Lords, if it would not be presumptuous to congratulate the noble Earl on his maiden speech I should desire very genuinely and warmly to do so. Although a novice, he seemed to have a striking volume of general knowledge and particular experience in the field that we are discussing. I might perhaps even more suitably and respectfully felicitate the Opposition on being reinforced by so powerful a piece of artillery for their counter-battery work, and the House itself upon acquiring so eminent and so welcome a recruit.
  The noble Earl's Motion has a certain duality. If I may slightly vary the noble Lord Rea's simile, I would say that it is rather like a pair of field glasses, one glass of which is directed upon Cyprus and the other upon the Middle East. The division does exist between the spheres of the Foreign Office and the Colonial Office, and I myself propose to confine what I have to say to the House, in as narrow a compass as possible, to the Middle East glass, leaving the Cyprus glass to my noble friend Lord Munster at a slightly later stage, and only adding that my noble Leader intends to wind up, what I may call bifocally, on both heads of the Motion at the end of the debate.
  So far as the Foreign Office interest goes, this debate is not taking place at the most advantageous of moments. We had a debate on the Middle East in this House not long ago and there have subsequently been various discussions on the subject in another place, but more particularly because my right honourable and learned friend the Foreign Secretary returned only this afternoon, while this debate has been in progress, from his extensive and arduous pilgrimage, which
  484
  has taken him to, amongst other countries, all the signatories of the Baghdad Pact. I have, consequently, not had the opportunity—which I should admittedly have liked—to consult him and to obtain from him his impressions of his various visits. But I can at least tell the House from the messages he has sent home that in all these countries he found the Governments concerned in a robust mood, and firm and faithful in their adherence to the Baghdad Pact.
  The noble Earl, moving his Motion, made reference to the need for raising the standard of life of the peoples of the Middle East, and I only say this much in passing. We have in all our dealings with the Baghdad Pact countries paid particular attention to the economic aspect of the arrangements which we are considering in that regard. I am going to speak a little more at length about the Baghdad Pact, but before doing so I would point to one small matter. If I understood the noble Earl aright, he made a slight slip. He indicated that Greece was in some way a member of the Baghdad Pact. That is not the position, of course, and I am sure that that was not the impression which the noble Earl wished to give. At the same time, I think it was the impression which the House derived from what he said, and I may perhaps be allowed to remove it.
  There are critics of the Baghdad Pact, both in this country and abroad—people who are apt to contend that the creation and continuation of this Pact is in some way a provocation and is, indeed, mainly responsible for the worsening of the situation in the Middle East which has come from the acquisition by Egypt and possibly by other countries through Egypt of arms of Czechoslovak origin. That is not in the least the view of Her Majesty's Government. It does not seem to us that it is in the least probable. The Soviet Government must undoubtedly be behind the actions of the Czechoslovak Government in this move. It is against all their normal habits to undertake a new move from one day to another without long deliberation, and only after such deliberation they bring it into operation when the moment seems more favourable. In our view, this arms deal was conceived far earlier as part of the usual Communist technique to

  485
  exploit and intensify the existing difficulties in the area. The Communist purpose was not merely to fish in troubled waters, but first to trouble the waters and then to fish in them. I recall that when my right honourable friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer, at the time when he was Foreign Secretary, raised this question of the arms deal with Mr. Molotov, both in New York and subsequently at the second Geneva meeting, in each case he was told that this was purely a commercial transaction—though I am bound to say that that allegation was not accepted with complete conviction by Her Majesty's Government. But this arms deal changed the situation for the worse in the Middle East, and, in our view, the Baghdad Pact came into being just in time to limit and to localise the scope and the effect of this Communist incursion into the Middle East.
  I confess I always find it a little difficult to understand the grounds for opposing, as a matter of principle, these various pacts which now exist in different parts of the world, such as the Baghdad Pact and the South East Asia Treaty Organisation. It is surely a fair comment upon the line of criticism with which I have been dealing that if the grouping together of countries in, for instance, the Baghdad Pact constitutes an incitement to the Communists, the same must be true of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and the South East Asia Treaty Organisation, for the character and purpose of them all are exactly the same. If we admit that these objections can be levied against all these arrangements, then surely we are accepting and endorsing the whole Communist thesis that N.A.T.O., for example, is designed for aggressive objects. One cannot help thinking that it must be a somewhat agreeable experience for the Russians to observe their case being thus guilelessly made on their behalf.
  They must also, I think, be somewhat comforted by the attitude of those who urge that they roust be brought into any discussions on the Middle East. The Baghdad Pact owes its origin solely to genuine fears of Soviet policy and to the determination of the member countries to make better defensive provision for their own safety by collective than they could ever have made by separate action. Had there been no such incentive to them thus to coalesce, there would have been
  486
  no Pact and no need for a Pact. Now it is suggested that the door which this Pact was spontaneously designed to close should be flung lightheartedly open and that those whom it was formed to keep out should be invited to step in.
  If that is the view, why not offer them membership of the Baghdad Pact? And if that, why not membership of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation? I do not remember that those who are now very vocal in urging that Russia should be asked to step into the Middle East were at the time very loudly in favour of agreeing to the Russian proposal that she should join the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. Your Lordships may remember that that was one of the Russian moves some time ago. I do not think it was very seriously considered by any Party in this country. Yet now the suggestion is that, in spite of the existence of the Baghdad Pact, she should be invited to step into the theatre of the Middle East. There is no logical distinction between the two positions, each one of which could, in my submission, result only in the collapse of the whole defensive structure of the free world. I am inclined to think that there is already quite enough Communist activity in the region of the Middle East without going out of one's way to increase it. If is does not create, it is at least prompt to exploit any incident which is unfavourable to the West. Certainly, we have had our anxieties lately in the Middle East, and those anxieties have been acute. General Glubb, since his return, has made plain his own attitude to what happened with a degree of generosity, wisdom and restraint that is perhaps the most effective commentary upon the circumstances of his dismissal after so many years of zealous and selfless service.
  The position in Jordan as a whole, however, seems to be clearing gradually. I am not going to venture into the realms of prophecy, but I think that so far one can go. Your Lordships will remember that the King of Jordan did not accept an invitation to the Cairo talks which recently took place between General Nasser, the King of Saudi Arabia and President Kuwatly of Syria, talks which resulted at least in an extremely lengthy and resonant communiqué. Yesterday, as your Lordships will have seen, there was also a meeting between the King of Iraq and the King of Jordan, who are

  487
  not only bound by geographical but also by dynastic ties. I would add only this: the noble Lord, Lord Hore-Belisha, called attention to the position in Jordan and the necessity of looking at the situation afresh; and a remark on the same lines was made by the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, in moving his Motion. The position is that in Jordan, at the moment, Her Majesty's Ambassador is engaged in talks with the Jordan Government on the existing situation, and the House will understand if I go no further than to say that those talks are being carried on.
  Our preoccupation with events in that part of the world, of course, is due only to the obvious fact that any sudden upheaval might at any moment disturb what is admittedly the precariously poised situation between Israel and the Arab States. The whole situation in that area of the Middle East is not made easier by the vicious and persistent broadcasts of stations such as "The Voice of the Arab". I do not intend to-day, with the number of speakers there are on the list, to go over the ground that I attempted to cover in our last debate on the Middle East on the more restricted field of relations between Israel and the Arab States. I propose only to say this. If there has been no actual outbreak of hostilities during the past six years or more since the State of Israel came into being, in my view, that condition, if not of peace, at least of "non-war," has been attributable in the main to the existence of the Tripartite Declaration. That Declaration is still of full force and effect. I can only repeat to-day the conviction I expressed in the earlier debate that the only solution which can give real and lasting relief from the present prolonged tension and animosity lies in a settlement between those directly concerned, with any assistance they may require from other countries, of difficulties which hitherto, unfortunately, the passing of time has only served to perpetuate.
  Sometimes it has been urged that since we have a Treaty with Jordan, under which we are bound to go to the aid of Jordan should she be attacked, we should conclude a similar Treaty with Israel. Our 1948 Treaty with Jordan, which is the existing one, was in replacement of a former Treaty made in 1946, as the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, will remember, which, in its terms, gave form and substance and
  488
  definition to our relations with Jordan. Therefore, our treaty relations with Jordan stem from a situation which existed at a moment before the State of Israel ever came into being at all. The conditions which have existed in the area since the Armistice Agreement have been covered and protected by the Tripartite Declaration. The Tripartite Declaration is a phrase which is not altogether to be overlooked, because, as distinct from a Treaty, this is a Declaration which involves not us alone, but the United Kingdom plus the United States and plus France, and it therefore is a treble assurance—
  LORD HENDERSON: My Lords, may I intervene? I am interested in the last remark of the noble Marquess. I recall the Prime Minister in another place saying in the last debate, with reference to the Tripartite Declaration, that the representatives of the three Governments were meeting to consider the nature of the action to be taken to give effect to the Tripartite Declaration. In view of the fact that the noble Marquess has again rejected the idea of a bilateral Treaty with Israel, is he in a position to say what is the nature of the action that is to be taken, because that is the deterrent value of the Tripartite Declaration?
  THE MARQUESS OF READING: I quite follow the noble Lord's point. What was said was perfectly accurate. That aspect is being discussed, but I am not yet in position to say exactly what the outcome of it may be.
  Towards the latter part of his speech, the noble Lord, Lord Hore-Belisha, asked a question, I think not wholly rhetorical, about what separate interest this country was claiming in the Middle East. I think that question arose out of what he had been saying about Cyprus. So far as I know, we are claiming no separate interest in the Middle East. We are accepting perhaps a separate responsibility in Cyprus, because it happens that Cyprus is a British possession, and therefore the responsibility for Cyprus rests upon this country. But when the noble Lord asks what we feel about oil and whether we should sell it to Russia and so on—
  LORD HORE-BELISHA: My Lords, may I interrupt the noble Marquess? My point was: why do we not discharge

  489
  the responsibility on behalf of N.A.T.O., instead of as a purely British responsibility?
  THE MARQUESS OF READING: I think we have a duty to discharge our own responsibility, though certainly with our eye upon N.A.TO. Indeed, it is the interests of N.A.T.O., as well as our own strategic interests, that have led us to attach the importance that we do to the geographical position of Cyprus and to its use as a base.
  LORD HORE-BELISHA: My Lords, forgive me. I think the point has some substance, and I am sure that the noble Marquess does not want to gloss over it. Is there, then, nothing in the claim of Mr. Eisenhower and of other foreign Powers, Members of N.A.T.O. that their interests are affected by what is happening in Cyprus, that they wish to be consulted and would make a composite policy? I think it necessary to call attention to this matter because it occupies a great deal of space in every newspaper, and I think it is worthy of consideration for the sake of good relationships.
  THE MARQUESS OF READING: Consultation is one thing; giving information is one thing; but discharge of responsibility is another thing. At the present time, as things stand, as I have said, it is our responsibility to discharge our task in Cyprus of establishing and preserving order and, at the same time, carrying on the base which has been installed there. Certainly throughout the Middle East, in all our dealings with the problem of that country, we have not only sought but have received a considerable volume of co-operation from other countries. Indeed, in an earlier passage of my speech I went in some detail into the position of such an Agreement as the Baghdad Pact, where, after all, we are working in close relation with other Asian countries. We quite realise that in many parts of the world to-day we cannot be responsible for security except by a combined effort of all those concerned. I suppose that one of the first and basic principles of foreign policy—I have said this before to your Lordships—is that in all these matters we have to match our resources with our responsibilities and not let one outweigh the other. That we have sought to do in our Middle East policy, as well as in our policy in other parts of the world.
  490
  There are many other matters with which I could deal in this particular field, but the weight of the debate so far has, I think, been on the Cyprus issue, and will perhaps continue to be. At the same time, I thought it right, in view of the double nature of the Motion of the noble Earl, that there should be, on behalf of the Government, at least a speech which should confine itself to the problems of the Middle East. With what I have already been able to say I shall content myself, and I can only hope that, to some degree, I may have contented the Home as well.
  5.13 p.m.
  THE EARL OF LISTOWEL: My Lords, this debate, as the noble Marquess, Lord Reading, has pointed out, has been mainly concerned with Cyprus, in spite of his own valuable foreign policy contribution; and Cyprus is a subject on which I have had a Motion on the Order Paper for several months. I should like to express my gratitude to the noble Marquess, the Leader of the House for his courtesy in giving us this early opportunity of discussing this subject. We on this side of the House have never wished to hamper negotiations, which everyone hoped would succeed, by a premature debate here. We therefore readily agreed, at the request of the Government, to postpone my Motion until there was either a settlement or a breakdown in the negotiations. A breakdown has now unfortunately occurred, and the noble Marquess has been good enough to rearrange the Business of the House so that we can discuss the subject without any unnecessary delay. I propose to confine my own remarks to Cyprus, and I am pleased to observe that the noble Earl, Lord Munster, who is a former Colonial Office Minister, will soon be in a position to reply to me.
  The reason for my special interest in Cyprus is that I was a Minister at the Colonial Office at the time of the 1948 constitutional offer, when my noble friend Lord Winster was Governor of the island, and working so hard for its acceptance. Since then I have been a close and sympathetic observer of events in the island. There are two things that strike one particularly forcibly about the present tragic situation. One is that we cannot hope to find the right way out unless all the relevant facts are examined without

  491
  Party or national prejudice, with a mental willingness to see and understand the British, the Greek, the Turkish and the Cypriot viewpoints. This is not altogether easy at a time when Party and national sentiments have already been deeply stirred. The other thing that strikes me particularly forcibly is that responsibility for what has happened in Cyprus is widely distributed in time and space: it ranges from our failure to bribe Greece, by the offer of Cyprus, to come into the First World War in 1915, to the strategic requirements of the present cold war and the tension between Israel and the Arab States in the Middle East. If we on this side of the House deal with the special responsibility of Her Majesty's Government, it does not mean that we have forgotten these other relevant factors; it means simply that we are trying to do our job as Her Majesty's Opposition.
  We recognise, of course, that those primarily concerned with, and responsible for, the present situation are the British Government and British policy and the Greek-speaking Cypriot population. In my view, there have been mistakes on both sides—mistakes which ought to be frankly admitted—and the future of the island will depend on the rectification of those mistakes by both sides. The two most grievous mistakes of the Cypriots were, I believe, first, to refuse the liberal constitution in 1948, which would eventually have given them a Parliamentary weapon in the struggle for Enosis; and secondly, to start the present campaign of terrorism and violence, which would have been quite unnecessary if they had had a constitutional method of pressing their national claim. Terrorism has brought death to Britons and Cypriots; it has brought untold misery to their families and financial ruin to many people on the island. The longer it continues, the harder it will become to find the common ground necessary for agreement.
  I should now like to pass to the mistakes which, in my view, Her Majesty's Government have committed and which have led up to the present situation. I shall then go on to say something about the changes of policy that are now required, and I hope to allude to the interesting suggestions of the most reverend Primate the Lord Archbishop of
  492
  Canterbury for putting an end to terrorism and coercion and achieving an agreed settlement. The policy of Her Majesty's Government towards Cyprus since 1954 has, I believe, been weak and vacillating —and I think that this was implied by something that was said by the most reverend Primate. This weakness has encouraged the belief that the British Government will surrender to force what they will not give to persuasion. Their inconsistency has obscured the limit beyond which concessions cannot go. Step by step, in response to pressure from Cyprus, the Government have retreated to the position which they should have occupied at the start.
  In July, 1954, a shadow of self-government, a Legislature without an elected majority—a much less liberal offer than that made in 1948—was held out to Cyprus. Thirteen months later, in August, 1955, the Foreign Secretary announced that this shadow had been given substance, and that Cyprus would have a Legislative Assembly, with an elected majority and powers of internal self-government. The unfortunate feature in this sequence of events was that shooting had started in Cyprus in the spring months of 1955. Self-government had thus been conceded, but not self-determination. In that regard the Cypriots were no better off after the Tripartite Conference in the autumn of 1955 than they had been before it; indeed, the failure of the Conference—to which, of course, Greece, Turkey and ourselves were parties—to reach any agreement merely worsened the situation in the Eastern Mediterranean. I should be surprised if Ministers looking back did not admit, privately at any rate, that the Tripartite Conference was a blunder and should never have been convened. International conferences should presuppose from the start a reasonable chance of agreement. With that general principle I am quite sure all those who have been concerned with foreign relations will agree.
  The public exposure of the differences over Cyprus between Greece and Turkey started the terrible anti-Greek riots in Istanbul and Ismailia, and the refusal of self-determination preceded violence on the island. In November of last year the Governor had to declare a state of emergency. Then, quite suddenly, in the following month of December, only three

  493
  months after a categorical statement by the Foreign Secretary that exceptions must be made to the principle of self-determination of Cyprus, the same Minister informed the Members of another place that self-determination for Cyprus was no longer not in the foreseeable future and should come (and here I quote his words)
  "at some time and on certain conditions."
  The time and the place were not specified, but everyone realised that a right for which the majority of Cypriots had been striving for the last hundred years had been at last granted. If only these basic demands, self-government and self-determination, had been offered in 1954, instead of being conceded to mounting violence in the next eighteen months, Cyprus might have been today as peaceful an island and as useful and efficient a base as Malta is in the Mediterranean.
  It is thus against a background of agreement on essentials that in January and February of this year the talks between the Governor and the Archbishop proceeded. This, at any rate, was the view expressed by the Secretary of State at the beginning of the present month. I should like to quote his words. He said:
  "The big issues, the principle of self-determination and the question of self-government, are in a sense out of the way."
  The talks therefore broke down on matters of much less importance—matters essentially negotiable—and what I think the Government have to do to justify their policy in breaking off their talks; and what I do not think they have done hitherto by their explanations in another place, is to give a single valid reason for calling off the negotiations at this stage.
  Everyone is aware of the three issues —my noble friend Lord Attlee has dealt with them at length, and I will not repeat them—on which the two sides failed to agree. Too many people think that both parties could have made concessions without losing anything essential. Your Lordships will have noticed that that view was expressed in The Times yesterday by their correspondent in Cyprus. This report is a matter of such interest that I should like to read a few lines from it. He says:
  494
  "… your Correspondent has come to the conclusion that the talks with Archbishop Makarios should not have broken down, at least when they did. This is not the view merely of one or two minor and possibly disgruntled or prejudiced philhellenic officials; apart from the Greek Cypriots or the Greek representatives here, who are naturally unanimous, and for the most part genuinely so, that the deportation of Archbishop Makarios was a blunder, there are evidently many others who think that agreement might, and should if possible, have been reached."
  EARL FORTESCUE: My Lords, I think it would be convenient if we were now to adjourn during pleasure for the Royal Commission.
  House adjourned during pleasure.
  House resumed.

  ROYAL COMMISSION
  5.30 p.m.
  The following Bills received the Royal Assent:

  Leeward Islands,

  Children and Young Persons,

  Therapeutic Substances,

  Police (Scotland),

  Charles Beattie Indemnity,

  Agricultural Research,

  Dentists,

  Food and Drugs (Scotland),

  Pakistan (Consequential Provision),

  Monmouthshire County Council,

  Crosby Corporation,

  Blyth Generating Station (Ancillary Powers),

  Dundee Corporation.

  House adjourned during pleasure.
  House resumed.

  EASTER RECESS AND BUDGET DAY
  EARL FORTESCUE: My Lords, I have to inform your Lordships that Budget Day is April 17, and that the Easter Recess begins on March 29 and ends on April 10.

  THE MIDDLE EAST
  5.43 p.m.
  Debate resumed.
  THE EARL OF LISTOWEL: My Lords, I was saying before the interlude that The Times correspondent in Cyprus and a number of persons in that island took the view, which was not shared by the Government, that there was a real possibility of agreement at the time when these talks were broken off. Surely, the benefit of the doubt in this matter should have been given by the Government to those who still saw the hope of agreement, however faint that hope may have been. I would only say in passing that the narrowing of the gap which has been going on ever since the negotiations began on the three points of difference must have been largely due to the negotiating skill of the Governor, Sir John Harding, who has shown himself in these protracted discussions to have the qualities of a statesman as well as of a soldier.
  The decision—as we think, the disastrous decision—to break off the talks was followed by the decision to deport the Archbishop. The two reasons given for this action have been his refusal to appeal publicly against the use of violence and his direct or indirect complicity in terrorism. The Archbishop's answer to the first of these charges is that an appeal would have been useless; it would not have stopped violence unless he had been able at the same time to offer his supporters a political settlement. I cannot help thinking that the Archbishop is just as well qualified to know what the probable effect on his own supporters of an appeal would be as Her Majesty's Government. Whether or not people agree with the Archbishop's reply to this charge, I think, at any rate, it should be stated, because it was quite clear that in none of the ministerial statements that were made yesterday in another place was there any representation at all of the other point of view.
  On the other charge, the Government have adduced detailed evidence to support the complicity of the Archbishop and have stated that he was personally involved in the terrorist campaign. The Archbishop has not yet had an opportunity to reply to this charge, and fair-minded people will at least keep their minds open until they have heard his
  496
  side of the case. I understand that he denies this charge through those who are entitled to speak for him, but he obviously has not had an opportunity to make any comment himself. But let us assume for the moment that the Government is right and that the Archbishop is in fact a terrorist leader. The question then arises whether he should have been arrested when he was arrested or allowed to remain at large. On the Government's own showing, this was a matter of pure expediency and not of morality or principle. The Government were fully aware of the Archbishop's connections with the terrorists while the negotiations were going on, but they did not wish to prejudice a settlement by placing him under arrest at that time, and I applaud the Government for adopting that policy; I think they were perfectly right.
  Now, if the Archbishop had continued to be more useful to the Government at large, it is to be presumed that he would still be free. This makes it all the more culpable that the Government did not foresee and avoid the irreparable damage his deportation is now doing in Cyprus and its serious repercussions in Greece and on the rest of the outside world. There is now no moderate leader left in Cyprus with the authority to resume the negotiations, and we are faced with an indefinite period of coercion and no prospect at all of an agreed settlement. The leadership of this national movement in Cyprus has of course passed into the hands of the extremists—E.O.K.A. and the Communists—and they will continue to answer force by force. The bitterness this action has provoked in Greece threatens to wreck the N.A.T.O. alliance in the Eastern Mediterranean and will certainly impair its effectiveness, as indeed has already happened in the past, for a considerable time. We have also antagonised and shocked a large amount of world opinion. Even our most important and loyal ally, the United States of America, judging from the reactions of members of Congress, has been moved to express its sympathy with Cyprus and Greece. Those of your Lordships who know America will realise how deeply public opinion there can be stirred by manifestations of old-fashioned colonial rule. I only hope that Cyprus will not be in American eyes a symbol of British imperialism—another India, Ireland or Palestine.

  497
  The only solution that will give us a secure base for our commitments in the Mediterranean and the Middle East and bring back peace and normality to Cyprus is an agreed political settlement. The threefold basis of such a settlement already exists, although it may not last much longer: for the Greek Cypriots, management of their own affairs and ultimate choice of their political future; for the Turkish minority, adequate safeguards in whatever Constitution may be adopted; for us, the use of the island as a military base as long as we require it; and for N.A.T.O. a permanent base in the Mediterranean which, ipso facto, will be shared by Turkey. The only alternative to such a settlement is a continuation of coercion and bloodshed. Our men and airfields on the island will be surrounded by a hostile population, and the people of Cyprus will continue to lack the freedom and security for which British rule has always stood. We cannot therefore agree with the Government that the effort to reach a political settlement must now be abandoned.
  It is, I expect, clear—to me regrettably clear—so far as Cyprus is concerned, that the bipartisan tradition of colonial policy has been broken. If we had the authority of the Government we should reverse their policy; the Archbishop would be released and invited to resume the negotiations at the point at which they were broken off. But by that time, if and when it comes, the atmosphere in Cyprus may be so poisoned by hatred that a settlement will be impossible. I therefore beg the Government to have second thoughts now, to try once more for a settlement that will end violence and coercion, and to remember that that is what thousands of ordinary people in this country and all over the world most ardently desire.
  I should like particularly to ask the Government to consider the constructive and statesmanlike proposals that the most reverend Primate made at the end of his speech. If I understood him rightly, his main suggestions were that a Constitution could be drawn up forthwith, and that the Archbishop should be released as soon as law and order have been restored in Cyprus. Surely, that is an improvement on the sterile and negative policy of repression which is all that the Government have so far offered us. I should like to ask Her Majesty's Government not
  498
  only to study and examine these proposals with the utmost care and with the minimum of delay, but to communicate the results of their study to the House, because I know that the House was deeply impressed by the contribution of the most reverend Primate and I am quite certain that the whole House would wish to know the result of the Government's consideration of it.
  5.53 p.m.
  VISCOUNT DE L'ISLE: My Lords, I hope not to detain the House long in my remarks. May I start by echoing what has already been said in words of welcome to the noble Earl, Lord Attlee. Like so many other institutions and individuals, this House makes collections. The House of Lords collects Prime Ministers, end we are proud of the latest addition to our list. I am glad that the noble Earl opened his innings by raising a subject of great current importance. All of us must be deeply disturbed by the recent events both in Cyprus and in the Middle East; in particular, the dismissal of General Glubb by King Hussein of Jordan made a deep and painful impression on public opinion—an impression which I personally share. General Glubb had great achievements to his credit which we all gratefully acknowledge. The dust has settled a little since that event, and we certainly should not make premature judgments; but I fear that grave damage has been done which we ought not to underestimate—damage to the Anglo-Jordan Alliance and damage, I fear, to the reputation of the throne of Jordan. Those of us who have had the honour of meeting the King still entertain hopes that he may emulate his eminent grandfather, King Abdullah, to whom Lord Attlee referred. We must not abandon these hopes, and we must still trust that the young King may preserve his country and his dynasty.
  The Arab Legion is certainly a matter of grave concern for this country, but I hope noble Lords will not forget that under our Treaty, we occupy two highly important airfields in Jordan—Amman and Mafrah. They are part of the complex of airfields and bases which stretch from Malta, through Libya to Cyprus, and on, under our recent Treaty, to Iraq. I read with great care the Report of the debate in another place on the Middle East and I was glad that the leader of the Opposition, Mr. Gaitskell, recognised

  499
  explicitly the dependence of the economy of this country, as well as of Europe, upon oil from the Persian Gulf. But I could not join with him when he seemed, as I thought, to view the situation in the light that those States who produce oil must sell to us. I am sorry that the lessons of Abadan have not taken deeper root in the minds of the Opposition. Nationalism and anti-Westernism, Communist-stimulated, could quite easily create such chaos in those States that they will deny oil to this country even at the expense of great misery to themselves and disaster to this country. Therefore, I say again that we ought not to underestimate the part played in the pacification of that area by the air bases which are either occupied by us or upon which we have facilities. They stretch from Iraq down the Persian Gulf and along the Northern shore of the Indian Ocean, in the Aden Protectorate and in Aden colony, and the pivot of the whole complex is the Island of Cyprus.
  We know that we left the Suez Canal because we could not maintain a base when we had not the power of internal security. The noble Earl, Lord Attlee, following a line of argument with which we must all be familiar, seemed to point to the inevitability of the process of representation in internal government as if it always brought benefits both to the countries concerned and to world peace. Sometimes the power of nationalism is so strong and our power not strong enough so that we have, at the point of insurrection, to concede it. We certainly ought not to seek to be deceived by the results of world peace. There is still violence on the border between Northern and Southern Ireland; in the Indian subcontinent strife is rife in Kashmir, and racial and religious antagonisms abounded when we left there; and in the near East, when we yielded up our Mandate of Palestine and planted it in the lap of U.N.O., we left a legacy of bitterness and racial hatred which still burns fiercely. So let us not seek to be deceived into thinking that when we yield up power in the face of insurrection we are making for world peace.
  We have responsibilities in the island of Cyprus quite beyond those particular responsibilities which attach to a British colony. No speaker from the Opposition has thought it worth while to maintain
  500
  the Turkish position, nor the fact that there are strong Communist elements both in Cyprus and in Greece. Viewed from the Turkish situation, how could they allow the possibility of a Communist-dominated Cyprus, attached possibly to a Communist-dominated Greece? And if we yielded to the demands made without an adequate safeguard to the Turkish minority, without adequate compensation to the fears of Turkey, in our extraordinarily difficult international situation we should do far more harm to the cause of the free world and to N.A.T.O. than we should by possibly offending some Western opinion and opinion in the United States. We cannot abdicate, because of our wide responsibilities, the power of law and order in the Island; and I personally regret that the neglect of these elements in the speeches of noble Lords on the opposite side of the House must have done, and must do, great harm to the cause of freedom.
  We have all read with mixed feelings the remarks attributed to the United States Ambassador in Athens. I have not seen an official version of them, but certainly they have given great and justifiable offence in this country, and nothing put out by the State Department which I have read has minimised what I would call the disastrous effect upon the unity of the two leading Powers in the free world. When our greatest Ally treats on terms of equality Great Britain and the Government of Cyprus, which has been pouring out subversion, or at least conniving in subversive propaganda and incitement to violence, I wonder they did not mention a third great friend, the Republic of Guatemala, where, I believe, constitutional government exists entirely free from external pressure. I hope that the United States Ambassador in this country, who is our great friend, will not fail to report to his country the intensity of the feeling here that we have been let down by a friend who should support us.
  At the time when I had the honour to be Secretary of State for Air, I did my best to make that partnership, so far as it concerned the Air Forces of the two countries, a reality; and I yield to no one in my belief in the vital importance of continued Anglo-American understanding. I am a deep admirer of the institutions and spirit of the great Republic, but speaking from that point of view I

  501
  say that we are entitled to expect a far higher degree of comprehension and sympathy than we have received. After all, we have done our best, sometimes under great difficulty, to understand their policy in the Far East and I feel we ought not to mince our words now, when we are supporting, at the expense of blood and treasure, and perhaps of reputation, the power of the free world in the Near East.
  I must deplore the fact that some noble Lords and some outside this House, treat on terms of equality the Government of Cyprus and those who are trying to subvert it. And to the most reverend Primate the Lord Archbishop of Canterbury, I would say, with the greatest possible candour, that I deeply regretted not hearing him deplore the murders which have taken place, at least with the connivance, if not under the inspiration, of Archbishop Makarios.
  THE LORD ARCHBISHOP OF CANTERBURY: My Lords, I thought I made it perfectly clear that I dissociated myself utterly and entirely from the terrorism and murder which is in progress there.
  VISCOUNT DE L'ISLE: It is not enough to dissociate oneself. Surely it falls to the most reverend Primate utterly to condemn it.
  THE LORD ARCHBISHOP OF CANTERBURY: My Lords, I thought if one dissociated oneself from such action, one condemned it. Certainly I condemn the Archbishop Makarios for not himself disowning it. I wish to make perfectly clear that I was not at all lacking in condemnation of the terrorism and murders in Cyprus.
  VISCOUNT DE L'ISLE: I am very glad to have elicited that statement, if it was not already in the most reverend Primate's speech, because it is most important at this time that the forces of law and order should restore in the island of Cyprus good and stable government. For I am certain that the views of the Cypriots themselves, whether they are Greek-speaking or Turkish-speaking, can be made known only when fear of violence and murder has been removed. It is, and has often been, the case in situations of this kind that the agitators and those who are prepared to use violence completely suppress moderate opinion, which
  502
  will not emerge until law and order are restored. We ought not to yield up a position and a burden which we must carry in wider interests, as well as in national interests, because of the pressure of internal or external events. It is because I believe that Her Majesty's Government are doing so that I support them.
  6.5 p.m.
  LORD TWEEDSMUIR: My Lords, I should like to preface a rather short speech by paying my own tribute to the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, who initiated this debate. It would be impertinent for me to comment on the maiden speech of such an orator, beyond saying that I do not recollect when I heard a speech so easy to listen to. He and I first met twelve years ago in circumstances of Mediterranean strife, when he was Deputy Prime Minister in the Coalition Government. He came out to see the Gothic Line battle and was handed over to an officer, who was myself. I lost my way, and instead of having a distant view of the battle, the noble Earl had a most intimate view—which, of course, was no novelty to him, because among his many distinctions he had extremely distinguished service as an infantryman in the 1914–18 war.
  I should like to take up a point made by my noble friend Lord De L'lsle in his remarkable speech. Like him, I yield to no one in my feeling that the future of the free world depends almost above everything else on a close understanding and alliance with the Americans. Almost every speaker has drawn attention to the tremendous impact on world opinion caused by the deportation of Archbishop Makarios. The reaction of American public opinion was unfortunate, to say the least. I do not think it was unfair of a newspaper to plead to-day that His late Majesty, King George III, should be allowed to slumber in peace. When we in this country make a mistake it is not that we have not let rued the lesson, once or many times, but merely that we have learned it but forgotten it. We are a much older country than the United States and, with great humility, I would say that they make a mistake because they are finding themselves in a sphere in which they have never found themselves before, and in which they have no experience. They are still wedded to the belief that it is possible to be a great Power and, at the

  503
  same time, to be popular. To be popular as a country one requires to have no Army, no Exchequer, and no power, and to be picturesque. Then you can be popular at the price of being utterly powerless.
  The noble Earl, Lord Attlee, in his interesting speech, said that much of our position in the world rested on public opinion. I go right with him if by that he meant our position of leadership in ideas in the world. I am sure he would not have suggested, or meant to imply, that public opinion in the world had anything to do with popularity. I would support no Government which shrank from taking a step which they thought right, because they thought that step would be unpopular. Noble Lords who have spoken are naturally disturbed and concerned in their minds, as we all are, about the position in Cyprus. It is tragic that we should be at odds with Greece, to whose classic past our own civilisation owes so much. When one first-class brigade, at just the right moment, prevented Greece from going behind the Iron Curtain, it was a British brigade—a matter of great pride to all of us. This is not a colonial or foreign affairs problem. This Enosis movement has acted as a burning glass on the dry tinder of the ancient feuds of Europe—for there is much dry tinder spread about; and to that fuel has been added by Archbishop Makarios and the Communists. The noble Earl, Lord Listowel, who is not here at the moment, made great play with an article in The Times, from its correspondent in Cyprus. I put great store by The Times correspondents, but it is only fair to point out that Her Majesty's Government have access to sources of information at least as good, and probably a good deal better, before they make up their mind.
  It is rather natural that this debate should narrow its focus, so far as Cyprus goes, on the deportation of Archbishop Makarios. This man's complicity is proved up to the hilt. It is not, I think, a question of saying "We have not heard his side of the story": his complicity is absolutely proved. The most reverend Primate told us earlier that the Archbishop had two capacities: that he was regarded as the political head of the country and as the head of that branch
  504
  of the Christian Church. That may be. A man may have two spheres to his life but he cannot have two characters, and the deeds committed by Mr. Hyde must be paid for by Dr. Jekyll. I have seen it written that
  "the Christian Church is an anvil that has worn out many hammers,"
  and will yet wear out many more. But, my Lords, murder is murder wheresoever and by whomsoever it is committed. If one tries to find excuses of this kind, if Christianity ever compromises on fundamentals, there is a danger not that that anvil will be broken but that it will be eroded.
  Archbishop Makarios was only too plainly committed to violence, either as a protagonist or as a puppet. We have given every evidence of our patience and sincerity. We have given him every chance. It was he and not ourselves who turned Cyprus into an armed camp. He cannot now escape his responsibilities. I believe that this ambitious man thought that moderation, let alone agreement, would weaken his position with his followers; and, whether he was a power-hungry man or a mere puppet, he believed that in the end, under the force of terrorism, we should crack. He was wrong; and our task is now to lower the temperature so that we can get back again to reasonable negotiations. When the agitators take hold of a country the moderates fall to a discount, because while you can argue moderation, counsel it, and preach it, you cannot agitate for it; so the agitators have the hustings all to themselves.
  I am in agreement with the noble Earl, Lord Swinton, who said earlier to-day that he firmly believed that some 90 per cent. of the people of Cyprus wished an end to the whole thing; that they wished no part of these to-ings and fro-ings, but wished merely to be left alone to lead their own lives—because when there is violence and bloodshed it is the innocent, far more than the protagonists, who suffer and lose their lives. I feel that many a citizen of Cyprus now, if he could read English and had an opportunity of reading a certain poem of Rudyard Kipling's, might feel the circumstances applied to himself up to the time when the Archbishop left. Let us remember this line:
  "We are not ruled by murderers but only by their friends."

  505
  We have shown, I think, abundant evidence of good will, and we are there to go on with the conversations when any moderate and resolute man will come forward to continue them. As I say, the moderates in this wave of terrorism have gone temporarily to a discount.
  Our tasks are these. We have brought impartial justice. We must restore the Pax Britannica and then we must negotiate that last thing, some form of free and orderly government. This is going to take patience and resolution on the part of all concerned, not least on the part of that resolute, gallant, good-natured and most famous Britisher, Private Thomas Atkins and his cousin the policeman. This debate has been conducted with all the temperateness that one expects in your Lordships' House. It has not been so conducted beyond its walls, and our Party has been accused by one Party of madness and by another of folly in getting rid of Archbishop Makarios. That we had to take this step I, and I think all noble Lords on these Benches, shall remember with regret, but without a tinge of remorse.
  6.16 p.m.
  THE LORD BISHOP OF CHICHESTER: My Lords, I propose to confine my remarks to Cyprus, and I am extremely sorry to and myself in discord with the son of John Buchan. May I preface my remarks by saying how much I appreciate what Lord Rea said about approaching the whole matter from the international angle, and, if I may do so without presumption, may I add how much I admire the wisdom and statesmanship of the noble Earl, Lord Attlee. May I say at once, in case anything I say later may be misunderstood—though I hope it will not be—how profoundly I abhor and condemn the outrages and barbarities now taking place in Cyprus and how deeply I, like the noble Earl who introduced this Motion, feel the terrible position of the troops and the police.
  I speak from a rather particular angle. Through my intimate connections with the World Council of Churches, as Chairman of its Central Committee for many years and now as the honorary President, I am necessarily in close touch with the opinion of many Churches of very different characters, reformed and unreformed, in many countries. I am not, of course, speaking here in any way for
  506
  the World Council of Churches, but I have heard from, and conversed with, officers of that Council, at Geneva and in London, and a personal statement was issued by the General Secretary, Dr. Visser 't Hooft, on March 13. I think it is important to appreciate the reason why the Archbishop, whoever he may be, must (he cannot help it) be the spokesman of the national as well as the ecclesiastical position in Cyprus. It is due to the historic opposition of the Greek Orthodox Church for many centuries to Turkish rule. Doctor Visser 't Hooft says:
  "Even though the activities of the Archbishop as ecclesiastical and as political leader are logically distinguishable, they cannot be separated in the minds of the people. It must therefore be made unmistakably clear to all concerned that this act of deportation against the head of a church is very deeply resented throughout the ancient Orthodox Churches."
  On various occasions in recent years the World Council of Churches has issued statements and resolutions condemning the actions of totalitarian réegims, and what they have said has been some comfort to hard-pressed Eastern churches. It is not surprising, therefore, that when an action which everybody must agree was totally unexpected from a great democratic Government in the West, what might be described as a thunderbolt from Britain, was launched, there was consternation amongst these Churches, and messages and protests and inquiries came in in a stream. I will not quote the text, for the most reverend Primate has referred to various messages and telegrams to the World Council and to him. I would just call attention to the fact that one of the protesters was the Greek Evangelical Church in Cyprus as well as the Orthodox Church. Perhaps the most disquieting feature of all in these protests or appeals was that in spite of that sufferings of Greece from the Communists, in spite of the great friendship of Greece for Britain, in spite of the fact—and the Prime Minister referred to this in another place yesterday—that it was British troops who delivered Greece from Communist control in 1944 to 1945, in spite of their abhorrence of Communist rule and Communist ideals, nevertheless the Greek Orthodox Church made an appeal to the Church of Russia. How curious! They asked the Church of Russia to show the
  "traditional protection you have always given the Orthodox Churches."

  507
  Colleagues of the World Council of Churches have spoken of the reaction through the whole world. "Throughout large parts of the world, Christian opinion", they say, "is greatly shocked and troubled by this event". Whilst I know that my view will not be agreed with, I think it is important to know not what I think (that is quite irrelevant) but what outside Churches think of us. They say: "We cannot understand." There is widespread bewilderment abroad, and they cannot understand that an action which, rightly or wrongly, they look upon as by-passing the law should have been taken, above all by Britain. And they would say that the action is an action which, so far as they can see from the facts that have been so far published, is without adequate moral basis. While the British Government may be thoroughly satisfied as to the rightness of this action, nevertheless from the point of view of many people in the international theatre it comes as a blow to British prestige and a reduction of Britain's capacity for moral leadership.
  I am very conscious of the strain which is placed upon that fine character and man of ability, Sir John Harding. Everyone must have great respect for him and great sympathy with him in the difficulties of his position in an intense political crisis. There is no dispute that the outrages are horrible, and that they are by all good Christian opinion wholeheartedly condemned. And I can understand the request which the Governor has made and which the Colonial Secretary has made to Archbishop Makarios to declare openly against terrorism. I deplore and condemn terrorism, and I wish with all my heart that the Greek Orthodox Church would publicly condemn it. But before we condemn Archbishop Makarios too vehemently I think we should remember the strength of the nationalist sentiment in Cyprus. It is far from certain that if Archbishop Makarios did make a public condemnation of the terrorist movement that the terrorist movement would cease. The most reverend Primate quoted those words of Archbishop Makarios in which he said that he was sincerely afraid that if there were an official condemnation of these events by himself it would not find, at the present stage, the necessary response, but
  508
  would involve the risk of exposing him rather unprofitably—
  VISCOUNT DE L'ISLE: If the right reverend Prelate will forgive my interrupting him, I should like to ask him this. Leaving aside the question of whether or not condemnation of terrorism by the Archbishop would be effective, does he think that he ought to have made such condemnation?
  THE LORD BISHOP OF CHICHESTER: I am asking the noble Viscount to pause before he is too vehement in his condemnation.
  THE LORD ARCHBISHOP OF CANTERBURY: I quoted those words of Archbishop Makarios and I promptly said that in doing that he deserted his duty as a churchman and spoke as a politician.
  THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: I should like to ask the right reverend Prelate whether he agrees with or differs from the Archbishop in this matter.
  THE LORD BISHOP OF CHICHESTER: Which Archbishop?
  THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: The Archbishop of Canterbury.
  THE LORD BISHOP OF CHICHESTER: I will in a moment answer the question which the noble Marquess the Leader of the House has put to me. First of all, let me say that when Archbishop Makarios made that remark I do not suppose he was thinking of himself and his own personal safety and position, but rather of the effect on his influence—a moderating influence, as I believe—that such a condemnation would have. It is not so simple for Archbishops and Bishops in any country, in times of revolution and war, to take a line which large bodies of their fellow countrymen resent and repudiate. I can speak from personal experience.
  I should also like to call your Lordships' attention to the fact that in the time of Sinn Fein the Roman Catholic Bishops in Ireland did not think they would increase their influence by a strong condemnation of violence there. Nor did the Church leaders during the Nazi occupation of Holland, while Dutchmen were doing acts of violence and sabotage, think they would help the position by open condemnation. I should like to call attention to Archbishop

  509
  Makarios's statement at a Press conference on March 5, after the meeting of the Ethnarchy Council. The report that I have says:
  "The Archbishop concluded by saying that until the British Government reviewed their position and showed respect and understanding towards the national aspirations of the Greek people of Cyprus the latter must remain cool and equip themselves with persistence and patience for the continuation of their peaceful struggle for self-determination."
  Those words are restraining words, and the whole emphasis of the paragraph is on peaceful action. So the answer to the question of the noble Marquess the Leader of the House is this. To my great regret, I do not find myself in complete agreement with what the most reverend Primate said, in the precise way in which he said it, during a certain portion of his speech; but I do find myself in agreement (and I am sorry that I agree with one and not the other) with everything that the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, said in dealing with a very difficult and delicate situation.
  Archbishop Makarios is undoubtedly a determined champion of the Cypriot case in negotiations. The real trouble is that there is no common ground between him and the British Government. In my opinion it is misleading for the Colonial Secretary to speak in London on March 5 at the Press conference as though the real issues had been settled and only local problems remained. The Colonial Secretary said that Archbishop Makarios
  "has refused to use his great influence to prevent violence. And I say of a man who refuses to use his Influence to condemn violence when great issues are out of the way and only small, local problems are involved, he is as guilty of violence as someone who promotes it."
  I regard that as evidence of a certain inability to see where the heart of a matter lies. The form of the Constitution which the Colonial Secretary described as a "local" problem is the crucial issue. Indeed, the letters of Sir John Harding of February 14 and of Archbishop Makarios of February 25 are completely at cross-purposes. The Archbishop and the British Government want different thing, and clarification at this stage is of little use.
  Let me state what I believe to be Archbishop Makarios's position. He asks for self-determination. It is a technical term; the right of a people to determine its own future. The noble Earl, Lord Swinton, said that Cyprus was never a
  510
  Greek possession. Cyprus has a history of some 3,000 years. It is a Greek island; it was a free Greek island. It possessed itself for many years as a free Greek island with the free City States. It was a portion of Magna Graecia, the great classical Greece. It was part of the Byzantine Empire. Then there were certain vagaries of control after the collapse of the Byzantine Empire. For 300 years it was under Turkish rule, and for 78 years it has been under British rule. But all the time the people of Cyprus have been a Greek people. They have retained the Greek character and used the Greek language. And all the time there has been, sometimes strong, sometimes weak, but in these days stronger because of the pace of the times, the historic urge to fulfil their destiny in association with Greece.
  The position of the British Government at present is very different. To them, Cyprus is a British Colony. And the British Government offer not self-determination, or self-government, but self-government in a limited form, with large areas reserved for British rule; and at the heart of the Constitution there is a complete blank. It is an artificial solution in its present form; it is no solution at all. The Turks supply one-fifth of the total population; the Greeks are four-fifths. The Turkish Foreign Minister in London, in September last, said the guiding principle of any arrangements he would tolerate would be the granting of "full equality for the two groups" in Cyprus.
  I agree with the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, that the British Government's refusal to say what proportion of membership in the Legislative Assembly, in both Houses, should correspond with the proportion of the population in Cyprus, is a matter to be deplored. Certainly it would be regarded by Archbishop Makarios as an ominous sign. I believe that while the Lower House might have a majority in proportion to the population, there is reason to suppose that the Upper House would not have that proportion, for, with some nominated members and some Turkish members, the proportion would not be in favour of the Greeks in Cyprus, the general population. I do not think that this Constitution can he described as a "liberal and democratic Constitution", drawn up "in consultation with representatives of all sections of

  511
  opinion in the Island". On these terms Cyprus would remain a dependent territory of lower grade for an indefinite period. Our policy at present lacks an adequate moral basis, and a policy without an adequate moral basis cannot succeed. The moral and the real in the end coincide.
  Listening to one or two of the speeches, I have wondered whether we are sufficiently alive to the fact that we are living in rapidly moving times; whether we realise that, because of the rapid pace of the times, mistakes come home to roost far sooner than they used to do, and that retribution, still certain, is much swifter than it was before. I believe that the deportation was a blunder, and that it is one of the blunders which the present policy reflects. This policy is out of touch with the realities of the modern world. I believe that Britain, in its own interests, cannot afford to isolate itself from the public opinion of the world and that the whole policy in the Middle East wants reappraisal.
  To keep colonialism as a plank in our policy in Cyprus is not consistent with realities, and it supplies an opening for the Communists to sweep in upon a new rift in the Western armour. I believe it is actually a threat to the defence of the West, and that the gravest danger of all from this policy is that we should lose Asia and Africa. Little has been said about the reactions of the Asiatic countries, which matter so much, and I believe that if we lose them, we lose nearly everything. It is not in the military field that our chief peril lies but in the field of ideas, in the whole moral and spiritual field. That is the field in which the real conflict of our day is being waged.
  The problem of Cyprus is not insoluble, but it has to be envisaged in its true nature. I do not think that the London Conference provided the right approach. I do not think that the then Foreign Secretary's statement that Cyprus was "the hinge of the North Atlantic and Middle East defence system" goes to the root of the matter, important as the position of that island is. There are perhaps too many pacts; but there is force in what the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, said about the way in which the hydrogen bomb makes obsolete so many military approaches of the past. With all respect, I do not believe this is the way to preserve
  512
  N.A.T.O. itself, or to win the confidence of the younger and uncommitted nations, or to advance true British interests. Let us start afresh. Let us make plain, first of all, that Britain is not an autocratic power; that it recognises the new situation in the world; and that it appreciates the desire of peoples striving for national recognition, as it has so often shown. Let Britain declare that Cyprus shall be given effective freedom to determine her future, although it may be by stages. Obviously, safeguards are necessary for the Turkish minority and for defence interests. Bases in Cyprus are wanted. Yet this requirement is laid down, not with any idea of colonial domination, but with proper regard for Turkish as well as British needs, in co-operation with Greece, for a better defence of the West.
  6.42 p.m.
  THE MINISTER WITHOUT PORTFOLIO (THE EARL OF MUNSTER): My Lords, I feel sure that every noble Lord who has listened to this debate to-day will have appreciated the manner in which the Motion was introduced by the noble Earl, Lord Attlee. I, too, should like to offer my congratulations to the noble Earl on the occasion of his maiden speech. Before I come to a detailed reply to much of the criticism which has been levelled against Her Majesty's Government this afternoon, I want to deal briefly with some of the events that have occurred in past years. I agree wholeheartedly with the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, that there is no necessity to go back very far, and I intend to recall to your Lordships' minds what happened in 1946, during the time when the noble Lord, Lord Winster—who made an effort in that year to introduce a new Constitution—was Governor of Cyprus.
  Provision was made to set up a Consultative Assembly in order to consider the question of constitutional reform. That assembly met in 1947, but the right wing Greek Cypriots refused to attend on the ground that a local Constitution was no substitute for Enosis. This Constitution proposed that the new Legislative Council should have a substantial majority of elected members, and that, moreover, there should be three Greeks and one Turkish member on the Executive Council, and they would, in fact, be responsible for certain departments of State. The Consultative Assembly was

  513
  hardly representative, owing to the absence, as I have said, of the right wing leaders, and the proposals were accepted by only a narrow majority.
  The Government at that time, which was the Government led by the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, came to the conclusion that, in view of the narrowness of the majority and the composition of the Assembly, further steps should not be taken at that stage to implement the new Constitution. However, the noble Lord, Lord Winster—who I am glad is going to take part in this debate—told the Assembly at that time that if at any time there appeared to be genuine manifestations of public opinion in favour of the proposals, the British Government would take the necessary steps to enable this to be done. That Constitution remained open for six years, but no request came from local leaders in Cyprus for its implementation. I think that here is clear and unmistakable evidence that the late Labour Government and Her Majesty's present Government were both anxious to see a new Constitution implemented, but the Cypriot people had not become co-operative. I want to remind your Lordships that under that Constitution—if I may, I will describe it as the Winster Constitution—the future status of the island could not he discussed, and the noble Earl, Lord Listowel, is quite wrong in thinking that if that Constitution had come into operation the Greek elected members of the Assembly would have been able to discuss Enosis. That was definitely ruled out of discussion.
  THE EARL OF LISTOWEL: I agree with the noble Earl. I did not say that the Greek elected members would be able to discuss Enosis. I was closely connected with that Constitution, and I know that they would not have been able to discuss it.
  THE EARL OF MUNSTER: I am sorry if I misunderstood the noble Earl, but I thought he said that they would have been able to discuss Enosis. At any rate, the one thing that is quite clear is that the late Government were no less anxious than the present Government in their desire to see a new Constitution implemented. However, the new Constitution which we hope will come into being on this occasion contains no such reservation about Enosis, and any subject could come up for discussion at any time in this far
  514
  more liberal Constitution. Here let me say that I do not honestly believe that the right reverend Prelate, the Lord Bishop of Chichester, has ever bothered to read the White Paper which was issued by the Government on the question of Cyprus.
  THE LORD BISHOP OF CHICHESTER: I would assure the noble Earl that I have read it carefully.
  THE EARL OF MUNSTER: Then I am bound to say that, if the right reverend Prelate has read it, if he would exercise his intelligence in the right direction, he would observe that this is a far advanced liberal Constitution; it is common in many territories throughout the British Commonwealth, and is working extremely well in many of them.
  THE LORD BISHOP OF CHICHESTER: May I interrupt again to point out that what I said was that the two letter; of Archbishop Makarios and Sir John Harding showed that they were at cross-purposes, and the heart of the matter wad not really dealt with in an adequate way by Sir John Harding.
  THE EARL OF MUNSTER: I am coming to the speech of the right reverend Prelate at a later stage, and I will leave my further comments until then. In July, 1954, we announced our intention to introduce a modified Constitution. It had been impossible to make progress when a wave of terror began in April of that year. In September last, as your Lordships will remember, the Foreign Secretary called a Tripartite Conference together in London and laid before them the text of the Government's proposals. I do not agree with the noble Earl, Lord Listowel, who said that he thought this Tripartite Conference was a remarkable blunder. There was every reason to believe that it might have been a remarkable success, and, in any event, in the difficulties which were facing us at that time it was well worth trying to see whether agreement could be obtained. There was this meeting in London. The House may recall that important proposals were put to that Conference—namely, for the introduction of a new and liberal Constitution, leading to the fullest measure of self-government which was compatible with the strategic requirements of the present international situation.

  515
  It is well that the House should be reminded of what has occurred during the last ten years while successive Governments have endeavoured to introduce representative government for all the people of Cyprus. We have made strenuous efforts and great concessions to that end, but so far we have not met with much success. In October last year, the present Governor, Sir John Harding, in exploratory talks with the Archbishop and other Cypriot leaders, attempted to reach some political settlement which would offer prospects of substantial constitutional advance. All the correspondence which took place between the Archbishop and the Governor has been published in the White Paper.
  I wish to draw the attention of the House to the first section of that Paper which states the Government's policy on both the short-term and the long-term aspects. That statement was in due course explained to, and discussed with, the Archbishop and with the leaders of the Turkish community, who, as my noble friend Lord De L'Isle has said, must always be considered in any question dealing with Cyprus. The Archbishop informed the Governor that he was not prepared to associate himself with the statement, but that he was prepared, on certain conditions, to co-operate in framing a Constitution. These conditions concerned the form of the Constitution, and the amnesty. That in itself marks a vast improvement and a step forward towards final agreement, because the need to establish self-government was recognised on every side, and the principle of self-determination was therefore no longer a stumbling block. Discussions on the outstanding questions continued, and it soon became clear that the reservation of public security to the Governor for as long as he thought necessary, and the question of a Greek-elected majority and the amnesty, were matters requiring further clarification.
  In an all-out effort to try to reach a final settlement, my right honourable friend the Colonial Secretary decided to visit Cyprus himself. He saw the Archbishop and told him of certain undertakings which Her Majesty's Government were prepared to give if the Archbishop would co-operate in framing a Constitution and would encourage his fellow-countrymen to do the same. He also
  516
  asked the Archbishop to make an appeal for the cessation of violence, and to use all his influence for the restoration of law and order. The undertakings which my right honourable friend offered were that there would be an amnesty for all those convicted under the Emergency Regulations, except cases involving violence against the person or the illegal possession of arms, which would in any event come up for review in accordance with the normal rules. The release of detainees would begin at the same time as the amnesty, and all Emergency Regulations would be repealed at a pace commensurate with the re-establishment of law and order.
  My right honourable friend further elaborated the Governor's letter of February 14, and he told the Archbishop that we would send a Constitutional Commissioner to Cyprus to frame a Constitution in agreement with representatives of all sections of the population. Foreign affairs and defence, however, would be reserved subjects, and so would public security for as long as the Governor thought necessary. The House will observe at once that at that time foreign affairs and defence were no difficulty whatever: it was agreed by everyone that they should be a reserved subject and under the control of Her Majesty's Government. The control of Departments was to be handed over to Cypriot Ministers who were to be responsible to a Legislative Assembly, and the transfer was to take place as soon as possible. The Constitution was to provide for an elected majority, in which the interests of all the races would be safeguarded.
  After prolonged discussion, the Archbishop was still not prepared to accept the Colonial Secretary's statement, and in particular he emphasised that he would not agree to the exclusion from the amnesty of those who had been convicted of carrying arms or the reservation of public security for as long as the Governor thought necessary. The Archbishop also insisted that the composition of the elected majority should be defined to his satisfaction and in advance of the recommendations of the Constitutional Commissioner. Those were the three points upon which agreement could not be reached. They have now become the subject of criticism not only from the Opposition, who maintain that it ought to have been possible to reach agreement, but also from the right

  517
  reverend Prelate. Indeed, it has been said—and here I quote from the Daily Telegraph of March 12, when Mr. Gaitskell is reported to have said:
  "that the points at issue are much less important than those already agreed, and that they could have been bridged with a little more patience."
  The noble Earl, Lord Listowel, said more or less the same thing this afternoon: that the three subjects were of much less importance. How ridiculous is that suggestion! For a period of five months Her Majesty's Government and the Governor exercised unlimited patience, but whenever agreement appeared to be in sight the Archbishop invariably produced other points which had not hitherto been raised.
  Let me deal with them. First of all, let me deal with the amnesty. It had been agreed that, when law and order had been established, an amnesty would be granted to all those who had been convicted of offences under the Emergency Regulations, except those involving violence or incitement to violence or the illegal possession of arms, ammunition and explosives. Sentences for those crimes would come up for review, as I have told your Lordships, under the normal rules. During the discussions with the Archbishop, my right honourable friend, in the hope of reaching agreement, agreed to delete incitement to violence and violence not against the person from the exceptions; but the Archbishop was not satisfied with this proposal. He appeared to believe, this great Churchman, this great Christian, that carrying arms, ammunition or explosives was a harmless occupation and ought, therefore, to be removed from the exceptions.
  I venture to think, without fear of contradiction, that every normally minded person in this country would agree that no responsible Government could conceivably agree to give way there. Surely, any person found carrying arms could only have the intention of endangering life or committing murder and assassination. As we all know, security of life has always been an essential ingredient for every community and the first responsibility of all good Governments. To have conceded that point—I think the Opposition, in pressing this, are a little weak in their arguments—would have meant that anyone determined to commit murder to suit his political ends but, fortunately,
  518
  detected before doing so, would be able to claim the benefit of the amnesty. Surely, to-day, as in years past, the intention to commit murder is one of the most serious crimes known to civilised people. It is impossible to understand the attitude of mind of any man, let alone a Church leader, who thinks along other lines. In reply to the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, who raised that specific point, let me say at once that we could not and should not be prepared to concede that point.
  Secondly, my right honourable friend confirmed what the Governor had already made clear: that he was prepared to repeal all Emergency Regulations at a pace commensurate with the re-establishment of law and order. It must, I think, be clear to everyone that a period of instability might in all probability have followed the cessation of the Emergency, and to abandon the control of internal security might not, indeed would not, be feasible without a serious risk of a further loss of life. Her Majesty's Government's faith in the Cypriot people was so strong that they were prepared to hand over to Cypriot Ministries full control of all Government Departments other than pub-lie security and with the exception of defence and foreign affairs. That is not a limited form of self-government. I wish the right reverend Prelate would believe that that is a very advanced form of self-government for people who have never governed themselves before.
  THE LORD BISHOP OF CHICHESTER: May I ask the noble Earl to address himself to the basic points which remain unclear, as set out in Archbishop Makarios's letter of February 25, 1956, especially regarding representation in the Assembly?
  THE EARL OF MUNSTER: I am coming to that. If the right reverend Prelate will wait, I will deal with all these points. It had always been our intention—and the Archbishop was yell aware of it—eventually to transfer public security to local Ministers, but it was not possible to lay down in advance the time and date when the transfer should be made.
  I now turn to the third point, namely, the composition of the elected majority, which was raised by the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, and also by the right reverend Prelate. We had proposed the appointment of a Constitutional Commissioner

  519
  to determine the composition of the Legislative Assembly, whilst at the same time safeguarding the interests of all sections of the community. The Archbishop declined to accept what is quite a normal constitutional procedure and demanded instead that the composition of the elected majority should be defined to his satisfaction and before the Constitutional Commissioner even began his inquiry. The noble Earl who introduced the Motion asked me whether there was to be in this Legislative Assembly a majority of Greeks. The Archbishop was told, and indeed it is mentioned in the Governor's letter, that the Constitution would provide for an Assembly with an elected majority. That also affirmed what the Secretary of State told the Archbishop in person on February 29. The Archbishop, on the other hand, was not told whether or not there would be any nominated members, but he was clearly told—and, so far as we know, he fully understood—that there would in fact be an elected majority.
  EARL ATTLEE: On that point, is it not clear that it would have been possible then to have a majority of elected persons but an actual majority in the Chamber of the minority representatives with the nominated members which would have meant, in effect, no guarantee that the majority people in the island would have had a majority? Surely that is a clear point. What I would ask the noble Earl is: on what principle was the Commissioner to act? He would have to have some instructions. Surely that is a political act and not a judicial act.
  THE EARL OF MUNSTER: As I understand it, if the noble Earl will read Sir John Harding's letter of February 14 (which no doubt he has) he will there see under paragraph 2 (c):
  "The constitution would provide for an Assembly with an elected majority".
  and there was to be, as I clearly understand it, an elected majority in the Legislative Assembly, quite apart from any nominated members. In other words, the nominated members could not sway the result either one way or the other.
  EARL ATTLEE: I am not quite clear on that point. Does the noble Earl mean that there would be representation of majorities and minorities or that it would
  520
  be impossible for minorities plus nominees to have a majority? We have seen that happen in other Constitutions. I think the Archbishop probably was not clear. I am not clear.
  THE EARL OF MUNSTER: It is clear that the Archbishop was told that there would be an Assembly with an elected majority, and that is, in fact, precisely what my right honourable friend told the Archbishop as well. He has been told in all this correspondence published throughout this White Paper that there would be an Assembly with an elected majority. But to agree with the Archbishop that the elected majority should be defined to his satisfaction, and before—I am coming back to the matter in a moment—the Constitutional Commissioner had visited the island, would have made the purposes of the inquiry a complete and utter farce, quite apart from the fact that the Turkish community had also to be considered. The purpose of sending this Constitutional Commissioner out there was that he might well decide that it would be a good thing if they had two Legislative Chambers. He might, on the other hand, have wanted certain Bills reserved to the Governor or he might have wanted certain Bills to have a majority of both Greek and other reprecentatives in order that they might be carried into law. I should have thought it was very much better to let the Constitutional Commissioner visit the island and discuss these matters with the Greek and Turkish communities in the island.
  May I pass from that matter to deal with the other problem which was also mentioned by the noble Earl, Lord Attlee. Some people—he did not say so, nor do I—may well have asked why Her Majesty's Government ever authorised the Governor to enter into negotiations with the Archbishop when there was every reason to believe that he was personally implicated in acts of terrorism. As Sir John Harding has stated now, it is impossible to escape the conclusion that the Archbishop was so committed to the use of violence for his own political ends that he could not, or would not, abandon it. Is it not pertinent to ask whether the Archbishop ever really attempted to extinguish the blaze of assassination and murder? Indeed, did he not really seek to pitch further fuel on to the fire?
  However, under the curious position which prevails in Cyprus, the Archbishop

  521
  was the traditional leader of toe Greek community there; he was their spiritual leader as well. As the noble Earl said in his introductory remarks, he was the only single personality with whom we could deal. This being so, and because it was our earnest desire to reach a lasting settlement, we were prepared to enter into negotiations and go to great lengths to achieve a final and permanent agreement. During all these discussions Her Majesty's Government have made many concessions. The Archbishop has not been, as has been suggested in some quarters, the only person to give way. I have discussed at some length the three outstanding points upon which it was impossible to reach an agreement, and I believe those points were so important for orderly government that no further concessions could be made; and there then was no alternative but to break off negotiations.
  Here let me turn to one or two observations which were made by the most reverend Primate this afternoon. I am surprised that the Eastern Church should have thought that the action of Her Majesty's Government was (to use the most reverend Primate's words) "sacrilegious and barbaric."
  THE LORD ARCHBISHOP OF CANTERBURY: Not my words; I was quoting from the telegram from the Archbishop of Athens and the Patriarch.
  THE EARL on MUNSTER: I agree they were not the most reverend Primate's words; he was quoting them. But we have no desire whatsoever to stifle the Church. All we wanted to do was to stifle the terrorism which was reigning in the island. I should have thought, frankly, that if these great Church leaders of the Eastern Church would read the White Paper to-day they would see that there was every reason why Her Majesty's Government should have taken the action they did. There was, in fact, no attack whatever on the Church in Cyprus or on any other Church throughout the world.
  I was very glad to know that the most reverend Primate had communicated privately with Archbishop Makarios about the outbreak of violence in Cypris, but the reply which the most reverend Primate summarised in his speech to your Lordships this afternoon is surely complete and ample evidence that Archbishop Makarios did condone all acts of violence
  522
  and terrorism. For the political and spiritual leader of the Greek Cypriots to say that his appeal would meet with no response really puts the Archbishop in his true light.
  I was also asked whether there would be any chance of introducing a Constitution now and whether, if one were introduced, we should contemplate and consider allowing Archbishop Makarios to return to Cyprus.
  THE LORD ARCHBISHOP OF CANTERBURY: Is the noble Earl referring to my suggestion?
  THE EARL OF MUNSTER: No, I was referring only to the latter part of the most reverend Primate's suggestion.
  THE LORD ARCHBISHOP OF CANTERBURY: My suggestion was not that Constitution should be introduced but that a Constitution should be drafted. There is a great deal of difference between the two.
  THE EARL, OF MUNSTER: And then, I gather, the Archbishop should come back to the island.
  THE LORD ARCHBISHOP OF CANTERBURY: I am sorry to intervene again, but may I repeat my suggestions? The first was that a Constitution should be drafted; there would then be something about which to start negotiations. My second suggestion was that the Archbishop should not return until law and order had been restored, but that as soon as that was restored he might return and negotiations might begin.
  THE EARL OF MUNSTER: Yes; I quite understand the most reverend Primate's views. But one thing is essential: co-operation is desirable if a Constitution is to be introduced at all, and at the moment it is quite clear that there would be no co-operation in the island. As regards the other point, I can give no assurance whatever that Archbishop Makarios would be allowed to return to Cyprus, even in the event of the cessation of violence. However, I will communicate the most reverend Primate's views to my right honourable friend the Secretary of State for his consideration, though I am bound to admit that at the present moment I see no possibility whatever of meeting the most reverend Primate's request.
  THE LORD ARCHBISHOP OF CANTERBURY: May I ask the noble Earl whether he would suggest some other way of getting the reconciliation process going?
  THE EARL OF MUNSTER: I am coming to that in a few moments.
  As your Lordships are aware, Archbishop Makarios and the Bishop of Kyrenia, and two others, were deported from the island last Friday. Her Majesty's Government and Sir John Harding were forced to the conclusion that their deportation was absolutely essential. We had, and we still have, no desire whatsoever to impose restrictions on freedom of movement by deportation further than public security requires; but to leave the Archbishop and the three others who were deported with him roaming the island at large and being able, as they would have done, to condone further acts of violence and terrorism would merely have added still further to our difficulties. As my noble friend Lord Swinton pointed out, the deportations in 1931 were accepted without a word. They were approved by everyone, and I can see very little difference between the deportations to-day and the deportations at the time of which the noble Earl was talking. We are all now aware, every one of us—even, I think, the most reverend Primate—that from first to last the Archbishop's motives were shrouded, until they were uncovered, in a haze of gross insincerity in all his dealings. Neither we nor any British individual have at any time had any craving for revenge. Her Majesty's Government have only an irresistible desire, which has been shown throughout all these discussions between the Governor and the Archbishop, to bring these negotiations to a successful conclusion.
  My Lords, the question has been asked: Where do we go from here? Is there any hope of reconciliation? The future is by no means certain. We have not slammed the door. We have our hopes that, through the restoration of law and order, and of the freedom of thought and expression, others may come forward to bring about the formation of a new and liberal Constitution. I do not believe, as the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, said, that power will pass to irresponsible elements; nor do I believe as the noble Earl, Lord Listowel, said that power will pass to
  524
  the extremists. I think we may well see other people coming forward who up to date, through fear of the terrorism which was reigning in the island, were not prepared to co-operate with the Governor or with Her Majesty's Government. We shall continue to use all our efforts to reconcile conflicting interests, and I hope that these efforts may ultimately achieve success. But there can be no rapid road to reconciliation.
  I pass now to deal just for one moment with the observations which were made by the right reverend Prelate who told your Lordships that he was the honorary President of the World Council of Churches. I am bound to admit that I do not think the right reverend Prelate could have been speaking this afternoon for anyone but himself. The views which he expressed were so different from any that I have heard—they were certainly not re-echoed by any noble Lord who spoke to-day; nor, indeed, were they echoed in any speech which I heard in another place last night. I hope that when the right reverend Prelate reads his remarks tomorrow he will realise the disastrous consequences that utterances like that may well have at a very difficult time.
  LORD PAKENHAM: My Lords, I am afraid I did not hear all the remarks made by the right reverend Prelate the Lord Bishop of Chichester but since he has been denounced in such unbridled terms by the noble Earl I would say that, to my certain knowledge, there is no man in this House who commands a wider respect in this country and abroad.
  THE EARL OF MUNSTER: That seems to be a very unnecessary intervention because I cordially agree with the noble Lord.
  Let me conclude by saying that all noble Lords, on whichever side of the House they sit, will wish to pay their tribute to all the security forces, the permanent officials and the Governor for the restraint and the patience, for the courage and gallantry, they are showing in these difficult and trying circumstances.
  7.20 p.m.
  LORD WINSTER: My Lords, before I go on to the main subject of my remarks I should like, with your Lordships' permission, to refer for one

  525
  moment to something which I have seen in a publication of the Fabian Colonial Bureau called Venture. I do so only out of a sense of fairness to those officers of the Colonial Service whom I saw doing their duty so admirably when I was in Cyprus. I should like also to say that I regularly read Venture, and have always found it most accurate and moderate in its remarks. On this occasion, however, it has slipped up. The passage that I wish to quote refers to the grant of financial aid towards the £38 million development programme, and it says:
  "There is much to be done in improving communications, water supplies, irrigation, forestry, education and the social services. So much indeed is included in the programme, from trunk roads to technical schools and ports to social insurance, that the main impression is how much must have been neglected."
  My Lords, that statement is ignorant and ill-informed; it is grossly unfair to the officers of the Colonial Service who have done their duty admirably and have given of their best to Cyprus; and, of course, it is "jam" to those who carry on propaganda against us, especially the Greek newspapers in Cyprus which are never tired of referring to us as oppressors of an enslaved people, whose faces we grind from morning to night. On that account I felt justified in venturing those remarks in regard to that passage.
  May I go on to say how deeply interested I was in the speech of the noble Earl, Lord Swinton. I am acquainted with the history of the island, especially since 1931, and I know that the noble Earl was a good friend to the island of Cyprus and did a great deal for its Administration. I am not entirely sure about the feeling in the country to-day on Enosis. Certainly, in my time—and here I entirely agree with the noble Earl—it was not a matter of great concern to the majority of the population who lived on the land. I have always found that the peasant is the same man whether he is working in my native Westmorland or in Cyprus. His outlook is the same: all he wants is to get on with his work and earn a good living; he is not vastly interested in political questions. But that was a long time ago. Since then these people have been subjected to an intensive propaganda coming out from the towns.
  May I remind your Lordships that, at the time when I was in Cyprus, and for
  526
  some time thereafter, the Government had absolutely no means whatever of replying to that propaganda? There was one small English newspaper, which certainly was not in any way an instrument of the Government; but there were something like forty-seven Greek newspapers which were daily pouring out stuff the nature of which I have just mentioned; and the Archbishop had, of course, got his pulpit and his priests in each one of the 620 villages in Cyprus. To all that intensive propaganda the Government had no means whatsoever of replying, and se it may be that the feelings of the countryside are not quite as the noble Earl, Lord Swinton, and I remember them. One other thing the noble Earl mentioned which I should like to confirm concerns the Dodecanese Islands. After Greece assumed sovereignty over those islands, there was a distinct and severe economic recession—there was no doubt whatsoever about that.
  If I may now refer for one moment to the speech of the noble Earl who has just sat down, I thought it was a characteristic, hard-hitting speech, in which, if he will allow me to say so, he made the best of what I. regard as a rather poor case—but then, of course, in the view of the noble Earl I am hot what he described as a "normally minded person". I must admit that. I should like, with his permission, to check his speech tomorrow against my papers: I am not quite sure that he was entirely accurate in describing the events of 1947. But even if he was not entirely accurate, I have no quarrel with the main substance of Hs remarks, it was the case that the Constituent Assembly which I endeavoured to assemble was permitted by its terms of reference to discuss only a Constitution or the drafting of a Constitution; its terms of reference did not permit it to go outside that sphere. A movement started in favour of discussing not self-determination but self-government, but the Colonial Office decided that they could not go so far as that and that the Assembly must confine itself to its terms of reference; and on that the Assembly broke up.
  My Lords, in all that is being said about Cyprus to-day I think there is only one thing which is not in dispute, and that is that the Government, whether through their own fault or not, have got into a real mess in Cyprus. They appear to me

  527
  to have marched into a cul-de-sac and are now engaged in knocking their head against the wall at the end of the cul-de-sac. Having rolled the stone, as it seems to me, very nearly to the top of the mountain—I think it is fair to say that they had got it nearly to the top of the mountain—they then let it slip and roll down again to the bottom. All has to be done again, and it seems clear to me that the Government have no idea, or very little idea, of how to begin again. I have read and re-read the debates on the subject and the White Paper, but I am still not entirely clear as to why the breakdown occurred. There are still points of obscurity which I feel have not yet been fully explained; but, as I say, I confess to being not a normally minded person—they are probably beyond me.
  The Government say that it became impossible to negotiate with the Archbishop because of his proved bad faith and complicity in terrorism. I say this with some trepidation, but I feel that it would be a good thing if the factual evidence on which the Governor's statement was based could be assembled and published, possibly in a White Paper. In my view, much of the evidence was certainly circumstantial. I say that in no way to cast any doubt or criticism upon what the Governor has said, but because this matter has now assumed such international proportions that I feel that a factual statement of the evidence would be a good thing. According to the Governor's statement, which is backed by the Prime Minister and by the Colonial Secretary, we have known all the time we have been negotiating, and for even longer than that, about the Archbishop's character. I knew something about it myself; we have really known about the Archbishop's character for many years. Why the sudden change in attitude towards him? Character really cannot be made a condition of negotiating. Even that great Christian, Mr. Gladstone, had some dealings with Parnell.
  THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: Could the noble Lord tell us what he knew about the Archbishop's character?
  LORD WINSTER: I should be happy to tell the noble Marquess. I will only say that we knew that possibly he was, shall I say, rather a "slippery customer."
  THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: Perhaps the noble Lord will submit that to the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Chichester.
  LORD WINSTER: My Lords, the Bishop of Chichester is Bishop of my diocese so I am rather careful what I say. But why the sudden change? Mr. Gladstone had dealings with Parnell; Mr. Neville Chamberlain had dealings with Hitler, and he can never have been in any doubt about Hitler's character; Sir Winston Churchill had dealings with Stalin, and I do not think he can have been under any illusion as to what kind of man Stalin was: and Earl Lloyd-George and Conservative leaders had dealings with the leaders of Sinn Fein. So that to say that character must be a condition of negotiation will not bear historical analysis. I really do not know why we suddenly got so squeamish over the Archbishop. I am not saying that there was not enough to be squeamish over, but we had overcome it for some five months, and then suddenly these feelings surged up. The Archbishop represented someone who could be dealt with on this question and I agree with the letter in the Daily Telegraph which said:
  "To treat a man one day with the utmost respect as an ecclesiastical dignitary and the leader of a national movement and the next to hustle him away tinder guard to exile is hardly calculated to inspire confidence in British diplomacy."
  It seems to me that for a long time there has been an absence of common sense—I will not say of normality—in our actions generally regarding Cyprus. There has been much neglect, many downright mistakes and many crass stupidities. In consequence, the problem has become so bedevilled that it would puzzle anyone to know how, at this juncture, we are to begin again. But a new beginning has to be made, and Her Majesty's Government have to find someone to negotiate with or else they have no hope of settling the question. With the Archbishop out of the Island and in exile, a great many Greek patriots who are still indifferent to the subject of Enosis will feel very deeply and bitterly about the deportation of their Archbishop. That is my conviction; and it is really no good for the Government to say, paraphrasing Browning:
  "Makarios is in the Seychelles,
  All's right with the world,"

  529
  and leave it at that, with no future plans. We are entitled to be told that there are plans, and to know with whom the Government contemplates beginning to plan.
  The noble Marquess, Lord Reacting, once rebuked me, in a most friendly way which aroused no hard feelings, for saying that I sometimes got the feeling that the Foreign Office begin to think about things only when they happen. Two things recently have rather borne out my point of view. It had been known for many months, if not longer, that General Glubb was likely to be dismissed. That was common knowledge. When the inevitable happened, the Prime Minister came down to the House of Commons and said he had nothing to say and no new policy to announce. Now we have this breakdown of negotiations in Cyprus, and one gets, from the White Paper and debates, a clear impression that this also was anticipated; and once again there are no plans to deal with the situation.
  I spoke of mistakes and stupidities. The story has several times been told of the maladroit statements by the then Mr. Oliver Lyttelton as Colonial Secretary, and the then Mr. Hopkinson, who was Minister of State; and there was the London Tripartite Conference which, as The Times said, was a blunder, since the British Government had virtually no new proposals to make, so that it did more harm than good. I certainly thought that the proposal for a standing Tripartite Committee to be set up in Cyprus itself was a perfectly hopeless one. I believe the trouble goes even further hack. When the Prime Minister was Foreign Secretary he was in Athens, and my information is that he declined to discuss the question of Cyprus with Marshal Papagos, who was then Greek Prime Minister; and in one of the monthly magazines this month I see that in reusing to discuss the matter the Prime Minister said:
  "There is not a Cyprus question and there never will be a Cyprus question."
  I wonder whether he thought of those words when he was making his speech yesterday. The question has been there ever since 1931. Surely the Prime Minister has heard of Government House being burnt down in 1931, which was pretty good evidence that there was such a thing as a Cyprus question. The writing has been on the wall for a very long time. There were three unofficial Greek-Cypriot
  530
  members of the Executive Council: first of all, Mr. Chryssafinis resigned; then a short time ago Sir Paul Pavlides resigned, and now, within the last day or two, the last of them, Mr. Clerides, has gone, so that the Executive Council now consists of the official members and one Turk. A Government speaker yesterday spoke of our Greek-Cypriot friends. Well, we have outworn the patience of those Greek-Cypriots who served us long and faithfully upon the Executive Council, as I have reason to know.
  Until these last abortive negotiations began, I do not know precisely what has, been done since 1948. I think the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, will not take it amiss if I say I had always hoped that at that time he would appoint a politician as. Governor of an island where a political issue of the first magnitude was quite clearly brewing up. I am sure there was a good reason why the noble Earl did not feel able to do that, but I hoped far it and always regretted that, for some reason, it was not, possible to do it, or it was not done. Instead, he left the Cyprus Colonial Secretary as Acting Governor for six months. I do not know whether he satisfied himself of that gentleman's capacity for carrying out a difficult task of political conciliation. When that Acting Coverner's time came to an end he was replaced by a colonial civil servant. Thought have never put myself out to hear anything or to get information from Cyprus, I have inevitably heard something from the island. The impression left on my mind is that during an interregnum of six years little has been done in the sphere of what I will call political conciliation. A Times leader said yesterday:
  "The Labour Party … must bear the blame of having left the Cyprus question lying fallow during the quiet years."
  I equally regret these six years of lying fallow but it is only fair to say that the blame must be properly apportioned between Labour and Conservative Governments who have handled Cyprus since that date.
  Now let us look at what Mr. Macmillan said on December 5 last, when he was Foreign Secretary. He said
  "The only good settlement of the Cyprus problem will be a political settlement."
  That seems to me to confirm my view that a political Governor would have I been the right appointment for Cyprus

  531
  in the past. But, in spite of Mr. Macmillan's remark, the Government now seem to have converted a political problem into a military problem: at any rate, if all your Lordships do not look at it in that way I can assure you that that is how the Cypriots look at it. They view it in no other light. Indeed, to-day, since the breakdown in the negotiations, they suggest only a military settlement. Mr. Macmillan spoke of
  "the accepted working rule to-day, the principle of self-determination.… We have accepted it in the Charter of the United Nations,"
  but he watered that down by reference to the Austria State Treaty Bill, which, he said,
  "takes away in perpetuity the right of six million people to self-determination."
  I think a Foreign Secretary, especially in these days, should know better than to talk of "treaties" and "perpetuity" in the same breath. The dusty pigeonholes of the Foreign Office are mute witnesses of the folly of associating "treaties" and "perpetuity." But challenged as to whether he meant self-determination "some time," or "not in the foreseeable future," he said, "Some time and under certain conditions"; and when further challenged as to the "conditions" Mr. Macmillan declined to define them. Then came this passage in that speech:
  "We certainly shall not be the people to move the closure on discussions which might lead to co-operation instead of strife."
  But that is exactly what the Government have done: they have moved the closure. In their own words:
  "The possibility of negotiation has ceased to exist."
  I have spoken about the London Conference. What followed that Conference? Following a change of Governors the new Governor came home for consultations with the Government. He came home several times, but the last time he came home he gave a television interview before he returned to his post. In what the Governor was reported to have said—I have only a newspaper report of it—I found no reflection whatsoever of Mr. Macmillan's references to self-determination, vague and half-hearted as those references had been. Instead the Governor stated at some length the
  532
  military case for not granting self-determination but for staying put. I do not think I am mistaken in my interpretation of the interview because I notice that a commentator in a Conservative newspaper wrote:
  "I felt he had the soldier's rather than the politician's outlook"—
  this at a moment when what was needed above everything was the politician's outlook upon the problem. It is quite possible, at the same time to feel the highest respect and admiration for Sir John Harding's qualities and character. His handling of these negotiations, though they have been abortive, has been a great tribute to his qualities. Nevertheless, it is fair to ask whether, at this juncture in the disturbed state of the island, a Governor can wear two hats and can switch suddenly from responsibility for political negotiations to responsibility for repressing terrorism.
  So self-determination appears to have vanished, and the Prime Minister in his speech yesterday said:
  "We must safeguard the strategic needs of our country and of our allies. Neither N.A.T.O. obligations nor the Tripartite declaration nor the Baghdad Pact can be carried out unless we have the sure and unfettered use of Cyprus."
  Your Lordships will note those last words—the "sure and unfettered use of Cyprus." What has become of the self-determination of the 5th December in all this? I remember reading of an epitaph over an infant's grave which ran as follows:
  "Since doomed to be so early done for I wonder what I was begun for?"
  Having muttered "self-determination," the Government seems to have repented of its temerity, to have emptied the baby out of the bath with the bath water and to have come down on the side of staying put. The White Paper dismisses self-determination as "not now a practicable proposition." Then why have brought it up in December? Why have taken the step of mentioning self-determination in December if by the middle of March it is no longer a practicable proposition? What hope can there be for self-determination when it is to be contingent on British strategic interests, upon British oil interests, upon allied strategic interests and upon treaties to which Britain is a party? Where does self-determination

  533
  nose in amongst this series of contingencies? It seems to me that such reservations are designed to give the Government every possible "out" in any possible circumstances where self-determination for Cyprus is not deemed to be present. I see that the White Paper quotes Archbishop Makarios as saying that self-determination had been:
  "made dependent on conditions so general and vague, subject to so many interpretations and presenting so many difficulties as to the objective ascertainment of their fulfillment as to create reasonable doubt as to the positive nature of the promises."
  I am bound to say that I agree. I think those remarks of the Archbishop were fully justified. Why waste time talking about self-determination when it is hedged round in such a fashion?
  My Lords, it was an ambiguous statement of this nature which the Government told the Archbishop "admitted of no alteration or change," and I am hound to say that I think the letter addressed to the Archbishop really had a ring of "Unconditional surrender" about it. He was to make a statement in terms dictated to him which admitted of no change. There was nothing snore to be said. The door was closed to further discussion and he was to sign on the dotted line and without delay. Surely that is very unusual language to address to the man with whom you have been negotiating over five months on terms of equality—I should mention that it was before the breakdown had occurred that he was addressed in those terms. Nevertheless, the Archbishop agreed to co-operate in framing a Constitution "providing it shall be genuine self-government"—he did not say "genuine self-determination" but "genuine self-government". As I understand it, either before or after the breakdown he had stated his willingness to discuss the terms of a Constitution with a Constitutional Commissioner who was to be sent out from this country.
  So far all we have been told about the breakdown is that it occurred on three points which the Archbishop considered were, in accordance with our own words, "a wider measure of self-government". He considered that they fell within that framework. The Archbishop wanted an amnesty. He wanted a Greek-Cypriot majority in the Assembly, which would, of course, be in accordance with the proportional composition of the population,
  534
  and he wanted security to be in the hands of a Cypriot Government when established. My view on this matter is a purely personal view—perhaps I should have explained before that I am speaking in no Party sense or terms, but only out of my great desire to get a peaceful and a good settlement in Cyprus. Nothing else weighs with me for one moment in discussing this problem. My own feeling is that if we could get a firm and satisfactory settlement—really firm and really satisfactory; not something agreed for the sake of getting agreement—I think we should agree about amnesty. After all, these were political crimes. Historically, political crimes have always been treated on a different footing from civil crimes. These were political crimes such as have been amnestied elsewhere. If those of our men who have been killed in this horrible fashion could be asked whether they would want a settlement to be missed because of insistence upon retribution for their deaths, what would be their reply? They would say: "Never mind; go ahead and get your settlement."
  Then about this Greek-Cypriot majority in the Assembly, I cannot imagine there being anything but a Greek-Cypriot majority in the Assembly if and when it is set up. I cannot conceive that we intended otherwise in view of the ethnologic figures for the island. I do not see how there could be an honest-to-God Cypriot Government unless the Greek-Cypriots were in a majority. On security, again I would say, "Not yet", owing to the present state of the island and with recent events so much in our minds. But possibly some purely civilian departments of security could be handed over at once to a new Cypriot Government. I am bound to say that I think the decision as to when all security could be handed over ought not to be entirely at the discretion of the Governor: he is an interested party. Also, I think it would have been wise to accept the Archbishop's offer to discuss with a Constitutional Commissioner. It would have kept him in play, instead of breaking the line—if not, indeed, breaking the rod. And between them some suitable and effective compromise might have been found on the Archbishop's three points.
  The Times leader to which reference has been made to-day recites the reasons for our retaining Cyprus and includes the necessity for protecting our oil interests

  535
  in order to preserve our standard of living. Our enemies will certainly pounce upon that as an example par excellence of "colonialism." I would utter a word of caution on the subject of Turkey. This same leader speaks of practical certainty that a settlement in Cyprus will be violently resisted by the Turks and dismisses union with Greece "in the teeth of Turkish opposition" as impracticable. We have heard something on the same lines to-day. There is not time to discuss the Turkish case in detail, but I would utter a word of caution against believing that the Turkish Government will push the Turkish case to extremes. I think it is arguable that the Turks have been used rather recklessly as an argument in favour of our "staying put" in the island. I think that question cannot be taken for granted quite so easily and that it deserves very careful consideration.
  THE MARQUFSS OF READING: My Lords, will the noble Lord forgive me for putting this point to him? Has he studied any of the statements that have been made by the Turkish Government—not statements made by us on behalf of the Turkish Government, but statements made by the Turkish Government themselves?
  LORD WINSTER: I have read those statements, and I have also read the opinion of a highly qualified expert on Turkish matters, to the effect that we must not assume too readily that the Turkish Government will push the Turkish case to extremes.
  In conclusion, I ask: what of the future? Nothing constructive emerged from yesterday's debate on the part of the Government. Terrorism is to be stamped out. The Colonial Secretary said very grandiloquently: "We have the resolution and the force". That is a magnificent phrase. Certainly we have the force. We have poured 14,000 troops into an island of 500.000 people, 100,000 of whom are entirely friendly to us. But to stamp out terrorism in Cyprus is not a policy but an operation. It is not a policy. We really cannot hand this matter over to the "Captain Waterhouses" of this world to settle. We shall not settle the real problem that way. The Governor said sonie time ago that the net was
  536
  closing round the terrorists. That statement reminded me of Mr. Malcolm Macdonald in Malaya. He used to say almost every month that the end was in sight, that victory was just over the hills, and so on. Statements about Kenya on rather the same lies were made. I do not know about the net. What I do know is that you have let the Djinn out of the bottle and you will have a job to get him back into the bottle.
  I wonder whether this Government can achieve a settlement. I doubt if it really can take the steps necessary to make a fresh start in Cyprus with any hopes of success. To do that would involve the Conservative Government in "eating" so many words. And, after all, the Government cannot be expected to establish a shuttle service of frigates between the Seychelles and Cyprus playing a game of "In again, out again," with the Archbishop. Considering all that has been said, especially in these recent debates, I find it difficult to believe that the Government will find themselves able to make a new start and effect a settlement. And in all seriousness I am bound to conclude by saying that I feel it quite possible that a change of Government may be necessary before a final settlement is arrived at in Cyprus.
  7.58 p.m.
  VISCOUNT HAILSHAM: My Lords, at this somewhat late hour a conscientious Peer must necessarily ask himself: Why make a speech at all? And great numbers of his noble colleagues will undoubtedly re-echo the word "Why?" I would, I confess, have scratched my entry for this race but for two speeches that have been made in this debate. Those were the speech to which we have just listened and the speech of the right reverend Prelate, the Lord Bishop of Chichester. Perhaps I may say that I have the greatest regard for the right reverend Prelate because he is, in fact, my right reverend Father in God. I live in his constituency and his business is to point my unworthy soul ever upwards—a task he wisely delegates to a Suffragan. On the other hand, I have a great desire to point the reverend Prelate ever upwards in the political sphere. The Christian Church has two parts, the clergy and the laity. We always dutifully take the lead from the clergy in matters of faith and morals. I wish that the

  537
  Bishops would sometimes take the lead from the laity in matters of politics.
  I have begun on a slightly humorous note at this late hour, but that is not to say that my feelings about this subject are other than deeply serious. The thing which I feel it my duty to emphasise is simply this. I have never been slow to criticise the Government of my own Party when I thought it wrong, but on this occasion I think the only necessary thing, the abundantly necessary thing, for a patriotic Englishman and an unworthy Churchman to say, is that I give the Government wholehearted support in the difficult situation which they are having to face at the present time. I do that not because I am insensitive in any way of the many considerations which have been eloquently urged on the other side, and not because I am not alive to the complexity and difficulty of the situation, but because the real moral and political truth—and I emphasise the morality of it no less than the politics of it—is that the British Government, and through it the British people, have been most shamefully used by their friends, who owe them nothing but gratitude for services rendered in the past, while they were undertaking a difficult, delicate and dangerous responsibility for the people of the world—a responsibility which is, after all, far more important than purely local interests or parochial loyalties. That I believe to be the fundamental political and (if I may say to the right reverend Prelate) moral issue here, to which I am bound to say I was bitterly disappointed that he gave no adequate expression.
  About Archbishop Makarios, I will say very little. It is not my business to criticise Archbishops. But I think that I can recognise enough about a political leader to appreciate one when I see him. We have heard read out to-day by the most reverend Primate some words from Makarios: they are closely similar to the words which he wrote to the Governor of Cyprus. A more damning indictment of a political leader I have never heard. We in this country have a tradition of moderate statesmanship. When a moderate statesman refuses to obey the unequivocal duty, I will not say of a Christian, but of an honourable man, to repel and repress the extremism of his own followers, then as a political leader he is utterly worthless. If I were talking
  538
  about him as an Archbishop, I would remind him that there was a Church of Laodicea, of which the Apostle John said that it blew hot and cold on the subject of morality, of murder and force, and was spewed out by the Apostle. I cannot help thinking that Archbishop Makarios would have been a suitable candidate for the diocese of Laodicea. When, in the place where he has gone, Archbishop Makarios reflects on the consequences of his action, it might occur to him that though, as I recognise, the long and unhappy story of the Greek Orthodox Church has put him in a position where he is equivocally placed as Ethnarch and Archbishop, in the last resort a Christian Bishop can serve only one Master. By speaking with two voices on this subject of murder and refusing to exercise his authority as an Archbishop, Makarios has been serving at least two.
  I turn from Makarios to the Greeks. I hope that it will never he thought, in spite of what we have suffered in the past weeks from an irresponsible public opinion in Greece, that I am otherwise than implacably friendly, towards that country. Since I was nine years old I have drunk in the language and culture and literature of Hellas. There is nothing more built into my nature, apart from the Christian religion. There is nothing more deep than my loyalty to that culture, that literature and that people. Many a man has broken his heart by thinking that the modern Greeks are the lawful heirs of that culture, but I shall continue to think so. I think that the Cypriots are part of that culture—indeed I would respectfully have joined issue in one small respect even with the noble Earl, Lord Swinton, on that point. It is not simply, as the right reverend Prelate the Lord Bishop of Chichester reminded us, that the Greek language was spoken in Cyprus when Ulysses sailed from Troy to Ithaca, although that is a fact, and has been spoken continuously since that time. When we say that Cyprus has never belonged to Greece, we are saying something which, although literally true, is substantially misleading.
  The Greek-speaking inhabitants of the Mediterranean, whether they are to be found in Alexandria, in Constantinople, in Cyprus or in Athens, or, until 1922, on the Eastern Coast of the Aegean Sea,

  539
  are in fact nothing more nor less than the legitimate descendants of the Greek Christian inhabitants of the Roman Empire. We are apt to forget in this country that the Roman Empire was predominantly Greek in language and culture for longer than it was Latin. For a thousand years it was Greek and Christian under its Basilius in Constantinople. These Greek inhabitants of the Aegean Islands through centuries of persecution have retained the love of their own political unity for which they feel deeply at all times. I hope that I have said enough to show that, whatever else I am, I am not insensitive to the feeling of the Cypriots about Greece. I believe that I have interpreted it correctly. If this were viewed as a long-term aspiration, as an ultimate political ideal, I should have no words of reproach or criticism to offer. Outside this feeling, to my mind, is the undoubted fact that, legitimate as nationalist aspirations may be, they are not the only aspirations in the world, and sometimes they have to take second place.
  The noble Earl, Lord Attlee, to whom I should like to join in paying tribute on the debate which he notably initiated, was responsible when he was Prime Minister for granting independence to India. Although opinions may differ about details, there was not a single Englishman of any political persuasion who did not rejoice at that time, if not for anything else, at least for the testimony that was paid to British good faith in dealing with India for over 150 years, promising it self-government, and giving it in the end. We gave independence to India, and we can rejoice. But we gave independence in 1947. We should not have been right to give it when it was no less urgently demanded, in 1942; and we should have been wrong in 1937 to make the same concession. On the contrary, I remember the labours of my noble friend Lord Templewood at that time, which brought self-government nearer but were not based upon an immediate grant. Self-government and self-determination, although perfectly legitimate demands in the abstract, must often take second place to things like the peace of the world.
  What was wrong in pressing our strategic needs in 1942 against the legitimate nationalistic demands of India? We should have been betraying our trust as a great Power, as the champion of free-
  540
  dom and civilisation, if we had not done so, and if we had not resorted to measures of repression to do so. The fact that nationalistic aspirations may be legitimate does not entitle the Power which desires to encourage the irredentist movement to attack its friends with outrage and propaganda. We fought the last war because of what Herr Henlein did in Czechoslovakia, and what Hitler claimed to do because of the irredentist minority in Poland. When one saw on the television the other day the Greeks claiming that the British were equivalent to the Nazis, one wondered whether they had considered the Nazi policy of using an irredentist minority in another country where they did not enjoy sovereignty in order to advance political ambitions. We fought for that principle, and although one may treat our legal sovereignty, which is undoubted, as lightly as one chooses, it is none the less a fact. I must remind our friends that it is the fact that, politically speaking, you cannot disregard legal sovereignty if you want to keep the peace of the world.
  When we move from the question of political aspirations in the abstract to the realities of the Cyprus situation, it is here that I part company both with the right reverend Prelate and with the noble Lord who has just sat down. What is really wanted of us in Cyprus? What is it that our American friends demand? What do they expect us to do? Do they want peace between Israel and Transjordan? How is that peace to be secured? Do they want us to remain a party to the Tripartite Declaration, as to what we should do if aggression takes place further away in the Middle East; or do they want us to repudiate our obligation there? If they want us to keep our pledges under the Tripartite Declaration, how can we get out of Cyprus now? How can we do other than hold our base securely, as the Foreign Secretary said? What is it that it is claimed we are doing wrong? Our duty Ito world peace is to remain in Cyprus at the present time. Are we, therefore, to be assailed as oppressors and tyrants, and to have our soldiers and policemen murdered? Cannot our Bishops speak out at least as boldly on these lines as they do when they are so anxious to explain that our Government are wrong? To me this is just as much a moral issue as a political issue.

  541
  I do not believe the British nation can afford to betray the peace of the world. If the Almighty has a part in human history, it is our destiny at the present time to try to ensure that peace, and to attack us and let us be vilified and attacked because we have done no more than try to do our duty as civilised and Christian men is to miss the whole morality and politics of a complex situation. I say this, with respect, to our American friends. "Mr. Facing Both Ways" does not get very far in this world. It is all very well to talk to this country as if we were the greatest friend of the United States. I am half American. My mother was an American: I love America, and I always shall. But when, in a situation such as this, I see them attacking my country, for no other reason than that it has sought to discharge the share of responsibility which it bears for the maintenance of security in the world, when the world situation is manifestly deteriorating, I am hound to say this to the Americans. I agree with the noble Earl who initiated this debate. We have got to pay a great deal of attention to public opinion these days; and I hope that I always shall pay great attention to the opinion of other countries. But there is a factor which other countries, essentially in the free world, have been rather apt to neglect in the last ten years; and that is British public opinion. The Americans must clearly understand that what we think of them is just as important as what they think of us; and they must clearly understand, too, that the demarche of their Ambassador in Athens has left a nasty taste in the mouths of many good friends of the United States which it will take many long years to wipe out, and something much more, and much less equivocal, than President Eisenhower's statement of yesterday.
  I turn from America back to the subject that is being mainly debated to-day. I agree that in the course of long and legitimate negotiations it is always difficult to know the point at which it has become impossible to negotiate any longer. There is always a point, if the negotiations are going to break down, at which one asks: "If I had gone on another five minutes, could it have been better?" The guarantee, to my mind, quite apart from Party politics, that this has not happened here, is the known,
  542
  demonstrated patience of Her Majesty's Government in these particular negotiations. They have not hesitated to negotiate with Archbishop Makarios: I agree that they were right to do so. But there comes a point when one is bound to say to a political leader with whom one is negotiating: "Are you prepared to repress terrorism in your extremists, or are you going to allow them to continue?" The Archbishop did not agree to repress them, even after the seriousness and importance of it had been brought home to him again and again. It was therefore legitimate for Her Majesty's Government to break off negotiations and to treat him as a person upon whose word no reliance could be placed.
  Of course, we have to think of the future. I do not believe that the atmosphere is such as to encourage an immediate resumption of negotiations, but I hope that that unhappy situation will not persist very long. The sooner that an atmosphere of security, an atmosphere wanting in the hysteria which has characterised the Greek attitude towards Britain, is re-established, the better it will be both for them and for us. In the meantime, though the Government cannot, I think, negotiate at the present time—I believe they have demonstrated that—I hope they will not cease to try and think oat some new formula, and to publish it, if they find it possible, difficult as it may be.
  I myself was never quite certain whether the absolute insistence upon the word of sovereignty was well advised. It may have been, and I do not say that it was not; but I rather doubted it at the time. After all, what we want is control of the base and security in Cyprus. We do not want the word of sovereignty, as such, although we may be legally entitled. I remember Mr. Amery—for whose memory I entertain a deep affection—many years ago, in reviewing this very problem, suggesting a system of dual nationality so that both Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots should be able to enjoy a kind of nationality with their parent country. I feel certain that if the defence and security and foreign policy of the island could be controlled firmly, as it will have to be, some kind of working arrangement could be made under which Cypriots of both religions and of both races could live peaceably together and determine their own future. The

  543
  present situation is not one which is particularly hopeful for that end. But I should certainly rejoice if Her Majesty's Government found it possible to initiate some new political idea or formula which stood a chance of success. In the meantime, I fear in a rather lengthy speech, I felt it only right to give the reasons which I had for supporting wholeheartedly the painful and desperate course which Her Majesty's Government have felt compelled to take.
  8.40 p.m.
  LORD JEFFREYS: My Lords, the Motion of the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, draws attention to the deterioration of the situation in the Middle East. May I say a few words about the Middle East? The situation there is certainly far from satisfactory, and it is due in no small degree to the fact that successive British Governments, including the noble Earl's Government, have not realised that, whatever other mistakes may be made in dealing with Orientals, there is one which we can never afford to make, and that is to be or appear to be—and that is much the same thing—weak. Orientals get the idea that under continuous pressure we shall always give way in the end. There are notorious and recent examples. There is the example of Abadan, as bad as it possibly could be in its management by the British Government; the example later on of another Government dealing with Egypt and the Sudan, and now the example of Cyprus. I venture to say that we must learn to be firm and, where it is necessary, learn to say "No" in no uncertain terms.
  Egypt, which was a source of strength to us in the past, is now a great source of difficulty. We administered it extremely well, and it is partly because we missed an opportunity that we are suffering now. When the Neguib and Nasser coup was brought off not so long ago, that was a revolutionary Government, and we were bound by no sort of obligation to that Government. We should have taken advantage of that fact and put our affairs and our relations with Egypt on a different footing. There is only one thing respected in the East, and that is strength. There are good reasons for being strong in the Middle East—and not only strategical reasons, important though those are. With regard to the strategical
  544
  value both of Cyprus and our position in the Middle East, I would say let nobody think that the hydrogen bomb has made any sort of operation impossible. The hydrogen bomb is a deterrent which we must have, and which undoubtedly our opponents have; but it is only a deterrent, and it is only men—troops and the air force—who can deal with events on the ground, as we may have to do. That is the reason why we have to be strong in the Middle East and, under present conditions, strong in Cyprus.
  The noble Lord, Lord Winster, mentioned The Times leader about Cyprus, but I am not at all sure that that leader was not referring to the Middle East in general—I have not had time to refer to it—and not particularly to Cyprus. Undoubtedly, we must not think only about the strategic situation, but we must think about the supply of oil to this country—the vital supply of oil, I would call it. Again, as in other things, we must expect reasonable co-operation from the United States. But American oil interests are powerful, and they have not much sympathy for us in our desire to get any oil at all out of the Middle East. I think I may say that those American oil interests are definitely hostile to British interests. At any rate, no adequate support in that matter has been given to us by the American Government. I venture to repeat that the supply of oil to this country from the Middle East is an essential for this country, and is vitally affected by our Middle East policy.
  Then there is the policy in Jordan. Apart from the Baghdad Pact, there is the recent and notorious case of General Glubb. Dismissal in the particular manner in which General Glubb was dismissed was in fact an affront to this country, as, indeed, it was described in another place by the Prime Minister. I agree that it is difficult to know what to do. To act strongly and to break entirely with King Hussein would be a mistake, and General Glubb himself urged that we should not, as he expressed it, "get tough" with Jordan. Possibly the right thing to do might be to point out that dismissal in such a manner was an affront, not only to General Glubb, but to this country, and that he should be restored to his position and be allowed to remain on leave until the due date for his retirement, which I

  545
  understand is not far distant. That would be a different matter entirely. Then it has to be recognised that feeling, against Israel is very strong in all the Arab States. We must reckon with this and expect, again, support from the United States of America in this matter, because they have always supported Israel, although they refused a mandate to administer that country and left it to us to undertake—reluctantly, I think.
  Now to turn to Cyprus. In the first place, as was pointed out by my noble friend Lord Swinton, Cyprus has never belonged to Greece. By the Treaty of Lausanne, this former Turkish-owned island was ceded to this country, having been for many years occupied by us. Incidentally, Greece was one of the signatories of the Treaty of Lausanne. A large section of the Cyprus population—there has been some argument as to the proportion—is Turkish; and these Turks are not friendly to the Greeks and certainly would not wish to serve under them. Apart from all this, the strategic imporance of Cyprus is very great. It is closely adjacent to the Turkish coast—I think this point has not been brought out to-day—and the Turks take a great interest in the occupation of Cyprus. Moreover, its general importance to the Middle East is considerable and has been much increased since our evacuation of the Suez Canal. In this respect we should be able to count again on American support, instead of the ill-informed criticism which has taken place and the action of the American Ambassador in Athens.
  Undoubtedly, the object has been to push us out, thinking that we should give way to pressure in the end. I believe that, in spite of the opinions both of the right reverend Prelates and of the Opposition, the Government, to the relief of the great majority of the population of our country, have resorted at last to action and have deported Makarios. The noble Earl who introduced this Motion was against deportation and against, so far as I gathered, strong measures. So was the noble Lord, Lord Winster. What they never said, and what the right reverend Prelates never said, is what they would suggest as a method of dealing with this matter.
  THE LORD ARCHBISHOP OF CANTERBURY: Did the noble Lord say "Prelates" in the plural?—because I did suggest a method.
  LORD JEFFREYS: I apologise to the most reverend Archbishop of Canterbury, but I did mean it in the plural.
  THE LORD ARCHBISHOP OF CANTERBURY: I did suggest a method.
  LORD JEFFREYS: I am afraid I did not think it a very effective method.
  THE LORD ARCHBISHOP OF CANTERBURY: That is quite a different matter. Being ineffective is one thing, but to say that did not suggest a method is another thing.
  LORD JEFFREYS: I apologise to the most reverend Primate. At any rate, it is certain that the noble Earl who introduced this Motion did not suggest any means of dealing with it. The noble Lord, Lord Winster, practically suggested giving Makarios all he wanted, but I hardly think that that is a course which would commend itself either to Her Majesty's Government or to the people of this country. As I say, I believe that the people of this country are relieved that at last the Government have taken action and have sent the Archbishop to another sphere where he can talk as much as he likes but will not have any influence. Many people are asking why he was not put out long ago. Although he is a nominally Christian Prelate, he has constantly incited to violence, and has not only not condemned but has encouraged murderous assault. The Governor's statement which was published was about as strong and convincing as any statement could possibly be.
  In this connection, many of our own newspapers have been too mealy-mouthed and have refrained from even using the word "murder"; for murder it has been—Murder with a very big "M," Murder most foul. We ought to condemn it; we cannot condemn it too much. It is amazing to me that some of our newspapers and some of our people do not condemn it as murder ought to be condemned. I venture to say that any troops but British would not have stood what they have had to stand in Cyprus—often doing police duties unarmed against mobs armed not only with stones but with grenades. They have had to suffer terrible and considerable injuries. I do not think it is fair to ask them to go on doing this and to take no steps against the leaders of the other party.

  547
  Then there are youths and schoolboys who have used not only stones and other missiles but more dangerous weapons, such as hand grenades and firearms. I venture to suggest that the proper treatment of these youths and boys is to give them sound thrashings, which should be both painful and ignominious. It would do them a great deal of good and would have a considerable effect in stopping this campaign of stone-throwing and outrages by youths generally. Every possible step should be taken to stamp out the E.O.K.A. terrorism. It is time to talk about giving Constitutions and so forth when there is peace in the island and the people are law-abiding. It is absurd to talk about granting responsible government to people in the present condition and frame of mind of the Cypriots. There has been too much of such experimentation of late. What may be good for the people of Britain is by no means necessarily good for people of a more excitable nature, with less sense of responsibility or civilisation. I say it is most unfortunate that the United States, who know little or nothing about either the Middle East or Cyprus, should have taken up a positively hostile attitude as regards Cyprus.
  Again, it is necessary and desirable to remind the Greeks that it was this country and not the United States which came to the rescue of Greece and saved it from Communism in 1944 and 1945. It is necessary that that should be remembered. They ought to be grateful for it. It is to be hoped that the Government will support the Governor of Cyprus in restoring law, order and safety before any other steps are taken, and that there will be no more discussions or any question of self-government for Cyprus until peace, quiet, and decent behaviour have been full restored.
  8.47 p.m.
  LORD BIRDWOOD: My Lords, one of the curious features about finding oneself, through the luck of the draw, low down in the batting order is that one rises to find that most of the runs have already been scored. That being so, I find myself relieved of the obligation to say much about Cyprus. I would confine myself to one comment, and that is this. In all the negotiations that have taken place over these last few months in Cyprus, it
  548
  seems to me that up to now no Greek Cypriot leader and no Turkish Cypriot leader have yet met face to face over a table and talked about the future. Your Lordships may recall that, when the late Sir Stafford Cripps went to India in 1942, he sadly had to admit that he had gone 5,000 miles to meet the Indian leaders, and that the Indian leaders had not moved across the road to meet each other. All I am meaning to imply is that, if and when we reach the stage when the Constitutional Commissioner arrives to thresh out the Constitution, I trust that the talks will not be bilateral talks as between the Constitutional Commissioner and the Turk and Greek representatives, but that it will be a round table conference affair. If the round table conference principle is established at the beginning, there may be some hope. As I see it, it would be hopeless to proceed and then find that these leaders had not met each other, and that consequently months had been wasted and we should be faced with an entirely different situation.
  With regard to the wider aspect of Middle East affairs, I find it fairly simple to differentiate between the situation in Jordan and the eternal riddle of the relationship between Arab and Jew. As regards policy for Jordan, when we learned of the treatment that had been meted out to General Glubb, the nature of that treatment was so conflicting with all one's ideas of Arab manners that I was one of those whose immediate reaction was that this was only the beginning and that in a few weeks' time all British officers would have disappeared from Jordan and we should then be faced with a quite new situation. It may be of assistance if I remind your Lordships of the purposes for which we conceived the Arab Legion. It was established in 1921. At that time, Jordan was a young and weak kingdom. There was the Wahabi raiding, there was the Bedouin raiding, and it was to give stability and strength to this young, inexperienced kingdom that the Arab Legion was conceived.
  Time went on and it has grown and expanded. In 1941 it was used outside Jordan in connection with crushing the Raschid Ali rebellion in Iraq. It was used in the Syrian campaign. So there is a precedent for the use of the Arab Legion outside Jordan territory. Then, as we all remember, in 1948 it was the

  549
  spearhead of the Arab attack on Israel. Later on it came to be regarded as Jordan's sure shield against aggression. It is in that light that we have always viewed it: as a weapon against aggression. It is in that light, as I believe, that General Glubb conceived it: a weapon against aggression rather than the spearhead of the future Arab potential attack.
  I have elaborated, as I see it, the rôle of the Arab Legion only to emphasise that apparently now, if it is used, it will be in an entirely different rôle from that which we originally conceived for it and, indeed, from that for which we have hitherto given a subsidy of £9 million. One's immediate reaction was that it would perhaps be folly to continue giving this subsidy: on the one hand we should be paying out of the British taxpayer's money a considerable sum; and on the other hand, under the tripartite guarantee British troops might conceivably have to he ordered to resist that Arab Legion which we were supporting. That was by no means a logical situation, and so the temptation was there to cash is on the Egyptian-Saudi Arabian proposals. One wonders how they would have liked to dole out some £9 million—or £12 million, if the economic aid is included. It is a lot of money, even for an Arab country such as Saudi Arabia; it is about one-tenth of their income from oil royalties. Even so, one knows that in any case oil wealth is no necessary guarantee for internal and economic stability when it comes to Saudi Arabia. So the temptation there was to cease paying out this money.
  Then, having read General Glubb's extremely balanced and generous letter in The Times, I confess one had to modify one's views. Yet I do claim there is a difference between a policy of "getting tough," as General Glubb put it, and a normal right of merely asking the Jordanians that the money should be spent not in conflict with the principles in support of which we anticipated the Arab Legion would be employed. What I suggest is that in the Arab Legion we have a card in our hand and at the moment we should just retain that card; we do not play it. Apart from the subsidy there is another aspect of our relationship with Jordan. We have the 1948 Treaty and, as the noble Viscount, Lord De L'Isle, reminded us, we keep an armoured regiment on the Gulf of
  550
  Akabar; we keep there a squadron of the Air Force; we have two aerodromes at Amman and Mafrah. Presumably that is of some interest to those who have to plan under the terms of the Baghdad Pact. The question arises, therefore, whether we should not cut our losses entirely: perhaps move the aerodromes 150 miles only to the East where they would be on the more healthy territory of Iraq; perhaps abrogate the 1948 Treaty and therefore anticipate a move which we have always understood the Jordanians themselves were anxious to make; to end what might he termed a penny-packet kind of policy.
  Yet, on reflection, I still come back to the conclusion that there is greaser wisdom in a slightly different approach. The days are gone, of course, when British officers will continue to command formations or units of Arabs. But as to the further consideration of the Treaty with Jordan, I suggest that the paramount consideration now is what exactly it is that Jordan wants—and that refers to a subsidy or anything else. A recent visit to Jordan made me certain of only one thing, and that was the uncertainty in Jordan's own mind. The Prime Minister is, as I see it, attempting to walk a tightrope of neutrality—a kind of projection of Indian neutralism into the Middle East. I wonder very much whether he can go on doing it. It seems to me that, sooner or later, Jordan will have to make up her mind on which side of the fence she sits; but that decision must come from within Jordan, without any prodding from us or anybody eise.
  Now that means adopting a go-slow policy. It is not often that one finds oneself advocating a policy of "Wait and see," and yet I find that that is the right one in this particular case: a readiness either to abrogate the Treaty or to go on with it; either to send troops or to take them away, just as the Jordanian's require. To some extent I find that policy of waiting on events to be the right one to apply in the wider problem of Arab and Jew. I assure your Lordships that I put this in a spirit of inquiry, but I find myself always encountering the same problem as to the interpretation of the tripartite guarantee.
  Now Her Majesty's Government have on many occasions recently reaffirmed their firm intention to stand by the

  551
  guarantee, and it has been reaffirmed, I think, by the noble Marquess this afternoon. Yet when I study this guarantee I find myself asking this question: Is any American dispensation really going to move against Israel? Is a British dispensation really going to move against the Arabs? They are awkward questions, and they may be embarrassing questions to ask; but with reality apparently round the corner the thinking citizen is bound to ask these questions. A situation that paradoxically I believe would suit us the best would be to find a kind of "mix-up" in which it was extremely difficult to determine who was the aggressor. From the political point of view that would be the easiest kind of situation to deal with, as I see it.
  In view of all these difficulties I am wondering whether Her Majesty's Government have really set aside all prospect of international participation in the guarantee—only in the guarantee. Mr. Dulles, whose somewhat acrobatic handling sometimes of Middle East affairs leaves us a little bewildered, was quite right when, on February 24, he said that the State of Israel was a United Nations creation and to that I would add that, whether one agrees or disagrees with that creation—and I was one who at the time did not agree—one cannot see the United Nations, even in its more ineffective moods, permitting Israel to be swept into the sea.
  The Foreign Secretary on January 24 seemed to play with the idea of international participation. He spoke of the prospect of some bodies of United Nations' derivation being introduced to keep the peace. Now the arguments against international participation are well known. If action were taken within the Security Council, it would be subject to the Soviet veto. Alternatively, if action such as not to merit the Soviet veto were taken, it could mean only the inclusion of perhaps forces from the Soviet bloc within the terms of the tripartite guarantee, which would effectively ensure international confusion added to a situation already fairly well saturated with trouble. If, in contrast, the United Nations push on without the Soviet bloc, the Soviet, it is said, would exploit their opportunities in the Middle East. I suggest that whatever we do or do not do will not make the slightest
  552
  difference to the Soviet or to their intentions. We have seen them, now perhaps trickling into the Sudan; they have already achieved a treaty of friendship and a trade agreement with the Yemen, which indicates that they do not much mind whether the nation of their choice is a young nation struggling to assimilate democracy, or perhaps a primitive feudal anachronism.
  Your Lordships will recall that the Tripartite Declaration speaks of
  "preventing the violation of frontiers within or outside the United Nations."
  When I was studying this matter I tried to discover exactly what was the advice that the Secretary-General of the United Nations had to give. It was not very helpful. He held a Press Conference recently, on February 27, on his return from his visit all round the Middle East. He made it clear that, so far as he was concerned, he did not want United Nations action to come from within. He was asked this straightforward question:
  "Do you, in your opinion, consider the Tripartite Declaration of 1950 within the framework of the United Nations?"
  I should just like to read an extract from his answer. He said:
  "Is the system of regional pacts compatible with the United Nations Charter? On that point I have given one and the same reply every time.…I would not like to express here and now a personal opinion.… I note that a majority of the members of the United Nations consider it to be in conformity, and I find personally that the decisive factor is not primarily a legal one, but one concerning the aims and purposes, the guiding motives of these various arrangements. That is to say, I do not see any contradiction between a guarantee or a regional arrangement, to broaden it to that question, if the policy of that regional grouping or guarantee is compatible with the obligations of the member nations taking part in it under the United Nations Charter."
  My Lords, if we follow the legal implications we shall not be able to "see the wood for the trees"; but the reply of the Secretary-General seems to indicate, in broad terms, first, that initiative must come from the Tripartite Powers, and secondly, that if action outside the United Nations is taken by those Powers and it is in sympathy with the Charter then there is nothing to prevent such action from being taken. That being so, the number of Powers associated with the Tripartite guarantee could be increased, and such increase could be regarded as in the

  553
  interests of the maintenance of the principles of the United Nations Charter.
  I have no doubt that practical physical assistance from outside is probably not practicable, but I suggest that there may he value in a formal form of moral support. Could not the three Powers canvass the United Nations members with a view to obtaining signatures to add to the Tripartite guarantee—to this effect: that any unpleasant move that had to be made in connection with this guarantee would have their full support? It may be said that would be a meaningless gesture. I suggest that moral support, expressed openly in a formal understanding, can have effects quite unpredictable in scope. In any case, should we not welcome the opportunity to remove the focus of responsibility and the blame a little away from our own shoulders and spread it on to the wider shoulders of an international dispensation?
  There are those who take the rather tragic view that perhaps the power of oil is irrevocably linked with tins problem of Anglo-Israeli-Arab relationships, and that the flow of oil would be jeopardised. If it is a question of a global war, of the Baghdad Pact Powers being called into operation, then of course oil is in danger; but in a, purely Arab-Israeli war I suggest that such a war can be localised. The sources of oil are far removed from the zone of operations. The oil of Northern Iraq, the Kuwait oil and the oil of Southern Persia could have little political connection, and in geography is far away from a possible showdown around the frontiers of Israel. One asks oneself: would Syria jeopardise her pipeline royalties in such a position? I suggest that though possibly the movement may be in doubt, the sources are perfectly safe.
  If Syria did not permit oil to flow, then that oil would have to come round through the Canal, and people would say "Well, there is Egypt in a dominating position on the Canal. With a war going on, the oil will not get to Europe." We need not differentiate between the power of the Egyptians to prevent ships from going to Israel in a situation in which the Egyptians have always said "This is not a peace; it is not an armistice leading to a peace, but just a lull in a war," and their preventing tankers from going to Europe. If the Egyptians were so
  554
  foolish as to prevent tankers from going through the Suez Canal in the course of a war, they would bring upon themselves the odium and abuse of the whole world. They would have contravened the 1888 Convention to which they subscribed again when, in 1954, we negotiated with them the new arrangements; and they would also probably endanger their prospects for taking over the Suez Canal finally in 1968.
  Finally, I refer to Soviet penetration—a process that is relentless, not really, as I see it, over-concerned with this or that particular situation but always perfectly prepared to exploit an opportunity. There is one weapon to meet either Soviet penetration or Egyptian or Saudi-Arabian misrepresentation: it is a weapon that we have not yet fully exploited—namely, the voice on the air. We may regard the Arab as illiterate. He may not be able to read or write, but he can and does listen. No modern invention has had a more profound effect upon the Middle East, either in the political field or the social field, than the wireless. Every Arab sits in the coffee-house and he knows how to listen; yet for our own purposes this medium has been comparatively neglected. I am reminded of the old man who, when asked what he is doing, says, "Sometimes I sits and thinks, and sometimes I just sits." We all know that Her Majesty's Government, if they are sitting, are certainly doing a lot of thinking as well. The point is that other people do not know it, and I think the time has come when we have to show exactly what we think and why we think it, otherwise we are never going to meet such a challenge as is offered to us by "the Voice of the Arabs" from Cairo. When I was in the Middle East it was put to me that there are ways and means of developing this weapon.
  My Lords, that is the only positive aspect of policy which I would advocate. For the rest, I would say that flexibility must continue to govern all our thinking. There is reason to believe, I am told, that perhaps what we are watching in the Middle East is a kind of shadow boxing exhibition; that Nasser does not really wart to go to war, and that he realises just what it would mean if he did. If that is so, then time is on the side of peace. Perhaps, under those conditions, one day, not this year or next year, but

  555
  perhaps in two or three years' time, Arab leaders and Israeli leaders may be prepared to meet. Some of your Lordships may have read that book Lord M., and I am sure the noble Marquess will confirm that passage when Melbourne is extremely irritated with a friend who thumps the table and says always: "This must be done," and Melbourne turns to him and says: "Whenever I hear you thump the table and say that, I know you are going to do something damned silly." Some of the measures that we have heard proposed as remedies for the Middle East remind me that perhaps Melbourne's comment on the clear-cut but over-hasty decision applies.
  9.3 p.m.
  LORD STRABOLGI: My Lords, at this stage in the debate I do not wish to speak for more than a few moments. I wish to say just a few words, because I want to deal with a subject that has not, so far as I know, been touched on in the debate so far. First of all, I wish to mention the question of Cyprus and to say how much I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Jeffreys, when he condemns most strongly the terrorism on that island. On the other hand, I cannot help feeling that a certain amount of this terrorism is the result of the refusal of the Government to grant the principle of self-determination. First of all they said, quite categorically, "Never"; then they shifted the position slightly and said "Perhaps"; and now they have gone back on their tracks and have said that they admit the principle of self-determination but this is not now a practical proposition.
  I think there have been mistakes on both sides, and while I condemn most strongly the terrorism, on the other hand, we Liberals on these Benches take the strongest exception to the repressive measures to restrict liberty that have been taken by the Government. I think it would not be an exaggeration to describe these measures as almost draconian. May I remind your Lordships that Cypriots are not allowed to read reports of debates in your Lordships' House and in the other place; newspapers are not allowed to publish articles advocating Enosis; and Athens radio has been jammed. I notice that that causes a certain amount of hilarity on the Government Front Bench.
  556
  I wonder what we in this country would think if we were not allowed to read newspapers that were critical of the Government's policy, or if during the war we had not been allowed to tune in to the German radio.
  I think it is clear that the great majority of Greek Cypriots desire Enosis, and that was borne out by what the noble Lord, Lord Winster, said. I think we must try and understand their point of view. I heard with great interest the words of the right reverend Prelate, the Bishop of Chichester. The noble Earl, Lord Swinton, and, I think, the noble Lord, Lord Jeffreys, said that Cyprus has never been a Greek possession. That, of course, is perfectly true. On the other hand, the Cypriots do not desire union with Greece on historical grounds but because they feel strong racial and cultural ties, and also because they speak the same language. The diplomatic correspondent of The Times of August 27 last year said that:
  "The Greek speaking majority feel, however, that the island has never lost its Greek character; that they share a cultural heritage with Greece; that the island is the last Greek-speaking territory since the Greek War of Independence which has yet to be united to modern Greece; and that Cypriots would acquire Greek citizenship as full equals with a real chance, as one observer has said, of becoming Prime Minister and not merely of becoming a prosperous restauriant proprietor."
  One has a good deal of sympathy with those aspirations when one thinks of all that Greece has meant to our civilisation. The Cypriots feel, whether rightly or wrongly I do not know, but they feel very strongly, I think, in their breasts, that they are the heirs of this great civilisation which, in the words of Gilbert Murray, has never been surpassed and rarely equalled.
  The noble Lord, Lord Jeffreys, has said that Greece owes us a great debt for our help to her in opposing Communism in 1944. I thoroughly agree with him. On the other hand, may I remind your Lordships that Greece also stood alone with us in 1940 and 1941. She fought the Italians and the Germans in the same passes in which she had fought the Persians, and I know that at that time she identified herself very much with her ancient civilisation. These ties between Cyprus and Greece I think were recognised by the British Government when they offered Cyprus to Greece in 1915.

  557
  I admit, as several noble Lords have said to-day that there is at present a deadlock, but one hopes that some day a solution will be found.
  Perhaps in time the Turkish minority on the Island will come to feel that if Cyprus passes to Greece, they will be accorded the same liberties and privileges as are now enjoyed by the Turkish minority in that part of Greece which is Western Thrace. Perhaps Turkey one day may come to feel that, although Cyprus is only forty miles from her coastline, nevertheless, there are other islands, such as Chios and Samos, which are part of Greece, and which are nearer; and, furthermore, that surely an island which has a British base cannot be a menace to her security. The British Government even may come to feel, if Greece should grant her the use of bases in Cyprus, that this would be more of advantage with a friendly population than retaining those same bases in the face of the hostile opposition they are having to contend with now. But, as I say, at present there is a deadlock.
  I wonder whether it is not possible to consider an alternative to this problem. For instance, is Cyprus the only base in that area? Is it not possible for the. Government to consider the possibility of another base? I am myself one of those who think that when we left Suez we perhaps made a mistake in establishing our base in Cyprus. I think it would have been better if we had entered into an agreement with Israel to have had a base at Haifa. The harbour there is much better than any in Cyprus, and such a base would have the advantages of land communications which are denied to an island in the sea. There would be the additional advantage of a friendly population. I would suggest to Her Majesty's Government that it might be possible to approach Israel now as an equal and to enter into a bilateral treaty with her whereby a second base could be established in Haifa. I cannot see that this would be counter to the Tripartite Declaration, because the Anglo-Jordan Treaty is not. From such a Treaty would surely flow, as a corollary, a supply of arms to enable Israel to keep parity with those received by the Arab States. I cannot agree with the Minister of State when he says—as he did in another place—that a balance of strength has been main-
  558
  tamed to date. I find myself much more in agreement with the Leader of the Opposition in another place who said that this reminded him of our nonintervention policy in the Spanish Civil War. I feet that the advantage of this second base would be that it would strengthen our strategic position, would afford Israel greater security, and would surely have a stabilising effect on the Arab-Israel dispute.
  9.12 p.m.
  VISCOUNT ALEXANDER OF HILLSBOROUGH: My Lords, when I look at the clock I think that the best thing I can do is to be as brief as possible. I have sat through most of the speeches which have been made to-day, and some of them have been quite long. I am bound to say that we on this side of the House have immensely enjoyed the opportunity which has arisen for the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, to make his maiden speech on a really memorable occasion; and we have not been disappointed in what has happened in that connection. We shall hope to have the noble Earl with us on many occasions, speaking with all that wisdom and clarity for which he is so well known. The debate is approaching its end, and I am sure your Lordships are anxious to hear it wound up by the noble Marquess the Leader of the House. I should not presume after the manner in which the various points have been deployed and explored during the last seven hours or so to go over them all again, but there are one or two things to which I want to make sure the noble Marquess replies.
  My noble friend's speech in opening this afternoon gave a masterly survey of the Middle East, and I appreciate that it will be quite impossible to have a general reply to that to-night. I understand that the Foreign Secretary is only just back in this country, and no doubt it will he thought desirable to have a few consultations. Nevertheless, there is one point raised by my noble friend Lord Attlee upon which I think it is essential to have some statement—I refer to what he said upon the situation with regard to the security of Israel in the light of the arms race which has now been launched. I think that my noble friend put the matter very quietly and fairly, and without undue incitement to either side, in suggesting that Israel ought now, in view

  559
  of the changed situation in the arms race, to be supplied with quality, and modern quality, weapons sufficient at any rate to give her some security against a sudden attack upon her. I do not wish to ask any further question on the general side, as I understand that the noble Marquess the Leader of the House wishes to leave the subject of the Middle East in general to another occasion.
  With regard to Cyprus, may I say that I listened with great interest to the speech of the noble Earl, Lord Swinton. He and I are old friends. We often disagree, but when it comes to matters of strategy and the value of bases or equipment, one has to sit up and listen to him carefully to make sure whether one agrees with him or not, for he has great experience in these matters. When he talked about Cyprus as a valuable base to-day in spite of this being the atomic age, I began to wonder how much better a base it could have been than Egypt, which was evacuated under the assurances of the then Prime Minister, Sir Winston Churchill, that there was no need to stay there now because of the hydrogen bomb. That factor must be taken into account (the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, has already referred to this) if the Government are looking at it merely as a position of strength from which to go to the assistance of Israel, on the one side, or an Arab people, on the other, under the Tripartite Declaration. And is it not clear that we ought to remember in our discussion that if the negotiations had been carried a little further the Government could have had within Cyprus the base they wanted for that sort of purpose in spite of the fact that they would have been granting the main national aims of the Cypriots? That is a thing to be remembered when talking about bases.
  Now I come to a point of substance put by my noble friend Lord Attlee—a point which has been touched upon by later speakers, and more firmly than anyone else, I think, by the most reverend Primate, but it has not been effectively answered in the speech of the noble Earl, Lord Munster. I refer to the question: Where do we go from here? Now that Archbishop Makarios and the Bishops have been deported, where do we go from here? That is the kind of question that we should have answered in the speech of the noble Marquess the Leader of the
  560
  House. I hope that when he makes his final reply he will deal with it. I should like to make my own personal position clear. I am not here to defend any part of the actions of Archbishop Makarios. I personally hold that many of his actions have not redounded to the possibility of a co-operative and amicable settlement. If there has been any condonation on his part of the violence which has been exercised in the campaign in Cyprus, that, of course, is something which is reprehensible—no weaker term could possibly be used to describe it. And I think my noble friend Lord Attlee said as much in his speech.
  The point is that, because of the practice, apparently quite widespread, in the unreformed Churches like the Greek Church and the Roman Church of having hierarchies in which the leaders of the hierarchies can be both political and religious leaders, this sort of thing inevitably happens. They are unable to exercise to the full the Christian doctrine and the Christian spirit which they are charged to uphold because of the fear of what might happen in the political field. That seems to have happened in this case. So you have to look at the political side and see, when you have deported these people, what happens.
  The most reverend Primate the Lord Archbishop of Canterbury made a threefold suggestion—it has been referred to as twofold, but as I remember it it was a threefold suggestion. It was suggested that proper steps should be taken to get an alternative (and I put these words into the suggestion), perhaps an even more progressive, draft of a Constitution, which should be considered to see whether we could make progress with it. It would be essential, in the second place, that there should be a joint appeal by the Greek and Turkish leaders in Cyprus to their people to refrain from further violence whilst negotiations were going on. In the third place, I understood that the most reverend Primate was anxious to secure that it should be known in advance that the deportation of the Archbishop would be for a limited period, which might vary according to the period which was taken to bring about a cessation of violence. I think that that is the most substantial suggestion made in the debate.
  I think that something, more than has yet been said by the Government speakers

  561
  is due from the Government. Though the noble Earl, Lord Munster, took this point up to a certain extent, I did not feel reassured by what he said. Let us face the alternative. We might have to face the kind of campaign we have lad in other countries where we have not been successful in keeping those countries within their previous form of control, either within or without the Empire. It seems clear that negotiations prior to the deportations had broken down, for reasons which can hardly now be justified in the light of the history of negotiations in other countries where there has been a nationalist uprising for freedom. My noble friend Lord Pakenham pointed out to me this afternoon some references in Sir Winston Churchill's book The World Crisis and the Aftermath to the Irish dispute. I have not time to quote them now, because I do not want to take long, but they show how foolish it would be for the Government, however reprehensible the violence has been, to take the line that we cannot consider an amnesty which would be complete enough to meet the needs of those negotiating on behalf of the movement seeking liberty. I hope the noble Marquess will not think that I have nothing else to say about this subject. I have a great deal to say. But I feel it essential that he should be given time to-right to deal with this matter more adequately than it has been dealt with by the Front Bench. That is the only reason why I sit down now and leave it to him.
  9.23 p.m.
  THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: My Lords, I rise to speak at the end of what I am afraid has been a very long debate. I have sat through practically every moment of it, and therefore propose to be as brief as I can. In any case, your Lordships 'have already heard two speakers from the Front Bench. You have heard my noble friend Lord Munster, who spoke on behalf of the Colonial Office and who dealt with recent events in Cyprus; and you have heard my noble friend Lord Reading who, speaking for the Foreign Office, dealt with the great problem of the Middle East. I rise merely to say a few words with regard to these two topics in the light of further comments that have been made in the debate.
  As we all know, Her Majesty's Government have been the subject of certain
  562
  pretty violent attacks in another place over Cyprus in particular, though to a much lesser degree in your Lordships' House. In this House, it was the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, who was chosen to open the attack. Before I go any further, I should like to say, like other noble Lords who have already spoken, how happy we are to welcome so distinguished a new Member to cur debates. It is a special pleasure to me, for I worked so much with the noble Earl in the past during the war. I could not help feeling a little sorry for the noble Earl on account of the occasion which had been chosen by his Party for his debut before your Lordships, because even in this House a maiden speech is supposed to be non-controversial. I am sure he did his best, but no doubt it was asking a great deal of him to expect him to be impartial at these two topics; and, if he did go a little beyond the uncontroversial, in the circumstances one cannot blame him. In any case, he tackled these matters with such skill, charm and moderation that I think he won the approval of even those noble Lords who do not altogether agree with him.
  If I may be so allowed, I do not propose to follow the noble Earl and other noble Lords who have spoken in those portions of their speeches which have dealt generally with the Middle East. For one thing, the noble Marquess, Lord Reading, has already spoken on that topic: and, moreover, so far as the noble Earl was concerned at any rate, I found little cause for disagreement. Over the policy which the Government had adopted over the Baghdad Pact, the noble Earl was in broad agreement with us, so far as I could make out. Over the policy with regard to Jordan, I do not think he agreed so entirely, but he made two definite recommendations. The first was talks with the Jordan Government, and the other was closer co-operation with the United States. I de not quarrel with either of those suggestions: indeed, they are almost the identical policy which Her Majesty's Government are trying to apply at the present time. I should have liked to say a good deal more about Jordan, particularly in view of the important speech made towards the end of the debate by the noble Lord, Lord Birdwood. I hope he will understand that if I do not go further to-night into the

  563
  suggestions which he raised, it is not because they are not of great importance, but because time is short. But I can assure the noble Lord—and I know I am speaking not only on behalf of myself but also on behalf of other Members of the House—that what he told your Lordships will be read with interest and studied, as we know that he speaks with special authority on this subject.
  Now I cone to the subject of Israel. The noble Earl, Lord Attlee, skated so skilfully over this topic that I hardly knew exactly what policy he wished the Government to adopt. But he made one specific proposal with regard to the supply of arms to Israel, and perhaps I ought to say something about that, especially in view of the further appeal I have had from the noble Viscount. Lord Alexander of Hillsborough. The noble Earl, Lord Attlee, said that in his view the specific proposal, to which I shall refer in a moment, would not constitute an arms race. What exactly constitutes an arms race is almost a metaphysical argument, into which I do not intend to enter to-night. I think it can be said that in a race the object of each competitor is to get ahead of the other. If, therefore, the purpose of one party to an arms race was only to keep level with the other, then, in the strictest sense of the term, it could not be said to be a race. I suppose that that is technically true, but, in fact, in a competition of that kind, both parties inevitably become more and more heavily supplied with arms. A pace would be set for both of them by each other which neither could keep up beyond a very limited time, and at the end of that time there is very liable to be explosion—at least, that is the lesson of past experience.
  In a modified degree, I think that that consideration is applicable even to the less extensive proposal of the noble Earl, which is, as I understand it—he will correct me if I am wrong—that Israel should be supplied, not with unlimited arms, but with certainly selected arms. Of course, I will pass on that particular proposal to my right honourable friend the Foreign Secretary who, as your Lordships know, is just back in this country. In the meantime, I feel certain the noble Earl will not expect me to say more to-day, except this. In the ultimate event—and I think it is important that we
  564
  should remember this— I am certain it will not be the arms in the possession of Israel which will deter Egypt from invading that country if she really wants to fight. If she is to be deterred it is the knowledge that by doing so she will bring in the signatories of the Tripartite Agreement—and Britain and the United States are two of those signatories—who, with the means at their disposal, would be able, if they were forced to do such a thing, utterly to crush her. It is that fact, of which the Tripartite Agreement is the written pledge, which is, to my mind. Israel's main safeguard, and I think it is right to say that to your Lordships.
  LORD HENDERSON: If I may interrupt the noble Marquess, what I should like to get at is this. I asked him whether any result had yet been reached in the consideration of what the Prime Minister called "the nature of action to be taken." The important thing is not that action shall follow after aggression has been committed, but that aggression shall be stopped; and unless all sides know that the three major Powers are in a position, ready and willing, to take action to prevent aggression, then the lack of arms to resist aggression would lead them to be sadly knocked about in the first twenty-four hours.
  THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: I appreciate that, and I agree about the importance of the point that the noble Lord has made. But it does not alter the general import of what I said. I am not ruling out or prejudicing in any way the proposal of the noble Earl—that is a matter which has to be properly considered—but I do not think a proposal to supply arms to Israel would, by itself, be important. As I say, I will bring to the notice of my right honourable friend, the Foreign Secretary, not only the point made by the noble Earl, but the further point made by the noble Lord, Lord Henderson. In short—and this is really the only thing I want to say about the Middle East; I am afraid it is very little, but it is the most I can do before I pass to Cyprus—I believe that our policy in the Middle East should be based, first, on the Baghdad Pact; secondly, on the Tripartite Agreement of 1950, properly interpreted; and thirdly, on a continuation of our friendly relations with the Hashemite Kingdoms of Iraq and Jordan. I believe that that policy, in the difficult

  565
  circumstances in which we are placed, is the only wise one, and I hope it will continue to be pursued by all Parties in this country.
  I am now going to turn to the question of Cyprus, with which the greater part of this debate has been concerned, and especially I feel I ought to say something about Archbishop Makarios and his deportation, to which so much reference has been made from all sides of the House to-day. The noble Earl, Lord Attlee, in the speech with which he opened the debate, painted an agreeable picture of the Archbishop, from which I think any ordinary listener without other sources of information might have got the impression that he was a perfectly respectable, God-fearing, law-abiding person. The noble Earl actually used in this connection the words—I thought it was slightly odd—that he was a constitutional leader. I did think that was painting him in rather more agreeable colours than was justified.
  There are, however, certain plain facts about Archbishop Makarios, about his negotiations with the Governor and the reasons for his deportation, which, in view of some of the things that have been said here and elsewhere, I feel I must bring once more before the House. The first is this—and it has not been said this afternoon. The Archbishop is, in fact, a British subject. He has enjoyed throughout his life the advantages of British citizenship; he has possessed, and, for all know, still possesses, a British passport, with all that that implies. He has held strongly, as he is perfectly entitled to do, certain views with regard to the future of Cyprus. I am not suggesting for a moment that that is anything improper; I am not even going to complain—and I say this to the most reverend Primate—that it is improper that he should hold such views as a Churchman, who perhaps should not be interested in active politics. In the British Commonwealth and Empire it is, as we all know, open to anyone to hold any views he likes, so long as he remains within the law. Indeed, as the noble Viscount. Lord Hailsham, rightly pointed out this afternoon, the very fact that the Governor, with the full approval of Her Majesty's Government here, has continued to negotiate with the Archbishop, in spite of those known views, is, I think conclusive proof of that fact.
  566
  But what I think no one can excuse, either in a Churchman or in a layman, is that he has used his British nationality, which throughout he has made no attempt to discard, and the special position which attaches to his religious rank, not only for subversive purposes—which, in itself, I think, is not very agreeable—but, far worse, for the fomentation of violence and terrorism which has resulted in the death of many innocent people. The Governor's statement, which your Lordships will have read and which was issued at the time of the Archbishop's arrest, gives ample evidence of this. I will quote one or two sentences from that statement, because I do not think it would be right to forget these things It says:
  "Over the past two years information has been received from a number of different sources indicating that the Archbishop has personally supplied funds to agents in Greece for the purchase and supply of arms and explosives for use in terrorist operations in Cyprus."
  The second sentence I quote is this:
  "He has remained silent while policemen and soldiers have been murdered in cold blood, while women and children have been killed and maimed by bombs.— His silence has understandably been accepted among his community as not merely condoning but even approving assassination and bomb-throwing."
  It has been suggested that Her Majesty's Government have not established complicity. I can assure noble Lords that there is no doubt about the fact as exposed in this statement. If the sources are not given it is because, purely for security reasons, they cannot be given. But I believe that neither the Governor nor anybody else who knows the facts has any doubt about it. That is the man whom the noble Earl, Lord Listowel, and even more strongly the right reverend Prelate the Lord Bishop of Chichester, has charged the Government with treating far too harshly.
  I must confess—I only wish he were here; I know that he had to leave—that I listened very sadly to the right reverend Prelate this afternoon. He has the respect of us all we know that he has complete intellectual integrity, and I am not in the least suggesting that there was any derogation from that. But he talked of the British Government as bypassing law and order in deporting Archbishop Makarios. Your Lordships have heard, and the right reverend Prelate must know, what Archbishop Makarios has

  567
  done; and if the right reverend Prelate had been here I should have liked to ask him: Does he regard Archbishop Makarios himself as having by-passed law and order? Does he think he should have been allowed—and that was the alternative—to continue with immunity to foment and organise terrorism and the murder of British soldiers? Does he think that? He did not put forward any alternative, and yet that is the problem which the British Government and the Governor had to face, and that is the problem which I feel we all have to face. Whatever our views, we cannot blink those facts. It is not a question in this matter of violence as an abstract principle—"Is it ever justified or is it not?": the sort of debate we used to have in our school debating societies. It is a question of plain bleak murder—murder of men and women.
  I was driven to the conclusion, as I listened to the right reverend Prelate—and I do not want to misrepresent him—that he cared so desperately about the World Council of Churches, and the continuation of that great movement, that he subordinated everything else to it; that nothing mattered to him but that. That is really (I do not want to use an unpleasant term), applying ecclesiastical politics. It is merely thinking in terms of expediency; and that. I thought, if I may say so, underlay every word he said. There must be many of us, I hope good Christians, humble members of the Church, who simply could not accept the union of Churches at that price. The union of Churches must represent to us a high standard of conduct, as I am sure it does to the most reverend Primate.
  THE LORD ARCHBISHOP OF CANTERBURY: May I say that I entirely agree with the noble Marquess on this matter? I am very sorry that the right reverend Prelate quoted the Secretary of the World Council of Churches, who I think exceeded all his rights in issuing this statement at all.
  THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: I am grateful to the most reverend Primate for what he has said. Your Lordships may feel that I have said too much. If so, I express my regret; but this is really a matter about which I feel extremely strongly. Frankly, I do not think I have ever been more shocked by any speech
  568
  than I was by the speech of the right reverend Prelate that I heard this evening. Archbishop Makarios has not been treated too harshly. On the contrary, I should have thought there were few examples in history of such tolerance being extended to a man who was known by the authorities to be plotting secretly to overthrew by violence the established Government of his country, and in the interests of another State.
  The noble Earl, Lord Listowel, expressed fears that the firm steps that have been taken by Her Majesty's Government had had, and would have, more unfavourable reactions in other countries, and notably, I think he said, in certain circles in the United States. As your Lordships know, I have been, and I shall continue to be, the most ardent champion of a close understanding between Britain and the United States. I believe that on that depends not only future peace but the survival of Western civilisation in this sadly distracted world. But perhaps for that very reason I may be allowed to say this. If a man of American nationality—and the Archbishop, I repeat, is of British nationality—had, in a territory under American sovereignty, condoned and even fomented, in the interests of another nation, a campaign of violence and terrorism which resulted in the death of American soldiers, I do not believe that the attitude of American opinion would be quite so detached as it has been on this occasion.
  I may be told that no doubt, strictly speaking, Her Majesty's Government were within their rights in taking the action they have taken. But the Government have been asked this afternoon: Was it wise to break off negotiations with the Archbishop when there was still a chance of a successful outcome? Had the main difficulties not been surmounted? Were the remaining difficulties so important? That I understood to be the view of the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, this afternoon, and I know that it is widely held, especially by members of his Party. But it is necessary to remember what I think is often forgotten: that there were limitations to any negotiations with Archbishop Makarios at the present stage. If we were under a moral obligation to try to find a solution to this terrible problem that was acceptable to the Greek community in Cyprus, we were equally under a moral obligation, as my

  569
  noble friend Lord Swinton rightly said, to try to find a solution which was acceptable to the Turkish community. That was our undertaking, not only to the Turks in Cyprus, but to the Turkish Government as well. If we had not observed this we should have been guilty, and we should have been regarded by the Turks as guilty, of a breach of faith with them.
  The purpose of these talks with Archbishop Makarios, which were in a sense preliminary, was to get as far as we could in the direction of an agreement, so as to ensure the co-operation of the Greeks and Cypriots in the later negotiations, in which the Turkish community were also going to take part, for a self-governing Constitution which should precede self-determination. That was the object of these talks. They were never intended to take the place of those later negotiations. They could, in the nature of things, not do that. That is the cardinal fact which, I submit, should never be forgotten, for it is the real criterion, and the only real criterion, as to whether the outstanding issues on which the talks broke down were important or unimportant.
  If we use that criterion, two of them, at any rate, I should have thought, were of the first importance. The first is the point that public security must be reserved to the Governor of Cyprus so long as he thinks necessary. That is, of course, a wider issue than what I may call the Turkish issue. That, as the Prime Minister emphasised yesterday, affects the Cypriot community as a whole. But, in particular, it was necessary to safeguard the Turkish community until experience showed that the steps that Her Majesty's Government were proposing to take would leave no danger to them. That, to my mind, is an important point, and yet it is one which I do not think was mentioned at all from the Opposition Benches to-day. Secondly, there was a point made in the Secretary of State's last statement to Archbishop Makarios on February 29, 1956. I will quote the last two sentences:
  "The Constitution would provide for an elected majority in the Legislative Assembly and would safeguard the interests of all sections of the community. It would he for the Constitutional Commissioner to recommend what arrangements should be made for this purpose, including the precise composition of the elected majority which he would define in accordance with normal liberal constitutional doctrine."
  570
  Clearly, Her Majesty's Government could not agree to decide by negotiation with the Greek Cypriots alone the form and the composition of the Legislative Assembly before the opening of the negotiations, under the Constitutional Commissioner, in which the 'Turks were also to take part. Yet am afraid that was just what Archbishop Makarios wanted. He wanted everything signed, sealed and delivered before the Turks came in at all. Can anyone say that those two issues which I have described are minor differences? They are fundamental differences.
  Finally, there is the question of the amnesty, to which I think the noble Viscount, Lord Alexander of Hillsborough, referred. Of course, it is a matter of opinion how important that particular issue was. But I should have thought, that the Governor and Her Majesty's Government went a very long way to meet the Archbishop. They were ready, as I think my noble friend Lord Munster has said, to grant an amnesty to everyone who had committeed offences under the Emergency Regulations before a certain day, except those involving violence against the person and the illegal possession of arms. Cases under those two heads were to come up for review in accordance with the normal rules. I cannot agree that, in a great emergency, where murder is being done, those provisions were very savage. And yet the Archbishop refused even those. In any case, of course, even if there had been agreement on that point of the amnesty, the other two would still have remained. If the Archbishop wanted agreement he could have had it by deferring those outstanding points until the negotiations with the Turks. We could go no further at the present stage without a breach of faith with the Cypriot Turks and with the Turkish Government. Indeed, the Turkish Government, as I think your Lordships will have seen from a statement they published only a day or so ago, thought they had already gone a little bit too far. That was the position with which Her Majesty's Government were faced, and I cannot believe that it ought to be seriously contended in the light of the facts which I have tried to expose that the Governor broke off negotiations on flimsy grounds. Indeed, contrary to what has been said by some noble Lords, it was not the Governor who

  571
  broke off the negotiations at all; it was the Archbishop.
  With the final and lamentable failure of these talks, the Governor was of course, faced with a new situation. He knew, from the information which was already in his hands that the Archbishop was already actively fomenting terrorism. He had condoned that, while any hope of an agreement remained, although it must have been a very difficult decision for him to take. I gather from what he said that the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, thought that on that point he was right to give every chance for the success of the talks. But was it possible for him any longer to defend leaving Archbishop Makarios at large in Cyprus, sitting in his archiepiscopal palace planning sabotage and fomenting terrorism? I do not believe that any Governor, or any Government, worthy of the name could, in fact, have taken that course. I am certain—I have enough respect for noble Lords opposite—that, if they had been in office, they would have found it necessary to adopt exactly the same course. Could they let him go to Athens and then refuse him the right to re-enter Cyprus? That is one suggestion that has been made. But that would have left him free to foment rebellion and terrorism on just as large a scale from Greece. The only course was to place him where he could do no harm. That the Governor decided to do, as your Lordships know, after consultation and in full agreement with Her Majesty's Government. I believe that in doing so he, and we, took the only course that in these unhappy circumstances was open to us.
  I have been asked: What about the future? The question was asked, I think, by the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, and by the noble Viscount, Lord Alexander of Hillsborough, and others. The answer is—and I think the most reverend Primate himself mentioned it—that, first of all, law and order must be restored. And then, with the coming of more normal conditions, we firmly believe that there will emerge more moderate leaders, who certainly exist but who have been driven out of active politics by the extremism of recent months. I am sure they are there. I saw a letter given to me to-day from someone who has just been in Cyprus which gave quite a different
  572
  account of Cyprus from that given by the noble Earl. Lord Listowel—a great friendliness on the part of the population, even open expressions in some quarters, of the dislike of the methods adopted by what are known as the gangsters. In such circumstances as those that have existed during recent weeks and months, one cannot expect moderate leaders to show themselves. It is as much as their lives are worth to do so; but we are hoping that, with the return of law and order, these people will become available. I can assure the noble Viscounts, Lord Alexander of Hillsborough and Lord Hailsham, who also mentioned this question, that there is no desire at all on the part of Her Majesty's Government to sit still and do nothing. That would be a futile policy.
  There must, no doubt, be some delay while things become normal. I cannot say how long that will take, but so far as I and, I am sure, all my colleagues are concerned, the shorter that period, the better. I know that there are those in the Party of noble Lords opposite—I do not say the noble Lords themselves but in the Party of noble Lords opposite—who would have preferred a different policy. There were those who would have liked to hand over Cyprus immediately to Greece, relying on the terms of some treaty, without considering what would happen in the present inflammable state of the Middle East if another Government came in in Greece, possibly a Government of the extreme Left which did not feel itself bound by the treaty obligations of its predecessors. What then, in those circumstances, would happen to the safeguards of the Turkish community? What would happen then to the security of our base? We have had exactly that experience once already in Egypt. Is it really suggested that we should repeat it while things in the Middle East are in their present state of turmoil?
  The noble Earl, Lord Attlee, suggested that in the hydrogen world Cyprus was no longer strategically important. I could not, any more than the noble Lord, Lord Jeffreys, could, accept that for a moment.
  EARL. ATTLEE: In a major war.
  THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: In a major war. But would the, noble Earl say the same about a cold war?
  EARL ATTLEE:: No.
  THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: That is it. The cold war is what we have got. That is why it is so important, in our view, for us to be there I am quite certain that our friends in Asia, the Turks, the Iraqis, the Jordanians and the Jews, would all be very sorry if there were no British forces within reach at the present time. Are we to imperil all these important things by a policy of what I can only describe as ignominious scuttle? I hope sincerely that that is not the view which will be taken by your Lordships' House. I do not believe for a moment that it is the view of the British people. I believe that the news of the firm action which has been taken with regard to Archbishop Makarios has been received with a sigh of relief throughout the whole country.
  This afternoon the most reverend Primate, in, if I may say so, the movingly sincere speech which he made to your Lordships, advocated an alternative course. I did not know, of course, what the most reverend Primate intended to say. I have had no time, as he will understand, to consult my colleagues, so I am sure he will not take it badly if I cannot give him any definite answer to-day. The main feature of his proposals, as I understood them, was that a draft Constitution should be drawn up which could be submitted to the Greek and Turkish communities. That proposal is nor widely different from what has always been the intention or policy of Her Majesty's Government. We have always envisaged consultations, as a result of which a draft should be prepared. The real difficulty up to now, as I tried to explain earlier in my speech, has been that Archbishop Makarios required substantial concessions to be made before those negotiations began at all. That was really the main difficulty. If other leaders now emerge who are willing to adopt a less rigid attitude, a new and happier situation will, of course, begin. Constitution-making could start and there could be agreement on a Constitution which might he followed by the grant of self-government; and that, in turn, would lead to a situation in which self-determination might be considered as and when the strategic situation allowed.
  Those are the stages which have always been envisaged by Her Majesty's Govern-
  574
  ment. But first, of course, everything must depend inevitably on the restoration of law and order. Clearly, to bring back the Archbishop in his present mood, and after all that has happened, would not accelerate that process—it would, indeed, put off any advance. There, if I may say so, I profoundly disagree with the noble Earl, Lord Listowel, and the noble Lord, Lord Winster, who also, I think, made the same point. The noble Lord, Lord Winster, said that the Government had got into a cul-de-sac. It would he far truer to say that the. Government had removed a road block: that represents much more accurately the present position. I cannot, therefore, give any undertaking at all about the date for the Archbishop's return. The question of his future plans, as I am sure the most reverend Primate himself will appreciate, must depend on the course of events.
  The noble Lord, Lord Winster, after giving a good "dressing clown" to Her Majesty's Government, also complained that nothing had been done in the days of the late Labour Government. Of course, we too regret it: if something had been done at that period, perhaps the country would not have been faced with the difficulties with which it is now confronted. But I do not propose to threw any stones at the Labour Government tonight. NO one cart pretend that a solution of the problems of Cyprus which is to be satisfactory to all concerned is going to be at all easy to find. But I am convinced that the policy on which Her Majesty's Government have embarked gives, in the long term, the best chance. I believe it is the only way in which freedom—and by "freedom" I mean ordered freedom as opposed to anarchy—can be preserved in the island itself; and I believe it to be the only way that accords with our responsibilities, political and strategic, in this most troubled and vital part of the world.
  10.2 p.m.
  EARL ATTLEE: My Lords, at this late hour I should not think of inflicting any further observations on this House. I should like to thank many noble Lords for the kind things they have said about me. I should also like to thank the noble Marquess, the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, for correcting an obvious slip on my part. For the rest, I am bound to say that I leave this debate in rather

  575
  a feeling of gloom, thinking that Her Majesty's Government's attitude represents a triumph of hope over experience. I beg leave to withdraw my Motion.
  Motion for Papers, by leave, withdrawn.

  BARRY CORPORATION (BARRY HARBOUR) BILL IPSWICH DOCK BILL
  Brought from the Commons; read 1a. and referred to the Examiners.