Lords Sitting of 19 June 1956

Preamble
The House met at half past two of the clock, The LORD CHANCELLOR on the Woolsack.
Prayers
  BOURNEMOUTH—SWANAGE MOTOR ROAD AND FERRY BILL
  Read 3a, with the Amendments, and passed, and returned to the Commons.
FELIXSTOWE DOCK AND RAILWAY BILL [H.L.]
Read 3a, and passed, and sent to the Commons.
MIDDLESEX COUNTY COUNCIL BILL [H.L.]
Read 3a, and passed, and sent to the Commons.
HEYWOOD AND MIDDLETON WATER BILL [H.L.]
Read 3a, and passed, and sent to the Commons.

IMPORTS OF CANNED FRUIT
2.35 p.m.
LORD MACPHERSON OF DRUMOCHTER: My Lords, I beg to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
[The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government whether it is true that an increased allocation of two million dollars for canned fruit has recently been granted to the United States fruit canners, and that a similar application from Canadian fruit canners has been refused.]
THE CHANCELLOR OF THE DUCHY OF LANCASTER (THE EARL OF SELKIRK): My Lords, all imports of canned fruit from the dollar area have had to be very closely restricted in recent years. An exception is made for canned

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fruit financed under a United States Aid programme which does not cost dollars. Imports have, however, been allowed from Canada in order to enable Canadian suppliers to maintain their traditional links with our markets. We regret that these have necessarily had to be very limited.
LORD MACPHERSON OF DRUMOCHTER: My Lords, while thanking the noble Earl for his reply, may I ask whether consideration can be given to the point that the use of M.S.A. funds to import United States labelled and branded canned fruits to the exclusion of the same type of Dominion produce falls hardly on countries like Canada, and should be confined to bulk products.
THE EARL OF SELKIRK: I appreciate the point which the noble Lord makes, and I think we are keenly aware of it. I have not, perhaps, got the meaning of his last sentence. Perhaps we might consider it.

ABNORMAL LOADS ON THE ROADS
2.37 p.m.
LORD LUCAS OF CHILWORTH: My Lords, I beg to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
[The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government whether they will expedite action to reduce the congestion on the roads by the transport of abnormal loads of the nature of the twenty-two 90 feet long storage tanks which are at present passing, or are about to pass, through the centre of the country and through the already over-trafficked city of Oxford, and if they will immediately issue instructions that the balance of these loads are not allowed to travel on the roads between the hours of 6 a.m. and 10 p.m.
THE JOINT PARLIAMENTARY UNDER-SECRETARY of STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT (LORD MANCROFT): My Lords, as the noble Lord, Lord Lucas of Chilworth, well knows, there is no easy solution to the problem of exceptionally wide or heavy indivisible loads on the roads. Owners of vehicles carrying such abnormal loads
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must give notice to the police, who have powers to control the timing of movement. A ban on the movement of such loads by day might not be in the interests of safety; nor in many cases would it ease the flow of traffic.
I sympathise, of course, with the anxiety implicit in the question of the noble Lord, Lord Lucas of Chilworth, and prompted no doubt by recent photographs that have appeared in the Press of one of many such abnormal loads on its way through the City of Oxford. Last November the Government issued a circular to those concerned, putting forward certain proposals for discussion on this problem. The whole question of further measures to control the movement of these abnormal indivisible loads is still being considered by the Government in the light of the replies they have received.
LORD LUCAS OF CHILWORTH: My Lords, would the noble Lord accept an expression of my personal appreciation of what he himself is doing? And would he also accept my suggestion that these loads should be kept off the roads during the hours of daylight, especially as we are now nearing the peak time for holiday traffic? Is the noble Lord aware that one of the twenty-two juggernauts—of which, as he quite rightly said, photographs have appeared in the Press—passed through the City of Oxford last Saturday afternoon at 2.45, which is the peak time for pedestrian and vehicular traffic? Was that, I ask the noble Lord, with the consent of the police? At the same time that this was happening another similar load, though not of the same type, broke down in the High, so that there then had to be one-way traffic. When I spoke to the police about it, they said that their permission had not even been asked for it to come. Cannot we get some order out of this confusion? Would the noble Lord recollect that he himself said in your Lordships' House on June 12 [OFFICIAL REPORT, Vol. 197 (No. 101), col. 911]:
"I believe that the constant frustration of the traffic jams on the raid contributes to accidents by causing irritation and bad temper…"
If the noble Lord would accept my suggestion, I think that that might be alleviated.
LORD MANCROFT: My Lords, I must confess that I have some sympathy with the grievance which the noble Lord

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has just ventilated. I am unable to reply on the specific point of the juggernaut which settled down in the High at the time he mentioned. I should be very much surprised to hear that the movement of that vehicle was not known to the police and was not made with their permission. As I have already informed the noble Lord, the police have the right to control such movement. And I should like to reiterate what I said concerning the question of daylight movement. The police are not satisfied that sending these loads by night, however much that might reduce the strain on traffic during the day, is really conducive to the safety of the roads.
LORD LAWSON: My Lords, I think it would be wrong to allow this Question to pass as though this were the kind of thing that applied only to Oxford. As a matter of fact, the sort of thing of which the noble Lord, Lord Lucas of Chilworth, complains has been growing throughout the country. The length and height of the loads which come on to the roads have been increasing and these vehicles are becoming a menace. I would suggest that there is only one place for these loads and that is on the railway. It is time that steps were taken seriously about this.
LORD MANCROFT: I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Lawson, that this is a serious matter. But people do not send these loads on to the roads for fun. Very often their size is such that they cannot go at all by railway. I agree that it is a problem which is not confined to Oxford. But it is a very complicated problem indeed. It is for this reason that we have asked for the views of all concerned and are now trying to work out some solution to the problem.

DELINEATION OF GERMAN FRONTIERS
2.42 p.m.
LORD FARTNGDON: My Lords, I beg to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
[The Question was as follows:
ask Her Majesty's Government whether the statement issued in the Press of June 8, to the effect that the War Office had requested the Oxford
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University Press to receive Dr. Gruessner of the Geographical Department of the West German Foreign Office to discuss the frontiers as delineated in a recently published Atlas of Central Europe, is correct: and, if so, whether this action by the War Office is consistent with the reply reported to have been made to the German Ambassador on this matter by the Foreign Office, and what is the standing of the War Office therein.]
LORD FAIRFAX OF CAMERON: My Lords, the War Office did not request the Oxford University Press to discuss the delineation of frontiers with Dr. Gruessner and the inconsistency mentioned in the second half of the noble Lord's Question does not therefore arise. They were, however, in touch with the Oxford University Press to ensure that the time of Dr. Gruessner's visit to Oxford about this did not clash with a visit to the War Office to discuss quite different matters.
LORD FARINGDON: My Lords, I thank the noble Lord for his reply. I need hardly say that I am much relieved by his Answer, which. I assume I am right in concluding, clearly indicates that there is no implication that the German inquiry has received any support from Her Majesty's Government. I should be grateful if the Government could assure me that, like myself, they consider such interventions by the German Government profoundly disquieting to the other countries in Europe. I should hope that Her Majesty's Government would find it possible to express to the German Government our anxieties on this kind of point and our hopes that the German Government will see fit to accept things as they are, especially in view of the fact that there are now an appreciable number of Germans east of the Oder-Neisse line.
LORD FAIRFAX OF CAMERON: My Lords, the noble Lord's supplementary question is a little outside the terms of the original Question. Perhaps I can best reply to it by saying that an approach was made to the Foreign Office by the German Embassy about the manner in which the Oder-Neisse line is shown in certain British atlases. While the Government's view is that this line remains provisional, pending the conclusion of a peace treaty, the German Embassy was

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told that the Foreign Office could not intervene in a matter which was entirely one for the publishers of the atlas.

CHARITY OF FRANCES BARKER AND CERTAIN OTHER CHARITIES (CITY OF YORK) BILL
2.44 p.m.
Order of the Day for the Second Reading read.
LORD AMULREE: My Lords, in rising to move the Second Reading of this short Bill, it is only necessary for me to state briefly that the Bill combines the work of forty-six charities in the City of York. The charities comprise, among other things, the running of almshouses, the maintenance of certain pensioners, relief for the poor and certain work for young people. There is not enough money to run the almshouses, and other money is granted for relief of the poor under present conditions, so the Bill now before your Lordships seeks to consolidate the Charities into one and to give them fixed benefits, two-thirds of the money going to the almshouses, one-third to the poor and the sum of £60 being contributed to a charity far young people. The Bill has been widely publicised in the City of York and has met with no objection. I beg to move that the Bill he now read a second time.
Moved, That the Bill be now read 2a.—(Lord Amulree.)
On Question, Bill read 2£, and committed to a Committee of the Whole House.

CONSOLIDATED MUNICIPAL CHARITY AND CERTAIN OTHER CHARITIES (LUDLOW) BILL
Order of the Day for the Second Reading read.
LORD AMULREE: My Lords, in rising to move the Second Reading of this Bill, I should like to state that in the year 1758 almshouses in the City of Ludlow were rebuilt and the same charity covered the stipends of two clergymen. The money for the almshouses has not been really sufficient and there is not now enough money to pay the stipends of two clergymen. The Bill now before your
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Lordships is for the purpose of modernising the almshouses, with a reduction, which is being made with the greatest reluctance, of the number of residents from thirty-two to twenty-four and at the same time of separating the money for the payment of the stipends for one clergyman instead of two. There will be two bodies of trustees. This Bill has been widely publicised in the town of Ludlow and has met with no opposition. I beg to move that the Bill be now read a second time.
Moved, That the Bill be now read 2a—(Lord Amulree.)
On Question, Bill read 2a, and committed to a Committee of the Whole House.

HOSPITAL OF ROBERT EARL OF LEICESTER CHARITY (WARWICK) BILL
Order of the Day for the Second Reading read.
LORD AMULREE: My Lords, this Bill makes provision for certain changes to the historic hospital of the Earl of Leicester, Warwick, which was founded in the sixteenth century by Queen Elizabeth's friend and favourite. At the present time the administration is in the hands of a retired clergyman, who has not been able to put in a great deal of time. The building needs repair. The Bill before your Lordships changes the administration and puts it in the hands of trustees. At the same time, there are two big rooms in the building not wanted for administration and the Bill makes provision for raising a certain amount of money by renting these two rooms for various purposes in the City of Warwick. Once again, the Bill has been widely publicised in Warwick and as there are no objections, I beg to move that the Bill be read a second time.
Moved, That the Bill be now read 2a.—(Lord Amulree.)
VISCOUNT DE LISLE: My Lords, I have been connected for many years with the Charity to which the noble Lord refers. I have been in contact for some time with the Charity Commissioners, who have been most courteous in consulting me as heir of the original benefactor. I think that this scheme will refound the ancient Charity on sounder

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modern lines, and it certainly has my support as patron.
On Question, Bill read 2a, and committed to a Committee of the Whole House.

SUTTON'S HOSPITAL (CHARTERHOUSE) CHARITY BILL
Order of the Day for the Second Reading read.
LORD AMULREE: My Lords, the point of this short Bill is to enable the Governor of Charterhouse to let some of the buildings, which were destroyed by enemy action during the war, and which have now been completely restored, for the purpose of raising money for the upkeep of pensioners. The present scheme will bring in a little more money for the maintenance of the pensioners and will, I think, improve the standing of the charity. Again, the project has been widely publicised and has produced no objection. I beg to move that the Bill be now read a second time.
Moved, That the Bill be now read 2a.—(Lord Amulree.)
On Question, Bill read 2a, and committed to a Committee of the Whole House.

NATIONAL INSURANCE BILL
2.49 p.m.
House in Committee (according to Order): Bill reported without amendment.

SLUM CLEARANCE (COMPENSATION) BILL
2.50 p.m.
Order of the Day for the House to be put into Committee read.
Moved, That the House do now resolve itself into Committee.—(The Earl of Munster.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.
House in Committee accordingly.
[The EARL OF BUCKINGHAMSHIRE in the Chair]
Clause 1 [Payments in respect of unfit houses occupied by owners]:
On Question: Whether Clause 1 shall stand part of the Bill?
LORD SILKIN: There are one or two things I should like to say on this clause,
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and particularly on that part of the clause which deals with the question of mortgagees. On Second Reading I explained my position, but since then I have been informed that the building societies, in particular, are apprehensive about this provision. I have no predisposition in favour of building societies, nor have I anything against them: they are doing a valuable piece of work. The building societies are concerned that this Bill creates a precedent, and feel that in certain circumstances, although there may be money outstanding on a mortgage, it will be possible for the mortgagor to go to the court and ask for the court's discretion to wipe out the balance of any money so outstanding. In my Second Reading speech I took the view that I could not foresee any circumstances, except where the mortgagee had behaved improperly, in which a court would exercise its discretion and cancel the balance outstanding. Therefore, I thought that this provision was illusory and was not going to help the owner-occupier at all. On the other hand, there it is, a provision in what will be an Act of Parliament stating that people who have lent their money in good faith, where there is an amount outstanding, do run the risk of forfeiting whatever is outstanding.
I should be grateful, first of all, if the noble and learned Viscount the Lord Chancellor could tell me whether there is any precedent for such a provision. It seems to me to create an extraordinary precedent. If, after an advance has been made in good faith, it is possible that any balance outstanding may be in jeopardy, it may give rise to an entirely new outlook on the part of building societies and others lending money. A building society and the ordinary lender of money will have to be exceedingly careful in case hereafter a court should hold that, on some grounds of equity, the lenders will have to lose the balance of their money, and are not to be entitled to rely on the personal covenant of the borrower.
Moreover, there is the position of trustees who may have advanced money, again in good faith, on property which in 1939 seemed to them perfectly sound property but which since then has deteriorated and may have become represented as a slum property. Finally, there is the

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case of the person who, out of the goodness of heart, wanting to help another person desperately in need of a house to buy one, advances money and knows that the amount advanced is possibly in excess of what may have been advanced on a purely business footing. That person is specifically singled out in the Bill as a person who advanced money knowing that the security was not there: the attention of the judge is directed to him, and he is a person who may definitely lose his money.
I would ask the Lord Chancellor to consider all these cases, and particularly the point that we are here creating a precedent which may hereafter be found to be most undesirable. This Bill is designed to help the owner-occupier, and the last thing I want to do is to put forward any proposal which will make his position worse than it is under the Bill. My own feeling is that the right way of dealing with this problem is to go all out and really help the owner-occupier by relieving him of any obligation that may exist in respect of his house. If the Government tell a person actually living in a house that it is insanitary, and he has incurred obligations in respect of that house, then it is for the local authority who require the house to see that he goes cut free of any debt. There are only a limited number of these cases, and I cannot for the life of me see why it should not be possible to provide that the local authority should take the house as it stands, with all liabilities. If there is a mortgage outstanding, I cannot see why they should not pay the balance, and be given a discretion to go to court if they feel that either party has acted improperly.
I agree that if the owner-occupier has deliberately allowed his house to go into disrepair, and has not spent a penny on the house for the last ten years, and thereby has caused the house to become a slum house by his own inaction, he should not get the benefit of a provision of the kind I have in mind. But that is not the normal case: most people who own a house look after it to the best of their ability. I should have thought that, in those circumstances, the right way to deal with it would be as I suggest: that the local authority should have a discretion to pay to the owner-occupier the full value of the house, in-
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cluding any amount that may be outstanding on mortgage, with the proviso that in a particular case they might plead that the state of affairs had been brought about by the owner-occupier himself. This Bill is limited in its period by definition. There will be few cases of this kind, and I cannot think that it will impose any great burden on any local authority. In this way, I am sure that justice would be done, and the Government would not be in any danger of creating difficult precedents. If the noble and learned Viscount, the Lord Chancellor, thinks there is anything in this suggestion, it would be possible to do something about it on the next stage of the Bill. I hope that he, and the Government, will see their way to giving this favourable consideration.
LORD MILNER OF LEEDS: The primary object of this Bill, as set out in Clause 1, is obviously wholly desirable. It is right that full compensation should be paid to an owner-occupier in circumstances envisaged by the Bill. It would obviously be quite iniquitous to have a case—and we have had one or two which have had serious consequences—where the property of an owner-occupier was taken for public purposes, or for public reasons, yet the compensation paid was not sufficient to discharge the liability of a mortgage, with the consequence that the owner-occupier was left bearing a heavy burden. I think that was the Pilgrim case. But is not the remedy set out in the Bill quite misconceived? As I understand it, where the compensation is not sufficient to discharge the mortgage, either the owner-occupier himself, as is the case at present, or the lender will have to lose the amount due on the mortgage which was not satisfied by the compensation payable. Surely, when a property is taken for a public purpose, or for public reasons, that is quite wrong.
Reference has been made to building societies. They may be the principal lenders concerned, but one has to remember that there are trustees administering trusts for the benefit of beneficiaries who themselves are no better off—and sometimes are worse off—than those who occupy the premises on which the money has been advanced. Friendly societies are also mortgagees, as, indeed, are trade unions. There is also the individual

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lender who, for one reason or another, may have lent money. In present circumstances, when the interest on mortgages ranges from 5½ per cent. upwards, I imagine the great majority of mortgages which are likely to come within the purview of this Bill, would carry low interest—perhaps 4 per cent. or 4½ per cent., or something of that sort—whilst the value of money has, of course, depreciated considerably. All those lenders have lent in good faith, frequently at low interest, and almost invariably at less interest than that at which they would lend to-day.
This clause creates an undesirable precedent. It means that in this case, and, it may be, in other cases affecting properties, mortgages and so forth, the Legislature provides that the sanctity of the contract may be destroyed and no lender will know where he or she is. That seems to me quite wrong. It is not the fault, presumably, of either the owner-occupier or the mortgagee that the property should come within a slum clearance area and should eventually be taken over by a local authority. It is quite right that the full compensation should be paid to the owner-occupier, but it seems to me quite wrong that, in those circumstances, any portion of the burden should be borne by the owner-occupier, on the one hand, or by a lender in good faith, on the other.
I venture to suggest to the noble and learned Viscount that the proper answer is that in all cases compensation should be adequate to discharge the mortgage. I do not quite like Lord Silkin's suggestion about leaving it at large to the local authority. That is possibly better than the course envisaged in the Bill, but I should prefer to see in the Bill a clause whereby the sum paid, in the limited class of cases to which this clause would apply, should be adequate to discharge any existing mortgage on the property. In that way there would be no hardship on the owner-occupier and no hardship on the lender, whether a trustee, an individual or a building society and all parties would be satisfied. The liability cannot be a serious one. The limitations of the Bill, as it stands at present, reduce the number of cases to a very small number indeed. The liability as between the compensation paid under the -present provisions of the Bill and the compensation
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which would be required if the amount had to be sufficient to pay off the mortgage, would arise in only a few cases, and would be very small. In those circumstances, I hope the noble and learned Viscount will consider that matter with his colleagues and perhaps let us know before the Report stage whether that or some other suggestion commends itself to him, so that neither party shall suffer when they have acted in good faith.
VISCOUNT WAVERLEY: This is a highly complex matter, and I do not myself feel competent to enter into the merits. But it seems to me that the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, has shown good cause for asking the Government to reconsider the position between now and the Report stage of the Bill. There is one further point to which I should like to allude. In certain circumstances, it seems to me that, as the Bill now stands, a mortgagee might have an onus thrown upon him which he would find it difficult to discharge, in having to show, perhaps after the lapse of many years, that the sum of money he lent was prudently lent in all the circumstances obtaining at the time. For that reason, among others, I venture to support the plea which the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, has put forward.
3.7 p.m.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR (VISCOUNT KILMUIR): I agree with my noble friend Lord Waverley that this is a complex matter, and I hope that all your Lordships will agree with me that it is also a matter where it is desirable to do justice between the parties involved because of the circumstances that are well known to your Lordships. The complexity of the matter is shown by the different suggestions that were put forward in successive speeches by the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, and the noble Lord, Lord Milner of Leeds. Therefore, at the risk of trespassing upon your Lordships' time, I wish to point out how this matter arose.
The two subsections of Clause 1 which we are discussing, subsections (4) and (5), were not included in the Bill when it was introduced, but were moved on Report stage in another place in a Government Amendment. That Amendment was designed to meet, so far as possible, the point raised from the Opposition Benches on the Committee stage by the honourable and learned Member, Mr. Mitchison.

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It is important to consider the grounds for that Amendment which motivated the Party opposite when they were considering this point in another place. The plight of the owner-occupier, whose payment under Clause 1 might, as a result of changes in the market value of slum houses, be insufficient to meet his outstanding mortgage liabilities, has been in everyone's mind—it has certainly been in my right honourable friend's mind, and in mine—ever since we had to consider the Housing Subsidies Bill in which we thought of dealing with the matter. But when the Opposition raised the matter on the Committee stage in another place, my right honourable friend felt sympathy with the grounds of the Amendment, although he was not prepared to go as far as the sweeping suggestion then made.
I think it is right that your Lordships should have in mind what was suggested at that stage. The suggestion would have had the effect of enabling any mortgagor or tenant purchaser, in the case of a contract to purchase by instalments, to obtain a complete discharge of any outstanding liabilities, provided that he assigned to the mortgagee or the landlord vendor, as the case may be, the whole of any payment due to him by way of compensation for the unfit house. That provision took no account of the circumstances of the original transaction, and it might well have inflicted great hardship on some mortgagees—for example, the category which the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, mentioned, of family friends, or people of that kind, who advanced the money to meet the housing difficulties of the mortgagor or the tenant. It was in consequence of that fact that my right honourable friend decided that the best course was to leave the matter to the discretion of the county court, who would examine all the circumstances.
Noble Lords have referred to various people or companies who lend money; and the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, mentioned particularly building societies. In general, building societies take the most careful steps, by survey and whatever else is necessary, to examine the property on which they lend their money. Very few building societies would enter into transactions of the type that is really dealt with here. But that is only one side of the matter. The other side is the great
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housing shortage which people have had to face since the war. This goes far beyond any Party difference. We have all seen it. Those of us who have been in another place have had literally thousands of constituents coming to us with true and agonising stories in the matter. Therefore, one has to consider the position that the mortgagor or the tenant might well be driven by the extreme scarcity of housing to enter into a contract into which, without that abnormal and unfair pressure, he would not have entered. The noble Lord, Lord Silkin, asked me whether there was a precedent for this provision. There is not an exact precedent, but there are plenty of precedents, going back to the very beginning of the Court of Equity, for harsh and unconscionable bargains being reopened. Even if it did not go so far as that, in these circumstances when we have this housing scarcity and this abnormal position of extreme pressure on families to find a roof over their own heads and those of their children, I should have thought one was entitled to say: "These are circumstances in which we will have the matter examined again." That is our approach to the matter.
On Second Reading, the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, developed another line which he mentioned to-day and incorporated in his speech. Then he was concerned with the efficacy of the remedy and whether the courts would find something on which to work. If the noble Lord will look again at the provisions in the Bill he will see in subsection (4) these words:
"…either party to the mortgage, charge or agreement may apply the county court who, after giving to the other party to the mortgage…an opportunity of being heard, may, if the court thinks tit, make an order—

a) in the case of a house which has been purchased compulsorily, discharging or modifying any outstanding liabilities of the person aforesaid by virtue of any bond",

and so on,
"or

(b) in the case of a house vacated in pursuance of a clearance order…discharging or modifying the terms of the mortgage, charge or agreement,

and in either case either unconditionally or subject to such terms and conditions, including conditions with respect to the payment of moneys, as the court may think just and equitable to impose."
Then subsection (5) lays down the circumstances which shall be taken into account by the court in determining in any case

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what order may be made. The court is to have regard to all the circumstances and in particular, on the one side,
"to whether the mortgagee or person entitled to the benefit of the charge acted reasonably in advancing the principal sum on the security of the house."
Reasonability is the foundation of the Civil Law of this country, and all the difficult circumstances which the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, put to your Lordships may be, and I am sure will be, taken into account in deciding whether there should be a modification.
On Second Reading the noble Lord said—I will refer to his words, which I have in front of me, without quoting them: "Well, if the money is owing, why is it not reasonable?" I do not think that is the whole story. For example, if there is a purchase by instalments, which is already provided for, where the house is sold to the tenant at an excessive price, then I do not think it would be difficult for a county court to arrive at a reasonable price. Again, if the mortgagee, not foreseeing the compulsory acquisition but foreseeing the intense desire of the tenant to retain the roof over his head, had advanced too large a sum, clearly knowing it was too large a sum, then again it would be reasonable for the court to say, "Well, you knew very well that that sum was out of all proportion to the security. You were really taking into account the position of the defendant, and that will be modified."
If I may take the cognate problem of the Moneylenders Act, all these circumstances were taken into account by innumerable courts in deciding what was right and just in the alterations which they made in contracts in order to provide reasonably and fairly for the situation which they found. We feel that an examination of the circumstances of each case is a reasonable way of approaching the matter. The noble Lord, Lord Silkin, suggested that the local authority might pay the balance that was outstanding. The noble Lord, who is one of the most distinguished products, if I may put it that way, of local government in this country, with his vast experience, said to me: "But be careful about precedents." But the precedent that he suggests, I should have thought, was a more dangerous one from the point of view of the local authority. The interesting point
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is this—and this shows the difficulty of the matter. The noble Lord, who is one of the clearest thinkers and expositors in this House, suggested in his speech that the local authority in these circumstances should have the right of going to the court to have determined exactly the same question which he submits would be difficult to determine if it is originated by the tenant. It is a rare occasion when one can, if I may be colloquial (and I think the noble Lord knows me well enough to know that, as a rule, I am not a logic chopper), demonstrate the difficulty of one part of the noble Lord's argument by the very argument which he himself advances a short time later. The noble Lord, Lord Milner of Leeds, put the matter slightly differently. As I understood his argument, he would desire that the payment should be added, so to speak, to the value of the house—the noble Lord is good enough to nod assent. There again, the precedent that would then be adopted would be of giving an entirely artificial value to the house.
My Lords, all I would say about the intervention of Lord Waverley, is to repeat that he agreed that this was a difficult problem. I do not think he intended to identify himself with the distribution of public funds suggested by the two previous noble Lords who spoke, and therefore Lord Waverley has really pinpointed the difficulty of the matter. As I say, I myself have given this matter thought ever since we started on consideration of this form of legislation. I had to consider it when we were dealing with the Housing Subsidies Bill, and I have confidence in the county courts in these matters. Most of the judges of Her Majesty's county courts have had years of experience in dealing with Rent Act cases. They have seen before them exactly the types of person who are faced with the difficulty here, and I believe they will be able to do justice and do what is right and fair.
If I may put it the other way—if I may remind your Lordships again of what was advanced by the Labour Party in another place, namely, that the whole of the balance should be allowed to go—then I would say that we have struck a fair balance between that suggestion and the suggestion advanced to-day, that we are doing harm to the sanctity of contract by I the provision contained in the Bill. What

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we are doing is to follow a well-trodden path—namely, when people in extreme difficulties make a contract which may operate with extreme harshness, then we leave it to the courts to give the help of equity. I am most moved by the suggestion by your Lordships that I should consider the matter. Of course I will do so, but I do not want to buy peace at this stage by holding out hopes which I know are illusory. I should be less than frank if I were to raise hopes in the matter, because we have considered it and that is as far as I can go. That is why I have, I am afraid, taken up a lot of your Lordships' time in dealing with the matter.
3.24 p.m.
EARL JOWITT: I knew nothing about this matter at all until I came into the House and heard the speeches which have been made. I stand, therefore, in a position of considerable advantage. I do not know which Party moved the Amendment in another place. It may be that I am sinning against the observations of my own Party—I do not know and I do not very much care; I am concerned merely to consider the matter as I understand it. I speak from a position of comparative irresponsibility, but I give your Lordships the benefit of my impressions on this argument, such as they are worth, if anything.
Frankly, I say that I am rather disturbed. Of course, it is the case that for many years the Court of Equity has taken steps to deal with "harsh and unconscionable contracts"—that was a phrase used in the Moneylenders Act—but the court could act on the conscious wrong before that period of time. As we all know, it became rather an extended and not altogether approved doctrine. It used to be said that "Equity is a roguish thing, as variable as the Chancellor's foot", because any particular Chancellor could consider the matter not on settled principles but on what is called ex aequo et bono—as to what he thinks is desirable and right. One man's judgment will differ from that of another, and therefore many years ago it became desirable that the principles of equity should be settled.
I do not hesitate to accept the doctrine that any court ought to interfere and intervene in any case where what has been done is harsh and unconscionable. But if a contract has been entered into, unless there are grounds for saying that it is
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harsh and unconscionable, then the contract must be carried out. I am not in the least concerned about the owner of what we call an unfit property—I never have desired that he should get much money for his unfit property. But consider this position, which I understand is the position here raised. He may have borrowed money on the strength of a mortgage, and the man who lends him the money—I am assuming a case where he is neither harsh nor unconscionable—has two rights. In the first place, he has what we call the personal covenant—a man who borrows money gives his personal covenant to repay the money. Secondly, the man who lends the money has the security of the property; if necessary he can foreclose and have the property sold.
There may be a case where the property itself has gone down in value—where there is little value, but where the mortgagor, the man who borrowed the money, is a wealthy man and has a lot of other property. What I would ask the Lord Chancellor to consider is this. I say frankly that I am rather shocked at this proposal, as interfering with the sanctity of contract. As I understand the proposal which the Government are now putting forward, if the property goes down in value and becomes unfit, so that the mortgagor who has borrowed the, money receives only a very small sum for it insufficient to discharge the mortgage debt the amount the mortgagee is going to be paid is left to the hazard of the opinion of the county court judge. Why? Why should the mortgagor be relieved of his personal covenant? I am always assuming that this is a bargain where there is nothing harsh and unconscionable. I could predicate that if there is harshness and anything unconscionable, then by all means let him be relieved. But if there is none, why should we say to the mortgagor, "You have got very little money for your house; that being so, we relieve you of the solemn obligation which you have entered into to pay this sum of money to the mortgagee"?
I cannot think that that is right. I cannot think that, if it were stripped of all the trimmings, the Government, on reflection, would think it right. I would ask the Government to look into this matter rather carefully. I believe that there is a question of principle here. I think that one of the most important

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principles we have to bear in mind is that we must not lightly interfere with the freedom of private contract. If two people have acted together in working out a contract, then we ought to be careful to see that that contract is carried out. If a man has borrowed money on the security of a house or houses, and if he has entered into a convenant to repay the money so borrowed, then, unless there has been something harsh and unconscionable or improper on the part of the lender of the money, we ought to see that the lender is repaid his money according to the convenant which he has. I am sure that that is a principle which Her Majesty's Government must accept. I ask them to look at this matter again before the next stage of the Bill, to see whether they ought not to do something about making it plain that if they are going to give relief against the mortgagee who has lent the money, that can be done only on the ground that the mortgagee has done something improper, that there has been some over-reaching or unfair dealing or something of that sort which alone should justify any court in interfering with a private bargain.
Though I have read this Bill only in the last few minutes, so far as I can see there is nothing which makes the jurisdiction of a county court judge in any way dependent upon his finding that there has been any such over-reaching or unfair dealing, and I am sure Her Majesty's Government must intend that that alone can be the basis of such action. I should like Her Majesty's Government to look again at this clause to see whether it cannot be re-drafted to make it perfectly plain that a man is not to be relieved from a contract into which he has entered, and which he may have ample means to fulfil, or from a personal convenant, unless it is found that there has been, in the conduct of the lender of the money, something in the nature of harsh, unconscionable or over-reaching action which makes it right and proper for the court to interfere. It is wrong and unfair on an unfortunate county judge simply to throw this action and tell him to do the best he can to apply some equitable doctrine, ex aequo et bono. I very much hope that Her Majesty's Government will take this clause back and see whether they cannot re-draft it on the lines that I have indicated.
LORD CONESFORD: Like the noble and learned Earl who has just spoken, I came quite fresh to this clause and feel some of the doubts which he has so ably expressed; therefore, I do not wish to repeat any of his arguments. I fully sympathise, of course, with all the arguments put forward by my noble and learned friend the Lord Chancellor, but I find difficulty in seeing that what he wishes to do is satisfactorily done by the clause as it stands. In support of the argument of the noble and learned Earl who has just spoken, I would particularly invite the attention of my noble and learned friend, the Lord Chancellor, to such little guidance as is, in fact, given to the county court in subsection (5). It is perfectly true that the subsection says:
"…the court shall have regard to all the circumstances of the case, and in particular, in the case of a mortgage or charge—

(a) to whether the mortgagee or person entitled to the benefit of the charge acted reasonably in advancing the principal sum on the security of the house…"

But the mortgagee did not, of course, advance the money only on the security of the house. As has been pointed out by the noble and learned Earl, he advanced it also on the terms of the personal covenant, among other things. I wonder whether among the Amendments which my right honourable and learned friend might consider for the next stage, he could not at least alter the wording of Clause 1 (5, a) by adding after the words "on the security of the house" some such words as "and the remaining terms of the contract" in order to bring in the whole transaction for consideration and not merely the valuation of the house.
LORD SILKIN: Before the noble and learned Viscount replies, I should like to bring the Committee back to the Bill which we are discussing, which is primarily a Bill for the relief of the unfortunate owner-occupier whose house has been condemned. The particular parts of the Bill we are now discussing are those where such an owner-occupier has a mortgage. The purpose of this Bill is not to impose greater burdens on the mortgagor but rather to see how we can ease his burden. I quite agree with my noble friend Lord Jowitt that, from a legal point of view, it is most undesirable that we should in any way seek to interfere with the sanctity of contracts. I agree with him and with the noble

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Lord who has just spoken as to the distinction between interfering with a contract which is harsh and unconscionable and interfering with one which is held to be unreasonable, particularly when such contract might have been entered into as far back as 1939, when a judge would have to look at the circumstances as they were in 1939. I wish to preserve the sanctity of contracts and I do not want it left to a county court judge to say that a contract made twenty years ago was unreasonable.
It may be that a purchaser paid too high a price for his house, but, nevertheless, I want to get back to the purpose of the Bill which is to relieve the owner-occupier, so far as possible, of his burden of having his house taken away and then finding that, though he has lost his house, he still has a liability to the mortgagee under his personal covenant. That seems like adding insult to injury. That is the position to which should like the noble and learned Viscount to direct his mind, and I believe that that is really what Her Majesty's Government have been seeking to do under this clause. My criticism of the clause is, first, that it breaks a principle which I believe those of us who are lawyers ought to hold as sacred—that when people enter freely into a bargain they should keep to it. The mere fact that the bargain turns out to be unreasonable, in the light of later circumstances, is not a reason for interfering with it. I want to adhere to that most strongly. At the same time I want to see that the person who is the victim of unfortunate circumstances, whose house has been taken away, is relieved of the obligation to spend possibly the rest of his life not only paying rent for his new dwelling but also paying back the instalments on his old mortgage.
How can we do that? I made a suggestion. The noble and learned Viscount kindly told me, with those very friendly words which I always assume may possibly be followed by words which are less friendly, that I was inconsistent or illogical. I do not think that I was; but supposing I were: we must find a remedy and this Bill does not provide the answer. My remedy is that there should be a prima facie obligation on the local authority to discharge the mortgage, but that in certain circumstances—not the circumstances set out in this Bill,
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where the transaction may be unreasonable, but the circumstances which the noble and learned Viscount himself visualises: that the bargain was harsh and unconscionable—the local authority should have the right to refuse to pay and leave it to the county court. I have no feeling against the county court. I have earned some part of my living by going to the county courts and have found them friendly and competent bodies. I would as soon rely on the discretion of a county court judge as I would on that of anybody else, but I feel, however, that we are putting an unreasonable burden on the county court here by asking it to say, possibly after many years, that a transaction was unreasonable.
So my solution is—the noble and learned Viscount can "go for it" again if he wishes, and it is possible that he can suggest something better—that prima facie local authorities should be under an obligation. I do not link that this would be entirely unpopular with the local authorities themselves. I think they want to act reasonably. I do not think they want to benefit by the oppression of persons such as those of whom we are thinking. They would pay, but if they felt that there was anything about the transaction which would justify their not paying, then they should have the right to go to the county court. I realise that the noble and learned Viscount has given a promise that the matter will be reconsidered. I rely on him. I know that if he thinks a thing is right he will fight for it and see that it really is seriously considered; and I am content myself to accept his assurance that, in the light of everything that has been said, he will reconsider this point.
3.42 p.m.
LORD MILNER OF LEEDS: May I advance one additional point which has not so far been put forward? If this Bill goes through in its present form, the result will be that lenders will not consider, as they do at present, both the personal responsibility of the borrower and the value of the property put forward as security; they will consider the value of the property alone and disregard altogether the personal obligation of the borrower—at least they will do that if they are careful with their funds, and most building societies and other bodies of that type are. At present it is frequently the

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case that an additional proportion of the purchase price of a property is advanced because of the responsibility of the borrower. If he is a civil servant or occupies a special position, frequently a larger advance is made than would be justified in the normal course on the bare security of the property offered for mortgage. If the Bill goes through in its present form building societies and insurance companies will pay no regard to the personal position of the borrower; the whole consideration will be the value of the property, because there is always the possibility that the property will be taken over for slum clearance and only hare value paid by way of compensation. No regard will be paid to the amount actually lent on the property. I hope that the noble and learned Viscount will give that point his consideration.
LORD SALTOUN: May I ask a question arising out of what Lord Silkin has said? If the mortgage, as he suggests may sometimes be the case, is an old one which was properly made on the value of the house, and the house is to-day condemned by the local authority, does it not rather suggest that the owner-occupier has not kept the house up in accordance with his duty as a borrower? I do not see in that case why he should be assisted to the detriment of the mortgagee.
3.45 p.m.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: If I may. I will deal first with the point made by my noble friend Lord Saltoun, because it is rather outside the main stream of the debate. That point is covered by subsection (5) (b). That subsection states that:
" the court shall have regard to all the circumstances of the case, and in particular, in the case of a mortgage or charge—
in the terms of paragraph (b):
"to the extent to which the house may have become unfit for human habitation owing to any default on the part of the mortgagor or person entitled to the interest charged in carrying out any obligation under the terms of the mortgage or charge with respect to the repair of the house."
On the general point, I will certainly consider carefully everything that has been said in this debate. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, for his last speech, because he brought us back to the actual point we are considering
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here—and this is important—that this is a slum clearance compensation Bill. The main object of the Bill is to provide for the case where someone is living in a house which he had bought between September 1, 1939, and December 13, 1955, and which within the next ten years is purchased compulsorily as being an unfit house. The object is to see that he receives as compensation the amount that he would have received had the house not been declared unfit. We start in the Bill with an effort to help the owner-occupier whose house has become unfit and has been compulsorily acquired, by giving more than he would get under the ordinary law of compulsory acquisition. And to that extent I think everyone would agree, the public purse comes in to help the house owner.
Then one has to deal with this situation—I am sorry to emphasise my personal experience to your Lordships, because it is an irritating form of argument, but my personal experience is that people went into a house and made contracts under great stress of mind and great difficulty of human circumstances. And that is a position which has always appealed to my right honourable friend the Minister and to me. In these circumstances, we thought that there ought to be the possibility of having, and, indeed, the right to have, the matter reconsidered. The noble and learned Earl said that the Bill did not provide for the position of the lender. I ask him to have another look at it—I know that he will do so just as he knows that I, too, will have another look at it. Subsection (5) (a) provides that:
"the court shall have regard to all the circumstances of the case, and in particular, in the case of a mortgage or charge—

(a) to whether the mortgagee or person entitled to the benefit of the charge acted reasonably in advancing the principal sum on the security of the house;"

The question there is, is our test of "acting reasonably" right: and I am still, as I said to your Lordships, disposed to think that it is. You have to consider the position of the mortgagee as to whether what was done was a reasonable thing to do or whether the transaction took place with an inflated price because of the circumstances of the case.
I shall certainly look at the point which Lord Conesford suggested. I must say that the question of the personal

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covenant, as distinguished from the security of the house, had not seemed to me as of great importance, because the same document would include the personal covenant. The ordinary mortgage includes the personal covenant as well as indicating the security. I should have thought that that would certainly come into the circumstances of the case and into the reasonability of the mortgagee's action. But I am more than ready to consider that point, and I shall consider it with all those involved.
If your Lordships disagree with me on this matter I would rather divide and have done with it, because I feel so strongly about it. I want to go away from your Lordships' House knowing that your Lordships agree with me that there can be circumstances in which, where someone bought a house and entered into a mortgage in those years, whether after the bombing, during the war or in the housing shortage after the war, it is right that we should ask: was it reasonable to have advanced that money at the time? Was it reasonable to have made these instalment terms of purchase? Was the rate of interest reasonable? Were the whole circumstances of the case reasonable? I think that that is due to a person who ex hypothesi is being helped by the State. On the matter of principle, that he should be entitled to have the position reconsidered, I would not compromise; but I am prepared to look again at the method by which it should be done. I think that that is the most forthright way I can put it to your Lordships, and on that I hope the noble Lord will not press the matter today.
On Question, Clause 1 agreed to.
Clauses 2 and 3 agreed to.
Clause 4 [Interpretation]:
THE MINISTER WITHOUT PORTFOLIO (THE EARL OF MUNSTER): This Amendment and the one that follows it can be linked together and I need not detain your Lordships more than a few moments in explaining them. Their object is to place a house which is subject to an undertaking for its demolition in exactly the same position for the purposes of the Bill as a house which is subject to a demolition order. I think is need say no more. It will be clear to your Lordships. I think it is an Amendment which should be inserted, and accordingly I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 6, line 3, leave out from ("been") to ("given") in line 4 and insert ("vacated and demolished in pursuance of an undertaking for its demolition").—(The Earl of Munster.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
THE EARL OE MUNSTER: I beg to move the next Amendment, which is consequential on the first.
Amendment moved—
Page 6, line 5, leave out ("at the date of its demolition").—(The Earl of Munster.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Clause 4, as amended, agreed to.
Remaining clauses agreed to.
House resumed.

HOTEL PROPRIETORS (LIABILITIES AND RIGHTS) BILL
3.55 p.m.
Order of the Day for the House to be put into Committee read.
Moved, That the House do now resolve itself into Committee.—(Lord Merthyr.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.
House in Committee accordingly.
[The EARL OF BUCKINGHAMSHIRE in the Chair]
Clause 1:
Inns and innkeepers
1.—(1) A hotel within the meaning of this Act shall, and any other establishment shall not, be deemed to be an inn; and the duties, liabilities and rights which immediately before the commencement of this Act by law attached to an innkeeper as such shall, subject to the provisions of this Act, attach to the proprietor of such a hotel and shall not attach to any other person.
(3) In this Act, the expression "hotel" means an establishment held out by the proprietor as offering food, drink and, if so required, sleeping accommodation, without special contract, to any traveller presenting himself who appears able and willing to pay a reasonable sum for the services and facilities provided and who is in a lit state to be received.
LORD FARINGDON LORD FARINGDON moved, in subsection (1), to substitute "an hotel" for "a hotel." The noble Lord said: I cannot possibly pretend that this Amendment and Amendments Nos. 2, 3, 4, 7 and 11 have any considerable effect upon the meaning of the Bill. I may confess that

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outside your Lordships' House I have been somewhat teased about these Amendments. However, I take them rather seriously. I consider that none of us can be too happy about the use by ourselves and by others of our language. We are constantly told of the excellences of that language, but I think that one of the excellences which is constantly praised is praised in the wrong terms. For example, we are constantly told that no language has such richness of synonyms as English has; but what we are not told, as a rule, is that every single one of those synonyms has a particular shade of meaning of its own and should be used on certain occasions and not on others.
In moving these little Amendments, which I am hopeful that the noble Lord, Lord Merthyr, will accept, it is not my intention to quote authorities. I do not think that it should be necessary to do so in your Lordships' House. If one considers the enormous sums of money which must have been spent upon the education of Members of your Lordships' House, one would probably conclude that there is no body anywhere in the world which has had such educational advantages; and I believe that your Lordships should be able, and are able, to decide matters of this sort without reference to authorities. I would make reference, however, to one authority on modern English usage who has had enormous influence, and I think, on the whole, beneficial influence, on the subject, though sometimes he leans over backwards and indulges in a kind of inverted snobbery, in his attempts to avoid preciosity. I suggest that, desirable as the avoidance of such excessive elaboration is, it is nevertheless a mistake to throw the baby of elegance out with the dirty water of preciosity.
To-day, I am asking your Lordships to make a demonstration in favour of elegance. Many noble Lords have told me that they agree with me in thinking that "an hotel" and "an hotelkeeper" are preferable to aspirating the "h" in "hotel," as is usual and as appears nowadays to be modern practice. I find that it is becoming usual to hear the word "humour" with an aspirated "h" and dread the day when we are going to hear "honour" so pronounced too. I would ask your Lordships to join me in making a demonstration in favour of elegance. I suggest that the use of "an" instead
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of "a", if ever it be justified, is justified before the word "hotel". I beg to move
Amendment moved—
Page 1, line 5, leave out ("a") and insert ("an").—(Lord Faringdon.)
LORD CONESFORD: I think that this Amendment has merit and should be made. My noble friend Lord Merthyr has in favour of the drafting at present in the Bill the great authority of Fowler, who has been mentioned by the noble Lord who moved this Amendment, but I think that, for once, Fowler has "nodded." Fowler does not dispute the rule on which I am going to rely, but he says that it is obsolete, and in fact he describes those of us who believe in it as pedants. I think Fowler is wrong. Let me state simply what the rule is. In the case of an aspirated "h", in a word, that is to say, where the "h" is pronounced, the question whether you say "a" or "an" depends on whether the first syllable of the word beginning with the "h" is accented or not. If it is accented it should be "a"; if it is unaccented it should be "an": that is to say, if the first syllable of the word beginning with "h" has the accent, you say "a", but if a subsequent syllable has the accent you say "an". I say that that rule is not in the least obsolete, and I venture to suggest that your Lordships all follow it in ordinary conversation.
Let me give a simple example. I believe that every one of your Lordships would say "a Harrow boy", but would also speak of "an Harrovian". That exactly illustrates my point. My noble friend the Leader of the House shakes his head, but I cannot think that he would say "a Harrovian". I feel that a great many noble Lords would say that, so far, I am right. Where does this rule lead us in the Statutes? This rule would lead us to say in Statutes "a hospital" but "an hotel"—and I would point out that that is precisely what our Statutes have hitherto done; at least, I am going to quote some Statutes which bear me out. My noble and learned friend the Lord Chancellor may be able to say that there are later examples which go the other way, but if that is so, I am unaware of them. For the expression "a hospital" I would refer to Section 1 of the Poor Removal Act, 1846; and in favour of "an hotel" I would refer to Section 2 of the Licensing (Ireland) Act, 1902,

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where the words are "an hotel". Therefore, unless there are good reasons, I cannot see why the learned draftsman on this occasion should not follow his predecessors.
As a justification and explanation of the rule I should like to read a short passage from a hook called The queen's English by Dean Alford, which your Lordships will find in our Library. Incidentally, I was delighted to find that this was published in 1864. It therefore solves a question that puzzled many of us when Her Majesty the Queen came to the Throne—namely, whether it was now the Queen's English or still the King's English. It is clear that we should now refer to the Queen's English. The passage that. I would quote is as follows:
"What is our rule—or have we any—respecting the use of a or an before words beginning with an aspirated h? The rule commonly given is this: that when the accent on the word thus beginning is on the first syllable, we must use a; when it is on the second or any following syllable, we may use an. This is reasonable enough, because the first syllable, by losing its accent, also loses some portion of the strength of its aspiration. We cannot aspirate with the same strength the first syllables in the words history and historian, and in consequence, we commonly say a history; but an historian."
I submit that that rule is a rule which has reason; it has never become obsolete; it is followed in ordinary practice in conversation, as I have shown by the example of "a Harrow boy" and "an Harrovian" and it has hitherto been followed by our Parliamentary draftsmen. I therefore support this Amendment.
LORD REA: The noble Lord bases his argument on whether the accent goes on the first or later syllable in the word spoken; but would he let us know where he stands in the case of a one-syllable word. And, in the case of an inn sign of a public-house, would he look at it as "a Horse and a Hound" or "an 'Orse and an 'Ound"?
LORD MERTHYR: I feel that this momentous question is one which essentially falls to be decided by the Committee as a whole, without Party lines, and I am prepared to leave it to the Committee to decide, if they would be good enough to express their views. The noble Lord, Lord Faringdon, has dwelt upon the vast sums of money that have been poured out on education. If the noble Lord had been "a Harrovian" instead of (as I
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know he was, because I was there at the same time) "an Etonian", there might have been something in that argument. It is rather sad to think that the noble Lord and I should have been educated in the same place, and at the same time, and that forty years later we should come here to differ upon this question. The noble Lord, Lord Faringdon, and the noble Lord, Lord Conesford, have mentioned Fowler, but have not gone so far as to quote him much, possibly because he is against them. Without troubling your Lordships for too lone, I should just like to say why I have doubts about this Amendment.
Fowler, who surely ought to be accepted as the authority, says this:
"A is used before all consonants except silent h (a history, an hour); an was formerly usual before an unaccented syllable beginning with h (an historical work), but now that the h in such words is pronounced the distinction has become pedantic, and a historical should be said and written; similarly an humble is now meaningless and undesirable."
Then I took the trouble to have the word "hotel" looked up and this is what I find:
"The old-fashioned pronunciation with the h silent is certainly doomed and is not worth fighting for."
There it is. I submit that we can sum up the matter thus. The noble Lord opposite is out of date and old-fashioned. I, on this side of the House, on the other hand, am a progressive. I admit, of course, that so long as the old French pronunciation of the word "hotel" was used, then the word "an" was appropriate to come before it. But times change, and the word now is not thus pronounced, I submit. Except in a very few cases, the word is "hotel." That being so, I submit that the proper word to go before this is "a" and not "an". But, as I said at the beginning, I am entirely willing to take the sympathetic view of the Committee on this matter, and perhaps we can show what we think by our voices on the question. If those who agree with me are willing, I will cease the battle, although I am not so sure that we do not shout louder than the others. I say that because I do not think it is worth dividing on this Amendment. To avoid a Division, I will give way and allow the Amendment, if it is your Lordships' pleasure.
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
LORD FARINGDON: The next Amendment is a similar Amendment. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 1, line 10, leave out ("a") and insert ("an").—(Lord Faringdon.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
LORD FARINGDON: I beg to move this Amendment.
Amendment moved—
Page 1, line 12, leave out ("a") and insert ("an").—(Lord Faringdon.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
4.10 p.m.
LORD SILKIN LORD SILKIN moved, in subsection (3), to omit "food, drink and, if so required." The noble Lord said: We now come to the provisions of the Bill, and I beg to move the first Amendment standing in my name. This deals with the definition of "an hotel", and in the definition in the Bill the emphasis appears to be laid upon the provision of food and drink and then. "if so required, sleeping accommodation." As I read this definition, so long as food and drink are provided to any traveller presenting himself, and who appears able and willing to pay, the place is, by definition, an hotel. But if sleeping accommodation is also required, so much the better. In my view, the essential factor in an hotel is the provision of sleeping accommodation. People often go to an hotel not for the purpose of getting food at all, but for the purpose of getting sleeping accommodation. Therefore, it seems to me quite inartistic and unsound to define an hotel primarily in relation to the provision of food and drink.
Furthermore, it is quite inconsistent with the rest of the Bill. If the noble Lord will look at the Bill, he will find that throughout there is the assumption that sleeping accommodation is being provided. That is the implication in every other clause. Having defined an hotel as being primarily a place where food and drink are provided and, if so required, sleeping accommodation, once we part from this definition there is no further reference to food and drink at all throughout the Bill. Therefore, possibly the noble Lord in charge of the Bill will see his way so to alter the definition of "hotel" as to ensure that it defines his primary purpose, which is that the place should provide sleeping accommodation,
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and the subsidiary purpose, which is eating and drinking. I ought to have said that this Amendment goes with the next. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 1, line 17, leave out from ("offering") to ("sleeping") in line 18.—(Lord Silkin.)
LORD SALTOUN: I should like to ask the noble Lord who moved this Amendment whether it would extend the provisions of the Bill to those places, which are going up all over the country, that offer lock-up rooms to visitors without any special food or drink at all: the visitors provide for themselves. The noble Lord will know of such places for the accommodation of motor travellers. They are of such a nature that it would not be proper to bring them under the provisions of this Bill.
LORD MERTHYR: I am sorry that at present, at least, I cannot accept this Amendment, and I would ask your Lordships to resist it. I must admit I find it difficult to see just what is between the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, and myself on this matter. I contend that the Bill as drafted carries out the recommendations of the Lord Chancellor's Law Reform Committee as to the definition of "an hotel". These two Amendments—and I agree that we should look at them together, as the noble Lord himself suggested—seek to alter the definition of "an hotel". Therefore, if they were agreed to, we should be going contrary to the recommendation of the Law Reform Committee. I agree with the noble Lord that the emphasis of this Bill is on sleeping accommodation, but it seems to me that his point is met in the Bill as drafted. Further, there seems to be no need for the second Amendment. There is nothing in the Bill to imply that the eating and sleeping accommodation to be provided must be under the same roof. So far as I understand the matter—and I hope I have done so—under this Bill an hotel can provide accommodation under more than one roof; and it can provide sleeping accommodation under one and eating accommodation under another. It seems to me quite undesirable to alter the emphasis in the present definition.
I also have in mind a point which was, I believe, raised in another place, that nothing should be done to impair the

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facilities which are now provided, and which are expected on an increasing scale, for genuine travellers, maybe on foot, who cal] at hotels and ask for food and refreshment—I refer to ramblers and similar people. That point was taken in another place and, as I understand it, there would be a danger, if this Amendment were accepted, that that accommodation would be jeopardised. I do not know that there is much between us, but I certainly ask the Committee not to pass this Amendment.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: May I make an appeal? It is such a rare and refreshing position for me, even at a slight expense of Order, to defend the views of the Labour Party expressed in another place against the attacks on them by the Labour Party in your Lordships' House. On this Amendment I should also like to tell your Lordships that a revered colleague of all of us, Mr. Chuter Ede, who feels so strongly on behalf of ramblers and similar people, urged that we should do nothing in the Bill, as my noble friend Lord Merthyr has said, to alter the liability or decrease the importance of innkeepers who provide food and drink for ramblers and people of that kind. So I appeal to the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, not in my own capacity as Lord Chancellor, but on behalf of our right honourable and respected former colleague, not to press this Amendment.
LORD SILKIN: May I ask the noble and learned Viscount whether he is suggesting that my Amendment would, in fact, alter the rights and obligations of an innkeeper? I merely present it as what seems to me the logical thing to do. One regards an hotel as primarily a place which provides accommodation and also, if required, food. That seems to me simple. But I cannot see either the case of the noble Lord, Lord Merthyr, who rejects it because, he says, it is in conflict with the second Report of the Law Reform Committee—it is nothing of the kind—or the argument of the noble and learned Viscount, who quite legitimately drove a wedge between my friends in another place and myself. I think that is perfectly fair game. But is he seriously suggesting that my Amendment would make any difference whatever to the legal obligations of the hotel proprietor? If he assures me that that is
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so, I will gladly withdraw the Amendment.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: If the noble Lord feels strongly about the point I will have another look at it, but I understood that not only the Law Reform Committee but the decided cases placed the emphasis as we have done in the Bill, and that it would change that if we placed the emphasis on sleeping accommodation. I do not think there is much between us in the matter. There is always a danger if the emphasis is altered, because then skilled lawyers (and nobody knows this better than the noble Lord opposite) always try to build on that an argument which might create uncertainty. I do not put it any higher than that. That is the position as I understand it. I will gladly have another look at it, but I ask the noble Lord not to press the Amendment.
LORD SILKIN: Certainly I will not press this Amendment. I do not think it is all that important, but if there is no objection, I think the onus should be on accepting the Amendment because it is logical. I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
4.22 p.m.
LORD SILKIN LORD SILKIN moved, in subsection (3), to leave out "traveller" and insert "person". The noble Lord said: I beg to move this Amendment, which is to substitute the word "person" for the word "traveller". This again is not in the definition of an hotel and it relates to a traveller presenting himself. I do not know whether the term "traveller" is a term of art, or the subject of any legal definition, or whether, if it is, it is desired to confine the advantages of this Bill to a "traveller" as distinct from anybody else. But I think we ought to use the widest possible word to cover anybody who presents himself at an hotel and seeks food and drink and, if he requires it also, as the Bill stands, sleeping accommodation. Surely the noble Lord does not intend to confine himself to people who are described as travellers? If he does, ought he not to provide a definition of the word "traveller"? If he did, he would find that he was really a person.
Amendment moved—
Page 1, line l9, leave out I "traveller") and insert ("person").—(Lord Silkin.)
LORD MERTHYR: Here again, I am afraid that I must ask your Lordships not to allow this Amendment to be passed. I do not do so at all lightheartedly; there are serious reasons involved. It seems to me that perhaps the chief reason is that one of the main objects of this Bill is, and one of the main objects of the Law Reform Committee in their Report was, to alter a state of affairs which had, perhaps I might say, grown up, and in future to confine strict liability on the part of the proprietor to persons who are genuine travellers—that is, those who actually stay a night at an inn or hotel. I should like to take this opportunity of saying something about a point arising out of the postponement of the Committee stage. If I may say so—I hope I am right—it seemed to me then that the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, was under the impression that in moving the introduction of this Bill I was in some way acting on behalf of hotel proprietors. If he was under that impression, I should like to make it clear that that is not so. It is true that I have some shares in one hotel, but beyond that there is no ground whatever for saying or thinking that I have any connection with the hotel proprietors' trade or business. I do not belong to any organisation connected with it. I should like to say that to banish the thought that I am here with a brief for hotel proprietors. What I have just said applies to several of these Amendments.
It has been decided, I know, in 1948 that an innkeeper's duty under the criminal law to supply refreshments did not extend to a person who could not be regarded as a traveller. It seems to me to be undesirable to do anything in this Bill which has the effect of altering the criminal law as it now stands, because the criminal law is directly involved in this. There seems to me to be no purpose in this Amendment, if I may respectfully say so, because Clause 2 of this Bill is confined to guests who engage sleeping accommodation and who are therefore, I should have thought, obviously travellers. If the noble Lord agrees with that proposition, why does he want to alter "traveller" to "person"? That is widening the word in a way which I do not think is useful. Again I do not know that there is very much between us, as was the case on the last Amendment which he moved, but in my opinion not
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only would this Amendment not improve the Bill, but it would make it less effective in its purpose. I therefore ask your Lordships to resist it.
LORD SALTOUN: I should like to understand that. Do I understand the noble Lord, Lord Merthyr, rightly if I imagine that he said that, if I go to an hotel in my overcoat and put my coat, hat and stick in the cloakroom, in the place appointed by the hotelkeeper, and go to lunch—or, possibly, if I deposit any valuables I may be carrying in the place appointed by the hotelkeeper and I go to lunch—and I suffer loss, the hotel-keeper is not liable to me unless I have taken the precaution of booking a room for the night? That seems to me what he was arguing.
LORD MERTHYR: We shall hear later on a little more about this matter. The noble Lord has really put two questions in one, in two different sets of circumstances. The answer to the first part of his question, in my opinion, is that in the case of the person who goes into a cloakroom (I think the noble Lord said) and leaves his hat there, the proprietor is not liable unless negligence is proved. The noble Lord then touched on the question of depositing valuables, as I understood him. That, of course, is another matter, but we shall hear more about this later this afternoon.
LORD PETHICK-LAWRENCE: Suppose I live in a house next door to an hotel and it so happens that my house is being repainted. I do not like staying in my house while it is being repainted, so I put up at the hotel next door for a week. Surely the noble Lord would not contend that that would put me in some way outside this Bill because I was not a traveller. I certainly should not be a traveller, because I should have gone only next door. In my opinion it is very difficult to call me a traveller, and yet I should come under the provisions of this Bill just as if I had come from a hundred miles away.
LORD MERTHYR: I agree that it would not put the noble Lord outside the provisions of this Bill, because he would go to the hotel and book sleeping accommodation. The fact that he might have come only half a mile, instead of a hundred miles, is, in my view, immaterial.
EARL JOWITT: Is there authority for his? I do not know what the definition of "traveller" is. Does one become a traveller ipso facto by reason of sleeping a night in an hotel? In the case cited by the noble Lord, Lord Pethick-Lawrence, I should have thought that he was not a traveller. Is there authority for saying that he is a traveller just because he sleeps at the hotel?
LORD SALTOUN: Is there not a definition of "traveller" in the: Acts dealing with alcohol? This question of a bona fide traveller occurred a great many times in the early years of the century.
LORD MERTHYR: I should hesitate very much to debate this legal point with the noble and learned Earl, and I should be very much inclined to accept it if he told me that I was wrong. But I should have thought the answer was that if a man books a room at an hotel, it does not matter how far he goes in order to do so. If I am wrong on that, where is the line to be drawn? Is it ten miles, is it a hundred miles? I should have thought that the only logical rule was that if a man books a night at an hotel it does not matter how far he has come. If I am wrong about that I will give way at once.
EARL JOWITT: Because it is SO difficult to draw a line, is that not the very reason why it would be wiser to accept the word "person" rather than the word "traveller"?
LORD MERTHYR: With respect, I should have thought the answer to that is, No. I should have thought that it would he regarded by everybody who has to do with the law as it would then be, if this Bill were passed, that if a room is booked, a man is automatically a traveller. If I am wrong, perhaps the noble and learned Viscount the Lord Chancellor will put me right.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I think that if I remind the noble and learned Earl, Lord Jowitt, of the Case Law on the matter by name, the points will come back to his mind. He will remember that in a case known as William v. Linney, which is reported in 1951; I King's Bench, at page 565. the Court of Appeal decided that an innkeeper's strict liability under the civil law—may I
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repeat, under the civil law—extended to anyone visiting his premises for refreshment; and one of the main objects of the Law Reform Committee's Reports was to alter the state of affairs thus disclosed and to confine strict liability to persons who stayed the night at the inn. That is done by Clause 2 of the Bill, and that would cover the noble Lord, Lord Pethick-Lawrence, in the point he raised. But the noble and learned Earl will also remember the case of The King v. Higgins, reported in 1948: I King's Bench, at page 165, in which the Court of Criminal Appeal decided that an innkeeper's duty under the criminal law to supply refreshment did not extend to a person who could not be regarded as a traveller; so that delimited the criminal law in that way.
It is not for this House, sitting legislatively, to speculate a3 to the inter-action of these cases, because the point may arise. We have to look at the practical position and to see that it is clear. If we have the word "traveller" it will leave the criminal law as it exists to-day, but it will make quite clear the legal position that the person who books a bedroom is covered by Clause 2. My view is that someone who takes sleeping accommodation is a traveller, however short his journey. It is for that reason that I prefer not to have the change, but if any noble Lords who have any doubt on consideration will have a word with me in the intervening period I shall be pleased to consider the point.
LORD FARINGDON: I wonder if the noble Lord could tell me this. I am a little puzzled. Supposing, as in the case put forward by my noble friend Lord Pethiek-Lawrence, I am having my house painted and I move into the hotel which may be next door. I can, I understand, by virtue of the fact that I book a room, be a traveller. But the painting may take some time. Can a man stay in the hotel for a week or a fortnight and be a traveller all the time, or does he cease to be a traveller at any stage? Indeed, as we all know, there are a number of people who will stay for quite considerable periods in hotels. Are they covered by the term "traveller", although they may perhaps stay for months or longer in an hotel in which there are other people who are travellers just staying for one or two nights? Are they all "travellers"?
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: If the noble Lord will allow me to intervene I may be able to help. He will see that this comes in only as part of the definition. The rights of the noble Lord and his friends, or indeed of any unfortunate grammarian who is turned out of his house for a long time, are covered quite clearly by Clause 2, so they would, not be in any difficulty in the matter.
LORD FARINGDON: Thank you.
LORD SILKIN: I cannot for the life of me see why it is necessary, in a Bill which deals with the civil rights of innkeepers, to have in the word "traveller" when you really mean "person". Every time the noble Lord, Lord Merthyr, or even the noble and learned Viscount tried to explain "traveller", they did so by the use of the word "person". I cannot see why is should be necessary to retain in the Bill this word "traveller", which is confusing and which appears at any rate to limit the liability of the innkeeper, and to restrict it to that particular class of person who can be defined as a traveller. Let me say at once to the noble Lord, Lord Merthyr, that I never imagined for one moment that he was introducing this Bill because of his personal interest in the hotel business, or because he has shares or anything of that kind. Of course not; I should not have dreamed of making such an imputation. What I intended to say was that this was an innkeepers' Bill. It was introduced in order to assist in the legal position of innkeepers, apparently because they have suffered from the effects of a legal decision which this Bill now seeks to put right. That is all I had in mind. Certainly the noble Lord can rest assured that I had no thought whatever of ever making the slightest imputation against him. Coming back to the Amendment, I still think that it is right, though I should not wish to divide the House on it. The noble and learned Viscount has said that he will look at it again, and I am quite content with that.
LORD MERTHYR: May I just say, in answer to the noble Lord, that I entirely accept what he has just said about what I said. I agree with him in every way—save this: as I regard this Bill, it is not so much an innkeepers' Bill but an attempt to bring up to date the law on the subject of innkeepers from the point of view not only of innkeepers but also
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of the public, the other party concerned. I hope that in that way it is a reasonable Bill and, where necessary, a compromise between the conflicting interests of the innkeeper and the public. I hope that it does not give any undue or unreasonable advantage, either to the innkeeper or to the public; I should be disappointed if it did. But the noble Lord has said that if the Amendment could be considered in the interval between now and the next stage, he would be good enough to withdraw it. I would certainly enter into the spirit of that offer and give serious consideration to it before the next stage.
LORD SILKIN: I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
4.39 p.m.
LORD SILKIN: There is little that I want to say on this Amendment. The term "proprietor" is used, and I think it ought to be defined. Quite often, the proprietor is a limited company—it may even be a company which is registered abroad. The person one wants to look to is the person who is running the business, the manager; and my suggestion is that we should define "proprietor" so as to include not only the owner, whoever that may be, but also the manager of the hotel. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 1, line 21, at end insert—
("(b) the expression 'proprietor' shall include the manager as well as the owner.").—(Lord Silkin.)
LORD MERTHYR: Here, I am afraid, there is more between us, and I think it would be most unfortunate if this Amendment were passed. So far as I am aware, the law, in this matter has always dealt with the proprietor of the hotel. I agree that in olden days it may be that the proprietor was individually present on the premises all the time and lived there; and I agree that in these days he is possibly nowhere near. It is that man—if it be only one—who is actually the proprietor. I also agree that the proprietor may be a company, but it remains true that the law has always dealt with the proprietor and no one else, and I believe it would be a dangerous precedent if we now started to widen the phrase to include somebody else employed by the proprietor, such as the manager. If the

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manager, why not the doorkeeper or receptionist, who might be there far more than the manager? I can see no objection at all to continuing to deal legally with the proprietor. In any case, there is no doubt as to who is the proprietor, even if it is a company, or I hay,: never heard of a case in which doubt has arisen. Therefore I do not see the necessity for this Amendment. In fact, I go so far as to say that if the Amendment were passed the Bill would not be such a useful one. Moreover, I suggest that it would be wrong that a hotel manager should have any lien on a guest's property, as he would have if this Amendment is passed and another part of the Bill is not amended. With respect, I do not think that the noble Lord has made out a case for this Amendment, and I ask your Loreships not to pass it.
LORD SILKIN: The noble Lord certainly did not make a case against it. It is in the interest of the guest that the person who is in charge of the hotel, the only person with whom he has contact, should be responsible. I am not sure that he is not responsible in any case, but this Amendment makes it abundantly clear. If the noble Lord has any special reason other than wanting to relieve the manager of liability I could understand it; but I cannot see why he should suggest that this makes the Bill worse. It is certainly not worse from the point of view of the guest that he should be able to look to the person who is in fact responsible for the management of the hotel.
THE EARL OF SELKIRK: I do not know whether I am adding to what has been said by the noble Lord, Lord Merthyr, but this is a personal obligation on the proprietor, and in that sense I do not think it really matters whether as such he is an individual or a company. I believe it would be wrong to extend that liability to a member of his sta1 who, after all, is net very clearly defined as such in this Amendment and might be anybody. As the noble Lord has explained, the obligation is there, and if one wishes to bring an action or there is any claim, one knows perfectly well whom it is being brought against. Further, one must look at the other side If there is a personal obligation which extends to the manager, he then has a
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personal lien, though only as such, on certain articles belonging to the visitor or traveller as the case may be.
LORD SILKIN: It does not in the least follow that this would give him a lien.
THE EARL OF SELKIRK: It would be very difficult to exclude that without being too unfair.
LORD SILKIN: I will not press this Amendment. I beg leave to withdraw it.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 1, as amended, agreed to.
Clause 2:
Modifications of liabilities and rights of innkeepers as such
2.—(1) Without prejudice to any other liability incurred by him with respect to any property brought to the hotel, the proprietor of a hotel shall not be liable as an inkeeper to make good to any traveller any loss of or damage to such property except where—

(a) at the time of the loss or damage sleeping accommodation at the hotel had been engaged for the traveller; and

(b) the loss or damage occurred during the period commencing with the midnight immediately preceding, and ending with the midnight immediately following, a period for which the traveller was a guest at the hotel and entitled to use the accommodation so engaged.

(2) Without prejudice to any other liability or right of hi,; with respect thereto, the proprietor of a hotel shall not as an innkeeper be liable to make good to any guest of his any loss of or damage to, or have any lien on, any vehicle, or any horse or other live animal or its harness or other equipment.
(3) Where the proprietor of a hotel is liable as an innkeeper to make good the loss of or any damage to property brought to the hotel, his liability to any one guest shall not exceed fifty pounds in respect of any one article, or one hundred pounds in the aggregate, except where—

(a) the property was stolen, lost or damaged through the default, neglect or wilful act of the proprietor or some servant of his; or

(b) the property was deposited by or on behalf of the guest expressly for safe custody with the proprietor or some servant of his authorised, or appearing to be authorised, for the purpose, and, if so required by the proprietor or that servant, in a container fastened or sealed by the depositor; or

(c) at a time after the guest had arrived at the hotel, either the property in question was offered for deposit as aforesaid and the proprietor or his servant refused to receive it, or the guest or some other guest acting on his behalf wished so to offer the property in question but, through the default of the

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proprietor or a servant of his, was unable to do so:

Provided that the proprietor shall not be entitled to the protection of this subsection unless, at the time when the property in question was brought to the hotel, a copy of this section printed in plain type was conspicuously displayed in a place where it could conveniently be read by his guests at or near the reception office or desk or, where there is no reception office or desk, at or near the main entrance to the hotel.
LORD FARINGDON: I beg to move the next Amendment.
Amendment moved—
Page 2, line 3, leave out ("a")and insert ("an")—(Lord Faringdon.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
4.42 p.m.
LORD SILKEN LORD SILKEN moved, in subsection (1) (b) to leave out "and" where that word last occurs, and to insert "or". The The noble Lord said: I beg to move the Amendment standing in my name on the Order Paper. It is rather more than a drafting Amendment. It seeks to extend the liability of the hotel proprietor for a longer period than the Bill at present provides, and I hope that this is not in itself wrong. At present, liability for loss or damage must have occurred during a period for the relevant portion of which the traveller was a guest at the hotel and entitled to use the accommodation so engaged, but there is the case when a person has booked a room and sent his luggage in advance, perhaps a day or two before he actually arrives. In those circumstances he is certainly not a guest of the hotel. He cannot be a guest until he actually arrives; but he may be entitled to use the accommodation. I believe that the liability of the hotel ought to run during the period for which the traveller was a guest or the period during which he was entitled to use the accommodation so engaged.
To take another possibility: a person books a room and sends his luggage but does not arrive in time to take up the room and it is therefore vacant. He is not a guest, unless the mere fact of booking a room at the hotel without physical attendance makes one a guest. In my view he is not a guest but he is entitled to use the accommodation. He cannot comply with both requirements, and therefore I feel that the right word is "or", and that liability should exist
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either if the traveller is a guest or if he is entitled to use the accommodation so engaged. Incidentally I see that the word "traveller" is used again, in that liability is to a traveller and not to a person; and again I suggest that this word "traveller" needs to be looked at.
Amendment moved—
Page 2, line 11, leave out ("and") and insert ("or").—(Lord Silkin.)
LORD MERTHYR: I really find it difficult to see the purpose of this Amendment. We must draw some limits to the liability of the proprietor. Rightly or wrongly, the Bill seeks to define those limits in Clause 2 (1) of the Bill. The important words begin in line 3:
"… the proprietor of a hotel shall not be liable … except where …"
and then:
(b) the loss or damage occurred during the period commencing with the midnight immediately preceding, and ending with the midnight immediately following, a period for which the traveller was a guest at the hotel and entitled to use the accommodation so engaged.
Where the Bill says "and entitled to use" the noble Lord wants to say "or entitled to use", and he has mentioned the case where a man may send his luggage in advance, possibly three or four days before he arrives, and suggests that there should be innkeeper's liability for loss or damage to that luggage for perhaps three or four days before the guest arrives. Again, the noble Lord also suggested a case where the guest books a room and sends his luggage perhaps only a few hours before, and then does not use the room. It is just a question of degree. I admit that we could extend the period of liability. We could extend it in both directions, both before the guest arrives (if he ever does arrive) and after he leaves. That is true. All I say is that it is necessary to come to some definition of the period of liability. I am resting my case on that. The Bill comes down with a definite period, and it says in as many words—
LORD SILKIN: I am not challenging the period at all. In my Amendment the period remains as it is.
LORD MERTHYR: To this extent the noble Lord does so. Here we come into slight conflict I think; because under the Bill if a man books a room and does not use it, then, as I read the Bill as

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it is drafted, he cannot claim. Before he can claim, a Iran has to be a guest, and I think that means that he has to be in the hotel during the critical period. As I understand the Amendment, if it were passed a man could claim although he never went near the hotel—if I am wrong the noble Lord will correct me. I do not think that that is desirable. As I understand the noble Lord's argument, it is that a man could book a room, put his suit case in the hotel, leave it there overnight, never go to the place at all and then, if the suit case were stolen. He would have the right to claim. He would he able to say: "I booked a room; therefore I was entitled to that accommodation for one night and therefore I can claim". It is a matter of degree.
But the question is this: is it desirable that in those circumstances there should be a claim? In my submission, it is not. If you ask me why, I can only say as I said before, that there must he some limit to this liability, and I think that the limit laid clown in the Bill is fair—in other words, a man can claim if he, first, books a room, and, second, sleeps in the hotel for a night. Then he can claim for twenty-four hours before that midnight and twenty-four hours after that midnight. I think that is reasonable. It seems to me that if he does not go to the hotel at all he should not be able to claim. Therefore, I hope the Committee will reject the Amendment.
LORD FARINGDON: I am rather puzzled by what Lord Merthyr says. I confess that I share the view of my noble friend Lord Silkin upon this matter. I did not agree with him on the last Amendment, which he withdrew, but I support hire on this. If I book a room at an hotel, and if I do not occupy that room on the day when I am expected but all the same pay for it, and if I have sent on my luggage and the proprietor has sent the luggage up to the room, then I should have thought that his liability attaches to the letting of the room, regardless of whether I am there or not. If I send my luggage along and simply hope for the best without booking a room, then, I can appreciate, the hotel proprietor should have no responsibility. But if I have actually booked, and pay for, a room, surely the hotel proprietor should have responsibility and should have liability.
LORD SILKIN: The noble Lord, Lord Merthyr, started by saying that he did not understand why I was moving the Amendment. As he developed his case, I think he began to appreciate that there was a point here, and I do not think that he has really answered it by saying that it is not desirable to extend the liability of the innkeeper. Why not, if it is a proper liability'? I would not regard that as justification for refusing every single Amendment as the noble Lord has done so far—simply because he does not want to extend the liability of the innkeeper. I want to extend it to the extent that is practicable and reasonable. I think that we here, by this Amendment, safeguard the interests both of the innkeeper and of the guest who goes to the hotel. The mere fact that the noble Lord does not want to extend liability is no reason whatever for not doing it. If it is right, it should be done, and I think that in this case it is right. Assume that you have sent your luggage to a hotel where you have booked a room. That is a common practice. It is not as if there were anything improper or unusual about it. I suggest that the hotel proprietor has undertaken to look after your luggage and he must be held to be liable in respect of it. I shall begin to think that the noble Lord is unreasonable if he does not accept this Amendment.
LORD PETHICK-LAWRENCE: May I ask the noble and learned Viscount the Lord Chancellor whether he would consider if "guest" covers a man who intends to go to an hotel and deposits his luggage there but does not actually go himself? If the noble and learned Viscount says that that is so, then I would not wish to support my noble friend's Amendment. If a man is not a guest unless he goes to the hotel in person and stays, then I certainly should support my noble friend.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: As I understand it, there must be something more connoted by the word "guest" than entitled to use the accommodation. I should have thought it required a personal presence. But I think that the answer to Lord Silkin's worry is this: that the traveller cannot be entitled to use sleeping accommodation without being a guest. That aspect of the matter is all right. But the other aspect, that he can hardly be a guest—
LORD SILKIN: If he has booked a room he is entitled to use the accommodation, is he not? He becomes a guest when he physically attends.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I suppose that that is so, although it is comparatively rare. But take it the other way. Clause 2 (2) says:
"during the period commencing with the midnight immediately preceding, and ending with the midnight immediately following, a period for which the traveller was a guest at the hotel …"
A man could hardly be a guest at the midnight following that period without being entitled to sleeping accommodation. We are dealing here with strict liability, and the innkeeper's liability is to-day to guests and not to people who send baggage in advance and who may not themselves turn up. I think the noble Lord has it in mind, and I emphasise it, that this clause is dealing with the strict liability and not with anything less than that. The law to-day is that strict liability extends to guests—that is, people who are actually there. And in so far as the noble Lord wishes to extend that, he is changing the law adversely to innkeepers and hoteliers. What I was trying to do—and it is always a dangerous thing—is to show that in practice there is not likely to be a hard case. It would be more accurate to put it in this way: in so far as the noble Lord thinks it is a hard case, it would he an extension of the law against the innkeeper to bring it within the scope of the Bill.
EARL JOWITT: I am getting confused about this matter. Two people book accommodation at an hotel. The first one motors down and takes the luggage of both. He puts his own luggage in his own bedroom and his friend's luggage in his friend's room. His friend intends to come down that night. In the meantime, before the friend gets down, the luggage which has been placed in his bedroom is stolen. Is there a liability there or not? There is no liability under the Bill as it is, by reason of the word "and". If it were "or", there would be. Ought there to be liability or not? —that is the point. It sometimes happens that a man has booked a room intending to go down to the hotel but is prevented from getting there—perhaps he is sitting late at a debate in your Lordships' House or he has been detained by fog. He has
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booked his room and paid for it, and the luggage in his room is stolen. Is it right that he should have some redress or not? I do not know. I do not feel strongly about it one way or the other, but I think we ought to realise that that is the point of this Amendment and we ought to decide what is the right course in the circumstances.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: There is no doubt that if the room was booked in the name of a person who did not turn up and the luggage was stolen, then under the present law liability would not accrue. On that point it is not the intention of the Bill to make the law more severe. I leave the point open. I think the noble and learned Earl would agree with me that if the person who booked the two rooms actually turned up and treated the luggage as his, a nice point arises, which the noble and learned Earl and I might have to decide at some time.
LORD SILKIN: The difference between us has now been narrowed to this. We are not now discussing the merits: I think the merits are with the Amendment. The noble and learned Viscount asked if it is desirable to alter the law to the detriment of the innkeeper. I certainly think it is in this case. In another part of the Bill we are altering the law to the advantage of the innkeeper we are relieving him of the hardship of a case which has been decided by your Lordships against him. This might be regarded as a quid pro quo. Since we are amending the law, let us amend it so that it does justice to both sides. I think that this is an Amendment which is right.
LORD MERTHYR: I should like to pose this question: how can a traveller be entitled to use sleeping accommodation at an hotel unless he is a guest? If we consider that question and look at the Amendment. I think we shall agree that it would not improve the Bill from any point of view.
LORD SILKIN: If that is the only point troubling the noble Lord, I think I can answer him. He is entitled to use the accommodation because he has booked it. He becomes a guest only when he actually arrives. Therefore, a position may arise when a person is entitled to use a room but he is not a guest. In that case, as the Bill stands, if his luggage

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were stolen in the circumstances described by my noble and learned friend, he would have no redress.
EARL JOWITT: Everyone knows cases of people staying at an hotel who go away for a day or two and leave all their luggage in the hotel. We have all done it. Here is a man entitled to use accommodation which is paid for. He has not packed his things or emptied his drawers, but has gone up to London for a day or two. He is entitled to use the accommodation though on that particular night he is not a guest. What is the position there?
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I should be inclined to think that in that case he was a guest. I want to put this point to the noble Lord, Lord Silkin. We are trying to follow the recommendations of the Law Reform Committee. The noble Lord wanes us to go considerably beyond those and enlarge strict liability to the case where a man has not become a guest, in the sense in which we are treating it—he has not arrived at the hotel. That is a new and difficult point. The noble Lord will appreciate that there is a difference between trying to give effect to a Law Reform Committee Bill and trying to legislate in the ordinary way. I suggest that we should have a look at this point, without prejudice. I cannot undertake anything for my noble friend Lord Merthyr, but I make this suggestion to the Committee, as one of its members. I do not suppose that the noble Lord, Lord Merthyr, or any of us, can commit himself, but I think it is a point worth looking at. I hope that your Lordships will think that that is reasonable and not press for a decision to-day, if my noble friend is agreeable.
LORD MERTHYR: I certainly would agree. Obviously, this is a point of substance. I think we have narrowed the issue by this debate, but I am afraid that at the moment I am not prepared to give way or this point. If the noble Lord would withdraw his Amendment, I can undertake to have any amount of discussion before the next stage and to listen carefully to the points put forward.
LORD SILKIN: I think that the position has been made so clear now that there is nothing I can add, even i! I had the pleasure of spending a great deal of
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time with the noble Lord. It is all on record. In view of the undertaking, I gladly withdraw my Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
5.9 p.m.
LORD FARINGDON LORD FARINGDON moved to add to subsection (1):
"(c) the traveller who, when partaking of a meal or refreshment, shall have deposited his property in a cloak room or other place provided for the purpose in the charge of an attendant to whom payment whether by way of gratuity or otherwise is customarily to be made."
The noble Lord said: I confess that I am amazed at my own temerity in intervening in such a technical Bill. I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Merthyr, will be able either to accept my Amendment or set my anxieties at rest. It seems to me that a guest in an hotel who might. have stopped only for a meal and therefore will not be entitled to any recompense for loss of or damage to his property since he is not spending a night, may none the less leave his property in a cloakroom for which either a charge is made or to the attendant of which a tip is expected to he given on departure. It seems to me that if an hotel proprietor supplies a service of that sort, with art attendant, and makes a charge, either directly or indirectly, he must assume a liability for clothes, goods, sticks, umbrellas et cetera, that might happen to be left in charge of the attendant. This seems to me merely fair, not to put it more strongly, and I hope that the noble Lord will be prepared to accept the Amendment. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 2, line 12, at end insert the said parsgraph.—(Lord Faringdon.)
LORD MERTHYR: In the first place, I must join issue with the noble Lord on a point of English grammar.
LORD FARINGDON: I am not surprised.
LORD MERTHYR: The noble Lord succeeded in his earlier efforts on behalf of the language. I have read this Amendment several times and I cannot see the purpose of the word "who" in the first line. If one reads the Amendment with the Bill, the words that go before it are "except where", and the word "who" seems to be wandering in the air. Still, I pass from that—it may be only a slip—

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to the merits of this Amendment. The Amendment is fundamental and goes against the whole purpose of the Bill. Its object, as I understand it, is to retain strict liability in respect of the property of a traveller who goes into an hotel only for a meal or for a drink. One of the main purposes of the Bill is to deal with that situation, if that traveller deposits his property in a cloakroom, whether it be in the charge of an attendant or not. If this Amendment were passed, we should preserve the present, and I think wrong, distinction between the hotel proprietor and the proprietor of a restaurant which is not an hotel. That distinction, as I think, has nothing to commend it. It has been criticised by the Law Reform Committee set up to inquire into this matter—and if your Lordships desire to know the reference, it is paragraph 12 of the Report. I want this Bill to go back to the old Common Law conception of a traveller, and to limit the strict liability to travellers, as the Bill says, who stay the night and engage sleeping accommodation. That is one of the main purposes of the Bill and the Amendment of the noble Lord goes right against it. Therefore, I am afraid I cannot accept the Amendment.
LORD FARINGDON: I wonder whether the noble Lord could answer this question. He has said that he desires to relieve hotel keepers of a liability which is not imposed on restaurant keepers. Clearly, therefore, the hotel keeper in future will, as it were, be in a dual position: his liability will be covered by this Bill, so far as the property of any guest who is sleeping in his establishment is concerned; on the other hand, he will also become a restaurateur. He will have a dining room in which persons who are not resident in the hotel may come and eat a meal, and they may, and will, as I have suggested in my Amendment, leave their clothes in a cloakroom for which they will make payment. What is the position of a restaurant proprietor, in those circumstances? What, therefore, will be the position of the hotel keeper?
LORD MERTHYR: As I understand it, the restaurant proprietor is liable only if he is proved to be negligent, and not otherwise; and the hotel proprietor, after the passing of this Bill, will be liable in the same way only if he is proved to be
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negligent. There will be no strict liability attached to him, as there is not now to the restaurant keeper.
LORD FARINGDON: I thank the noble Lord for his reply and, with your Lordships' permission, I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
LORD FARINGDON: I beg to move this Amendment, which is consequential.
Amendment moved—
Page 2, line 14, leave out ("a") and insert ("an").—(Lord Faringdon.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
LORD SILKIN LORD SILKIN moved to add to subsection (2):
"Provided that where the vehicle or its contents or horse or other live animal or its harness or other equipment was stolen, lost or damaged through the default, neglect or wilful act of the proprietor or his servant the proprietor shall be liable therefor notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary."
The noble Lord said: This is an Amendment which I think goes to the root of the case. As the Bill stands, the innkeeper is relieved of liability in respect of the horse, the vehicle and so on. The purpose of this Amendment is to make him liable if the loss has been caused
"through the default, neglect or wilful act of the proprietor or his servant … notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary."
It is customary in many hotels for the proprietor either to exhibit a notice or in some other way to seek to relieve himself of liability by way of contract. He says in the notice (it is generally in the form of a notice) that he is not to be held liable for the loss of the particular commodities dealt with in this clause. I believe that at the present time, so long as some steps are taken to draw the attention of the guest to this provision, it is held to be a contract, and the innkeeper is exonerated from liability. The purpose of my Amendment is that, whatever contract may have been entered into which would relieve the hotel keeper of responsibility for a horse or harness or other equipment or vehicle (and in this context it is perhaps more profitable to talk about vehicles, rather than horses) that contract should not be enforceable if the loss has been caused through the "default, neglect or wilful act of the proprietor or his servant". In other words, he is not in a position to contract out as the result of his own wrong. I

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think that is a principle which will commend itself to the noble and learned Viscount, the Lord Chancellor, and I hope that this Amendment will be acceptable. The innkeeper is being relieved of a good deal of liability, but he ought not to be relieved of a liability which comes through his own default. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 2, line 17, at end insert the said proviso. —(Lord Silkin.)
LORD MERTHYR: The noble Lord has said, rightly, that so far I have been unable to accept any of his Amendments. Therefore, I was the more disappointed that the noble Lord did not move Amendment No. 7a on the Marshalled List of Amendments, because had he done so, it was my intention to accept it. Here we come to an Amendment of considerable importance which raises a short but rather critical point in our deliberations. The question is, as the noble Lord has said: should the hotel proprietor be able to contract out of his liability for negligence? Whilst admitting that it is an arguable point. I have conic to the conclusion, after a good deal of thought, that on balance we ought to say that he should be able to contract out. In support of that view, I would put forward this consideration. Why should the hotel proprietor, in respect of the article; which we are considering—that is, motor cars et cetera—be put in a different position from the garage proprietor? We know that under the present law—and the position will not be affected by this Bill—the garage proprietor can get rid of his legal responsibility for negligence merely by putting up a simple notice to that effect in a proper place on his premises. If that be correct and desirable, why should the hotel proprietor by placed in a different position? I am hound to say that I do not follow the argument that he should, and that is why I am resisting this Amendment. That is the point. It is Just a question of opinion as to whether there should be this distinction or not, and I think there should not.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I also have given great consideration to this point. As the noble Lord may remember, when we were having a discussion before the abortive Committee stage I said it was one of the thoughts which ought to be ventilated and which required serious consideration. The reason that
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has influenced me is that stated by my noble friend Lord Merthyr. One is dealing with motor cars, and if one looks at the actualities in some cases, of course, the garage is part of the hotel in the truest sense—it is the same building. Then you get the intermediate case, where you have to drive about a quarter of a mile round to the back of the hotel, and you get the third case where the hotel garage is in a different building, sometimes two or three streets away, and outside the hospitium altogether. Any garage proprietor can put up a notice, and if the notice is put up in such a way that it is reasonably brought to the attention of the people taking in their cars, he can contract out of negligence. I believe that what worries us are the historic words the noble Lord has used: the "default, neglect or wilful act". "Default or wilful act" seems a strong thing to contract out of. The noble Lord's Amendment goes on, with perfect propriety:
"of the proprietor or his servant.…"
What one has to consider is: is it right for him to contract out of the negligence of his servant? I find myself in that difficulty. I do not see why he should be in a different position from the garage proprietor who can contract out.
I always find difficulty, as I am sure the noble Lord does, in deciding how far one should take into account insurance on these matters, but I think it is relevant to this extent. Can one say that it would put up the premiums of car insurance against theft if the Bill stands as it does already and there were not the proviso which the noble Lord suggests? I do not think it could reasonably be said that that would he likely to put up the premiums on policies in that way—I do not speak with any certainty on that, but I am giving your Lordships my views. The true point is: should there be a difference between the garage of an hotel and the garage of a garage proprietor? When one has made up one's mind on that, one is certainly entitled to take in as a makeweight the fact that the Law Reform Committee did not suggest such a distinction. I am trying to follow the noble Lord and consider these points on their merits, and not simply follow what the Committee have said. Therefore, after the consideration I have tried to give it since the noble Lord put this Amendment: down, I should advise your Lordships to maintain the Bill as it stands.
LORD SILKIN: There are two points which the noble and learned Viscount has raised, and I hope he will not mind if I touch on them. First, there is the question of insurance. I agree that, primarily, it has nothing to do with the case at all. I am no more an authority on the practice of insurance than the noble and learned Viscount is, but I believe that the obligation to insure is merely against third party risks. This is an additional risk which some people may not have thought it worth while to insure against. A person goes to a hotel, and he is not insured against the loss of his car. It may be a serious matter for him and, therefore, I think it is a factor to be taken into account. On the other hand, the probabilities are that the hotel proprietor will be insured against all kinds of things of that nature. Therefore, on the insurance point, if one were trying to hold a balance I think one would say that one ought to hold a balance in favour of the guest.
The noble and learned Viscount did not feel able to draw a distinction between the private garage and the hotel garage. That is a strong point, but I would ask him to consider this fact—and this is where I think the distinction arises. I would concede at once that if the garage is away from the hotel possibly a different position may arise, and there I should be prepared to consider some other treatment if it were thought desirable. But where the garage forms part of the hotel, let us look at the position of the guest. He books a room in the hotel, possibly some days earlier by telephone. He would not normally say, "Have you any conditions about leaving cars with you by which you seek to contract out of your normal liability for default?" Of course not. He would just arrive at the hotel, and by the time he arrives he is committed to that hotel and finds himself bound by a contract, which he has not deliberately entered into, by the fact that he has engaged a room in the hotel, and by the fact that the notice is exhibited in a conspicuous place. Of course, he can say, "I do not like these conditions about the car, and I will go somewhere else." But that is not being realistic.
In those circumstances, I think there is a distinction between that sort of case and where the garage is chosen according to the conditions it imposes. If I
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do not like garage A because it makes conditions which I think are unreasonable, I go to garage B—and fortunately at present one can still do so, within limits. But with an hotel the situation is different: one has already tied oneself to the hotel, and it is a little difficult and unrealistic to leave the hotel because one does not like the particular conditions about garaging the car. That is a distinction that can be drawn if one wants to make a distinction. The noble and learned Viscount and the noble Lord have been good enough to consider this point already, but I would suggest, in the light of this discussion—I am sorry that they have so many matters to consider between now and Report stage—that this is eminently a matter that might be considered further, especially as the noble Lord, Lord Merthyr, mentioned balance. I hope that I have been able a little to disturb his balance. On that understanding, I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
LORD FARINGDON LORD FARINGDON had given notice of an Amendment to add to subsection (2):
"except where the vehicle has been left in a garage or parking place provided for the purpose, and for whose use a charge is made by the hotel proprietor, always provided that even where no charge is made where negligence can be shown the hotel proprietor shall be liable."
The noble Lord said: This Amendment deals with almost the same point—at any rate, it is so closely related that I shall not press it. I hope that, as the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, has suggested, the noble Lord, Lord Merthyr, will consider this matter before Report stage. I would point out that if one intends staying at an hotel and looks through an A.A. Handbook to see the hotels in the place to which one is going, one very likely chooses an hotel simply because the book says that it has a garage. Therefore, I support the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, when he says that he thinks that the hotel garage is not quite on all fours with another garage, With your Lordships' consent, I will not move this Amendment. However, I beg to move the next Amendment in my name.
Amendment moved—
Page 2, line 18, leave out ("a") and insert ("an").—(Lord Faringdon.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
5.32 p.m.
LORD SILKIN LORD SILKIN moved, in subsection (3), to substitute "five" for "one" [hundred pounds]. The noble Lord said: I beg to move this Amendment, which deals with the extent of the liability of an innkeeper who has sought to limit his liability by the methods set out in the Bill, with the exceptions that are listed in subsection (3) of Clause 2. The Present liability is limited, I think, to £30 and £50 respectively, but it is conceded that these figures are quite unrealistic and that an hotel proprietor ought to be liable for the luggage of a guest for what is to-day to be regarded as a realistic amount. The figures in the Bill are £50 in respect of any one article or £100 in the aggregate. I suggest that at to-day's values those figures are quite unrealistic.
On the Second Reading, I cited a case of a person who goes to an hotel for a night, and the noble Lord, Lord Merthyr, implied that I must be much better off than he is—which I completely dispute—because I claimed that my luggage might be worth more than £100 while his was not. Of course, we are not dealing only with cases of people who go to hotels for a night. People go to hotels for a longer period, and they are guests. Even the noble Lord, Lord Merthyr, will agree that, if you go to an hotel for a week, the chances are that the value of your luggage is considerably more than £100. I do not think I need enlarge on that aspect; but, if you take, for instance, your ordinary clothing, plus evening wear and what goes with it, you arrive almost at £100 already. So, on the assumption that a person's luggage has been lost at an hotel, this figure of £100 will definitely not cover it.
The figure I have in mind is £500 in respect of the aggregate amount. I am quite prepared to leave the limit of £50 in respect of any one article, because the person who has any one thing more valuable than that has the option of leaving it in the charge of the hotel proprietor, thereby giving him notice. In those circumstances, £50 is not unreasonable hut, if the intention is to compensate a person for the loss of his luggage, then £100 is utterly unreasonable. If £500 is a little high, I am prepared to "do a deal" with the noble Lord, if he is prepared to "do a deal" with me, and, as a compromise, reduce my figure. It is surprising how quickly the total value mounts up if you
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try to evaluate the luggage that you might take along with you to an hotel for a week. I had the misfortune some years ago to have my luggage stolen from my car. I had to make a list of what was missing and put some value to it—it did not make any difference; I never got it back. But I did make that valuation and I was astonished how much it came to in the end. If one has any kind of luggage at all, £500 is not an excessive figure, but if the noble Lord thinks £500 is excessive, although it can be the subject of insurance I should be prepared to agree to a lesser figure. I do not think this Amendment needs any further advocacy.
Amendment moved—
Page 2, line 21, leave oat The second ("one") and insert ("five").—(Lord Silkin)
LORD FARINGDON: I should like to support the plea made by the noble Lord, Lord Silkin. I put down a rather similar, though more modest. Amendment before I saw the noble Lord's Amendment upon the Paper. I base my calculations on a little sum which I have done as to the value of my own luggage when travelling, and I travel fairly light. In fact, Lord Silkin's figure is considerably more realistic, because I did my calculation for myself hut, when discussing this matter with a female friend of mine, I was assured that her luggage would inevitably amount to considerably more than that—and that, of course, did not include any very valuable articles, such as jewellery, for which I think it would be quite unfair to hold an hotel keeper responsible. The suggested sum of £100 in the Bill is totally inadequate. If the sum is to cover feminine luggage, as well as masculine luggage, Lord Silkin's figure is probably nearer to reality than my own. I wish to support his Amendment.
Lotto MERTHYR: May I say, first of all, that the reason why this figure of £100 appears in the Bill, for good or for ill, is that it is the figure recommended by the Law Reform Committee. They published their Report—and these days, in connection with money, dates matter—in 1954. They recommended that the original sum of £30 in the Act of 1863 should be increased, that the amount for any one article should be £50 (I understand that the noble Lord does not quarrel with that), and that the aggregate limit should be £100. Whether or not

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your Lordships agree with me, I am sure you will see why this figure is in the Bill: it is because that Committee recommended it. I support it because, as I have said before this afternoon, I am trying to strike the right balance between two conflicting interests—that of the hotel proprietor, on the one hand, and that of the public, on the other.
I concede that this is a question of degree and that opinions may differ within fairly wide limits as to what is the ideal figure, whether it should be £100 or more than £100. I am prepared to listen carefully to what is said on this matter and to take the advice of the Committee. So far, I am bound to say that I am in favour of the Bill as it stands, rather than either of these Amendments. Needless to say, I should prefer the Amendment of Lord Faringdon to that of Lord Silkin, though I am still unconvinced that even £200 is the right figure. One has always to remember, as I pointed out last time, that any article of special value can be deposited. The noble Lord, Lord Silkin, said—and I understand why—that some articles, even if they are of special value, are so bulky that they cannot reasonably be deposited; or, perhaps, that they are wanted every day or every evening, and therefore, for that reason, cannot be deposited. I see some force in that argument.
On the other hand, if one looks at it from the point of view of the hotel proprietor who has to bear this responsibility, I think it is reasonable to say that any guest in the hotel who has articles of any sort of special value should deposit them. The noble Lord did not give an example of some bulky article which is normally kept in an hotel bedroom and which could not reasonably be deposited. I suppose there may be something, but I do not know what it is. As to the point of its being needed every day—well, I have heard of people depositing things from day to day. There is not much room for argument on this
matter. It is simply a question of a figure. I am still not persuaded that the figure in the Bill is wrong, and I leave it with your Lordships.
LORD SILKIN: If the noble Lord wants an example of bulky articles which are of value, let me give him one: evening wear—I mean ladies' and gentlemen's evening wear. I do not think it would be proper to ask the noble Lord what he pays for his evening wear. The same applies to ordinary clothing: the cost can very soon mount up to £100. Without going about with an amount of expensive luggage, one can carry clothing of the value of up to £100—I do not think there is any doubt about that. There is nothing else that I can add. I think that £100 is quite unrealistic and unfair. The hotel is in a special position; it has charge of other people's property, and I think it should give a reasonable indemnity having regard to the current price of those goods.
On Question, Amendment negatived.
LORD FARINGDON: I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 2, line 21, leave out the second ("one") and insert ("two").—(Lord Faringdon.)
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: This debate has been rather limited to those who have been following it rather closely, and a point which I do not think has been made and which I intervene to make is that the present figure is £30 while the figure in the Bill is £100—that is, three and one third times the present figure. I ask your Lordships to consider whether that is not a fair comparison with the pre-war value of articles, clothes or anything else. I am not going through a list. I see a very potent figure taking a different view, but I want to make it clear that the Bill as it stands puts up the figure three and one third times.
On Question, Whether the said Amendment shall be agreed to?
Their Lordships divided:—
Contents, 15; Not-Contents, 18.

CONTENTS

Jowitt, E.

Amulree, L.

Pethick-Lawrence, L

Burden, L.[Teller.]

Rea, L

Alexander of Hillsborough, V.

Chorley, L.

Silkin, L.

Stansgate, V.

Faringdon, L.

Sinha, L.

Kenswood, L.

Strang, L.

Southwark, L Bp.

Lawson, L.[Teller.]

NOT-CONTENTS

Kilmuir, V.(L. Chancellor.)

Gosdhen, V.

Ebbisham, L.

Fairfax of Cameron, L

Albemarle, E.

Aberdare, L.

Hawke, L.

Fortescue, E.

Birdwood, L.

Joicey, L.

Morley, E.

Blackford, L.

Merthyr, L. [Teller.]

Selkirk, E.

Conesford, L.

Middleton, L.

Derwent, L. [Teller.]

O'Hagan, L.

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

LORD AMULREE: In the absence of my noble friend Lord Gifford, I beg to move the Amendment standing in his name. The point of this Amendment is a comparatively simple one and I trust that, as it comes from a quarter which Las not moved an Amendment before, the noble Lord may take a rather more kindly view of it than he has taken of those which have hitherto been moved. We feel that the Bill as it stands at present goes a good deal further than the previous law, and one is not quite sure whether it is fair to saddle an innkeeper or proprietor with responsibility for loss if something valuable is put into the care of somebody appearing to be authorised. Obviously it is perfectly satisfactory if the person is the proprietor himself or a person specifically authorised by him to take charge of goods; but a person visiting an hotel might think a chambermaid, a waiter or even a "boots" appeared to be authorised, and put in his charge some-thing valuable; and that person might put it in a wrong place so that it got lost. That is not a satisfactory state of affairs. I beg to move.
Amendment!moved—
Page 2, line 28, leave out ("or appearing to be authorised,").—(Lord Amulree.)
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I will put to your Lordships the legal position as I understand it, and perhaps the noble and learned Earl will correct me if I am wrong. There are three categories at Which one has to look: first, the servant who is not authorised at all; then the servant who is apparently authorised—that is, by the objective test that any reasonable person would think that that servant was authorised; and thirdly, the servant who is actually authorised. Although the Act says that the property must be entrusted to the innkeeper, the law at the present also says that the Act will apply if it is entrusted to the innkeeper or someone who has ostensive authority—that is, someone who any
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reasonable person would think was authorised. There is a decision which excluded a case where property '.vas handed to the "boots", the point the noble Lord, Lord Amulree, had in mind. That is the position to-day: the test is ostensive authority. We desire to keep ostensive authority because we feel that it is fair to the traveller or guest as well as to the innkeeper, and the words "appearing to be authorised" reproduce the test of an ostensive authority. They would not be construed as "appearing to the guest to be authorised" but as "appearing to a reasonable man to be authorised". I hope that after that explanation, if noble Lords do not disagree with me, Lord Amulree may find his doubts set at rest and not desire to press this Amendment.
EARL JOWITT: Perhaps I ought to declare an interest, because I am President of the Travel Association, and one section of the Travel Association is concerned with hotel keepers in this country. Hotel keepers have seen me, in my capacity as President of the 'Travel Association, about this clause, and I, in my turn, have seen the noble and learned Viscount, the Lord Chancellor. He has said to me what he has been good enough to say here today, and I think we are all perfectly happy to this extent: that it is obvious that if the servant is, in fact, authorised, or he has ostensible authority, in either of those cases the hotel keeper should be liable. What worried the hotel keepers—and the Lord Chancellor's words will no doubt to a large extent satisfy them—was this phrase: "or appearing to be authorised."
So long as this is quite objective—that is "appearing to a reasonable man" then it is quite all right. But if, by any chance, it could be construed as "appearing to the man handing in the property," it would be all wrong. In England, for example, no one would assume that the "boots" had authority. For all I know, in Texas (I do not know anything about Texas) the "boots" may normally be the man who does have authority. And

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if a Texan came to visit this country and handed his valuables to the "boots," what then? To the Texan it would appear, no doubt, that the "boots" did have authority, that being always the case in Texas. To an Englishman, it would be clear that the man had not authority, because that would not be reasonable from the point of view of our experience and practice. Therefore the test is, to whom is it to appear? The Lord Chancellor has said categorically—and I have no reason at all to doubt what he has said—that it is certain that the word "appearing" would be construed in the objective sense. If so, those who who have spoken to me would, I think, have no misgivings about the matter. Their misgivings, if I understood them aright, arose from the fact that they feared that the word "appearing" might let in the subjective case. So long as the Lord Chancellor is satisfied, and continues to be satisfied, that there is no reason to fear that that will take place, then I understand their objections disappear.
LORD MERTHYR: May I add one or two words to the extremely clear statement which has been made by the noble and learned Viscount, to whom I am very much obliged, because this Amendment worried me a little. I feel sure that it ought not to be passed. If the Amendment were passed, as I see it, it would be essential for the guest at an hotel or the traveller, whatever we may call him, to make positively certain that the person with whom he made a deposit was, in fact, authorised. That would be a considerable burden on the traveller. If this Amendment is not passed he will not have that burden. We then come back to what the Lord Chancellor described as a person whom a reasonable man would suppose is authorised. I feel entirely persuaded by the words which the Lord Chancellor has spoken that this Amendment ought not to be accepted.
LORD AMULREE: In view of what the noble and learned Viscount has said, I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
6.4 p.m.
LORD AMULREE LORD AMULREE moved in subsection (3) (c), after "question" to insert "at a reasonable time". The noble
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Lord said: In the absence of my noble friend, Lord Gifford, I beg to move the second Amendment which stands in his name. Again, I think it is an Amendment which is put down for the sake of getting some kind of explanation from the promoters of the Bill rather than with a view to its being pressed. It would seem a trifle unfair that if someone who had arrived at a little country inn or hotel, suddenly realised in the middle of the night that he had his valuables—jewellery, or whatever it might be—in his room, and thought they ought to be deposited, he should be able to summon the proprietor, whatever the time, in order to get the things put safely away. It would be quite a different matter at a big London hotel, such as the Savoy, the Ritz or the Westbury. At such establishments there is a staff on duty all the time. So one wonders whether it would be possible to put in some kind of a time factor to ensure that in the little country hotel, where they do not have people on duty all night, the proprietor should have some protection in this connection. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 2, line 36, after ("question") insert ("at a reasonable time").—(Lord Amulree.)
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I think I can reassure Lord Amulree again. If he will be kind enough to look at the Bill he will see that this passage deals with the position. Beginning at line 35, we have these words:
"or the guest or some other guest acting on his behalf wished so to offer the property in question but, through the default of the proprietor or a servant of his, was unable to do so."
The key word is "default". That ties in exactly with the noble Lord's Amendment, because it would not be default if the person concerned was not there to take the offer at an unreasonable time. His duty would be to be there to take the offer at a reasonable time. If the time were unreasonable there would be no default. So, in my view, "default" covers what the noble Lord is seeking to ensure.
LORD AMULREE: I should like to thank the noble and learned Viscount, the Lord Chancellor, for his explanation. I am quite satisfied with what he said, and I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
LORD SILKIN LORD SILKIN had an Amendment on the Marshalled List to insert the following paragraph in subsection (3):
"or
(d) the property stolen, lost or damaged consisted of arty vehicle or any horse or other live animal or its harness or other equipment which the proprietor of the hotel had accepted for custody."
The noble Lord said: In view of the fact that the noble Lord has undertaken to give consideration to a number of points which might affect this particular question, I do not desire to move the Amendment. But I should like the noble Lord to be on notice that I may move it again at a later stage if the results of the consideration are not satisfactory.
6.8 p.m.
LORD DERWENT LORD DERWENT moved, in subsection (3), after paragraph (c) to insert:
"Provided that no property shall be regarded as deposited expressly for sate custody under the provisions of paragraph (b) of this subsection, unless a receipt indicating that it was so deposited is given to the guest or to the person acting on his behalf at the time of the deposit by the proprietor or servant as aforesaid:"
The noble Lord said: At the eleventh hour, I have been asked to move this Amendment for my noble friend, Lord Clifford. The point here seems to be that my noble friend considers it only fair to proprietors and guests that the deposit for safe custody should be properly receipted. There have been cases in the past. I am told, where a deposit has not been specific enough to give the guest the protection which he thought he was getting. My noble friend is of opinion that if a receipt had to be given to a guest when things were deposited for safe custody, it would protect both the hotel proprietor and the guest. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 2, line 28, at end insert the said proviso.—(Lord Derwent.)
LORD MERTHYR: I shall ask the Committee to reject this Amendment also. The purpose of it, as I understand, is to make sure that no property is to be regarded as deposited for safe custody unless a receipt has been given for it. In my opinion that is undesirable. Whether property has been deposited or not ought to be—as I think it is now—a question of fact, and should not depend on whether a receipt has been written out or whether a receipt has
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been kept by the depositor. That question of whether there was a deposit is a question which may have to be proved in court. It may depend on evidence, and surely it should not depend on whether a receipt is given or whether a receipt is lost. Still less should it be possible for a hotel proprietor to escape liability by somehow refusing or neglecting to give a receipt. For those reasons it seems to me to be in every way undesirable to pass this Amendment. I think that the present law is a good protection for both sides. As I understand it, it is a question of proof. Is it a fact that there was a deposit? If so, there is liability; if not, there is no liability.
LORD DERWENT: I understand that my noble friend does not want to press this Amendment to a Division. I do not know how satisfied he will be with the statement he has had from my noble friend Lord Merthyr, but in the circumstances I ask leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
LORD MERTHYR: The next Amendment goes with No. 19, which is the more important, and perhaps I may speak on both together. As noble Lords know, one sees notices in hotels quoting the legal phraseology of the Act of 1863. It occurs to me and many others that it might be more desirable if, in future, while retaining the public notice limiting liability, the notice itself should not be a mere copy of the Section of the Act of Parliament but should set out the position in plain and simple everyday language. That is the purpose of this Amendment, with which I hope your Lordships will agree. It seems to me that it will fulfil the purpose of giving notice to the guest or traveller that the liability of the innkeeper is limited and at the same time enable the traveller to understand it. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 2, line 41, leave out ("this section"} and insert ("the notice set out in the Schedule to this Act.").—(Lord Merthyr.)
6.14 p.m.
LORD SILKIN LORD SILKIN moved, in the proviso to subsection (3) after "guests" to insert "in the bedroom allocated to the said guests and". The noble Lord said: I made no comment on the last Amendment

1107
because I agreed with it. I profoundly agree that the notice that is to be exhibited should be in plain language. I am sure that the noble Lord, Lord Merthyr, will agree also that it should be exhibited where it is certain that the guest bound by the notice will see it. As the clause stands, notice has to be exhibited
"in plain type … in a place where it could conveniently be read … at or near the reception office or desk or, where there is no reception office or desk, at or near the main entrance to the hotel."
That language seems to me to be quite vague, especially where there is no desk or recognised office. What we mean by "at or near the main entrance" is a matter of choice to the hotel proprietor. If we want to make as reasonably certain as we can that guests do see a notice, one way of doing it would be to have the notice exhibited in the bedrooms. Most people read notices in bedrooms. I should think that an hotel proprietor would have done everything he could if he had a notice exhibited in the bedroom, and that is the plain purpose of my Amendment. I think it is wrong to limit liability by the exhibition of notice unless the notice is so situated that a guest is reasonably bound to see it. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 2, line 43, after ("guests") insert ("in the bedroom allocated to the said guests and").—(Lord Silkin.)
LORD DERWENT: May I suggest that if we agree to this Amendment, your Lordships are treading dangerous ground. Under the Bill this notice has to be "conspicuously displayed" either at the desk or, if there is no desk, at the main entrance. It must not be hidden behind the door; it must be conspicuous. The Amendment suggests that we should interfere with the running of hotels by having these notices pasted up in some form or other in every bedroom. May I ask noble Lords to visualise the bedrooms in one of the more expensive hotels—say the Dorchester—with large notices displayed on the walls, clashing with the wonderful wall paper decorating the rooms. If this notice has to be shown in the bedroom, why not other notices which proprietors have to display, such as those dealing with the licensing laws? In a short space of time, hotel bedrooms would be papered with licensing and other legal notices. I hope your Lordships will not agree to
1108
this Amendment, because I think it is unnecessary and interferes with the rights of hotel proprietors. I suggest that their duty to display this notice conspicuously in one or other of the places mentioned in the Bill is quite sufficient.
THE EARL OF MORLEY: May I say that the Dorchester display all their notices under the glass tops of the dressing tables.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I think everyone has great sympathy with the intention of the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, in this Amendment. I share his reluctance about people entering into contracts involuntarily, and that is what often happens in cases of contract by notice. People ought to read things, but they do not. What the noble Lord desires is that they should have every opportunity of reading the notice and that it should be very difficult for them not to read it. On the other hand, I have been impressed by the argument of my noble friend Lord Derwent, and it has been represented to me that from the aesthetic angle, especially in the more expensive hotels, the proprietors desire strongly that the rooms should be homes from home and that their aesthetic treatment should not be marred by statutory notices. I feel that it would be rather strong action for your Lordships' House to interfere with proprietors in the way they run their hotels.
The noble Lord, Lord Silkin, has seen the words which have been emphasised— "conspicuously displayed". It is clear from these words that the notice cannot be hidden away near the entrance but will be visible so that even a sleepy guest can read it as he books his room. Therefore I should suggest to the noble Lord that this is not like our other Amendments, where we have been discussing important differences of emphasis; this is a matter where representations have been made on a serious ground. I do not think that anyone to-day would say that the fact that I mentioned expensive hotels meant any wrongful discrimination. What I had in mind was hotels to which visitors from abroad come. As your Lordships are well aware, the tourist industry is one of our greatest exports and dollar earners, and it is something that we ought to bear in mind. Therefore I suggest that the noble Lord should not press his Amendment, but that we should allow

1109
this course to be carried out; and if we do find that it is not working in practice, then we can have a look at it again and perhaps provide for it in a short Bill. The noble Lord has been a Minister himself and he knows the difficulty of getting these short non-controversial Bills through. However, on balance I do not think that we should protrude a view—and I may say that in this matter I have considerable personal sympathy with the noble Lord, Lord Silkin—against the wishes of the industry when the industry is so important to us.
EARL JOWITT: I feel that I ought not to sit quietly and say nothing about this matter. I confess that this is one of the few occasions—in fact, it is the only one of which I can think—when I do not see eye to eye with my noble friend Lord Silkin; and that makes me distrust my own judgment the more. However, it is the fact that some of the hoteliers in tins country are concerned about this matter. People like ourselves do not visit the sort of suites that are occupied by millionaires at the most expensive hotels, where I have no doubt great care is taken with the internal decorations—the walls are probably adorned with pictures of Cries of London, or something of that sort—and it is felt that the illusion of the "home from home", which is the impression they want to create in the mind of the welcome wealthy guests, would be rather shattered by seeing some notice in the bedroom referring to the Hotel Proprietors (Liabilities and Rights) Act, 1956. Whether that feeling has any real substance, I cannot say; but I can say that there are hoteliers who know their business who feel that there is substance in it. So far as the real object underlying this Amendment is concerned, it is, I take it, to see that the advertisement of this Act shall not be just put in a hole-and-corner place where it may or may not be seen, but that it should be effectively brought to the notice of the guests. So far as that desire is concerned, I need hardly say that I am entirely with my noble friend Lord Silkin. I felt that I should say these few words, becaues it is the fact that there is in the hotel industry some apprehension about this matter, although it is not at ail pleasant for me to differ from my noble friend Lord Silkin.
LORD SILKIN: I am sorry to have caused my noble and learned friend any unpleasantness—but I do not think he is entirely right in this matter. First of all, if we are dealing with tourists—and the Lord Chancellor specifically talked about tourists as people who are likely to take the expensive accommodation—ought we not, particularly in that case, to take the greatest care that they are made aware of any conditions which limit the liability of the hotel proprietor? Secondly, the noble Lord, Lord Derwent, must not think I am as Philistine as he made out, and that the only way in which this notice could be brought to the attention of a guest would be by fixing it to a wall. I should have thought there were other places in a bedroom where it could be put without spoiling the harmony of the design. After all, there are notices even in the "home from home" bedrooms which tell the guest what time he can gel: his breakfast, his lunch and so on. I have not stayed in these luxurious hotels about which my noble and learned friend has spoken, but I imagine that they desire to give their guests information, and this would be part of that information.
However, what I am particularly concerned about is that the attention of the guests should he brought to this limitation. I do not think is good enough to put it up near the entrance to the hotel, or near the desk. I would ask noble Lords to bear in mind the psychology with which guests arrive at a hotel, especially when they are corning from abroad. Their first thought is whether the booking is all right; the second is whether their luggage is in order; and, of course, they want to get to their rooms as quickly as possible. They do not go wandering round the desk: looking for notices to see whether there is any limitation of liability imposed upon them, and it is unlikely that they will see the notice, however conspicuous it may be.
Is there any alternative way of dealing with it? I thought that to put a notice of this kind in a bedroom would be the most innocuous way of directing the attention of guests to the limitation. In the vast majority of hotels the considerations to which the Lord Chancellor and my noble and learned friend have referred would not arise. Possibly we could give hotels an option of either putting the notice up in the bedroom or of handing out a notice. I admit that the Amend-

1111
ment does not cover handing out a notice, but there will be other stages of the Bill when we can put down Amendments. Is it not a possibility that the hotel should have the option either of putting up a notice in the bedroom or of handing a notice to the guests? It is customary (again I speak with diffidence about the kind of hotel to which the Lord Chancellor has referred) to hand to guests a small card which tells them the number of their room, and sometimes even how much they have to pay for it—although I know sometimes that is kept as a pleasant surprise until the end. At any rate, guests do get this card, and there are all kinds of things on it about which they want to know. Would that not be a possibility? If the noble Lord in charge of the Bill would be prepared to consider that as an alternative, I should be quite ready to withdraw this Amendment and later to put down another Amendment which would give the hotel proprietor the option of doing one thing or the other.
LORD MERTHYR: I started out with a good deal of sympathy for this Amendment, and I have listened with much interest to what has been said on both sides. I am, on the whole, impressed by the argument of the hotel keepers that they do not want every room to be plastered with notices. On the other hand, as the noble Earl, Lord Morley, has said, it would be possible to put them under a piece of glass on the dressing table. The point that I want to make—and it is a technical point—is this. I am advised that, in any event, the drafting of this Amendment is defective to secure what the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, wants, because, as the Amendment is drafted, the notice would have no validity unless it were displayed in every bedroom or in the bedroom of every guest in the hotel. There are obvious loopholes there—it is purely a drafting point. May I suggest to the noble Lord that he should now withdraw his Amendment, and I will readily agree to his suggestion that it should be considered further, particularly having in mind the suggestions which the noble Lord threw out before he sat down. I can make no promise to accept this Amendment, or a variation of it, but it has, I think, the sympathy of a good number of people. If the noble Lord will withdraw his Amendment, which is, as I say, defective technically, I shall certainly be prepared to discuss it further.
LORD SILKIN: I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 2, as amended, agreed to.
Clause 3 [Short title, repeal, extent and commencement]:
6.31 p.m.
LORD SILKIN: I beg to move the next Amendment standing in my name. The Committee will be relieved to know that it is the last of the Amendments I propose to move. I have not had much good fortune with any of my Amendments so far, and the best I have been able to secure is a promise to consider, without any obligations and without much hope. The object of this Amendment is to simplify the title. I do not understand why it is necessary to have the words "Liabilities and Rights" incorporated in the Title. They do not mean very much. They are not comprehensive—there are only some liabilities, and I do not know which are the rights. It is not even completely descriptive of the Bill. Surely, "Hotel Proprietors Bill" would meet the case. As a legal practitioner who sometimes has to refer to these measures, it would be an economy of words and, what might interest the noble Earl, Lord Selkirk, a financial economy. Every time you print this Title it would save three extra words and two brackets. That, I have no doubt, will appeal to the noble Earl. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 3, line 2, leave out ("(Liabilities and Rights)").—(Lord Silkin.)
LORD MERTHYR: I have great pleasure in accepting this Amendment, and, in so doing, may I say how much I appreciate the time and thought that the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, has given to this Bill?
LORD MERTHYR: This Amendment is consequential upon the Amendment to which your Lordships have agreed about the displaying of a notice in ordinary language, rather than in the language of the Parliamentary draftsman. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
After Clause 3, insert the following Schedule—

SCHEDULE NOTICE

  LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO GUESTS PROPERTY
  Under the Hotel Proprietors (Liabilities and Rights) Act, 1956, a hotel proprietor may in

  1113
  certain circumstances be liable to make good any loss of or damage to a guest's property even though it was not due to any fault of the proprietor or staff of the hotel.
  This liability however—

  (a) extends only to the property of guests who have engaged sleeping accommodation at the hotel;

  (b) unless the property has been deposited, or offered for deposit, for safe custody, is limited to f50 for any one article and a total of £100 in the case of any one guest;

  (c) does not cover motor-cars or other vehicles of any kind or horses or other live animals.

  The display of this notice does not constitute an admission either that the Act applies to this hotel or that liability thereunder attaches to the proprietor of this hotel in any particular case.") —(Lord Merthyr.)
  THE DEPUTY CHAIRMAN of COMMITTEES: The noble Viscount, Lord Furness, has down an Amendment to this Amendment. Perhaps some other noble Lord would move it for him.
  LORD DERWENT: I have been dealing with these Amendments, and I believe the noble Viscount, Lord Furness, would not want to move his Amendment to the Amendment because it is consequential on one that has already been dealt with.
  Title, as amended, agreed to.
  House resumed.

BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE
EARL FORTESCUE: My Lords, I have to inform your Lordships that the right reverend Prelate the Lord Bishop of Southwark has consented to postpone the Motions he has on the Order Paper and the noble Lord, Lord Teviot, has done the same.
MANCHESTER SHIP CANAL BILL
Committed: the Committee to be proposed by the Committee of Selection.